EtLLCOW', Public Disclosure Authorized
TANZANIA
AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
VOLUMEI
LANDRESOURCES AND GRAIN MARKETING Public Disclosure Authorized
Supplement to Report No. P-5200-TA: AgriculturalAdjustment Program
(Credit2116-TA, Approved March 30, 1990) Public Disclosure Authorized
Southern Africa Department Public Disclosure Authorized Agriculture OperationsDivision Africa Regional Office CURRENCYAND EQUIVALENT UNITS
Currency Unit - Tanzanian Shilling (TSh)
Dec. 1985 US$1 m TSh 17 June 1986 US$1 - TSh 40 June 1987 US$1 = TSh 63 June 1988 US$1 = TSh 96 June 1989 US$1 = TSh 145 Feb. 1990 US$1 = TSh 193
FISCAL YEAR
Government July 1 - June 30 MAIN ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT
AISCO Agriculturaland IndustrialSupply Company BOT Bank of Tanzania CRDB Cooperativeand Rural DevelopmentBank CSD Child Survival and DevelopmentProgram DAFCO Tanzania Dairy Farming Company Dfl Dutch Guilder * EEC European Economic Community EIB European InvestmentBank ERP Economic Recovery Programme ESAP Economic and Social Action Programme FAO Food and AgricultureOrganization - UN IC Industrial Company (owns and operates cotton ginneries) ICO InternationalCoffee Organization IDA InternationalDevelopment Association IFAD InternationalFund for AgriculturalDevelopment ILO InternationalLabor Organization IMF InternationalMonetary Fund IRTAC IndustrialPehabilitation and Trade AdjustmentCredit (Cr. 1969-TAof November 1988) IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources LSTG Pounds Sterling MRC Multi Sector RehabilitationCredit (Cr. 1741-TA of November 1986) NAFCO National Agricultureand Food Corporation NAPOCO National Poultry Company NARCO National Ranching Company NBC National Bank of Commerce NMC National Milling Corporation (the grain parastatal) OGL Open General License Facility PCS Primary Cooperative Society (the first-tier cooperative society, within the RCUs) PER Public Expenditure Review PFP Policy Framework Paper PSAP Priority Social Action Progrsmme RCU Regional (or subregional) Cooperative Union (the second tier cooperativesociety) SAF StructuralAdjustment Facility SGR Strategic Grain Reserve SIDA Swedish InternationalDevelopment Authority SPPF Special Project PreparationFacility
TANSEED Tanzania Seed Corporation TCMB(Cashewnut) Tanzania Cashewnut Marketing Board TCMB (Coffee) Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board TCMB (Cotton) Tanzania Cotton Marketing Doard TFA Tanganyika Farmers Association TFC Tanzania Fertilizer Corporation UNDP United Nations DevelopmentProgram UNFPA United Nations Fund for PopulationAct .vit±ls UNICEF United Nations Children'sFund TAMMAA
AGRICULTURALA.lUTNMET FROGA
WORKING PAPERS (in two volumes)
PREFACE
In order to prepare the AgriculturalAdjustment Program and develop the neces- sary consensusfor the Program among the Government,IDA and the interested donors, several missionswere carried out during 1988 and 1989. These missions involved several consultantsand donor personnel, and worked closely with the thienMinistries of Agricultureand LivestockDevelopment, and of Local Governments,Cooperatives and Marketing.
These two Volumes present the main working papers produced durir., that preparationperiod. Each paper reflects the situation and findings as of the date of their preparationand, as such, each of them is somewhatdated.
In the meanwhile,the Governmentproceeded to implementits Agricultural AdjustmentProgram, and the sector situation has been significantlymodified. Many of the recommendationsstemming from the workingpapers were implemented,while others were modified or postponed. It has been considereduseful, however, to make these working papers available as thev cortain much of the information, data and -nalyses on which the policy decisions have beeniadopted. Much of the informatiuncontained in the papers is not otherwise available.
No attempt at updating these papers has been made. They are presented here as they were when their contents were used to substantiatedecision proposals or to recom- mend additionalstudies. Updatingthem would have required repeition of most of the missionscarried out then, requiring an enormousamount of time and money. Most of these papers will be supersededby the completionof the Long-Term Perspective Study the Governmentis preparing, and by the Agricultual Sector Report which the Bank is preparing in order to support the Governiment-sLTPS and to update the analyticalbase for its policy and lending analyses.
Volume One includes papers on land resources for rainfed production, economics of agricultural production, and grain marketingin rural and urban areas. Volume Two includes papers on the markedng of major export crops (cotton, coffee and cashewnuts) and on the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs. The report of the FAO/CP agricultural review mission, issued in March 1988, and its annexes are not included. TANZANIA
AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
Contents of the Working Papers
Working Paper Title Date
VOLUME I LAND RESOURCESAND GRAIN MARKETING
No. 1: Land Resource Potential for Rainfed Production 08/89 of Maize, Bunded Rice and Wheat
No. 2: Economicsof AgriculturalProduction 09/88
No. 3: Marketing of Basic Food Commodities 04/88
No. 4: Cereals MarketingPolicy and Food Security 05/88
No. 5: Food Crops 07/87
No. 6: Open Markets for Grain in Urban Areas 10/88
VOLUME II EXPORT CROP MARKETINGAND INPUTS
No. 7: Appraisal of the Cotton Marketing System 07/89
No. 8: ImprovingCotton Marketing 10/88
No. 9: Policy and Action Program for Cotton Marketing 05/89
No. 10: Coffee MarketingArrangements 03/89
No. 11: ImprovingCoffee Productionand Marketing 08/89
No. 12: Cashew Marketing and Processing 03/89
No. 13: Export Marketing of Tobacco 01/89
No. 14: Supply and Distributionof AgriculturalInputs 0?188
No. 15: Input Supply and Distribution 03/89
No. 16: A StrategicAssessment of the Fertilizer 05/90 Industry in the SADCC Countries Working Paper No. 1
TANZANIA
AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
WORKINGPAPER
LANDRESOURCE POTENTIAL FOR RAINFEDPRODUCTION OF MAIZE BUNDEDRICE AND WHEAT
Southern Africa Department Agriculture Operations Division Africa Regional Office Working Paper No. 1
TANZANIA
AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
WORKINGPAPER
LANDRESOURCE POTENTIAL FOR RAINFED PRODUCTIONOF MAIZE, BUNDEDRICE AND WHEAT
Table of Contents
Pare No.
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
II. LAND.'ESOURCES ...... 2
Geography,.... .4*...... 2 Climateso ... ..t... to...... 2 Moisture Regime...... 5 Physiographyoo*.ooo*.**e.... 4.** ...... 5 Sols...... *0 ...... 5 Land Resources....o ..... o..*...... *...*. 11 National Parks, Game Land and Forest Reserves...... 11
III. METHODOLOGYFOR ASSESSINGLAND RESOURCES...... 18
Introduction...... #O...... 13 Types of Crops and Land utilization...... 13 Climate Adaptabilityof Maize, Bunded Rice and Wheat.. 14 EdaphicAdaptability ...... 14 Thermal Zone Suitability...... 18 Moisture Zone Suitability...... *...... 18 Agro-edaphicSuitability...... 22 Slope Limitations...... 24 Land Suitability...... , 24 Results of Land SuitabilityAssessment ...... 25
IV. RECOMNENDATIONSFOR FUTUREASSESSMENTS ...... 30
Present Land Use ...... *...... 30 Climatic Resource Inventory....***.******...... 30 Inventoriesof Soil and Landform Resources...... 31 Computerization...... O..*...... 31 Working Paler No. 1
REFYRENCES
APPENDICES
1. Land Resourcesby Region 2. Master Tables of Gross Potential
TABLES
Main Text
1. Area of Thermal Zones
2. Area of Moisture Zones
3. PhysiographicRegions
4. Extent of National Parks, Game Reserves and Forest Reserves
5. Attributes of Land UtilizationTypes
6. Climatic AdaptabilityAttributes for Maize, Bunded Rice and Whe&t
7. Edaphic AdaptabilityInventory
8. Thermal SuitabilityZone Ratings
9. Moisture Zone SuitabilityRatings
10. Soil SuitabilityRatings
11. Slope SuitabilityRatings
12. Yield Ranges
13. Comparison of PotentialProduction Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Maize at Low Level of Inputs
14. Comparisonof PotentialProduction Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Maize at IntermediateLevel of Inputs
15. Comparisonof Potential ProductionCapacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed maize at High Level of Inputs
16. Comparisonof PotentialProduction Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Bunded Rice at T!owLevel of Inputs
17. Comparisonof potentialProduction Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Bunded Rice at IntermediateLevel of Inputs Working Paper No. 1
18. Comparison of Potential Production Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Wheat at Low Level of Inputs
19. Comparison of Potential Production t-apacityand Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Wheat at IntermediateLevel of Inputs
20. Comparison of Potential Production Capacity and Current Demands by Region for Rainfed Wheat at High Level of Inouts
APPENDTX TABLES
Appendix 1
Table 1: Land Resources of Arusha Region
Table 2: Land Resources of Coast Region
Table 3s Land Resources of Dar Es Salaam Region
Table 4: Land Resources of Dodoma Region
Table 5: Land Resources of Iringa Region
Table 6: Land Resources of Kagera Region
Table 7: Land Resources of Kigoma Region
Table 8: Land Resources of KilimanjaroRegion
Table 9: Land Resources of Lindi Region
Table 10: Land Resources of Mara Region
Table 11: Land Resources of Mbeya Region
Table 12: Land Resources of Morogoro Region
Table 13: Land Resources of Mtwara Region
Table 14: Land Resources of Mwanza Region
Table 15: Land Resources of Rukwa Region
Table 16: Land Resources of Ruvuma Region
Table 17: Land Resources of Shinyanga Region
Table 18: Land Resources of Singida Region
Table 19: Land Resources of Tabora Region
Table 20: Land Resources of Tanga Region Working Paper No. .
ApRendix 2
Table 1: Gross Potential Master Table
Table 2: Gross PotentialMaster Table
Table 3: Gross PotentialMHster Table
FIGURES
Main Text
1. Regions
2. Thermal Zones
3. Moisture Zones
4. PhysiographicRegions
5. ReliabilityDiagram
6. Schematic Outline of CalculationProcedure
ApPendices
Appendix 1, Figure 1: Land Resources of Arusha Region
Appendix 1, Figure 2: Land Resources of Coast and Dar Es Salaam Regions
Appendix 1, Figure 3: Land Resources of Dodoma Region
Appendix 1, Figure 4: Land Resources of Iringa Region
Appendix 1, Figure 5: Land Resources of Ragera Region
Appendix 1, Figure 6: Land Resources of Kigoma Region
Appendix 1, Figure 7: Land Resources of Kilimanjaro Region
Appendix 1, Figure 8: Land Resources of Lindi Region
Appendix 1. Figure 9: Land Resources of Mara Region
Appendix 1, Figure 10: Land Resources of Mbeya Region
Appendix 1, Figure 11: Land Resources of Morogoro Region
Appendix 1. Figure 12: Land Resources of Mtwara Region Workina Paper No. 1
Appendix 1, Figure 13: Land Resources of Mwanza Region
Appendix 1, Figure 14: Land Resources of Rukwa Region
Appendix 1, Figure 15: Land Resources of Ruvuma Regior.
Appendix 1, Figure 16i Land Resources of Shinyanga Region
Appendix 1. Figure 17: Land Resources of Singida Region
Appendix 1, Figure 18: Land Resources of Tabora Region
Appendix 1, Figure 19: Land Resources of Tanga Region Working PaPer No. 1 Page 1
TANZANIA
AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
WORKINGPAPER
LANDRESOURCE POTENTIAL FOR RAINFED PRODUCTIONOF MAIZE, BUNDEDRICE AND WHEAT1/
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 This Working Paper has been prepared in the context of the AgriculturalAdjustment Credit Mission that was fielded in Tanzania from 23 May to 6 June 1988. The Working Paper contains: (a) an overview of land resources for individualregions; (b) as assessmentof the land resources potential for rainfed productionof maize, bunded rice and wheat by region; (c) comparisonsof present and potential productionby region for maize, bunded rice and wheat.
1.02 The land resources inventorydescribed is largely derived from work of de Pauw C1983 and 1984); the methodclogy for assessing the land resourcespotentia'l taken from the FAO's Agro-ecologicalZones Project (1978).
1.03 The informationon present land use was obtained from the FAO's Monitoring and Early Warning Systems Project in Tanzania, the reports fo the FAOICP AgriculturalSector Review Mission (1987) and the report on Tarzania National Food Strategy. Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (1984).
11 This paper was prepared by N. van Velthuizen (Consultant). Working Paper No. 1 Page 2
II. LAND RESOURCES OF TANZANIA
Geography
2.01 Tanzania is located in East Africa between latitudes 1° S and 120 S and longitudes 300 E and 400 E. It is bordered by Kenya and Uganda in the north; Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia and Malawi in the west; and Mozambique in the south. Mainland Tanzania is subdivided into 20 regions (Figure 1).
Climate
2.02 Thermal Regime. Tanzania has a tropical climate, which can be subdivided according to altitude into a warm zone with altitudes from 0-750 m and mean daily temperaturesof 240-27O C, a moderatelywarm zone with altitudes of 750-1500 m and mean daily temperatures of 210-240 C, a moderatelycool zone with altitudes of 1500-2300m and mean daily temperaturesof 150-200 C, and a cool zone with altitudes above 2300 m and mean daily tmnperaturesof 10o-150 C (with risk of night frost). Figure 2 presents a generalizedmap of these zones, and their approximateareas are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. AREA OF THERMAL ZONES
Mean Daily Approximate Thermal Zone Altitude Temperature Area (m) (0C) (000 ha)
Tl (warm) 0 - 750 24 - 27 15.000
T1IT2 (warmlmoderatelywarm) a - 1500 21 - 27 4,000
TZ (moderatelywarm) 750 - 1500 21 - 24 52,800
TZ/T3 (moderatelywarm/mod.cool) 750 - 2300 15 - 24 2.500
T3 (moderatelycool) 1500 - 2300 15 - 20 14,000
T4 (cool) > 2300 10 - 15 300
Adapted from de Pauu, 1984 * ~~~~~~~~~~Figure1
REGIONS
.01
, w A N a , A ! E N > rY- ,*-u1,1
Ws_~~~~-A# _ A) '2_t 'sI ^t * W
I . \ * * e51*8*t*^* # \E \ X~~~a i It A "ee >eC SALAAM 2 1$1 Etu, e +.@. . -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@\elw§**w> 0 , 4 {,8t_e#/ ZiR,,E , C r e /f/sv 2 l ^ A8 i i) i~ _\ v .2 +_ J} L e il i A4A o } C | ~~~u v u_ l*a.T - a so t0 240 lw. si _x ~'{ -- ' *- 0 2 A M19 I a u E - Working Paper No. 1 _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Page4 Figure 2 THERMAL ZONES r~~ ef-;-. _* *-_ - _. T3N _ 2 $ t gto T2 {ss244.t £;N -. e. . ^w t A T3 N M i ... exg", .7 9"Ou,~ a ~ ( u¶44 a T 0 i~~~a .~ ; f . A 9 i .} ) eSe"se> < i_ _ s S 5 _ XIteeifi-~~~t - ~I ,~... TI_ Za A UI A I * ~. ~ %wto - v v- = ?efr.._-g;)"L^;I-.Z3G I1 *71/T I~ ,.AT3 V U U a as I" 240 T 0 Working Paper No. 1 Page 5 Moisture Regime 2.03 The seasonal rainfall distributionpattern varies greatly from north to south. In the North, the rains generallystart in Octoberwhile in the South, the onset of the rains is in late November/earlyDecember. The North has a bimodal distributionwith "short" rains from October to January and 'long" rains starting in March and continuingthrough May-June. There is a general change to a monomodal pattern in central and southern regions, occasionallywith a dry break in February. 2.04 De Pauw (1983) assessed moisture availabilityby means of the growing period concept. For 88 stations in Tanzania, the length of growing period was calculated by means of water balances taking into account rainfall, soil moisture storage and evapo-transportationequals or exceeds half the exceeded in four years out of five. A number of growing period key characteristics,in particular the duration, the onset date of the growing period, and their variability,were estimated and mapped as moisture zones. Figure 3 shows a generalizedmap of these moisture zones. The characteristicsand approximateareas of the zones are presented in Table 2. Phys iography 2.05 De Pauw (1984) subdividedmainland Tanzania into nine major physiographic regions,which in turn were subdividedinto 132 physiographic units, describingin quantitativeterms altitudinaland relief characteristics. Also positions of different soil units have been presented in this context, from which relief and slope characteristicsof individualsoil units can be derived. A generalizedmap presenting the nine major physiographicregions is shown in Figure 4. Table 3 presents the general characteristicsof these regions and their approximatearea. Soils 2.06 De Pauw (1984) compiled a national soil map at 1:2 million scale from soil survey reports describing soil resourcesat various level of detail, but mainly at reconnaissancelevel. This informationcovers about 50X of mainland Tanzania. For the other 50Z small scale soil maps complementedwith satellite image interpretations,geological maps and topographicalmaps at 1:1 million and 1:250,000 scales were used. 2 2/ This informationwas supplementedby limited field checks. Working Paper No. 1 Page 6 Figure 3 MOISTUREZONES ltJGNAN -A ..~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~...... MbzA..-._u t^N"Ia ts <.MQZAMC;'.JU _ _ r ^~~~ f \ _ 8 ^ * r .- _~wS Vat Working Paper No. 1 Page 7 Table2. AREAOF OI ZONES ApprexI mat Map Syabol Growingperiod charateristIes Area (999 ha) 1. AREASWITH ONEGROWING PERIOD UNRESPONSIVETO MOISTI*E STORAGE CAPACITY SUl Up to O9 days Onsetunreliablo. ,20e su2 O9 - 76 days Onsetunreliable. C,00 SW3Cr) 90 - 105 days Onset reliable. 6,090 SU3(u) 90 - 105 days Onset reliabl.. 7,1? SU4(r) 129 - 160 days Onsetreliable. 5,39 SU4(u) 120 - 160 days Onset reliable. 799 SUC 16 - 18f days Onsetrelilabl. 6,59 11. AREASWITH ON£ GROWINGPERIOD. MODERATELY RESPONSVE TO MOISTURESTORAGE CAPACITY 51(r) 90 - 135days Onst reliable. 5a SI(u) 99 - 136 days Onsetunreliable. 6,399 52 90 - 160 days Onsetunreliable. 1,400 SMs 129- 1U9 days Onsetunreliable. 2,300 SM4 1S0- 180days Onset etIable 7,399 SII 13 - 225 days Onsetreliable. 3,39g 111. AES WITHONE GROWING PERIOD. HIaILY RESPONSIVETO MOISTURESTORAGE CAPACITY N1 9# - 150 days Onet unreliable. 499 SH2 128 - 105 days Onst unrelIable. 2,69 SN8 130 - 2U days Onsetreliable. 11,400 S144 150 - 240 days Onsetreliable. 49 5st 130 - 270 days Onset reliable. 8,290 IV. AREASWIT ON GROWINPERIOD (OR OVIUPIN GOWN PERIODS)HI Y RESPONSIVE TO OISTURSTORAGE CAPACITY. LENGT VARIABLEOME TO OROORAPHfICFACTORS SC1 120 - 210 days Onset unreliable. 1o sC2 15 - 240 days 30 SCI 165 - 30dys (Peba) SC4 1 - days 209 SCS 10 - ldays 5W SCO i - hfdays 200 SC? 219 - 0days * 1,409 SCM 249 S- U y O 79y V. AREASwT 1 'GowN0 PERItODS D4 75 and Of days Ons t *log periodgunreliablo. 79W DM1 126L1C and 75-99 days One"t Ohert periodg uArellable. 200 oM2 129-166 and 45-75 days Onset "shortperlod unreliable. (Zanzibar) DM8 9-129 and 30-40days Onet both periodsunreliable. 2,309 Adapted fro de Peus, 198M Workin, PaPer No. 1 Page 8 Figure 4 * P4HYSIOGRAPHICREGIONS - - _.---. . _ = ._-_* _-_.. .--..-...... |~~ , -,,. *- e ,,,.¢^ -s - . - .*. RwtOW~,* n ^' i 3 K E N4 YVA _ l~~~. &^ _n 1& 0m- . RV 40 /~~~~~I - ^ff#$"v x a Z)pAoSSAoA \~~~~ R £_ J A. _tW*. 0 ~ , Sem~aT Aa / 0 Cti$4-/ |"-~~ ~~~~ ) 44 , - _.qa.a._ .O 1 o 4 'U AMIOJ 7 ~~~. *i23 _. W _ . O Z Table3. PHYSIOCRAPHICREGIONS Mapping Approitieso Unit Physiographicregion Description Area symbol (000hb) C CoastalZon* Low altitudeplaine (below 760 8) developedon *ainlymerine, .eoundsry ond tertiarysediments 0,80 E featornplateaux Low to sedium altitude plain. (160-1300m) with Isolated ead mountain blocka. mountain blachk (1800-2650a) developed on procambrion nets- morphic rocks 21 1W0 H Southernhighlands High altitude plateaus (1600-2600 .) plains with volcanic and precambrionmtamorphic rocks 8,78O N Northernrift Zone and Mediumhigh altitude(1000-2300 m) plainswIth volcanic veicentehighland. snd rift lendfrm and/ervolceanic deposits 65,0 P Centralplateau Mediumaltitude plains (I80-1380 m) developedasinly on granites 32,700 R Rukte-Rueherift gene Mdiu altituderift depression (800-1280 a) filledup with lacuetrinesedlent a,600 S InlandSedimentary Meium altitudepelasn (766-¢ - a) developedmainly on Karroosedi*ents 0,780 U Utips plateau Highaltitude (1600-2200 a) upliftedplateau developed on motaerphic,sedimtetry and graniticrocks 1,80 I lVeternhighland. Medium bt highaltitude plalns (1280-1980 a) developedon volcanicor aedimentaryrocks 4,8am .. t1 z I. Working Paper No. 1 Page 10 Figure 5 ... .~ Md/ R E L I A B I L I T Y Sa ils *teatifnat.on from high hind medium intensity *oil Surveys Soils informat,on from low intenSity l}e surfv@ys Genetal roils tOnto ldnOan from goolOg.c3 X maps Soils infofmal on entetred from small scale SO0l maps. to. mngrgphiral| nj,s.satellte migery. papers Working Paper No. 1 Page 11 2.07 The soil inventorycontains soil mapping units representingsoil pattern (soil associationsor complexes). The compositionof the soil mapping units in terms of dominant soil units (>50Z),associated soil un.ts (15-50Z)and inclusions(<15?) are provided for each mapping unit. The individualunits have been described in detail and classifiedaccording to FAO/UNESCOLegend for the Soil Map of the World (1974). De Pauw established41 different soil units. * Land Resources 2.08 The above informationon climate, physiographyand soild has been brought together by de Pauw in a so-called, lAgro-ecologicalZones Map*. This inventory basically consists of overlays of thermal zones, moisture zones, and physiographicunits of which the latter are broken down into soil mapping units of which, in turn, the composition in terms of idividual soil units is known. This countrywide 'agro-ecologicalzones inventory" has been used to derive regional inventoriesof "land resources". Appendix 1 presents region by region land resourcesmaps (scale 1:2 million approximately)and tables presentinga general description,the thermal and moisture regimes, major soils and extents. 2.09 For the assessmentof the land resources potential for rainfed production of maize, bunded rice and wheat, full details as presentd in different parts of the report on soils physiographyand agro-ecological zones of Tanzania by de Pauw (1984) have been used. National Parks, Game Land and Forest Reserves 2.10 The 'agro-ecologicalzones inventory,'in turn, has been overlayed by a mapped countrywideinventory of national parks, game reserves and forest reserves. This inventoryat the same map scale as the agro- ecological zones inventory at 1:2 million scale was compiled for the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (secondedition of 1974). The classificationsand extent provided by the 1985 United Nations List of National Parks and ProtectedAreas, prepared by the InternationalUnion for Conservationof Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), have been used for updating. 2.11 The areas occupied by national parks and reserves have been applied to the individualmap units of the agro-ecologicalzones inventory. A sunrdaryof the extent of national parks, game reserves and forest reserves by region is presented In Table 4. Table EXTENTOF NATIONAL PARKS. CAME RESERVES AND FOREST RESERVES TotalExtent NationalParks 1 CameReserV9s 2 Sub Total ForestReserves 8 Total (ON ha) (see ha) (060h) (On he) (we6ha) (GM ha) Arusha 6,299 see 6ee 131 1,011 Coast 8,265 354 864 287 641 Oar Os Salosm 1i9 Dodoma 4,131 266 265 94 362 Irings 5,686 719 - 719 449 1,167 Kagera 2,646 - 383 383 176 6S8 Klgom 3,704 - - 986 986 Killmanjaro 1,826 66 223 279 127 408 Lindi 6,664 1,936 1,936 429 2,884 More 2,174 80- on 3 980 Mbys 6,685 K6 5e 423 499 922 Morogoro 7,OB2 842 1,786 2,127 332 2,469 Mtwara 1,671 - - - 66 58 UVenza 1,968 16 62 67 97 164 Rukwe 6,864 201 223 424 2,699 2,523 Ruvme 6,3867 208 20S 495 703 Shinyanga 6,076 476 010 1,086 8338t0 Singida 4,984 - 1,46 1,546 - 1,646 Tabora 7,616 217 21? 2,887 3,164 Tangs 2,660 - 99 99 96 194 06,332 4,164 7,719 11,823 10,072 21,892 ------__------__------ NationalParks: Arushe,Oombe Stroam, Ketevi Plain, Klilmanjaro, Lake Manyore, Mikumt, Ngorongoro Conservation, Ruaha, Rubondo, Serengeti and Tsrengi re. 2oa0mResrves: Biheroulo, Burigi, lbands Arena, Kliloanjero, Kixigo, Masswe,Mkomez, Mount Moru, Rungwa,Rumanytik Orugund.,Saono Island, Sadant, Solon*, Ugalla River, Ubonda Lake Rukus. 3forestReserves: The extsntsrefer to forostreserves outside nattonsl parks and gene reserves. o 1 00 0 D,,'Io Working Paper No. 1 Page 13 III. METHODOLOGYFOR ASSESSINGLAND RESOURCES3 Introduction 3.01 The ability of land to produce crops is limited by climate and sail conditions,and by the use and management applied to the land. The procedure used for the assessmentof land resourcespotential is set up accordinglyand comprises the followingactivities: (a) selectionand definitionof crop and land utilization types; (b) determinationof climatic and edaphic requirementsof the crop and land utilizationtypes; (c) formulationof agro-climaticsuitability classification; (d) formulationof agro-edaphicsuitability classification; and (e) manual applicationof agro-climaticand agro-edaphic suitabilityclassifications onto the land resources inventory as provided by de Pauw (1984) to assess land potential. Types of Crops and Land Utilization 3.02 Combined descriptionsof crops, produce, inputs, technical know- how, etc., form the basis of the definitionof the land utilization types (lut's) employed in the assessment. Detailed definitionof land utilizationtypes applicationto a national land evaluation is difficult, because of the wide variation in economic, social and management factors across the country. 3.03 For the purpose of this assessment,generalized land types have been considered. These are based on single crops and were evaluated at three levels of inputs, a low, an intermediate,and a high one. The assumptionsused for the definitionof these three input (management) levels are presented in Table 5. 3f The methodology is adapted from the procedures set out by FAO's Agro- ecological Zones Projects (1978). Working Paper No. 1 -- Page 14 3.04 Pertinent to the definitionof the la.d utilization types are the following facts: (a) the crops are produced for grain only; (b) the crops comprise readily available cultivars (low inputs), improved cultivars (intermediateinputs), and high yielding cultivars (high inputs) of the following ranges in length of growth cycles: - lowland maize: 90-120 days (mean temperatures>200 C); - highland maize: >120 days (mean temperatures<200 C); - bunded rice: 100-130 days; - wheat: 100-130 days (spring cultivars); and (c) storage facilitiesand on-farm production inputs are not considered in the assessment. Climatic Adaptabilityof Maize, Bunded Rice and Wheat 3.05 The concepts and principlesof crop climatic adaptabilityrelevant to land suitability assessmenthave been described in FAO (1978). Maize, bunded rice and wheat have specific requirementsfor photosynthesisand phenology,both of which bear a relationshipto yield. The role of crop photosynthesisand biomass production are directly related to photosyn,theticcapacity (unit are efficiencyx size of photosynthetically active area) and its response temperatureand radiation. 3.06 Within any suitable length of growing period, the temperature an photoperiodic regimes together govern which phenologicalcrop type can be g;own. When the climatic phenologicalrequirements are met, then the temperature and radiation regimes together set a limit to biomass productivity. For the rainfed crop to be successful,it is necessary that its growth cycle be of such a length that it is comfortably contained within the growing period determined by environmentalconditions. To assess maize. bunded rice and wheat for their climatic suitability,it is necessary to prepare an inventory of climatic adaptability requirementsfor both photosynthesisand phenology. These are presented in Table 6. Edaphic Adaptability 3.07 In order to assess the suitability of soils for maize, bunded rice and wheat production, the sail requirementsmust be known. Further, these requirementsmust be understoodwithin the context of limitations imposed Table 5. ATTRIBUTESOF LANDUTILIZATION TYPES Low InputLovel InteromdiateInput Lovel High InputLevel Attribute L U.T. L.U.T. L U.T. Producoand Extensivecultivation of maizo,bunded ricel, whoet. Rainfedand sole croppingof singlecrops only in Production spppropriat.rotations. No multiple(mixedy cropptng. Market Subsistenceproduction Subsistenceproduction plus Commercialproduction orientation commercialsale of surplus Capital Low Intermeiatewith crediton High Intensity accessibleterms Labour High. Includinguncosted High. includinguncos ed Low. Familylabour costed if used intensity familylabour familylabour Power Manuallabour with hand tools Manuellabour with hand tools Completemechanization including resoutces a.td/oranimal traction with harvosting improvedimpleonts Technology Localcultivars. No forttilaer Improvedcuttivars as available. High yioldingcultAvars including employed or chemicalpost and disease Sub-optiuomfertilizer applica- hybrids.Optimum fertilizer appl;- control. Fallowperiods. No cation. Simpleextension pack- cation.Chemical pest, diseaso and conservationmeasures ages includingsoe chemical woed control.Very limitedfallow. post and diseasecontrol. Some conservationmeasures including fallowperiod. No conservation use of crop residues meosures Intrastructure Marketaccessibility not Somo oarketaccessibility necos- Marketaccessibility essential. reqpire_nts necessary.Inadequate *dvi- sary withaccess to demonstra- High levelof advisoryservices and aory services tion plotsand services applicationof researchfindings Land holdings Small,sometimes fragmented Small9 somotime.fragmantod Large,consolidated Incomelevel Low Modersto High No productioninvolving irrigation and othortechniques using additional water. No floodcontrol measures OQ m s1aunded rice Is only consideredfor low and Intermediateinput levols. m CD Working Paper No. 1 - _Page 16 by landform and other features which do not form a part of the soil compositionbut may have a significantinfluence on the use that can be made of the soil. The basic soil requirementsof crop climate may be summarizedunder the followingheadings related to internal and external soil properties: Internal Requirements: - the soil temperature regime, as a function of the heat balance of soils as related to annual or seasonal and/or daily temperature fluctuations; - the soil moisture regime, as a function of the water balance of soils as related to their capacity to store, retain, transport and release moisture for crop growth, andlor to the soils' permeabilityand drainage characteristics; - the soil aeration regime, as a function of the soil air balance as related to its capacity to supply and transport oxygen to the root zone and to remove carbon dioxide; - the natural soil fertility regime, as related to the soils' capacity to store, retain and release plant nutrients in such kinds and proportionsas required by crops during growth; - the effective soil depth available for root development and foothold of the crop; - soil texture and stoniness,at the surface and within the whole depth of soil required for normal crop development; - the absence of soil salinity and of specific toxic substance or iron deleterious to crop growth; and - other specific properties, e.g., soil tilth as required for germination only. External Requirements: in addition of the above internal soil requirements of crops, a number of external soil requirements are of importance: - slope, topography and characteristics determined by micro and macro relief of the land; - occurrence of flooding as related to crop susceptibilityto flooding during the growing period (e.g., maize is very susceptible),or inversely,to flooding requirements (e.g., rice). The incidence, regularity (irregularity)and depth of Table 6: CLIMATIC ADAPTABILITY ATTRIBUTES FOR MAIZE, BUNDED RICE AND WHEAT Attributo LowlandMaize KighiandMaize BundedRIce Spriageat Species: Zee oars Zee sale Oryza sativa Triticua aestiwus Photosynthesispathway C4 C4 Cs Cs Rate of photosynthesis at lightsaturation 20-30 at optimumlemp. 1ature 30-40 (lgC0 2 d- hr- ) Tenparaturerequirement for photosynthesis - optimum 25-56 20-3U 26-35 is-il - range 16-46 1i-as 16-36 6-8U Phonology Lengthof growthcycle 90-120 )120 100-130 i0U-l35 Growthhobgt determinate determinate determinate Life span annual annual annual annual 0 '1 00 as -oo 91 ^2 0 I-' Working Paper No. 1 Page 18 flooding are important factors determiningthe potential use of extensive rive flood plain soils; and - soil accessibilityand trafficabilityunder certiin management systems. 3.08 From the basic soil requirementsof crops, a number of crop response related soil characteristicscan be derived at least for the most important crops and existing cultivars. One of these characteristicsfor instance, soil pH. For most crops and cultivars, the optimal soil pH is known and can be quantified by a range within which it is not limiting to growth. Outside the optimal range, there is a critical range within which the crop can be grown successfullybut with diminishedyield. Beyond the critical range, the crop cannot be expected to yield satisfactorilyunless special precautionarymanagement measures are taken. 3.09 The same holds for other soil requirementsof plants related to soil characteristics. Many soil characteristicscan be defined in a range that is optimal for a given crop, a range that is critical or marginal, and a range that is unsuitable under the present technology. 