125 IPRIS Viewpoints

JUNE 2013

Portugal and : Starting from Scratch

PAULO GORJÃO Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

In April and May, Georgia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Does this mean that we are witnessing a qualitative (MFA), , as well as Georgia’s State Min- change, or is it just a passing phase? Put another way, ister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Alex the deepening of bilateral relations between Portugal Petriashvili, made officials visits to Lisbon. It is clear and Georgia is it sustainable? that from 2010 onwards, the bilateral relations between In order to try to answer these questions, this paper Portugal and Georgia have intensified. Indeed, in stark begins by analyzing the bilateral relationship, as seen contrast with the past, in the last two years there was a from Lisbon, and then performs the same exercise from significant increase in the number of direct contacts be- ’s point of view. The article concludes by trying to tween politicians and diplomats of the two countries.1 answer the two questions posed earlier and by offering The contrast could not be greater with the period be- suggestions on the possible future course of the bilateral tween 1992 and 2010. In the first 18 years after Georgia’s relationship. independence there was much less high-level bilateral contacts. Moreover, from 2010 onwards, as if to confirm Portugal and Georgia: Starting from Scratch Tbilisi’s interest in strengthening bilateral relations with Over the last two decades, Portuguese diplomacy did not Portugal, Georgia opened an embassy in Lisbon. Equally devote significant human or financial resources to the important, last year Tbilisi formally requested the status regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.2 The collapse of associated observer of the Community of Portuguese- of the in the 1990s and the emergence of Speaking Countries (CPLP). a new set of sovereign states have given rise to a range of challenges and opportunities to which Portugal paid

1 The facts speak for themselves: in February 2010, Georgia’s then-Foreign sporadic attention. In large part, the explanation for this Minister visited Lisbon; in December 2010, Portugal’s then- lies in the fact that the Caucasus and Central Asia do not Foreign Minister Luís Amado reciprocated and visited Tbilisi; in March 2011 fit in what have been the three priorities of Portuguese Georgia’s then-Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze visited Lisbon once again; in foreign policy – transatlantic relations, the Portuguese- November 2011 and the 2012 political consultations took place at the level of directors-general of both Ministries of Foreign Affairs, first in Lisbon and then in Tbilisi. Last but not the least, this year Georgia’s new MFA and new State 2 Regarding Central Asia, see Paulo Gorjão, “Terra Incognita: Portugal and Cen- Minister came to Lisbon. tral Asia” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 99, June 2012). IPRIS Viewpoints Portugal and Georgia: Starting from Scratch | 2

speaking countries, and the (EU). Be- Portugal’s interests align more nearly to Georgia’s in the ing the two regions on the periphery of the Portuguese context of the EU than NATO. foreign policy priorities, the Caucasus and Central Asia In light of the above, the limited relevance of diplomatic remained largely off the ra- relations with Georgia is in dar of Portuguese diplomacy. line with what is happening In a clear sign of Lisbon’s low In line with EU positions, with the other countries of degree of attention to the re- the Caucasus and Central gions, twenty years after the Portugal supports the Asia. There is not, therefore, independence of the former any discrimination in favor of Soviet republics, Portugal did territorial integrity third parties. Without a con- not have a single embassy in solidated strategic agenda the Caucasus or Central Asia. of Georgia and does in Lisbon, without notorious This does not mean that coun- not recognize the political and economic in- tries such as Azerbaijan and terests, in a sense in Portu- Kazakhstan have not captured independence of gal has been prevailing the the attention of Portuguese weight of inertia. diplomats, especially in the and . Also From a formal point of view, context of the economic di- Portugal established diplo- plomacy. But it is evident that within the EU context, matic relations with Georgia Lisbon has not developed a immediately after its inde- strategic vision about the kind Portugal supports pendence in 1992. But in the of bilateral and multilateral the strengthening of two decades that followed, relationship that it intends to little or nothing happened consolidate with the Cauca- relations with Georgia bilaterally. Political contacts sus and Central Asia. To that were virtually nonexistent end, Portuguese diplomacy to in the framework of the and economic exchanges the region is largely shaped by lacked significant expres- decisions made in Brussels Association Agreement sion. To that extent, it can both in the EU and NATO con- be said that the year of 2010 texts. Thus, in line with EU po- being negotiated at this marked a turning point. Thus, sitions, Portugal supports the stage, as well as the the intensification of bilateral territorial integrity of Georgia political contacts since 2010 and does not recognize the in- establishment of a Deep could, in theory, open the dependence of Abkhazia and door to a substantive change South Ossetia. Also within the and Comprehensive Free in the bilateral relationship. EU context, Portugal supports This is at least the current the strengthening of relations Trade Area (DCFTA). In expectation. But rather than with Georgia in the framework a certainty, the deepening of of the Association Agreement turn, in the context of bilateral relations is still a being negotiated at this stage, NATO, Portugal supports hypothesis waiting to mate- as well as the establishment rialize, and will hardly bear of a Deep and Comprehensive the Euro-Atlantic fruit without enhancing the Free Trade Area (DCFTA). In political, diplomatic and eco- turn, in the context of NATO, aspirations of Georgia. nomic agenda. Therefore, the Portugal supports the Euro- establishment of the founda- Atlantic aspirations of Geor- tions that can sustain a more gia. However, Portuguese diplomacy regards Georgia’s substantial bilateral relationship is imperative. The sign- claims not only in light of Article 10 of the Washington ing in 2012 of a convention for the avoidance of double Treaty, but also in view of the importance of the collec- taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to tive defense, democracy, consensus, cooperative secu- taxes on income, and a protocol between Camões – Insti- rity, outlined in the Perry Principles in 1995.3 In short, tute for Cooperation and Language – and Georgia’s Ivane

