AUSTRALIAN NAVAL REVIEW 2016

Australian Naval Review 2016

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL REVIEW 2016 Issue 1

Contents Page Foreword by the President 3 2016 Vernon Parker Oration 5 by the Honourable Kim Beazley AC Maritime Operations in the Littoral - The Minister's Perspective 19 by Senator the Honourable Marise Payne, Minister for Defence Percival Edwin McNeil - Pioneering Naval Shipbuilder 27 by Commander Greg Swinden, RAN Australia’s naval shipbuilding plans: guided by strategy or industry? 39 by Dr Andrew Davies Raid on Goodenough Island: Australia’s First Amphibious Operation 53 in the Second World War by Associate Professor Peter Dean

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Australian Naval Review

Chair of ANR Committee: Commodore Lee Goddard Editor: Kiri Mathieson Formatting & typesetting: Peter Jones

Australian Naval Review Advisory Committee

Professor Tom Frame (Chair) Dr Stephan Freuhling Dr Tom Lewis OAM Commodore Richard Menhinick AM CSC RANR Dr John Reeve Dr David SteYHQs

To contact the Australian Naval Review: [email protected]

Printed by Instant Colour Press, Canberra Set in Georgia Regular 11 IS6N 2207-2128 (hard copy) Front Cover: A Chinook (CH-47F) conducting first of class flight trials in HMAS Adelaide off Tasmanian waters. (RAN). Rear Inside Cover: HMA Ships Ballarat and Yarra (RAN).

Copyright of the articles published in the Australian Naval Review resides with the authors.

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Foreword by the President

An enduring characteristic of the Australian Naval Institute during its 41 year existence has been a desire to regularly reshape the organization to ensure its relevance to its members and the broader Australian maritime community. It is only through such efforts that it can continue to be a forum for the discussion of naval and maritime matters. In recent years the Australian Naval Institute ceased production of its quarterly Headmark journal and focused considerable attention on its web page and associated social media. As a result our members, as well as over 1,000 subscribers, now regularly access the Institute's website to keep abreast of maritime developments in Australia and our region. The Australian Naval Institute recognised however the need for a high quality peer reviewed publication to discuss in a reflective and at times provocative manner naval and maritime topics. That is the origin of the Australian Naval Review. In the inaugural edition will be found a wide spectrum of articles with the Vernon Parker Oration taking pride of place. I trust you enjoy the inaugural edition of the Australian Naval Review.

Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO DSC RAN (Retired) President Australian Naval Institute 15 December 2016

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ANI Objectives

The ANI was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975 as a self-supporting and non-profit making organisation to provide a forum for naval officers and others interested in maritime affairs. The main objectives of the Institute are: • to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession. The ANI achieves these goals through: • The Vernon Parker Oration and dinner, • The Goldrick Seminar which each year focuses on a different aspect of naval affairs, • Striving to be the leading website and email service on Australian and regional naval and maritime developments, • Publishing the Australian Naval Review, • Holding Maritime Events at a Fleet Base of HMAS Albatross to promote engagement with the Fleet; and • The presentation of Prizes and awards to promote excellence. Join the ANI Your membership helps support the ANI in realizing its objectives. Members receive: • discounts on ANI events, • the Australian Naval Review, • access to the ANI website, and • discounted access to the on-line version of the US Naval Institute Proceedings. www.navalinstitute.com.au 4 Australian Naval Review 2016

2016 Vernon Parker Oration by The Honourable Kim Beazley, AC

The premier event in the Australian Naval Institute is the Vernon Parker Oration. Named in honour of the inaugural President of the Institute, the Oration is delivered by a distinguished leader on naval, maritime or strategic affairs. This year the Lockheed Martin Vernon Parker Oration and Annual Dinner was held on 22 June at Hotel Realm in Canberra. The ANI was delighted that Kim Beazley could, for the third time, deliver a Vernon Parker Oration. He gave his Oration to a capacity audience.

It's really a privilege to be here with all of you. You know my views about what's important in political debates and how nations form opinions, what becomes salient opinion. What is important for me has changed a lot since I have been in the United States and seen a different society operate. It’s led me to be far more respectful of and concerned for the wellbeing of those in our society who take defence seriously—which you do. And all of you have got different sorts of jobs, different sorts of roles in this community, some directly in command roles, like the Chief, and in roles that are associated with the civilian side. Defence roles in protecting the reputation and the history, roles in defending the status of the system and roles in its history, there's a whole range of roles that are performed by you all of which add up to a collective memory 5 Australian Naval Review 2016 and a collective forward view about what ought to be the nature, the character of our society as far as defence matters are concerned. We are at a crisis point but we sit in it like the proverbial frog in boiling water. We do not recognise it. We have a hybrid American taxation system, we have a hybrid European social security system and we have a substantial defence problem that emanates from our distance from allies and the changing regional distribution of power. This does not cohere. This is not sustainable. And choices are going to be made around this White Paper, are going to be made around industry, which are going to lend veracity to the view that I have always thought and that is the White Paper whenever it is produced does not end debate—it merely starts it. There is going to be an awful lot of water flow under the bridge for decisions taken to this point. I'm not going to talk about the Navy today. I'm going to talk about American politics and the potential impact on our relationships and various outcomes that might occur in the presidential election later this year. I am very pleased to see the fact that we've come full circle in the White Paper and returned at least in the area of industry policy to the old strategy of self-reliance. The industry policy and the associated measures by the Government, both in terms of ensuring it works and that it is technologicallyexcellent, are to be very much welcomed. However, one has the sneaking suspicion that for the folk involved at the start in writing that paper, that policy was not there and the policy subsequently appeared. The policy that subsequently appeared was a product of a political revolt and decisions that were taken subsequent to that, shifted us abruptly away from a course that we'd been pursuing, not with evil intent in any shape or form, but with less and less thought given if you like to questions of the sustainment of Australian industry, more and more to costs, putting pressure on the system to enable equipment to be bought elsewhere even if they had to be sustained here. We have slammed what was prevailing industry policy into reverse. That is going to create major challenges for the people who manage these programs, particularly if some of the political pressure points diminish, but it is the right policy. It needs to be broadened. Self-reliance is not just simply industrypolicy, it's about appreciating the total capacity of your population. We used to in the 1980s talk about mobilisation, incorporating all our national assets, civil as well as military. We are a maritime nation and we are focused properly here on the Naval component of it, but it has a civilian component as well. The Americans think much better about that. We complain about the Jones Act and all the other things that are associated with it and the way the Americans operate their coastal shipping services. The Americans very consciously want to sustain a major marine capability. They take seriously the civilian component that is sustained by a healthy merchant marine around their coastline and further afield.

6 Australian Naval Review 2016 We view our merchant marine more in the context of struggle with the MUA and not in the context of what the nation really truly needs. That should change. We're a good nation often ruined by politics. But politics at least produced something of a reasonable outcome here. That's all I want to say in that area and I want to move over to something else, but as I do start the talk about the US, the most critical thing happening for us in the US at the moment, aside from whether or not we have an isolationist as President, which is a very big aside from, is the oddly named Third Offset Strategy—but it is critical. This is the direction in which the Americans are going to go as they try to find an affordable solution and effective solution to asymmetrical strategies which bedevil them around the oceans littoral and threaten their capacity to deploy for defensive objectives they consider important. They are seeking a third technological fix for military superiority. The science behind it is actually producing very close to finalised systems. They will introduce great complications for those pursuing asymmetrical strategies. What needs to happen now for the deployment of it is money. The systems are there and they basically work. Now for our industry, for our platforms, the submarine that goes into the water in 10 years’ time, if it looks in its capacity like a contemporary submarine with contemporary purposes, our White Paper process will have failed completely. The US is no longer operating the submarine as a sort of hunting wolf. It is operating it as the centre of systems for area control and it's developing the autonomous capacities associated with that. The most critical decision that is going to be taken in relation to submarine programming is not simply just the platform, but it's the way its systems cohere and integrate with other capabilities. It will not be in the way it coheres in a contemporary Collins submarine, good though that is. Now you can take that trend through the rest of our platforms. The Americans are changing their views about what they need to do in terms of how they deploy. They've been so carrier focused. They're shifting away now to enhancing smaller ships as well. Some of these new capacities ought to be being contemplated for the platforms that we plan and the systems we will put into them. Just take a look at something that occurred a couple of years ago with the modified USS Ponce. Cost them $40,000.000 to modify the Ponce to be able to operate a laser. Now that laser is capable of being utilised either to suppress the electronic systems of a ship or take it out. You've got a capacity to ramp it up to do one or other, or several of those things on the way through. Now a war shot of a missile to take out that particular ship would probably cost you the best part of $1,000,000. A laser war shot costs you 59c. So these are the things that the Americans are thinking about. They are struggling because of the wretchedness of the wayin which Congress treats the 7 Australian Naval Review 2016 US defence budget. It's not simply a matter of the operation of sequestration and cost cutting. Having straightened available resources, they then direct outlays. They impose on it a whole range of obligations for veterans and current service families that are enormously costly. They sustain facilities and acquisition programs based on local political preferences, not need, in a ‘you scratch my back I'll scratch yours’ relationship with each other. Congressman ought to know better when they look at the defence needs of the United States and make life impossible.

USS Ponce conducted an operational demonstration of the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf. (US Navy)

The US armed forces are finally coming to the understanding that if they are going to be able to do the tasks that they set themselves in relation to protecting the global commons and in relation to advancing our interests and the struggles that we have with fundamentalist terror and other threats, they cannot do it on the basis of their own initiative and capability. We talk a lot of our own interests in interoperability with the US. Within the next five years the Americans are going to talk about integration. What they will actually want of our platforms is the performance of tasks that they do not have the resources to do and for us I just cite one example. The Marine Corps operating in the Pacific will be permanently short of two flat tops. In their own calculations, they need two flat tops more. Guess who's got the two flat tops? These are the sorts of discussions that we're going to be having and we need to think our way through. I'm not sure that the Australian 8 Australian Naval Review 2016 public is prepared for the direction of that thinking and that is where you all come in you see, that's where I started. So that's the theme setting if you like.That's the significance of what it is that we're handling here. I'm going to add another piece to that, and that is my shock when I got to the United States to discover that we were vastly more deeply engaged with the Americans than we were during the Cold War. Vastly more deeply engaged. I didn't expect that because it is counter intuitive. One would think that the Cold War alliances in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall would gradually fritter away. In a sense, they did. The frozen architecture of the Cold War did melt, but what didn't or wasn't expected, was that more and more the issues for the US would revolve not so much around structures but around states prepared to do things. The United States would increasingly seek a show of hands of those prepared not to act necessarily in accordance with the strict terms of triggers in alliance relationships. However, if we arrive at a conclusion that military assistance is required in a particular area for a particular political outcome, for particular purposes, who will do it with the US? As they change their prioritisation globally, away from the old flashpoints of the Cold War, some of which are making a comeback in contemporary terms, but you know tragically as opposed to necessarily making a comeback. Increasingly this focus on the global commons is another thing. It's important to talk about the global commons and one thing the Americans might consider doing is ratifying UNCLOS, the most important legal instrument on the commons. It's important to think about that, or say it—but why would you say it—well you'd say it because increasingly it is the economic character of the international community that drives priority and so the United States is automatically directed to our area. Hence their belief that they need to pay more attention to our region. I used to wonder, why the Americans let me and the Hawke Government get away with such crap when we were operating in the 1980s. It wasn't crap, they were good policies but they didn't like what we were doing on Cambodia, they didn't like what we were doing on South Pacific nuclear free zones, they were sceptical of what we were doing on dealing with weapons of mass destruction insofar as gas was concerned, they were concerned about defence self-reliance. There were a whole range of issues which they basically felt that perhaps we had just a touch, but not an unacceptable touch of the 'New Zealands', and that was a factor in mydiscussions from time to time with them but you know at the end of the day—none of it actually mattered. It didn't actually matter to the Americans because after Nixon's press conference in Guam in 1969 when he made amply clear to countries like Australia and those in the zone we inhabited, that we were not on the top of their priorities during the Cold War. Not being at the top of their priorities, could we kindly get on with defending ourselves. 9 Australian Naval Review 2016 So, once the Americans had ascertained that we were going to continue ‘gateway’ surveillance operations of the Soviet Fleet, once they ascertained we were not going to abandon the five power defence arrangement, once they ascertained that we were not going to stop their ships coming into our ports, once they ascertained that we were going to uphold and defend against political pressure, and this was the most important of them all, the joint facilities, they couldn't care less what we did. Their view was that if you're doing the things that are important for the central balance and the region's stability and you say you're prepared, that was the other thing. Say you're prepared to join up with us if there's some issue that arises and we are seeking allies, then get on with it. That was the view that they effectively expressed to us and we made marvellous use of that freedom in an otherwise, as I said, frozen structure that existed around us. Joint facilities were crucial and I'll get on to talk about them a little because they're crucial too to the way in which we have become closer. How did we see them? Well we were unique in western alliance relationships. If you look at the great sacrifices that the US made after World War II when they could have used the fact that they drove 55% of global GDP, to completely ignore the rest of the world and let us get on with it, which would have been royally suitable punishment for the performance of the Europeans and the Japanese. They chose not to do that, they chose to confront the Soviet Union and place at risk their population. If the United States and Soviets clashed in any of these areas where people had been mad for centuries then the United States would have lost 100,000,000 people and the America we know would have been completely destroyed. That is a monumental sacrifice. That is a statement unprecedented historically that a nation would place itself at that level of risk. Europeans, Japanese, they consumed American security. That was their position in the NATO and related alliance relationships. We were the opposite. We would not have been a nuclear target but for those joint facilities. The United States consumed our security. The Americans recognised that and understood it and that's why they put us on a very long leash because provided we were prepared to support the facilities, that was a position to be respected and to be utilised and not to be traduced. So we had from the Americans an enormous level of freedom, of course we did not assume a nuclear war was going to occur and neither did they for that matter, but nevertheless there was a finite possibility of that. We also of course had choice as we looked around the globe to sources for our forces, equipment for our armed forces, and we made many choices; sometimes they involved the Americans sometimes they did not. So what has changed now—what had changed when I got to Washington? One change of course was our position has changed. From being a strategic irrelevancyduring the Cold War, we became the southern tier of the focal point 10 Australian Naval Review 2016 of the global political system which was the East Asian economy. So our policies are no longer a matter of take it or leave it, provided we do the right things by the deterrent. We are actually critical and the conversation that we have with the Americans is critical and they are prepared to treat us seriously on that basis. That's a change. Of course the threat that we might have felt that we would be a nuclear target, that has changed. We are less so now, as numbers of nuclear weapons decline. A further thing that had changed is the relative significance of the problems that we would confront in our region. When I was Defence Minister doing the White Paper in 1987, the Australian GDP was greater than that of ASEAN combined. This last White Paper has been in the context in which Indonesia alone probably over the next couple of years will pass us. So with the essential engine of defence strength, our economy, we have got an environment where our neighbours’ concerns were then about internal security, they are now increasingly about force projection. We were alone really as submarine owners back in the 1980s, now everybody owns a submarine in this area and is going to have about 50-60% of the world's submarines over the course of the next 10-15 years. The Russians used to talk about a thing called the ‘correlation of forces’ which was a dynamic international model much better than essentially static balance of power theories. The correlation of forces has shifted decisively against Australia. That process of shifting decisively against Australia will not stop. It will not be reversed. It will simply get more substantial in character as time goes by. The US relationship was a bit of a decision of courage byus. Now it's absolutely essential and our public has no understanding of how this relationship has changed. The joint facilities have changed their character. Still very significant, but then in those days what we did with the joint facilities is we went for full knowledge and concurrence. We could describe, as Des Ball has, them rightly as the strategic essence of the relationship and they are still the strategic essence of the relationship. Well those joint facilities now are seamlessly connected with Australian Defence capability. We are not spying on Americans, we are integral with them in not only the areas that concern them that are covered effectively by the joint facilities operations, but us. They are the first line of our information. They are critical to us and we work those systems. We are conscious of the fact that as these cover areas where other parts of the globe's environment get incorporated within our defence concerns, we have an interest in a broader understanding of their value to us and that interest is best served by expanding the joint facilities. When I was there, the joint facilities were expanded effectively by several locations and those mostly related to space, not entirely related to space 11 Australian Naval Review 2016 situation awareness and all these functions are at the forefront of our minds. We are conscious that these are is an important bargaining chip on one hand and on the other hand a critical part of our own defence requirements. That is a vital component now of where we stand in relation to the United States. On top of that, we have the situation of the type of equipment we require. Now I've already discussed the Third Offset Strategy, but what is that built on? Well I'll tell you what it's built on—we spend in US defence industry $13,000,000 a working day. The Embassy that I was responsible for had a task in its Defence section of managing over 400 foreign military sales programs and that's by no means all the programs. They're associated with defence industry in which we are involved, a very big slab of it. Over on to the civilian side, they are now our principal investment partner to the tune of $1.3 trillion, our investment in the US $600 billion, rising at the rate of about $20 billion a year. Most of that is portfolio investment so it's superannuation funds. Increasingly, however, it is small and medium sized enterprises’ direct investment who understand if they situate a productive facility in the US they can more readily access the US system on all sorts of fronts, civilian and military. And understanding that they're increasingly getting engaged, an increasingly important role that the big American primes operating in this country perform is mentoring and they are mentoring large numbers now of Australian companies. Some of them they're mentoring here, some of them they're mentoring in the United States. But as we shift to being producers of intelligent services and high technology manufactured product, this part of the process is what means that we can prosper. You cannot prosper with a nation's market of 24 million people. We actuallyhave to get an economyof scale and the only way we can do that really is with an association with the US. Everybody else will pinch your intellectual propertyand that's simply the fact of the matter. You can get sentimental about it but too bad, you just simplylose your propertyif you take that sentimentality to a point of producing something in an unprotected zone. That $600 billion is probably about 10 times what we invest in China and that isn’t going to change much as we sit down and contemplate where our future is going. So take a look at the totality of that, talking in Australian dollars. Brendan, if you talk American dollars, it goes down to about $480 billion. I saw skepticism on the man's face. So I will correct it for him. That is deep, deep engagement. Normally when you use the expression ‘deep state’ what you're talking about is a quite evil process associated with dictatorships that mean that whatever the politics are that runs across the surface of a state, underneath it all is the real power that lies in the deep state which is usually a military/intelligence phalanx. Well we have a benign ‘deep state’ and the people who are representative of that include many sitting in this room.

