Resisting Capital: Simulationist andSocialist Strategies

ZEUS LEONARDO (CaliforniaState University, LongBeach)

ABSTRACT Postmoderntheory has problematizedthe concepts and concerns ofMarxism with respect tosocialist praxis.One of the most diligentexamples ofthis engagement comes from Jean Baudrillard’s simulationtheory. Pronouncing the death ofMarxist categories,such asdepthand revolution, simulation theory offersan aleatory,indeterminate model of society where the real implodesinto the hyperreal.With special attention tothe concept ofresistance, this essay assesses the conceptual frameworkof both simulation and socialist theory fortheir promisesand problems in the context ofpostmodernity. Bringinghistorical materialisminto dialogue with simulation theory reasserts the importanceof Marxism in addressingthe unŽnished projectof social emancipation.There is much to suggest that with the real becominghyperreal, exploitation intensiŽes intohyperexploitation. In short,notwithstanding the merits ofsimulationtheory, Marxist concepts andconcerns are still central toboth radical theory andpraxis. Bringing the merits ofsimulationtheory toMarxism offersa social theory of meaningin the context ofcapitalism.

“Resisting Capital:Simulationist and Socialist Strategies” In the secondmillennium, social theorists are in a maddash to construct newways of explaining the shiftingterrains of social life. SpeciŽ cally, theorygeneration over the roleof capital in today’s postmoderncondition arguablyrepresents a dominantmatrix in academic discussions. Clearly, oneof the mostfertile terrains in the debateover current conditions

Critical Sociology, Volume 29,issue 2 also availableonline Ó 2003Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden www.brill.nl 212 Leonardo ² representsthe engagement betweenMarxist theories and postmodern discourses.Discussions over theory generation beneŽ t fromcritically addressingthis intersection. Having witnessed the victoriesas well as failuresof the 1960’s movements torevolutionize social life andthen the subsequentfall ofthe formerSoviet republics, many intellectuals attemptedto move “beyond”the polemicsand promises of Marxism. Jameson(1988a) has suggestedthat one cannot avoid periodization, in the sense thatpostmodern theory arrived in a contextfollowing the material dissolutionof colonial rule and the change insocial thought to explain thisnew formation. It is a bitlike living inan eraof post-Michaels, followingthe fall ofthe eraof Michael Jordan,Michael Jackson,and the SovietMichael, Gorbachev.Dubbed as the “postmodernturn” in social theory,the “post”in po-mo, posty, post-ism, or post-al thought has been interpretedas anti moderntheories like Marxism.In particularpostmodern thoughthas pummeledMarxist theory with objections to itsuniversals and totalities:in short, its hubris and hamartia. Themost extreme challenge toMarxist orthodoxy issues from Jean Baudrillard’s simulationtheory, an ironicdiscourse of resistance through strategiesof hyperconformity, which insist that the realhas been absorbed inthe hyperreal,the copywith no original. Responding to theoretical de- velopments invarious post-ism’ s, Marxist scholars found themselves doing doubleduty: generating new modes of thought to resist capital’ s general expansioninto everyday life aswell asresponding to the postmodernchal- lenge oflinguisticplay and jouissance.Itis atthisintersection between social- ismand simulation where capital is wedged. Critical scholars have found thatscholarship must confront the effectsof capital on the sign.For exam- ple,critical theorists have suggestedthe need fora politicalhermeneutics thatprovides scholars and students with the mostemancipatory strategies againstthe distortionsof capital (see Leonardo,in press). In thisessay, I examine the meritsand problems of simulation theory through the works ofJean Baudrillard.Furthermore, the essay engages the Marxistresis- tanceto postmodern condition as the mostrecent incarnation of capitalist relationsof exploitation. Because ofthe globalizationand intensiŽ cation ofcapital, resistance theory becomes even morecentral to the project ofnegation. In otherwords, although the essay acknowledgesthe shiftin culturo-technologicallife, it also argues that the postmoderncondition does notrepresent a breakfrom capitalist production but rather an extension ofit. Finally, bringingMarxism in conversationwith simulation theory af- Žrmsthe dialogicalarm of Marxism through its ability to engage, rather than merely refute,competing claims. As such, while the essay problema- tizesBaudrillard’ s simulationtheory, it appropriates useful insights from hiscontributions and joins them witha socialistpraxis. Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 213 ²

JeanBaudrillard’ s SimulationTheory Jean Baudrillard’s (1988a,1988b, 1981, 1975) early workforeshadowed whatwould eventually becomehis ofŽ cial break from Marxism. The System ofObjects , ConsumerSociety , Fora Critique ofthe Political Economyof the Sign, and The Mirrorof Production ,all dealtfrom an arm’s length withMarxist interpretations of society. In these early texts, Baudrillard privilegedconsumption over production in attempts to understand the social meanings behindproduction. By prioritizingconsumption over production,Baudrillard emphasizes the superstructureover the basein Marxisttheory. Baudrillard was part of an intellectual movement –along withFoucault, Derrida, and Lyotard (and later their followers) – searching fornew ways to theorize the currentconditions of social life characterized byfast capitalism and an even fastertechnology and communication system. In effect,Baudrillard and many otherFrench theoristscoming outof the 1960’s triedto put Marx backonto his superstructural feet. For example, in Fora Critique ofthe Political Economyof the Sign ,Baudrillardtried toinstitute a revolutionthrough semiotic Marxism by linking exchange anduse value withsign value, orthe waysocial meaning conspires withthe structurallogic of the economicsystem. Despitehis growing disenchantmentwith classical Marxist categories, Baudrillard was still hauntedby Marx’ s ghostsand he spenta considerableamount of text deconstructingconcepts like labor,value, andhistory. Consideredpart of the “discursiveturn” in social theory, Baudrillard advancedhis assault on Marxist theory by downplaying class struggle andlater denigrating economic revolution. Through engagement with discourseson cultural (as opposedto historical) materialism, Baudrillard’ s love/hate relationshipwith Marxism is now purely one of animosity. Simplyput, the economicsphere cannot assume its privileged position ofalterity because the priorityof political economy is jettisoned. Thus, resistanceto capitalismseems ironicallybourgeois and passé . The economic baseis not“ the last instance”so it does not require an organicstance from aself-proclaimedtheoretical terrorist like Baudrillard.Whereas Antonio Gramsci(1971) encouraged people to become “ organic”intellectuals, Baudrillard,following Georges Bataille, adoptsthe “orgiastic”intellectual, onewho functions under the signof excess andwaste, rather than economicproduction. The proliferationof meaning in the currentsocial formationpostmodernizes the economyas adiscursiveconcept that has no inherent privilegeover other signiŽ ers, like desire,eroticism, and seduction. Andif the capitalisteconomy is no longer “ real”in the theaterof semiurgy, then resistanceto it is likewise aspuriousstrategy. For over a century, socialistshave resistedcapitalist accumulation with the ideaof communist production.To Baudrillard,much time has been wastedresisting a system 214 Leonardo ² thatseems tostrengthen asa resultof resistance. It is as if capitalism growsas it feeds on minor subversions, like unionstrikes. On the other hand,the ironicstrategy of conforming to the system’s imperatives(what Baudrillardcalls “code”) saturatesit to the pointof collapse, much like a personwho overeats only tovomit. So rather than resist, people should assist the consumptionof commodities (i.e., the objectsystem) until,like a potlatch,there isno more to consume (Bataille 1997,1991, 1988, 1985; see also,Richardson 1994; McLaren, Leonardo, and Allen 2000,1999). However,this does not suggest that social critique is no longer valid. ToBaudrillard, critique becomes a formof seduction, not reduction (a commoncritique of Marxism). Critique is a formof gift that seduces thoseit engages torespond with greater intensity, not synthesis. Therefore, dialecticalmaterialism is out, excremental materialismis in. The pointof critiqueis not to arrive at deep embedded structures of exploitation on the roadto truth and emancipation, but rather, as Bataille mightsuggest, tolaugh excessively andcynically inthe faceof it all. Critiquebecomes an exercise ofwaste rather than production. To Baudrillard, following Bataille, exploitationis not a tragedybut a comedy.And Marxism, as the harbingerof it all, isthe biggestshow in town. It led peopleto think that adeepnarrative existed as and in the formof history through labor and classstruggle, a storyto besurebut one that assumed a trueworld. Taking from Ecclesiastes ,Baudrillard(1983a) follows the dictum:“ The simulacrum isnever thatwhich conceals the truth– itis the truthwhich conceals thatthere isnone. The simulacrum is true” (p. 1). And then again: “Whereas representationtries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation,simulation envelops the wholeediŽ ce ofrepresentation asitselfa simulacrum”(p. 11). Following Nietzsche, Baudrillard dismantles any notionof a true,or transcendental world. So what choice is there but tolaughat the suggestionof an uncynical,true world? Contrary to Marxist analysis ofworkers in the textile industry,one should critique workers as texts. ToBaudrillard, critique is much less aboutemancipation (since this assumesan essence tobe liberated) and more about semiotic play and “visionsof excess,” of betting even when onehas little towager. At least withbetting, one surrenders to the conceptof chance,an enchantment lost inrationalist,modernist discourses. Throwingthe realityprinciple off balance with an uppercut, Bau- drillardthrows a left hookat productivist theories. His knock outpunch comesto us in the formof simulation theory. In Baudrillard’s (1994,1990, 1983b,1983a, 1979) more recent works, like Simulacra and Simulation , Fa- tal Strategies , Inthe Shadow ofthe Silent Majorities , Simulations , and Seduction, Baudrillarddevelops a theoryof simulation that ushers his concept of hy- perreality.As Baudrillard(1983a) puts it, the conditionof hyperreality is Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 215 ²

afantastic telescoping,a collapsingof the twotraditional poles into one another:an IMPLOSION –anabsorptionof the radiatingmodel of causality, ofthe differentialmode of determination, with its positiveand negative electricity –an implosionof meaning. This is wheresimulation begins : : : the possibilityof an explosion towards thecenter .(Pp.57 and 74; italics inoriginal)

The twopoles of Marxist dialectics (the proletariatand bourgeoisie) becomesimulated entities, that is, understood as signs that implode into oneanother and lose theirprivileged status. As such, political economy isneither the Žrstcause nor the causecelebre .In simulationtheory, the realis no longer a validconcept because the currenteconomy functions throughthe production(understood as a sign) ofcopies without an original. Thatis, postmodern economy loses the notionof identity so dear to modernistunderstandings of production. The objectand all ofits daily vicissitudes(e.g., knowledge) areproduced for the very reasonthat they arereproducible. We live ina socialformation marked by relations of reproduction, not production.What islost is a previousera’ s sense ofaura. Postmodern conditionis like ajokewith neither punchlinenor target. At least with modernjokes, one has appealto the irony’s other,or the normalcase. In Baudrillard’s postmodernsensibilities, all sense ofreference collapses.To FredricJameson (1988b), postmodern “ pastiche”is

like parody,the imitationof a peculiaror unique style, the wearingof a stylistic mask, speech in adeadlanguage: but it is aneutralpractice of such mimicry, withoutparody’ s ulteriormotive, without the satirical impulse, withoutlaughter, without that still latent feelingthat there exists something normal comparedto which what is beingimitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody,parody that has lost its sense ofhumor.(P. 16; italics in original)

Toput it another way, Baudrillardean postmodernism is the laughterleft inthe wake ofthe disappearanceof truth and essence. Humoris lost for the precisereason that it iseverywhere; sociallife ishumorous.Postmodern hyperproductionbecomes a formof general reproductionof social life so thateven ideasare only copiesof other ideas that precede them. In popularculture, one only has tocount the numberof songsthat are remakes ofprevious hits. The singer,Mariah Carey, has little incentive to producean “original”song if she canmake asmuch, if not more, money byremaking old standby’ s, like Michael Jackson’s “I’ll bethere.” Since radiostations rarely premise these songsas remakes ofan oldhit, much ofthe public(especially the youth)assumes that the currentsinger is the originatorof them. So much the betterfor Mariah Carey; the same goes forreproduction. In all, asense oforiginality is lost and consequently adisenchantmentwith radicalism as the searchfor true consciousness 216 Leonardo ² andknowledge of reality. By deŽnition, consciousness is false becauseit is supplementedby itsother, the unconscious,another one of thoseannoying discoursesof “ depth”(Baudrillard 1979). Rather than discoursesof depth, Baudrillard(1994, 1993, 1983a, 1975) advocates discourses of death: e.g., oflabor, value, social,history, etc. By pronouncingthe deathof Marxist categories,Baudrillard testiŽ es totheirstatus as signsthat have noprivilege overother signs. By evictingMarxist dialectics, Baudrillard also gives the sociala newlease towarda worldof the notyet. Itshould be noted that Baudrillard’ s hyperconformiststrategy is not an originalidea. By advocatingassistance rather than resistance– that is,to harness capitalistenergy andimplode it – Baudrillardarticulates a theorythat is traceable to versions of eastern philosophy.Also known as “takingthe pathto least resistance,”assistance is a strategyof directing energy ratherthan opposing it. We see thisclearly inthe martialart of Judowhere the neophyte istaught to use the attacker’s energy against itselfand to avoid meeting forcewith force. The Judostudent learns to usethe attacker’s momentumagainst itself by stepping aside or shifting his weightat the criticalmoment. In otherspheres of life, complementarity is the preferredsign, the yin andyang oflife’ s energies. Thisestablishes the pointthat Baudrillard’ s theoryof “ least resistance”is shocking only when consideredwithin a narrowlogic of western thought. What differentiatesit fromeastern philosophyis its application. Baudrillard generalizes assistance (hyperconformity)to includeconsumptive and discursive practices. In Baudrillard’s descriptions,the realhas been realizedand so has utopia.In otherwords, we live ina post-utopianworld. Those who con- tinueto construct discourses characterized by utopian themes, like truth, emancipation,and revolution simply missed the boat.There is nothing re- mainingbut to play withthe leftoverpieces, a combinatorialtransgression oflaws and determinisms. Ours is a worldcharacterized by a reversal, asocialitythat proceeds from the model,or Baudrillard’ s constructionof informationsociety as a pre-packaged,DNA-like determined,code. Facts nolonger follow real events. Real events areŽ rstmodeled and then they transpirein the realso that they canbe reproducedby simulation appara- tuses,like the media.If maps, as models, represent the real,then thisis a modernistidea. Reversing thisrelationship, Baudrillard (1983a) argues,

Abstraction todayis nolonger that ofthe map,the double,the mirroror the concept. Simulationis nolonger that ofa territory,a referential being ora substance. It is the generationby models of a real withoutorigin or reality:a hyperreal.The territoryno longer precedes the map,nor survives it.Henceforth, itis the mapthat precedes the territory– precession of simulacra.(P.2; emphasis inoriginal) Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 217 ²

Thereare some clear implications resulting from Baudrillard’ s reversal. With respectto the media,journalists no longer report the newsbut actuallycreate it. In the age ofsimulation, the mediadoes not represent the siteof news production but new reproductions. The newshas already been modeledbefore it happensin the real:a bitlike the movie,“ Wag the Dog.”Even people’s actions(which news is apparently about) follow the same geneticlaws. Reporting news is only an exercise inpretending that somethingakin toa factjust occurred. Baudrillard’ s (1994)cynical power takes thisform, “ Themedia and the ofŽcial newsservice areonly there to maintainthe illusionof an actuality,of the reality ofthe stakes, ofthe objectivityof facts” (p. 38; italics in original). Thus, like “Wag the Dog” Baudrillardexposes the media’s phonyattempt to report the news.Instead, newsreporting signals the relationsof simulation. Reporters pretend to reportthe newsand the masspretends to believe it. Ourera is characterized by simulative (as opposedto productive) relations.To Baudrillard, social control is more accurately secured by seizingthe means ofsimulation, the mediabeing one of its central nodes of power.In the eraof simulation, controlling images supercedes domination ofproductive forces. The seducingimage class is able to propagate and projectits “ gift”for the masses.Rather than the bourgeoisieexploiting labor,the dominantimage class secures its power by seducing the mass intoits messages andthereby institutingits power through the actof giving. Itis then the obligationof the massto consume the imagesand demand more,that is, to raise the stakes, andthereby institutingpower in its favor: andthe seductioncontinues. The currentmode of simulation we function underis characterized by the revenge ofthe object,or those human strategiespatterned after the objectworld, not unlike “primitive”societies, whichendowed objects with magical powers. It is this object world which Baudrillardgeneralizes inthe postmoderncondition and which Ž ndsits expressionin the mediaas asimulativeapparatus. Reproductionis near perfect replication as the modeldetermines the outcomesbefore they happenin the real,understood now to be a copy: hyperreal.That is how Baudrillard (1995) was able to shock the world withthe pronouncementthat “ the GulfWar did not take place.”By this, he meant thatthe warwas modeled through the mediabefore it was representedfor and consumed by the public,not that it did not occur. In hyperreality,the copyis more real than the real.Miniaturized copies of citiesportrayed in Disneyland arealibis for the real.They aretestimony tothe factthat U.S. cities are as muchmodels as those in Disneyland. But perhapsBaudrillard’ s (1994)own description drives home the pointwhen he says, 218 Leonardo ²