3 In early 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, indicated that there control, protect human rights, and respect the sovereignty of others; accept were four principles that underpinned NATO’s past success: collective defense, that intra-Alliance consensus remains fundamental; and possess forces that democracy, consensus, and cooperative security. Applied to NATO’s enlarge- are interoperable with those of existing NATO members. See William J. Perry, ment, this meant that new members must have forces able to defend the Al- “The Enduring, Dynamic Relationship that is NATO” (Munich Security Confer- liance; be democratic and have free markets, put their forces under civilian ence, 5 February 1995). IPRIS Viewpoints Portugal and Georgia: Starting from Scratch | 3

Javakhishvili is, in a way, a good must also be understood in light of Georgia’s global pol- starting point for building bilateral ties. icy of diplomatic expansion. Since 2010, Tbilisi has es- tablished diplomatic relations with dozens of countries Georgia and Portugal: Play- and opened embassies in ing Simultaneously on Three Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Levels Tbilisi’s desire to deepen Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, Georgia’s integration into the Norway, Portugal, and South EU and NATO has been a ma- the bilateral relations Africa. This way, Georgia has jor foreign policy priority of not only tried to recruit new Tbilisi since the 2003 Rose with Portugal fits into allies and international part- Revolution, which brought ners, but also it has aimed to to power President Mikheil its strategic priorities. close doors to possible rec- Saakashvili, and especially Moreover, the deepening ognitions of independence of after the 2008 war with Rus- Abkhazia and South Ossetia. sia. However, one question relationship with In this context, the opening of lingers: will the diplomatic Georgia’s embassy in Lisbon priorities established by Saa- Portugal must also be in 2010 was one among sev- kashvili resist a change of eral diplomatic salvos made government? understood in light of by Tbilisi in recent years. Despite some initial fears, Thus, at this stage, with the the change of government in Georgia’s global policy exception of Luxembourg and Georgia in 2012 did not led of diplomatic expansion. Malta, Georgia has diplomat- to a realignment of Georgia’s ic missions in all EU member foreign policy priorities. In his Furthermore, Lisbon states. Likewise, with the first foreign visit, in November exception of Albania, Croa- 2012, Prime Minister Bidzina appears as a gateway and tia and Iceland, Georgia also Ivanishvili went to Brussels, has diplomatic missions in all and reaffirmed the goal of a useful ally concerning NATO countries. Georgia’s integration into the Furthermore, Lisbon appears EU and NATO, while also ex- the establishment and as a gateway and a useful ally pressing the wish of better deepening of relations concerning the establish- political and diplomatic rela- ment and deepening of rela- tions with . In Brussels, with the Portuguese- tions with the Portuguese- Ivanishvili expressed a desire speaking African countries. to conclude negotiations on speaking African countries. According to this strategy, the Association Agreement – in January 2012 Georgia for- DCFTA provisions included – According to this strategy, mally requested the status before the next Eastern Part- of associated observer of the nership summit, scheduled to in January 2012 Georgia CPLP. In order to fulfill the take place in Vilnius, Lithua- formally requested the prerequisites required for nia, in November 2013. More- associated observer status, over, Ivanishvili also stated status of associated this year the Ivane Javakh- Georgia’s intention to keep to ishvili Tbilisi State University the process of joining NATO, observer of the CPLP. opened a Center for Studies which he called “irrevers- in and ible”, even though, after the Culture. Of course, the deep- 2008 war with Russia, it is presently in abeyance without ening of relations with the CPLP is not a priority compa- concrete prospects to formally begin. rable to the integration of Georgia into the EU and NATO. Compared to Lisbon, Tbilisi’s relationship with Portu- In any case, with limited political and financial costs, the gal is much more consolidated. As can be seen from the CPLP is a gateway to relevant geopolitical spaces and brief description above, Portugal – a member of the EU potential partnerships in South America (Brazil), Africa and NATO – is at the epicenter of the geopolitical spac- (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São es that constitute the current key priorities of Georgia’s Tomé and Príncipe) and Southeast Asia (Timor-Leste). foreign policy. Thus, Tbilisi’s desire to deepen the bilat- eral relations with Portugal fits into its strategic priori- ties. Moreover, the deepening relationship with Portugal IPRIS Viewpoints Portugal and Georgia: Starting from Scratch | 4