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The aircraft carrier has been the cornerstone of US naval power. USS Ronald Reagan is in company with some of the multinational ships in Exercise RIMPAC 2014. (USN).

Thank God there are more of them than just you, but nevertheless it is an aspect of what you are because you are the people that comprehend what I have just been talking about. We have debates in this country on should we make choices between China and the US, how do we do the outreach to Asia? All of that's important, you must do those things. Diplomacy rules your day to day discourse and it must rule your day to day discourse but you need to understand that extraordinary ballast that exists underneath our deepest international engagement on everyconceivable front. That's what sits there and that is what actually drives the successful long term survival of our country. I'm not going to talk about the contemporary state of American politics because it'd make you weep. And I was ready to leave after four years but the Liberals invited me to stick around for another two, and I wished they hadn't removed me now because the America I knew is changing so fast. Of course if Hillary wins we may in two years’ time be wondering what it is that we were all talking about and nothing much will have seemed to change. If Trump wins it will be altogether a different matter. You need to understand this, that Trump, aside from on racial and religious issues—and that's a verybig aside from, I do concede that— but aside from those issues, Trump is running not only to the left of Hillary but to the left of Sanders. You need to understand that. He is running to the left of Sanders. He stands effectively for the collapse of America's alliance system. 13 Australian Naval Review 2016 He intends to get at the Japanese and Koreans who already pay a huge amount to the Americans for their presence in those countries and are very substantial in their preparedness to develop their own defence forces. He is prepared to say to them double down or develop a nuclear weapon. Madness. But that's what he says. Sanders doesn't say the US should dismantle or threaten the alliance system in Asia or the alliance system in NATO. Trump says it. Trump says the time has come for them to understand that the US can afford it no more. Talk about making America great again! He is talking about driving America down into sort of state autarky and nothing else. Then move over to an area of great American leadership and that is global free trade. Sanders doesn't like that all that much and he doesn't like the TPP so he agrees with Trump on not doing the TPP. But he doesn't think it's a smart idea to whack 45% on Mexican product coming into the United States or starting out on the Chinese at 45% as well and inducing a trade crisis of massive proportions in our region. Neither Sanders, and much less Clinton, is asking for that, and that's where Trump is. This is the most left wing position put forward by any leading figure in the US since World War II basically, it's so out of sorts with anything in the past. In the process too he's done something that the Democrats have never been able to do, though they sincerely wish they had the opportunity to do it, and that is at least temporarily destroy the Republican Party. The Republican Party is the ‘national’ party. A small n and in quotation marks. And what do I mean by that? Each country has a ‘national’ party and when it moves away from that position, the country is demeaned and it becomes unanchored and ruthless. The Republican Party was the ‘national’ party. That means that they were the party devoted to global free trade. They were the party devoted to liberal internationalism. They were the party devoted to American leadership through alliance relationships and proper discourse with friends and colleagues and bringing them along in discussions with adversaries. That was the Republican Party. Steadily over time the republicans have trashed their own base and they've introduced to their base the means of their own destruction. So I recollect before, about 18 months ago, sitting down Harley Barber who used to be the Governor of Mississippi and sometime Chairman of the Republican Party, and he said to me, ‘What do you think of the Republicans?’ And I said ‘I'll tell you what, you're now the party of the white American working class. You represent their social attitudes. The problem is you don't represent their interests, so you are doomed to disappoint them and at some point that disappointment will overflow into a populist revolt against you and your base will be destroyed.’ Now I never thought it would be Trump who would be the person capable of doing that because one could not come across more of a mountebank in 14 Australian Naval Review 2016 American politics than this particular character, but nevertheless he is the one who had the smarts and savvy about reality television and contemporary thinking of Americans that enabled him to exploit that sentiment. He can only exploit it temporarily for the campaign because he has no program. So at the end of it all there is if he is elected, is two years of an arbitral mess. In that mess, some folk will investigate his background to see if he's committed any impeachable offences and if they find them, some things may well change two or three years down the track. But in those two years, the confidence of people in this country and many others, in the United States, will be destroyed. So there we are. The question is, because I suddenly realised I'm going so far over time I'm testing the patience of you all—is he going to win? Is this the most likely outcome from this election campaign? Well I think that all depends on ‘black swans’. I, as a West Australian, love black swans. I see them as I drive along the freeway to go down to University every day and I keep away from them when one is on the riverbank because I recollect my youngest daughter being pursued by them at different points of time. So I don't find the expression in any way a suitable one to describe malevolent circumstance. But the Americans do. They use the expression ‘black swans’ as an event which is game changing and horrific for the person whom it affects. And there are ‘black swans’ that always circle the Clintons. They do like to handicap themselves. Whenever they go into an election campaign they'd be the ablest political couple maybe that the United States has ever produced, but theydo it generally speaking running against themselves before theymanage to get it together to run against somebody else. And of course, she's got the FBI sitting over her head and I just do not know what that will produce. One hopes that there's political common sense in the FBI and if their investigations have not produced an indictable offence by now then it won't, at least not of Hillary produce an indictable offence, but you never know. And then there's the American economy which is beginning to soften. Now will it soften substantially by the time of the election? One doesn't know. And then there's always the possibility of a terrifying terrorist attack and we do know that in terms of economic management and on management of national security the Republicans still have a hangover advantage that their candidate does not deserve. The Republican Party itself for this election campaign has got a lot of money. But Donald Trump hasn't. So let's assume that the ‘black swans’ don't settle and that there is a course that seems to be the course that is now set; well if that occurs, Hillary will win. The thing that you've got is that Trump has appealed to the white working class, he has mobilised them. But it conceals some stats that you never hear. See the Democrats and Republicans hold their primaries on the same day, mostly, not always, but mostly they hold them on the same day. Currently, well it's over so it's not just currently, this is the position. Trump certainly has 15 Australian Naval Review 2016 polled the largest vote that a Republican candidate has ever polled. Sanders has polled the same and Hillary 3,000,000 more. So that 3,000,000 more is of an electorate, that is approximately 20% of the ultimate American election. Recollect that Obama won by 5,000,000 in an electorate four times the size. So Hillary is 3,000,000 ahead in an electorate about a quarter of which will ultimately vote. That's an important thing to contemplate. See many of the primaries are conducted by caucus and Sanders won most of the caucuses. But if it came to a vote in a primary state in which a normal election was conducted, Hillary cleaned up. Trump is crazy as a campaign prioritiser. He has put virtually nothing into Ohio, virtually no organisation, but is building up a massive organisation in New York. Why he'd want to do that when on the day of the New York primary, true he got 550,000 against Kasich’s 230,000 and Cruz's 140,000, but Sanders that day got 750,000 and Hillarygot 1.3 million. So I don't know what's going on in his noggin but that is not suggestive to me of the likely fall of New York as a Democrat edifice. And this is his problem right around the country. He won't declare his tax returns and he won't declare them for two reasons. Either he pays no tax or he has no wealth and/or both, and the revelation of those tax returns would absolutely destroy his position. But when you have a fellow who says he's as rich as creases and he's out there asking for $100,000 to be able to participate in advertising in one particular state, you've got to say perhaps we're dealing with a mirage of a candidate here. He cannot do without Republican money. He has to have that money in behind him or he cannot win and you can see that now one of the reasons whyhis polling is falling apart is that for the last three weeks Hillaryhas been battering him in purple states (those that could go either way) and he has not replied. Anti-Trump ad after anti-Trump ad. What she's doing is insurance. She's taking the purple states and she is defining Trump. She is defining Trump for the long term purposes of the election. Good time to go and Hillary apparently has plenty of dough and so there will be a lot her way I think. Then there is the ethnic structure of the electorate. He is getting into the voting process folk who don't normally vote. The white working class doesn't normally vote, at least not in large numbers. Maybe they will on this occasion, but one thing we do know is a fact is the Hispanics now have 2,000,000 more people enrolled than they had last time and that previously, for George W Bush to win he had 36% of the Hispanics. Romney to lose narrowly had 28% of the Hispanics. Currently, Trump has 10%. Now that is what comes into play in a general election. The Hispanics do vote and they are certainly going to vote where Mr Trump is concerned. African Americans will probably vote in reasonable numbers, not as much as for Obama, and Trump will do slightly better amongst African Americans. It would be impossible to do better from Hillary's point of view than Obama who got 92 to 8, I would bet that Hillary would get about 80 to 20. There are some

16 Australian Naval Review 2016 in the African American community who do take some note of things that Trump has said about the Hispanic community, some of whom agree with the general propositions that he has been putting forward in regard to that. I think a lot will depend on women and the last election Obama got 60% of women, but only 45% of married women. Now the question will be does she do better amongst married women. I would think yes and if she takes down the married women component voting Republicans from 55 to 50 it's over. That move alone would finish off Trump. So this is a situation where one should not be without hope. But there is another problem here. This is trust. On negative feelings around Trump and Hillary is a race to the bottom and whoever wins the race to the bottom loses the election. At the moment, Trump is winning it and he is gaining distance. Whether that will desist all depends on the Republican convention, which is not looking good. None of my mates are turning up at it except one who intends to go there to abuse Trump and if he, he's a Senator who's decided not to stand again, and if he does so we'll all hail him as a hero, but his chances of making it home are small and that'll be a profile in courage, but that's the sort of playing out of things. I think that as I said we have an awful lot swinging on this. My view when you have a situation where a candidate may win who is electorally unsustainable in Australia, and I think Trump is. If this happens, what I will find myself doing is my level best to defend the essence of the American alliance because that relates to our long-term survival. This character may last four years, but he will certainly last no more and there will be a struggle to keep American relationships right across the globe. He will not help. None of the positions he is adopting will help. Folks say, and they're very knowledgeable, that a President is not all powerful. For a President to do things he or she has to get the Congress on his or her side; all true, but a President has an enormous power to act destructively. It is very difficult for him to act positively, but very easy for him to act destructively. He can dismantle any of these alliance positions simply by activity off his own bat because these alliance positions relate heavilyto confidence in the populations of the relevant alliance members and their confidence can be very readily disturbed. It will be an impossible year, or four years, for those of us in the ‘deep state’ here in Australia. It'll be very hard if Trump wins. That is why one would pray that the cup gets taken from us. For the Navy, for our Navy, there's so much at the centre of the rebalance which is essentially a maritime strategy. It is essential that we have over the next decade a seamless interaction with American industry with a capacity to enhance the platforms that we're going to buyat enormous expense. Our ability to do that of course will be a project of 40/50 years standing, but the start we make up front in locking ourselves into the opportunity of accessing the new technologies and actually participating in the development of those 17 Australian Naval Review 2016 technologies with our own people in the supply chain, that is going to be absolutely critical. When we did Defence Self-Reliance in the 1980s, we dismantled the Australian Defence industry of the day. They were Government-owned entities. They produced good things, but they were not things that kept us at the forefront of technology and what we deliberately sought to do was to bring in a plethora of primes to enhance the capacity of Australian industry to relate to the high technologyin the end of Defence production, that was the strategy. That's what we wanted to do. That problem has not gone away, it's just a bit easier to do now than it was then, because we now have had a lot of experience of having that sort of access. So we know those who love the Australian Navy, those who believe it's vital to the effective long term defence of our approaches and of this countryknow that whatever happens in the American election we need to have the political underpinnings. For that conversation to continue in a seamless sort of way. Now what applies to the Navy of course applies to the other services, but they're not paying for this lecture, so they don't get to have a mention. But again, thank you for having me here.

About the Author The Honourable Kim Beazley AC was Australian Ambassador to the United States from 2010-2016. He previously had a distinguished political career in which he served at different times as Deputy Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Minister for Defence, Minister for Finance, Special minister of State and Minister for Aviation. He is an Honorary Life Member of the Australian Naval Institute.

18 Australian Naval Review 2016

Maritime Operations in the Littoral - The Minister's Perspective

by Senator the Hon Marise Payne Minister for Defence

At the Australian Naval Institute's 2016 Goldrick Seminar on 20 October, the Minister for Defence presented her perspective on Littoral Operations.

This year’s Seminar theme—Maritime Operations in the Littoral—is as Peter said, very timely given the White Paper’s strong focus on associated issues, particularly amphibious capability development and also timely given the relatively recent first fully operational deployment of HMAS Canberra. In fact, in literally my first week as Minister for Defence last year, I visited HMAS Canberra during the SEA RAIDER exercise, near Townsville. I travelled with the team from Canberra to Townsville on the Wedgetail and then by MRH-90 out to the ship. Now not many things are left to chance in Defence, if anything, so you can bet it wasn’t just serendipity when the CDF and the Secretary thought, ‘Where can we start? That looks like a good idea, to highlight the capability of HMAS Canberra in the first instance, and particularly the ADF focus on operating as a joint force.’ It seemed to them I am sure, and in retrospect most certainly to me, as a very good opportunity, in my first days as Minister. It demonstrated the importance being placed on, and certainly the pride in, the development of these capabilities. 19 Australian Naval Review 2016 So the development of our amphibious capabilityand the abilityto operate as a joint force are two factors that will heavily influence the effectiveness of our operations in the littoral. By definition, the littoral includes the areas seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence from the landand the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence from the sea. So logically, defence operations in the littoral demand effective joint operations. And so while we talk about maritime operations in the littoral, it is important that we also consider this as a joint endeavour. The 2016 Defence White Paper was launched only in February this year, although that does seem a long time ago on the 2016 timescale. The Defence White Paper set out three Strategic Interests to guide our defence planning and they are: • A secure, resilient Australia. Defence to be provided with the resources it needs to act independently to defend Australia’s air, sea and northern approaches. • A secure nearer region, including maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific, and • A stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order that supports our interests. Our region is the most vibrant in the world. It is home to half the world’s population, the three largest economies, and 12 of the G20 member nations. It is a hub of trade: of the world’s busiest ports nine out of 10and 16 out of the top 20are located in the Indo-Pacific. Instability in the region would threaten Australia’s security and our vital and growing economic relationships. In Australia, more than 80% of Australians live within 50 km of the coast. Indeed, as Dr Peter Dean of the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre has observed, 75% of the population in the Indo-Pacific live within 200 km of the coast. Clearly, littoral areas of our region are not only extensive. Our ability to operate effectively is vital to ensuring we can defend Australia and protect our interests in our immediate region. And I reference again our three Strategic Interests as outlined in the Defence White Paper. Now, not for one second, before I set anyone’s hearts palpitating, do I suggest that the need for blue water operations to keep our sea lines of communication open will diminish in the current strategic environment. But, the reality is that the range of potential operational requirements in the littoral is indeed very broad. It’s a range of requirements that continues to grow, particularly as the Government and the population turn to the ADF to fulfill more non-traditional, non-warfighting roles. Therefore, our ability to operate effectively in the littoral 20 Australian Naval Review 2016 is fundamental to the ADF’s ability to seize the opportunities and respond to challenges over the coming decades, and the Defence White Paper set out our plans and our observations in great detail, over the first decade from 2016 and more broadly over the second decade.