Disneyland exists in orderto hide that itis the “real”country, all of“ real” America that is Disneyland (abit like prisonsare there tohide that itis the social inits entirety, in its banalomnipresence, that is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginaryin orderto make us believethat the rest is real, whereas all ofLos Angeles andthe America that surroundsit are no longer real,but belong to the hyperreal orderand to the orderof simulation : : : This world[Disneyland] wants tobe childish in orderto make us believethat the adultsare elsewhere, in the ‘real’world, and to conceal the fact that true childishness is everywhere –that itis that ofthe adultsthemselves whocome here toact the child in orderto foster illusions as totheir real childishness. (Pp.12-13; italics in original)

Thisis classic Baudrillard at his most brazen. This is cynical power at its height andmore Nietzsche thanNietzsche: hyperNietzsche. For those who have been toDisneyland, one cannot help todrive the screwa quarter turn more. Disneyland’s “charm”works through its politics of nostalgia (Giroux 1999,1994). It harks backto the frontierdays of old, when Americawas a‘heroic’land, white men couldact racist in public and be proud of it,and Africans were slaves. Ridethe jungleride at Disneyland andyou get the sense thatthe offensivedepiction of Africans as either buffoons or headhuntersis only play,only Žctive,and not to be taken seriously.Then yourealize that this is Americain miniature, a racistland where African Americansare treated as subhumanby the whiteimagination. Think some moreand you realize that Disney isprobably well awareof this but does notcare. In fact,it may bewhat many ofthe park’s visitors(domestics andtourists) expect andwant to see. Aftereating your ice cream bar, you advanceto Fantasyland andenjoy the ride,“ It’s aSmallWorld.” Here youare taken ona touracross the cultures,into the costume-worldthat isAmerica. You see Mexican, Chinese,and African miniatures: dancing, smiling,and blinking their eyes atyou. In fact,this is not very different fromthe kindsof images children receive about‘ foreigners’in uncritical formsof multiculturalism: food, folks, and fun. As Baudrillard points out, Disneyland representsa general alibifor the hypocrisiesand transparent politicsin social life. At least youdon’ t have topay to get intoreal life! Baudrillard’s simulationtheory encourages people to forgetabout originary sourcesand revel incynical indeterminacy. This is the challenge he poses tohis readers.

Marxist Theory as Boomerang Notwithstandingthe seductiveappeal of Baudrillard’ s postmoderntheory, modernistphilosophies, like Marxism,have respondedaggressively tothe currentcrisis in social theory. Marxism is said to have aboomerang-like Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 219 ² qualityto the extent thatthe moretheorists reject it the moreŽ ercely itreturns (Buroway 2000). Indeed, there has been ashiftin cultural Želd throughelectronic communication, cyber identities, and mediatized subjectivities.We understandthat Foucault and fatness aresurveilled by discoursesof thin; Baudrillard’ s bawdynarratives bring us some needed bouncein social theory; Lyotard’ s languagegames arelaudable for exposingthe limitationsof western meta-narratives as universal for all societies.For as Bataille (1997,1991, 1988, 1985; see also,Richardson 1994;Noys 1997;McLaren, Leonardo, and Allen 2000)has argued, “primitive”exchange functionsunder discourses of waste and expenditure, notproduction. But to suggest that we arebeyond the age ofcapital as an objectiveforce is surely toperpetuate another myth inthe name ofsocial Žction:social because it is still socialtheory, Ž ctionbecause it projects afuturistic,albeit creative, world out of sync withcurrent relations of exploitation. Itis now a popularrefrain to discredit socialism based on the fact thatthe formerSoviet Union has fallen andother socialist economies, like China,approach a mixedeconomy. Indeed, the formerSoviet Union was noposter child of Marxist utopia. Far from it. It began with Stalin’ s reign ofterror, then punctuatedby aninefŽcient bureaucratic system thatmade itall butimpossible to respond to changes insocial life. This rigidity eventually led toits fall fromlegitimacy. In fact,the fall of“ ofŽcial” Marxismmay bepreferred with respect to the futuredevelopment of Marxistthought (Bottomore et al.1991:126-127). This point has led some thinkers tointerpret that capitalism, especially inits American form, has worked.And of courseit has.It has workedto beneŽ t the fewmultinational corporationswho own the wealthand means ofproductionto control other people’s lives andtheir ability to make adescentlife forthemselves. It has workedto exploit the laborof men, women,and children who have only theirlabor to sell. Ithas workedto further divide the workingclass fromtheir middle class neighbors. After all, they confrontone another ona dailybasis through work, school, and friendships whereas members ofthe bourgeoisiesend their children to private schools and remain out ofsight. Finally, capitalismhas workedto subvert world peace because monopolizingoil is more important than solving the MiddleEast crisis. Ifcommunism failed because of its rigidity, then capitalismhas “worked” ironicallybecause of its  exibility. The dialecticaltension between discourse and historical materialism isproductive, but the “endof the real”thesis appearsunsustainable, and worse,complicit with relations of exploitation.In fact,ludic postmodernists may have succeededin dodging Scylla only tostrengthen Charybdis.It is fairto assume that if the UnitedStates were to become a socialiststate, 220 Leonardo ² whitemen willlikely holdthe importantbureaucratic positions, therefore racismwill still bea problemand women will Ž ndthemselves Žghting forgender rights. The ugliestforms of racist and patriarchal relations may signiŽcantly decreasethrough economic transformation, but race and genderrelations will not become insigniŽ cant in socialist America (Hunter 2002).Thus, social theory must incorporate an analysis ofdifferences, especially intheir commodiŽ ed form. Here, postmodern theorizing has been helpful.Discourses of difference remind us that although gender, sexual, andrace issues do not exist autonomouslyfrom material relations, they arearticulated in meaningful ways that have theirparticular concerns. Forexample, wenotice that socialist Cuba had to reconstruct the family, Mao’s Chinainstituted the culturalrevolution, and the elite inthe former SovietUnion was all butmale. Differenceis in ected by the economy,but isnot determined by itin the orthodoxsense ofMarxism. Tothe extent thatMarxist praxis neglects the speciŽc discoursesof identityformation, it is guiltyof subsumingthe socialmeanings thatracial- ized,gendered, and sexualized subjects experience ona dailybasis, some ofwhich inform the epistemologicalwork of revolutionarymovements. Re- ducingidentity politics to anindividual’s experience minimizesthe institu- tionalaspect of a subject’s identity.But asserting identity in itstraditionally vague wayassumes an a priori sameness betweenthose who invoke it,some ofwhom may experience arudeawakening when they discoverthe pane ofdifference (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Rather, the process of identiŽ - cationmay bepreferable to the apparent condition ofhaving an identity. Thisis where Nancy Fraser’s (1998)ideas on the politicsof (mis)recognition amelioratethe otherwisevulgar suggestion that identity is privateand only particular.She deploysa neo-Weberianmodel for addressing the differ- ential statusand rights of gays andlesbians in the contextof heterosexist capitalism.This is an areawhere orthodox Marxism has been criticized forits refusal to address identity discourses with respect to rights, prestige, and status. AlthoughBaudrillard’ s theoriesdid not create the notionof difference, they attendto its contours. The politicsof identity is based on the notion thatgroups of people have been treatedas merely differentin patterned waysthat have materialsources and consequences (Leonardo 2000, 2002). Forexample, the socialmovement weknowas the CivilRights Movement wassupra-individual. It was the recognitionby masses ofpeople of color, women,and gays andlesbians that the white,male, heterosexual state wasdeliberately thwarting their rights as groups ofpeople. There is also a sense thatthe 1960’s identitypolitics movement extended beyondidentity as politics-of-the-selfwhen whiteAmericans joined hands with people of colorand acknowledged that minorities were being oppressed on the basis Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 221 ² oftheir identity. Looked at in this way, we can avoid relegating identity politicsto the marginsof theory as a formof privatized discourse having noties with material life. There is something to suggest that the “new identitypolitics” and materialist politics are compatible. For the very notionof identity is traceable to the material owof life andhow, for example, the blackbody is commodiŽ ed as the sexualizedsubject. In otherwords, a materialistidentity politics is part of an overall andmore completetransformation of objective life insofaras it leaves itsstamp on oursubjectivity. Identity is real because it is partof the productiveprocess insofaras workers gain an identitythrough their practical activity. To the extent thatidentity is abstract, it is imagined. It is very muchlike the sort ofthing that Levi-Strauss described as a “‘virtualcenter ( foyervirtuel ) to whichwe mustrefer to explain certainthings, but without it ever having a realexistence” ’ (citedby Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 9; italicsin original). Keepingin mind the dialecticbetween the realand imagined aspects of identity,theorists avoid a fetishismof either pole. Ifby myth wemean the codesthat bind the socialŽ eld andnot the oppositeof truth, then emancipationmay beone of the strongest, modernistmyths. Towardthis end, Ebert’ s (1996)commitment to Marxist praxisis loud and clear, especially withrespect to the shortcomingsof “ludicfeminism.” Marxism may notemancipate the social once and for all throughpraxis but this does not suggest that it is a modernisthoax. Asa formof revolutionary praxis, Marxism is indispensable for social transformation.Rallying arounda praxisthat emphasizes continuous and increasing emancipationof people from material exploitation represents a genuine accomplishmentof modernist enlightenment ofthe Marxiststrain. Guardingagainst the pitfallsof naive enlightenment, suchas the vulgar type ofMarxism which posits the historicalinevitability of socialism, does notmilitate against all otherredeeming facets of Marxism. That is, if we considerpostmodernism, as Lyotard (1984) clariŽ es, asa Žlteror detour forlate modernism(as opposedto an epochafter it), in such a waythat anidea is modern only afterit becomes postmodern, then the projectof emancipationis a possibilityor potentiality, not an inevitability. With respectto the differencebetween inevitability versus the necessity ofsocialism, I amnot far off from the positionoffered by the Frankfurt School,as summarized by Raymond Geuss. Geuss (1981)says the following,

The members ofthe Frankfurt Schooltake itas an importantdistinguishing featureof their “critical”version ofMarxism (anda sign ofits superiorityover moreorthodox versions) that they donot categorically predictthe “inevitable” comingof the classless society. Marxism as atheory ofsociety claims togive knowledge of the necessity ofa transformationof the present social orderinto a 222 Leonardo ²

classless society : : : From the fact [sic] that the agents have an overwhelming practical interest in bringingabout an objectivelypossible transformation, it doesnot follow that the transformationis inevitable.(P. 77;italics inoriginal) Emancipationfrom objective, parasitic relations takes commitmentto a politicsof resistance. It requires more than critical re ection because, all byitself, social thought does not liberate real conditions (Freire 1993). In additionto radical thought, it takes aradicaland practical activity totransform the environment.A criticaltheory starts from the premise thatsubjective re ection on objective structures begins the processof emancipation.But without practical action, re ection is as effective as readingthe assembly directionsfor a newmicrowave stand and discovering thatthe partsare missing! Marxism is still anecessary andstubborn toolfor explaining the persistenceof suffering and human degradation. Thusa projectof emancipation cannot dispense with active resistanceto capitalbecause it subverts people’ s rationalunderstanding of their actions. Moreover,as revolutionary praxis, Marxism explains aswell asprovides the combustionfor emancipatory knowledge. As capitalism commodiŽ es the entireediŽ ce ofsocial life, the need forliberation is confused with the need toconsume, the need forrational action with the need toshop. Resistance isin diametric opposition to Baudrillard’ s notionof hyper- conformity,or assistance. This is less anegationof Baudrillard’ s contri- butionsand more of a politicizationof the heuristicvalue ofsimulation theory.Resisting capital requires a commitmentto explaining the stub- bornpersistence of real suffering in people’ s lives. Resistance here isless asearchfor essence andmore about becoming aware of ideological mis- recognitionand working toward identifying its genetic sourcesin order to createconditions free ofcoercion and exploitation (Geuss 1981).Thus, resistancein postmodernity retains a privilegedplace in transformational politics.Because ofits invidious presence in basically all facetsof post- modernlife, capital assumes a centralpoint for resistance. It is accurate todescribe social life asquite complex and web-like to the extent thatit becomeshard to trace the originarysource of social phenomena. But this doesnot militate against targeting those differences which make the most differencein creating unequal relations of power. In otherwords, some differencesmake moredifference than others. Ideological class difference isobviously more determining of one’ s choicesin life than differencesbe- tween belly buttons,inny oroutty. In the same vain,in the currentregime ofsigns, differences within discourses about sexuality aremore signiŽ cant thandifferences within discourses about, say, icecream preference. Prior- itizingdifferences is both a logicaland political nature of being human (Eagleton1996). That said, class difference remains a stubbornconcept in postmodernity. Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 223 ²