Conclusion of political and diplomatic regular contacts at the highest At present there is an asymmetry in the bilateral rela- political level, and keep up the frequency of high-level tionship between Portugal and Georgia. One can identify visitation. Paulo Portas, Portugal’s Foreign Minister, with relative ease the elements that contribute to Geor- must pay a state visit to Tbilisi this year or next. At the gia’s interest in deepening the relationship with Portugal, same time, political consultations between both Foreign but the rationale for Portugal is at this stage less clear. Ministries must continue. Last but not the least, the two Georgia’s interest in deepening diplomatic relations with countries need to strengthen economic ties, which are Portugal are mainly political, and result from Tbilisi’s pri- currently miniscule. To this end, the organization of a oritization of deepening relations with the EU, NATO and, business forum is a priority. Textiles, renewable energy, in a much lower level of significance, with the Lusophone agro-industry, and tourism are some of the areas where countries. Portugal, meanwhile, still seeks to define and there is a window of opportunity for increasing commer- stabilize the content of a political, diplomatic, and eco- cial exchanges between the two countries. nomic agenda. In other words, Lisbon is still seeking a While in Lisbon, State Minister on European and Euro- coherent strategy for the Caucasus and Central Asia to Atlantic Integration Alex Petriashvili underscored that guide, among others, its relations with Georgia. “in October 2012 Georgia passed a litmus test of holding Despite this, since 2010 there has been a leap forward successful parliamentary elections that marked the first in the bilateral relationship. Does this mean that we are peaceful transition of power”.4 Although this has been a witnessing a structural change in the linkages between significant step, Tbilisi has yet to pass Samuel Hunting- Portugal and Georgia? And, if so, is it sustainable? Final- ton’s famous two-turnover test for democratic consolida- ly, is it possible for the bilateral relationship to become tion.5 Portugal, like its European partners, has interest, more balanced? and the obligation, to contribute to Georgia’s democratic These are the weighty questions to which I do not guar- success. With this in mind, is there a better ‘carrot’ than antee a response. However, with the political will recently the promise of a growing European and Euro-Atlantic in- demonstrated by both countries, a set of initiatives could tegration? and should be developed in the short- and medium-term. Multilaterally, the two countries could support each other in their applications to positions within international in- stitutions. For example, Portugal supported the Georgian 4 See Alex Petriashvili, “Challenges and Perspectives: Georgia after the Election candidate, George Tugushi, to the Committee against in 2012” (IPRIS Occasional Paper, No. 7, May 2013), p. 1. Torture for the 2012-2015 term. In turn, Georgia will sup- 5 “[A] democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes port the Portuguese candidacy to the UN Human Rights power in the initial election at the time of the transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election Council for the 2015-2017 term. Reciprocal approaches winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”. like this can and should be repeated whenever possible. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth The two countries must also maintain the current level Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 266-267.

Editor | Paulo Gorjão assistant editors | Kai Thaler • Sean Goforth DESIGN | Atelier Teresa Cardoso Bastos

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Rua da Junqueira, 188 - 1349-001 Lisboa PORTUGAL http://www.ipris.org email: [email protected]

IPRIS Viewpoints is a publication of IPRIS. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IPRIS.

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