HMAS Canberra sails with relief supplies and an embarked force to assist cyclone ravaged Fiji as part of Operation Fiji Assist (ADF). We have to also consider this in the context of our rapidly changing strategic security environment. And we must be prepared to think differently in how we go about best preparing the ADF to fight and to win. In the Defence White Paper, not only did the Turnbull Government commit to ensuring Australia maintains a regionally superior ADF with the highest levels of military capability and scientific and technological sophistication, it also placed more emphasis on the joint force, which means the ADF will be able to apply more force more rapidly and more effectively when required. Responsiveness and flexibility to provide the most useful assistance to our neighbours when requested will demand an enhanced joint amphibious capabilitywhich is the heart of Australia’s strategic effectiveness in the littoral. In peacetime, an effective amphibious capability allows us to send a self- contained joint force to exercise with our neighbours. Furthermore, it provides a critical asset for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and Operation Fiji Assist would be the most timely and pertinent recent example of that. Effective in the extreme. Effective across so many aspects of our engagement with Fiji.

21 Australian Naval Review 2016 The White Paper has set out a plan to strengthen the ADF’s capacity for amphibious operations through capability development, centred on our two Canberra Class large amphibious ships, and enhanced amphibious capabilities across the three Services. The Canberra Class underpins ADF amphibious capability through their capacity to facilitate a range of operations, including supporting the security of maritime South East Asia and Pacific Island Countries and addressing emergent threats in the broader Indo-Pacific region. These two ships provide Australia with a highly capable and sophisticated amphibious deployment capability. Indeed, Canberra and Adelaide have already delivered a more robust and sustainable amphibious capability than at any previous time in the ADF’s peacetime history. As I said, Canberra returned from her first operational deployment earlier this year, having provided critical humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the people of Fiji following Cyclone Winston. What that short-notice deployment enabled was the delivery of more than 114 tonnes of emergency relief supplies, three MRH-90 helicopters and around 800 ADF personnel to support Fiji’s recovery effortssomething that would have been much more of a challenge to achieve without this highly capable Canberra Class. Canberra’s successful deployment was also testament to the significant progress we’ve made in growing the ADF’s joint amphibious capability. As another example, earlier this year I also had the opportunity to visit Ross Island Barracks in Townsville, where the Army maintains a niche capability that contributes to the broader ADF amphibious capability with the provision of shore watercraft, beach landing teams and specialist training. The professionalism of the Watercraft Squadrons and supporting Defence personnel stationed at Ross Island is particularly noteworthy and I congratulated the Defence force in their progress in developing Australia’s amphibious capability. Our current amphibious capability, though, is far from the finished product. And indeed as impressive and effective as it is now, there is more to come. As our experience operating the Canberra Class grows we will further invest in the platform. In the future, upgrades to communications and intelligence systems and semi- autonomous self-defence capabilities will better support its joint command and control capability. This will include, for example, communications systems that are compatible with all amphibious force elements—watercraft, helicopters and amphibious vehicles—to strengthen command and control and Canberra and Adelaide will be the centre of our joint amphibious force for decades. 22 Australian Naval Review 2016

A Unimog disembarks from one of HMAS Canberra’s landing craft in Suva harbour as part of Operation Fiji Assist (ADF).

I must say that it doesn’t matter the international engagement—such as with the Prime Minister of Singapore and the Singapore Defence Minister Ng last week—the commentary and observations about Canberra and Adelaide are always extremely powerful, extremely complimentary and compelling. They always take the opportunity to pass observation in relation to that, virtually no matter which counterpart with whom I meet. The Government has outlined a number of other future investments in the Integrated Investment Program that will further expand our amphibious capability. Indeed, the ADF’s Riverine Patrol capability will be re-established to increase tactical mobility in the littoral zone. The Riverine Patrol capabilitywill deliver a fleet of lightly armed boats in the mid-2020s to allow operations in a wide range of littoral environments. The capability will provide a force element that is capable of effective support to littoral combat operations. We will also need to support these new capabilities with increased personnel and training facilities. Around 700 additional ADF positions will be needed for force generation for amphibious operations from the Canberra Class amphibious ships; amphibious support systems, including over the beach logistics and beached materiel 23 Australian Naval Review 2016 recovery; armed medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft; tactical unmanned aircraft; a long-range rocket capability; and combat support systems. In the longer-term, as indicated in the White Paper, the Government will consider a new Northern Advanced Joint Training Area to support large-scale, joint and combined amphibious training, in addition to Shoalwater Bay, which is currently our only other large-scale training area with a joint amphibious training capacity. Future challenges in developing the ADF’s amphibious capability and integrating communications systems more broadly across the force will need to be addressed, including through building on the existing Land Network Integration Centre. This will provide an enhanced battle lab testing facility that will help to ensure systems interoperability across the joint force and explore more sensitive joint capability solutions for further development. While there is an emphasis on networking and integrating our existing platforms into a joint force, our next generation of platforms must be joint by design. I emphasise that means designing interoperability into our new platforms and systems. We have to ensure the ADF is capable of contributing individual platforms or task groups to coalition operations at both the regional and global levels. The ADF’s modernisation more broadly will demand close cooperation between the three Services, who will work more closely than ever beforeas a joint forceso that the ADF can provide greater options to apply more force, as I said, more rapidly and more effectively when required. Now, maintaining our technological edge and capabilitysuperiority will require us to design this interoperability from the outset. Integrating the fleet with Army and Air Force platforms and systems is essential to realising our capability potential. Our future ships, aircraft, land forces and submarines have to be designed to work together and we must also ensure our people are trained to realise the potential of our future force. The leadership of the ADF is acutely aware of the requirement, and each of the three services are currently implementing comprehensive plans to transition their people, their equipment, their supporting elements to ensure that as our new capabilities come into service, we are able to leverage their full potential. As part of Plan ‘Pelorus’, the Navy will be generating and deploying self- supported and sustainable maritime task groups capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations.

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The RAAF will play a key role in littoral operations. This is the first RAAF P-8A Poseidon. It is flying down the St Vincent Gulf. (ADF)

These task groups will be flexible, scalable and structured to achieve the operational outcomes directed by the Government. As part of Plan ‘Beersheba’, Army has developed an amphibious landing force capability initially with 2nd Battalion force elements to assist the development of the ADF’s amphibious capability. Under Plan ‘Jericho’, Air Force will strengthen the capabilities of air and maritime platforms through effective integration and training to provide increased protection for amphibious task groups, better situational awareness, and provide communication gateways so that surface forces can retain information control in contested environments. Further, as outlined in the 2016 White Paper, for the first time international engagement will become an integrated core function across the entire Defence portfolio, aligned with the Strategic Defence Objectives. As Australia’s strategic environment becomes more complex it is important to further develop our international partnerships. Australia can better pursue its objectives of growth and prosperity and protect its interests in our region and globally by working with others, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally.

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Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, depart HMAS Adelaide onboard an LCM-8 landing craft during Exercise Sea Explorer 2016 off the northern coast of Queensland. (RAN) Earlier this month I met with US Secretary for Defense, Ash Carter and we both welcomed the in-principle conclusion of cost sharing negotiations for the Force Posture Initiatives. As you know, under the Force Posture Agreement, Australia and the United States will continue to work towards having up to 2,500 US Marines rotating through northern Australia. Our amphibious landing force, currently based on 2RAR, is developing amphibious capabilities that will enhance Australia’s interoperability with the US Marines. The Force Posture Initiatives increase opportunities for combined training and exercises and deepen the interoperability of our armed forces and further the development of our own amphibious capability. These initiatives also provide opportunities for broader collaboration between Australia, the United States and our partners in the Indo-Pacific. We are also working more closely with our near neighbours, and I referred earlier to last week’s visit by Prime Minister Lee and his Ministers for Trade, Defence and Foreign Affairs to Australia. Last week in fact the Singapore Defence Minister Dr Ng and I signed a Memorandum of Understanding for military training, unilateral military training as part of the Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

26 Australian Naval Review 2016 This will allow up to 14,000 Singapore Armed Forces personnel to conduct unilateral Army training in Australia for up to 18 weeks per year, almost trebling current arrangements. Singapore will also upgrade and expand facilities at the Townsville Field Training Area and Shoalwater Bay Training Area. I am sure many of you are familiar with both of those locations in their current iteration. They will be larger. Prime Minister Lee wants to see them as state of the art training facilities, an initiative that will benefit not just the Singapore Armed Forces’ training activities but also the ADF. Both of these initiatives, the Force Posture Initiatives and the CSP, will strengthen our ability to work with our allies and promote regional stability. Ladies and gentlemen, the subject of maritime operations in the littoral is particularly relevant as I hope I demonstrated to you today, as we embark on the transformation of the ADF to meet future challenges. I encourage you, as I know the Chief of Navy does, to think differently today as you explore the complexities and the new capabilities that will equip the ADF for maritime operations in the littoral. The ADF is highly capable, highly respected for its professionalism world-wide. Our challenge is to maintain our capability edge and prepare for an increasingly complex and uncertain strategic environment. That demands innovation and collaboration. So I commend you for your collective efforts in bringing together this very impressive seminar and I look forward to learning of today’s outcomes and wish you very well in your contemplations today.

About the Author Senator Marise Payne was a former Federal President of the Young Liberal Movement of Australia. She became a Senator representing New South Wales in 1997. Before becoming Minister for Defence in September 2015, Senator Payne had spent nine years on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee as well as being Minister for Human Services (2013-2015) and Acting Minister for Defence Materiel and Science (2015).

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28 Australian Naval Review 2016

Percival Edwin McNeil: Pioneering Naval Shipbuilder by Commander Greg Swinden, RAN In 2016 the Australian Naval Institute inaugurated the McNeil Prize to be awarded to an individual from industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy. This article tells the story of Rear Admiral Percival McNeil.

Some historians will claim that Australia was totally unprepared for World War II. This denies the reality that confronted the Australian Government and its three armed services in the mid-1930s with the rise of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan. By 1938 the road to war was clear for all to see following Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, Japan’s advances in China and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. Britain and her empire began to re-arm in earnest for the troubled times ahead. Fortunately for the RAN at the head of its shipbuilding program was Rear Admiral Percival Edwin McNeil. McNeil was born on 25 September 1883 at the family home in Curzon Street, West Melbourne, Victoria. He was the third son of engineer John McNeil and his wife, Elizabeth Frances McNeil (nee Jones). The McNeil family were

29 Australian Naval Review 2016 Methodists and originally hailed from the Isle of Man on England’s mid-west coast. Percival grew up in Moonee Ponds and was educated at Essendon State School where he completed Year Six in 1895. He then completed two years of secondary schooling privately and passed the Matriculation Examination for Melbourne University in 1897. Instead of proceeding to university he chose to undertake a six year general engineering apprenticeship with Forman & Co. of South Melbourne. McNeil also continued his formal technical education at the Working Men’s College in Melbourne (the forerunner of today’s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology). In late 1905 he commenced his career at sea as an Engineering Officer for the Union Steamship Company and later with Huddart Parker & Co. serving as the 5th, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Engineer in a variety of vessels on the Australian coastal and trans-Tasman routes. In early 1909 he sailed to England and in April of that year was granted his 1st Class Engineering Certificate on the Register General of Shipping and Seaman in London. McNeil was then employed, through a family linkage, as an engineering draughtsman in the engine works drawing office of the shipbuilders John Brown & Co. at Clydebank, Scotland. He spent nine months at the shipyard between 7June 1909–11 March 1910 and he was noted as a ‘careful and diligent’ worker.1 After completing his tenure at John Brown he returned to Australia and resumed work with Huddart Parker & Co. as a 2nd Engineer and later as a Chief Engineer. McNeil neither smoked nor drank alcohol and was noted by his employer as ‘a sober, attentive and efficient seagoing engineer and also a very good workman’. In mid-1911 he applied to join the RAN and on 14 November 1911, aged 28, was appointed as an Engineer Lieutenant in the fledgling Australian Navy. McNeil was immediately appointed to his first ship, the Torpedo Boat Destroyer HMAS Yarra, based at Williamstown Naval Depot, for training. After five months in Yarra he briefly served in her sister ship Parramatta for further training. His first officer’s report, by Lieutenant Commander Thomas Biddlecombe, in early 1912 described him as ‘a zealous and hard-working officer. Has proved himself capable in every respect. Physically sound. Recommended for advancement in due course’.2 On 22 May 1912 Percival McNeil married 27-year old Emily Jean Leslie at the Methodist Church in Gladstone Street, Moonee Ponds, Victoria. They were to have three children; Jean (born 1913), Percival Leslie (born 1918) and Nancy (born 1921). In July1912, less than one year after joining the Navy, McNeil was appointed as the Engineer Officer of Yarra and was to serve in her for the next 15 months

1Correspondence from John Brown & Co. March 1910, McNeil Collection, Seapower Centre Australia (SPCA). 2 Correspondence from Huddart Parker & Co., dated 1911, McNeil Collection, SPCA. 30 Australian Naval Review 2016 including the formal entry of the Australian Fleet unit into Sydney Harbour on 4 October 1913 (by HMA Ships Australia, Melbourne, Sydney, Encounter, Warrego, Parramatta and Yarra). His Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Biddlecombe, described him as ‘a hard working and zealous officer—recommended for advance in due course. Has served with sobriety and to my entire satisfaction’. His next Commanding Officer in Yarra, Lieutenant Commander Stewart Keightly, stated McNeil was ‘zealous and tactful’. 3 On 14 November 1913, Lieutenant McNeil was transferred to the newest River class destroyer Warrego; the third of the Australian destroyers and built at Cockatoo Island dockyard in Sydney from prefabricated material produced in Great Britain. He was to serve in her for the next three years. While serving in Warrego Lieutenant McNeil also continued his engineering studies, by correspondence via the International Correspondence School in London and regularly achieved results of 100% in his exams. With the outbreak of war in 1914 the British Government requested that Australia undertake the capture of the colony of German New Guinea and the Australian Fleet was dispatched northwards. The three destroyers operated extensively in New Guinea waters and were present at the capture of Rabaul (the seat of German Government in the colony) on 11 September 1914. They also searched the Sepik River for German vessels—but none were found. McNeil was promoted to Engineer Lieutenant Commander on 1 January 1915 and Warrego returned to Australia in February 1915. His annual report for 1914 report (written by Commander Claude Cumberlege) described him as ‘a careful and thoroughly trustworthy Engineering Officer’.4 The three RAN destroyers then operated off the Australian east coast. In October 1915 they were sent to Sandakan, Borneo and over the next few months conducted patrols off the neutral Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; to ensure German merchant ships interned in those ports did not try to escape. Additionally, neutral merchant vessels were intercepted and searched for contraband—such as weapons and ammunition being illegally imported into British India—in a German attempt to create an uprising there and divert British forces from the European campaign. His final report from Commander Cumberlege, on leaving Warrego, was exceptionally glowing: This officer is the best engineer I have ever sailed with. Theoretically and practically exceptional. His advice has been taken in other ships than the Flotilla. But I think his record for the last two years in this ship considering the vast amount of steaming the ship has done

3 NAA: A3978, Item 8374980, Officer (RAN) Personal Record— P.E. McNeil. 4 Ibid. 31 Australian Naval Review 2016 especially during the war should be closely noted by the Board. He is full of resource and has a fearless character. 5 After nearly five years of sea service Lieutenant Commander McNeil could expect to be posted ashore to a naval depot but this was not to be. In July 1916 he was appointed, at short notice, to the elderly cruiser HMAS Psyche as the Engineer Officer. Psyche was built for the Royal Navy and commissioned in 1899. She arrived on the Australia Station in 1903 and in July 1915 was transferred to the RAN for service in South East Asian waters. The cruiser was an old ship with an equally old engineering system and was operating in tropical waters which made working and living conditions arduous; particularly for the engineering staff. In February 1916, several stokers refused duty to protest the poor food and working conditions. A courts martial was conducted and several men were convicted and sentenced to periods of imprisonment. When McNeil joined the ship in July she was in refit in the cooler climate of Hong Kong which made conditions onboard more tolerable; but he still faced the daunting prospect of leading an engineering team that was under-manned, in poor health, working and living in appalling conditions and who had recently conducted what was effectively a mutiny. In McNeil’s characteristic ‘hands on’ style he quickly earned the trust of his men and soon had then working as a team again. His Commanding Officer, Commander Henry Feakes, wrote of him: A zealous, capable and sound officer. As an officer he exercises good control over the formally unruly junior section of his branch. His service in HM Ships is limited to destroyers and Psyche. Service in a large ship with large wardroom complement would be of value to him.6 In the latter half of 1916 the cruiser operated from Hong Kong for several months conducting patrols on the China Station, before relocating to the Bay of Bengal where she escorted transport vessels from India to Burma. During this time Psyche visited the ports of Penang, Port Blair, Rangoon, Calcutta, Madras and Colombo as well as patrolling along the coast of Sumatra. In mid-1917 she operated from Singapore before returning to Sydney via Dili (Portuguese Timor), Thursday Island and Townsville. Psyche finally arrived back in Sydney in late September 1917 and was de- commissioned on 17 October. Lieutenant Commander McNeil was posted ashore to Williamstown Naval Depot (HMAS Cerberus), but this was a short- lived move. No sooner had he begun to reacquaint himself with his wife and three-year old daughter, then Psyche was recommissioned on 19 November 1917 and McNeil was recalled. The cruiser then commenced patrols along the

5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 32 Australian Naval Review 2016 east coast of Australia to protect shipping from possible German raiders (the raider Wolf had been active off the east coast laying mines and also captured the steamer Matunga in August 1917). On 20 March 1918 Psyche was finally paid off and McNeil took up his first shore posting at Williamstown Naval Depot for ‘the instruction of Engine Room ratings and supervision of tenders’.7 His report from Williamstown stated: A capable and practical engineer and wide general engineering experience but without experience in large ships at war. Is sound and reliable in charge of all engineering work in HMA Naval Depot. Has commanded both the Service and Civil section of the Engineering Department of this establishment with success. 8 His time ashore was all too brief as in October 1918 he joined the new light cruiser HMAS Brisbane to gain experience in ‘a large ship’. Brisbane was the first Australian cruiser to be built at Cockatoo Island Dockyard and was commissioned in late 1916. She served briefly in the Mediterranean before operating in the Indian Ocean searching for German raiders. In 1917, Brisbane returned to Australian waters for convoy escort duties and patrol work. Bylate 1918 the cruiser (now under the command of Cumberlege) was preparing to deploy again to the Mediterranean but she arrived after the Armistice had been signed and the war was now over. The fighting may have finished on the Western Front but the Russian Civil War was still underway between Bolshevik ‘Red’ forces and the ‘White’ Russian pro- monarchy forces. The Allies provided military support to the White forces and Brisbane steamed through the Dardanelles, on 10 December 1918, and briefly patrolled in the Black Sea and off Sebastopol as a show of force. By late December she was on her way to England for an extensive refit which commenced in January 1919. McNeil’s mid-year report for 1919 stated: This officer is highly efficient. I have known him for many years. Resourceful and courageous. He is now in charge of the Engine Room Department of this ship as an Engineer Lieutenant Commander where an Engineer Commander is allowed by complement.9 Brisbane returned to Australia in late June 1919 and McNeil was promoted to Engineer Commander on 1 July 1919. Several years later a newspaper article regarding McNeil stated:

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 33 Australian Naval Review 2016 When he stepped on board the old HMAS Yarra as an engineer lieutenant in 1911 he scarcely needed the purple distinguishing cloth between his gold braid to point to his profession. His engineers love of the job earned him rapid promotion. In less than eight years he had gained the ‘brass hat’ of commander’s rank.10 On 17 September 1919, McNeil joined the RANs flagship, the battle-cruiser Australia (now under the command of Cumberlege), as her Engineer Officer. During his two years onboard the battlecruiser was the RAN’s training ship and also escorted HRH the Prince of Wales on his tour of the eastern Australian states during May–August 1920. In 1920 McNeil considered leaving the navy and working for the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board but this did not eventuate. Cumberlege’s 1920 report on McNeil stated: A very high standard of officer professionally. He is most zealous and full of resource. If this officer had had chances he would have acquitted himself well during the war. His work during the early days of the war was such as would undoubtedly gained him some distinction. But in those days the Pacific seemed rather far away perhaps. I have known this officer for seven years in various ships and both as mess mates and professionally. I can strongly recommend him for any post and responsibility. A strong quiet character, fit but not active, very self-controlled temperament.11 McNeil remained in Australia until she was decommissioned on 11 December 1921. Australia was later sunk in 1924 as part of the Washington Treaty terms on limiting fleet sizes. In January 1922, McNeil was appointed to the Navy’s shore depot at Garden Island as the RANs coal inspector. The job was to ensure the supply of coal to the Navy was of the right quantity and quality as well as overseeing usage throughout the fleet and proper storage throughout Australia. McNeil visited the major coal fields in Australia and New Zealand to see first-hand the quality of the coal being mined in each location and supplied to the RAN. After six months he was posted to Flinders Naval Depot (HMAS Cerberus), at Westernport Bay, in charge of the Mechanical Training School and also responsible for the depots machinery and attached tenders.

10 The Mercury (Hobart), 9 January 1942, p.3. 11 RAN officer reports from 1911 to the early 1980s were under the ‘closed’ system. Commanding Officers (CO) could write as they pleased & the officer being reported on rarely saw their report. The officer did receive a short precis (known as a flimsy) often only stating, ‘has served to my entire satisfaction’ from their Captain. This allowed the CO to provide a frank & often very blunt appraisal of their subordinates to Navy Office. In McNeil’s case his consistently very good reports really do show the high regard in which he was held. In the 1980s the ‘open’ system was created so that officers could read their reports & be counselled on shortcomings—it also allows for reports to be contested. 34 Australian Naval Review 2016 McNeil returned to Garden Island in January 1923 as the Engineer Manager of the depot and the dockyard. His duties involved overseeing the maintenance and refit of the ships of the Australian Fleet and he remained in this important role until late 1928. This was a period of mixed blessings for the RAN. The peace dividend saw a number of destroyers and submarines gifted to the RAN, by the Royal Navy, but a shrinking defence budget reduced the ability to maintain the fleet. Many ships were laid up in reserve and those ships in commission required regular maintenance; using aging dockyard infrastructure operated by an often unsupportive dockyard labour force riven with political and union factions. For six long hard years McNeil was the link between the Navy and civilian labour force maintaining the RANs warships. His reports for the period show the depth of character of the man: 12 1923: Tactful, determined, mental qualities of a high order. A loyal and capable officer. 1924: A steady and strong character. Administratively very good especially in dealing with civilian labour. 1925: Very energetic and hard-working, very keenly interested in his work. His management of yard employees has shown marked tact and ability, an above average organiser. On 31 December 1928 McNeil was promoted to Engineer Captain. His final report on leaving the dockyard (written by Captain Henry Cayley, Superintendent of the Garden Island Depot) described McNeil as: A most capable officer and a good organiser and has controlled his important department with conspicuous ability and success. The successful management of the dockyard under existing industrial conditions needs an officer of rare ability, tact, good judgement and strength of character. Engineer Captain McNeil possesses all these qualities and I cannot speak too highly of the very valuable services he has rendered as Engineering Manager. His professional ability is exceptional and I have found him always a most loyal officer whose services I am very sorry to lose. He has very good social qualities and will be most missed at Garden Island.13 From February 1929–January 1931 the McNeil family lived in London where Captain McNeil was the Technical Assistant to the Australian Naval Representative based at the Australian High Commission. During this time he completed the Senior Engineer Officers Course at the Royal Naval College Greenwich and also found time to design and patent an ‘Improvement in

12 NAA: A3978, Item 8374980, Officer (RAN) Personal Record— P. E. McNeil 13 Ibid. 35 Australian Naval Review 2016 Screw Propulsion System’ (Patent 5897/30). 14 The McNeil family returned to Australia in February 1931 and set up their home in the Melbourne suburb of Kew. The following month Captain McNeil was appointed to Navy Office, then located in Melbourne, as the Director of Engineering (Naval). He was to serve at Navy Office for the remainder of his career. His first and only Navy Office report stated: An excellent administrator. Very good influence and very tactful, strong personality. His predecessor set up a high standard as Director of Engineering which Engineer Captain McNeil has fully maintained. Very good physical and social qualities. 15 McNeil was promoted to Rear Admiral on 30 June 1934; however he was not appointed as the Third Naval Member (responsible for engineering) despite this position having been vacant since 1922 when Vice Admiral Clarkson 16 retired. . It would appear McNeil was not popular with the First Naval Member (Vice Admiral Sir George Hyde) or the Second Naval Member (Captain Phillip Esmonde Phillips, DSO, RN) who both threatened to resign if McNeil was appointed as Third Naval Member. 17 Despite this animosityhe was appointed as a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (CB), in the King’s Birthday Honours List of June 1936, for his ‘services to naval engineering’.18 McNeil continued to serve as the Director of Engineering (Naval) and oversaw a significant ship building program in the lead up to war in 1939. With the increased militarism from Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan and the rise of Nazi Germany, from 1936 onwards, the major western powers began to re-arm as the likelihood of war increased. Australia was no exception and significant money was spent to increase the capability of the RAN. Three new light cruisers and six old destroyers were obtained from Britain but the building of vessels in Australia also increased. Four Grimsby class sloops were laid down at Cockatoo Island Dockyard with Yarra and Swan commissioned in 1936 and 1937 respectively. Parramatta and Warrego were ordered in 1938 but not commissioned until 1940. The boom defence vessel Kookaburra was also built at Cockatoo Island and commissioned in 1939; she was followed by three more of her type in 1939–40. The elderly cruiser Adelaide was modernised in 1938–39 and recommissioned and the seaplane tender

14 Patent registered by Percival McNeil, McNeil Collection, SPCA. 15 NAA: A3978, Item 8374980, Officer (RAN) Personal Record— P. E. McNeil. 16 The rank of Commodore was not used in this era, except for specialist appointments generally at sea—thus McNeil was promoted directly to Rear Admiral. 17 R Hyslop. Interview with author, 1997. 18 The London Gazette, 26 June 1936. 36 Australian Naval Review 2016 Albatross was brought out of reserve and transferred to the Royal Navy in 1938. At the outbreak of war, however, the RAN had only 13 vessels. Once war was declared in September 1939 the pace of shipbuilding, conversion and arming of merchant vessels increased exponentially and all this activity was overseen byMcNeil. The first of three Tribal class destroyers, Arunta, was laid down in November 1939 and conversion of five merchant vessels, to armed merchant cruisers, was also completed within a few months. The major project, however, for the navy shipbuilders was the production 60 Bathurst class corvettes. 19

One of the 60 Bathurst class corvettes - HMAS Warrnambool. These Australian designed and built ships were arguably Rear Admiral McNeil's greatest achievements. (RAN) The concept for the corvette began in the 1938 when Captain John Collins raised the need for a large number of small sloops for use as coastal minesweepers and anti-submarine vessels. A plan to obtain these from the United Kingdom failed and in mid-1939 the building program was handed to McNeil’s Engineering and Construction Branch. Within a short period of time the design work was completed and on 9 December 1939 the contract to build the lead ship, HMAS Bathurst, was awarded to Cockatoo Island Dockyard. Bathurst was laid down in February 1940 and completed 10 months later.

19 Of the 60 vessels completed, 30 were built for the RAN, 26 for the RN and 4 for the Royal Indian Navy. The RN ships were transferred to, and manned, by the RAN. Two of these vessels still exist today; Castlemaine as a floating museum ship in Victoria and Whyalla as a landlocked display vessel at Whyalla. 37 Australian Naval Review 2016 Over the next three years another 59 corvettes joined her from Cockatoo Island and seven other Australian shipyards.

As Director of Shipbuilding Rear Admiral McNeil oversaw the construction of both naval and merchant shipping including the River Clarence shown here in Melbourne. (State Library of Victoria) On 30 July 1940 Rear Admiral McNeil was finally appointed to the Naval Board as the Third Naval Member and Chief of Naval Construction—even though he had effectively been carrying out the job since 1934! In late 1940 he presented to the War Cabinet a proposal to commence merchant ship building, as he expected that warship building would taper off towards the end of 1941, and there was a shortage of merchant ships for service in Australian waters. As a result the Australian Shipbuilding Board was created with McNeil as the deputy chairman and Director of Shipbuilding. An Australian designed 9,300 ton merchant ship known as the ‘A’ or River class was soon approved and the lead ship the River Clarence was laid down at Cockatoo Island on 29 July 1941. While 60 vessels were planned onlyeight were completed before the end of the war, as Japan’s sudden entry into the war increased warship construction and battle damage repair to many Allied warships. A newspaper article of the time described McNeil as ‘quick thinking’ and ‘work worshipping’ and also paid tribute to his part in expanding Australia’s fleet to its greatest strength since the outbreak of war. 20 McNeil was well-known throughout senior navy circles as a workaholic who put in lengthy hours in Navy Office particularly in the dark days after Japan’s entry into the war. By 1942–43 over a dozen Australian shipyards were in action producing the Bathurst class corvettes, Tribal class destroyers, River and Bay class frigates, Fairmile motor launches and harbour defence motor launches as well as the conversion of armed merchant cruisers to landing ships (infantry).

20 The Mercury (Hobart), 9 January 1942, p. 3. 38 Australian Naval Review 2016 On 25 September 1943, McNeil turned 60 and was required to retire from naval service. Due to his skill and ability he was immediately appointed as the Director of Merchant Ship Building (Department of Munitions) and continued to serve in this role for the remainder of the war and into the immediate post war years; which saw a resurgence in Australian merchant ship building. In late 1947 McNeil suffered serious heart problems and stood down from his position in March 1948, although he remained in a part time advisory role for another 12 months. In March 1949 he ceased this work and could now be considered to be fully retired, but continued to keep abreast of shipbuilding methods and engineering improvements and undertook design work for ships boilers and hatches. In March 1951 McNeil offered his services to the Liberal and Country Party as a Senate candidate for election to be held on 28 April 1951.21 His offer was not accepted because he had applied too late to be considered. This proved to be a moot point as on 17 April 1951, Percival Edwin McNeil died at Caulfield Repatriation General Hospital, from cardiac failure and coronary sclerosis. Following a small private funeral service in Toorak, where the family had moved in the late 1930s, he was cremated at Springvale Crematorium. He was survived by his wife, three children and four grandchildren. Throughout the 1930s McNeil had played a pivotal role in preparing the RAN for the coming war and once hostilities commenced he supervised the largest shipbuilding program ever conducted by Australia with over 100 vessels of various types produced. While quickly forgotten in the post war era, he can be considered the father of Australian Naval shipbuilding.

About the Author Commander Greg Swinden has extensive sea and operational experience and has written extensively on naval history. His books have included First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli (with Tom Frame), HMAS Melbourne - The Forgotten Cruiser and HMAS Adelaide 1922-1946: A short history of the cruiser.

21 P.E. McNeil, Letter to Liberal Country Party, March 1951, ‘McNeil Collection’, SPCA. 39 Australian Naval Review 2016

2016 McNeill Prize Winner

The inaugural recipient of the McNeill Prize was Mr Ian Croser AM, the co-founder of CEA Technologies. He was presented the award by the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN in the presence of members of the McNeil family.

Mr Croser, through his remarkable vision, perseverance, determination & a dogged desire for excellence had successfully developed unique radar and communications systems from the ground up. As a consequence the RAN, the ADF & the nation are now reaping significant benefits from his prodigious engineering talent & technical leadership.