3.10 Table 7 presents optimal and critical ranges of the following characteristics: slope, drainage, depth, CaCO3, gypsum, flooding, texture, pH and salinity. Thermal Zone Suitability 3.11 The initial step in the matching process is to compare the temperature requirementsof individual crops with the identified thermal zones. This step indicated if the crops should be considered from a temperaturelphotosynthesisand phenology viewpoint in each thermal zone. 3.12 Crop/thermalzone suitabilityratings for each crop and zone are Fresented in Table 8. Three suitabilityclasses are employed (i.e. Sl. S2. and N) and the ratings given apply to all three input levels. Where requirementsare fully met, the zone is deemed Si; where requirementsare sub-optimal,the zone is deemed S2, and where the requirementsare not adequately met, the zone is deemed as N (not suitable). Moisture Zone Suitability 3.13 Matching of crops to growing period zones is done according to the following procedure: (a) computationof net biomass and constraint-freecrop yields by individual length of growing period z^ne; (b) inventory of agro-climaticconstraints for each length of growing period zone by crop and input level; and Table7. EOAPHICADAPTABILITY INVENTORY If MAIZE EUNDEDRICE UHEAT Crltoria Low + Int. Inputs High Inputs Low * Int.Inputs Low Int.Inputs Hlgh Inputs Optimum Range Optlium Range Optimum Range Optimum Range Optimum Range Slope (3) 0-9 6-20 0-8 8-16 0-4 4-8 0-B 8-24 0-6 e-18 Drainage(cls..) MW-V I-SE MW-V I-SE I-MW VP-V M-W I-SE MV-V I-SE Depth (cm) >60 26-W0 >60 26-W0 >0 20-50 >60 25-60 >S0 26-50 taCOC (X) 0-16 15-30 0-1S 15-80 0-1 16-30 0-30 30-60 0-6 6-20 Cyptum%t) 0-3 s-ia3-16 o-a 3-160-8 a-1s s3 a-1s ss 3-1C flooding (class) FO Ft FO Fl FO-F1-F2 FS FO Ft FO Fl Texture(class) L-SC LS-KC L-C SL-MCs SICL-CL SL-MC L-SC SL-KC L-KCs SL-MCs pH 6.6-9.2 6.2-6.2 6.5-8.2 6.2-6.2 6.5-7.6 6.2-8.2 6.0-8.2 6.2-6.5 6.0-6.2 5.2-0.5 Salinity (umho.) 0-4 4-6 0-4 4-6 0-2 2-4 0-6 S-10 0-S 5-10 Alkaltnity(ESP) 0-16 15-26 0-16 15-29 0-20 20-40 0-30 30-40 0-30 30-45 Orainaogclasses Texturalsequence Floodingclasses VP - very poor KCs - montmortiloniticclay (structured) fO - no floods P - poorly drained C - clay F1 - occasionalfloods I - mperfectlydrainage KC - knoltnltccloy F2 - frequentfloods MW - moderatelywell drained SC - sandy clay FS - severefloods V - well drained SICL- ellty clay SE - somewht eucessivolydrained L - loam E - excessivelydrained SL - sandy loam LS - loamy sand o CL - clayloom P Adeptedfrom PAD (1978) pU 0o Working PaPer No. 1 Page 20 Table B. THERMALS;TASIUTY ZONERATINOS Theral Zone maize Sunded Rice Wheat Ti: Warm, 0-760 m Si Si N 24-27 °C T2: M6deratoly worm, 760-1,S en Si Sl/$2 N 21-24 °C T3: Modersatly cool, 1,600-2,300 Si N Si 16-20 °C 4: Cool, <2,M6 N N S2 <16 *C Working Paper No. 1 Page 21 Table 9. MOISTURE ZONE SUITABILITY RATINGS Map Symbol Moisture Zone Length Maize Bunded Ricel Wheat (days) SUl 60 N N N SU2 60-75 N N N SU3 (r) 90-105 S3 N S3 SU3 (u) 90-105 S3 N N SU4 (r) 120-150 S2 S3 S2 SU4 (u) 120-150 S2 S3 S2 SUS 150-180 Si S2 S1 SMI (r) 90-135 S2 N S2 S1 (u) 90-135 S2 N S2 512 90-150 S2 N S2 SM3 120-150 S1 S2 Si 514 150-180 Si S2 Si S15 180-225 S1 S2 S2 S1R 90-150 S2 N S2 SH2 120-195 Si S2 Si SR3 150-210 S1 S2 Si 54 150-240 S1 S2 S1 S15 180-270 Si 32 S1 SCi 120-210 Si S3 Si SC2 150-240 S1 S2 S1 SC3 150-300 S1 52 S1 SC4 150-330 S1 S2 S1 SC5 150-360 S1 S2 S1 SC6 180-300 Si S2 Si SC7 210-360 S2 S2 S2 SC8 240-360 S2 S2 S3 DU 75 and 60 S3 N S3 DM1 120-135 and 75-90 S2 S3 S2 D02 120-150 and 45-75 S2 S3 S2 DM3 90-120 and 30-60 S2 N - -1 a moisture requirements fully met. S2 - moisture requrements not fully met (sub-optiml). S3 - moisture requirements partly met (marginal). 1 - moisture requirments insufficient met. j1/ Rice yields in climatically suitable areas are, to a large degree, dependent on complete water control. Tide is considered not possible under purely rainfed conditions; therefore the rating for this crop is deemed at best sub-optimal (S2). Working Paper No. 1 Page 22 (c) applicationof the agro-climaticconstraints in (b) to the constraint-freeyield in (a) to determine (aSro-climatically attainable)crop yields by individual length of growing period zone. The above procedure has been described in detail in FAO (1978). The moisture zones defined by de Pauw (1983) are similar to the growing period zones defined in FAO (1978). Table 9 presents the moisture zone suitabilityratings (adapted from FAQ 1978) for maize, bunded rice and wheat. 3.14 An exception to the general methodology for agro-climatic suitabilityassessment applies to Fluvisolsbecause the length of (rainfed) growing period does not fully reflect their particular circumstanceswith regard to moisture regime. Cultivation of Fluvisols is generally governed by the depth, intensity and duration of flooding which occurs in low-lying areas of these soil. These flooding attributesare generally controlled not by the amount of "on-site" rainfall but by external factors such as river flood regime, hydrologicalfeatures of catchment area, and catchment site relationship. Additionally,cultivation of these soils is normally confined to post-floodperiods, the crop being grown to a lesser or greater extent on moisture remaining in the soil. As a result of these factors, the anticipatedyields according to length of growing period and the agro- climatic suitabilityratings are not applicable to Fluvisols. 3.15 Accordingly,the following suitabilityratings have been applied to all areas of F:uvisols. For maize and wheat, all areas of moisture zones longer than 240 days in a single period are rated not suitable because of excessive wetness/flooding. The remaining moisture zones are rates SZ for 55Z of the area and rated N for 45Z of the area. For rainfed bunded rice, 252 of all areas of all moisture zones are rated S2, and 75Z are rated N. Agro-edaphic Suitability 3.16 The soil unit evaluation is expressed in terms of ratings based on how far the conditions of a soil unit meet crop requirementsunder a specified level of inputs. The appraisal was effected in three based classes for each crop and each level of inputs, i.e. very suitable of suitable: S1, marginally suitable: S2 and not suitable: N. A rating S1 indicated that there are no, or only minor limitations to production of the crop, provided climatic conditionsare suitable. Rating S2 was given when it was considered that soil limitationsare such that they would markedly affect production of the crop. Rating N was given when soil limitations appeared to be so severe that crop production is not possible, or at best very limited. Table 10 presents soil ratings of the 41 different soil units for maize, bunded rice and wheat at three levels of input use. Table 10. SOIL SUITABIIIitV RA4iTNS Soil Code lAO/Unesco 1/ A A I I E * U N 1 * 0 a I C E _ H I A I (de Paut, equivalent Int. High Lois n. Low lnt. High I9 A ______1 Chernotees 52 SIIS2 S15S2 Sz S 51 SS 2 Phaeolems S1 S1 Si S1 St Si S1 St 3 Solonets N N H N N SUN 12/N 52/N 4 Phaeoueas/Coubisols S2 SI/S2 SIM2 SI St Si 1 51 Si S Nitosols S2 Sl/S2 S1 S2 SltS2 S2 Sl Si 6 Nitsots SSI S1 St Si Si S1 S1 Si Ar*nosols/Luvisois t S21N 52/N a S21k N N tCombisols/AcrisoS 52/N S21" S2UN SalN $2/N S2 SZ 5I52 9 Luvisols/Actisols S2 52 SI/Si S2 SIM/2 S2 52 SIM/5 tO tsvitots 52 IIS2 &1/52 52/N £2/N S $2 Si/2 11 Nitosols/Aclisost 52 SIIS2 Si 52 SItS2 S2 Si S1 12 Iortalsols S2/N S2 S2 S2/N S2 S2 52 13 52 fertalsots S2 SI/2 SitS2 S2 SI1S2 S2 S11S2 S1162 I4 ferralsolslAtriiats S2 S2 52 S2 S2 Sz S2 S2 Is ferralsols S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 16 Lithosols/Regosols N N N N N N N e 17 Lithos@ts/AndosoLs S H N N N N N N le Phaeouats S2 S2 N N N $2 S2 N 19 Phacoes 1 1 Si Si $1 Si 20 Aegosots N N N N N N N N 21 Regosols N N N N N N N N 22 S,gi@Oli N N N N N 23 N N1 N Andosots S2 SliS2 511S2 52 SimS? S2 S1/S2 SI/5M 24 Andosols 511S2 SIMS2 51 St Si SIMS2 511S2 SI/S2 ZS Coftj*ojslAcf 4sot% S2 SIIS2 SIMS Sil/ Sa2/ S2 S1IS2 SI/S2 25 xeoosolsa/Atisotl S2 52 StIM S2/N 62N" S2 S2 SIIS2 21 ArenosolS N S21N Sa2l of NHN N 25 Arenosols 25 S2/N SIi N N $S/N 2N 29 vertisols SZIN S21 t 2 S2/SI S2/h SitS2 S 30 AtenoSoIs N N N N N 31 CleysostsltuvIsots H N N S1IS2 SitS2 N N N 32 Gl.,sots/UtuviSOtS N N N S2 SII2 N N N 33 vertisots N N5 SIM5 NNN0 IA PlanosolSsotonett N N SS2? N N 35 fluvisots N N N N N N N N 36 ltuvisots Si Si S1 Si Si Si 51 So 3? Uluvtsots 11 Si £1£ Si Si SIS $1 S 35 Uuvii@t5 SI 3 53 S2 2 $ Ss 53 O 39 SoonchablSolomkI 40 Stot, 0 N NN 121 £2/N N H N aZ 4t ituvisots N N N N N N N 1t r*)r the rating of these individualsoil units account has been takenof the - detaileddsctipt0ion of *&ch unit *ivenin de Pju. 1C4. Working Paper No. 1 Page 24 Slope Limitations 3.17 The following general ratingsare applied to take into account limitations tmposedby slopet Table 11. SLOPE SUITABILITY RATINGS Slope class Maize/Wheat Bunded rice Low Interm. High Low Interm. < 22 Si Si Si Si Si 2 - 5? Si S1 S1 SZIN S21N 5- 8a S1/S2 S1/S2 S2 N N 8 - 16Z S2 S2 S2/N N N 16 -30 S2/N S2/N N N N > 302 N N N N N The suitability ratings S1, S2 and N, and combinations,are similar to those of the soil unit ratings. Land Suitability 3.18 Both the agro-climaticsuitability and the agro-edaphic suitability are required to arrive at the land suitabilityassessment for the three crops under consideration. The land suitability assessment takes account of all the inventoriedattributes of land and compares them with crop requirements,in order to give an easily understandablepicture of the suitabilityof land for the production of the crops. 3.19 Four suitabilityclasses are employed, each linked to attainable yields for the three levels of inputs considered. For each level of inputs, the land suitabilityclasses are: very suitable (VS): 80? or more of the maximum attainableyield; suitable (S): 40? to less than802; marginally suitable (MS): 202 to less than 40Z; and not suitable (NS): less than 202. 3.20 In essence, land suitabilityhas been computed by modifying the cor!uted extent of lands in the four agro-climatic (moisture/temperature) suitability classes by the ratings of the various soil units and slope Working Paper No. 1 Page 25 classes prevailing in those agro-climaticzones. Accordingly,it is possible to assess the areas of land variously suited to the production of the three crops at the three levels of inputs considered. 3.21 Figure 6 gives the schematic outlive of the calculationprocciure for the suitabilityassessment of maize, bunded rice and wheat. Table 12 presents yield ranges for each crop at each of the three levels of inputs for the four suitabilityclasses. Results of Land SuitabilityAssessment 3.22 The results of the land suitabilityassessment are contained in three master tables presenting the gross potential areas 4 for maize. bunded rice and wheat, region by region (Appendix2). These results are expressedas a percentage of land of the different regions variously suitable. Table 1 presents results regardlessof land occupied by national parks, game reserves and forest reserves; Table 2 presents results after deduction of land occupied by national parks and game reserves;and Table 3 presents results after additional deduction of forests reserves. The extent of national parks, game reserves and forest reserves is presented in Table 4 of section 2.11. 3.23 Results of the assessment and relevant informationon present production and requirementsare presented in eight summary tables, one for each land utilization type. The table contain the following information region by region: - extent (000 ha) of individual regions; - extent (000 ha) of very suitable and suitable land combined (gross potential area) respectivelyfor all land, all land minus land occupied by national parks and games reserves, and all land minus land occupied additionallyby forest reserves; - extent (000 ha) of very suitable and suitable land combines after taking account of fallow land requirements (net potential area) respectivelyfor all land, all land minus land occupied by national parks and game reserves, and all land minus land occupied additionallyby forest reserves; - production potential (000 tonnes) of very suitable and suitable land. (This is derived from the extent of net potential areas and weighted yields according to occurrence of very suitable and suitable land, and in the case of maize also the occurrence of lowland and highland maize); 4/ The gross potential areas do not take into account fallow land requiremenLts; net potential areas do. Working Paper No. 1 Figu,re6 Page 26 SCHEMATICOUTLINE OF CALCULATIONPROCEDURE Land Resources Inventory (ThermalZones, Moisture Zones, Soil Utit$, and Physiography) (de Pauw 1984) I. All Land Resources II. All Land ResourcesMinus Land Land UtilizationTypes occupied by National Parks and for maize, bunded rice and wheat Game Reserves at three leveis of inputs III. All Land Resourcesminus Land occupied by National Parks, Game Reserves and Forest Reserv THERMALZONE RATINGS SOIL UONIE RATINGSj SLPLS AIG SOI UNITRATINGS s M'S Working Paper No. 1 Page 27 Table 12. Y2EI RANS (t/ho) 1/ Inputlevele/ LowlandMalie Highlmnd maiei SundedRlce Wheat suita,bilitycleosew (29-120 days) > 120 days) (12-139days) (l-130 days) VS 1.4 - 1.6 2.2 - 2.7 n.S. 1.1 - 1.4 S 9.7 - 1.4 1.1 - 2.2 6.6 - 1.0 0.- 1.1 LOWVI 3/ iSU 0.4 - 0.7 0.Q - 1.1 0.3 - 6.6 0.3 - 0.6 Ns 0.0 - 0.4 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 0.S 0.6 - 0.3 Vs 3.6 - 4.5 5.4 - 6.8 n.8. 2.3 - 3.6 S 1.6 - 3.0 2.7 - 5.4 1.3 - 2.6 1.1 - 2.3 XNT. SWUTS 3 MS 0.9 - 1.6 1.4 - 2.7 6.? - 1.3 0.6 - 1.1 NS 6.6 - 9.9 6.9 - 1.4 6.9 - 0.7 0.0 - O.6 VS - .7 - 71 87 .0 / . 4.5 - 6.6 S 2.8 - .7 4.44- 8.7 2.2 - 4.5 HIGHDNPSM MS 1.4 - 2.8 2.2 - 4.4 1.1 - 2.2 NS 9.0 - 1.4 9.0 - 2.2 6.9 - 1.1 / Yields so calculated and verified with reserch date by FAOAgrO-ecologiCI ZonesProject (FAO1970) V Fer seize and wheat at low and intermediat level of inpute, 4allo, period requirmenat hove not bee taken Intoe acunt. 3/ Maize with 120 day growth cycle: eazi potestiefyield 7.1 t/he 2/ Maisewith 210 day growth cycle: eazDim potential yield 19.9 t/he Working Paper No. 1 Page 28 - actual production of 198511986 cropping season S (which includes irrigated production); - estimated 1986 population,6 and - requirementsof the different regions in 1986 7 Tables 13, 14 and 15 present the results of maize; Tables 16 and 17 for bunded rice; and Table 18, 19 and 20 for wheat. Data on current areas devoted to each crop per region are not available. 3.24 Maize. From the agro-climaticviewpoint (i.e.. moisture and temperature),more than 60Z of the country area is either suitable or very suitable for the production of either lowland or highland maize. In the T1 and TZ thermal zones (suitablefor lowland maize varieties) the main constraintsare related to soil fertility. The majority of the soils are only marginally suitable. In the T3 zone soils are markedly better but slope/reliefconstraints are the main limiting factors. 3.25 In total, Tanzania has, depending on level of inputs, 10 to 12 million hectares that would be suitable for maize production (of which less than 10? is very suitable). 3.26 To maintain yield levels as presented in Table 12, fallow period requirementswill have to be respected. By taking into account general climatic and soil conditions,a cultivationfactor of 40? has been assumed for low level on inputs; for intermediateand high levels of inputs, 652 and 902 respectively.8 5/ Source: Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Systems, FAO/KILIMO. 6/ Source: Bureau of Statistics. 71 Source: Food Self-SufficiencyPolicy and Food Needs Assessment in Tanzania, Food Strategy Unit, PAO/KILIHO. 8I Cultivation factor is the number of years in which it is possible to cultivate the land, as a percentage of the total cultivation and non- cultivation cycle (restorationof plan nutrient status, improved organic matter status and soil structure, control of weeds, control of pests and diseases, erosion control and in some cases augmentation of soil moisture). Working Paper No. 1 Page 29 3.27 In most regions of Tanzania, the potential for maize production exceeds the present requirements(1986) especiallyin Iringa, Kigoma, Mbeya, Morogoro, Rukwa and Ruvuma. However, assuming low levels of inputs, Arusha, Coast/Dar Es Salasm, Dodoma, Kilimanjaro,Mara, Singida and Tanga are potential deficit regions. 3.28 Bunded Rice. Rainfed bunded rice in Tanzania is mainly possible in depressionsand in alluvial valleys (water collecting sites) on Fluvisols, Gleysols and Vertisols. The areas where the above conditions prevail, in combinationwith sufficient rainfall and suitable temperature regime, cover approximately4 million hectares. 9 3.29 Regions with relativelyhigh productionpotentials are the Coast, Kagera, Kigoma, Lindi, Mars, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mwanza, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Shinyanga and Tabora. Dar Es Salaam, Kilimarjaro,and to some extent Mtwara at low level inputs, cannot or can just meet present requirements (1986). 3.30 Wheat. 10 Wheat productionis confined to highland areas (T3 and T4 thermal zones) where temperaturesare suitable. Within these areas some 1 to 1.5 million hectares are assessed as very suitable or suitable for wheat production. This is less than 102 of the T3 and T4 zones. The main constraint to wheat production is slope/relief. 3.31 Overlapping. Areas potentially suitable for wheat for maize overlap substantiallyin thermal zone T3. They do not overlap in zones Tl and T2 (not suitable for wheat), and T4 (not suitable for maize) (see Table 7 for reference). Areas suitable for maize and for rice show some minor overlap in zones Ti and T2, but non in T3 and T4 (not suitable for rice). Areas potentially suitable for rice and for wheat do not overlap. 91 For rice, fallow land requirementsare assumed to be 0 (cultivation factor is 1002). Rice potential was not computed at high inputs. 101 For wheat, fallow period requirementsare assumed to be similar to those assumed for maize (cultivationfactors assumed are 402, 652 and 90Z for low, intermediateand high levels of inputs, respectively). WorkingPaper No. 1 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Page30 IV. RECOMMENDATIONSFOR FUTUREASSESSMENTS 4.01 The presentassessment of Tanzania'sland resourcespotential for threemajor cerealsinvolved manual evaluation of 62 differentecological zones subdivided,on average,into 2 moisturezones and 6 differentsoil units,which fell on averageinto 2 slope classes. The evaluationof these approximately1,500 differentecological "cells' for 9 differentland utilizationtypes took about 4 weeks of intensivework. For a 1:2 million scale informationbase of generallygood quality, resultsonly down to the regionlevel are justified. However,for assessmentsof differenceswithin regions(district level), a much finer land resourcesinventory is required. Basic data to compilesuch a data base/inventoryare required. Such basic data are availableand/or can be generated. For this, the materials/activitiesdescribed in the followingparagraph would be involved. PresentLand Use 4.02 A reliabledata base for presentcultivated land under different crops is not available. The informationat the districtlevel, compiled by the Crop Monitoringand Early WarningSystems (FAOIKILIMO). is reliablea present. Very valuableadditional information could, however, be obtained throughsystematic interpretation of SPOT images(ground resolution of 20 m), or LANDSATthermatic mapping (groundresolution of 30 m). The complete coverageof SPOT imagesfor Tanzaniawould cost approximatelyUSS 600,000, while for the systematicinterpretation of presentland use about 24 months of work is involved(estimates by FAO's RemoteSensing Unit). ClimaticResource Inventors 4.03 The climaticinventory produced by de Pauw (1983)and which was integratedinto an agro-ecologicalzones inventory(de Pauw 11984)requires considerablerefinement. For the notificationof the thermalregime 2.50 C steps insteadof the current50 C stepswould be required. The accuracyof the mappingitself needs to be improvedtoo. The moistureregimes as quantifiedby de Pauw sufferfrom a lack of quantificationof year-to-year variability.A specialmap overlayquantifying variability in space and time i5 also required. 4.04 The basic data requiredfor the compilationof a refinedclimatic resourcesinventory is availablewith the Directorateof Meteorology(DOM) in Dar Es Salaam. The DOM has historicaldaily recordsof rainfallfor over 400 stationsspread throughout the countryand over 1,000 stations with averagedata. lWMOat presentis installinga computersystem in DOM which will be used to store this data. From the time the data will be availablein computerizedform, some 6 man-monthswould be requiredfor data analysisand mappingof climaticresources at the requiredscale of 1:1 million. Working Paper No. 1 Page 31 Inventoriesof Soil and Landform Resources. 4.05 In the present inventory (1:2 million scale), as indicatedby de Pauw through a reliabilitydiagram, about 50S of Tanzania is supportedby reliable reconnaissancesurveys. The other 50 requires updating and probably field work. At present, the northern part of Tanzania has been inventoriedat 1:1 million scale by the InternationalSoil Referenceand InformationCentre in Wageningen (Netherlands). This inventory is being digitized and computerizedby FAO's Land and Water DevelopmentDivision. The southern half of Tanzania might be tackled by the National Soil Survey of Tanzania. For a district level assessment,a computerizedinventory of at least 1:1 million scale is required. Computerization 4.06 A land resourcesevaluation down to the district level for the whole of Tanzania cannot be handled by hand. Present informationland use, climatic resources, soils, and landformswill have to be digitized and computerizedin a mutually compatibleway, to enable computer application of available land resoutces assessmentmodels. BY REGION Table 13: COMPARISONOF POTENTIAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDS FOR RAINFED MAIZE AT LOW LEVEL OF INPUTS 3 Production4 Population' Requirewentse Region Gross Potential' NetPotential' Production Potential 1985/86 1986 1986 (000) (000tonnes) Extenis Extents(000 ha) Estents(000 ha) (000tonnes) (000tonnes) lOOOha) I 11 111 1 11 1I . t 1 111 143 198 1,219 169 Arusha 8.209 279 263 254 112 105 102 157 147 77 77 12 569 203 Coast 3,255 192 176 176 77 70 70 8S - 1,598 - Dares Salaam 139 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 17 1,212 53 Dodoma 4,131 99 99 99 40 40 40 44 44 44 282 1,132 190 Iringa 5,685 1,103 1,091 1,069 441 433 428 617 611 599 83 37 1,334 42 Kagera 2.846 239 205 188 96 82 75 106 91 62 809 74 Kigoma 3.704 659 659 470 264 264 188 290 290 206 30 63 1.116 49 Kilimanjaro 1,325 91 91 54 39 37 21 55 52 136 26 618 19 Lindi 6,604 456 337 310 182 135 124 200 148 18 27 803 33 Nara 2,174 67 39 39 27 16 16 30 18 232 1,380 174 Nbeya 6.035 987 972 845 391 389 338 547 544 473 336 332 114 1,178 109 torogoto 7,062 1,068 763 756 427 305 302 470 80 24 908 25 Ntwara 1.611 189 189 180 76 76 72 84 84 131 132 107 1.816 95 Hvanza 1.968 328 312 299 131 125 120 144 503 136 628 75 Rukwa 6.864 1.743 1,599 899 697 638 360 975 892 206 720 87 RuvuMa 6,367 1,093 1,076 1,012 437 430 40S 481 473 446 297 1.708 152 Shinyanga 5,076 373 365 213 IS0 146 85 165 161 94 34 756 30 4,934 44 25 25 18 10 10 20 11 11 Singida 1,142 108 tabora 7,615 937 906 528 375 362 207 413 398 228 213 44 43 124 1.306 111 Tanga 2,668 lot 1t1 99 40 40 39 44 4,560 3,680 2,211 20,022 1,806 TOtAL 88,332 10,060 9,274 7,511 4,022 3,705 3.004 4,929 Crossiltfitial areasdo not take into accountfallom land requirements AreaI accountsfor all landvery suitable and suitable for maize all landvery suitable and suitable for maize,excluding land occupied by national parks and game reserves Area11 accounts for gavereserves ard forest reserves , Aeu III accountsfor all landvery suitable awd suitable for maize,excluding land occupied by nationalparks, cultivationlactor of 40 2, for t') Netpotential areas take account of fallov landrequirements (for uize and vheat at lov levelof inputsa 2 areas o intermediatelevel 65 I andfor high level 902 is assumed;Area 1, 11and Ill as forgross potential 1.1t/ha (lowlevel inputsI WWeighted yield for very suitableand suitable landfor highlandmaize is 1.7tJha and for loulandsaize Source.Crop Nonitoring and Early Varning Systems o Source:Bureau of Statistics Source.Food Security Unit Table 14: COMPARISONOF POTENTIALPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENTDEMANDS BY REGION FOR RAINFEDMAIZE AT INTERMEDIATELEVEL OF INPUTS Region GrossPotential' NetPotential2 ProductionPotential3 Production Population' Requirements' 1985/86 1986 1986 Extents Extents(000 hal Extents 1000ha) (000tonnes) (000tonnes) (0001 (000tonnes) (000ha) I 11 III I It III I I1 III …_- … 169 Arusha 8,209 344 320 320 224 208 208 762 708 708 198 1.219 203 Coast 3,255 221 205 205 144 133 133 389 359 359 12 S69 Dar es Salaam 139 7 7 7 5 5 5 14 14 14 - 1,598 - 1.212 53 Dodoma 4.131 119 119 119 77 77 77 208 208 208 17 198 Iringa 5.685 1,376 1.364 1,262 894 887 820 3,039 3,015 2,787 282 1,132 42 Iagera 2,846 577 509 472 375 331 307 1,A3 894 829 37 1,334 74 Kigoma 3,704 814 814 513¢ 529 529 383 1,428 1.428 1,034 62 809 49 Kilimanjaro 1.325 102 97 57 66 63 37 224 214 125 63 1,116 Lindi 6.604 554 436 390 360 283 253 972 765 683 26 610 19 873 33 Mara 2,174 81 52 52 53 34 34 143 92 92 27 114 Ibeya 6.035 1,031 1.026 905 670 667 580 2,278 2,268 1,999 232 1.380 Horogoro 7.062 1,497 1,109 1,066 973 721 693 2,627 1,946 1,871 114 1,178 109 Ntuara 1,671 239 239 229 155 155 148 419 419 400 24 908 25 Nvanza 1,968 411 394 372 267 256 242 721 691 653 107 1,816 95 75 Rukva 6,864 1,661 1,592 927 1,080 1,034 602 3,672 3.516 2.047 136 628 87 Ruvua 6,367 1,572 1,554 1.477 1.022 1,010 960 2,759 2,727 2,592 206 720 Shinyanga 5,076 396 386 233 257 251 152 694 677 410 297 1,708 152 30 Singida 4,934 54 30 30 35 19 19 95 52 52 34 756 to0 Tabora 7,615 990 959 548 634 624 356 1,712 1,684 961 213 1,142 III Tanga 2,668 133 133 128 d6 86 83 232 232 224 124 1.306 1.806 TOTAL 88.332 12,179 11,345 9,388 7,906 7,374 6,100 23,401 21,909 18,048 2,211 20,022 t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t Grosspotential areasdo not take into accountfallou land requirements Area I accounts[or all land very suitable andsuitable for maize to Area 11 actcounts[or all land very suitable and suitable [ormaize, excluding land occupiedby national parks and gamereserves reserves , Area III accountsfor all land very suitable andsuitable for maize,excluding land occupiedby national parks, ganereserves and forest factor of 40 2, for o 2 Ikt potential areas take acciunt of fallou land requirements(for saize and wheat at lovlevel of inputs a cultivation intermediate level 65 S andfor high level 90 S is assumed, Area 1. Itand IIlas for gross potential areas saize 2.7t/ha lintermediate level inputsl ' WeightedYield for very suitable and suitable land for highland maizeis 4.1t/ha and for lowland Source. Crop Monitoring and Early Uarning Systems Source: Bureauof Statistics ' Source:Food SecuritY Unit Table 15t COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDS BY REGION FOR RAIUFED MAIZE AT HIGH LEVEL OF INPUTS Region Gross Potential' NetPotential" Production Potentlal 3 ProductioRr' Population' Requirements 1985/86 Extents 1986 1986 btents 1000ha) Extents1000 ha) 1000tonmes) 000tonnesl 4000 (000tonMes (000hal 1 I 111 1 II III I If III Arusha 8,209 279 254 254 251 228 228 1,30u 1.185 1.iD5 198 1,219 69 Coast 3,255 393 368 368 354 331 331 1,522 1,423 1.423 12 569 203 Dar es Salaam 139 7 7 7 6 6 6 26 26 26 - 1,598 - Oodma 4,131 83 83 83 15 75 75 323 323 323 17 1,212 53 Eringa 5,685 133 722 66S 660 650 598 3,432 3,380 3,110 282 1,132 198 Lageta 2,846 395 324 302 356 292 272 1,531 1,254 1,172 37 1.334 42 Kigoma 3,704 567 567 393 510 510 353 2,193 2.193 1,518 Kilimanjaro 62 809 74 1,325 42 38 20 38 34 18 163 14S 77 63 Lindi 1,116 49 6,604 766 502 475 689 452 428 2,963 1,944 1,841 26 610 mara 19 2.174 59 43 43 53 39 39 228 168 168 27 073 (teya 33 6,035 923 917 SIS 831 825 734 4,321 4,290 3,816 232 t,380 Norogoro 1,062 174 1.102 756 692 992 680 622 4,266 2,924 2,841 114 1,170 nttara 109 1,671 222 222 214 200 200 192 860 860 826 24 909 Iluanza 25 1,968 398 380 360 358 342 324 1,5391,470 1,393 107 1.616 Ruoka 6,864 1.492 95 1,400 761 1,3531,260 685 6,833 6,3633,459 136 626 Ruvuma 6.367 75 891 853 777 802 760 699 3,499 3,3503,050 206 720 Shinyanga 5,076 el 396 386 239 356 347 215 1,531 1.492 925 291 1.708 152 Singida 4,934 54 30 30 49 26 26 211 112 112 34 756 30 labora 7,615 990 959 510 al9 863 466 3,831 3,7112,004 213 1,142 108 Tanga 2,668 216 216 208 194 194 107 834 805 805 124 1,306 111 OtJAL 88.332 10,0099,027 7,224 8.9460,122 6,498 41,41137,418 30,080 2,211 20,022 1,806 ------.---.------0 Grdss potential areas do not take into atcount fal wouland tequirements AreaI accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for saize Area It accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for maize,excluding land occupiedby national parks and gamereserves AreaIII accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable formaize, excluding land occupied by national parks, gate reserves and forest reserves rD NHet potential areas take account of fallow land requirements Ifor saizeand wheat at lowlevel of inputs a cultivationfactot of 40 1. for s 2 intermediatelevel 65 S andfor high level 90t isassumed; Area 1, 11and IIl as for gross potential areas o ' 1eighted yieldfor verysuitable and suitable land for highland maize is 6.1 t/ha and for lowland maize 4.3 t/ha ihigh level inputs) 4 Source. Crop Monitoringand EaTIr Varning Svstens Source: Bureau of Statistics Source. Food Security Unit Table 16s COMA.RISON OF POTENTIAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDSBY REGION FOR RAINFED BUNDED RICE AT LOW LEVEL OF INPUTS _-..-.-.-----.------. 2 Populatio&'Requirements' Region GrossPotential' NetPotential ProductionPotential' Productiun 1985/86 1986 1986 (000) 4000tonnesl Extents Extents1000 ha) Extents4000 haI 1000tonnes) 4000tonnesl ID00ha) I 11 III I It III I I Il 1 1,219 6 Arusha 8,209 33 33 33 33 33 33 26 26 26 28 %69 97 Coast 3.255 159 143 143 159 143 143 127 114 114 1,598 - Dares Salaaa 139 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 - 0 1.212 8 DDdoma 4.131 45 45 45 45 45 45 36 36 36 2 1,132 5 Iringa 5,665 St 23 23 Sl 23 23 41 18 18 1 1,334 4 Kagera 2,846 196 171 151 196 171 51 157 137 121 1 809 5 Kigoma 3,104 111 III 74 111 111 14 89 89 59 5 1,116 9 EilleanJaro1.325 ------20 618 13 Lindi 6,604 237 178 165 237 178 165 190 142 132 3 873 4 tara 2,174 150 ISO 150 ISO 150 150 120 120 120 37 1,380 24 Ibeya 6,035 206 193 175 206 193 175 164 154 140 149 1,178 89 morogoro 7,062 296 240 240 296 240 240 237 192 192 26 908 19 ttwara 1.671 33 33 33 33 33 33 26 26 26 86 1,816 51 Wwanza 1,968 262 253 236 262 253 236 210 202 189 13 628 7 Rukva 6,864 233 213 82 233 213 82 186 170 66 33 720 13 Ruvuma 6,367 146 140 127 146 140 127 117 112 102 81 1,708 37 Shinyanga 5,076 537 447 360 537 447 360 430 358 288 4 756 4 Singida 4,934 123 79 79 t23 79 79 98 63 63 38 1,142 26 Tabora 7,615 289 281 160 289 281 160 213 225 128 17 1,306 14 Tanga 2,668 59 59 59 59 59 59 47 47 47 547 20,022 435 TOTAL 88,332 3.173 2,799 2,342 3,173 2,799 2.342 2,520 2,237 1.873 30 Grotsspotential areas do not account orfallou land requirements AreaI accountsfor all land suitable for bunded rice reserves @° x0 Area11 accounts fot all land suitable for bunded rice, excluding land occupied by nationalparks and game ga resermand reservesfogest X AreaIII accounts for all land suitable for bundedrice, excluding land occupied by nationalparks. La. take accountof fallow land requirements(for bundedrice however.it is assumedno fallow land is required). 2 Net potential areas 0 Area1. 11and IIIas forgross potential areas ' Yieldfor suitable land for bunded rice is MU.8t/a(lov levelinputs) 4 Source:Crop Nonitoring andEarly Varning Systems Source:Bureau of Statistics * Source.Food Security Unit Table 17: COMPARISONOF POTENTIALPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENTDEMANDS BY REGION FOR RAINFED BUNDEDRICE AT INTERMEDIATELEVEL OF INPUTS ------ 3 Region GrossPotential Net PoteRtial2 Produt.tionPotential Productiote Populatiorp Require.ents 1985/86 1986 1986 Extents Extents1000 ha) Extents(000 ha) 1000tonnesl (000tontesl (0001 (000tonnes) (000 ha) I If 111 I If 111 I It 111 Arusha 8,209 33 33 33 33 33 33 66 66 66 3 1,219 6 Coast 3,255 159 143 143 159 143 143 318 286 286 28 569 97 Dar es Salaa 139 7 7 7 7 7 7 14 14 14 - 1,598 - bodona 4,131 45 45 45 45 45 45 90 90 90 0 1,212 8 Irlap 5,685 62 34 34 62 34 34 124 68 68 2 1.132 5 Kagera 2,846 233 205 176 233 205 176 466 410 352 1 1,334 4 Kigom 3,704 152 152 96 152 152 96 304 304 192 1 809 5 kilimnJaro 1,325 ------5 1,116 9 Lindi 6,604 237 178 165 237 178 16S 414 356 330 20 618 13 Nara 2,174 150 150 150 IS0 150 150 300 300 300 3 873 4 Ibeya 6,035 302 290 260 302 290 260 604 580 520 37 1,380 24 morogoro 7,062 339 275 275 339 275 275 678 550 550 149 1,178 B9 lItuara 1,671 33 33 33 33 33 33 66 66 66 26 908 19 Heanza 1.968 411 400 372 411 400 372 822 800 744 86 t',6 St Rukua 6.364 329 30' 96 329 302 96 658 604 192 13 .8 7 Ruvuma 6.367 216 210 197 . 16 210 197 432 420 394 33 /ZO a il,ir.vanga¶,.'.b o'J S8.. 44.' 6t3 584 447 1.346 1. b8 894 81 1.108 3,? 1 ZSirni-.a 4.934 1_:JJ 9 123 ; 79 2. 158 150 564 Tabora 1.615 ,45 .-..9 _51.S57 44i 251 v1; 98 S50 38 1.14' Tanga zt.668 '? 9 5s 59 59 59 118 118 118 17 1.sUb ruTAL 3h.,.^ *._V.0 2A'.e .1:0 J.bZ8 ..918 S.04t) -.>62% 59SJb 54i*I .0A,:;- Jt; pGtUti*at il i .1.azJ.tUbt - t tall.y IdnJ requreemets AreaI -:.untsi'1i alllarI,J suital1e f.r bunJeJrin.e so Atea 11 t..E1 all la;.Jsuitat*le f..r t'jrdedr;.e. exIudarg land o,.upicd 1, natt.n41 t.a:i;s arsJ gae ieserves Artci 111 6%."Umsif. all lai, sultat4li (r t.u.ddfi-.e. ef .JU"irigla;t,i (-Uppled lii I,dL14.a1 j.arls.gamt aeseaves ited (..lst ivstiJt4 Mletpotent,i1 aruas tak ....- unl A.. fa,ii larkJrequieenerts tf;,r turdledri.re thuever. it is assumedne. falivu lasiJ is it.uirt.I. 0z ea 1. l1 and IIIis f-. pI Ss j tr,tia1 actM YielJ t.. 4'itat1le lathllan t4aut-J ri.t is2.0 t/ha intermediate level inputs 4 &cu-we.r rs it.-llring anlJLdil; Warr,mre;vstems * ur.t. L'b1:JJ .1 .ut, 'n:; £..ur.e t..i x.Srlw. !Ingt REGION Table 18s COMPARISONOF POTENTIALPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDS BY FOR RAINEFEDWHEAT AT LOW LEVEL OF INPUTS 4 Population'Requitreente' Region GrossPotential' NetPotential" ProductionPotential3 Production 1995/8b 1986 1986 (000tonnes) Extents Extents1000 ha) Extents(000 hal (000tonnes) 000tonnesI (000) 1000ha) I 11 III I 11 111 I 11 III 53 1,219 14 Atusha 8.209 57 49 49 23 20 20 21 le 10 569 46 Coast 3,255 ------Dares Salaae 139 -1.598 1,212 - Dodoma 4,131 ------12 1.132 13 Itinga 5,685 671 671 614 268 268 246 241 "'I 221 - 1,334 1 2,846 ------Kagera 809 3 3.704 15 IS 15 6 6 6 S 5 5 - Kigoa 1.116 4 KiliuanJaro1.325 45 42 25 10 17 10 16 15 9 ------618 I Lindi 6.604 - - 873 Nara 2.1t4 - - - - ^ - - - - - 1 1,380 5 Hbeya 6.035 168 168 151 67 67 63 60 60 56 1 1.178 5 Norogoro 7.062 14 14 14 6 6 6 5 5 5 - - 908 3 Mtwara 1.671 ------1,81b 8 1.968 ------lwanza 628 2 Rukwa 6,864 220 220 206 88 e8 82 19 79 74 - 5 720 3 Ruvua 6.367 51 51 51 20 20 20 18 18 to - 1,700 1 Shinyanga 5,076 ------156 4.934 ------Singida 1,142 4 7,615 ------Tabora 1.306 6 Tanga 2,668 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 72 20,022 123 TOtAL 88,332 1,249 1,238 1,139 499 495 456 448 444 409 >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ takeinto account fallov land requirements Grosspotential areas do not 0 I accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for wheat Area reserves > 10 Areatt accounts for all land very suitable and suitable for uheat, excluding occupied bynational parts and game gameres'rves and forest reserves w - Area1II accounts for all land very suitable and suitable for bheat, excluding land occupied bynational parks, maizeat lov level of inputs a cultivationfactor of 40 2. for z 2 Net potentialareas take account of fallowland requirements (forvheat and intermediatelevel65 2 andfor high level 90 2 isassumed; Area 1. 11 and III as for gross potential areas. WWeighted yield for very suitable and suitable land for wheat 0.9 t/ha (lov level inputs) 4 Source:Crop Nonitoring andEarly Warning Systems Source: Bureauof Statistics Source.Fool Security Unit REGION Table 19: COMPARISONOF POTENTIALPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDS BY FOR RAINFED WHEAT AT INTERHEDIATELEVEL OF INPUTS 4 Requirements Region CrossPotential' NetPotentialP ProductionPotential' Production PopulationP 1985/86 1986 198b (0001 (000townes) Extents Extents (000ha) Extents (000ha) 1000tonnesI 1000tonnes) (000ha) I 11 III I If itl 1 11 III 163 53 1,219 14 Arusha 8,209 181 IS6 148 118 101 96 201 172 - - - 569 46 Coast 3,255 ------1.598 - Dar es Salaa. 139 ------1.212 4 Dodoua 4,131 ------12 1,132 13 Iringa 5.685 801 801 728 521 521 472 886 886 804 - - - - - 1,334 - Kagera 2,046 - 3 3,704 15 IS 1S 10 l010 17 37 17 - 809 Kigoma 1.116 4 Kilinanlaro1,325 62 57 34 40 37 22 68 63 38 - - 6t8 Lindi 6.604 ------871 2 tara 2,174 ------1,380 5 6,035 162 162 151 105 105 98 179 179 161 1 tlbeya 1 1,178 S Norogoro 7,062 21 21 21 14 14 14 24 24 24 - 908 3 tftwara 1,671 ------.816 8 ------aranza 1,960 628 2 Rukwa 6,864 220 220 206 143 143 134 243 243 228 - 5 720 3 Suvnma 6,367 51 51 S1 33 33 33 56 56 56 - - - 1,708 1 Shilnyanga 5,076 ------756 2 Sinpida 4,934 ------1.142 4 Tabora 7,615 - - 1,306 6 Tan8a 2,660 11 It 8 7 7 S 12 12 9 - 72 20,022 123 TWtAL 88.332 1.524 1.4941,362 991 971 884 1,686 1,652 1,506 rtosspotential areas do not take Into account fallov land requirements AreaI accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for wheat and gamereserves Area 11 accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for Wheat,extluding land occupiedby national parks gamereserves and fotest reserves reamIII accountsfor all land very suitable and suitable for uheat, excludingland occupiedby national parks, factor of 40 1, forinterwediate NNet potential areas take accountof fdllow land requirements(for wheatand maize at lov level inputs a cultivation level 6S I and for high level 90 I is assumed;Area 1, 11 and Ill as for gross potential areas. inputs) D ' Weightedyield for very suitable and suitableland for wheat 1.7 t/ha (interseiate level * Source:Crop Nonitoringand EarlyWarning Systems ' Sotrce:Bureau of Statistics * Source. FoodSecurity Unit * . Table 20: COMPARISONOF POTENTIALPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CURRENT DEMANDS BY REGION FOR RAINFED WHEAT AT HIGH LEVEL OF INPUTS Region Gross Potential' NetPotential* ProductionPotential3 Production4 Populatiod' Requireuente 1985/86 1986 1986 Extents Extents 1000 tsal Extents (000hia) (000tonnesl (000toanesl l001) (000touse I000ha) II it ItI II III I [if Arusla 8,209 90 74 74 8l 66 66 275 226 226 53 1,219 14 Coast 3,255 ------569 46 Dar es Salaam 139 ------1,598 - Dodoma 4,131 ------1,212 Iringa 5,685 574 4 517 408 517 465 435 1,758 1,582 1,479 12 1,132 Kagera 2,846 13 ------1,334 1 Kigou 3,704 If 11 11 10 10 10 34 34 34 - 809 3 Xilisanjaro 1,325 22 21 11 20 19 10 68 64 34 - 1,116 4 Lindi 6,604 ------618 1 tara 2,174 ------873 2 Nbeya 6.035 103 103 97 93 93 87 316 314 295 1 1,380 5 iforogoro 7.062 7 7 7 6 6 6 20 20 20 1 1,178 5 NItuara ,1 - - - - - ,-o - 908 3 war.;a l.*a ------1.816 8 hukia(U.t3 1'i 1['3 IS to 160 1,8 544 544 504 628 2 kusulia~~~~ t ------S 31,Ir,va1.3'td,. hv{ - - b 1208 Siflgido 1 x - ' - - - ' t-(.l.a oIS - - - - 1,142 .660{§ga ------I1t.bUt.30t t TutAL -d )J'* 1 iss J19 88t 621 i.015 .. 7t 72 20.0A L t 4fvSS P&W6f.tatia W:0J J%.n,u- lal.e Jjjtj. aX:.CUrjl ldlh.* IdAS FEQUITUelgtS Area I a . untit t,t alt ldr #(.t uklatiJ auJ cuiltatle ft ul.ttat Alta 11 at'ur,Cs 1.1all tajdtt'fL S*tdtdit: dthJSULta,lc for &ticdt. extluJirig lartdt vcujptJtV atjwdtl pais andgmaletl° Arta III d.-,.-.U,tS11r all iardA verv Euitatie ad suitAtle for utieat.exludiuig larudvccupied tv naticrnal pal:s. ,tmt rest1vtF a;J firct restjvei6 NOet [t.n t it tl rtas t4.t -,. vun VI'vt tal larW reJwire91rts (tot Qhtat dnd MIZEe at )-it level Vi MipUtS d ,ultivativra iJd- vf ,u fw 'z II,tLtt3jlate *. k.el t' ". aind:..1 ,sg level W. 1tis assumed. Area 1, 11 and III as fu,r fivss p-terntial areas. 0 10ttJt ..-. j J1.1 VtAt; SuidJl-t) ,shI .3Ultd:i 1h01 l.1 iaheat*s Js. t.ia 1tilgh level inPutsS, * .11II i- I I fKI,i-4I1 a4IiJ Eatr Wdl.tlar li;Steus ul tlui3..LJ I _tJtlzitk1. -..uleU ' ].-t-W;I IJliit Working mpe lio. I Pa-ge40 XEF%RENCES I. CMEWS Region and District Food Crop Statistics, (1987) 1985186, FAOIMALD, Dar es Salaam. 2. De Pauw, E. Agriculturalpotential and constraintsin relation to (1983) growing periods and their variability in Tanzania, Pedolog%, 1983, (2):, p. 147-170. 3. De Pauw, E. Soils Physiographyand AgroecologicalZones of Tanzania, (1984) CMEW Project, MALD, Dar es Salaam. 4. FAO FAO/UnescoLegend of the Soil Map of the World, (1974) 1:5 million, Unesco, Paris. S. FAO Report on the agroecologicalzones project, World Soil (1987) Resources Report 48, Vol. 1 - Methodology and Results. 6. PAO/World Bank AgriculturalSector Review Mission; Working Papers, (1987) FAO, Rome. 7. ISRIC Soils of Eastern and NortheasternAfrica at 1:1 million (1988) scale and their irrigationsuitability, ISRIC, Wageningen. 8. IUCN 1985 United Nations List of National Parks and Protected (1985) Areas, Gland, Switzerland. 9. MALD/?AO Tanzania: National Food Strateay,HALD, Dar es Salaam. (1984) 10. Ministry of Mapped inventory of a.o. National Parks, Game Reserves Natural and Forest Reserves at scale l:2,000,000, compiled by Resources and Forestry Division, Dar es Salaam. Tourism (1974) 11. Nachtergaele, Investigationsof Lands with Declining and Stagnating F.O., (1988) ProductivityProject. Methodology for Regional Analysis of Physical Potential for Crop Production, Field Document 1, PAO GCP/RAF/230/JPN,Dar es Salaam. LANDRESOURCES OF ARUSHA RE8ION MIOISTNREREGIME AEZ EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMAL Unit (000 ha) REGIME (length of growingperiod(s) MAINMAJOl SOIL UNITS (meandaily tamp) -SU probability) (FAO/UlISCO1974) El 2,063 (263) 0 Mediunaltitude plains; growing periodtoo short*na T2 (21-24 C) SU2 (60-76 unreliable for relnted agriculturo days) Xerosols/Luvisole E2 1,724 (211) Mdium altitu4d plains with some hill rangs; mtinly 72 (21-240C) SU2 (60-76 days) Xerosols/Lawisols diu_-t.sturedsolos with lowto moderatefortility; growng poriod short and unreliable ES 82 (IS) Floodplain severely affectod by salinity Tl-T2 (21-27°C) Sul (less than " doys) SolonchaklSolonotz NW Vertiso*s NI 738 (9x) High titude plastaus covered by clays with lowto 73 (18-20°C) moderatefertility SM2(90-169 days) Nitosols, Acrisols and and volcanic ash soilsof highfor- (SHI) (90-160 doys) Lithosols/Reoesols tillity;short to medium growing periods with unreli- ableonsets 82 0 N2 (13) Very high altitude volcanic plateau end slopes; growing T4 (10-16C) SHI (90-160 period lim3ted by low temperatures days) Phaeozam,Lithosols Regosols*nd Lithosols\ Andosols N3 328 Medium 0 (41) altitude lake flats with sallo. soils; very 12 (21-24 C) SUl (lessthan 68 days) short to short Soloncbao/Solonets growng periods SU2 (69-76 days) and vortisols SU3(u) (90-106 days) N6 410 (65) Mediumaltitude volcanic platoau wIth fertile volcanic 9 *sh T2 (21-24C) SH2(120-196 doys) Chornoisand Andosols soils; short to medium growing period with unroli- SH2 (90-160days) able onets (SH2) (69-76 days) NO 574 (75) Modiumaltitude volcanic platoeu withfertile volcanic T2 (21-249C) SUI (lessthan 60 days) Chernozens, Vertisola, ash soils; ehort or very short growing periodwith SU2 (60-76dal unreliable onsets Lithosols/Andosols end Uitisols/Regsots NY 492 (68) Mediuoaltitude volcanic plateau with fertile volcanic T2 (21-240C SU2 (60-76 doys) Chernoges and Andosols ash soils;short growing periodswith unrolIable (TS) (1-20 C) SU3(u) onsets (90-106 days) NO 828 (43) High altitudo, dissectedto hilly volcanicplateu T8 (16-260C SU3(u) (9W-I" days) Phaeozoes* with furtile voleone 0 Vortiacls § ash soils;short growingperiods (72) (21-24C) and with unreliable-*onots e Solonetz Pt 32 (1) Medlum sllitud,plains with mainly sandysoils; short T2 (21-24°C) SU2 (80-76days) and enroliable growing Arenosoil/Luvisols pi e periods Cambisola/Acrisol. Lithos.lalR.gosols * . and Phasooems P2 126 (4j) Medium altitude plains with mainly sandy soils; 0 short t2 (21-24 C) SU3(r) (90-106 days) Aroso Luvitol 2 growing periods with reliable onsets; sevore tsotse Infestation Vertisolsand Fertalsols/Acnisols MISC. 78 (OX) Areas too steep and too rocky for .griculture/lakes UNIT Not defined Not detined N.A. TOTAL 0210 (100X) LU Rt SIJKE (IF COAUSTRIgu wOisnM~RCItE All eEnT BESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (leath of growiog period(s) MAIUMAJO SOIL1l3l1 unit (on be) (naw daiiy temp) -0 probaubilIty) (FAOIESCO1074) Cl 89 (A2 Coastal lowlands. mIslty polee with botb saedy med Ts (24-27*) 103 (90120 days.W-6" dayi) Aresosolb (Luvisoli) clsyoySols; short sale growlin period s wey shwrt bad* rtleols seconadry groeolg period Ct 073 (171 Coastal loewlads, solely plate., with Prodlsisl edWy TI (24-27C) Sll(*) (06-18 days) ArseolosLvtleol solls; ae ahort NW_ srolksble grew1la period Cs 292 (6) Coost leDa, solelyOtrUo0ly dis4ec,edplaIts ad TI (24-270C) Sl(e) (90-8IR days) Forrso4lo/Aerlools, plsteses;see short sadll|tasteSsbi growingperiod LI t&els/Rogoelso and Vertiools C4 go (ill) C"otal fleodpl.s with flat topography nsa rich wAss TI (24-27C) O1M3(0I120 dsyae309-0 days) FluwIeols sllswlol solsl grosia#period install dlstorod by or S1ill() (90-186days) tl@"dia ragiso Cs I65 (SOS) old slluuielterrocas be tor floodsdfree rivte Ti (24-2?C) SMIl() (-186 dsys) Arnosolts/Lavtola with eserallyesadtysollse shOrtNW .aarelisblo Arenosols end Verthsols rte|g period);sevely tIafostdby ttb Es 400 (161) Tropical lowlsads,iaely plst. with strooglymoth- Ti (24-2 0c) W3 (90-120 daysi30-60 daYs) foeralsols,Acrists* ered eolls of low fetility; am shrt liabl, growing SU83) (WIGS days) Csbtolooslesod Llooso period; sroly isfeted by testes Silt(s) (90-186 days) 51 1Us (65 Low sititodsplatns plateea, cowered by sedy 1T (2U-270C) Sil(s) (-136 days) Areeosols/Lsvleols sells of low fortlltyl short SPd werellobl grewieg periods;seoly late"d by teste MIsc. uWiTS 8a (1X) Aras tee teep,oe too roy r r let/l o dtleed sot defined N.A. TOTAL8,165 (INS) tot~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 0,t 6 * -. .1 Pts '1 0 cb * Working Paper No. 1 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~APPeWdi.X1 j o je Table 3 . ~ ~~i 4 i 5 s20 Z at giU S~ * i I" a g i'a |,II d .9 LABRE8KES Of soon"M SEICAN oIsTnRE KCIME LEa EXTUIT OEsCRITIC TIEM REGIMEC (lengt of q,owing plod(e) MAI MIAJOIISOIL naTS unit (n ba) (man dailly tep) -88 probbbi It *) (FAUESCO 1874) El 41 (15) Mdilu altdud poleess Greases period too sabot d Tn (2l-t4C) Wsu (0-76 days) XeL l eaellabil far related si8leolture E2 1,576 (8) M altude poolae"w.ith aea bill tese.; mal*y TS (21-24oC) su52(6-76 days) xeroee/l. .odlamt.ete edalle, with too to soderete forlility; growien ped alert aN verel*Mla1 tA "I &72 (OX) traplzol efte etra*ooly dlctUd, soelals plateau.s IS (16-2°C) S131 (160-210 dya) 1llltoelo/Acriele covered L, staye 1itb is, to moderst fertilltrs medium L.tlhooIlofiftoole greelee period. with relialebo eaeel P1 413 (165 sM a ud lae with mally seedy "Il*e aMert Ti (21-24c) 5A2 (W676 day.) Are"aolaeLwiasole, Cambt ola/Actleal , bad ateliable #reel*g periods Litbo..lajfteseeoi PS 7M2 (113) 1d u a11itude plai"celth mIldy eedy eell a abert Ti (21-240C) SUI(r) (90-106 days) AromeoiJLeAvieei growleg perlods with reliabl eceele; *evere te1ote CambielslAcrieole, Vertlela *ad icteltitte. FarrelIola/Acrlole PO 5 (145) Medim altitude, plai*c sitI slysedl S edy loamy TS (21-240c) s91(r) (0-106 day.) Cssbleole/Acrielole e oells *f feefortlltly evorelyaffected by reeoloee SU2 (0-75 days) Ar.oeoola/Losvleele elar grosieg periads wlth rollable emoee CAbreesls/Lwoole G Pi6 41 (13) Medim altitule p1l1ic sIth moldy 0aady or lamy TX (21-24UC) SUD(r) (90-146 days) seils of lee fertilily, ceove by de" thic $ Arenoel ll alert stoule. period. with reliable eeeels solAaa.le/LWlole Its lo (43) IMdium ltitud f#latlacuatrie PlaIce with aiely TS (21-H4C) Sw(r) (0-146 dayr) alluvialclay, Sell" and erdpo slle; short AnolLll oreal.perods with reliable, easel.; severely ComblooleffAcreloo* Olayslel,P*lh.ols lefeated by teatee sandLilleaale MISC. N.A. UNITS 16 5(4) Ar"s t oeteep *a te roatmyfo areeicuiture/lae I totdficdl .ot,del id TOTAL4,181 (16) n i: 0lb; * , 0 LAND RESOURCES OF IRINGA REGION MOISTUREREIKME AEZ EXTENT DEUSCIPTION THEMALREI4ME (leng of gvowing period(*) MAINMAJOR SOIL SnI unlit (on h) (cea daily teap) -6ex probabilIy) (FAOPJUC 1014) El 227 (41) MIdlum altitudeplates withpredoinently triableclars TI (21-24eC) SH3 (168-216day) Luvisol.AAorlale sd of low to derwateetiliity; one modiumad teilable SH6(106-210 days) V. growing period; eWrely Inteste by teet Ell SI (11) Complei meims altitude depreselon with mIlnly OaWy Ti-TI (21-27C) s0 (18216 days) A C (LOvisls) eoil* of lew fortillty;modma, roliablegrowing peI.d HI 1,478 (2015) High altitude platea ,lth mediu to heevytoetared 18 (15-29C) EN4(18-180 dovy) FOrralsol, ACristo end o0 IQ with low to moderate frtilityl medium growing (SR) (168-210 day,) Nitocle perliods with reliabloensoat H2 789 (141) NOh altitude platem. wlth modiumto heavy textured Ta (15-200C) SS (108279 daye) FerralsOe, Aerlolaand s00I with low to sodarts, fertilily; modiumtoo Bong Nitsole growlngpeods with reliableonete "IS 512 (63 Tropical montaInswith clayey eelleof lee to mod.r.- Ta (16-211C) 515 (168-27days) Nitoole/Accriale fertility;long growing periods sith reliableonnete HS 841 (OX) Volcanic bighland withplatesl a1 etrearowlydissced TS (16-298C) 5045(18276 daye) Andoeoleand Nitloes/ inef_or.cowred by wolca"lc ak salsg long, SCI (248-80days) Acrioole cfte.,continue.., yrols Periods me 57 (13) Very bighaltitude plateamcovered by vocsanicso 14 (1I8°C) KS (248-80days) Andosocl seOIl, lo", oftenCon ue..$rowlg period (eigbtfrost) HI 766 (143) Tropicaloften strongly dlisectOd, asuntla plaetenx Ts (1C-2O°C) 4 (1-211 days) liteeois/AcrisleaNl Coveredt4 clay. with low to moderateertity; mI Ltlolc e grewingperiod. with reliableeosete P2 910(11 MoediumalltItde plae with mainlysandy sillos; bort TI (21-24C) 5U1(r)(68-16 da".) Aeeole growingperieds with reliable onecte; savors tactee Cambshessicriesai, Infoetation Wortgole MAn FPorrolsalo/Acis.lO RS 114 (23d) M .edialtitude flat lacuetrineplain. witheslely TR (21-24°C) SUA(r) (0 g19days) SolOneta , luvial clays.*salie sad hardpn soils,short Arenoeel./Leviale growingpaeriod with rellabloonsets; severely Camblolo/Acriole lnestedby teetee Oleysole,Plaeexlo oad Lithools Q4 114 ( NMedium altltude riertlne floodplai with yousng, t (21-240C) SUI8(r)(98-196 day) Flewlseole fOrtilo atllvialsolil; short growing peri with o reliableonset, strong ymodIitod * by floode*Irogime mISC. WITS 841 (03) Areastoo steep andtoo rocky for agrlcultere/lahoa Nat detInd Not deoIfid N.A. . P TOTAL606e6 (1663) --o WI ( I RESCUS OF AMAEA REGION MOISTtIREREGIMAE AE2 EXTENT DESCRItION HERMAL Unit ( be) RE41M1E (lengthof growing period(s) MAINMAJOI SOIL UITS (an. doIlytamp) -393 probabilIty) (FAOUESCO1974) P4 390 (145) Msedim altitude pl&Inq with hetorog.o.uo sells; usdium Ta (21-24°C) SU4(m) grsoingperlods (120-160 daye) Adenowolm/Luvioolo with unreliable o"oto Su3 (12-160 days) V*rtlools CaebIsol.IAcrisols OlysolaJPfuvisol e Forrilools W1 564 (86) HIghI altitude tregly dissectd to billy plsteoun To (16-29C) SC?(210-30 dave) Farralools end Lithouooi with melisy clyaO *t low I.rtilitn long, oft.. con- tiuow"egroinga periods Luwkols 12 (4) 114 HOlogaltitude stronly diecto billy plateau Ts (16-2PC) S36 (130-226days) with m1eily claysof FerralsoleNd NlHt.ols/ low to medium fertilityl lon Arie*oi greeog periods witA rellablo nsetse W3 641 (111) Mediumaltitude plains sad plateaus.oft.. disseteed. T2 (21.242C) $S1 (129-169days) Ar eoel/Luvlsole coweted by sends adN Iow with. lew rtilitYlsodium ad growingperiods with unreliablooo"t 34 039 (883) Mediumaltitude and pIulas piote"a coveted by Clare Tl (I1-24C) SCt (219309days) Ferraleols LIthaols with leo fertlity1 long, ot.. coatmou growing nd girowingperiod. Luviv el TOTAL2,64 (1365) j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0 0F *oi I. LAND RESOURCES OF KIGOMA REGION MOISTUREREUGIME All EXTENT OESCRIPTIOlN TLEM" REIME (lengthof growing Period(*) MAINMAJO SOILUWTS unit (an0 ha) (uss daily tamp) -MS probabIlIty) (FAOIESCO1P14) nPS 71 (213) dU"mlaltitde4 plains with mainlysandy pleand"il TS (21-24C) SU6(150-160 days) Aroneso eol/Lutve.l sad cleysybetteealnd sells; Ndium growig Peris"od f.rrsiolajAorlsols with reliableone.,.; everely Infested by tsetse Cl-onzlelflw viaol Vertloleo P0 00 (17) Medim altide plainsand .lateeuu with mainty sandy TS (21-240C) SM6 (100-226days) Are.oolo/Lavslole sod iamy seilsof low fertility;sedium growiag f.errisols/Acriol rrieda with reliable neset.sverely lsfested t olo a Pit 561(153) Mdium altit"de,flat lowlaadplains w eeaelly-ith TS (21-240C) SUS (10-180 days) Vertloolasad ity"oso/ or permeetly waterlogsdclayse medium grolin Flav ob periodetreagly, altered by f leodiosso; eely isfested by teetee R1 15 (5U) Mediumatitde, fist riftdepreslse with malely media 1s (21-2°C) SM4 (180I2Sdais) SI,ncheksISolo*1 soills;medium greovIng periods with reliableonsets US4 (100270days) Ferrasolae/Acriseol Aad AosoleLvsola 32 1,146 (813) Hi1ghaltitudle etreOblly dissected to billyplatoons To (15-20C) SUE (100225days Ferreleolsand Nitmools with any 17 of too to mediumfertillty; long Acrisois growingperiod. with reliaebleeasete 31 111 (g8) medium altitdo plain eod piateoum often dIsseted TS (21-Z4°C) SUS (120-150days) Aron..ola/Lawleele moered by sands eNd lomomsith low fetility mdim sa Ferraisois growlg W eds with wareliableone0ts ad Lltb.elof 34 X4 (23) 1 1Mea lttud tlissad plalteas cowered by cloys tS (21-24 C) SC? (210-5e days) forresolo ith low fertility; Ieee, ofte ceotinoot gprowing Luvisole growing peiod To (1S-WC) S5118(150-210 days) Forraieols/Acrelols U 111 (53) HighU 111loamy altitudemails of plains low fe1tility6and plateau.medium covered growing by sandyper sad (SH6) (36-270 days) AreroeoiejLuvieole roe preeAedoeo with "relible loebl eofnsefotsodsto ltlOI Camblolol/Acrisoli MITS.) 11C Ares to step snd oo rocky for egricultere/lsnee Nt d1f1I0d Met deotfIWd N.A. * TOTAL5,044 (1SM 0) * t'.. 4 0 -J m3tl LAI RMESCES OFEKILI AJAORE iN iOISTNE REGIME AEU EXTENT OESCRIPTIAN THERMALREGIME (1ength of growing period(s) MAINAVAlI SOtILWIT unit (w (a na)daily tmp) - probability) (FAOIESCO1814) El 47t (3I) Mdium altitudeplaino; growing period too hort and T2 (21-24°C) Stl2 (60-16days) X t@5@l5/Lwl ol5 uarellable for eolnfed agriculturo E2 285 (2) edu altitudeplain. wIth somehill rernge*; mainly T2 (21-140C) SU2(60-J6 days) X resols/Lavsolo meium-toeut,rdsells with low to moderatefertilIty; gresiag pertod short and"wumlable £8 0 (61) Floodplalseverely afttecked by ealialty TI-T2(21-270C) SUl (lassthan as days) Solonchak/Soloanots and Verticals E12 1109(88 Tropical hi 1ehos.d with billy metatl pteaus. Ta (16-200C) SCs (I1-36 days) NItesol.sfActiols milely clayey s11s w.itbmderate fertility; modium growligperiods with mre Ilabla-enat dateo N4 262 (1) Volcanicmontain withprdoentmiatly fertkleclays T2-T4(1*24C) SHI (6169 days) Nitosols aN ltHitesole derivedfrom volcanic edimtat and lava.; grooIng SC (I-330 days) periods aovorWd by attitudean oeste by eperosee to rlbearlag wInds aNd ralashadaweffect. N3 4 (d) Iium altitudevolcenie plateu with fortIle volcanic T2 (21-24°C) SU (loe than 69 days) Cborneoz~, Vortiolo. ash s"llo abort or very abort growing period with SU2 (60 - 76 days) Lithosole/Audosolsand unrelilable enoeat LlthosolSIRgoosolC MISC. UNIT 110 (OM Areas to stoop aWd" oecigy for agticulturs/laee Not def Ined Not detined N.A. TOTAL1 *325 (16) ti >i id 0) H zD V A S A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a 0 Cr 4 LAUJ RESORCES OF LIbNJRECION MOISTUIRERECIMiE AEl EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMALRE4IME (Iengthof growing period(s) MAIN MAJORSOIL UITS unit (NW bs) (Soan del y beep) -001 probaility) (FAO/UNESCO19t4) Ci 1.180 (10 Coastal loloends, Isanly plolno with preduminantly TI (24-270C) SMI(a) (90-136 days) Arenoosis/Luvisola sandy soils;on shortand unrollable growing peleod Cs i3s (65) Coastal lowlens, mainly stronolydissected plains asd tl (24-27°C) SMI(U) (90-136days) Forralsols/Acrlsols platmeun; em shortand untoliable growingperiod Lltboaolo/R.gos.lo and Vertlsoli C4 So (1) Coastal floodpaine with f let topographyand rich Ti (24-270C) DM3 (90-129 days 39-60 days Fluvisole young*llv,iul soils;growing perlod mainly or SMI(u) (90-136 days) dotormlmdby Iloodingregime Cs 152 (25) Old alluvilo torrae o l"ept floodedfrom rivers Ti (24-27°C) SMI(u)(90-136 days) Arenosols/LLulsols with serelly s*dy soils; oe abort ed unreliable Arsools NWdVrtleole growing period; strongly lntestedby tesoos 13 1,510(238) Troplcal lowload mainlyplines ithb strongly TI (24-21C) DM3 (90-129dsys'M-69 days Ferraleole, AcrIsole wethered soils J low fortility; one beor%and SU3(u) (90-106 days) Cabieoloawd Luvisols unreliable growing period; strongly infeoted SMI(u) (9-131 days) by t"te Es 694 (95) Tropicallowlends, minly withsolls of variable TI (24-21?C) SM4 (16U-180 days) Forolsole, Aronois/ we"theredeel Is o low fertility;one sodiumsod Luv"ols, Combisool/ rollablo growingperiod; sevreolyIntofstd by tetse, Acrisol3 and Areoo_ol S1 792 (12) Low altitudeplaine un plato.euucovered by saody TI (24-27°C) SMI(*)(90-136 days) Aronosols/Luvisols soilsof loefortilityl shortand nrelilable growing perodsa severelyif"Wd by testes 52 I,OI0 (285 Low altituleplaIn. and plateaus coveredby sandy TS-TS (21-21C) SM4 (160-190 days) ArenoeOlOeLuvlsel soilsof lowfertility; with meduinand reliable (SIU)(168-210 days) oweing poeriods;seorely infestedby tastes MISC. UIll 0 (15) Areos too steepand too rocky for sgricult&re/lnkes Not dofIned Not doftind N.A. TOMAL0,04 (156), * - 03 tD[ :3 0 LAND RESOURCESOF MARAREGION MOISTUREREGIME MAINMAJOR SOIL UNITS AEU EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (length of growing petiod(s) Unit (0 ha) (eoon daily temp) -60X probabilitty) (FAO/UNESCO1974) Ni B7 (41) Mediumattitud volcanicplateau with fertilevolcanic 12 (21-24°C SU2 (66-76days) Chernotemsand Andoeols ash solls; shortgrowing periods with unrollabloonsets (T3)(16-29°C) SUS(u)(9W-10O days) days) PhaoloOm, Vortisols Ns 6o8 (21) High altitude,dissectd to hilly volcanicplateau with T3 (16-20C) SH3(u)(90-106 with fertilevolconic ash soils;short growing periods (T2)(21-24°C) end Soloneti with unreliableonsets 0 Solonetiand Vertisoli N9 239 (111) Mediumaltitude volcanic plateau covered by *odic T2 (21-24C) SH13(u)(90-106 days) volcentiash soils;growing periods with unreliable (13)(l6-20 C) onsets;severely Infested by teetes Nil 66 (38) High lItitudeplateau with predominantlyclsyey soils T3 (16-20°C) SCO (188-380days) Luvisols/Acrisols of low to modaratefertility; long, often continuous Nitosols/Acrlsolssnd growing periodswith unreliableonesets Frralsols 0 Planosoet/Solonets PO 1,011(4U11) Mediumaltitude plains with mainly hardpan soils and 12 (21-24C) SU3(u)(90-1O days) moderatefertility; short growing potiods Vertisols cIOn of Cambisols/Acrisolsand wih unrellableonset. Arenosol5/Luvisols MSIC. UNITS 198 (0X) Areastoo steepsnd too rocky for agriculture/lakes Not defined Not defined N.A. TOTAL2,170 (ISM1 0IC tt IF Hn '-9WtIll z slim H Z o4 H' LAND RESOURCESOF UBEYA REGION UO0ST1URERECIUf_ _ AEZ EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIUE (length of growing period(s) MAIJ MAJORSOIL UNITS Unit (we ha) (mean daily t*mp) -80% probability) (FAO/UNESCO1974) Ell 60 (II) Complex,medium depressionwith mainly sandy soils T1-12(21-27°C) SH3 (160-210days) Arenosots(Luvesols) of low fertility;sodium, reliablegrowing period HlI 80 (1%) Lou altitudelacustrine alluvial plains with fertile, TI (24-270C) SCO (240-3BOdays) Fluvisols 6edium to heavy texturedsoils; long,ofton continuous growing periods NS 884 (11%) Volcanichighland with platesu.and stronglydissected T3 (16-280C) SH6 (180-279 days) Andosolsond Nitosols/ landforescovered by volcanicash soils; long,often SC8 (240-386 days) Acrisols continuousgrowing periods P2 892 (SX) Medium altitudeplain. with mainly sandy soils; short T2 (21-240C) SU3(r) (90-106days) Arenosois/Luvisols rowing periods with reliableonsets; severe teote Caombiools/Acrisols Intoestation Vertisol and Ferralsoli/cerlsole Pa 1,320 (221) Medium altitudeplains with mainly sandy soils;medium 12 (21-24°C) SU4(r) (126-166days) Arenosols/Lavieole growtng periods with reliable oasets; oeverely Infested Ce blaois/Atrisols by tsetse ForralsolsIAcrosole Ol.ysols/Fluvisols endVortisols PS 1,188 (2SX) Medium altitudeplains with mainly sandy upland eolle 12 (21-24°C) SUS (166-180days) Arenosols/Luvisola and claq y bottoolandsoils; medium growing pertods Ferralsol.fAcrlsols with reliableonsets; severelyInfested by tsete, ¢leysole/Fluvisole Vertisol PS 121 (21) Medium altitudeplains and plateruxwith masnly seandy T2 (21-240C) S£6 (189-226 days) Arenosols/Luvisols end loa*y eoels of low fertility;medium growing periods Ferr.lole/Actisols with r liableoneota; soevrelyInfested by tetae Arenosolsend LithosolasRegosols RI 422 (11) Mediu altitude,flat rift depressionwith mainly T2 (21-240C) SM4 (160-180 days) Solonchak/Solon.ts *odic soils;medium growIngperiods with reliable SH6 (189-270 days) FrratlsolJ/Acrisole onsets Arenosols/Luvisols and Arenosola N2 408 (0) Medium altitedeflat lacustrin.plains with mainly 12 (21-24°C) SW4(r) (120-160days) fluvisols,Soloncbek/ siluvisiclaya, saline and herdpan soils;medium Solonots growing periods with reliableonsets Planosole/Solonsts and Lithosols/Regosole Ns 241 (42) Medium altitud.flat lacustrineplanos lth maInly T2 (21-249C) SUW(r) (90-106 days) Solonchak/Solonotc alluvial clays, saline and hardpansoils; short Areosols/Lowvisols rowing periods with reliable onsets; severely Ctmbisols/Acrisols infestod by toetes 4leysols o Planosols and Litbosole 0 U 181(38) High altitudeplains and plateauxcovored by sandy TS (16-2°C) SH3 (160-210days) Ferralsols/Acrtools.4 and loamysoils of low fertility; edium growing (SH6) (180-270days) Arenosolm/Luovsole t m periodswith roliable onsets Arooosolssand ri ox MISC0,615 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~Camblsols/Acrisols0 UNITS V64 (IIX) Areas toe sop and too rocky for agriculture/lak"e Not defined Not.defined N.A. 1 0TAL 8,03S (100) tAND RESOURCESOF MOROGOKOREGION MOISTURERECIME DEZ EXTENT DESCRIPTION THnERMALREGIME (lengthof growingperiod(s) MAIN MAJOR SOIL UNITS Unit (9Om ha) (mean daily temp) -89X probability) (FAO/UMESCO1974) Cl 71 (1I) Coastal lowlands,mainly with both sandy and clayey TI (24-21OC)- 03(99-129 dayst3g-69days) Arenosols(Luvisls) 6oil; short main growingperiod and very short snd Vertisols secondarygrowing period Cs 71 (Is) Old alluvialterraces no longerflooded from rivers TI (24-270 C) SMI(u) (90-136days) Arensols/Luvisols with generallysandy soils; one short and unreliable Arenosols growing periods;severely infested by tsetse and Vert.sols E2 212 (3X) Medium altitudeplains with some hill ranges;mainly T2 (21-240C) SU2 (60-75days) Xerosols/Luvisols medium-texturedsoils with low to moderatefertility; growing period short and unreliable E3 141 (23) Tropical lowlands,mainly plains with strongly ti (24-270C) OM3 (90-120days*30-60 days) Ferralsols,Acrisols weatheredsoils of low fertility;one short and unroli- SU3(u) (90-106days) Cambisols able growing period;strongly infested by tsetse SUI(u) (90-136days) and Luvisols E4 999 (141) Tropical lowlands,mainly plains with predominantlyfir- ti (24-276C) SN2 (120-196 days) Forralsolsand Luvisols/ bls clays of low to moderatefertility; one medium but Acrisols unreliablegrowing period;severely tnfested by tste.J El 1,180 (163) Medium sItitude plains with predominantly friabl,clays T2 (21-240C) SH3 (160-210 days) Fluvlsols/Acrisols of low to moderatefertility; one medium sd reliable (SH6) (100-270 days) and ferraleols growing period; "sverly inftnted by taote, E9 686 (8S) Low altitude,flat alluvial plain. with predominantly ts (24-27c) SW2 (120-2tO days) Flutvisoi fertilo clays; medium growingperiod strongly snfluenced by rainfallpending and runoff collection; severelyinftsted by teetee E10 777 (11#) Low altituda,flat alluvialplin with predominantly Tl (24-27°C) S144-SH6(160-271 days) Fluvlsols fOrtileclay.; growing period mainly deteramned by flooding regim E14 424 (OX) Tropical bighlodsa, dissectedmountain platoeu. with T3 (15-200C) SC2(150-240 days) Nitosols/Acrisola footelop", mainly clayeysoils with lowto moderate fertility; mediumgrowing periods with unreliable onset dates;severely nlfeted by tetse, E1 212 (8X) tropicalhighlands, mountain plateau with footolopee, T2-TB(1-24°C) SH5 (180-270days) Nitolaol/Acrlaols mainlyclaysy soils of low to moderatefertility; long rowingperiods with reliableonset dates; severely afeetedby teats. "T 777 (113) Tropical,often strongly dissected, mountain plateaux T3 (16-26PC) S143(160-210 days) Nitosols/Acelsoleand coveredby clayswith low to moderatefertility; medium Lithosols/Rgosooln growingperiods with reliable onsets Si 212 (IX) Low altitudeplains and plateaux,covored by sandy Ti (24-27°C) Sl(u) (80-13Cdays) Aronosole/Luvisols 4 soilsof low fertility;abort and unreliablegrowing X l periods;severely infested by toetsee S2 2,472(20%) Low altitudaplains and plateaux,covered by sandy T1-72(21-270C) SM4 (160-180days) Arenosols/Luvisole soilsof low fertility;with medium and reliable (SH3)(160-21 days)o growingperiods; severely infested by tsots w z MISC o UNItS 71 (13) Areastoo steepand too rockyfor agriculture/lakes Not defined Not defined N.A. Y.1&, . SOI (trA% * . LANDRESOURCES Of MTWARARECION MOISTUREREGIME growing VAINMAJOR SOIL UNITS AEZ EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (Qongtb of period(s) probability) (FAO/UNESC01974) Unit (000 ha) (Motn daily teop) -U0t 0 Artnosols/Luvisols E2 636 (609) Coastal lowlands,mainly plaine With predoeinantly Tl (24-27C) SMI(u) (90-13Sdays) sandy solls; one short and unroliablegrowing period F*rrlasols,Arenoool./ ES 619 (495) Tropical lowlonds,oainly plains with soils of variable TI (24-270C) SM4 (166-10ldays) toxture but low fertility;one sodium and reliable Luvisols,Csmbiaols growing period; severelyinfested by tsets. Acrisolaand Aroosols MISC. UNITS 16 (IS) Areas too steep and too rocky for agricultur*/lakeo Not defined Not defined .A. TOTAL 1,671 (INS) .~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~*4 I-A.~ LANDRESOURCES OF MWANZAREGION MOISTUREREGIME MAtIMAJOR SOIL UNITS DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (lengthof growingperiod(s) AEa EXTENT tamp) -B05probability) (FA0/UNESCO1974) Unit (an ha) (meandaily 0 Ar.nosols/Lovisoie plainswith heterogeneous w0110; 12 (21-24C) SU4(u)(120-160 dsys) P4 1,161(093) Mediumaltitude SM3 (120-168 days) Yertisole mediumgrowing period *tth unreliableonsets Cabisols/Acr;sols CloycIl /Fluvi ole and fertelsots SMS3(u)(90-106 days) Plsaos.lsfSo1oneta Pe ?as (se%) Mediumsltitude pisnas *ith mainly hardpas soils and t2 (21-240C) perods Vertisols elayeof moderatefortility; short growing Comblaolo/Acrisols unreliableonset.s and ArenosolslLuvisols Not defined N.A. UNITS 79 (4) Areas too steep and too rockyfor agriculturellakes Not defined TOTAL1.969 (1691) 0cW ty r )3. LAM ESOURCESOF RUKM ECIO IMOISTUREREtIME AEI EXTENT DESCRIPINON THEMAL RtEGIME (length of growing period(s) MAIN MAJORSOIL UITS Unit (Oas be) (mesa delty UMP) -WI probabi IIty) (FAOJIUNSCO194) PS 1,236 (181) ldiumaltitude plsins with mainly sandy upland sells 12 (21-24°C) SUt (160-1l0 days) &rAnoso1o/LQvIs6ls nd clayey bottmland soils; mdium Growing periods Forralsols/Aceoloei sith rellablemeoUl severaly Infsted by tsetse Ct, 0FfViVS. V-rtleols PO 2,128 (3115) Midum altItude plains and tlst.es with mainly sandy 12 (21-24C) SMI (198-226 days) Ar.nosolo/Luvisols and loaoy oils of low fertility;medium growing period ForraleolfAcerisola wIth reliblteonstst sevwerely Intoed by toet. Arenoolso end LltbosolR.ogeols P13 216 (41) Mediuu altitude, flat looland plalns with soasonally 12 (21-24°C) SUl (16-1SW day,) Uortleole and or pernently waterlooedclays; medim Growing period Gley.ols/Fluvlsels strongly altered by flooding sevoerelyinfested by tsetee Al 1,09 (1816) Mdium altitude, flat rift deprtseio with mainly T2 (21-24°C) SM4 (160-140 days) Soloncblk/Solonott *odic se1ls;mdl_u prowing periods with reliable SW (10-270 days) forral.els/Acriel*o onoete andArstnosole/Luvisols Aronosols U 1,441 (211) High altitudeplaine and plateauscovered by sandy and 18 (16-20C) 513 (160-210 days) Fertalsols/Acrlsols loamy soils of low fertility; medium growing period (SMH) (180-27t days) Arenosol*/Lvielole, with reliableonsets Arnosols and Csmbisolo/Acwieola MISC. UNITS 060 (I) Areas toe step and too rocky for agrlculture/lahee not detined Not detined N.A. TOTAL8.0,4 (11X) 06P so LANDRESOIRCES OF RUVUMA REGION MOISTUREREGIMlE DESCRIPTION THERMALRECIME (length of growing period(s) MAINMAJOR SOIL UNITS AEZ EXTENT (FAOOMESCO1974) unit (0 ha) (seen daily tomp) -5 probability) ES 637 (lIO) Tropical lowlansA, minlty plins with aoil* of variable TI (24-27°C) Sl4 (160-IOOdays) Forralgols texture but low fertility; one mediumand reliable Arenosola/Levisols growingperiod; severelyInfested by ts tee Cab;iols/Acrisols and Aronosole E7 2,865 (465) Mediumaltitude plain. with predominantlyfriable clays 72 (21-24°C) SH3(159-216 daya) Luvisols/Acrisols of lowto moderate fertility; one medim and reliable (1H5)(16-270 days) and Ferralsols growing period;severely tft"tedby toots. (Luvisols) ElI 8I16(61) Complex, mediumaltitude depresnion with mainlysandy T1-T2 (21-27°C) SNl (150-210 days) Areosole *olls of low fertility; mediu, rellble growing period iJ 1,665 (295) Tropical ountaineswith clayoy solls ot lowto moders- T3 (16-200C) SHS (160-276days) Witosols/Acrisolo fertility; long growingperiods with reliable onsets S2 764 (12S) Low altitwde plainsand plateu.,covored by sandy TI-T2(21-276C) SM4 (169-166dayc) Aremosolsl/visols soilsof low fertility;with mediu and relloble SH3 (160-216 days) growingperiods; svoerly Infestedby teotee MISC. UNITS 121 (21) Areas too step and too rocky for agriculture/lakes Not defined Hot defined M.A. TOtAL 6,867 (I15X) cr P0 0* . K LANDRESW RCES OF SHIlYANGAREGION MOISTUREREGIME period(*) MAINMAJOR SOIL WNTS11 DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (length of growing AEZ EXTENT daily tlmp) -8ax probability) (FAO/UNESCO1904) Unit (00 he) (seen SWI (lese that 09 days) Solochaks/Solonta s*d altitude lak filtswith s$ilno soil.; very T2 (21-240C) Ni 61 (1) Medium, SU2 (00-76days) Vlrtisols ehort to ahort growingperiods SUS(u) (90-196 days) (B0-7Sdays) Chernozeesand Andosols aIt.tudevolcanic plateou with fertile volcanic I2 (21-240C SU2 N? 355 (71) Medium C) Sua(u) (99-106) ash soils; short growingperiods with unrellblo (TS) (16-20 onsts T2 SH3(u) (90-106 days) Solonot: and Vertlsole N# 162 (31) Medium altitudevolcanic plateau cowered by *odic (21-240C volcanicash *oil.; short Stowing periodscith reliable (T3) (16-201C) onsets; severely Infestedby toots. soile; 12 (21-24°C) SU4(u) (120-150days) Arenosols/Levisole P4 964 (101) Medium altitudeplains with heterogenoous Vertisols with unretlablooenacts SUB (120-160days) modium growing periods Camblols/Aerlools OloysoisJFluvisols and Ferralsols T2 (21-24°C) SUS (16J-18 days) Arenosols/Luvisols PS 312 (18) Medium altitudeplains with mainly sandy uplandsols periods Frralrsol/Acrisoels and cleyoy bottoolond*olls; medium growing Wl,ysol/PFluV1sols with reliableonsets; severelyinfested by teetee Yertisols and of high for- I2 (21-24°C) SU3(u) (90-106days) Phasox.ms/Caubleols Pi 866 (71) Medium altitudeplans with mainlyclays Planosol/Solonota tility; ahort growing periodswith unreliableonsets I2 (21-24°C) SU3(u) (90-106day.) Planosol/Solonets Pe 2,030 (U4) ditumsititude plains with mainly hardpan*oell and growingperiods Vertigols clays and moderatefertility; short Caablsols/Acrieolsnd with untellableoenats Arsoosols/Luvisoli Vortisols lowlandplains with seasonally I2 (21-246C) SU3(u) (90-165days) P12 102 (21) Medium altitude,flat SU3(r) (00-106days) waterloggedor floodedclays; short growingperiods stronglyaltered by flooding and seasonally T2 (21-240C) SUS (160-180days) Vertisols PIS 15U (B1) "Mdium altitude,flat lowlandplains with Oleyaols/Fluvisols or permanontlywaterlogged clays-; modiuo rowing period by stronglyaltered by flooding;severely Infested 0 tsetse P MISC. Not defined Not defined N.A. UNITS 102 (21) Areas too stoep and too rocky for agriculturo/lakes TOTAL 6,070 (13SM) LANDRESOURCES OF SINIDA REGION (isiWth of growing period() AIN JOR SOIL UlNlS AE2 EXTENT DESCRIPTION THERMALREGIME (pas*" dai1y tamp) -803 probability) (FAOAWESCO1014) unit (on ha) SuI (lessthas a0 days) Solonzhak/Solomatas VW Medium altitudela&, flats with saline solls; very 12 (21-24C) N3 40 (13) SU2 (6-76 days) VYrtlio,s short to short Growlin periods SUS(u) (90-186 days) mainly sandy soils; short 12 (21-24°C) SU2 (W66 days) Ar.nosol/Luvisols, Pt 2447 (6) Medliu altitud, plains with Cambesols, Acrisols, growing periods and unreliable Lithosols/Roreaos and Phboe (21-24°C) SU3(r) (90-106 days) Arenosols/Luviso.l, Pt 2,06t (533) &edum altitudeplains with mainly sandysoils; short T2 severe tastes Cambisols/Acriaols, growing periodswith rellableonseta; Vortisolsend infestation F4rralsola/Acr1soI* Aroneale$/LuwIsols. plainswith matnly soils; medium T2 (21-24°C) SU4(r)(120-166 days) Ps 306 (61) ediumaltitude Cerltolj'Acrlsol: roatinperiods with rliable onsets;severly ForralsolstAclelool infxstd by tb ts Wleysols/Flavieols and Vortisol. T2 (21-24°C) SU3(r)(96-186 days) CamlsolsfAcrloole end P1e 601 (143) Medium altitud plains with mainly sandy of loamy Arenosol/Luvisole soilsof lee fertility,covered by densethicket; short growingperiods with reliableonsets and hardpen T2 (21-24°C) SU3(r)(90-106 days) Plsnoeols/Solonets Pit 197 (43) Medlum altitude flat depressionwith mainly Solonchat/Solonets and salInesoils shortgrowing period strongly alteredby floodins, runoff, salinity flat lowlandplains with Seasonally *2 (21-240C) SUW(w)(90-106 day) Vertisols P12 24? (l5) MeIum altitude (906-16days) waterloggedor looded clays; shortgrowing period SUI(c) strongly slteredby flooding MISC. Not defined N.A. UNITS 493 (13 Areas too steep and too ro.y for agriculturo/laoke Hot defined TOTAL4,934 (16) *1 '- ci Oit ci. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . . . LAND RESflICES OFTAO RGN MOISTUREREGIME AEZ EXTENT DESCRIPTION IHE3UL REGIME (loogth of growing poriod(a) MAINMAJOR SOIL uNtn Unit (3M ha) (massdl lIy temp) -11 probabiII ty) (FABJUIESCO1014) Pg 152 (23) Mdium altitudeplains with .inly sandy soils; short Ta (21-24°C) SiI(r) (9-186 disy) ArenoelscLwviole growingperiods wlt reliableonsets; savero toots. Combleolo/Acrieols Infestation Vrttseols Wa Ferralsol/sAcrleole PS 2,741 (#) Mediumsltitude plals wit; Laiaysandy soll; m1edium TS (21-240C) 5U4(r)(1M156 days) Aren_olo/Luvisols, growing periodswith reliableoneset.; sverely nfested Cabliol,.AcriSolo by toot"e F.rraliole/Acrieols O'leysolsfe/Fvbsale and Vetlsale PS 2,316 (373) Mediumaltitude plains with mainly seny upland 0o11 TS (21-240C) SUS (II-8W days) Aranool/Luvbole :ad cloyedbottlad salle;modium groinog periods falolAcris ith reliable eosats;severely Infested by tsat" 0losole/Flwovisoa Vertisels PT S6O (43) ediu litlud plainswith maily cle" of hlob for- TS (21-240C) 515(u)(IU-3 days) rb"aoxems/Cambi"Issod tility; ebort growingprtiods with Soreiiableones Planosols/Solo"ts Pe 76 (1U) Me alttude plains with mainly hardpa sails Vad TS (21-240C) P(s) (U-IM days) Plsmosois/Solonets claysof moder*tefeirtility; ehert growiag periods VortiaslO waroliebleonsetsa Cambialsl/Acrisolsand with Aremosele/Levisola Pil 16 (2) Mediumaltitude plains with aolnly sand or loamy T (21-24°C) SU13(r) (WlGS day) Cebloole/Acriole and solse of low fertility, cowered by dense thicket; Aremsolo/LaWlsal* short growingperiods with rlliable emote P12 76 (1 Mdlu sltitwud flt lowlandplains with oeosoaslly TI (21-246C) SUS(u) (980-16 days) Vertisole waterloggedor looded clay; ehortgrowlng period SJ(r) (6- dy strengly altered by floodlia pig 014 (123) Mediumal1titude flat lo1wan PlaInswith seasoaly TI (21-24°C) SU5 (16-106 days) Vertisol an or p"emoatiy waterloogdclays; mediumgrowing period *ispeolo/Filoisole .tr..4lyaltered by floodlig;serely lifeted by misc uliTS 381 () Area too steep sod too rocky for agricultur*elllso mot defoInd Net defined LA. IOIAL1,616 (16s) I. F 10' zI 0 iake.SMCES F YmCAnEaim MOIST ItEEEIME LEE EXNT DESCRIPTION THEMALREGIME (lew*th of growing period(-) MAlI VAJ SOI WiS unit ( he) (mooI deity ta) -0 probebi Ity) (FAOIWESCO1974) Cs 420 (1. Coast-al lowlands, "lopy plains with both sendy and TI (24-21nC) 0 (0-12a deye*eJ daey) Arencole (L iois) clayey sell; short maimg;roi period NW Very short Nod rtseol secondarygrowzl period C4 59 (25 .tl fle.dpleai with flat topoegrhy and rich Yong Ta (24-27C) *1ls (90-1l dayepm4-0 doYs) FitAvlel lovial **cllosgroiong poniod salaly d.t.lsod by or Silt(s) (0-136 days) leodies tregis £1 00W (13) M(ed)umolStItds pla1in. grewalg pelod toe sbort end T (1-*4°C) SW (00-76 days) Xero.oltjwLlsolo "erolebt- far related .rlrclt.ro Ea 454 (175) Mdim sititadb plate wthol somebill ranges; s9ol1y TS (i-243C) SU2 ("-Is d"e) Xereols/Luvleolo mdlsm-tewturod sells with Im to moderate,fortlifty growing pot od shot sod wareliable El so? (a 'Tropicel lewleeds solety plat1. with stroN9ly TS (24-SI°C) Gll (O9S1-: days*il-Go dais) forterlole, Acforols weaterd ol. ;I Sowfertlityl see short and SW(*) (-105 doye) Cabisoles, nWL1sole wnrelable growing portled stroegly In#0to Sil(s) (0-135 daye) b teetee Es 00 (85 Tropical lowlnds, moiey plt.. with friable elsys TI (24-270C) ml (120-185 daye76-00 days) Ferrelsolo NW of Io. to moderatefertiolty; too short grewags S 1" X ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t&Pariod. Luvisotetcelll/A Aorleeto o tool s11r El 1in (4) Tropical blhblsedb witb blilly essatte p1ate0,aluossJctlsol is (a-us) S IIU- dy) soly" daisy soils with moderate friity; mdles gretalg periods with sereliabie emet dat" 11 U (25 Tropical hih leebs, eso"66imesu with solely alaym To (16-2MAC) SC (1 daly) Mltoe1o/haeiol, sellso ith low to *doretefertilitys bag, Ott" coetimeasegrowing peIods UNITS 213 (0) Aros t. *seep an 6o rocky for grielmitasr'/llaee Not dl teed Met de teed.. TOTAL3,610 (I") 0 '1 _ . F-. Working Paper No.l Appendix 1 Figure 1 LAND RESOURCESOF ARUSHAREGION )\ ~~~(1: 2 Million) \ "s r 3 s ~Volcanic cones Scarps (rocky steep areas) 2 N Ns .. X2 / N 2 4 NS IJ38~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -_ V j~ E2 1 _ s '_>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~E3 2 I .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . _ Workin ae j. ARpendix 1j LANDRESOURCES OF COAST AND DAU ES SALAA4 REGIONS Figure 2 (Scale 1:2 million) Scarps . R ES SALAAM '~C Working PaPer No.1 Appendix 1 Figure 3 LANDRESOURCES OF DODOMAREGION (1:2 million) PI 1i)_ Scarps _ _ _ J^ _ b e, CS*t'-KfEl % {'L. . I Working Paper No.1 ",qD RESOURCESOF IRINGA REGION Appendix 1 (2million) fgr _ ~~~~3 > < ~~~~~~~~Scarps ZP2 /s~P C ,, ~~ HI~ ~ ~ e:>,s '6 } . g y~E rn * ? 3~~~~~~~~~~*;A IV Pi Working Paper No.1 Appendix 1 Figure 5 LAND RESOURCES OF KAGERA REGION (1:2 million) t . , ,., . ~~~~Victoria WiW 4-, W3~~~~~~' >' ";~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ X.I . .01~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I* 11 't .. , ,,*'1 * . .t* _ __ : . Working Paper No.1. Appendix 1 Figure 6 LANDRESOURCES OF KIGOMAREGION (1:2 million) PfS Sarps A7 .P5,0d PS ffi (P6.r. 9-t. qPG W e \W(f~~P Working Paper No. Appendix 1 7 REr,ION Fisure LAND RESOURCESOF KTLtSJANjARO (1:2 million) volcanic cones Lake . t~~~~Saps Working Paper No.l Appendix I Figure 8 LANDRESOURCES OF LINDI REGION (1:2 million) '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Si El E Working Paper No.1 Appendix 1 Figure 9 LAND RESOURCESOF MARAREGION (1:2 million) i/, cv r ° I As S I~~~~~~~~~~P A n .4ew~~~~~~~~~M carps ;~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~rNp#1 tWorICing Paper ?Io.1 Appendix 1 -Figure 10 LtAD $UPORECtS OF MBEVAREGTON (1:2 mailli0n) >.~~~~~P 4 , - ^ * . e .** - R 2 --- XLL Scarps + r~H4' * .. -F j'- :_ Working Paper No.1 APpendix 1 Figure 11 LAND RESOURCES OF MOROGOROREGION (1:2 million) Scarps E7~~~~~~H t m * j I v v M~< H772 . . .. _Z; 4 l; S2 1~S Working Paper No.1 Appendix 1 Figure 12 LANDRESOURCES OFi VWARAREGION (1:2 million) g . " < t 7 Xt \ C2 r E5^I I \A ,,R, t.~~~ . . Isb \ .,. " ~~~~~~~Scarps Working Paper No.l Appendix i Figure 13 LAND RESOURCESOF HIWANZAREGION (1:2 million) Lake Victeoria P4 -. , L7ZPWSA. '. e ',,:. I WorkiLng Paer No. * hopenadlx1 Figure 14 L.ANDRESOUJRCES OF RUKWAREGTON (1:2 million) uLzlkP -sea\rps .' i \ ,.~~~~~~~~~~~~1 Pe __~~~R X " r1 r r~~~~~~~~~~P * \ *_ P5~~~~ -s YKA. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ti Working Paper No.1 1 Appendix Figure 15 REGION OF RUVUM.MA RESOURCES LAND (1:2 million) - .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0. * jx~SaRps;Va Working Paper No.1 1 REGION FAendix LAND RESOURCESOF SHINYANGA 1 (,2' mlin co 4'~~~~~~~~t 0.@ X '' t-X>' E , ILb 'Z;S 96~~~~~~ Working Paper No.1 Appendix 1 LAND RESOURCESOF SINGIDA REGION Figure 17 (1:2 million) _ Scarps P2 >3eD ~~F2| w P10 ^~~P1 a ~~2d PIO~~~~~~~~~ .. ,, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- Working Paper No.1 LAND RESOURCESOF TABORAREGION Figured a (1:2 million)Fire1 P7 P13-13p P6 P P3 Scarps 'Working Paper No.1 Appendix _1 Figure 19 LAND RESOURCESOF TANGAREGION (1:2 million) .00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,A ...... WVOD tl"o a 0 - o of-P I 3 a -. so a a a me. a. 3m is1 4 t a..... -~04 t 011.00.o60 a6*51 0 to609.S 0.4S 6. * .0006 0 60. * 04 *. 00 a 0.-* 001.0, ai 0121a 91. -. 006.5. 15 .0- .IA sa t seseve a.o ". 0 e * 6.0 3 060es - Is 10.to 0 * 4. * 46 - 1. 5.30 063a 6.0 - 06.8 - * No --- ''*no - . * s06 6...33e it. 0S.5660 * 1 11 t9 .1 , * 1406.6I0s 0 3 0.0 * -. 664. 6.3 as0 - 0. -0. 04.0a -. 0- 30 - - 0 911 * -. 0. "- Liodl 034630 a 055.04 St I935 - 10 2.116Is0 * .30 40.3 1.10.4106 3.30 006. - 1no- - * - M0 * . M. &.0 11.04 110.14a9040to30. s I 0de0 0 1340 0100we 00 14 6.1 A, . 0461 * 0 3.a. I 3no - - - Mo * *No us0.. *. to1S S. D85 06to36 304 60.a .06 390 1 - 6 4.6n9 04.0 as . 0-0. 33.0 as S 6. 0 0 4.3 -. 048 03 960 - 0 0.at .4 0.04- . e. es.e 33S3...I.i. 3.0 68 o 4a 9I5 s 51a so go6 0.A08 00 f4at0. - 0W * 11.6 ora P C ?.0 3. 1 0 1. 040 3. a0.50..00. 3 a e's. 01. 13.43 - 0.00,6~%VI16 a 14aWae0046.- 0003SaWSGL -0- 668 0.0 0- 9.6- 06Wa * no no - so5.? t.0M 0 0 1 s Sto3 006 5 t0a9 so0 de 6- 0a601- 00.3- 909IO460 0.- 0.0- 663 - we0 on30 to PA" 00 0.1 NO000 804 "S6 61.54 Of. 3333G 0 0 3 - 6043. "S5 - asO Is.0 aO, - 60 0. We016.5 063 10 04S 0 053 58 043. 0. .4 03S "S 01-We 90.03 so6I000 *1a0so0d6a 06I1003I 1 0 1.0 - 800a 40 Ma- 4. 1.2a0 01 4 0-151 01.6A 01 0a 06o 0.3031. 0.a 006 to3010 Sklo- 3o. 8.0a1064 01 303to0 0et0I 300 S a660- M100.666.34 - is.03I.a6IS - 5130.4a, 6640 - 0 - - - 3M OW& - 0.0. .060 941050.00oIa4s 01 10. b0. Os a to 31.6 - 105 a. $50 gwe * a. 33. t3. a 1 0 . 00 - . . so3 IWN" - .3 .193.go 0 .1 ,306a 65, 'si' 11 I5 a. Is. a 30 00003OD 0.0 0004180 I aS 111 064. to0o00 0.0.00 o * 3OD leo. - ~~~~a00so316so- 0010.60 n4 - 0.1 1.066s0- 139- 01.0- 93 or0a 0.0- 01.6 - 0 0 00 0. 00 00. * 036. j/ TheogpotentiaI. do not take into account follow land reprl eeeto (appt icaebi for matte and sheat). These asoeesaofiteproide oea. potential mikfo ingle crop*rogardlea of present land wase. Valtoes premwentd In this Table I do no11* Into account any lanid occupied by ational Pak aaReserves or ForestReservea. lIIl.ivdtarv ,'I altas fit t3e ditti{rt-l: lEghVI4SVM l(,USIV ZU1t( d t ii t,tt . .:,au,gsta.a U.,.. .1 .* e, s IU2tE ktPuit I wAtu lenio Lou lPPts lot Inputs HtighInputs Lowltofts flit. 114.uIs Lu, tnputs lot Irnuts RIh Inputs VS S U5 NS iS S Ns S VS 5 Ns5 a S 5 As VS S Ns us VS S NSI VS 5S B VS S s a iush - 3.2 s9909 0o 34 5.690.S 0.4 21 36933 - 0.4 - 9.6 0 4 996 0 6 1.9975 1.91.9962 - .0.90,.2 cant - 5.430.7829 - 6.311.616.1 - 11.310070 - 44 - 956 - 4.4 - 9s6 - - -0oo0 - - -100.0 - - -100.0 o01 e Slu - 4.4 9.3) 6 3 - 5.2 12.102.1 - .9 6.0 88. - s I - 94 9 -S - 94.9 - - -100.0 - - - 10.0 - -100.0 kon - 2.4 5 92 2 3 0.s 2.4 41 92.3 - 2 0 4.79 - .0.4. 9e.s I I . s - - - loo.0 - - - 00.0 - - -OA. Irloap 0.4180820s 60.3 47193165595 3.1 9.4 7.1808 - 0. 0.4 99.2 - 06 0.3991 0.8 10 91 79.3 3.7 10.4 8.7 17.2 3.0 6.1 3.79 .2 gS - 7.223.769.3 - 17.918 064.1 - 3.4 9.5 79.1 - 6.0 6.367.7 12 6.086w - - 1oo0 - - 100.0 - - --00.0 lio - 17.8 11.211 e0 a 421.6 7.340.1 0. 14.43 0. 7.5 3.0 14.302 1 4 1 12.9830 0 4 2 99 4 -0.4 0299.4 - 0.3 0.199.6 IilalsJare 3.9 s.0 S.5 87 6 1.9 5 4 5.7 87.0 0.6 2.3 2.5 94.6 - - - 100.0 - - 3000 09 2.3 2.0 94 8 1.1 3.3 2.0 93.6 o.s 1.1 .9 97.5 Lo.1n S.l e 09 9 9 - 6.6 id.1 75.3 -7.6 11.361.3 2.7 - 97 - 27 - 973 - - -0o 0 - - - 100. - - -1 0.0 abt - 1.8 4 6 93 0.2 2.2 4.6 93.0 0.3 1.7 3 6 94.2 - 6.9 - 93.4 6 9 - 911 - - -00 - - -300.0 - - - 10.0 lbep 0.9 15.212.571 1.616 *416.666.4 2 0 13 211.4 75.4 - 2 12.384.5 -. 811.8 83 4 0 5 2.3 3.0 9 2 o.s 2.2 3.1 94.2 0.3 1.4 2.1 16.2 1rot" -o 30.6 17.9 13.3 0.7 IS.0 17.6 46.5 0.9 9.6 10.9 76.4 - 3.4 5.3 91.3 - 3 9 S.660 5 0 2 0 2 99.6 0.1 0.2 0o 99.6 - 0.3 0.3 99.8 MRm - 1t3. 2.176.0 -4.3 21.166.6 - 13.338.36 .(4 2.0 - 980 - 20 - ':09 - - 100.0 - - - 300.0 - - -100.0 son - 3. 122 s 1.6 0.7 19.3 14.06S.2 3.3 16.0 11.369.4 32.920.5 66.6 20 3 16 8 61.9 - - 100.0 - - - 300.0 - - - ioo.o bkss - 23.3 5.3 7t.4 0.3 22.9 20.7 56.1 0.6 19.8 19 4 64.2 - 3.3 36.680.3 - 4 4 14.0 81 6 - 3.2 1.6 95.0 - 3.2 18 95.0 - 2.6 1.1 96.3 un - 16.9 22.6 66.5 0.7 23.737.4 38.2 2.3 13.110.6 76.0 - 2.2 3.4 94.4 33 2.3 944 - 0.8 068 4 0.4 0.4 0.8 08.4 - - - 100.0 Shiosip - 7.2 73 BS.5S 7 6 9.2 82.9 7.6 86836 - 8 91 92.1l7.5 .59l0 - - too0 - - - 100.0 - - - 100.0 Slgdap - o.s 5 8 93.7 - 0 6 5.6 93.6 - 0.6 3.6 95. - 1.6 0.9 97. - 1 6 1.0 91.4 - - - 100.0 - - - 10.0 - - - 100.0 tabora - 11.9 7.41107 0.? 11.9 It 6 15.8 1.4 11.2 8.1 79.3 - 3.715 81 3 5.9 14.6 79.5 - 300.0 - - 000 - - - 100e0 lange - 3.8 12.176.5 - S.0 19.6 1S.4 6.l 7.3 84.6 - 2.2 - 978 - 22 - 91.8 - 0.3 0.5 99.2 - 0.4 0.599.1 - - 0.2 99.0 ------ t?ewepotentials de Mt takeInto asal (alIo landreuirsts applicablefor ai2eand ieuti the aamt providesgross potentials only for single crop regardlespesent land use Valuespresetd in this table 2 escida lay I area,ouied bq MlWomlMrs ad GooA£rA P 1;' cr ' 940' 0* 'V4 o-t.9 legion ~~~~~LowInpuls lot Inputs. HighInputs LowInpts lot Ikputs Lowl:tputs lot Inputst nigh lrinbs Vs SHSNSNs Vs SNs Is Vs NSKS Vs Ns8Ns Vs "S RsI Is SNits K VS SINS S VS S IS N Irusba - 3 1 590911 0 534 S4 96 0 42 7 3 492 5 - 04 99 b 03 - 999 0.6 1 897 6 - 36 896.48 - 0.9 0., 90.2 coant - 541t7073 9 -6.3 176161 - 13 10.0 78.1 44 -95 6 A4 956 - - too00 - - - 100.9 - - -3100.0 or es Salsaa 4.409 396 3 -5.212.7I92 -4.9 1 68088.3 SI -949 99 - 53 9. 1000 - 100.0 - - -108.0 Diodo" 24 5192 4 0524A -2.0 4.792,3 4 793.3 II 0.498 5 -II - 04985 100 0 - -00.0 - - - 100.0 Iringa 0.4 17.418.863 4 4 3I?715.4 62.4 3.0 0.7 6.262.1 -04 04992 06 03 991 0 810 0 6.1 811 3.49.4 917.1 - 2.9 5.6 31 08.4 Lagea - 6.6 223 71 -1 266167166.7 - 10.6 99 535S.71990 806 62 5488 4 - -Do00 - - -200.0 - - -3100.0 ligmna - 12278097804 0 2IS3 .'1.) 70. 0 310 3 8880 6 20 9198 9 2 b8489 0 04 0 2994 - 04 0.299.4 - 0.3 0.199.6 lilteasaro 1.0 31 4.1 918 2.0 3.3 4.391.4 0.4 1.1 1.8967I -1000 . 1000 0.5 1.4 1 4967 0 6 2 0 1.496.0 0.2 0.6 0.6 8.6 Usnd1 4.7I 82187.2 - 5.9 16.977.2 - 7.210.6862.2 2.5 -91 5 252 97 5 - 1000 - -00.0 - 100.0 lbra I184.9 93 4 0.2 2.2 46 93.0 0 31.7 3.894.2 6 9 -933 6 9 931 - 1000 - 100., - 100.0 hffea 01 132 11.9141 1.413 614 370.7 1.8117lI0 S6 0 2910.8 863 - 33105852 0 52 1 2)94 7 0 52I0 2094%.? 0.3 1.3 2.096.4 Norogoo - 107I158735 0.614 5173167.6 0.2 9 610.081.2 34 6.0 906b 3.9'095 1 0 2 02996 Utwara 031 02 0399".6 - 0.1 6.199.8 -10 812 277 0 -1 23726060.3 - 12.817 669 6 20 - 980 2 0 98 0 too100 - 1000 - -00.0 mmns I 523It673 2 0.6283 130961.3 1 317010 5 It.2 122019 6 tb4 19 lb0651 It -00 0 too-200- -00.0 bkua a3. 4 4925S -13.5 14672t6 12.1 122876 1 1.2 8 290 6 1 ' - o492 2 30 11953 - 30 1 795.3 -2.4 3.096.6 immaI 59 21.862 3 0.7 22.533.9 43.9 2 39.9 9,3716.7 -2.0 3.4 946 I13 2394 .0.8 6 0 898 4 0 40 4 0.898.4 - - -200.0 ahinyaga - 42 S.8900 4 6 7.58675 4)I6 188.3 . 13 5.2873I - a9a 4386 9 -00 0 - 100.0 - -00.0 Singlda - 05 580937 -0.6 5.693.8 - 0.6 36 95.9 I 16 0.997.5 126 3097 4 - -00.0 - 100.0 -00.011 Tabora 684.2896 0 0.46606.166?- -23 0 46.4 429 0 8.789 2 3 3 8488 2 - -00 0 - lope 100.0 - -00.0 3. 12.2842 .4818.716.5- 786.S851I I 2 2 - 978 2 2 -978 0 3 0 499.3 -0.3 049. - - 0.299.8 ------ iten potentialsdo !!R takeinto accountfallov laid requiremets(applicable (or salte anduftatl te messeseetprovides gross potentials only for single Cropsregardless preset landuse Vatuespreseted to this Table3 excludeamy land area occupied by Nationalfarlk. GMnReserve and F.Ores( lReserve Working Paper No. 2 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER ECONOMICSOF AGRICULTURALPRODUCTION Southern Africa Department AgricultureOperations Division Africa Regional Office Working Paper No. 2 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKING PAPER ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION Table of Contents Page No. I. EVOLUTION OF MARKETINGAND PRICING SYSTEMS...... 1 Marketing...... 1 Pricing...... 1 II. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS...... 5 III. EFFECT OF PRICES ON PRODUCTION...... 7 Main Assumptions...... 7 Maize Production...... 9 Rice and Wheat Production...... 19 IV. ASSESSMENT OF CHANGESAND CONCLUSIONS...... 22 TABLES 1. Nominal and Constant Prices of Food Crops 2. Maize and Paddy Prices in Premium and Non-PremiumRegions 3. Producer and Consumer Prices in Official and Informal Markets 4. Transport Cost by Road, Rail and Least Cost Option 5. Estimated Foreign Exchange and Specific ConversionFactors 6. Import Parity Prices of Maize 7. Estimated Regional Floor and Ceiling Prices for Maize Based on Import Parity 8. Export Parity Price of Maize in Year 2000 9. Export Parity Price of Maize to the Producer 10. Domestic Resource Cost of Maize 11. Maize Crop Budget, Improved Hand Cultivation - Ruvuma Region 12. Import Parity Prices of Paddy and Wheat 13. Import Parity Prices of Paddy and Wheat for Producers in Major Producing Regions 14. Domestic Resource Cost Calculationfor Paddy and Wheat 15. Estimated Floor Prices of Food Crops Under Different Assumptions 16. Floor Prices of Food Crops According to Varying Exckange Rates Workina Paper No. 2 FIGURES 1. Floor, Ceiling, and Import Parity Prices to Producers and Consumers in Different Regions According to Transport Cost 2. Variations in Producer and Consumer Prices in One Year and for a Grain Region Workingi Paler No. 2 Page 1 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER ECONOMICSOF AGRICULTURALPRODUCTION 1/ 1. EVOLUTIONOF MARKETING AND PRICING SYSTEMS Marketing 1. The primary characteristicof the Tanzanianmarketing system over the past 20 years has been repeated. Soon after independence(1964) private trade was suppressedand cooperativesbecame the main mrketing institution. Following the poor performanceof cooperatives,they were abolished in 1974, atadthe Marketing Boards/Authoritieswere strengthened. This reflectedthe Government'sdesire to control a range of economic functions,including crop marketing and processing. For a number of reasons the introductionof Marketing Authoritiesdid not improve the viability of the marketing system. The Governmentwas, then, forced to increasinglysubsidize their operations. In 1983, the Government,recognizing that it could not continue subsidizingat such a massive level, decided to reintroducecooperatives. 2. In 1984/85 the cooperativeunions were revived and given responsibility for crop procurement. With a few exceptions,the crop authoritiesreverted to their former status as marketing boards. However, these changes have not reduced the costs of agriculturalmarketing and need to be followed up with further refinementsto the marketing system. Pricing 3. Crop prices are establishedannually by the Governmentat three levels: i) producerprices, which are paid at the village level by cooperative societies. These prices are set with the aim of providing a minimum income to -he producer; 1/ This paper was prepared by Youssef Attig, Consultant. Working Paner No. 2 Page 2 ii) Wholesale prices, which cooperativessell the produce to official marketing institutions(NMC, TCMB,..). These prices are designed to cover all costs incurred by the cooperativesfrom collectionat the village level to delivery at the marketing institution'sstores. Collectioncosts sre annually negotiated between the Unions and the Marketing Boards and are reviewed by the Governmentbefore a decision is taken; and iii) Consumer Prices for domesticallyconsumed commodities,at which the produce is sold to official trading institutions,consumers, etc. These prices are determinedtaking into account political,social, financial and other factors (purchasingpower of consumers,deficit of marketing institutions,...). 4. Annual price fixing is conducted in several steps. The main institution involved in assessing and making price proposals at the different levels is the Marketing DevelopmentBureau (MDB) of the Ministry of Agricultureand Livestock Development (MALD). Based on its own market informationsystem, on publicationsof other institutionsand on discussionswith market participants,Government institutions, the Bank of Tanzania, etc, MDB calculatestentative prices at the producer and consumer levels for discussion within MALD. Final proposalsare thereaftersubmitted to the Inter- Ministerial Committee,comprising the principal secretariesof the ministries interestedin agriculturalprices. At this stage prices are consideredfrom their macro-economicand social aspects. The Committee then prepares a paper for submissionto the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. The Cabinet may meet several times before a decision is taken and may give MDB alternativeprices to assess their impact. 5. Official Producer Prices: The Government reviews producer prices every year. Over the past 10 years, the prices of food grains in current and constant terms have increasedas follows: Working Paper No. 2 Page 3 Table 1: Nominal and Constant Prices of Food Crops Nominal Prices Constant 1988189 prices Maize Paddy Wheat Maize Paddy Wheat (TShfkg) 1976177 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.27 16.59 19.91 1981/82 1.50 2.30 2.20 9.57 14.68 14.04 1986/87 6.30 9.60 7.20 10.47 15.96 11.97 1987188 8.20 14.40 9.00 10.26 18.01 11.26 1988/89 9.00 17.30 10.35 9.00 17.30 10.35 Annual increase (Percentage) 76/77-86/87 22.9 25.4 19.6 (2.3) (0.3) (4.9) 86187-87188 30.2 50.0 25.0 (2.0) 12.8 (1.9) 87/88-88189 9.8 20.1 15.0 (12.3) (5.8) (8.1) 6. The nominal prices of the main food grains were raised on average by 20- 252 per year between 1976/77 and 1986/87. However, in real terms, only the price of paddy has risen with the real prices of maize and wheat both declining. 7. Maize and paddy prices were pan-territorialuntil 1982183 when Government introducedprice differentiationfor some food crops between premium and non-premiumareas. Areas which are supposed to have a comparative advantage in the production of staple cereals (premiumareas) received higher prices than the other areas. In 1987188 the price differentiationfor paddy was abolished on the grounds that domestic supply is far below potential demand. 8. Regardingmaize production, the cooperativesin non-premium regions raised complaints against the system since producerswere either selling their produce to private traders or transportingit for sale in adjacent "premium areas'. Thus, cooperativeswere not able to acquire any maize locally for sale to consumers and were forced to buy it from outside the region at higher prices. This system was abolished also for maize in 1987/88 and pan- territorialprices were reintroduced. Official fixed prices in premium and non premium areas over the last five years were as follows: WorkiinaPaper No. 2 Page 4 Table 2: Maize and Paddy Prices in Premium and Non-PremiumRegions Premium areas I/ Non-premiumareas Maize Paddy Maize Paddy (TSh/kg) 1983/84 2.20 4.00 1.90 3.00 1984/85 4.00 6.00 2.50 4.00 1985/86 5.25 8.00 3.50 5.50 '.986/87 6.30 9.65 4.20 6.05 1987/88 8.20 14.40 4.20 - 1988/89 9.00 17.30 - _ 1/ Premium regions include: Morogoro, Tanga, Zrusha, Kilimanjaro,Tabora, Kigoma. Rukwa, Kagera, Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Dodoma (only Kondoa and Mpwapwa districts),Mara (only Tarime district) and Shinyanga (only Kahama district). 9. Informal market nrices: The informalmarket prices of foodcropsvaried very much according the region and the period of the year. Producer prices for maize were higher in 1987188 than official prices; they ranged from TSh 8.311kg in Shinyanga to TSh 12.561kg in 1Dodomain 1987188, or from IZ to 53Z higher than the official price (TSh 8.20/kg). Consumer prices for maize ranged from TSh 9.801kg in Iringa to TSh 16.68/kg in Lindi, much lower than the official price of TSh 17.001kg. This situationis attributed to the interventionof private traders, who are more efficient and less bureaucratic than NMC and who incur lower transportcosts. The situationfor paddy/rice and wheat is different sinicethe supply of these two grains does not meet the potential demand, and thereforeprices to the producer and the consumer on the informal market are higher than those on the official market. Official and informal market prices for producers and consumers in 1987188 were as follows: Working Paper No. 2 Page 5 Table 3: Producer and Consumer Prices in Official and Informal Markets Producer prices Consumer prices Official Informal Official Informal (TShlkg) Maize 8.20 10.71 17.00 13.37 Paddy 14.40 18.28 24.70 30.14 Wheat 9.00 32.74 26.25 40.35 II. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS 10. Following the reintroductionof the cooperativemovement, Government abolished the transport permits required for inter-regionaltransport of food crops and unofficiallyallowed licensed private traders to purchase food crops. In addition, it set up two Task Forces to review the food distribution and pricing system and the operationalefficiency of export crop marketing. 11. The Task Force report on food grains was issued in June 1987 and its main conclusionswere submittedto the Cabinet in September 1987. The cabinet approved most of its recommendations,including an official sanction of the participationof private traders in grain marketing, a liberalizationof the export of small grains and cassava, and the right of cooperativeunions and private millers to set up and operate mills. 12. In February 1988, the Government requestedthe Task Force to propose the actions required to implement the Cabinet decisions of September 1987. The Final Recommendationsand ImplementationProposals of the Task Force were issued in April 1988. 13. The implementationproposals were considered by the Cabinet on June 4, 1988. The Cabinet decision has yet to be publicly announced. The proposals put before the Cabinet by the Ministry of Agriculture included the following arrangementsfor the 1988/89 marketing season: -Grain marketing is confined to the primary soe~ieties,who can sell their produce to the Union, NMC, private traders etc. This means that producers should sell only to primary societies. NMC, cooperativeunions, primary societies and private traders are allowed to trade among themselves, both within and between regions; -NMC is no longer required or expected to buy all the maize offered by the cooperativeprimary societiesand unions. NM; will operate on a WorkinA Paner No. 2 Page 6 commercial basis only, buying on its accountwhat, when and where it believes it can trade profitably. The buying procedure starts with NKC negotiating with each of the unions the wholesale price at which the crop is delivered to NMC stores. Once an agreement is reached NMC will advance the required funds to the unions to purchase the crop; -The Governmentwill guaranteeminimum producer prices, on the basis of which NMC and the unions will negotiatewholesale prices. Producer prices announcedby the Government in February 1988 were TSh 9.00/kg for maize and TSh 17.30/kg for paddy on delivery of their crop to primary societies; -At these prices the government,through NMC, will acquire any quantity the cooperativeunions cannot dispose of, whenever and wherever necessary at the minimum guaranteedprices (floor prices). Stocks accumulatedthrough the operation of the price support system will either serve to replinishthe StrategicGrain Reserve (SGR) or be marketed through normal marketing channels. Any loss rcsultingfrom this operationwill be borne by the Government; -A maize grading system will be developed as soon as possible and will be introducedwith the harvest year 1989190. For the 1988/89 season, the producer price of maize with any foreign matter will be accepted at the discretionof NMC and other governmentprocurement agents at TSh 7.65/kg; -The SGR will no longer be controlledby NKC but by a Board of Trustees; NMC will continue to operate it for a fee. The level of the SGR will be increased from the present 113,000 tons to 150,000 tons. A provision of about TSh 1 billion in the 1988189 budget was made for NMC to purchase about 37,000 tons exclusively from Ruvuma and Rukwa regions; -NMC will import wheat and rice as required by Governmentand will buy beans only as a procurementagent for public institutions. In both cases, commoditieswill be sold at prices fully covering NMC costs. All other commoditieswill be handled by the cooperativeunions, private traders and others, with NMC buying and selling them for commercialpurposes only; -NMC is free to set prices of maize grain and maize flour, after consultingwith the Government; -The consumer price of maize will be subsidizedby levies on rice and wheat flour of TSh 2.00/kg and TSh 4.00/kg respectively; -The consumer prices of rice and wheat flour are set at TSh. 5G.0/kg and TSh. 50.00/kg, respectively. In order to keep the consumer prices of rice and wheat flour to a minimum, the import duty on these tWo commoditieswould be cut from 25Z to 152, and the sales tax on wheat flour would be cut from 252 to 152. Workinft Paper No. 2 Page 7 III. EFFECT OF PRICES ON PRODUCTION Main Assumptions 14. The net Economic Benefit (NEB), Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), and Effective ProtectionCoefficient (EPC) were calculatedfor maize, paddy and wheat in regions, for which data were available. The transport cost from the different regions to Dar es Salaam was taken into account to reflect their respective comparativeadvantages to supply the main consumer center or to export. In addition,within each region,most representativeproduction systems were considered to check the comparativeadvantage of traditionaland more progressiveproduction systems. 15. The calculationsof parity prices, NEB, DRC, and EPC have been based on the following assumptionst 1) The internationalprices of maize, rice and wheat in 1988 and 2000 as projected by the Vorld Bank in constant 1988 prices. The average increase in fertilizerprices in constant terms between 1988 and 2000 is estimatedby the World Bank at about 652. This increasewas used to adjust fertilizerand chemical costs in the different crop budgets when the projected prices of output were used. 2) A current exchange rate of (approximately)TSh 100 to US$ 1 was used J.n the base case calculation. A projected exchange rate of Tsh 125 to USS 1 was used to calculateparity prices and DRC's. This is an arbitrary figure selected for analyticalpurposes only; the target exchange rate is still being negotiated between IMF and the Government. 3) The transport cost from each region to Dar es Salaam was estimated on the basis of NMC transport cost by road in 1987188 plus about a 302 increase, and the actual TRC railway fare. MDB estimates of least cost transportwere used in the calculation. These costs are summarizedas follows: Working Paner No. 2 Page 8 Table 4: TransportCost bY Road, Rail and Least Cost Option. Transport Distance 1988/89 Transportcost by means a) road b) rail c) MDB d) (Km) (TSh/ton) Morogoro TIR 200 1500 690 690 Tanga T/R 350 3040 890 890 Dodoma TIR 480 3680 1000 1000 Kilimanjaro T+R 560 4810 - 1070 Arusha TIR 650 5460 1220 1220 Tabora R 840 - 1470 1470 Shinyanga R 1050 - 1700 1700 Mwanza R 1230 - 1930 1930 Kigoma R 1250 - 1950 1950 Singida T+R 720 - 2050 Mtwara, Lindi S - - (2470) 2470 Kagera R+S 1350 - 1400 2870 Mara T+R 1420 - - 2900 Iringa T 500 3900 - 3430 Mbeya TIR 850 6690 3650 3650 Rukwa T+R 1090 8vz0 3480 4030 Ruvuma T+R 990 7660 - 5580 a) T s by road. R s by rail. S & by ship. or, + and b) By road only. These costs are NMC 1987188 figures + SOZ. c) By rail only or by boat when specified. (Source:TRC) d) Least cost combining rail and road transport. (Source:HDB) 4) The informal market producer and consumer prices of food grain (maize, rice/paddy and wheat/wheat flour) were collectedby MDB surveyors in the different regions in the 1987/88 season. Informal market prices for 1988/89 were estimated on the basis of the 1987/88 ratio between informal market and official prices. 5) Specific conversionfactors (SCF) for all items used in the calculation of parity prices and crop budgets were estimated on the basis of their respective foreign exchange, taxes and unskilled labor content. These were discussedwith NMC, NDB and the Canadian Wheat Project and were adjusted by the mission where appropriate. 6) The crop budgets used for the analysis are published by MDB and were adjusted only marginally by the mission. These crop budgets show a number of inconsistenciesand possible errors which are reflected in the DRC calculationsand conclusions. Tradable elements of the crop budgets were valued at border prices, while non-tradableitems were adjusted with their Working Paver No. 2 Page 9 specific conversion factors (SCF). The SCF were calculatedon the basis of foreign exchange (FEC) and tax contents of the different cost slements. These FEC and SCF are summarizedas follo:.'s: Table 5: EstimatedForeign Exchange and Specific Conversion Factors FEC SCF Percentage Seeds 10 95 Fertilizers 54 85 Pesticides 54 85 Oxen use 25 95 Tractor use 60 90 Tools 20 85 Bags 50 90 Source : MDB, NMC and Canadian Wheat Project. 7) The shadow wage rate was assumed to be similar to the market wage rate in view of the important labor shortage in almost all of the regions. Any other assumptionwould produce lower DRC and thus (a fortiori) amplify the conclusions. Maize Production 16. Maize is the most important cereal crop grown and consumed in Tanzania. Productionwas estimated at 2.4 million tons in 1986/87, the bulk of which came from Iringa (16Z), Ruvuma(13Z),Arusha (112), Mbeya (l12), Tabora (10?) and Rukwa(82). About 252 of this production is marketed, only one third of which (9X of total production)passes through official channels; the remaining two thirds (16? of total production)is sold through the informal market. Imports of maize have varied from year to year. Average imports between 1980 and 1985 were almost 200,000 tons annually. In the past two years Tanzania has had record maize production levels, resulting in NMC accumulatingrelatively large stocks for which it could not find a remunerativedomestic or export market because of high Cooperativeand NMC marketing costs and low exchange rates. Thus, NMC was left to handle (and NBC to finance) the productionfrom remote areas and store the surplus production. Eventually NMC exported 90,000 tons of maize, albeit at a considerableloss. As a result, NMC losses amounted to some TSh 1.8 billion in 1986187 and are expected to reach TSh 4.0 billion in 1987188. Working PaRer No. 2 Page 10 17. The potential prodactionof maize is important. The assessment of land resourcespotential for rainf.d production of maize demonstratesthat from the agronomic point of view (i.e, moisture and temperature),more than 602 of the country area ie either suitable or very suitable for the production of either low land or high land maize. Estimates of.maize production potentialwith different levels of input applicationwere computed. On the basis of estimates by the Food Strategy Unit of MALD for the 1986 regional demand for maize, and assuming an increase of about 2% in per capita consumptionand 3Z population growth, projected production and demand for maize by the year 2000 were calculated. Depending on the input level, and therefore on the improvementin technologicaland cultural practices, Tanzania would be able to generate a surplus production of between 0.9 million and 19.3 million tons of maize by the year 2000. '8. Using the current internationalprices and the current and projected exchange rates (see para. 15), and assuming that incrementalproduction of maize would substitute for imports, an import parity price was calculated for the different regions as follows (Table 6): Working Paper No. 2 Page 11 Table 6: Import Parity Prices of Maize (at current prices) Current Proiected Exchange rate Exchange rate (TSh/kg) Cif - Dar es Salaam 10.8 13.5 (current 1988) Import parity price at Dar es Salaam a) - to the producer 11.3 13.8 - to the consumer 16.5 19.8 Official prices - producer 9.0 9.0 - consumer b) 20.0 20.0 Informal market prices - producer 11.8 11.8 - consumer 15.7 15.7 Nominal ProtectionCoefficient (NPC) c) - producer 0.95 0.78 - consumer 1.04 0.87 a) In fact at any region, excluding transportcost. b) Not yet officially declared. c) Weighted average of official and market prices divided by import parity prices. 19. The official producer price of maize at Dar es Salaam is currently lower than its import parity price. However, consumers are paying higher prices for domesticallyproduced maize than they would for importedmaize. The difference is mainly due to the very high marketing cost of NMC and cooperatives. In fact, since consumer prices are based on the cost-plus approach, NMC and cooperativesoverestimate their marketing costs, and the difference is used either to cross-subsidizeother activities or to cover marketing inefficiency. This is further confirmed by the fact that on the informal market the difference between the maize consumer and producer prices is significantlysmaller than on the official market. In addition, informal market prices, both to the producer and the consumer, are close to calculated import parity prices. This suggests that the informalmarket has been operating relatively efficiently. Working Paper No. 2 Page 12 Table 7s EstimatedRegional Floor and Ceilinx Prices for Maize Based on Import Parity Transport Current Proiected Cost Exchange rate Exchange Rate Floor Ceiling Floor Ceiling Prices Prices Price Prices (TShIkg) Dar Es Salaam 0 11.30 16.50 13.80 19.80 Morogoro 0.69 10.70 17.20 13.20 20.50 Tanga 0.89 10.50 17.40 12.00 20.70 Dodoma 1.00 10.40 17.50 12.90 20.80 Kilimanjaro 1.07 10.30 17.60 12.80 20.90 Arusha 1.22 10.20 17.70 12.70 21.00 Tabora 1.47 10.00 18.00 12.50 21.30 Shinyanga 1.70 9.80 18.20 12.30 21.50 Mwanza 1.93 9.60 18.50 12.10 21.70 Kigoma 1.95 9.50 18.50 12.00 21.80 Singida 2.05 9.60 18.60 12.00 21.90 IMtwara,Lindi 2.47 9.10 19.00 11.60 22.30 Kagera 2.87 8.70 19.40 11.20 22.70 Mara 2.90 8.70 19.40 11.20 22.70 Iringa 3.43 8.20 19.90 10.70 23.20 Mbeya 3.65 8.00 20.20 10.50 23.50 Rukwa 4.03 7.70 20.50 10.20 23.80 Ruvuma 5.58 6.30 22.10 8.80 25.40 20. On the basis of the above import parity prices at Dar es Salaam (Table 7). different transport costs from the different regions to Dar es- Salaam, import parity prices to the producer and to the consumer were calculated (Table 8). At the current exchange rate, the import parity price is 24? higher than the official price in Dar es Salaam, and about 302 lower in Ruvuma. To determine import parity prices to the producer and to the consumer, it was assumed that any marginal surplus in a given region would be consumed in Dar es Salaam (in substitutionfor eventual imports) and that any marginal deficit would come from additional imports through Dar es Salaam. This means that at these prices the governmentwould intervene to support producers and safeguard the purchasing power of consumers against speculation and extreme cases of poor market functioning. As illustratedin Figure 1 below, the price to the producer and to the consumer in any given region would oscillate between lines Al and A2 and Bl and B2, respectively. Producers, in a given region, would normally get higher prices, and the extent would depend on the region's situation of having largely or marginally a net surplus or net Working Paper No. 2 Page 13 deficit. For a given region, the producer price would be somewhere between si and s2 (equal to or higher than the floor price of sl), while at the same time the consumer price would then be equal to sl or s2 plus marketing cost and margins. The higher the transport cost to Dar es Salaam, the higher would be the differencebetween import p'rity prices to the producer and the consumer. Figure lt Floor, Ceiling and Import Parity Prices to Producers and Consumers in DifferentRegions According to Transport Cost Prices 11 11 I1 11 import parity price to the producer (B2) Max price Il _ ~ _ _ (A2) to producer so 11c: ...... (Bl)Min price II 61 ----- _ to consumer (.Al) import parity price to the producer -Transport Dar Ruvuma cost 21. Since the floor price to the producer and the ceiling price to the consumer are the only guaranteedprices, governmentintervention would only be required when the producer price fell to level Al (floor price) or when the consumer price increased to level B2 (ceilingprice), as illustratedin Figure 2 below. The interventionof Government at the floor or the ceiling price is mutually exclusive in any one region. In the first case, Governmentwould be required to buy any quantity brought to its agents at the floor price. In the second case, it would have to sell any quantity required by consumers at the ceiling price, i.e. it would have to destock to meet the demand. A continuous monitoring of prices would help the Governmentto set floor and ceiling prices from one year to another taking into account its objectivesof grain reserves and potential exports and imports. In this context it should be emphasized that floor and ceiling prices should be based on import and export parity prices in order to make efficientuse of limitee national resources. However, the adjustment should not totally follow changes in internationalprices. A Workinc Paper No. 2 Page 14 three-to four-yearmoving average of internationalprices would be more indicativeof changes in pric'e trends. Figure 2: Variations in Producer and Consumer Prices in OhieYear and for a Given Re_ion prices 11 B2 ||------^-_ceiling Ii / \ price | X ~~~~~~~~~~~floor K11------______--_----price Iitime 22. The regionalfloor prices calculated above were based on the assumption that Tanzania would remain a net maize importer cr, at taximum, self-sufficient.However, since Tanzania has potentialto increaseits production even under a lov level of inputs. it is expected that in the long run a surplus production of maize vould be generated which could be exported economical'ly if prices to the producers were properly set. Using the current exchange rate and the same cost structure, the maximum export iparitv Prices of maize under today's conditions would be around TSh 4.01kg at Dar (involving no transport cost at all) and negative in Ruvuma (TSh - l.0lkg). Thia means that exporting one:ton of maize from Ruvuma would cost TanzanLia its full production cost plus an additional TSh 1,000. It is thus questionable whether Tanzania would be able to export its surpluses economically at the current excbange rate and current international prices. Even if exportable surpluses were to come from regions closer to Dar es Salaam, the maximum producer price would have to be around TSh 3.3/kg. It is clear, therefore, that under present marketing conditions (transport cost, marketing efficiency, etc.) and with the prevailing exchange rate, Tanzania has an economic advantage in substituting maize imports, but no comparative advantage in exporting maize; the optimum situation would be self-sufficiency. 23. In the long run, however, it is anticipated that the exchange rate would be further adjusted to properly reflect the scarcity of foreign exchange WorkingPaper No. 2 Page 15 (125 to US$ 1 was used). In addition,World Bank price projectionsan indicatean increasein maize pricesof aboutUS$ 137/tonby the year 2000 in constantterms. Using theseprice projections, export parity prices in economicterms with currentand projectedexchange rates are presentedin Table 5. The exportparity price of maize to the producerwould be aroundTSh 8.3/kgat the currentexchange rate. However,if the exchangerate were adjusted,the exportparity price of maize to the producerat Dar es Salasm would be aroundTSh 112/kg. Table 8: Export Paritv Price of Maize in Year 2000 Current Prolected Exchange rate Exchange rate (TSh/kg) FOB price - Dar es Salaam Projected : 2000) 13.7 17.1 Export parity price at Dar es Salaam -to the producer 8.3 11.2 -to the consumer 12.3 16.0 Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) at Dar es Salaam -to the producer 1.30 0.96 -to the consumer 1.41 1.08 24. On the basis of the above export parity prices and transport cost from the different regions to Dar es Salaam, regional export parity prices to the producer were computed (Table 10). It appears that with the projected price of maize and exchange rate, the actual price of maize in constant terms could either be increased (by up to 242) or maintained for 11 regions, and reduced for the other 8 regions (up to 202 for Iringa). The Ruvuma region appearsto be in a specialsituation due to its high transportcost. For Ruvumathe price would have to be reducedby about382 in constantterms for it to be able to export any surplus economically. This situation, however, would improve in the near tuture, once the road linking Songea to the port of Mtwara is finished. U.atilthat time, it would not be economically justified to stimulate increased productior in that area. This means that a proper pricingpolicy should be introduAcedconsisting of settingdifferent prices for different groups of regions. One solutionwould consistof groupingdeficit regions, for which the actual price would be maintained or marginally increased in real terms, grouping and surplus regions, for which the price in real terms would be reduced over a number of years to reach an acceptable level (para 43). Working Paner No. 2 Page 16 25. Such differentiation,combined with proper agriculturalresearch and strengthenedextension services,would probably generate surplus maize production,which would amount to 0.9 million tons under low input levels and up to 19.3 million tons under medium input levels (para 17). However, no data are available to anticipatethe effect of reducing real producer prices on maize production in regions such as Ruvuma and Rukwa. Over the past 18 \ rs, producer prices of maize have remained more or less stable in constant te.ms while productionhas kept pace with increasedpopulation, suggestingthat this effect would only be marginal. In addition, prospects could even be better if steps were taken to reduce the number of intermediariesinvolved in marketing activities,so that licenced exporters (NMC and others) could be supplied directly by farmers and primary societies in chosen areas and then export directly. 26. In relation to SGR, the mission looked into the possibility of achieving food security through a higher price paid to the producer in surplus regions (Ruvuma...etc) with higher transport costs but which also are climaticallymore reliable. In fact, the official price is only TSh 2.80/kg more than the import parity price, compared to the average cost of TSh 3.5/kg to cover the SGR storage,maintenance, deterioration in maize quality, etc. However, this approach is valid only for the quantity which would otherwise be required for food security objectives. The higher the political and social weight attached to food security,the more justifiedwould be higher prices paid in surplus areas. Working Paper No. 2 Page 17 Table 9: Export Parity Price of Maize to the Producer (at projected 2000 prices) transport current projected cost exchanae rate exchange rate TSh/kg Dar-Es-Salaam 0 8.30 11.20 Morogoro 0.69 7.70 10.60 Tanga 0.89 7.50 10.40 Dodoma 1.00 7.40 10.30 Kilimanjaro 1.07 7.30 10.20 Arusha 1.22 7.20 10.10 Tabora 1.47 7.00 9.90 Shinyanga 1.70 6.80 9.70 Mwanza 1.93 6.60 9.40 Kigoma 1.95 6.50 9.40 Singida 2.05 6.40 9.30 Mtwara,Lindi 2.47 6.10 9.00 Kagera 2.87 5.70 8.60 Mara 2.90 5.70 8.60 Iringa 3.43 5.20 8.10 Mbeya 3.65 5.00 7.90 Rukwa 4.03 4.70 7.60 P.uvum& 5.58 3.30 6.20 27. On the basis of MDB estimated crop budgets, Net Economic Benefits (NEB), the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) and the Domestic Resources Cost (DRC) were calculated using projected exchange rates and current (1988) and projected (2000)maize prices for different regions and different produ^tion systems. Working Paper No. 2 Page 18 Table 10: Domestic Resource Cost of Maize import parity Exnort Rarity (1988 prices) (2000 prices) NEB EPC DRC NEB EPC DRC (TSh'000 (TSh'000 Iha) Iha) Dodoma - hand cultivation a) (1.2) 0.63 1.38 (1.8) 0.83 1.51 - hand cultivation b) 1.0 0.66 0.82 (0.2) 0.85 1.03 - animal traction 3.9 0.61 0.57 2.0 0.82 0.81 Arusha/Kilimanjaro - hand cultivation 3.2 0.67 0.68 1.1 0.87 0.91 - animal traction 11.8 0.60 0.38 6.4 0.78 0.70 - mechanized cultivation10.3 0.41 0.43 4.6 0.56 0.78 Mwanza/Shinyanga - hand cultivation 0.4 0.70 0.90 (0.6) 0.93 1.11 - animal traction 2.6 0.68 0.71 0.5 0.92 0.95 Ruvuma - hand cultivation 0 1.02 1.00 (2.3) 1.51 1.23 - improved hand 5.5 0.99 0.67 (0.9) 1.75 1.05 cultivation a)___Low___potential______areas.__ a) Low potential areas. b) High potential areas. 28. The expansion of jroductionunder hand cultivation is not economical. In fact, with the current labor shortage,any expansion of productionwould have to rely on improved technologies(animal traction, mechanization. etc) combinedwith the use of better inputs (improvedseeds, fertilizers, chemicals). In the case of Ruvuma, the region has a comparativeadvantage in substitutingimports of maize, but only under improved hand cultivation. In an export situation,Ruvuma becomes uncompetitiveto generate anv surplus which could be economicallyexported. In fact, even under improved hand cultivation,incremental production of maize in Ruvuma would result in a net economic loss of about TSh 5801ton, despite the fact that such production would result in foreign exchange earnings of about TSh 1,030/ton (Table 11) Working Paper No. 2 Page 19 Table 11: Maize Crop Budzet Improved Hand Cultivation- Ruvuma Rezion (Tsh/ha) Foreign Value of production Financial Economic Exchange (yield 1.9 tons/ha) 17.1 11.7 22.5 Inputs 6.3 5.5 2.9 Labor 7.1 7.1 - Net return 3.7 (1.1) 19.6 ------_____ a) at official price b) at projected export prices (year 2000) and projected exchange rate 29. Sensitivityanalysis of the above resultswere performed to determine the importanceof changes in the main two assumptionsregarding the exchange rate and the shadow wage rate. To get a DRC of 0.8 (more or less confirmed comparativeadvantage), either the shadow wage rate should be around 65? or the exchange rate should reach about Tsh 155 to US $ 1. 30. Finally, an analysis was carried out to determine potential deficit and surplus regions, to quantify roughlywhat would be the eventual exportable surplus and its origin. On the basis of potential production and the cost of transport from one region to another, any surplus over domestic requirements would have to come from Ruvuma and Rukwa. In fact, out of the total potential productionof Rukwa of 827,000 tons, only 229,000 tons would be used to meet demand (in Arusha 178,000 tons and M4ara35,000 tons), while more of the surplus productionof Ruvuma would be used within the country. Rice and Wheat Production 31. The production of these two cereals was estimated at 644,000 tons and 72,000 tons, respectively,in 1986/87. Paddy is mainly produced in Shinyanga (202), Morogoro (192) and Mwanza (1Z), while wheat is grown predominantlyin Arusha (58Z) and Iringa (32Z). Wheat is produced mainly on government farms (NAFCO) and is almost totally marketed through the official channel (NMC). Only 50? of paddy productionis marketed, most of which is sold on the informal market (472). Imports of rice and wheat have increased substantially over the past 10 years, but total supply has still not kept pace with increasingdemand, as reflectedby the high price levels on the informal market. Total imports of rice and wheat grain equivalentwere 83,500 tons and 53,500 tons, respectively,in 1986/87. Using the current internationalprices and the current exchange rate, the import parity prices of paddy and wheat were calculatedas follows: Working Paper No. 2 Page 20 Table 12s Import Parity Prices of Paddv and Wheat (at current 1988 prices) Current exchange Projected exchange rate rate Paddy Wheat Paddy Wheat (TSh/kg) *Cif Dar (Current 1988) 28.0 a) 17.5 35.0 a) 21.9 Import parity price at Dar es Salaam -to the producer 13.6 16.3 17.7 20.1 -to the consumer 22.5 25.2 28.4 30.6 Official prices -to the,producer 17.3 10.4 17.3 10.4 -to the consumer 29.7 36.4 29.7 36.4 Informal market prices -to the producer 22.0 37.7 22.0 37.7 -to the consumer 36.2 56.0 36.2 56.0 N4ominalprotection coefficient at Dar es Salaam -to the producer 1.60 0.90 1.23 0.73 -to the consumer 1.60 1.57 1.26 1.29 32. Official paddy prices to producers and consumers are, respectively, abotut282 and 32Z higher than their import parity prices. Informal market prices are even higher, reflectingthe shortage of paddy and rice. Despite the higher official price of paddy, potential demand is not met by increases in production or imports. Such a situationbenefits the producer. who enjoys protection, but taxes the consumer,who pays a higher price for domestic rice than he would have otherwise paid for imported rice. However, official prices are in line with import parity prices at the projected exchange rate. 33. On the other hand, the producer price of wheat was set at about 37% below its import parity price. This seems to have worked as a disincentiveto the domestic productionof wheat. In fact, only a small quantity of wheat is produced by smallholders;the rest is produced in NAFCO State farms where it receives higher than official producer prices. The high consumer price of wheat flour on the informal market (about 222 above official price and 61% above import parity) reflects the potential demand for this crop, and the extent to which it was not met either by domestic production or by imports. 34. On the basis uf the above import parity prices in Dar es Salaam, and transport costs from the different regions, import parity prices to the producer were calculated as shown in Table 13. Working Paper No. 2 Page 21 Table 13: ImPort Parity Prices of Paddy and Wheat for Producersin Maior Producing Regions Transport Current Projected cost Exchange rate Exchange Rate Paddv Wheat Paddy Wheat (TSh/kg) Dar-Es-Salaam 0 13.60 16.30 17.70 20.10 Morogoro 0.69 12.90 - 17.10 - Tanga 0.89 12.70 - 16.90 - Kilimanjaro 1.07 12.60 - 16.70 - Arusha 1.22 - 15.20 - 19.00 Tabora 1.47 12.20 - 16.40 - Shinyanga 1.70 12.00 - 16.10 - Mwanza 1.93 11.80 - 15.90 - Mtwara,Lindi 2.47 11.30 - 15.50 - Iringa 3.43 - 13.20 - 17.10 Mbeya 3.65 10.30 - 14.40 - Ruvuma 5.58 8.50 11.30 12.70 15.10 a) Producingmore than 10,000 tons in 1986/87 (exceptwheat in Ruvuma which was included for comparison). 35. NEB, EPC and DRC calculationsfor paddy (no crop budgets were available for smallholders),based on the MDB crop budgets and using current and projected exchange rates, are presented in Table 14 below. Working Paper No. 2 Page 22 Table 14: Domestic Resource Cost Calculation for Paddy and Wheat Current Proiected exchanxe rate exchange rate NEB EPC DRC NEB EPC DRC (TSh'000) (TSh'000) MwanzafShinyanga -hand cultivation 1.7 1.51 0.88 5.6 1.09 0.68 -animal traction 6.9 1.53 0.67 13.0 1.09 0.52 Ruvuma -hand cultivation (0.6) 2.31 1.03 6.7 1.41 0.76 36. At the projected exchange rate, Tanzania has a comparativeadvantage in substitutingimports of rice even in remote areas (such as Ruvuma) and under hand cultivation. This is because the transport cost is offset by the higher physical potential in these regions. Rice producers have enjoyed strong protection,which should in the long run stimulateproduction, especially since the importationof rice is restricted.In fact, paddy productionhas increased from 265,000 tons in 1974175 to about 644,000 tons in 1986187. IV. ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES AND CONCLUSIONS 37. The changes in the food marketing system proposed by the Task Force aim at improvingthe efficiency of existing marketing institutions. The marketing arrangementsintroduced for the 1988/89 marketing year may be considered transitional step prior to the full implementation of the Task Force's recommendations. The success of the new marketing arrangementsin this transitionalyear will critically depend on the level of production for the coming marketing year. If production remains at last year's level, Government (through NMC) will be forced to buy a large proportion of the crop from more remote areas (see para 30), since private traders would rather operate in regions closer to consumer centers. If, instead, production declines, informal market prices should rise and NKC would handle a smaller proportion of the crop, which will help it dispose of at least part of its stocks. Some of the recommendationsare already being implemented (see para 13), but others require more analysis and discussion. 38. Under the new system, greater responsibilityfor regional food distributionwill be passed on to regional operators, cooperativeunions and private traders. Competitionat the regional level is expected to lead to a reduction in marketing costs within regions. Responsibilityfor inter-regional trade will also be passed on to regional operators, cooperativeunions and private traders which should help reduce both the number of intermediariesand Workina Paper No. 2 Page 23 some of the inter-regionaltransport costs, as greater flexibilitywill encourage transfers from adjacent regions. In the longer run farmers should be allowed to sell their produce directly to NMC, to the primary societiesor to private traders. This would introducemore competitionand give more incentive to (and thus reduce the inefficiencyof) cooperativesand NMC, and result in increased remunerationto producers. 39. Regarding 1988189 producer prices, the Governmenthas set a maize producer price of TSh 9.0/kg to be paid by the primary societiesto the farmers at the village level without any government guarantee to buy from the cooperatives,since NMC is no longer required to buy all the maize offered by the cooperatives. In fact, in previous years the cooperativeunions were required to collect crops from all primary societies so that they were able to average their transportcosts over the whole region. With restricted confinement,primary societiesclose to regional buying centers may be able to dispose of their crops easily, while those in remote areas will find it more difficult. This may mean that some societieswill have difficulty in getting a buyer for their maize. In such a situation the alternativesare for farmers in those areas to accept a lcwer price or for the Government to step in and buy from them at the agreed support price. I- previous years, farmers in remote districts sometimesreceived less than the full producer price (as indicatedby the informal market prices recorded by MDB). NMC will be instructed by the Government to buy, on its account, to replenish the SGR only from farmers in Rukwa and Ruvuma. 40. It is at the retail or into-store level that the Government, currently through NNC, will be a guaranteedbuyer (TSh 13.90/kg for 1988189). Therefore, the into-storeprice rather than the producer price should be announced by the Government. Provided NMC is not in a monopolisticsituation the farmer should receive a price reflectingthe into-storeprice, less transport and handling costs. Over the longer term. farmers who are a long distance away from the regional buying center will receive a lower price than those located closer. This will encourage production to be expanded in areas with lower transport costs. 41. NMC will no longer operate as a monopoly, except in the case of grain imports. It will operate on a commercialbasis and should, therefore, be allowed to compete with private traders. This means that in certain cases NMC might pay a higher producer price than the floor price or sell at a lower consumer price than the ceiling price. As an export agent, it would only buy the quantity of food crop, delivered at its store, it would export at the price it estimates possible to export (which eventually should become the export parity price). At the same time, it would become the last resort for the sale and purchase of food crops on the account of the Government. To be performed successfullyand timely, this function of price supportwould involve high fixed and overhead costs. Thus, it is not economical to give this function to any other institutionthan NMC to avoid duplicationof infrastructure,staffing, etc. NMC would have to establish clear separate accounts and fair allocation methodologyto avoid cross-subsidization.Any resulting loss would be borne by the Government. Working Paper No. 2 Page 24 42. In the past, pricing policy has been based on internal supply and demand considerationsand on production and marketing costs. With the major macro-economicreforms of the ERP, however, there is now a need to develop a more economicallyrational pricing policy for producers and consumers,which would have to be set on the basis of import/exportparity prices to reduce the misallocationof resources. In setting the into-storeprice, the Government should pay a premium for production from those regionswhere transport costs to the main consuming centers are lower. This will encourage the expansion in production to occur in those areas since they involve a lesser commitment of the country's foreign exchange resources for transportation.Since Dar es Salaam is thc most importanturban center (consumercenter) and the main port, parity prices should be calculated assuming that surplus productionfrom the different regions would supply Dar es Salaam. As a result of the above changes, NMC would have to handle smaller quantities of food crops, and therefore it would have to size down accordingly. Those of its assets (milling factories, stores,...)thus becoming idle should be sold or rented to cooperativesand private traders. 43. On this basis, the country could be divided into a number of regions to reflect transport costs to Dar es Salaam. In practice, however, this would be very difficult to monitor and adjust periodically,since it would involve a continuousupdating of transport costs (fuel price, road and rail situation, etc.). A simpler approach would consist of splittingthe country into surplus and deficit regions for which two differentaverage producer prices would be set. Another simple approach would be to fix a floor producer price for the most remote surplus region (currentlyRuvuma), based on the import or the export parity price depending on whether the country is in a net importer or net exporter situation. This price would be the pan-territorialsupport price, applied to the whole country. As illustratedin Figure 1, Government could intervene in other regions at higher prices than the floor prices, but below the estimated regional parity price. In this case the floor producer price under the different assumptionswould be as follows: Working Paper No. 2 Page 25 Table 15: EstimatedFloor Prices of Food Crops Under DifferentAssumptions actual pan- Exchange rate territorial current Proiected Prices (TSh/kg) (a) (b) Maize - Import parity : current 9.00 6.3 8.8 1'.3 - Import parity , projected 9.00 11.0 14.7 18.4 - Export parity : current 9.00 (1.1) 0.3 2.6 - Export parity : projected 9.00 3.3 6.2 9.1 Paddy - Import parity : current 17.30 8.5 12.7 16.7 - Import parity : projected 17.30 10.8 15.5 20.2 Wheat - Import parity : current 10.35 11.3 15.1 18.9 - Import parity : projected 10.35 14.8 19.5 24.1 ------a) at TSh 125 to US$ 1. b) at TSh 150 to US$ 1. 44. These floor prices depend on a number of assumptions,the most important of which is the exchange rate. The higher the projected exchange rate, the higher the floor price and the more competitiveTanzania would be on the internationalmarket. The present floor prices of maize, paddy and wheat under different assumptionsof projected exchange rates, using year 2000 projected prices, are presented in Table 17: Working Paper No. 2 Page 26 Table 16: Floor Prices of Food Crops Accordinz to Varying Exchange Rates TSh to US$ 1. Maize Paddy Wheat Import Export ( TShlkg) 100 *actual 11.0 3.3 10.8 14.8 110 12.3 4.4 12.7 16.7 120 14.0 5.6 14.6 18.5 125 *projected 14.7 6.2 15.5 19.5 130 15.4 6.7 16.5 20.4 140 16.9 7.9 18.4 22.3 150 *projected 18.4 9.1 20.2 24.1 175 22.1 12.0 24.9 28.8 200 25.8 14.9 29.6 33.5 230 30.2 18.3 35.3 39.1 250 33.2 20.6 39.0 42.9 45. On the basis of Tables 15 and 16 three scenarioscould be developed according to the projected exchange rate. a) Scenario 1: (exchangerate TSh 100/US$ 1)t In this case Tanzania should have the objectivesof self-sufficiencyin maize and import substitutionof paddy and wheat. Over the years, surplus and deficit production should balance, and the country should not aim at generatinga major exportable maize surplus since it would represent a net economic loss if actually exported. For maize, therefore, the producer floor price would have to be set at a level between the import parity price of maize in current prices (TSh 6.3/kg) and in projectedprices (TSh 11.0/kg). This level should be adjusted annually according to current and projected grain reserve requirements. Since at the current price of TSh 9.01kg there will be a surplus production of maize, the maize price for the next season should be reduced marginally in real terms to dampen the high production growth rate and to limit maize surpluses. In the case of paddy, the floor price should be set between its current import parity price (TSh 8.5/kg) and its projected import parity price (TSh 10.8/kg)(Table15). Thus the paddy price should be reduced from TSh 17.3/kg to TSh 10.8/kg as a first step and thereafter to its average import parity price over a number of years '3-4 years moving average). For wheat, the situation is different. The official floor price is below the current import parity price. Therefore its floor price must be increasedto stimulatedomestic producers to substitute for imports. Thus it should be increased from TSh 10.35/kg to TSh 11.3/kg by next year and thereafter to a target price of TSh 14.8/kg. Workina Paper No. 2 Page 27 b) Scenario 2: (exchangerate TSh 125/US$1). Under this scenario the situation improves a little. The floor price of maize would not need to fell in real terms since the current import parity price of maize is about the official floor price (TSh 8.81kg). However, it would increase to a much higher level (TSh 14.7/kg) as long as imports of maize could be avoided in exceptionalyears. However, if Tanzania expects to move from a net import to a net export situation,then the price structureshould reflect the export parity prices. With current prices, the floor price would have to be set as low as TSh 0.3/kg, and at TSh 6.2/kg at projected maize prices. Therefore the floor price would have to be reduced from its present level of TSh 9.0/kg to a maximum of TSh 6.2/kg over the next 5-7 years. To generate a surplus at this price level all production systems in surplus areas would have to improve their productivity. In the case of paddy, the floor price would still have to decrease by next year to TSh 12.7/kg and to a target price of TSh 15.5/kg. For wheat flour, it vould have to increase to at least TSh 15.1/kg by next year and to a target price of TSh 19.5/kg. c) Scenario 3: (exchangerate TSh 150/US$l). Under this scenario the Governmenthas more room for maneuvering. The projected import parity price of maize would more or less equal the current official price (TSh 9.1/kg). Therefore it would not be necessary to decrease the floor price to the producer in real terms in order to move from a net importing to a net exporting situation. This would have been taken care of by the adjustment in the exchange rate and the increase in internationalprices. At this price Tanzania could generate maize surplusesand export them economically. Ruvuma would, then, have a comparativeadvantage (DRC below 1) in expanding production for export. Paddy floor prices to the producer could increase to the level of this projected importedparity price (TSh 20.2/kg) and the wheat floor price would increase to about TSh 24.1/kg, more than double current official prices. 46. The main beneficiariesfrom the new marketing arrangementswill be the producer through higher prices; the consumer through better and in certain cases cheaper supply (e.g. maize); and the Government,through a reduction in losses by NMC and the cooperativeunions. Data are not available to quantify these benefits to producers and consumers. NMC net losses in 1986/87 were TSh 1.8 billion and for 1987/88 are expected to be up to TSh 4.0 billion (ref. Gray and Barker 1988). This representsa loss in 1987/88 of about TSh 12.00/kg of food crops handled by NMC. Most of the losses in 1987/88 can be attributed to export sales of maize and beans, total losses on which are estimatedat TSh 2.- billion. The loss on export sales of beans alone is estimated at about TSh 1.1 billion. Under the new marketing arrangementsNMC would no longer be involved in the marketing of beans. NMC is still expected to incur losses on exporting surplusmaize in 1988/89. The extent of these losses will depend on the quantities involved, internationalprices fetched, and the actual exchange rate. With the adjustment in the exchange rate already made and the improvementexpected in world grain prices following the drought in the US, unit losses on exports are likely to be reduced by about 252 from those incurred in 1987/88. Working Paer No. 3 TM4ZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER MARKETINGOF BASIC FOOD COMMODITIES Southern Africa Dtepartment Agriculture Operations Div,lsion Africa Regional Office Working Paper No. 3 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER MARKETINGOF BASIC FOOD COMMOVOPTIES Table of Contents Page No. FORWARD...... - i I. BACKRUN#.... G R O UN.....D.... *oo 1 II. A POLICY FOR GRAINMARKETING DEVELOPMENT...... 4 Reform of pricing policy...... s..0...... 6 Measures to protect the NMC from adverse implicationsof market decontrol..*..*o...... 7 Financialrestructuring and financialrelations between the NMC and Gover nment...... 8 Modificationsto stocks policy and managementof the Security Grain Reserve...... sr9 Measures to achieve a more integratedmarket syse y...... t..em*... 0.. .. 10 III. KEY IMPLEMENTATIONISSUES...... *.to.* ...... 11 Reform of maize pricing policyl...... 11 The roles of marketing institutions...... 13 Storage and stocks policy*c...... 15 Financial relationsbetween the Government and the NMC ...... 16 Management of the N1MC...... t.... 17 External trade in coarse grainsa...... *..*...... 17 Implementation of grading systems ...... 18 TechnicalAssistance requirements...... 18 APPENDICES I - Terms of Reference for Food Marketing Consultants Worlkin Paper No. 3 TANZANIA Page (i) AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER Marketing of Basic Food Commodities FOREWORD rhis report is a sunmary of the findings and recomnerdations of a Z-man Food Marketing Consultancy undertaken from 15th March to 20th April 1988, under the auspices of the World Bank and funded by the UKOverseas Oevelopment Administration. A comprehensive review report has also been produced as essential background and justification for the major points here summatad. A preliminary draft was presented on the 5th April, and mainly concerned the development of a mechanismfor the formulation of a food pricing policy and the identification of implications requiring immediate Government sanction. Subsequently, it becameclear that a shorter, more succinct summary document was required for those readers not especially expert in the specificsof economic analysis or in mathematical modelling. In addition,a longer-term implementation plan concerning the overall concepts envisaged also seems to be necessary and this need coincided with the arrival of a 4-man Food Marketing Consultancy provided by the Netherlands Government. Because of the limitation of time, this team was provided with the U.K. draft report and asked to respond to the latter long-term requirement. The reports of both U.K. and Netherlands inputs should therefore be considered together.. Each largerly supports recomnendations made during June 1987 by the Government's Task Force (TF) on the "Food Distribution System i.n Tanzania with Special Reference to Institutional Functions, Inter-Regional Trade, Pricing and Cost Reduction; latterly coordinated by the Marketing Development Bureau (MOB) to whon both Consultancies reported. In the opinion of the U.K. Consultants,further conceptualreview is not necessary either in the short or long-term; prompt Government action about a basic policy is urgentlyneeded based upon the followingdeadlines: * This report was prepared by J.G. Gray (Food Studies Group: InternationalDevelopment Center, U.K.). The full study is available from Southern Africa Department,Agriculture Division. ** Messrs. Jan Jansonius;Adrian P. Oomen; M. Vos and J.H. Pott Workint Pa,er No. 3 Page (ii) By end June 1988 approval of long term strategy (Netherlandsreport); - formal decision on operationaltactics (UK report); - By end August 1988 - publication of prices, quality parameters and market responsibilities(UK); - By end June 1989 implementation of operational tactics, provision of requirea Technical Assistance and evaluation of market respor.ses, (UK); By end June 1991 comprehensive review of policies, operational tactics and identificationof further implications, leading to confirmation/modification of strategy. The full Terms of Reference of the UK assignment relating to this report are attached as Appendix Y. In summary, they were to: (1) develop an appropriate mechanism to be used in the formulation of food pricingpolicy taking. into account the impact of transport 'and quality differentials on farmgate and consumer prices of the main food commodities; (ii) determinethe relativeroles of parastatals,cooperatives and the private sector in food pricing and distribution; (iii) analyse the appropriate size and operations of the SGR with particular reference to procurement procedures and quality differentials. Workina No, 3 Page (iii) tn preparing this report, the consultants have benefitted from extensi,e assistance and cooperation from many institutions and individuals. tn particular the consultants wish to thank the staff of the Marketing Oevelopment Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture and of the National MillingCorporation for their assistance, without which it would not have been possible to finalise the work in the brief time allotted. Working Paper No. 3 Page 1 BACKGROUNO 1.1 rhe marketing of foodgrains (especially maize, paddy, rice, beans, sorghum, cassava, wheat and finger millet) is clearly in a state of crisis in 'three main respects: (a) First, the cumulative losses incurred by the NMC are so large that they are impeding the realisation of macroeconomic and monetary objectives of Government, through the cr2dit expansionary effects of NMCborrowing from the NBC; (b) secondly, the financial and logistical requirements imposed on the official marketing agencies to market the crop ire excessive, leading to delayed procurement and late payment to the farmer; (c) In addition to these short run problems the present system of crop marketing is incurring substantial economic costs through the distortions to production brought about by the existing pricing system. 1.2 The reason for the present difficulties lies in the movement of the economy from a state of chronic food shortage to one of market balance and this has resulted from two main factors: (a) The improvement in production attributable to the weather, particularly in the years 198S/86 and 1986/87; (b) an increase in marketablesurpluses following the extensive decontrol of private sector marketingactivities. It is important to recognise that the increasing financial difficulties of the NM4Carise partly from the success of food policy in moving from a deficit to a balanced situation. Workina Paper No. 3 Page 2 this report makes recommendations on measures which need to be taken to consolidate the progress already made in management of the food economy and to put NMC ooerations on a sound financial footing in the new marketing environmentin which it now functions. 1.3 Almost simultaneously, two major policy changes have occurred which have fundamentally altered the structure of grain marketing: (a) The re-establishmentof the cooperativesas the prime offic.a channel for the purchase of grain from the farmer; (b) extensive decontrol of privata sector domestic grain tradirg activities which has occurred through the removal of restrictions on private sector internal trade. 1,4 These two changes have altered the role of the NMC from a virtual monopoly in primary and secondarygrain trading to a more restricted role as the dominant secondary marketing agency and each is causing particular new problems for NMC and NMC finances: (a) The re-establishment of cooperatives, while ostensibly a major advance on the previous system, is posing a problem of high and rising primary marketing costs on the economy, coupled with poor or non-existent quality control on crop purchases. This has mainly been due to inadequate pre- planning of the structural change and a lack of resources; (b) decontrol of the private sector is leading to a marginalisation of the NMCC: the NMC is in danger of being left with the non-profitable high cost elements of maize marketing. Specifically, they are likely to be handling poorer quality grain, servicing the longer, uneconomic supply routes, and holaing grain for longer inter-annual periods. Each of these factors tends to raise the real costs of the NMC; Working PaDer No. 3 Page 3 (c) the NMC is no: experienced in coping with a situation which requires the active marketing of Its products in order to ensure stock turnover. 1.5 Nevertheless, in spite of these problems, there have been important benefits from the process of decontrol. tn particular, consumers have benefittad from the greater availability of produce whicn has arisen with the freeing of inter-regionaltrade, and also from the resulting lower market prices which have been below the officiaT prices in many regions for much of the past year. tn addition the presence of the private trade has reduced the requirement for public sector credit for crop procurementfrom the levels which wouldotherwise have been required. Workint Paper No. 3 Page 4 A POLICYFOR GRAIN MARKETIN6 DEVELOPMENT 2.1 The rask Force established by Government in 1986 to formulate recommendations for food pricing and distribution policy has already presented a framework for reform which has been accepted at a policy making level. The present report builds on these recommendations and proposes more specific steps in the implementationof the framework already established, concentrating on pricing, financial and operational issues affecting the NMC and upon more effective control and planning capabilities in the GOT. 2.2 Government strategy towards grain marketing is now based on the desire: (a) to build upon the improvements which have already been achieved; (bl to establish the financial integrity of the marketing institutions; and (c) to avoid massive financiallosses. 2.3 This strategy is based on two elements: (a) Establishing the target role for the NMC in relation to food security as being one of buyer and seller of last resort in the maize market. The precise meaning of this role is spelt out in Chapter II of the main review report but the essential idea is that the NMC should strengthen food security by protecting producers against excessively low prices in high production years; and by protecting consumers from excessively high prices in periods when markat supplies are short; Working Paper No. 3 Page 5 (b) Establishing pricingpolicy for the main cerealson the basis of achievinga substantial reduction in the financial losses of the NMCin thecontext of a shift to an explicit policy of price support. 2.4 The studt a:,temptsto identify the main steps and measures required to implement these basic proposals. The measuresfall under the following groups: (a) Reformof pricing policy; (b) measures to protect the NMC from adverse implications of market decontrol and cooperative primary marketing; (c) financial restructuringand reform of the financial relations between the NMC and the Government; (d) modifications to stocks policy and the use of the Sectrity GrainReserve; (e) measures to achieve a more integrated marketing system; (f) establishment of quality parameters relating to price. i.e. grading standards; (g) improvement of NMC and Cooperative operational capability at least cost, particularly with respect to quality preservation; (h) development of improved planning and monitoring capabilities in Government, particularlyconcerning the better integration of post-harvestdevelopment. The above recommendations are summarised here under the above headings, detailed reasoning being contained within relevant Chapters in the main report. Recommendationsfor an Implementation Prograirme follow from Section 8 onwards. Working Paper No. 3 Page 6 A. REFORMOF PRICING POLICY 1. rhe main objectives of pricing policy reform are: (a) to make pricing policy consistent with the change of role of the NMC to one of buyer and seller of last resort- this requiresthat gazettedprices be set in rela:.cn to minimum and maximum prices acceptable on oroducer and consumer market respectively (rather than as actual targe: prices); (b) to increase the degree of cost recovery in the official price margin with a view to reducing the financial losses of the XMC; (c) to ensure the synchronisation and coordination of the setting of into- and ex-store NMC prices with a view to maintaining control of the overall financial position of the NMC. 2. Chapter VIY outlines a proposed methodology for setting the 'IMC maize into- and ex-store prices and concludes that: (a) quality differentials for maize grains should be based upon a simple three grade system of: standard grade; - sub-standard grade; - reJect grade; (b) the price structure for maize should incorporate the following discounts: - standard grade none - sub-standard grade - 15% from the standard - reject grade - sosfrom the standard Workinft Paper No. 3 Page 7 (c) quality differentials ftr grains other than maize (wheat, rice,paddy and "red beans") should be based upon a system of: standardgrade (acceptable); reject grade; (d) for the purposes of financial accountabil-ity, the price structure for all reject grades for all grains should incorporate a 50% discount from the standard. B. 84MEASURESTO PROTECT THIE NC FROMADVERSE IH4PLICATIONSOf MARKETDECONTROL 1. There is a need to protect the !4MCfrom the process of marginalisation9 i.e. being left with the most unprofitable parts of the market. The specific measures required to address.. this probblem are: (a) the introduction of a regionally differentiated price structure, especially,, but not necessa solely for the producer price, to cover at least part of the transport subsidy which the NMCis currently in effect providing to producers in remte producingareas; (b) the introduction of quality differentie's in the producer price based on a sound grading System, to protect the NMC from becoming the residual purchaser of only poor quality grain; (c) modifications to the official price structure to recover the additional costs incurred through the increased length of storage associated with the withdrawal of the NMCfrom a large part of the seasonaltrade In maize. Workint Paper No. 3 Page 8 Oetills of the proposed systemsof -egional and quality price differentiation are set out in the main part of this report particularly Appendices ItIand tV. With respect to crops other than maize it is recommended that the Government adopt an explicit policy of generating financial surpluses for cross-subsidisation of the maize account. The measures required to achieve this are: (a) automatic adjustment of rice and wheat prices to exchange rate movements; (b) establishment of a profit margin in the pricingformula for rice, wheat and the processed products derived from these grains. C. FIMANCMALRTlRUCTURItNG ANO FU4ANCtAL RELATIONSBE4I THE NWC AND GOVERRM ' Financial relations between the Governmentand the NNC need to be put on a basis which will allow soe stability in the financial environment of the NMC. To some degree this will be achieved by the recomnded changes on pricing policy. However, there is also a need for the following measures: (a) writeoff of NC overdraft outstanding at the NBCon 31/7/1988 in so far as this exceedsthe vtlue of stocks carried over; (b) limitation of the liability of Government to subsidise maize market to support for the Security Grain Reserve as set out below. Workinig Paper No. 3 Page 9 o. MODIFICATIONSTOSTOCKS POLICY ANDMANAGEENT OF THE SGR t. rhere is C. need to modify policy with respect to the holding, financing and turning over of reserve stock in order to take account of the stockholding function of the NMCas follows: (a) the prime function of the Security Grain Reserve should be to provide buffer stocks for NMC sates in support of consumer maize markets during the period when grainimports are an order; the use of SGR stocks should not be limited to "emergency" situations; (b) Government and the NMC should define appropriate operational rules for triggering imports based on NMC stock levels (includingthe SGR), the period of the year and market conditions; the import trigger stock level may differ from the level of the SGR; (c) an institutional mechanismshould be established for the recognition of emergencysituations in which the distribution of grain free or on a concesslonal basis may be required. Such distribution should normally be from the SGR stocks, and financial losses arisingshould be met from the budget; (4) the SGR should form the basis for Governmentsubsidization of inter-annual stabilisation of the maize market; all other costs of market support and stabilisation should be recovered from the NMCtrading margin between the into- and ex-store prices; (e) in addition to purchasing the initial SGR stocks the Governmentshould make payments to NMCin respect of the management and handling functions of the NMC,the repair and maintenance of the SGR godowns, and in respect of the quality cost incurred by the NMC when SGR stocks are turned over other than in final sale to the market; WorkingPaper No. 3 Pasge10 (f) consideration should be given to the establishment of a financial food security reserve in the form of an ext3rnalty held, interest-bearing deposit dedicated to the importatior of maize when required for NMC domestic price support operations. E. MEASURESTO ACHIEYEA MOREINTGRAT MARKETSYSTEM 1. In order to provideeffective support to producers and consumers in a partly decontrolled grain economythe NMCmust have adequate channels to influence the prices prevailing on unofficial markets. This requires a strengthening of the links between the official and unofficial markets, which are currently to a largedegree separatoe. Tha following measuresare proposed to give effect to this change: (a) Permit licensed private traders to purchase grtrin. from primary cooperative societies for onward sale as licensed buying agents to the NMC; (b) Encourage the cooperatives to sell to the private market when they can achieve a better sale price than the NMC into-stare price by doing so; WCc) Permit private 1icansed wholesalers to purchase maize direct from NMCgodowns; Cd) Encourage the NDL to procure direct from the market on a competitive basis. Worklin PaPer No. 3 Page 11 III. KEY IMPLEMENTATIONISSUES The previous Section has identified a range of measures wnich could be taken to improve both the food security impact and the cost-effectiveness of Government intervention in Tanzania's food markets. This Section summarises essential action. 3.1 REFORM OF MAIZE PRICING POLICY (a) The Govermnent should implement a system whereby the full costs of NMC market stabilisation activities are recovered from the margin between the into- and ex-store NMC prices, except for the extent of subsidisation to grain market stabilisation implicit in the Government meeting the costs of the Security Grain Reserve. (b) NMC prices should be set with reference to average observed real market prices in accordance with the methodology proposed in Chapter VIII; the practice of formulating price recommendations on the basis of estimated costs of production should be discontinued. (c) The Government should Gazette in-store and ex-store prices for maize procured during the 1988/89 season. (d) A regional price structure to the maize into-store price should be adopted based on the incidence of transport costs incurred by the NMC on outward movements of maize from depots; (e) The Government should publish guidelines an regional price modification. Workint Paper No. 3 Page 12 (f) The NMC should immediately formulate and implement a three. grade quality control system for maize distinguishing a Standard Grade, a Sub-StandardGrade and a Reject Grade; a price discount of t5 per cent for Sub-Standard, and SO per cent for Reject Qualities should be adopted initially. (g) The Government should Gazette the quality standards for maize grain by August 1988. (h) The NMC should formulate a two-grade quality control system for wheat, rice, paddy and red beans based upon acceptance and rejection only. M1) The Goverment should publish guidelines on the quality standards for wheat, rice, paddy and red beans. (j) The Government should synchronise the setting of the into- and ex-store prices so that the financial conseqiances-. of pricing policy for the NMCare taken fully Into account. (k) The Marketing Oevelopmnt Bureau should Immediately adopt and systematise the methodology proposed in this report for setting maize prices. (1) NMCinto- and ex-store prices should not be automatically adjusted by the Goernent and NMCfor arketing cost- escalation In the Cooperaives. (m) Regional authorities should announce a "reference producer price for maize, wheat, rice, paddy and red beans to provide an Indication to producers of the minimum level at which Primary Cooperative Societies would normally purchase grain. Worklng Paper No. 3 Page 13 (n) The pricing policy for rice, paddy, wheat, red beans and sembe should recover the full costs incurred by NKICand, in the case of rice and wheat, to generate a small surplus for cross- subsidisation to maize where the market permits this. (o) Prices for rice and wheat should compensate for exchange adjustments to avoid financial losses on these crops. 3.2 THE ROLES(F MARKVIFN6INSTITUTIONS The tNMC (a) The Goverrment should clearly define the role of the NMC as the principal institution responsible for national food security, through the adoption of a policy of acting as buyer and seller of last resort. The main implic.Ation of this is that the NMC should aim to influence availability and prices on uncontrolled markets through guaranteeing its willingness to buy and sell at announced prices. (b) The Government should permit the NlC to purchase grai:n direct. from primary cooperatives, cooperative unions and privats traders registered as buying agents. (Ic) The Goverment should permit the NMC to sell grain to public institutions, cooperatives ad licensed wholesalers and retailers. (d) The Goverment should. confirm the NMCas holder of the Security Grain Reserve, which it should seek to use as a buffer stock for market stabilisation, (e) The NKC should stop trading in secondary croM: such as cassava, sorghum and millet. Working Paper No. 3 Page 14 (f) The NI4Cshould be retained and reorganised as a national institution with an adequate network to fulfil its mndate. The current proposal to close down certain NMCdepots should be reviewed in the lightof this proposed national mandate. (g) Measures should be taken to facilitate the purchase of grain from the NMCby the Cooperatives and private traders and to escape from a rationing mentality of stock retention; these measures should includea review of sales procedures with a view to simplification. (h) The NMC should establish a system of sales by tender to permit the turnover of old stock onto the market at prices below the announcedex-store price. (1) The Governmentand the N4C should undertake a study of the storage requirements for the NMCunder the prdocsea role and imposea moratoriumon storage construction until such time as a national storage plan has been prepared which identifies the priorities for storage by locations and type. (J) The IC shtould undertake an external stock audit at the end of the 1987/88 financial year. Th Cooprtives (k) The Governmnt should permit primary coperative societies to buy and sell grain freely on a comrc'al basis, including the sale of grain to private traders and the purChase of grain from NMCdepots. Workint Paper No. 3 Page 15 (f) Cooperative Unions should also be permitted and encouraged to trade grain both within and between regions on a couuercial basis, to purchase and sell grain from the N1MCand to trade with private sector traders. (m) Government should establish a review procedure to assess the performance of the cooperatives as marketing institut4ons with a view to providing technical support and training for the development af a commercially sound cooperative trading sector. (n) NMC should provide crop purchase finance to cooperatives on a cash-on delivery basis. The NMC should not prc' t creditfor crop purchase to cooperatives. The PrivateTrade (o) The NMCshould institute a system of registering private traders as licensed buling agents for delivery of grain direct to depot at the into-store price. (p) Government should publish permission for private traders to purchase grain from the primary societies for onward sale either to the NMCor to private markets. 3.3 STORAGEAND STOCKS POLICY (a) Governmentshould adopt a policyof a diversified pattern of storage of fo6dgrains including investment in and improvementof storage on-farm.,at cooperatives, by private traders and by the NMC. WorknxaPaser No. 3 Page 16 tb) Governmnt should modify and thereafter dictate its policy towards the use of the SGR. The SGR should be treated as buffer stocks held and used by the NMCir implementation of the policy of price support and market stabilisation. The SGR should not be reserved for emergencies only. kc) The NMC should analyse its requirewnts for minimum reserv, stocks and clarify with Government the conditions under which imports should normilly be ordered. (d) The Goverment should seek donor support for the establishment of a financial food security reserve to be maintained as an external foreign exchange reserve. (e) The Government should undertake a review of all public sector storage capacity and facility requirements. (f) The Governmnt should confirm their approval and support for the 'first-in/First-out (FtFO) principle of stock turnover throughout the marketingsector. 3.4 FINCIAL RATIONS SETEENTIE GOVERMENAND TE NMC (a) The Govenmt should write off the excess of the total WNC bank overdraft (on all accounts) over the value of stocks held by NMC (on an' expected realisable value basis) on 31 July 1988. (b) The Government should remove taxes on impOrted food coditles handled by the NMC since these are in effect providing a mechanismfor unplanned credit expansion. (c) Providing the odifications to pricing policy recommended in this report are adopted, the Goverment should not place restrictions on the expansion of NBCcredit to the NMC for purposes of purcbasing produce in market support operations. Workint Paper No. 3 Page 17 3.5 MANAGEIMETOF THE NMC (a) The Government should review the managerial structure and capability of the NMC in the light of changes in its role and operations,particularly with regards to reorganisatton and internaldelegation of responsibilities. 3.6 EXTERNALTRADE IN COARSE GRINS (a) The Governmentshould decontrol the export of coarse gr. ; with a view to permitting cooperatives and private traGa-r to enter the export market for these crops on a commercial basis. 'b) Governmetshould encourage the export of grains, including maize, overland to neighbouring countries when the domestic market conditions are favourable with a view to legalising these flows. Cc) The Government should, however, insist upon the imposition of appropriate phytosanitary control particularly regardint the incidence, dissemination and containement of the Larger Grain Sorer. More stringent penalties should be Gazetted for the disregard of the control of this insect. (dt The Goverwnnt should formulate and publish rules for NMC exports of grain to avoid the large financial losses incurred in 1987/88. (e) The Governmet should employ international phytosanitaryl Insurance Agencies (eg. SGS - Superintendents Ltd), as added, unbiased assuranceof the purity and cleanliness of export shipments especiallywith regard to the incidence of the Larger Grain Borer (Prostephanus truncatus Horn.). 'Worklnt Paoer No. 3 Page 18 3.7 IMPLEMENTATIONOF GRADING SYSTEMS (a) The Government should in4ediately establish a Quj. and Pest Control Working Group to coordinate and monic: the implementation of grading rules by NMCand the Cooperative. Unions. (b) The Qualityand Pest Control Working Group should fonmalise an NMC contract for produce inspection and pest control for and on behalf of the Cooperative Unions for the 1988/89 procurement and storage season. 3.8 TECHNICALASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS (a) The Government should immediately request new Technical Assistance in the following two ways: The National Establishment of Pricing and Marketing Mechanisms; Reorganisation and Iprovenent of Agricultural Planning. (b) The Tover should also imediately request the reappraisal, reformlation and appropriate expansion of the following: The ISROGrain Storage and Milling Project; The FAOCooperatives Training Proposal; The FAOLarger Grain Borer Project; The FAOSurvey of Storage Facilities Proposal. Working Paper No. 3 Appendix 1 Page 1 TERMSOF REFERENCE FOR FOOO MARKETING CONSULTANTS t. Backgqround In 1986 the Government estaolished a Task Force (t7) with the mancate to review the main food policy issues artd to r-ccnmend mea2;res which (taking fully into account fcod secujrity concerns) would improve (reduce economic and financial costs of) the existing i, ternal food distribution system. The TF's conclusions were discussed by Cabinet in August 1987,when it was decided. amongother things that, the role of NMCwould become one of buyer and seller of 14st resort and of manager of the SGR (for which seoarate financia! accounts would be kept). The SGR had by then been established (with 80,000 tonnes) but only partial steps have been taken to rqduca the role played by the NMC in food crop procurement. At the beginning of March 1988, the TF was reactivated,and ctvrged with developing the August Cabinetguidelines into specific measur on food crop pricing, distribution,and storage whichminimise costs (especially to the public sector) while providing farm incentives consistent with maintaining food security, and with efficient production. This will require reconsideringthe role played by officialproducer and sales prices, SGRprocureent and turnover, quality differentials, transport costs, NM4C(trading and milling) &cooperativeunions, primary societies, and private traders. The main commoditiesconcerned are maize, rice, wheat and beans. 2. Term of Reference In order to facilitate the accomplishment of these measures, the Government in consultation with the World Bankhas decidedto recruit two consultants (Messrs Saker and Gray of Oxford University's Fcod Studies Group) under ODA financing, to work with the TV. The general role of the consultants will be to assist the TF in a redesign of food policy which involves analysingviable alternatives, outlining WokLna Pau.r No. 3 Appendlx 1 Page 2 the key trade-offs involved and oroposinga comprehensive sat of measures (including both institutional and technical issues) as well as an appropriate phasing of impleme-.tation of the reforms. tn particular the consultants will deal with the following issues: (a) Oevelopment of an appropriate mechanism to Se used in the formulation of food pricingpolicy which takes into account the impact of transport and qualitydifferentilIs on farmgate and consumerprices of the main food commodities; (b) determination of the relative roles of parastatals, cooperatives and the private sector in food pricing arrd distribution; (c) analysis of the appropriate size and operations of the SGR with particular reference to procurement procedures and quality differentials. Because of the urgency of the work, the consultants had to finish their assignment in mtd-April so as to allow sufficient time for discussions within the Govermnt and other parties that will be responsible for the implementation of the agreed measures. The implementation of those measuresmust start in July 1988. Working Paper No. 4 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER CEREALSMARKETING POLICY AND FOOD SECURITY Southern Africa Department Agriculture Operations Division Africa Regional Office Working Paper No. 4 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER CEREALSMARKETING POLICY AND FOOD SECURITY Table of Contents Page No. 1. INTRODUCTION...... I fI. THE PRESENTSITUATION: FINDINGS OF THE MISSION ...... 3 III. ELEMENTSOF A CEREALS' MARRETCUM FOODSECURITY POLICY. 5 3.1 Policy Formulation...... 6 3.2 Instrumentsfor Policy Implementation...... 7 3.3 InstitutionalProvisions..** ...... 10 3.4 FinancialRequirements ...... 12 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS...... 13 4.1 General and First Phase Recommendations...... 13 4.2 Recommendationsfor Longer-termImplementation.... 18 ANNEXES 1. Terms of Reference 2. Overview of Positionson Main Issues Map of Tanzania Workint Paper No. 4 Page 1 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER CEREALPOLICY A1I) FOOD SECURITY * 1. ntdcIo The Minister of Finane, Economic Affairs and Planniu of the Governent of Tanzania requested the Minister for Development Co- operation of the Netherlands(NL) during disculiou on January 17, 1988to field a minsion In order to advise,at short notice, on the ongoing resaucturing of the cereabl market and food supplysystem. The requet was confirmed in lettwr of Febray 4, 1988,of the Principal Secretary of the said Ministry to the Netherlands Ambassador, stating: "that you asist us with expet who understnd the problems countries like ours face with inaequte rnportation and storage, to design a system of marketing of food grais which would Include alo elements of food scurty i.e. et of a Strategic Grain Reserve - size, rlenishme/s d managementsystem) as well as beingable to purc the food so producedso that the marketing sym helps In implemsntingthe country's policy of food self-sufficiency".Thi Is the report of the mission. Subsequly term of reference wer drafted (see Amnex1) asking of the mision amongothe ths: 1. to work togete with the Tak Force chaired by Mr. T. Banda; 2. to study mesnu aimed at reconclUn the objecdves of a more mket oieted crel production and approach and the objecives of fod 3. to dedslwap to follow up adecllowithregad to institutil and organizatonal mattes The mission visited Tanzania from Aprl 5 tOrh Api 14, 1983 and worked to ckas contact with the Charman of the Task Force oa Tnzia's Food Securty, Mr. T. Bands. The min wIa headed by Mr. MP.1 Vde, C _hamof the NetherlandsCentral Maketng Boad for Arb Crops Mmbes wer Mr. J. janonus (FAO, Food Scurity, Addis Abba Mr. J. Pott (Mlnlsry of Agriulture The Hagse, NL) and Mr. A.P. Oomen (FoodSecurity, EuropeanCenre for Developm_ntPoliW Ma ee, M cht, NL). The mdon conultd Mr. T. Band, Chairmn of the Tak Force, Mr. Teun, menber of the TF, Mr. Molel, DG of the National MUii Corporatiw (NMC),Mr. Mlifedba of the Coopwatives' Unio of Tanzania (CUT), the saf Of the Martb Bureau (MDB), the Food Security Unit, the WorldBan missin, the EEC delgate, FAO, WFP, resident and visitig expatriate expwt and the Neterlands Embay. The mision studied the first report of the TF of Jue 196,, "Food Distribution in Tanzani with special rfernce to lIstitutioal Functions, Itergonai Trade, Pricing ad Cost Reduction. Also the draft of a second report he Pricingnd Distributionof Baic Food * This paper was prepared by Kuropean Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM),May 25, 1988. Working PaDer No. 4 Page 2 Commodities" prepared by J. Gray and A. Baker (ODA-mission)pro- vided information that was indispensable for the work of the mission. The mission wants to express its appreciation for the excellent cooperation with Mr. Banda and the Task Force, for the great hospitality from the part of the Charge d'Affalres and Mrs. Bloembergen, for the many informative discusslons with officials and advisers and finally for the excellent logistic support by the Netherlands Embassy. The report contains three sections: 1. the present situation; findings of the mission; 2. elements of a cereals' market cum food security policy and policy implementation; 3. recommendations for the Tanzanian short term and longer term cereals' market policy. Vorkina Paper No. 4 Page 3 2. The prem situation:Findina of themidso Both the reptrts and the discussions confirmed the need for further reform and restructuring of the cereals' market In the framework of the Economic Recovery Policy of the GOT. For an extensive description of the constraints of the present situation and the changes already introduced by the GOT, the mission refers to the TF Report of June 1987 and to the draft report of Gray and Baker of April, 1988. However, four existing major obstacles to an efficient cereal marketing system should be mentioned here: (i) the institutional framework and the related regulations limiting the flow of cereals on the market (too many intermediaries) and limiting the development of a private trade that serves the need of the counry, 5ii) the deteriorated physical infrastucture of roads, railways, roling stock, mills, etc.; (Iii) the very high costs of the existing marketing system as It works in practice, both Intrisic (transportation on bad roads etc.) and extlnc (interest paymens, domestic credit requirements, levies, taxes, marketing mwgin of official agencies); (lv) the uncertainty for the producers due to frequent substantial change in marketing ad pricing policy, in (top-down) Instttiol provisions etc. The Instutonal framework (1) proves to be a major obstacle to grin flows from production to c ton centres. The official marketing system actually foresee six between the produce and the comer, nameiy:the Primsry Society, the Co- operativ Union, the National Miling CopoatonRgional Branch, NMC - Dar-es-Salasm, NDL or RePiooal Trdn Compayt, Retailer. Many delays in credit flos to the lIttution that buy from the poducers and In physical ainows from the poducm to the consumw cause piig up of stocks to the producing are under most umnutable conditions. The bad contion of the physical if uu () ad its impact on the cost of maketing and the other cos of the mketing system (ill) ar very well descred In the repor that are mentioned rlier. ffice bur c t tend to lUveat the expene of the famers, financial Itituons and the Treasury, and sometimes also of the coumes. With regwd to ({v) the need should be emphaszed fcr a steady, consistent gin marketing policy. Ov the lat twenty yers quite a number of chges were introduced in the marketing Institudons, rules, restrictions, producer ad consume pric et Co-operatives he" been established, abolished and re-etabished. NMC has been restrctured, de-centralized, then centralized again, Working Paper No. 4 Page 4 to Co-operative Unions (C.U.'s) without much prepration. Prevailing prices have sometines been pan-territorial, sometimes regionally diversified. There have been variations in the price hierarwchybetween different commodities e.g. the sorghum price has been set higher than maize from 1976/77 to 1978/79, at slightly lower level from 1982/83 and much lower than maize from 84/85 up to now. Sembe selling price has been much lower than maize grain price betweon 1980-1983 and nearly double in 1985. Certain crops, like finger millet and pigeon peas have temporarily been boosted by high procurement prices paid by NMC, then abandoned. Private trade has been banned vith varying degrees of severity, then re-established with several modifications. Village collection of produce has continued very much as before, but the name has changed from Village Committee into Primary Society. Application of a relatively high pan-territorial proement price, especially for maize, over a long period has distorted economic realities and caused shifts to uneconomic production. From the time- series records of NMC p r by region and by crop, it can be seen that food surpluses have inreasingly developed in the more remote areas, some with high trrt costs to Dar-e-Salaam. The mission, however, also wants to point at a number of positive elements that already have a visible impact on the present tramition perod. - EIv8a t was legalized and priva trde flows increased subhtantially; - the, together with the icree of prduction led to IQo L2LDZI' In urban areas vi. Dw-es-Sslaa - X in arosdue to both climatc conditions an farms' expecitations in respect to market devep t - the _ Won of the market and of the food security situation of the Maket Development Bureau and the Early W lart SystemFood Secity Unit provide valuable infonnatln on both urban nd nrral markets, which is IndIpensble for decision makng In the new, m 'remote' maket monitor function of the GOT. The minion wa not able to analyze and make recommendations on the following isu that It considers Importnt and to be studied. - the effet of ItB reommE atios Xonotber food crops or on non-food crops (export crops); - the preci financial plicatons of its reco tio though It wa confidently asumed that substeaW saving compaed to the preent system would mut; - the reform in fiscal polcy necesary to keep Government revenue on the required level since the role of NMC as tax and levy collector wil be greatly reduced. Working PaperNo. . Page 5 3. l of a Cereal' Maket cuo Food Security Policy This section provides an overview of the components of a sound cereals market and food security policy and policy implementation proes. As both the reports of the Task Force and ODA start out from the actual situation in Tanzania, It was considered usefdl in this report to start from what the mission considers an optinul combination both of a liberalised market and of food security in the longer term. Food security is defined as 'access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life' (W.B. Poverty and Hunger). Availability, accessibility and stabilityare the key words. Availability stands for an adequate supply of good, nutritious food, accessibility refers to priceincome ratios, whereas stability relstes to both supply and prices. Governents, especially the Tanzanian Government, have always considered food security to be their resporsibility, as food is a basic need of greatImportnce for the wholepopulation and social and political stability greatly depend on an adequate food security under all circumsnces. However, food security is hardly ever achieved without (public) costs to meet the needs of the poor. As a consequene governmen budgetu ally cae for the costs of achieving food security as a public interest Sometime these costs are vey high. Moreover, government tend(ed) to consider a substantial market intervention and regulation the best Itument to achieve food security.As food secuity lrely depends on the vailabilit of cereals, agrctural polices on cereal production, marketing and are often sed by a high degee of central regulations uan In the framework of stxuc l adjustment, bowever, both a high levl of govemn re and the degee of goertal itervention are subjt to subantial reform. Market liberalisation, a lage role for the private sector, reduction of the role of the gov t, resrgatlon of par tals ad reducton of the size of the g instituions ully ae common elements of the sctural tt p In designing a new rdatioship between govertnent and society, one of the fndametal questom Is how to give spe to the basic govrnmt responsibity for food securityIn a Iberalisedmarket. A d fdamenta question closely related to the first one concerns the specific chaacter of the aoculturl market itself, especially the ceeal maket, In the framwork of the actual trend to liberaliss markets: Nobody has ever sen In any place a well- functioning production and full coverae maketing system of basic food crop without some governent rket venn and/or protectim Working Paper No. 4 Page 6 Experience shows that without any goverment intervention a fully free market for food leads to a skewed distribution of food, i.e. hunger and malnutrition, because of the less-effective or non- effective demand of the poor. The opposite situation, a centrally planned agricultural production and food distribution system in sub- Saharan Africa, has also led to hunger and malnutrition in the rural areas as the svtems work badly and at extremely high costs. With the foregoing data and lessons in mind, the mission presents its views on the major elements of a nereals market cum food security policy in general. These are or will soon become relevant for decision making in Tanzania: - the fonnulation of a policy; - the instunmts to implement the policy; - the institutional provisions; - the financial quent. 3.1 Policy formulation A cereals' market cum food security policy is part of the overall g,ovrernmentpolicy and will reflect the ruling concept of the relationshp between government and society. if, in the framework of stuctura adjstment, a country has chosen to reduce the role of the ern the questions arise about which responsibilities remain part of a minimum role of the gove nt with regard to the cereals' market and food security and how thi can be attined at minimum costs. Even in a situation of a liberalised food market, the minimum responiity of the governtmet for the cor' market and food scurity is still sbstntial and should compise the folowing fumctions: 1. formulating a food security policy as part of and in harmony with Its overall soci and ecoomic policy; 2. exerting influence on open market farmgate prices in order to protet f s omes and on consume' prices so a to retai equity 3. regatin aU food Imports and food exports; 4. monitorn closely and on a pemnent bai the evolution of the food supply situation, both thrug crop monitoring and thrugh the monitoring of markets and (ocil ndicators related to food and nutrition. The functions mentioned under 2. and 3. will be further explaned hereafter in 3.2 d 3.3; the monitoring wil be explained in 3.3. With regard to Item 1. the formulation of a cereal market cwn food security policy and its Implementation requie the definition of the following elements: Working Paper No. 4 Page 7 - food and nutrition standards; total needs of the population; the effective demand and groups at risk; - local production targets; percentage of optimal level of self- sufficiency; quantitative targets for several crops to arrive at a quantitative and qualitative adequacy in food supply and nutrition (calories, proteins and vitamins); - security and intervention stock levels; possible food aid contribution; - import levels, timfetable of imports, food aid as part of the imports; - import levies to protect local production; local levies and taxes; - prices: floor price for produces; ceiling price for consumers; - targeted interventions for vulnerable groups, food entitlement and ration schemes; - decision making procedures a foDow up of data from the monitoring system. 3.2. bInena for poicy pitatlm As the direct involvement of the governm in the cereals market is reduced the instruments for polic implemention will be more of a legislative and monitoring tr th of an executive nature. In general th lberallsaton of the maket aN stimulation of the private sector wll requie a thorough rview of the legislation govering the stuctue sad opetions of private entprise, co- operatives, credt institutions. The fiscal system needs to be reviewed and adapted to the new strcne This need has alredy been extenvely analyse by the Task Force and its report contains a comprehensive set of reco dations for dealin with thi ise To infloec open market prices for produces ad for consumers the govemet geeraly needs t implement a price and market interntio policy, establishin a 'l.or price nd a8ctig rice, and maintaining them by o n the market by seling stocks or acting as buyer of last resort. For a better functioig of the market the gove also has to introduce a gradint system. For the rest the actors on the maket are free to buy and sell from and to whoever wats to sel and buy, provided levies and taxes are duly paid. Working Paper No. 4 Page 8 To guarantee food security in periods of threatened deficits the government takes the responsibility for the management of a food security stock. This stock forms part of the Intervention stock as far as operational aspects are concerned. For food security reasons it is decentralised and situated in deficit prone areas. Regulation of exports and imports should strictly be done by the government: A free exportation system may jeopardise food security plans. The size of the intervention and secwity stock(s) should be related to the timelag between a warning signal from the Early Warning System and the actual arrival of food from a surplus region or from outside the country. The better the management of EWS, of the decision making process and of the mobilisation of internal and/or external resources (food aid), the smaller the stocks will need to be and the lesser the costs. The possibility of establishing a 'food security insurance' or 'food aid standby agreement' with the donor. should be explored as one way to economln on costs of physical storage (see 3.3). Several times in the last five years large- scale, so-called 'infonnal cereal exchanges' did lead to famine and food Insecurity in sub-Sahan Africa. Large Imports of cereals on the other hand have often ruined the market for local production, Introduced foreign food habits, drained foreign exducne reserves etc. Regulation of imports and expc's could best be done by licensing each and every shipment. The next paragraphs deal more explicitly with the instrhment of 'price and market intervenUon policy'. Prie ad market W tPoUc The market sytem should be high libraised with a definite tervention and monitoring role for the govenment to maintai food Iscuity. In prinple the maket prics will move according to the supply/demand dstuat betwee a low noor price and a ceiling price both set by the g e The prcipal featus of the MM. Me for a specific grin ue: - It wi be set by the government on an amual basis; - it will be the price for which the govervnm wUilpurcha the grain In a specified and genrlly lmWted number of location In the country. The limitation of location wll avoid over- reliance on Government purchase; - cooperatives, privat traders and the farmers thomselves can sl their cerea to these govermet purchasin offices - minimum qualty r e for the cereal tt is bought by the goverent wiU be neceary to prevent the dane that the best grain Is sold to the open market and that the low quauty grain wll be offered to the govenment purchasing office; - It will be uniform for the whole country; some advantages of one floor price are: WorkingPaper No. 4 Page 9 * difficult political discussions on regionalization of floor prices can be avoided; * price differentiation could encourage artificial flows of cereals from low price regions to high price regions. The principal features of the UILngprie are: - it will be set by the government on an annual basis; - It will be the price that will be defended by the government by starting to sell from government owned bufferstocks at a somewhat lower price level; - it is the maximum price for selling to a consumer - the usual consumer price will according to the supply/demand situation be lower. The government will set the floor price for production and the ceiling price for consumers at such a level that the marketing and transportation costs between the surplus and the deficit areas can be recovered from the margin between the floor price and the ceiling price. If, in a given region, the marketing and tron Csts to Dar- e-Salaam are becoming too high to be recovered, the production of maize for the market of DSM will decrease or come to an end. The production of commodities with a more favourable value for weight ratio will be taken up inste Thus, a market oriented differentiation between, and specialisation of the regions will gradually take place. Maize production for the market Is therefore not a pReste for regional development. Differentiation, however, could imply speciaisation in maiz producton for export to neighbourig countries like Zare and the SADCC member countries. MDB could study this potential market for maize exor. Prvate Trade Private traders sad farmer coopti must be allowed to buy from farms and sell to retales and consumers v. the whole country in free coetition. In such an open and free market prices will be determined by the supply and demand situation for cereals at differen t and places. This willresult in hier market prices and prices received by farms in deficit area (especially in the adjacent areas to Dar-es-Salam). This sstem tends to encorg production in the are nar the markets. Free competition will also usually resut in prce paid by the conumers beng lower tn the ceiing price. -- ---1 on the Mst The governmet Is a buyer and seller of last resort. Its functions in this aspect are: WorkingPaper No. 4 Page 10 - to ensure a guaranteed outlet for grain with the minimum quality requirements for the producers at the floor price; - to emure that grain will be available for the consumers at a certain price. Sales to the goverunmentpurchasing offices will especially take place in years of high production in the more remote areas where the market prices are the lowest. These cereals purchased by the government will form part of the bufferstock/strategic grain reserve (SGR). The government will distribute the cereals to the storage facilities In the country. It will start selling the cereals when prices, paid by consumers in a certain area, will reach a 'trigger price'. This trigger price will be set by the government at a level somewhat below the ceiling price. Sales from government owned stocks to private traders and retailers could be made at a fixed price or by means of a tender. By selling in a deficit consumer market the govermnent will defend the ceiling price. 3.3 Istutional provo Permnunm food security requires several institutional provisions at different levels. Firstly different aspe of food security fall under the competence of several ministries or government departments. Seondly food security is usually a balane between coflcting interest of different groups. Thirdly, only thogh active ad diligent patipt of many and different institution in the monitoring of the food pply situatio does one arrive at a food and nutrition survillance system that provides a complete pictur of the situati as it evolves. Fourtwly, to cope with food and nuitio security a wide range of mer i avalable, each of them to be pleted by different competent Instiuom at differeAt levels: gove l - national. regional and local; prvate etor Inatitution li noo mental orgrnisation (NGO's). Fifthly, becae so Intertonal orgaisatio, bilateral dono snd pvo' from outside the cout are interested in food scurity and willn to co-opa, there is a need for stl for food seauity. Apart from a Minitry of Ariculture and Food Supply dealing with food production In the cot of the total agricultural poduction. at least four ItutIonal provom stalways without ay expanon of the mber of governent employees) are nceay to fully cover different aspects of food security. Tbey all are more or less forms of co-ordination, of exchang of I tion, of monitoring at different levels, with diffnt objectives Fisly, at the political and central government level: In many countries the vital importac of food securt X reficted in a high level Ineestertal committee the member of which are the Ministers dealng with policy ara with impact on food secrity. Working Paper No. 4 Page 11 The secretariat lies in the hands of the Minister who has been designated to be responsible and competent for food security affairs. This committee will normally deal with the food security sector policy and the instrwments to Implement It. Formally its decisions are to be ratified by Cabinet, but in emergencies It decides on the actions to be taken. Secondly, there always has to be a bureau to execute the governmental roles In the cereals' market and in maintaining food security. This body is responsible for the implementation of the price policy, for market intervention, for licensing impor and exports, for maintaining an intervention stock and a security stock, for the management of these stocks, for acting as buyer of last resort, for targetted concessional or free distribution in case of severe deficits. Becau of the direct link with central government decisions (see inter-minsterial committee), the bureau soWd be part of the Ministry that is in charge of the cereals' market and food security. Thirdly, there needs to be institutional capacity close to the central government to monitor and to provide interpreted data on the food supply situation both in the form of crop monitoring and of following social and market indcators (Early Warning Systems; food and nutrition surveillance systems, social dimensions of adjustment). In the fourth place co-ordination of external astance needs to be institutionalised. In several cotrie in Sub-Sahaa Africa extenl asistance in the ea of food security, icluding food aid, Is successfully coordinated on a permanent basis, i.e. both in the planning and the implementation stage. The active volvement of bilateral donos, multlatl orgtions like the World s*, FAO Nd WFP, and NGO's in the cause of national food security should result in a 'food scri inae' or food aid standby areement. Such an agreement can subsanally reduce the phscal level of security stocks as It alms at reducing the delivery time of externa food aid. Tiey and trustworthy information from the moitorig sytem (up to eight monti before an 'emergency' lle actually takes place) to the international communit at the national level is In that respect posible and more effecve tan larp itnational appeals and large grain reserves. The 'food secuity sector donor co-ordination group' ould be chaired by the priarly responsibleMinster or senior official of that Ministry and as a rule also be attended by senior officials of other Ministries involved in food security matter 'At least four' Indicats an option for one or more additional institutions.The mission wihes to add some The first one i for a working group to enure that the Int niel committee s kept abreat of difficulties, consisting of senior officals of different ministries who are dealin daily with aspect of food security in their respectve operational, administave and/or executve branches. The Tanzanian Task Force on th Cereals' Working Paper No. 4 Page 12 Market and Food Security isan excellent example of such a body. The second additional suggestion is to hold regular meetings of officers responsible for food security in the regions or provinces, to support the work of the Task Force. Lastly the establishinent of a Food and Nutrition Group is suggested composed of individual experu from outside the administration to advise the competent minister on the medium tern quantitative and qualitative food requirements of the country. 3.4 Fnscial rqui_reents The Government functions to guarantee food security are of a non- commercial character and their costs need to be financed out of the Government budget. These costs include: - the costs concerned with the funciong of the market intervention bureau and the mainterance and management of an intervention stock; - the costs of the malntalnane and management of a Strategic Grain Reserve (also when SGR becomes operationally an integrl part of the market intervention stock); - the costs of concessional food distribution in case of acute loss of food accesibility (mostly targeted food aid); - the costs of inter annual storage for the sake of food security only. All these diferen kinds of expenditure related to food security should be budgeted in a transparent mamer. Institutoal and recurret ,cos of each of the aforementioned idtitutions and funtUions are to be specified. Investment equirems should be identfied and, if apprriate, discussed as 'pojects' with the donao Total food import needs are aWo to be budgetd and posile savinp thrug food aid be specified. All food aid, including the project - food aid and/or targted food aid, should be valued and budgeted. This spcification of the use of the reveus from the sale of food aid (tbe so called couterpart funds) to defray the recuet costs of food security also is often useful for the dcussion with donors. Working Paper No. 4 Page 13 4. If the Tanzanian Government decides to enter into a process of restructuring of the cereals' market along the lines of the previous paragraph, a multi-annual policy and policy implementation plan have to be designed and institutional provisions have to be made, starting from the present situation. At present a great number of relatively rapid changes are already taking place. They should be monitored and guided so that changes, whether induced or spontaneous, will not have to be coreted substantially in a future phase. The TF-report presents an impressive agenda for decision and implementation. The mission's views are in line with almost all of their recommendations. Annex 2 provides an overview of the different poinrs of view in comparison with the present situation. For the sake of completeness this paragraph contains the recomendations of the mision, including many that were formulated by the TF-report. The recommn tions regarding the Floor Prce, the SGR-operations, the level of the stocks ad the grading sytem reflect a differnce of opinion from that of the otber reports (number 5, 8 and 18, maked by (M)J. In view of the design of a pln of implmenio a dtton is made betweern omndations for the first phe l.e. the immediate future and those for a later phase As policy options ar now adequately elaborated an avaiable the GOT isn an optimm potion for taking timely decisions that are needed now and in the Immediate fute 4.1 Genal and fht ps m (I) The GOT should keep up the responsibility for food secrity. It should take up a monitoring ad, if necery, an inteven_g role to secure for every citizen at lowest pble and affordable cou the vailabilty and accibility of food aNd tbe stability of the food supply. AU three aspt should relate to both the quantity and nutritive quality of the food. (2) To that end the missn *a liberalized domestic cereals' productio and market system effectively potected against distortions from the outside (world) maket. (3) The marketing, p icing and stock policy should reflect a balanced but flexible cho"i, between the objectives of a liberalized market and of food security.In principle themarket priceswill move accoding to the supply/demand situation WorkinK Paper No. 4 Page 14 (4) The further liberalisation and the restructuring of the market for maize and other food crops will need to be accompanied by appropriate decisions and measures on the part of GOT. Some of these are to be implemented in the Immediate future, others might be postponed, but should be prepared in the first phase of the restructuring. Recommendations for short term Inmplementation Price. market and stock oolicv. (5) The mission recommends the introduction of a fork type pricing system: (*}- a low pan-territorial floor price; - a high ceiling price for consumers. The principal featur of the floor price for a specific grain are: - It will be set by the Goverment on an annual and pan- tertorial basis; - it will be the price for which the Govenmnt will purchase the grin in a limited number of locatios In the country (NMC- depots; one or two per region); - co-opatives, private traders and the farmers themlves can sell their cereals to these NMC-purmasing offices at the noor price and at the condition that minimum quality r entsf for the cerl that is bought by NMC are set. The principal featurs, of the ciln rim a: - it will be set by the Government on an annual basis; - it will be the price that will be defended by the Governent by statng to sell from Government NMC-owned ferstoc at a somewhat lower prie level; - it i the mximm price for seling to a consmer. The consumer price will according to the supply/demand situation be ually lower. The Go t wi se the floor price and the ceiling price rat such a lvl that the marketing and trmporatio costs between the sWpltu ad the defict areas can be recoverd from the marxin betw the floor price and the ceiig price. Thi could be reached by freezing the actual noor price which is at the same tme NMC- procurement price for a mnuber of yes and by increasing the ceilig price for example by the flati ra. (6) Priva raders a fen' cooperatives should be allowed to buy from famers and sell to retaler and consumers in the whole country in free compettion. In such an open and free market prices wil be determIned by the supply and demand situation for cereal at different t Nd places. Working Paper No. 4 Page 15 1nerenion an tht Market (7) The Government should be a buyer and seller of last resort. Its functions in this respect are: - to ensure a guaranteed outlet for grain of minlmum quality standard for the producers at the floor price; ^ to ensure that grain will be available for the consumers, particularly the poorer sections of the population, at a certain price and of a certain quality. Sales to the NMC-purchasingoffices should form part of the intervention stock/SGR reserve. The Government will distribute the cereals over the storage facilities in the country. SGR reserves will be located in deficit prone areas. Sales from Government owned stocks to private traders and retailers could be made at a fixed price or by means of a tender. By selling in a deficit consuner market the Government wiU defend the ceiling price. (8) The mission fully endorses the recommendation of the ODA mission report with regard to the opeational Integation of the SGR and the Intervention stock, whereas from the point of view of administrion they are kept fuly separate. (*) The mission recommends to keep the SGR-stocks in deficit prone areas. (M) The mission never to use more than 50% of the SGR for normal market intevention purpoes. That meaomthat in deficit prone aea at leas 50% of the target SGR-level is always in stock. (*) The total level of the SGR- and iterention stocks suld, in principal, not exceed 10% of the marketed volume of the repective cereals. Institutioa MMue (9) Role of the Government. The new role of the Govenment vis-&-vis the private sector to be reflected in rules an regulatio drafted alog the lnes of pagrah 3 of this report. The TF-reprt anumates a number of them that need redraftng. The intwerton between the Goermnt and the private sector in the new set-up should be monitored. (10) NMC's role soud be divided into commercially viable functons and executive functions on behalf of ad financed by the Government. In the new sucture that part of NNMC that wil act as executive arm of the Govervme should take care of the following functions related to food security - buyer of last resort at floor price level; - market intervention bureau, managementof intervti stock; of SGR, concessional food distribution; - inter-annul storage. Working PaDer No. 4 Page16 As the executive arm of the GovernmentNMC shoud be present in all or almost all regions and maintaindecentrallsed stocks for both intervention and for concessional food distribution. It is strongly recommended to cluster all the different NMC-tasks Into distinct entitles In order to obtain a transparent financial and management system in the neaest future. Apart from the functions In the field of food security, NMCwill continue to be responsible for: - the import of food grains, both commercial Imports and food aid. - the level and the schedulingof food grain exports through the licesing of individualparties; this responsibilItyshould leave the responsibilityof the Central Bankunimpeded; - milling for Institutions; - storage both at the national and the regional level. For suggestionsat a later stage aee4.2. Prim Socletv (11) The primary society should develop an economicand competitive function. It shouldgive to Its member farmers influence on the purchasng price offered by Cooperative Unions and private trader The present role of physiea colectn of produce from the farmers shouldbe changed into a tradig functn PS's shouldbe In a poition to sell to private trad CooperativeUnions and urban wholeales. PS's should, bowever,lose their monopolyof buying from Individualprduces Primary societies shouldbe further allowedto form an Independentasocio of primary socities to strengthenthei economicviabllty either on a g hical or fucior bais for reasons of specilsation CoooenuurUnions (12) Co-operativeUniom shouldbe stimuated to evolve into comercAl, competitive sod viable intitutions. Their cost- structue should often be impd and cloly t A fair competition with the private stor might equire the otducon Of fiscal mess s on pivate nade. Co-opetive Unio shouldl Ioetrmonopoly of buyn from primy socii ud sellg to NMC.Howver, they will be able to sel diectly to the NaionW D butws Ltd. (NDL),wbolesars In urban areas and other Co-operativ Unions.They sbould also sradually tak over the teonalrade from NMC.Thoy might, moreovr, at a later stag on a sound economic bads develop a larger position In the credit-and-savingsbrsncb, in the sale of inputs an of consmmr goods. It s m that a multi-aoual aining and monitoring progrmme be designedto stimulate the Co-operatie Uniom In their change of attitude and character towds a commerciallymanaed orgnstlon workins Paper No. 4 page 17 Monielgin §M=zna: Food Secuity Unit/Early Waming System (EWS) and Market Development Bureau (MDB) (13) The very valuable work of EWS and MDB should be continued and in the light of the new market structure possibly be extended to 'market price forecasting'. MDB could moreover study the potential market of SADCC-countries and Zaire for maize fromn Songes and also from Rukwa, once the road Sumbawanga-Mbeyais improved. D-onor Coworinaiogn (14) The establihment of a food security sector co-ordination group chaired by the competent Minister and consisting of the donors (including NGO's) that are active in the field of food security and cereals' market restructuring (investment projects; food aid) is recommended with a view to sharing the costs of food security. To ensure an effective level of involvement regular meeting and timely information are useful. Milling (15) The mission recomn privatisation of the milling sector. It supports the intrduction of mills with differet capacities. After the renovation of the NMC-mills, NMC should look for private partnrshp. The Improvementof the products and of the marketng of NMC shouId be studied in that context Storage (16) To make an optimad use of the existing storage management expertise of NMC and of Its stores, dlos and warehouses at central, local regional level, the stage function of NMC should be clustered and work as a dstinct entity, at a later stage possibly as an indpen t compay, renting stores to private traders, private nUls, Co-operative Unions, NMC-SGR/security stock operatoim, NMC-mllnt etc. at central, regional and local level. NMC-tapr (7 Thbecost and othe pe of efficiency of the transport functio of NMC should be studled. The utpo operations should be clustered In one unit an accounted for as a sepwate entity. Gradin (°) (18) The missionI Rlnl the early implemtaton of a simple grading system based on minimum standard requients ('reject', 'acceptable') to prepa for the possible Introducto of a more sophisticated grading system prepared by the Gray/Baker mission Working Paper No. 4 Page 18 FInancial qpuins (19) Different functions require separate budgetting and accounting. The strictly govermental functions with regard to food seculity ae to be financed out of pubic funds by the Treasury (se 3.4, page 13). (20) The recoendations of the TF-report with regard to the review of the fical system in the light of the restructured market are fully endorsed. 4.2 Rd for Iong-term (21) The evolution of NMC into several clusters of functions could lead to a Holding Company structue. kt could also, if appropriate, be split into several separate companies Moreover,it could in agreement with the Government shed its executive functions It currtly discharges for the Govermet. This would result in a regouping of those functions in a relatively small mwket Intervention nd food security bureau. The remaining s compae of NMC could join with private Cooative Unions and Primary Societies (22) The Govenment should stimulate the evolution of the C.U.'s and the P.S's into commercl and trade cooperatives of individual farmers and othes Exte_ion of the functions of these orgistiO m into crdit and npu supplyshould be studied and faclitated. WorkingPaper No. 4 Annex 1 Temns of reference Mission on Cereals' Market Polica and Food Securitv in Tanzania Bmcksxa In the framework of the ortgoing restructuring of the food pricing and distribution system under the E.R.P. the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania invited the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation to field a mission of experts to advise on the design of a medium and longer term food grain pricing, handling and distribution system which would include also elements of food security. The Netherlands Government readily accepted the invitation and approved the mission to take place from 6 through 13 April 1988 and to consist of Messrs. Vos, Pott, jansonius, Oomen. Terms of Refence 1. The mission will work together with the Task Force, chaired by Mr. T.E. Banda, set up in 1986 to undertake an inquiry into food pricing and distribution and to recommend apprriate renmxdal mesures. 2. For that purpose the first repo of the Task Force of June 1987 "Food Distribution System in Tanzana with special reference to instional functions, inter-regional trade, pricing and cost-reduction", as well as the second report of the Task Force of April 1988 If available will serve as a guide to the work of the mission. 3. The mission wil assit the Task Force in idontfying feasible ways of implennthe decisios of the Tanzana Govement based on the r n t of the Tak Force. 4. Special attention will be pid to meaue aimed at reconcilin the objectives of a more market oriented cereal poduction and cons ton approach ad the objectives of food security. 5. The mision will fur#thr desig ways to follow up decisions with regwd to insttutnal and ozation matters. 6. The mssion wiU, If and when approprite and in areement with the Task Force, comult relevant Tanzaian Gove ent and private latltutin as well as Intaonl, multilateral and bilateral donor representations. 24/03188 WorkinR Paper No. 4 Annex 2 Page 1 of Z I85'338 ~~~oxmwt51um~a TV ftpk mrp AhNM .. wwapzuum?u~1jz.P-hogam. ad _ am~t..- ad NC~ w-.. "wtu a1.n I9 y OnwLty. t_~21. an luftJauib b _p aul tu*za, b W . Uul lhantial 1- oteL p vim ami- ea 3-. . - Cm o lug d- t.a baayi O h~~~iWd- .L 4. Fs" MC Wmtmausv m at ue __ 31101 avot. MqW ad MU at at am3 fungi. mumin pi. Um a .a L ta.. .. - wo.at g m (Nn swum to a Im pgp ad . " F .- t, 1 dzyt.i taatu, W*mm - 64fF , ; Omz2.af da &in . Wll ARtttigcpmIAu 1.uy w2md atkwin6a.IUMyll onG Aau~m, o .lLUytD 21y ~~~~~~--). b, ~. ma. wiLdt. lap c 1ga ~~~~~~~~bw t w,m bd fxi NCdm a ~~~~~~~~~adto m nCiba" fa dLx ta S. mAIS -iaMn agsU ball Mm - -wo =O-ft 0Im?k embaMUSIL at _IIt_ fi. d 1tr *k 1a i 1ima A G. ARi. VRmy at0 i _ ~u ~~ a~~~~~~ imatC, e C. 1UU SO at .~~~~A~ tain f fn 0- to i aIJa _C.-I i Ao uAeIJi. ya *~~~~~~~gk kwsa_ak ICI cam tsao_mu,I - w a am a bon.-im aw -:111.1106 -omommtam. w tam, tln, 1B20; 1U algA gz <|1 . ~~~~~~~Su 01.|~~~~~~~~~p-0u umq(UidC G. on t1IN&~.ClARIM l aUmidSWa AU p1mmw Bt to a- m wU . tWbym-XNW *Uld, a-wtm ft Sw 1|La Sw) I- mu ad GIII a*p/w m ii aigew biamk o wem, m homaim _,~~~~~~~~~bk _t _somm _ PS u 21w or ISUI ON-- idg *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cNC OM; atB _4111_% *.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~nbv^ W_f (ea"db be u ir amWM g~~I I I I ;s _Fi|rI(I A I~~~~~I it I ,!1,'I! Ii U,'!l] I A Alov I~~~~~~~~jI I,Ifl at.IR[ 41~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 *i§!i {f-11aW!!!' R A'I §! ft~~~~~~~~~~~~~jI Z !' i! t! 1! ll If iiA I~~~~~~~~~~~~~0O II 11111 illiA .~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I a Workint Paper No. 4 MAP OF TANZANIA MARA / ~SHINYANGA *- .' \ / ,#-'''-*s ,,S': lKILNJARO/ xK]GOa . Tab= ' , e AR ^ / *X5 e tl U l Mi__,BEYA ,. o' w I oo3- 400 -- . \t\; '"-,~~ ¢S''"*4 - ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.* 1'D a * L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Workint Paper No. 5 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER FOODCROPS a Southern Africa Department AgricultureOperations Division Africa Regional Office Working PaPer No. 5 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER FOOD CROPS Table of Contents 2aU I. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 1 - Introduction 1 - Production I - Imports 3 - Food Availability 4 It. INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED WITH FOOO CROPS 4 TThe National Milling Corporation (NMC) 4 National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) 6 - Other Institutions 6 III. MARKETING 7 - Historical Development I - Official Marketing Channel 9 -Open Marketing Channel 11 - Storage 11 - Strategic Grain Reserve 13 - Transport 14 TV. PROCESSING is V. PRICING SYSTEM AND PRICES 17 - The Pricing Process 17 - Producer Prices 18 - Into-Store Prices 21 - Consumer Prices 23 Vt. MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 26 APPENDIX 1. Task Force on Food DistributionSystem 2. Revised RegulationsGoverning the Reconstitutionand Operationof the TanzanianStrategic Grain Reserve Working Paper No. 5 LIST OF ABhOEVIATION AISCO Agriculturaland industries Supply Corporation SET Board of External Trade BIT Board of Internal Trade BOT Bank of Tanzania CA Crop Authorities CAT Coffee Authority of Tanzania CATA Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania COC CommonwealthDevelopment Corporation CRD8 CooperativeRural DevelopmentBsank CU Cooperative*Un*on DADO District AgriculturalOevelopment Officer FSC Farm Service Centre FSC Farmers' Service Centre 6APEX General AgriculturalProducts Export Corporation LSMO Lint and Seed Marketing Board "DB Marketing Developmentbureau HALO Ministry of Agricultureand Livestock Development NAFCO National Agriculturaland Food Corporation NBC National bank of Commerce HoC National OevelopmentCorporation NMC National Milling Corporation NTC National Trading Company PCS Primary Cooperative Society PPN8 Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau RAOO Regional AgriculturalOevelopment Officer RTC Regional Trading Centres STC State Trading Corporation SUDECO Sugar Development Corporation TANICA Tanganyika tnstant Coffee Company TANSEED Tanzania Seed Company TAT Tobacco Authority of Tanzania TCA Tanzania Cotton Authority TCB TanganyikaCoffee Board TCCC Tanganyika Coffee Curing Company TCMB-Cotton Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board TCtB (coffee) Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board TCMS (cashewnut) Tanzania Cashewnut Marketing Board TEXCO Tanzania Textile Corporation TFA Tanganyika Farmers' Association TFC Tanzania Fertilizer Corporation TP8 Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board TRDB Tanzania Rural Development Bsank tSA Tanzania Sisal Authority TSC Tanzania Sisal Corporation rTA Tanzania Tea Authority TTPMe Tanzania Tobacco Processing and Marketing Soard Ttaw Tanzania Twine and Rope Works UtI Ubongo Farm Implements Company Ltd. WCGA Western Cotton Growing Area Working Paper No. 5 Page 1 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMSNT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER FOODCROPS I. PRODUCTIONAND IMPORTS JjSho6us1ian 1. Given the shortage of recent. reliable statistical information, particularlyas regards crop yields. etc., estimatesgiven in this report do not niecossarilyreflect the realfoodgrain situation in Tanzania. Data used in this Working Paper were obtained'fromthe Morkoting Development Bureau (MOB) and the Crop Monitoring and Early Warning System (CMEWS).which appear to be the most reliable sources. 2. Maize, rice and wheat are the most important cereal crops grown in the country. Maize and rice are produced mainly by smallholders,while production of wheat is confined mainly to State-owned farms. A high proportion of maize and rie* productionis consumed - Caorieas 12. I (ZJ Maize 61 Iringa Shinyangs Hbeya Ruvuma Arusha Cassava 12 fwanza 1twars Lindi Tabora Ruvuma Paddy 10 Moro§ggo ftanza Shinyanga "beya Tabora SorghumlMillet a Shinyanga Singida Podoma Tabora Rukwa Potatoes 5 Mwanza Shinyange Tabors "beye Kagera Bananas 4 Kagera KilimanjaroMbeya Tanga Shinyanga Wheat __. Arusha Irina Kilimanjaro Ruvuma lbeya - -.- --.------.- --- - *-- --- Total Crops 100 Shinyanga fanza Tabora Ruvums Kagora al Percentageof total calories' intake from staple foods. 3. While statistics on food crop production cannot be relied upon too heavily, it should be noted that the country did not import large quantities of food crops. especially maize, except in drought years (para.6).This shows that food crop production kept pace with population growth. Estimates of food crop production are detailed in Tables 2.6. 2.1 and 2.. and suhuriaed as follows: This reportwas prepared by the FAO/WorldBank CooperativeProgramme InvestmentCenter, dated July 27, 1987. Working Paper No. S Page 2 ]]lalta 1184tOS ttSill6 .. .,'00'.... tons). Maize 1.940 2.090 2.130 Cassava n.a. 2.050 1.880 Paddy 360 430 500 Sorghum/millet 360 430 920 Potatoes n.a. 310 260 Bananat n.a. ?T0 ?40 Beans 540 440 350 Wheat 10 _on 7 J9Ns1: 6.250 Al 6,600 6,670 was:: as:co c:aus L/ fstimate. Ur_s% Early Warning and Crop Non*torins Bureau, MALD. 4. Marketable rIaguci: Host of the food crop production is retained by the farmers for their own consumption.Retention levels vary according to the crop and the productionyear. Ouantity of produce marketed through the official channel (para. 5 and 27) depends on the harvest. In years with poor harvests, farmers have less surplus to sell, thus demand exceeds supply. resulting in much higher prices on the parallel market than on the official one, and thereby reducing the official purchases of food crops. In fact. MOB estimates that, marketable production constitutes about 25Z and 201 of total production in good and bad production years respectively,of which official purchases represent around 35? and less than 151 respectively. On average. MOBassumes the following percentagesfor its calculations: Miarkeale Rrodgeliw. &I OffiejalnurehbAse S ...... (.)...... Maize 25 37 9 Paddy 50 14 t Sorghum/millet 15 11 2 Cassava - is 5 I Wheat 75 94 71 Li Of marktable production. k/ Of total production. 5. As a result of the abrupt change in the marketing structure (pars. 21-26), and therefore the difficulties encountered by the Cooperative Unions. ll (because the latter were not given the time and the capital to develop their various activities properly), only limited quantities of food crops were collected by the Notional Milling Corporation (NMC). In fact the pressure from cash crop marketing in some regions i. often such that cooperativesdo not have time nor the capacity to handle the entire food distributionin addition to the cash crop collection.which usually receives priority. As a result, in regions such as Shinyanga there is hardly any official food distribution channel within the region as NMC (paras.10-151 Working Paper No. 5 Page 3 withdrew from the districts and the Union did not step in. becouse clearing of the cotton market required all their resources. Storage capacity is another bottleneck for many cooperatives. as well as variout aspects of transport. e0g. trucks, tyres, fuel, roads, etc. Cooperatives cannot be expected to tackle these problems independently from own resources and therefore the Government should assist them in these matters. Although maize production was relatively high during the last two seasons, the structure of the food distribution system was such that official marketing organisations could not acquire a sufficient portion of the marketed production to meet their requirements, thus necessitating imports of food. ImEQtti (Tables 2.3, 4.1, 4.2. 4.3 and 4.4) 6. Increased levels of food crop imports hinge mainly on poor production. Food imports have increased significantly since 1966. with peak quantities in 1973/74. following the drought experienced in several grain- producing regions. Highest import levels in recent years were between 1960 and 1982. as follows: X %lar Quantitv xL Averae Gif PriC. (tonsOOO) (TSh million) (TSh/ton) (USS/ton) maize 1980/81 274.6 452 1.650 150 Rice 1981/82 66.5 305 4.590 250 Wheat 1981/82 70.9 130 1.950 250 T. Imports are also affected by the inability of the National Milling Corporation (NNC) to collect produce from areas of surplus. Therefore, even though the food situation in the mjor producing areas may be favourable. There was no option but to import in order to fill the gap between quantities collected by Cooperative UnionsINNC and the Government projected food demand, particularly in the poorer rural areas. NNC purchases and imports of food crops for 1985-86 are summarized below: Localourchases IIlorts TOTL .( '000 tons). maize 178.5 6.1 184.6 Rice (equivalent) 15.9 32.9 48.8 Wheat SO.3 21.8 72.1 8. The bumper production of 1965/86. corresponding to the 1986/8? marketing year, combined with the cooperatives' collection difficulties, resulted in an abundant supply of maize on the open market at low price levels which, until January 1987. were below official prices in Dar-es- Salaam. Thus NMC could not find buyers for its maize and stocks are piling up. Given the expected bumper harvest of maize in 198V/88. NMC does not intend to import maize in the coming season. Rice and wheat will continue to be imported. however, in order to moet demand for these commodities. Food availability 9. The FAO Food Security Mission 1/ estimated that the apparent overall availability of food crops per capita has increased from about 262 kg in 1915/76 to around 266 kg in 1984/85, ranging, during this period, from 239 kg to 321 kg. This is offset, however, by the difference in food I/ FAO - Rome. May 1986. Working Paper No. 5 Page 4 availability from one region to another, exacerbated by poor transport facilities and the type of food preferred. the main conclusions of the food security team were that: i) Tanzania appears to be in a surplus situgtion if the total food grain availability is taken into account; ii) Tanzania could be considered self-sufficient to the extent that consumers are willing to substitute the less preferred staples for the preferred ones. However, in most regions this substitution has not yet taken place, mainly due to .steur&ali difficulties in procurement of food crops by NSC. price distortion. etc. II. INSTITUtIONS INVOLVYD IITh FOOEl tQOPS . 1 10. Main institutions involved with food crops include the cooperatives (unions and primary societies - see Working Paper 7). the National Hilling Corporation, the National Distributors Ltd.. and the Regional Trading Centres. Ilia Nalional Million Crg.nrn,align(NMCI iI. The NMC was established by the national Hilling ACt in 1960. At that time *i"C bought cereals (maize, paddy, etc.) for milling from the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPS). When NAPS was abolished in l9O3 NNC started purchasing directly from cooperativeunions. When the cooperativeswere abolished in 1976. NHt purchasinglinks were established at the village level. NIC was given the sole authority to purchase, distribute, store, process and market specified agricultural products that included maize, paddy, rice, beans, sorghum. cassava. wheat and finger- millet. In effect, a dual marketing system was sanctionedby the Government: purchases for inter-regional transfers and sale went through "MC.while a system of local markets and direct personal consumptionwas maintainedon a traditional basis. To ensure that the separationof these two markets was maintained, a system of legal permits and road-blocks was instituted to restrict non-officialtransport of foodstuffs to one bag (90 to 100 kg). 12. In line with the new general policy to utilize cooperatives.1I a bill to restructure NMC was passed by the National Assembly it 1984 (Parliament Act No. 22 of 1984). NMC had to withdraw from village and district level activities,remaining only in the regional centres. !.s present role in the food distribution tystem includes the following activities: - purchase of food crops from the cooperative unions and directly from large-scale farms (NAfCO. etc.) - transfer of food grains from regions of surplus to those with a deficit; .11 See paru. 24. Working Paper No. 5 Page 5 - in case of anticipated shortages. the import of food from abroad and its distribution to the affected areas; - Sale of food grains to RTCs or. in Oar-es-Salaam, to MODL Biashara ya Wazee and Workers' Distributors for further distribution to consumers, as well as to institutions such as the Army, hospitals, schools, etc. (although this can also be the responsibility of the cooperatives in certains regions and of NDL in Oar-es-Salsam); - the milling of grains and the sale of the processed commodities. i.e. maize flour, rice and wheat flour, to the wholesalers (NOL. RTC) and institutions; - responsibility for maintaining the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR). With donor assistance, some 70,000 tons of storage capacity haos been or are being built to house this reserve. The Government showed willingness to buy 80,000 tons of maize grain from NMC's stocks to reconstitute the reserve. 13. Major problems faced by NMC recently, relate mainly to the bumper maize harvests experienced in 1985166 and expectedTin 1906/87. Until January - 19876 prices of maize on the open market were below officia-sarj.cs in Oar- es-Salaam. with the consequence th&t MtC could not find enough buyers for its maize and stocks began to pile up. By February230.000 tons of maize were held at NMC depots,mostly in Dar-es-Salasm.Another reason for this build-upof maize stocksmight have been NHC*s insistenceon firstdisposing of the yellowmaize which it had in stockwhich is not very popular with consumers.At the prevailinghigh interest rates, such stocks are a financialburden for NMC. This problem puts pressure on the official marketing organizationsto make cuts in marketingcosts in orderto be price-competitivewith the open market,and avoidthe heavy financial and operationalcosts incurredin maintainingleft over stocks. 14. NMC accounts were auditeduntil 1964.NMC profitand loss account 11983-66)and swmary of balancesheet (1963-85)are presentedin Tables7.1 and 1.2 and summarizedas follows: S ...... (TShmllion) .... - Sales 1,609 2.700 5.453 - Purchase of raw material 1.764 1,796 1,626 - Other costs 25 IL£ 3I=U GgogsorofitllosS (205) 240 274 - Overhead costs 16a 169 164 - Other revenue 43 91 6T - Subsidies 465 - - Otheradjustments U 12.01 - MetreslMt of the year 123 392 154 Capitaladjustment - 1,102 - Cumulativeprofitlloss (1,461) 33 is? 1921": PPmB. Working PaPer No. S Page 6 15. Followino the Governmfentdecision in 1984-85 to stop subsidizing NMC (some TSh 485 in 1984) Ond thus allow products to be sold to the consumersat their respoctive full cost, NNC s financial situation has slightly improved. In feet, the loss cf some TSh 1.584 million accumulated by NNC up to 1983 was absorbed through a Governfmentcapital adjustment. However, in 1986. after the maize consumer price was announced. Government felt that it might be beyond the reach of many consumers, and consequently the price was reduced to TSh 12.20/kg. As a result, it is expected that the Governmentmight be constrainedto subsidize NNC again. National Aoricultural and Food Cornoration (NAFCO) 16. The NAFCO was establishedby an order published in the Government Notice No. 09 of 11 August 1969 in accordancewith the provisions of the Public CorporationsAct No. 17 of 1969. The Corporation was formed to promote agriculturaldevelopment and the productionof food. In 1974 some of NAFCO's activitieswere transferredto the Sugar Development Corporationand the Livestock DevelopmentAuthority. Its major responsibilitiesat present are control and management of a system of public farms. NAFCO is a majo. producer of the country's wheat and rice, and the bulk of these crops mrketed through N"C, comes from this source. 17. NAFCOs accounts were audited until 1982. Profit and loss account (1983-1986) and sumary of balance sheet (1900-82)are presented in Tables 7.19 and 1.20 and summarizedas follows:. .. ITSh million). - