Fordham Law School FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History Faculty Scholarship 2007 Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy Pierre-Henri Conac University of Luxembourg Luca Enriques Harvard Law School Martin Gelter Fordham University School of Law,
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[email protected]. Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy by PIERRE-HENRI CONAc*, LUCA ENRIQUES**, MARTIN GELTER*** All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and re- medies arefar from uniform across jurisdictions,possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction,typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different perspective and de- scribe how three major continental European countries (France, Germany, and Italy) regulate dominant shareholders' self-dealing by looking at all the possible rules, doctrines and remedies available there.