40 Australian Naval Review 2016

Australia’s naval shipbuilding plans: guided by strategy or industry? By Dr Andrew Davies

Australia is about to embark on an ambitious program of naval ship and submarine building that will see the Royal Australian Navy grow in size and fighting weight. Given the growing strategic competition in the western Pacific between the United States and China, it reflects a decision by the Australian government to make a greater commitment to the ANZUS alliance and to help underwrite the status quo maritime order in the region. However, there is a marked disparity between the sense of strategic urgency as reflected in the 2016 Defence White Paper and the timescale on which the larger fleet will be delivered from Australian shipyards. Because of the government’s desire to establish rolling production of ships and submarines, driven in large part by political considerations, the pace of delivery is leisurely compared to the rate of strategic change as measured by its own assessments in successive Defence White Papers. That is especially true in the case of the future submarines: on current plans the RAN’s submarine fleet will reach twelve boats only in the late 2040s. On balance, successive Australian governments have managed to produce a significant disconnect between the nations defence strategy and defence industry policy settings.

Introduction – where we are now The RAN is in good shape, especially compared to where it was a decade ago. During the 1990s and 2000s the post Cold War ‘peace dividend’ caught up with the service. Submarine availability was consistently poor, and fell to effectively nothing at one stage in 2009. 22 The ageing S-70B-2 Seahawk fleet became increasingly difficult to support 23 and attempts to supplement naval combat aviation with the SH-2G Super Seasprite were written off after the expenditure of $1.4 billion. 24 The RAN’s post–Cold War ASW capability atrophied badly.

22 The 2009/10 Financial Year seems to have been the worst year on record for the Collins class. For aggregated annual data see Andrew Davies, Graphs of the week: Finally getting the Collins we paid for, ASPI Strategist, 27 Oct 2016. The absolute nadir was a short period in 2011 when no boats were available for tasking, a situation that made headlines. See: Cameron Stewart, Not a single submarine seaworthy, The Australian, 10 Jun 2011. 23 In 2009, then Chief of Navy Russ Crane observed that 'The Seahawk is the heart of our current helicopter force, and while continuing to provide sterling service, they are now 20 years old and specialist replacement parts are becoming increasingly difficult to find to keep them flying'. See Navy comments on ASPI's naval aviation Special Report, Department of Defence, Feb 27, 2009. 24 The sorry tale was told by the Australian National Audit Office's (ANAO) audit report The Super Seasprite, 17 June, 2009. 41 Australian Naval Review 2016 Experienced ASW operators were hard to replace, and ASW systems lapsed into obsolescence, with a reliance primarily on medium frequency hull- mounted sonar systems and helicopter deployed sonobuoys. The RAN had no dipping sonar capability after 1996, when the capability was removed from the Seaking helicopter fleet. 25 On the project side, upgrades to the Perry class FFGs and the warfighting improvement program (WIP) for the Anzac class frigates proved difficult to implement. The WIP was essentially abandoned and a new approach sought to provide the class with a local air defence capability that was fit for purpose. Fleet wide air defence was to have to wait until the Hobart class DDGs would be delivered over a decade after project approval in 2006. Problems with the FFG upgrade resulted in years of schedule slippage and higher costs than originally thought. Two FFGs were retired to free up the funds to upgrade the remaining four, which were delivered back into service only after years of delay. 26 There were some failures on the weapons front as well. Despite much effort and expense, the modernisation of the ADF’s lightweight ASW torpedo was only partially successful, with integration of the chosen MU-90 weapon onto embarked helicopters and the RAAF’s AP-3Cs abandoned. 27 While the approval by government in 2007 of the construction of two Canberra class LHDs and three Hobart class DDGs (which are regrettably likely to be forever known as ‘air warfare destroyers’) promised a significant future capability boost and much needed modernisation, the RAN faced problems keeping older vessels going in the shorter term. As was the case with the submarines, the amphibious fleet suffered from poor availability, to the point where no vessel could be provided to government when Cyclone Yasi threatened Australia’s east coast in 2011. 28 Given those circumstances, the Navy did a fine job to keep an Australian frigate on station in either the Middle East area of operations or off the east coast of Africa on for well over a decade. 29 But, overall, Navy’s comparative war fighting capability steadily decreased as the sustained economic success of Asia resulted

25 There have been numerous internal reviews into the ADF's ASW capability since 1990. The author was the lead author on one such review in the late 1990s. Some of the capability shortfalls identified in that study have been addressed, while other capability areas continue to languish. 26 The ANAO annual Major Projects Report has tracked the FFG and Anzac upgrades and extensive data can be found in the series. 27 The MU-90 lightweight torpedo project was the subject of multiple ANAO performance audits. The 2013 report Remediation of the Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Project is the most recent. 28 More unfortunate headlines for Navy, such as Neglect of amphibious fleet triggers Defence inquiry, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 Feb, 2011. 29 The list of RAN deployments to the Middle East theatre of operations is extensive. See: Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ List_of_recent_Australian_warship_deployments_to_the_Middle_East 42 Australian Naval Review 2016 in a steady increase in regional naval capabilities. In particular, Australia’s ASW capability was declining at the same time as the number and quality of submarines in the Indo–Pacific region was increasing. In the maritime domain, the ‘capability edge’ that successive Australian governments had banked on in successive Defence White Papers was being slowly eroded. Many of the capability enhancements announced in the 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP2009) were actually re-announcements of existing acquisition activities or plans, but there were some genuinely new and significant naval initiatives. The most newsworthy was a doubling of the submarine fleet from six to twelve vessels. That development was tied directly to a more pessimistic assessment of the strategic landscape than had been the case in prior White Papers: … the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. In the same passage, the government recognised the asymmetric value of submarines, noting that … a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force theywould have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us. 30 DWP 2009 also set in motion programs to replace the Anzac frigates with larger and more capable vessels. The eight new vessels would replace the Anzacs one for one, but would be larger and, … designed and equipped with a strong emphasis on submarine detection and response operations. They will be equipped with an integrated sonar suite that includes a long-range active towed-array sonar, and be able to embark a combination of naval combat helicopters and maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 31 According to DWP 2009, a fleet of new naval combat helicopters would be acquired ‘as a matter of urgency’. (The cancellation of the Super Seasprite project was announced the following month.) The result was the acquisition of

30 Defence White Paper: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030, Australian Government, 2009. (Paragraph 8.40) 31 Ibid. Paragraph 9.13. 43 Australian Naval Review 2016 24 new build MH-60R Seahawks, which brought with them a modern ASW torpedo and reintroduced dipping sonar to the RAN’s suite of ASW capabilities for the first time in 20 years. The other major naval capabilityannouncement in DWP 2009 was the planned acquisition of 20 multirole offshore patrol vessels to replace the Armidale class patrol boats along with the Huon class coastal minehunters and RAN hydrographic vessels. With an expected displacement of 2,000 tons, that would have represented a significant increase in the capability of the RAN’s minor vessels fleet in terms of endurance and seakeeping, with the larger hulls allowing additional sensor and weapons suites to be fitted. 32 Unfortunately for the ADF, the ambitious plans of DWP2009 did not last long. As the full impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and the accompanying end of the mining boom became obvious, successive governments cut defence funding and prioritised other areas of government activity. As a result, the shipbuilding and submarine projects made little substantive progress until they were revived when the Abbott government came to power in 2013. There were several factors at play. The new conservative government was more inclined to prioritise defence than its predecessors, and the politics of shipyards, particularly in South Australia, also played a role. But perhaps the most significant factor was a shift in the external strategic environment which resulted in an outlook that was less congenial to Australia’s interests than was previously the case. With the East and South China seas being front and centre in regional tensions, there was a recognition in wider defence circles that the maritime plans outlined in DWP 2009 needed a push along. That was especially true of the future submarine project. Years of essentially no progress meant that there was an increasing prospect of a future capabilitygap when the Collins class was retired from service. Consistent with the need to move things along, the Abbott and Turnbull governments have made a number of important naval announcements over the past couple of years. Competitive evaluation processes for the three largest naval programs have so far resulted in the selection of DCNS as Australia’s submarine design partner and shortlisting of candidates for the future frigate and offshore patrol vessel. 33 On the industrial side, there are plans to instigate a 'rolling production' model for submarines and a 'continuous production' model for warships.34 A recent restructuring of the government-owned ASC

32 Ibid. Paragraphs 9.20–9.22. 33 Prime Minister, Minister for Defence – Joint media release – Future submarine program, 26 April 2016. 34 The difference in terminology reflects an anticipation of continuous building of surface vessels, but allows for the possibility that there will be periods of shipyard inactivity between submarine builds. See Andrew Davies & Mark Thomson, When is rolling submarine production not continuous?, ASPI Strategist 6 Apr 2016. 44 Australian Naval Review 2016 into three separate business entities gives the government considerable scope to adjust its industrial plans as selection process are completed and business partners selected. 35 The ownership structure of the nation’s shipyards is especiallyimportant given the challenges of managing any de-facto monopolies that emerge in the continuous/rolling production approaches. Perhaps most importantly, the government has so far made good on its promised timetable of increasing defence spending to 2% of GDP in the early 2020s. It is not possible for current governments to dictate the spending priorities of their successors, but the funding trajectory currently has bipartisan support. So, barring another economic shock, it seems that this time the money will be available to execute the plans. 36 The interregnum between DWPs 2009 and 2016 was not entirely lost time in terms of the RAN’s capabilities. Over that period, some important work was done to introduce new hardware into the fleet and to improve the management of extant capability. As well as its new Seahawks, the Navy has taken delivery of its two LHDs, and acquired a relatively new amphibious vessel in the form of the second-hand HMAS Choules, thereby addressing many of the problems with the amphibious fleet. Deliveryof the three new DDGs is imminent (though several years late) and the fleet’s air warfare capabilityhas also been boosted by the success of the Anzac anti-ship missile defence system built around the indigenous CEAFAR radar and SAAB’s 9LV combat system. In terms of self- defence against air threats, the upgraded Anzacs are probably the most capable vessels of their size anywhere in the world. The tension between strategy and industry While the twin factors of strategic imperatives and industrial politics has finally seen some real progress in naval shipbuilding projects, they also create problems. There is a tension between strategic urgency on one hand, which argues for a short- to medium-term buildup of fleet capability, and the need for a long-term industrysolution on the other, which necessarilyhas an eye on the longer term. The basic problem is that a sustainable industry needs to a steady flow of work. Peaks and troughs in demand, which are typical of a project based approach to production scheduling, complicates the retention of critical skills. An example is the so-called ‘valley of death’ the ASC workforce is currently entering as work on the DDGs (‘air warfare destroyers’) winds down before follow-on builds commence. The total number of shipyard jobs is now in decline, and work in yards in Victoria and NSW that produced modules for the DDGs has come to an end. The political factors at work led to a government announcement that the cutting of steel on the OPVs will begin in 2018, with work to commence on

35 Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson, Interpreting the ASC split, ASPI Strategist, 12 Oct 2016. 36 Mark Thomson, The no-surprises Defence budget, ASPI Strategist, 3 May 2016. 45 Australian Naval Review 2016 the future frigates in 2020.37 As explained later, holding to those dates will significantly increase project risks. And while blue collar ‘steel bending’ activities are the most visible, the effect of discontinuous work is seen across the range of trades in the shipbuilding enterprise. The recruiting and retention of skilled white collar workers for design and production engineering work is likely to be even more challenging than the trades required for the actual construction phase. The ideal situation, at least from the point of view of maintaining a steady state industrial capability, is a continuous workflow, with concurrent building and design work. It is relatively easy to see how that works on the building side. A model in which the navy retires one vessel as a new one is delivered allows continuous production, and a steady-state workforce. But there are at least two complications with that model. First, if steady production is the goal, the fleet needs to be large enough for the lifetime of vessels to be long enough to to achieve a reasonable return on the capital invested in the assets before replacing them. Second, if the aim is to sustain an end-to-end capability, there

‘....the fleet’s air warfare capability has also been boosted by the success of the Anzac anti-ship missile defence system built around the indigenous CEAFAR radar and SAAB’s 9LV combat system.’ Here HMAS Anzac ploughs through a rough sea. (RAN)

37 Prime Minister, Minister for Defence & Chief of Navy, Shipbuilding announcement, 18 April 2016. 46 Australian Naval Review 2016 needs to be enough design and production engineering work to keep that professional workforce gainfully occupied. In other words, there is a critical mass of both vessel numbers and types required in order to be able to support an efficient industrial arrangement. For larger navies that is possible to do, although gradually declining fleet sizes are exerting pressure on naval shipbuilding sectors of even the largest countries. Among western nations, even the United States, which fields around 400 major vessels of various types, has seen some significant consolidation of its shipyards, and has a mixed record in designing and producing new classes. The DDG-1000, Seawolf submarines and Ford class carriers have all run well over cost, and production numbers have suffered as a result. The DDG-51 destroyers and Virginia class submarines have been success stories. But even the US has turned to foreign designers for one of the Littoral Combat Ship types. The story in the UK is even less happy. Due to a shrinking demand for vessels for the RN, the UK has essentially reduced its once diverse naval shipbuilding sector to a single monopoly supplier, and is having to sequence and modify its force structure modernisation to suit industrial needs rather than purely in response to strategic and operational needs—and the results are as costly as they are delayed.38 For Australia, either the size of the navy imposes some serious constraints on the shipbuilding sector, or the shipbuilding sector will come to influence Navy’s decision making on its future requirements. There will be a tension between maintaining a reasonable production rate (probably no less than a major vessel every two years) and the cost of replacing vessels before they have exhausted an efficient fraction of their design life. A back of the envelope calculation shows the problem for the RAN. With a 12 major surface combatant fleet (three DDGs & nine future frigates), a two year delivery drumbeat means that each vessel will have a service life of 24 years. That lifetime is probably too long to avoid having to do an upgrade to avoid obsolescence at some stage, but is substantially shorter than the usual 30 year lifetime—which might effectively increase the capital cost of the fleet. (A forthcoming ASPI paper on the economic relationship between warship lifetimes and upgrade paths will examine this point in much more detail.) 39 For the purpose of testing government policy as it stands today, it is enough to note that that the delivery of a vessel every two years will mean that there are long periods between design and production engineering work—with a resulting loss of white collar expertise. A faster delivery rate would help alleviate that problem, as would an approach of spiral development, with ships

38 Andrew Davies & James Mugg, Continuous shipbuilding in the UK, ASPI Strategist, 17 May 2016. 39 Working title: a comparative analysis of two warship acquisition strategies. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, for release in the first quarter of 2017. 47 Australian Naval Review 2016 built in ‘flights’ of small number, but either approach would exacerbate the additional cost issue. The risk is that we will instead end up with a steady state shipyard program but will nonetheless still have to deal with a boom-and-bust design and engineering regime. In fact, it would be surprising if that did not occur, as even the United States struggles with delays and cost overruns just about every time it commences work on a new class of vessels. But those are all problems that the government (and Navy) could choose to live with if the industrial strategy delivered the right force structure for the nation’s circumstances. Ultimately, defence capability decisions should be driven by strategy rather than industry. The capability conclusions drawn from the strategic assessments in the 2009 and 2016 white papers were unambiguous— Australia needs more naval capability to deal with strategic changes that are already taking place. But the government’s preferred industrial strategy, as explained above, works best at a pace of delivery that is glacially slow compared to the current rate of strategic change. The future submarines are a case in point. A doubling in the size of the submarine fleet is widely seen as a reasonable military response to shifts in regional power. But all indications, we won’t see the fleet grow beyond its current size until sometime in the late 2030s, and the 12th future submarine will not be delivered until the late 2040s. 40 In the meantime, some of the Collins will have to be retained in service until the second half of the 2030s. In other words, the considered view of the Australian government is that there is reason to worry about current strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific (and rightly so in this author’s opinion. There is much scope to debate the relative importance and implications of strategic changes, and there is no one school of thought regarding Australia’s most appropriate force structure response. For example, a ‘balanced force’ has been a consistent line of argument from the Defence establishment, while others have argued for a force structure that is more focused in particular capability areas.41 But the purpose of this analysis is not to survey thinking on Australia’s strategic circumstances, but to examine the extant Australian government policy position for consistency—a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be correct. The conclusion that successive governments have come to based on the best advice from their intelligence agencies and from Defence is that a larger

40 The Future Submarine Program website of the Defence Capability Acquisition & Sustainment Group says that ' Construction of the 12 new submarines will extend into the late 2040s to 2050 timeframe'. 41 Hugh White, for example, has argued for a greater emphasis on air power and submarines, at the expense of surface and land capabilities: A focused force: Australia's defence priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute, 2009. 48 Australian Naval Review 2016 and more capable surface combatant force and 12 new submarines is the core of an appropriate force structure response to our strategic circumstances.