With deconstruction,we understand that western metaphysics has functionedunder the signof logocentrism, or the privilegingof the “metaphysicsof presence,” as Derrida (1976) deŽ nes it.In this,western philosophyis guilty of neglecting the differentialplay ofsilence inthe sign’s apparentself-presence, which both ‘ supplements’and subverts the presence.For example, the signiŽer “ white”only exists inrelation to its silent andabnormalized supplement, “ non-white”(which is acodefor black inthe binarydiscourse of the UnitedStates). The signiŽer “ rational”(read “men”) only exists insupplementarity with “ emotional”(read “ women”). Itis this silent otherthat compromises the securityof the sign’s presence inour attempt to Ž xthe play ofsigns. In fact,Baudrillard (1994) explains thatspeech (as opposedto language) is the signifyingdifference between humansand animals. He writes, They, the animals,do not speak. In auniverse ofincreasing speech, ofthe constraint toconfess andto speak, only they remainmute, and for this reason they seem toretreat farfrom us, behind the horizonof truth. But it is what makes us intimatewith them. It is notthe ecologicalproblem of their survival that is important,but still andalways that oftheir silence. In aworldbent ondoing nothing but making one speak, in aworldassembled underthe hegemony ofsigns anddiscourse, their silence weighs moreand more heavily onour organization of meaning. (P. 137) Itis not rationality, civilization, or labor that distinguishes humans from animals,but our capacity and their failure to speak. Although speaking createspoetry and beauty, it also institutes violence anddiscursive castration.Finding violence insilence acknowledgesthe powerin non- participation(McLaren, Leonardo, and Allen 1999).One only has to recallbeing victim to someone else’ s “silent treatment.”It represents a subjectiveŽ eld ofexperience thatis never completely severed fromits other;that is, silence isintimate with presence. It is not a stretchto relate thisdescription to the discursiveformation of the bourgeoisie,which isparasitic on the worker’s discourse.In the actof speaking, bourgeois discourserecalls its relationship with the workeras radical other. Marxism addsthe dimensionof resistance grounded on revolutionary praxis. Thus, the concernfor transformation leads us to “ supplement”deconstruction withsocialist praxis because, as Althusser (1969) suggests, although the conceptof overdetermination avoids the pitfallsof classical Marxism, the economyis an overarchingforce in people’ s dailylives. Despitethe factthat there are,as deconstruction correctly suggests, differences within signs– like class,gender, and race – there exist important differences between them (Ebert1996). That is, classes have bothdiscursive andnon-discursive aspects to them. Discourse does not determine the objectiveconditions around an exploited,alienated worker. Regardless of 224 Leonardo ² howa sweatshop worker constructs the meaning aroundher work or the joyshe may receive fraternizingwith her co-workers(if this is even allowed),her labor is still exploitedand alienated. Regardless of how she may conceptualizeher working conditions as somehow better than the objectiveconditions of being workless, her work still satisŽes someoneelse’ s searchfor proŽ t. Although resigniŽ cation may assistthe projectof social transformation,it alone cannotfeed the hungryand house the homeless. Forthe exploitedhave needs thatare more immediate than their desire to besigniŽ ed in particular ways. In asense, providethe hungrywith food andthey couldcare less howthey areinserted into discourse! But this is an oversimpliŽcation. Marxismrepresents less atheoryabout Ž nal transformationof objective life andmore of a continuousprocess of materialawareness and dialogue. Forexample, GeorgLukacs’ (1971) historicist brand of Marxism suggests thatrevolutionary class consciousness arises out of the speciŽc material needs ofthe workingclass. He writes,“ Itsimply means thatthis objectivity isthe self-objectiŽcation of human society at a particularstage in its development;its laws hold good only withinthe frameworkof the historical contextwhich produced them andwhich is in turn determined by them” (p.49). By saying this,Lukacs breaks with a certaintranscendentalism withinMarxism, a certaintheory of universal class struggle. Lukacs speaks ofan economictotality that drives all the contradictionsat the locallevel despitethe factthat certain things make sense tothe individual.Emphasizing the totality,Lukacs makes acase forideological misrecognitionas a historicalform of consciousness about the world.As such,working class ideology matures within a given economicdevelopment andis inscribedby it.But as the universalclass that sees the worldthrough itsown experiences aswell asthrough the capitalistimaginary the working classrepresents the general interestof society (a bitlike DuBois’ (1989) conceptof “ doubleconsciousness” ). Forthe workingclass is in the position tosee the totalityoutside of its own immediate interests, something the capitalistis unableto dobecauseof hisself-interest. Lukacs (1971) explains, With the emergence ofhistorical materialismthere arosethe theory ofthe “conditionsfor the liberationof the proletariat”and the doctrineof reality understoodas the totalprocess ofsocial evolution.This was only possible because forthe proletariatthe total knowledge ofits class-situation was avital necessity, amatter oflife and death : : : From its own pointof view self- knowledgecoincides with knowledgeof the whole sothat the proletariatis atone and the same timethe subjectand object of its ownknowledge. (P. 20; italics added) AlthoughLukacs adopts the inevitabilityapproach to revolution, he advocatesa speciŽc materialistresistance to capitalthat takes intoaccount Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 225 ² the speciŽc needs andstage of working class consciousness. Through acompleteunderstanding of the socialformation at a given time,the workingclass develops the Žrstelement ofrevolutionary praxis: a certain consciousnessof current material conditions. ForLukacs, a targetfor working class critique is the general commod- iŽcation of reality in capitalism. More and more, social life takes onthe appearanceof a commodityand this makes itmore difŽ cult to determine essence fromepiphenomena, or the realfrom its reiŽ ed forms. It is this general conditionof reiŽ cation that provides, for example, the contextfor Baudrillard’s conceptof the hyperrealwhere the copyexceeds the original andthe twoimplode. Where Baudrillardand Lukacs differ, however, is intheir explanation out of this aporia. For Lukacs, greater dialectical cri- tiqueand “ ideologicalmaturity” force contradictions to theirrevolutionary point,whereas for Baudrillard (1990) “ fatalstrategy” suggests that we adopt aseductivestance andconsume desire until it irrupts into copies without trace.The theorist’s trickis to attend to the materialistdesire inherent in the workingclass movement toŽ ghtfor basic needs, withoutwhich any discussionof desire becomes a formof neglect. Allthis suggests that it is necessary toexamine postmodernityin the contextof late capitalism.Devoid of thismove, social theory degrades into complicitywith exploitation because it is not so much that socialism can dismantleforms of domination once and for all asmuch as it disables relationsof exploitation, or the ugliestforms of domination. Without this criticalingredient, social theory ignores the macrodeterminants of thought thatboth inscribe and infect our attempts to explain currentreality. Sidesteppingthis consideration produces what I have previouslyreferred toas “ socialŽ ction.”For despite the factthat it has becomeincreasingly difŽcult for macro theories to account for the globalmovement ofcapital, they areindispensable for resisting those forces that disable the localpolitics ofwhich Foucault speaks sofondly. Or as Best andKellner (1991)put it, “[W]hileit is impossible to produce a Žxed andexhaustive knowledgeof aconstantlychanging complex of social processes, it is possible to map the fundamentaldomains, structures, practices, and discourses of asociety, andhow they areconstituted and interact” (p. 260). Just as itwasdifŽ cult forearly moderniststo identify with modernism, Best andKellner suggest thatwe arein atransitional“ borderlineregion” between the modernand postmodernthat has yet tobe adequately theorized. Or as Harvey (1989) putsit, we are in “ acrisiswithin the former”rather than the birthof the latter(p. 116). Despite the postmodernistattempt to depict the modern subjectlike Žsh outof water, gasping for air, it is difŽ cult to suggest that the uidenvironment known as capitalismdoes not still envelop sociallife throughshifting waves ofproŽ teering and superexploitation. 226 Leonardo ²

In fact,there ismuch evidence tosuggest that the conditionof post- modernityrepresents the newcapitalist formation designed to create  ex- ibleaccumulation, new spaces for proŽ t, and new bureaucratic accom- modations.Instituting part-time work structures without beneŽ ts (e.g., ad- junctprofessors and standby workers), exporting labor to foreign lands (e.g.,sweat shops in the Philippinesand Malaysia), anddecentralizing state control(e.g., local control of schools) are ways to fragment both the ob- jective basisof life whichin turn, as Lukacs (1971) reminds us, fragments itscompanion, the subjectof history. Just when fragmentationbecomes moreacute and detecting reiŽ cation more challenging, abandoning so- cialistpraxis may have comeat the worsttime. In fact,postmodernism’ s debuton the academicscene arrivedat a suspicioustime when Leftist activistswere beginning to establish wider social support, cohesion, and momentum(Hartsock 1987). Fragmenting the subjectof history, aleatory postmodernistscontribute to the fragmentationof the Left.Just when a timeto believe inemancipation becomes more pertinent, in comes the “New Gnosticism”(Hassan 1992).God is not just an opiatebut dead. Even the Prometheantheme isa thingof the past;there isnomore of that Žrehe symbolizedas inspirationalknowledge. All we supposedlyhave are the leftoverashes. Theremay bea breakin capitalist accumulation, but this does not equatea transformationin relations of capital. It is perhaps just the opposite:the hyperintensiŽcation and hyperefŽ ciency ofcapital. As David Harvey (1989)writes,

[W]hat ismost interesting aboutthe current situationis the way inwhich cap- italismis becomingever moretightly organized through dispersal,geographical mobility,and  exible responses in labourmarkets, labourprocesses, andcon- sumer markets, all accompaniedby hefty dosesof institutional, product, and technological innovation.(P. 159; italics inoriginal)

Thus,the “newness”in postmodernity may infact be the old,tiring moderniststory of capital with a newchapter. This does not suggest thatButler’ s strategyof remetaphorization and Baudrillard’ s simulation theorydo not lend subversivearsenal tothe Left.Discourse may be deconstructivebut exploitation still needs someexplaining. Social theory cannot conŽ rm Bachelard’ s conceptof an epistemologicalbreak by announcingthat there isone. And this is ultimately the tragicside of simulationtheory. It forsakes feminist praxis for a seductivetheory in atime when chauvinismis at its all timehigh (therefore more sexist thansexist isnot desirable), when racismbecomes global (more racist than racistjust producesmore racists), and when consumptionprovides more capital for production(hyperconsumption generates moreproŽ t). Marx (1976)once Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 227 ² wrote,“ Perseuswore a magiccap so that the monstershe hunteddown mightnot see him.We drawthe magicdown over our eyes andears to deny thatthere areany monsters”(p. 91). At atimewhen exploitationhas becomemonstriŽ ed, we must not cut off our ears and pluck out our eyes tothe obvious. Ebert(1996) claims that despite the factthat language may bereal,this doesnot mean thatthe real ismade up of language.If social theorists make everything real,then nothingis real. As a socialcategory and analytical tool,the realno longer serves any heuristicvalue forrevolutionary understanding.It melts intothin air. There has tobe a pointwherein distinctions,as opposed to differences, have tobe made with respect to productionand signiŽ cation. For example, althoughdiscourse may affect the real throughregimes of meaning andtruth, discourse alone results inan amputatedpraxis because it denies the factthat signs do not only have powerfrom within but also from without. DeŽ ning power as diffuse, asFoucault (1978) advocates, forgets that power not only worksthrough subjectsas conduits and terminals, but power is also the powerto exploit. Foucault(1986) attempts to make power available forthe “careof the self,” orthose strategies, following Deleuze andGuattari’ s (1983)“ bodywithout organs,”to improve upon the self beyondhumanistic regimes of truth.It is aschizophrenicsubject who functions with one foot within current truths andwith the otherfoot in Bloch’s “notyet.” Butregimes of truth gain their privilege largely throughtheir rela- tionshipwith institutional power: in other words, through the real.Racist signiŽers work the waythey dobecause their targets are institutionally disempoweredto begin with. There is hardly an existing whitebourgeois male whosematerial life isthreatened by the signiŽer, “ honkey.”Possi- bly originatingas “ hunky”and a slurfor Hungarians, today honkey does nothave materialconsequences in keeping downwhite men (Barrettand Roediger2002). On the otherhand, “ nigger”or “ wetback”oppress African Americansand Mexican Americansbecause of their racialized place in re- lationsof production as well ashow these signiŽers have been usedto breakdown their psyche andself-conŽ dence (again,having materialconse- quences).The same canbe said about “ bitch”for women and “ queer”for gays andlesbians, even asthey maintaintheir distinctions from other social movements. Noamount of reclaiming the wordseems tosucceed in sub- stantially changingthe racist,sexist, andhomophobic landscape without a simultaneoustransformation of the economicsystem. Thatsaid, language and discourse cannot be materialized away. That is,discourse’ s constitutivepower to construct the realwithout actually producingit cannot be explained awaybut instead linked tothe material, muchlike the vein ofa Volosinov(1973) or John Frow (1994). The realis 228 Leonardo ² madeintelligible through signs that in uence the constructionof the real.If weunderstand this process in adialecticalmanner, then the superstructure andbase produce overdeterminations or thatculture produces effects onto the economy(Althusser 1969). In this,Althusser accomplishes what J.M. Fritzman(1998) calls aversionof “poststructuralmaterialism.” Along with Adorno,Althusser’ s innovationscontributed to the transformationwithin orthodoxMarxism to explain the roleof discourse in creating subjects for the reproductionof the conditionsof production. That is, in response to Lukacs’humanist or Hegelian Marxism,Althusser’ s anti-humanistbrand of Marxismopts for a theoryof subjectivity absent of references touniversal humanity.As such,his problematic starts with the ideologicalinterpellation ofhumans as subjectsof ideology. Said another way, discourse interpellates, orinserts, humans into subject positions within language. Attempting to understandhow ideology “ works,”Althusser explains thatit is through discoursethat subjects for production are secured by capital. Ideological apparatuses,like schools,induct students into their places within production byŽ rstinserting them intodiscourse. As far as Althusser emphasizes the baseas the Žrstcause, he ismaterialist,and as far as he eternalizes ideology, he ispoststructural. Through discursive practices, subjects (mis)recognize theirimaginary relations to the realfor their real relations. Discourse is a formof representation of the realand not the realitself. As the science of Marxismestablishes morerigorous standards for critique, this is said to be indiametric opposition to the evolutionof normal standards for thought. Hence, asscience evolves, ideologydevolves andrecruits increasingly more ofeveryday life intoits domain. Althusser’s theoryis in direct contrast to Alvin Gouldner’s (1994) conceptof ideology, which makes rationaldiscourse possible through a meta-language.In thiscase, ideology exposes relationspreviously thought tobe intimate with common sense. Throughideological thinking, subjects participatein rational dialogue, critique harmful traditions, and mobilize againstthem, using the powerof the wordas an ideologicalweapon. To Althusser,subjects fail to become materialist enough in the lastinstance becauseideological thought usurps their power to think innon-ideological, orscientiŽ c, terms. This is essentially the differencebetween philosophy as aformof ideological speculation and theory as scientiŽ c activity(Ricoeur 1986).In Althusser’s (1971)words, ideology can be describedthis way:

What really takes place in ideologyseems thereforeto take place outside it.That is why those whoare in ideologybelieve themselves bydeŽ nition outsideideology: one of the effects ofideology is the practical denegation of the ideologicalcharacter ofideology by ideology: ideology never says, “Iam ideological.”It is necessary tobe outside ideology, i.e. in scientiŽ c knowledge, tobe able to say: Iamin ideology (a quite exceptional case) or(the general Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 229 ²

case): Iwas inideology. As is well known, the accusation ofbeing in ideology only appliesto others, never tooneself : : : Which amountsto saying that ideology hasno outside (foritself), butat the same time that it is nothing but outside (forscience andreality). (P. 175; italics inoriginal)

ToAlthusser, resisting capital is a scientiŽc endeavorto decreaseideological thought.But like aproto-poststructuralist(pre-poststructuralist?), Althusser explains thisas a slippage,a non-stablemove tospecify Marxist scientiŽ c thinkingwhile generalizing the inuence ofideology. Perhaps the kernel of truthin Althusserian Marxism comes from its vigilant discourse on ideology aseternal asthe unconscious(see McLaren,Leonardo, and Allen 2000). Thatis, resisting capital as a formof ideological illusion requires a Marxist deferral,of Marxism never actuallyrealizing its full materialist potential. Marxistdiscourse is always one step behind ideological thought, never actuallycatching up to its weaker prey.As science becomesmore precise, moreof the socialŽ eld becomesengulfed by ideology. By suggestingthis, Althusserprojects Marxism into a statusof permanence since its other, ideology,persists even insocialist society. What appearslike acapitulation onthe partof Althusser is, in essence, aprojectingof Marx’ s science into astatusof permanency. AMarxistresistance to capital must engage the powerof discourse to Žrstaccess and then constructthe real.This discourse must be based on the languageof real subjects (Marx andEngels 1970).In hisresponse to postmoderntheory, Terry Eagleton (1996) afŽ rms real, historical language: “The linguisticanimal has the edge overits fellow creatures in all kinds of ways: : : Only alinguisticanimal could have history,as opposed to whatone imagines for a slugis just the same damnthing over again” (p.73). To Eagleton, the capacityfor language truly represents a human accomplishment.But it is not language as a given buta wayto transform oursensuous life thatEagleton’ s differencefrom postmodernists, such as Baudrillard,hinges. It is trueenough that humans have alanguagesensitive tothe nuancesof everyday life andsnails donot. The critical difference betweenthe twois the former’s abilityto change the objectivebasis of life throughlanguage rather than be the objectof it. When language, asdiscourse, gives formto the world,then the formit assumes must beassessed aswell. Marxist discourse may constructthe worldas a material,economic process, but this also leads it into certain praxiological commitmentsabout addressing exploitation. Marxism may bea discourse justlike any other,but it embodies a set ofinterventions which stem from itsdiscursive structure: e.g., class struggle, relations of exploitation, and revolutionarypraxis. Just as Marxism cannot materialize away language, neither canpostmodernism discourse away the real. 230 Leonardo ²