The first of the RAN’s new destroyers Hobart conducting trials off Adelaide. (RAN) The disconnect in the strategy comes when we factor in the concomitant defence industry policy and the associated desire for a sustainable naval shipbuilding sector. The net result is that the government is prepared to wait 30 years to put that force in place. That is an obvious disconnect in our national strategy. If we really need to spend tens of billions of dollars on new naval platforms to hedge against the strategic challenges that we see coming, then we need to do it on a suitable timescale. That could entail either buying vessels from established production lines overseas, or ramping up local efforts to deliver faster, with the key deliverable being a larger and more capable fleet, rather than a long term industry capability. Batches of warships can be delivered relatively quickly, even from Australian shipyards that are starting from a low baseline. For example, the 10 Anzac frigates were launched in a ten year period from 1994 to 2004, and the six Collins submarines from 1993 to 2001. However, that leads to a ‘boom and bust’ cycle of shipyard activity. The 2015 RAND Corporation report into Australian shipbuilding argued that the costs associated with those peaks and troughs in activities could be ameliorated bycontinuous build. 42But even if that is the case—and RAND’s analysis is contested - 43 -any extra costs that accrue

42 Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise, RAND Corporation, 2015. 43 Mark Thomson, Naval deconstruction: RAND’s shipbuilding report, The Strategist, 5 May, 2015. 49 Australian Naval Review 2016 should be weighed against the strategic costs of the slower delivery model. If Australia had the luxury of a benign strategic environment, it wouldn’t matter which option was chosen—two or three decades from now the RAN would be at its steady state strength. The next section examines the plausibility of that assumption, based on the government’s own strategic analyses. How long do we have? On current trends, the strategic competition we are hoping to influence will have played out—one way or another—before we have the hardware we think we need. In that context, it is instructive to look at the assessment of the US-China military balance in the past three substantive Defence White Papers. DWP 2000 China, as the country with the fastest growing security influence in the region, is an increasingly important strategic interlocutor for Australia.44 DWP 2009 In Northeast Asia, China is likely to be able to continue to afford its foreshadowed core military modernisation. Over the long term, this could affect the strategic reach and global postures of the major powers. There are many potential strategic scenarios that could emerge. Any future that might see a potential contraction of US strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region, with a requirement for allies and friends to do more in their own regions, would adversely affect Australian interests, regional stability and global security. 45 DWP 2016 While China will not match the global strategic weight of the United States, the growth of China’s national power, including its military modernisation, means China’s policies and actions will have a major impact on the stability of the Indo-Pacific to 2035. China’s Navy is now the largest in Asia. By 2020 China’s submarine force is likely to grow to more than 70 submarines. China also possesses the largest air force in Asia, and is pursuing advanced fifth-generation fighter aircraft capabilities. China’s military modernisation includes more-capable Special Forces, aviation and command and control networks and it is also investing in new technologies including space and cyber capabilities. 46

44 Defence White Paper, Defence 2000: our future defence force, Australian Government, 2000. Paragraph 5.25. 45 Defence White Paper 2009, op. cit., paragraph 4.12. 46 2016 Defence White Paper, Australian Government, 2000. Paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11. 50 Australian Naval Review 2016 In just the 15 years that elapsed between the development of the 2000 and 2016 white papers, the Australian government’s assessment of China’s increasing capabilities went from being almost incidental to having ‘a major impact’ on the region’s stability in the next two decades. The dates included in the DWP 2016 discussion are especially apposite to this discussion. The authors of the White Paper worry about the stabilityof the Indo-Pacific in 2035 —which might be just after the first of Australia’s future submarines has been commissioned, and still 15 years before the fleet will reach the 12 boats currently planned. Meanwhile, the PLA-N will likely have ‘more than 70 submarines’ just four years from now. If the Australian government is taking the strategic assessments coming out of its intelligence agencies (which underpin white paper discussions) seriously, it needs to be thinking about ways of expeditiously increasing our military power. Otherwise, if there is a strategic shock of some kind, such as escalation of the current territorial disputes in the South or East China Seas, or a conflict sparked by North Korea, we could find ourselves wanting more defence capability much sooner than is currently planned. In that case, we would have two broad options. We could try to increase the local production rate in order to grow fleet capability and capacity sooner, with all of the challenges of suddenly finding the required skills and capacity in a local industry gearing up for a long steady production run. Alternatively, we could supplement local production with purchases from overseas suppliers, but at a time when other nations will presumably also be in the market for equipment coming off the production lines. Either way, we would struggle to acquire capability quickly enough for it to play a role in whatever contingency played out. We could be fortunate. The current strategic changes that are worrying the White Paper’s authors could playout in a benign way. It might be, for example, that the South China Sea and the ‘nine dash line’ is the limit of China’s ambition, and that once it has secured the area to its satisfaction it will gets on with business and a ‘new normal’ strategic equilibrium will emerge. In that case, our leisurely timetable for fleet recapitalisation will be acceptable—and we could even find ourselves revising our plans for fleet expansion downwards. But hope is not a strategy, and there are many potential security problems beyond the South China Sea, including Taiwan, North Korea and the East China Sea. Defence planning is not about preparing for the best; the expanded and upgraded fleet is on the books to help shape the regional security balance and provide a hedge if things do not run to plan. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Australia’s current policy settings are wrong for the nation’s strategic circumstances.

51 Australian Naval Review 2016 The naval shipbuilding program Despite the disconnect identified above, we are where we are, and there seems to be little prospect—absent a strategic crisis—of the government adopting a faster approach to naval force structure. The question then becomes how best to manage the processes we have to get the best capability and efficiency outcomes. Given the discussion above, it is ironic that industry considerations rather than strategic circumstances are driving any current sense of urgency. The 2018 and 2020 dates for the start of construction work on the future frigates and offshore patrol vessels are being driven by a desire to replenish work for the currently dwindling workforce in the Adelaide shipyards. The danger is that there might be too much haste for prudent project management. The history of developmental projects shows that starting production before the design and production engineering are mature is a recipe for schedule and cost problems later. The best practice is for production to begin only after key systems engineering steps have been completed. Data compiled by the US Government Accountability Office clearly shows the disadvantage of starting production prematurely. 47 In particular, requirements changes after production has begun result in an average additional cost overrun of 50% and years of delay. A more acerbic description of the same effects can be found in Augustine’s Law Number XXIV: ‘The only thing more costly than stretching the schedule of an established project is accelerating it, which is itself the most costly action known to man’.48 Given the recent comment from the Finance Minister that the selection of the successful bidder for the OPV build will be delayed until 2017, 49 it seems unlikely that anything like the GAO’s identified level of project maturity could be achieved before work is to begin in 2018—unless an almost completely off- the-shelf design is adopted, with no significant modification for Australian operational or regulatory requirements. Similar considerations apply to the future frigates. We are yet to learn who will be the successful bidder in the competitive evaluation process. And these are considerably more complex vessels than the OPVs, with a substantial amount of development work likely to be required if the Commonwealth persists with its strategy of ‘Australianising’ the vessels by replacing the radar system on the winning vessel with the locally designed CEAFAR radar. The flow-on

47 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, Government Accountability Office, Mar 30, 2009. 48 Norman R. Augustine, Augustine’s Laws (2nd edition), American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, New York, 1983. 49 Julian Kerr, Possible delay to start of Australian OPV construction, Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 October 2016. 52 Australian Naval Review 2016 consequences of that change would be a significant rework of (at least) the superstructure, and a replacement (or complex modification) of the combat system. Experience with the upgrades of the Adelaide class FFGs is pertinent here. Reporting from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reveals that the then DMO significantly underestimated the nature and scale of the work required. 50 As noted earlier, the result was years of delay and a descoping of the upgrade from six vessels to four, with two being retired to free up funds. That experience is not unique. ANAO data collected over many years and projects shows that ‘Australianising’ hardware is a reliable indicator for project management problems, including project delays that average out at 34% of the original schedule estimate.51 A useful rule of thumb is ‘the more Australianisation, the longer the delay’. In short, we have all of the ingredients in place for a delay-plagued shipbuilding program—and an even longer timeframe for the recapitalisation of the fleet than is currently planned. Conclusion Successive Australian governments have managed to plan themselves into a deeply contradictory position in terms of the nation’s naval power. Defence documents talk of increasingly pressing strategic circumstances, with significant changes expected in the next two decades. A larger and more capable fleet is a major component of the planned military response to those strategic changes. But the procurement strategy for new fleet units is centred on the development of an enduring domestic naval shipbuilding enterprise, with the inevitable consequence of pushing timeframes out beyond the window of strategic change. If the government is serious about responding to perceived strategic circumstances with a naval buildup, it would be examining faster ways to procure capable vessels. That might include looking to established overseas production lines for suitable warships, running domestic projects on a more compressed timeframe than is required in a continuous production model, or both.

About the Author Dr Davies has been with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute since 2006. He has written extensively on ADF capability issues & decision-making in the Department of Defence. Before joining ASPI he was a post doctoral fellow in physics at Melbourne University & the ANU. He then spent twelve years in the Department of Defence in the areas of capability analysis & intelligence.

50 ANAO Major Projects Report, op. cit. 51 For a summary of the ANAO's findings, see Andrew Davies, The auditor's latest view of Defence acquisition, ASPI Strategist, 13 Mar 2015. 53 Australian Naval Review 2016

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54 Australian Naval Review 2016

Raid on Goodenough Island: Australia’s First Amphibious Operation in the Second World War by Associate Professor Peter Dean

Introduction On 22 October 1942 two destroyers HMA Ships Arunta and Stuart embarked the 2/12th battalion Australian Imperial Force (AIF) as well as a small detachment from the 2/5th Field Ambulance and a signal section from the 7th Australian Division.1 This force was to conduct the first Australian amphibious operation since the landing at Gallipoli in 1915. The landing troops, known as Drake Force, were tasked with a raid on Goodenough Island; located in the D'Entrecasteaux Island group some 25 km north of the Papua coast and 130 km from Milne Bay. After performing a landing operation Drake Force were to destroy the 300 Japanese Naval Infantry located on the island and ‘determine the practicability of channels and approaches to Goodenough Island for supply purposes’ and ‘to determine the practicability of the terrain for the constn [sic] of air fields.’2 Thereafter if the island proved unsuitable for the development of airfields the force would withdraw to Milne Bay; if found suitable the 2/12th battalion group would withdraw as soon as a relieving force of militia and airfield constructions troops arrived. The decision to launch the raid on Goodenough Island was part of the movement from a strategic and operationally defensive posture by the Allies in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) to an offensive one. The utilisation of amphibious operations was to be a key component in achieving victory against the Japanese in the Pacific War. In line with these first tentative offensive moves the operation against Goodenough Island was not a full blown amphibious assault but rather, in the modern parlance, a classical amphibious raid, that being: ‘an operation involving a swift incursion into or the temporary

1 Operational Order (OO) No.1, 21 October 1942, 2/12th Infantry Battalion, War Diary 2/12th battalion AWM52 8/3/12/9 October-December 1942. 2 New Guinea Force (NGF) Operational Instruction No. 39, 17 October 1942, War Diary, NGF, AWM52 1/5/51/19 - October 1942. 55 Australian Naval Review 2016 occupation of an objective to accomplish an assigned mission followed by a planned withdrawal. 3 Drake Force’s mission was to prove to be an inglorious start to amphibious warfare in the SWPA. Intelligence incorrectly stated that the Japanese were hungry, demoralised and possessed limited equipment and weapons. 4 Poor preparation meant that the 2/12th battalion had neither time for proper 5 reconnaissance or rehearsals for their mission. With local maritime and air superiority being highly contested the threat of intervention by Japanese naval and air power remained high and this further restricted the scope and support available for the operation. Compounding these factors was the systemic neglect of amphibious warfare in the Australian military in the inter-war period that meant that no one in the Australian Military Forces or the RAN in the SWPA in 1942 had much of an understanding of the complexity of such operations. Thus while this first step in amphibious operations was to prove to be an important operational success for the Allies, at the tactical level it was to prove just how far the Australian military had to go in order to master the art of amphibious warfare. In assessing the raid on Goodenough Island this article will evaluate the performance of the army and naval units involved, the intelligence, planning, support elements as well as the overall executive of the operation. In doing so it will highlight the strategic utility of amphibious operations as well as the difficulties, complexity and risks involved, especially when conducted by naval and militaryforces that lack specialist equipment and were neither trained nor experienced in amphibious warfare. Strategic Situation As October 1942 unfolded in the SWPA the strategic situation for the Allies in Papua was steadily improving. The second Japanese amphibious assault on Papua had been defeated at Milne Bay in August (the first having resulted in the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942). Soon after, in September 1942, the Japanese overland assault on Port Moresby via the Kokoda Trail had been turned back. By this time the pendulum had started to swing in the Allies’ favour with increasing Allied air power in Papua resulting in the Allied Naval Force (ANF) being able to established sea control in the Coral Sea and also

3 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.2 Amphibious Operations (edition 2), Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009; Joint Publication 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, United States Department of Defense, 18 July 2014, p. IV-I. 4 Operations Goodenough Island 22-26 October 1942: Lessons from Operations – No. 4, RG407 98 GHQ1-3.2 G-3 journal and files, November 1942, Box 604, U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, Maryland (NARA); A Graeme-Evans, Of Storms and Rainbows: The Story of the men of the 2/12th Battalion A.I.F., Volume 2, 12th Battalion Association, Hobart, p.182. 5 War Diary 2/12th Battalion, Oct-Dec 1942, AWM52 8/3/12. The battalion was notified of the mission on 19 October, an air reconnaissance by the CO & Major Gatehouse was undertake on 20 October, planning was undertaken on 21 October & the mission launched on 22 October. 56 Australian Naval Review 2016 being able to contest Japanese sea control around the north-eastern tip of New Guinea and into the Solomon Sea.

6 The key role for the ANF during this stage of the Papuan campaign was to maintain the sea lines of communication to New Guinea to ensure the regular flow of logistics and troops to the region; to prosecute anti-submarine warfare; maintain sea control in the waters to the south of Papua; support the expansion of allied control around the eastern tip of New Guinea and into the Solomon 7 Sea; and establish control over the critical littoral areas around Papua. With only limited forces available, including no amphibious craft and limited numbers of destroyers and light cruisers, the ANF was heavily stretched in maintaining these operational imperatives. However in October 1942 the ANF were now tasked with preparing for Operation ‘Lilliput’ – the establishment of a sea line of commination from Milne Bay to Buna along the north coast of Papua; an area in which the allies lacked air and sea control. 8

The Allied victory at Coral Sea in May 1942 had allowed General Douglas MacArthur’s SWPA to plan for offensive operations in Papua and New Guinea in mid-1942. However the Allies efforts to establish an airfield and forward

6 At this time the island of New Guinea was broken into three territories: Papua - the southeastern portion where the operations during 1942 were undertaken & British New Guinea where the 1943 campaign was undertaken. This corresponds to the modern nation state of Papua New Guinea. The western half of the island, now Irian Jaya, was known as Dutch New Guinea. 7 I Pfenningwerth, ‘A Novel Experience: The RAN in 1942, defending Australian waters’, in PJ Dean (ed.), Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2013, pp.185-192. 8 Operations Instructions, No. 21, ‘“Lilliput’, General Headquarters (GHQ) Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 20 October 1942, RG407 98-GHQ1-3.2 G-3 Journal and Files Box 573, NARA. 57 Australian Naval Review 2016 operating base at Buna on the north coast of Papua had been thwarted by the Japanese who had landed a sizable ground force at this location in July 1942, only weeks before MacArthur’s troops were due to arrive. Soon thereafter the US Marine Corps (USMC) landing at Guadalcanal in August 1942 caused the Japanese command at Rabaul to refocus their centre of gravity away from the SWPA to the South Pacific. The Japanese area HQ at Rabaul now had to contend with widely dispersed operations in both Papua and Guadalcanal and as such they invested the vast majority of their naval power in the waters around the Solomon Islands. This also drained off the vast majority of the major Allied, especially US naval assets, in the SWPA. 9 After landing at Buna in July 1942 Major Genera Tomitar Horii’s South Sea Detachment’s advanced on Port Moresby via the Kokoda Trail, a feat that proved much more difficult than the Japanese anticipated. Logistics and force concentration issues along with the stubborn Australian resistance on the Kokoda Trial and the Japanese command prioritising the actions around Guadalcanal meant that the Japanese 17th Army soon ordered Horii onto the defensive. Yet despite Guadalcanal taking priority, the Japanese still maintained a considerable force in Papua. In addition the difficulties facing the Allies, especially in terms of concentrating effective land, air and sea power in Papua, meant that the relative balance between the opposing forces in the SWPA throughout 1942 was narrow. The major consequence of the delicate balance in air and naval power between the two sides in Papua meant that the operations there took on the characteristics of a largely attrition style campaign. One of the reasons for this was the fact that the fighting in Papua was a classic case of a land campaign being fought in a maritime environment as neither side could concentrate enough maritime power to enable the ocean to be used as a large scale manoeuvre space.10 However by September 1942 the drain on the Japanese due to the Guadalcanal campaign meant that the size and scope of the Allied force in Papua started to edge ahead of the Japanese and this opened up options for the expansion of operations. The most critical need for the allies to prosecute the next stage of operations against the Japanese in the low lying coastal zones of northern Papua was the establishment of a coastal supply line to the Buna area. As the 7th Australian Division descended out of the Owen Stanley Mountains and compressed the Japanese into a small area around Buna-Gona-Sanananda a coastal supply line was critical to enable allied operations, especially as overland supply was exceptionally limited and air power could not provide anywhere near an adequate level of logistic support. This coastal supply line was of considerable risk, especially given the contested nature of sea and air

9 S.E. Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-Feburary 1943, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II Vol. 5, Naval Institute Press, 1949. 10 For more details see PJ Dean, ‘To the Jungle Shore: Australia and Amphibious Warfare in the South West Pacific Area, 1942-1945’, Global War Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2014, pp. 64-94. 58 Australian Naval Review 2016 control in these waters during this period of the war. Furthermore the Allies in the SWPA were constantly worried about a potential transfer (even a temporary one) of Japanese naval power from Guadalcanal to the waters around Papua. In particular MacArthur and the Australian Commander-in- Chief General Thomas Blamey remained concerned about another Japanese amphibious assault on Milne Bay. Allied intelligences services and the use of ULTRA signals intelligence constantly reiterated potential Japanese moves in this direction.11 MacArthur and his GHQ also lived in constant fear that the USMC would be defeated at Guadalcanal and that the Japanese would be able to concentrate all of their power against the SWPA.12 Operation Drake After the failed August assault on Milne Bay about 300 Japanese from the 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force had been stranded on Goodenough Island. Theyhad been using Goodenough as a staging post for the assault on Milne Bay but had become marooned there when RAAF aircraft had destroyed their landing barges.13 The Japanese had attempted to remove these troops on 11 September 1942 however the rescue ship, the Japanese destroyer Yayoi, had been sunk by the allied air forces with the Yayoi survivors washing up on neighbouring Fergusson Island. On 22 September the destroyer HMAS Stuart put a small shore partyon Fergusson Island from the 2/10th battalion to round up the 80 odd survivors from the Yayoi, however they only collected eight sailors, the majority having been rescued by submarine. 14 These moves set up the circumstances for the establishment of Operation ‘Drake’. Two of MacArthur and Blamey’s highest priorities were the security of Milne Bay and the establishment of a costal supply line to the Buna area: the continued existence of the Sasebo troops on Goodenough Island threatened both. To the Allies the Sasebo troops represented a threat, in that they could be reinforced and resupplied with landing craft in order to prosecute another attack on Milne Bay or Goodenough could be used to establish a base to interdict the nascent coastal supply line to Buna. Their removal also represented an opportunity. In particular MacArthur and Blamey had grasped the critical importance of air power in providing for sea control and if Goodenough Island could be cleared of the Japanese and the terrain proved suitable for the establishment of an advanced airfield it would give the allies considerable advantages in providing for the security of the supply line along

11 MacArthur to Blamey, 20 October 1942, RG200 Personal Papers of General Sutherland, Box 14, NARA. 12 See Petersburg Plan, Copy No. 1 on Redistribution of Allied Forces SWPA in the event of a Japanese Success in the Solomon Islands, 31 October 1942, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle Barrack, Pennsylvania. 13 H Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, AWM, Canberra, 1968, p.166. 14 Ibid, p.175. 59 Australian Naval Review 2016 the north coast of Papua. It would also provide the Allies an airfield considerably closer to the main Japanese base at Rabaul, one that was not affected by the need to cross the Owen Stanley Mountains or be subjected to the, at times, inclement weather at Milne Bay. The Allies also had strong reason to believe Goodenough Island would provide suitable for air operations as RAAF Kittyhawks had landed there on 7 August 1942 after running out of fuel while engaging Japanese Zeros in the area: the pilots having to exist on air-dropped rations until they were rescued. 15 It could also serve as a base from which to support the extension of allied airpower into the Solomon Sea. This was further recognition of the fact that the vital terrain in this maritime theatre were the parcels of land that were accessible and large enough to support the establishment of airfields or ports. By September 1942 it was becoming clear that MacArthur’s strategy was heavily reliant on air superiority to enable sea control to allow his ground forces to move forward. The best way to achieve this was by using amphibious warfare to land troops to establish airfields, ports and logistic bases to facilitate the further projection of power into new areas, thus enabling the advance on Rabaul and then the Philippines to continue. The problem at this stage of the war was that the Allies in the SWPA lack the means, especially a large-scale amphibious warfare capability, to achieve this joint operational approach contained within a maritime strategy that used the ocean as the space for manoeuvre. 16 Despite the limited resources available in October Blamey decided to act against Goodenough Island to support New Guinea Force’s operational priorities. While this would require the use of one of his few remaining uncommitted and highly trained AIF battalions from Milne Bay, potentially weakening this still very vulnerable forward position, the rewards for a mission against Goodenough were also potentially high.17 In addition the intelligence picture looked exceptionally promising with the Japanese troops being described as inadequately equipped, badly provisioned and in poor physical health. Intelligence also came to hand that the Japanese were most likely to attempt another rescue operation utilising a light cruiser from Rabaul on the

15 M. Johnston, Whispering Death: Australian Airmen in the Pacific War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2011, p. 208. 16 This strategy is articulated in a GHQ SWPA report entitled ‘Defensive and offensive possibilities’. SWPA GHQ G-3 Journals & Files Box 566 (no.1,) April 1942-30 May 1943, RG407 98-GHQ1-3.2. NARA. 17 Major-General Cyril Cowes, Commander of Milne Bay Force, believed that the risk by using one of his AIF battalion was far too great & he opposed to operation against Goodenough Island: Secret Cipher, Milne Force to New Guinea, NGF, 21 October 1942, Messages relating to operations in the Milne Bay & Goodenough Island area (Jul-Nov 1942), AWM 54 579/6/2. 60 Australian Naval Review 2016 night of 23 or 24 October 1942. 18 Moving as soon as possible would allow the Allies to both destroy the Sasebo force before it could be withdrawn and redeployed against the allies elsewhere as well as achieving the operations broader objectives.

18 Secret Cipher, New Guinea, Allied Land Forces HQ to New Guinea Force, 22 October 1942, Messages relating to operations in the Milne Bay and Goodenough Island area (Jul-Nov 1942), AWM 54 579/6/2. 61 Australian Naval Review 2016 The mission set for Drake Force by Blamey’s HQ was (as noted above) to ‘determine the practicability of channels and approaches to Goodenough Island for supply purposes’ and ‘to determine the practicability of the terrain for the constn [sic] of air fields.’19 For Milne Force and for the 2/12th battalion this was translated down to ‘destroy all Japs [sic] on Goodenough Island.’20 The order to do so wasn’t issued to Milne Force until 19 October leaving previous little time for preparations or rehearsals. Milne Force, to whom Drake Force would report directly, detailed the concept of operation. In general terms the plan was simple enough: the two destroyers Arunta and Stuart would transport the force to the island under the cover of darkness in order to achieve operational and tactical surprise. There they would marry up with the three locally sourced ketches in RAN service (Matona, McLaren King and Tierno), and three captured Japanese landing craft. Arunta would drop the bulk of the force at Mud Bay, while Stuart would land a reinforced C Company from the battalion at Taleba Bay. From here the two forces would converge on the reported Japanese positions at Kilia Mission in a pincer movement and destroy them in a hammer and anvil style assault.21 As it turned out the plan was in fact rather too simple, neglecting many of the joint force enablers that were available and instead concentrating of using naval and land power as two separate, rather than joint, capabilities. The result was an operation that resembled more of a modified modern day tactical sealift rather than a pure joint amphibious operation. Amphibious doctrine, training and experience One of the reasons for the limitations of the tactical plan for Operation Drake was the lack of understanding of amphibious operations in the Australian military at the time. The main amphibious features of the plan directly accorded with contemporary British doctrine —namely the use of a light, highly mobile seaborne force in a night landing to achieve operational and tactical surprise following in the footsteps of the strong British tradition of continental raiding in Europe. Drake Force and its landing ships however, had little if any practical experience in planning, coordinating or executing such an operation. This is not to say the units involved were not combat veterans, however their experience was vested in totally different realms of military operations. The 2/12th battalion had seen action at Tobruk before fighting at Milne Bay. It had no experience in amphibious operations and the battalions training program post the fighting at Milne Bay in August and September records no amphibious

19 NGF Operational Instruction No. 39, 17 October 1942, War Diary, NGF, AWM52 1/5/51/19 - October 1942. 20 Operational Order, No. 1, 21 October 1942, War Diary 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12; Operational Order, No. 1, 20 October 1942, War Diary 11 Division (Milne Force), AWM 54 1/5/25. 21 Ibid. 62 Australian Naval Review 2016 familiarisation or training. Instead it was, unsurprisingly, totally focused on infantry minor tactics in jungle warfare.22 For the naval forces the two destroyers were more used for escorting amphibious ships (if they existed in the SWPA at this time) than acting as them. Arunta had only started her service in May 1942 and had been concentrating on anti-submarine warfare patrols and convoy escort duties. 23 Stuart was part of the famous ‘scrap iron flotilla’ and had seen extensive service in the Mediterranean Fleet before returning to Australia to undertake convoy escort roles.24 Both ships had not been involved in amphibious operations and their selection for this mission had more to do with their serendipitous location in Milne Bay and Port Moresby as a result of their convoy escort duties. On top of this lack of unit level experience few, if any, officers or men in the 2/12th battalion or on board the ships would have had any amphibious warfare training. This area of warfare had been systematically neglected in the Australian military during the interwar period 25 and it was only in August and September 1942 that the first training establishments in amphibious warfare, the Joint Overseas Operational Training School (JOOTS) and HMAS Assault at Port Stephens in NSW and the First Australian Army Combined Training School (CTS) in Queensland at Toorbul Point (now Sandstone Point), were established. Graduating staff officers and instructors from these schools did not start to appear in combat units in the SWPA until October-November 1942 and none were available to support the operations at Goodenough Island.26 To Battle: 21-25 October 1942 As noted the time to plan and prepare for the operation was considerably restricted. The 2/12th battalion were only alerted to the operation on 19 October and HMAS Arunta only arrived at Milne Bay on the following day. On 20 October Lieutenant-Colonel A.S.W. Arnold, the battalion commander, and Major K.A.I. Gategood, officer commanding (OC) C Company (that formed the bulk of the secondary landing force), undertook an air reconnaissance flight over Goodenough Island. in a RAAF Hudson. Afterwards a conference consisting of the battalion HQ staff, company commanders, Lieutenant- Commander Power (HMAS Arunta), two officers from the Australian New

22 See War Diary, 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12, September-October 1942. 23 Report of Proceedings, HMA Ships and Establishments: HMAS Arunta, AWM 78 40/1. 24 RAN, ‘HMAS Stuart (I)’, Navy: Serving With Pride, 9 October 2016, http:// www.navy.gov.au/hmas-stuart-i 25 R Parkin, A Capability of First Resort: Amphibious Operation and Australian Defence Policy 1901-2001, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 117, Canberra, 2002. 26 PJ Dean ‘Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the Past for the ADF’s Future’, Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 57-76’ R Crawley & PJ Dean, ‘Amphibious Warfare: Training and Logistics 1942-45’, in PJ Dean (ed), Australia 1944-1945: Victory in the Pacific, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2016, pp. 257-277. 63 Australian Naval Review 2016 Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) and Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Chilton (GS01 New Guinea Force HQ), reviewed the operation and the plans. The following day two more company commanders were able to take part in another air reconnaissance while Arnold and Gategood attended a conference in Stuart that included the senior officers from both destroyers. At this planning conference they undertook a ‘discussion and coordination of finer details.’ Thereafter Arnold delivered final orders to the landing force. 27 On 22 October Drake Force started to embark on the two destroyers from 11:00 am and once all were on board disembarkation orders were provided to the landing force. Soon after the small naval task group left Milne Bay at 2 pm. 28 Arunta married up with the landing barges off Mud Bay at approximately 9:30 pm and here the landing operations commenced soon afterwards. The Mud Bay landings went relatively smoothly although it seems that they may well have been a quite noisy affair and there were delays in landing due to confusion in troop transfers between the destroyer and the landing craft as well as the grounding of a landing craft as one as the first packets of troops neared the shore. 29 The landing of the main body of the battalion was complete by 10:30 pm and half an hour later the troops started the nine-kilometre approach march over the jungle covered mountain track to Kilia Mission. Meanwhile Stuart disembarked C Company and attachments at Taleba Bay at 1:45 am on 23 October. By 3:40 am C Company were moving along the coastal track and they made contact with the enemy at 5:45 am.30 Major Keith Gategood Officer Commanding C Company. Upon disembarking their troops Arunta and (Official) Stuart’s role in the operation effectively ended. Their next task was to marring up

27 War Diary, 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12, 20-22 October 1942. 28 War Diary, 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12, 22 October 1942; Graeme-Evans, Of Storms and Rainbows, p.186. 29 D McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area First Year: Kokoda to Wau, AWM, Canberra, 1959, p. 347. This is disputed in Graeme-Evans, Of Storms and Rainbows, p. 188. 30 Report on Operation at Goodenough Island by Lt-Col Arnold CO 2/12th Aust Inf Bn, 22-26 October 1942, AWM 54 585/7/2. This document also includes Major Gategood’s official report and NGF HQ appreciation of the defence of Goodenough Is & NGF HQ Lessons Learned from the operation. [Hereafter referred to as ‘Report on Operations at Goodenough Island’.] 64 Australian Naval Review 2016 together before returning to Milne Bay. However at 1 am on 23 October Arunta and Stuart received a signal from the Naval Liaison Officer at Port Moresby indicating that a Japanese light cruiser was expected in Dawson Strait between the nearby Ferguson and Normanby Islands. 31 This situation was complicated by a break down in communications between the two ships. Arunta signalled Stuart to change their rendezvous however the message was never received. Meanwhile Stuart had got underway as soon as the troops from C Company were transferred to the ketches. Arunta not having heard Stuart’s code word indicating that she had finished landing her troops assumed Stuart was still on station at Taleba Bay. Stuart not having received Arunta’s signal was, in heavy driving rain and low visibility, steaming back down her approach route at full speed, at action stations and on the lookout for a Japanese light cruiser. Arunta meanwhile had moved out of Mud Bay, with the expectation of Stuart still being in place, and began searching for the cruiser. The two ships soon made contact with each other and Stuart gave the ‘order to fire … as the torpedo sights came on when [through] a sudden afterthought it was realised that it might be Arunta. The challenge was made and the correct reply received.’ Thus a major friendly fire incident was sidestepped and the two ships returned together to Milne Bay at 6:30 am on 23 October.32 While tragedy at sea had been narrowly avoided, a small tragedy of its own was playing out on land. The Mud Bay force, consisting of the bulk of the 2/12th battalion, struggled under heavy rain and a lack of moonlight to negotiate the steep and treacherous mountain trail to Kilia Mission. With every step it was falling behind schedule and radio communications with C Company were never established. Meanwhile Gategood’s relatively easy advance along the shoreline meant that his company was soon in heavy contact with the Japanese. The troops from the 5th Sasebo had wisely posted observations posts well forward of their main positions and thus had observed both landings and recognising the smaller size of Gategood’s force they pounced. They hit C Company with heavy mortars and machine-gun fire pinning them down before moving forward infantry to attack C Company’s advanced positions. Clearly the Japanese were no demoralised, disorganised or poorly equipped force. 33 With no fire support available from ashore, at sea or in the air Gategood’s company was slowly forced back. Even worse Gategood’s lack of radio contact with Arnold and the rest of the battalion meant that C Company had no idea that the battalion’s main body was nowhere near their objective. By 9 am Gategood was under heavy pressure from the Japanese. He was taking casualties and company headquarters was under direct fire. By 10 am he had

31 RAN Daily Operational Narratives, 1 October 1942 to 27 January 1943, Sea Power Centre, 14 October 2016. 32 Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p. 182. 33 ‘Report on Operations at Goodenough Is’. 65 Australian Naval Review 2016 realised that the risks posed to his company were just too great and by 10:45 am the company had broken contact and retreated back to a defensive positions having lost six killed, 11 wounded and two sick. Soon afterwards the company was forced to withdraw even further after coming under another round of sustained mortar and machine-gun fire. Soon after Gategood made the decision to withdraw his company and move them by the supporting ketches to Mud Bay.34 The only things that had saved Gategood’s company from being overrun were the quality of the soldiers and their leadership and the fact that a major attack by the Japanese had been thwarted by the arrival, on the opposite flank, of Arnold and the rest of the battalion. Arnold’s men had struggled over the treacherous mountains arriving on their proposed start line at 8:30 am, some three hours late. Soon after the battalion put in a two-company attack on the Japanese defences but they were easily repulsed. The Japanese were heavily dug in on rising ground with a stream to their front covered by prepositioned mortar and machine-gun fire.35 The Japanese positions were extremely well prepared and sited on the best defensive terrain in the area. Arnold was to later note and that they would ‘have done justice to a Field Works Course.’36 In their weeks on the island the Japanese, like the true professions that they were, had been busy in preparing their defences. Arnold, having chosen to leave his mortars back at the landing site had, like Gategood, no immediate fire support on hand. One mortar did arrive at 3 pm but the troops became disorientated on approach and wandered into the Japanese defences forcing them to abandon their supply of mortar bombs. With his troops exhausted from their gruelling night approach, no effective counter at hand to overcome the strong defensive positions and his flanking assault company became lost in the jungle Arnold called off the attack and withdrew to a defensive position one and a half kilometres from the Japanese.37 Utilising his attached signals section from the 7th Division Arnold made contact with Milne Force to request air support for the following day. He was also able to bring forward supplies and the rest of his mortars and was later reinforced by Gategood’s company. During the night the battalion noted considerable firing from the Japanese and in the morning the rifle companies moved forward to their start line to await the air support before assaulting the Japanese positions. However by 1 pm no air support had arrived and with the cut off deadline passed Arnold ordered his battalion to attack using his mortars for support. As the battalion manoeuvred onto the Japanese positions it quickly discovered that there was no return fire. The

34 ‘Report on Operations at Goodenough Island’. 35 Operations Goodenough Island 22-26 October 1942: Lessons from Operations - No.4. Rg407 98 GHQ1-3.2 G-3 journal and files, November 1942, Box 604. 36 Ibid. 37 Report on Operations at Goodenough Island. 66 Australian Naval Review 2016 positions were empty and the Japanese were gone.38 During the last rescue attempt two Japanese landing barges had arrived and during the night the Japanese used them to withdraw to Ferguson Island where there were retrieved 39 by submarine and small craft and returned to Rabaul. The cost to Drake Force had been 13 killed in action and 18 wounded. It is estimated that the Japanese suffered 39 casualties.40 On 27 October 1942 a party consisting of two US Air Corps officers, one ANGAU officer, accompanied by a 30-man patrol from Drake Force, moved by launch to conduct a reconnaissance of possible air strips around the island. They identified the area around Vivigani Mission as viable and elements of Drake Force moved into the area to start work on the strip on 31 October.41 The 2/12th battalion now expected to be withdrawn and replaced bymilitia and RAAF airfield constructions crews, however as a result of the shortage of combat troops in the forward areas and the development of operations in Papua the 2/12th battalion were to remain on Goodenough a lot longer than originally expected. Outcome and analysis Operation Drake did succeeded in achieving its operational objectives. The Japanese had been removed from the island and the reconnaissance was complete leading to the establishment of a forward operating airfield for the Allied Air Forces.42 The occupation of the island complicated any further Japanese assault on Milne Bay and the presence of Drake Force on the island helped to support Operation Lilliput. It is clear that in early November 1942 the AAF saw the establishment of airfields in the area bounded by Buna, Goodenough Island and Milne Bay as critical to providing for the security of Papua and in directly assaulting Japanese, air, naval and land power in the vicinity of Rabaul: the SWPA’s primary objective in 1942-43. Lieutenant-General George Kenney the commander of the AAF saw Goodenough as a key to his plan and he proposed that airfields on the island would support fighter, torpedo and heavy bomber aircraft. 43 But as November unfolded the plan for Goodenough Island did not

38 Report on New Guinea Operations, Goodenough Island 1942, AWM 581/7/35. 39 Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, pp. 182-183. 40 War Diary, 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12, October 1942. Graeme-Evans, Of Storms and Rainbows, p. 202. 41 War Diary, 2/12th Battalion, AWM 54 8/3/12, October 1942. 42 It is clear that in early November 1942 the AAF saw the establishment of airfields in the area bounded by Buna, Goodenough Island & Milne Bay as critical to providing for the security of Papua & directly assault Japanese, air, naval & land power in the Rabaul vicinity. Goodenough Island was proposed as both a base for fighters & torpedo aircraft. 43 Forward movement of Certain Air Force Unites (Codenamed ‘Gulliver’)’, George Kenney to MacArthur, 2 November 1942, GHQ, RG407 Box 574, NARA, November 1942. 67 Australian Naval Review 2016 proceed as Kenney anticipated. As the allies closed in on the Gona-Sanananda- Buna area it turned out not to be the ‘mopping up’ exercise that MacArthur expected. Instead the Japanese defences at the battle of the Beachheads proved formidable and the Japanese poured a continuous stream of reinforcements and supplies into the area during November-December 1942 via night-time destroyer runs from Rabaul that the AAF and ANF proved unable to counter. This resulted in the Papuan campaign dragging on until the end of January 1943 with the allies suffering thousands of casualties. 44 Through this whole time the situation at Guadalcanal hung in the balance and as such there were no troops available to increase the garrison on Goodenough Island and even if there was, to do so was judged to be operationally to risky. Goodenough Island was still considered strategically important even if NGF HQ lacked sufficient troops to carry out all of their priority tasks and thus did not believe it was wise to further dilute their concentration of force. Instead NGF HQ ordered a large-scale deception operation put in place. The ‘Hackney Deception Scheme’ included the installation of imitation ‘guns, tanks, [Bren- gun] carriers, trucks, campus, hospitals and store dumps’, while fake radio traffic, defensive positions and other measures were put in place to convince the Japanese that a reinforced combat brigade group had been established on the island.45 The replacement of the 2/12th battalion was to be made by only a reinforced rifle company from the 25th (militia) battalion who continued work on the deception plan and the airfield with some small-scale engineering support. 46 The completion of the Beachhead battles in January 1943 did not immediately alleviate the allies force posture issues. Almost immediately after the last redoubt at Sanananda fell the Japanese launched an assault on Wau in the New Guinea highlands and it was not until after the battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 that the Allies felt secure enough to exploit Goodenough Island’s location. From May 1943 the RAAF was able to move into the airfields on the islands in force and it subsequently became a base for No. 73 Wing’s three fighter squadrons. Later RAAF Bostons, Beauforts and Beaufighters used the island as a base for operations. Overall, during 1943, the airfields on Goodenough Island played a major role in defeating Japanese air power at Rabaul and supporting Allied operations throughout the region. 47

44 PJ Dean, ‘Anzac and Yanks: US & Australian operation at the Beachhead battles’, in PJ Dean (ed), Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2012, pp. 217-240. 45 Report on New Guinea Operations, Goodenough Island 1942, AWM 581/7/35. 46 Milne Force operation Order No. 6, Goodenough Island, December 1942,. AWM 585/4/1. 47 Johnston, Whispering Death, pp. 318, 335-336. 68 Australian Naval Review 2016

Tactically the operation in October had not fared so well. At Advanced Land Headquarters (Adv LHQ) in Brisbane the senior Australian staff officer, Major- General Frank Berryman, launched a review of Operation Drake.48 The Adv LHQ report was highly critical of Arnold and his battalion. While it noted that force was ‘of sufficient strength’ and the ‘tactical plan was sound’ it stated that there was a lack of ‘coordination’ that resulted in ‘piecemeal attacks of which the enemy took advantage and defeated in detail.’ The report put these failures down to the ‘unforeseen conditions of the weather’. 49

Major-General Frank Berryman who conducted a review of Operation Drake. (Official)

48 ‘Operations Goodenough Island – 22– – 25 October 1942: Lessons from Operations No. 4’, Allied Land Forces in the Pacific Area 28 November 1942. This document can be found in ‘Report on Operations at Goodenough Is’ AWM54, 585/7/2. 49 Operations Goodenough Island – 22– – 25 October 1942: Lessons from Operations No. 4. 69 Australian Naval Review 2016

The report however goes on to be most critical of the land force in the area of reconnaissance. This is critical both in terms of the initial attacks on the 23rd and then the subsequent attack by the Mud Bay force on the 24th. It highlights the use of frontal attacks, the delay in offensive patrolling to identify the extent of the Japanese position and its flanks. The report notes that in the second attack on the 23rd, when a company was sent out to envelope the Japanese flank without prior reconnaissance, ‘illustrates the case of a large unit moving into unknown terrain without guides or any prior recce and becoming lost.’ Another highlighted instance was on the 23rd when ‘a mortar squad inadvertently entered the enemy position, due to the lack of a recce route.’50 The lack of reconnaissance was also blamed for the delays on the night of 22-23 October, especially in moving from the landing site to the Japanese position and nature of the track which was much more precipitous than predicted. This also resulted in the Mud Bay force arriving at their line of departure exhausted. The other notable point’s where the lack of communications between the different elements of the joint force and the lack of mortars available for both the initial attacks. The latter, the report noted, was ‘contrary to the War Establishment’. 51 Blamey however was not amused by the contents of the report and the fact that it was issued without his approval. Having ordered the operation at short notice and appreciating the difficulties Arnold faced he rebuked Berryman that the report was an: … almost classic example of the Armchair Critic and it completely fails to grasp the condition under which the operation was carried out, and draws its lessons with a fire-side smugness accordingly … I regard this paper as the most unfortunate production.52 Berryman noted in his diary that he had received a ‘rocket from the C-in-C on the report’. 53 Berryman took it on the chin and reassured Blamey that it wouldn't happened again but on reflection Berryman and his staff had produced a report that contained more insightful observations than Blamey credited it with. All the criticisms in the report are valid, even removing the benefit of hindsight. Most of the issues stemmed, as the report states, from poor reconnaissance and communications. In fact the report overlooked a number of issues including the faulty intelligence, both on the Japanese force

50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Blamey as quoted in Horner, D Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p. 373. 53 Berryman Diary 28 November 1942, Berryman Papers, PR87/370, AWM. 70 Australian Naval Review 2016 and the track used for the approach march, the lack of planning expertise and the fact that there was virtually no time for rehearsals. Many of the criticisms in the Adv LHQ report are also valid in terms of the joint elements of the operation. On the RAN’s side there was no major post operational review, so ultimately Berryman’s report did not go far enough. 54 While understandably, as it was written by land forces HQ, it concentrated on the landing force’s operations this meant that no joint operational review was forthcoming. The greater issues with the operation were ones that evolved around the opportunities missed bynot effectively employing the joint features of the operation. For instance, prior amphibious reconnaissance of the landing site at Mud Bay and the subsequent approach march may have threatened operational surprise (if discovered), but the dividends would have been high.

HMAS Arunta commanded by Commander James ‘Copper’ Morrow DSC, RAN conducting naval gunfire support during the New Guinea campaign. Two months before Operation Drake Arunta had sunk the Japanese submarine RO-33 off Port Moresby. (RAN).

54 The Commanding Officer of Arunta did provide a post operational report; see HMAS Arunta, Reports of Proceedings, HMA Ships and Establishments, AWM78 40/1 Part 2 April 1942-June 1947. However no copy of this report could be found amongst the archival records of the RAN at the AWM, National Archives of Australia or SPCA. 71 Australian Naval Review 2016 If undertaken at Mud Bay the grounding of a landing craft would have been avoided and vital knowledge would have been gained on the terrain and the conditions of the track. This would have led to either a change to the landing site or an earlier landing allowing for significantly more time for the Mud Bay force to conduct its approach march. Rehearsals of disembarkation would also have allowed this part of the operation to proceed much more smoothly and efficiently as well as potentially maintaining tactical surprise. Some other important areas were also overlooked in the planning and execution of the operation. Both destroyers were highly effective naval assets, particularly Arunta, who was a brand new Tribal class destroyer of almost 2,500 tons and carried 6 x 4.7 inch guns, 2 x 4 inch guns, 6 x 40 mm anti- aircraft guns, 4 x 2 pounder anti-aircraft guns and 21 inch torpedo tubes. While both ships were well able to conduct naval gunfire suppport (NGS), no provision in the plans was made for their employment in this role. With air cover being in place until 12 pm on 24 October there was ample time for both destroyers to remain in the area to support the landing force. 55 Effective NGS would have made a considerable impact on the Japanese defences and would have been critical in the providing the fire-support that was missing due to the absence of artillery (and mortars). This was also not uncommon in operations at this time. For instance both the US Navy and the Japanese were making extensive use of NGS for bombardment of enemy positions on Guadalcanal. The destroyers could also have been used to bombard and harass the Japanese during the night approach as well as during the actual assault. An effective communications plan was also overlooked. The destroyers could have been used as relay stations for the two landing forces to coordinate the approach and the assault on the Japanese positions. In addition the allocation of the destroyers to this operation for such a short period of time also precluded the use of the navy to support operations on the night of 24-25 October, which may well have resulted in the interdiction of the Japanese as they retreated by landing craft. Finally, there was also a poor level of coordination of air support for the operation. The only major provision was for cover of the ships as they withdrew and the air force failed to inform Drake Force of the unavailability of air support on the 25th due to poor weather at Milne Bay. Conclusion The conduct of the operation at Goodenough Island in October 1942 clearly demonstrates both the importance of amphibious warfare to the prosecution of offensive military operations in a maritime-littoral environment such as that found in the South Pacific, as well as highlighting the limitations of the capability in the SWPA in 1942. Ultimately the failures at the tactical level can

55 The ketches operated all day in support of C Company at great risk but without interference by Japanese airpower. 72 Australian Naval Review 2016 be put down to a number of factors. The short planning time available which restricted training, reconnaissance and rehearsals. This was combined with a lack of qualified officers to effectively coordinate the operation and the lack of a joint command structure. That said amphibious operations at this time, based on British doctrine, were built around the notion of cooperative rather than joint command and in this the operation was successful. In the end the operations joint elements did not operate effectivelyand as such it was largely a disembodied amphibious operation. It is here that the key lessons were to be found. These included: the difficulties of ad hoc task forces with no specialised equipment, experience, and planning staff to be asked to conduct short notice amphibious operations; the need to properly leverage joint capabilities so as to conduct effective amphibious operations; the need for well-defined and understood doctrine, planning approaches, command structures, rehearsals and well as defined tactics, techniques and procedures. However while these tactical issues are all critical what should not be overlooked is the long term success of this operation and what can be achieved by a small, highly mobile amphibious force at the operational and strategic levels for commanders in a joint maritime operating environment.

About the Author: Peter Dean is a Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre as well as a Senior Lecturer at the Australian Command and Staff College. He has been a Research Associate at the US Studies Centre (Sydney University) and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre For Australian and New Zealand Studies (Georgetown University, Washington DC). Peter is the author of a biography of Australia’s most important operations staff officer, The Architect of Victory: The Military Career of Lieutenant- General Sir Frank Horton Berryman, 1894-1981. He teaches courses on military operations & expeditionary warfare and on Australia’s strategic alliances.

73 Australian Naval Review 2016

2016 Winner of the Commander-in-Chief Medal

The Governor-General of Australia, His Excellency Sir Peter Cosgrove AK, MC presents Midshipman Kate Milward with the Commander-in-Chief Medal. This occurred at the Australian Defence Force Academy Graduation Parade on 8 December 8, 2016. 240 officer cadets and midshipmen graduated from their military training and tertiary education at the Academy. (ADF)

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