Towarda Postmodern Socialism Postmodernsocialism requires that the subjectof history understands how capitalcurrently works, how the commodityform assumes its shape, and howreiŽ cation naturalizes the realin what Ernest Mandel (1976)calls the “giganticenterprise of dehumanization” (p. 65). Resisting capital insists that practicalintellectuals deconstructdiscourses for the purposesof arriving atsilences thatbetray the politicaleconomic interests of the discourses themselves. Forexample, inanalyzing mediarepresentations, Herman and Chomsky (1988)propose the strategyof disaggregating representations thatmanufacture the public’s consentunder the guiseof professional journalism.Or in Guy Debord’s (1994)terms, a revolutionaryanalysis ofthe mediamust arrive at its spectacular structure. That is, capital’ s newtechnological form as “ spectacle”provides ideological distractions thatdivert the public’s attentionfrom a fullerunderstanding of the productionof real life. Combining anarchism and a critiqueof political economy,Debord (1994) writes, “ The SPECTACLEIS capital accumulated tothe pointwhere it becomes image” (p. 24; italics in original) and how late mediauses “ policemethods to transform perception”(p.74; italics inoriginal). As long as the mediaproduces spectacles in which the massinvests affectively, then itbecomes more difŽ cult to arrive at the politicaleconomy of mass media, an Americanindustry worth billions of dollarsthrough advertisements, all ofwhich are part and parcel to the productivesystem andits exploitation of labor, commodiŽ cation of the image(Baudrillard’ s signvalue), andgreed for proŽ t (McChesney 2000). In apopular1990’ s television adfor Canon camera,the worldranked tennis playerAndre Agassi smacks paintsoaked tennis ballsinto a wall. Knownas a rebelin the tennis scene (Agassirefused to attend the WimbledonChampionships in London because he disdainedwearing white),Agassi takes onthe imageof an unorthodoxsportsman for Canon’s newmodel, “ The EOSRebel.” The camerahas nothingto dowhatsoever withtennis orrebellion, i.e., the imagevalue has little todo with the product’s usevalue. The message –“Image isEverything”– worksthrough the commodiŽcation of viewers’desire to associatewith the imageof asexy sportsman:Agassi. The bottomline ispurchasing the cameraand as long asthe capitalistcan tap into the buyers’desires, then productionremains unquestioned.Purchasing becomes a formof en eshing the spectacleand fulŽlling desirethrough vicarious associations. Takingits cue from this ad, the sodacompany, Sprite,inverts the Canon message byportraying playground athletes and ashingthe message – “Image isnothing. Thirst is everything. Obey yourthirst.” Hence, even the apparentattempt at negation shows a recuperativelogic. Obeying yourthirst is clearly an image,one which suggests an atavisticnotion of Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 231 ² humansas animalistic. Furthermore, when wekeep inmind Sprite’s hip- hopcampaign in the early 1990’s (a rather“ successful”one), then we understandthat the companytargets young African Americans through racistovertures of the sexed-up,virile black body. One mightsuggest thatsince its inception of the hip-hopcampaign, Sprite’ s largeincrease inrevenue impliesthat it “ works”and that it satisŽ es itsbuyers’ needs. In addition,intellectuals may even suggestthat the innocentpublic, rather than beingduped by the clever adcampaigns, in fact acts on its own desires.It is not the empiricalcase that the masshas avoidedspectacles, ratherthat they wantmore spectacles! Baudrillardoffers insights to explain thisdynamic. Deserving tobe quotedat length, Baudrillard(1983b) says the situationis

exactly like children face toface with the adultuniverse : : : The child resists onall levels, andto a contradictorydemand he alsoresponds with adouble strategy. Tothe demandto be an object,he opposesall the practices of disobedience,revolt, emancipation; in short,a totalclaim tosubjecthood. To the demandto be a subject,he opposesjust as stubbornlyand efŽ caciously with an object’s resistance, that is tosay, inexactly the oppositemanner: infantilism,hyperconformism, a totaldependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither of the twostrategies has moreobjective value than the other.The resistance-as- subject istodayunilaterally valorizedand held as positive : : : Butthis is toignore the equalor perhaps even superiorimpact, of all the practices-as-objects – the renunciationof the positionof subject and of meaning – exactly the practices ofthe masses –which we buryand forget under the contemptuousterms of alienationand passivity. (Pp. 106-107; italics added)

Baudrillardadvocates the revenge ofthe object,the morebanal version of asubject’s resistance.His portrayal of the massas infantile reconŽ rms the contradictionsinherent incapitalist conditions. The concernhere isless withfrustrations over contradictions (and yes they canbe frustrating) and morewith explaining them.The mediamanipulate images into spectacles andthis is not a haphazardevent. Advertisementdesigners decide on their targetaudience, brainstorm on common desires presumed to thrive in this segment ofsociety (a socialconstruction), and then combinesuggestive imagesto prey on its audience’ s affective ows.Again, this process has an ultimategoal in mind: to maximize company proŽ t. If Sprite’s campaign has worked,then itresults from manipulation of desire, not its fulŽ llment. Sprite summonsthe strongestmyths surroundingboys and men, particularly youngAfrican Americans as animalistic, and exploits them forthe beneŽt ofa racistclass relation. In thisinstance, resistance involves discursive interventionsinto the racializedorganization of classrelations. Said another way,media spectacles are Ž rstmade intelligible at the level ofdiscourse 232 Leonardo ² then transformedas knowledge through the subject’s understandingof real relations. Afewmore examples shouldhelp drivehome the point.A “Mon- ster.com”commercial features children who claim that they wantto be ex- ploitedwhen they growup. One wantsto follow orders while others have ambitionsof being underappreciated and underrewarded. The message thatMonster.com wants to send its consumers is that the companydoes notparticipate in such chicanery. At work here isa bitof Baudrillardean ironyof the real.The commercialis more real than the realbecause it hidesnothing from its audience. It is capitalism at its best (worst?), hav- ingno shame orguilt about its process of stratiŽ cation. It represents the truthof capitalist structures and uses it as irony for self-promotion. Many childrenwill grow up following orders and exploited for their work so the commercialis indicative of current material relations, not their opposite. Ifcapitalism is the modeof production,then postmodernismis its cultural logicand the twosometimes work together (Jameson 1991).An orthodox, economicalanalysis failsto account for the meaning insuchrepresentation, dismissingit as ideological. In anothercommercial, this time from “ Jack- in-the-Box,”the bulbous-headedJack isfound on the sideof the road interactingwith a Mexican womanserving foodwith chipotle peppers.Jack ordersthe foodby mispronouncing the wordseveral times,indeed mock- ingthe woman,despite being corrected by her. In the end,the woman gives uptrying. Again, at work here isan attemptat irony. Outside of the media’s pretensions,this interaction happens frequently and would be brandedas either racist or aformof cultural condescension. The commer- cialis brazenly real but works through the detourof irony, posturing as the oppositeof the real. Ihave arguedthat critical theory must work through the distortions ofcapital. As such, the actof reading becomes not only an exercise ofrepresentation, but a potentiallytransformative event (Freire1993). Throughoutthis essay, Iassessed the viabilityof both simulationist andsocialist theories as modes of explanation for the postmodern condition.In addition,I evaluatedtheir capacity to intervene intoor resistwith meaningful strategies relations of capital. Finally, the essay critiquedsimulationism and socialism for their praxiological value. Clearly, Baudrillard’s simulationtheory of the hyperrealrepresents a unique innovationin social theory that challenges any universalist,transcendental explanationof the social.En routeto its unpredictable ends, simulation theorypronounces the deathof certain modernist themes, like production anddepth, both of which link withMarxist discourse. Despite these formidablechallenges tosocialistepistemology, simulation theory falls short ofa sustainableposition because it denies the possibilityof systematic Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 233 ² oppositionsince this would be tantamount to admitting that a system is currentlyin place. Socialist societies may notobliterate oppression once andfor all, buta historicalmaterialist critique is a processthat attends tothe conditionsof exploitation as they historicallyappear. In atime ofreal as well astheoretical crisis, the promisesof Marxism remain a potential,not a guarantee.It is not only attentive tolanguage, but the languageof concretepeople. It takes discourseseriously but also constructs adiscoursefor transformation of reality. Despite the possibilitythat it may never realizea practicalcondition free ofcontradictions, Marxism isa discoursecommitted to ending human exploitation. In ourcurrent formation,Marxism’ s incessantcritique of capitalism makes itone of the moststable threats in the unstableconditions of postmodernity.

References

ALTHUSSER, L. 1969 For Marx.Londonand New York:Verso. 1971 Lenin andPhilosophy .New York:Monthly ReviewPress. BARRETT, J. AND D. ROEDIGER 2002 “HowWhite Peoplebecame White.” Pp. 29-34 in P.Rothenberg(ed.), White Privilege.New York:Worth Publishers. BAT AILLE , G. 1985 Visions of Excess: SelectedWritings 1927-1939 .Stoekl,Allan Trans. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1988 TheAccursed Share .Vol.I. R.Hurley (trans.). New York:Zone Books. 1991 TheAccursed Share .Vols.II andIII. R. Hurley (trans.). New York:Zone Books. 1997 TheBataille Reader .Botting,Fred and Wilson, Scott (eds.).Oxford and Malden, MA:Blackwell. BAUDRILLAR D, J. 1975 TheMirror of Production .St.Louis: Telos Press. 1979 Seduction.New York:St. Martin’ s Press. 1981 For aCritiqueof thePolitical Economy of theSign .St.Louis: Telos Press. 1983a Simulations .New York:Semiotext. 1983b In theShadow of theSilent Majorities .New York:Semiotext. 1988a “The System ofObjects.” Pp. 10-28 in M.Poster(ed. and trans.), Jean Baudrillard:Selected Writings .Stanford:Stanford University Press. 1988b “Consumer Society.”Pp. 29-56 in M.Poster(ed. and trans.), JeanBaudrillard: SelectedWritings .Stanford:Stanford University Press. 1990 FatalStrategies .New York:Semiotext. 1993 Symbolic Exchangeand Death .H.Grant (trans.). London,Thousand Oaks, New Delhi:SAGE Publications. 1994 Simulacraand Simulation .Ann Arbor:University ofMichigan Press. 1995 TheGulf War did not TakePlace .P.Patton (trans.). Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press. 234 Leonardo ²

BEST, S. AND D. KELLNE R 1991 Postmodern Theories: Critical Interrogations. New York:The GuilfordPress. BOTTOMORE, T. ET AL. 1991 Pp.126-127 in T.Bottomore, L. Harris, V.G. Kiernan andR. Miliband(eds.), ADictionary of Marxist Thought . 2nd Ed.Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell. BRUBAKER, R. AND F. COOPER 2000 “Beyond‘ Identity.”’ Theory andSociety 29 (1): 1-47. BURAW OY, M. 2000 “Marxismafter Communism.” Theory andSociety 29 (2):151-174. DEBORD, G. 1994 TheSociety of theSpectacle .New York:Zone Books. DELEUZE, G. AND F. GUATTARI 1983 Anti-Oedipus:Capitalism and Schizophrenia .Minneapolis:University ofMinnesota Press. DERRIDA, J. 1976 OfGrammatology .Spivak,Gayatri (trans.). Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins University Press. DU BOIS, W.E.B. 1989 TheSouls of BlackFolk .New York:Penguin Books. EAGLETON, T. 1996 Postmodernism andits Illusions .Oxford:Blackwell. EBERT, T. 1996 Ludic Feminismand After .Ann Arbor:University ofMichiganPress. FOUCAULT, M. 1978 TheHistory of Sexuality .Vol.I. New York:Vintage Books. 1986 TheCare of theSelf .New York:Vintage Books. FRASER, N. 1998 “Heterosexism,Misrecognition and Capitalism: A responseto Judith Butler.” NewLeft Review 228:140-149. FREIRE, P. 1993 Pedagogyof theOppressed .New York:Continuum. FRITZMAN , J. 1998 “LouisAlthusser: Poststructural Materialist.”Pp. 49-64 in M.Peters (ed.), Namingthe Multiple: Poststructuralism andEducation .Westport.CT: Bergin & Garvey. FROW, J. 1994 “Marxismand Literary History.”Pp. 295-302 in T.Eagleton(ed.), Ideology. Londonand New York:Longman. GEUSS, R. 1981 TheIdea of aCritical Theory .Cambridge,London, New York,New Rochelle, Melbourne,and Sydney: Cambridge University Press. GIROUX, H. 1994 Disturbing Pleasures .Londonand New York:Routledge. 1999 TheMouse thatRoared: Disney andthe End of Innocence .Lanham,MD: Rowman andLittleŽ eld. GOULDNER, A. 1994 “IdeologicalDiscourse as Rationality and False Consciousness.” Pp. 202-210 in T.Eagleton(ed.), Ideology.Londonand New York:Longman. Simulationist andSocialist Strategies 235 ²

GRAMSCI, A. 1971 Selections fromPrison Notebooks .New York:International Publishers. HARTSOCK, N. 1987 “Rethinking Modernism:Minority vs. Majority Theories.” Cultural Critique 7(Fall):187-206. HAR VEY, D. 1989 TheCondition of Postmodernity .Cambridge,MA andOxford: Blackwell. HASSA N, I. 1992 “From Paracriticisms .”Pp.60-77 in P.Waugh(ed.), Postmodernism: AReader . London,New York,Sydney, and Auckland: Arnold Press. HERMAN, E. AND N. CHOMSK Y 1988 ManufacturingConsent .New York:Pantheon Books. HUNTER, M. 2002 “Ifyou’ re light you’re alright”: Lightskin color as social capital for women of color. Gender& Society 16 (2),171-189. JAMESON, F. 1988a TheIdeologies of Theory .Vol.2. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press. 1988b “Postmodernismand the Consumer Society.”Pp. 13-29 in A.E.Kaplan(ed.), Postmodernism andits Discontents .Londonand New York:Verso. 1991 Postmodernism, or, theCultural Logic of LateCapitalism .Durham, NC: Duke University Press. LEONARDO, Z. 2000 “Betwixt andBetween: Introduction to the Politicsof Identity.” Pp. 107-129 in C.Tejeda,C. Martinez andZ. Leonardo(eds.), ChartingNew Terrains in Chicana(o)/Latina(o)Education .Cresskill,NJ: Hampton Press. 2002 “The Soulsof White Folk:Critical Pedagogy,Whiteness Studies, and GlobalizationDiscourse.” RaceEthnicity &Education 5 (1): 29-50. In pressInterpretation andthe Problem ofDomination:Paul Ricoeur’ s Hermeneutics. Studiesin Philosophy andEducation . LUKACS, G. 1971 History andClass Consciousness .Cambridge:The MITPress. LYOTARD, J.-F. 1984 ThePostmodern Condition: AReport on Knowledge .Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. MANDEL, E. 1976 “Introduction.”In K.Marx, Capital.Vol.I. London,New York,Victoria, Toronto,Auckland, and Middlesex: Penguin Books. MARX, K. AND F. ENG ELS 1970 TheGerman Ideology .New York:International Publishers. MARX, K. 1976 Capital.Vol.I. London,New York,Victoria, Toronto, Auckland, and Middlesex:Penguin Books. MCCHESNEY, R. 2000 RichMedia, Poor Democracy .New York:The New Press. MCLAREN, P. AND Z. LEONARDO 1998 “JeanBaudrillard: From Marxism to Terrorist Pedagogy.”Pp. 215-243 in M. Peters (ed.), Namingthe Multiple: Poststructuralism andEducation .Westport,CT andLondon: Bergin andGarvey. 236 Leonardo ²

MCLAREN, P., Z. LEONARDO AND R.L. ALLEN 1999 “The Gift ofSi(gh)ted Violence: Toward a DiscursiveIntervention intothe Organizationof Capitalism.” Discourse: TheoreticalStudies in Mediaand Culture 21(2):139-162. 2000 “Epistemologiesof Whiteness: Transforming andTransgressing Pedagogical Knowledge.”Pp. 108-123 in R.Mahalingamand C. McCarthy (eds.), Multicultural Curriculum .New York andLondon: Routledge. NOYS, B. 1997 “Communicative Unreason: Batailleand Habermas.” Theory, Culture &Society 14(1): 59-75. RICHARDSON, M. 1994 Georges Bataille .New York andLondon: Routledge. RICOEUR, P. 1986 Lectures on Ideology andUtopia .G.Taylor (ed.),New York:Columbia University Press. VOLOS INOV, V. 1973 Marxismand the Philosophy of Language .L.Matejkaand I. Titunik (trans.). New York andLondon: Seminar Press.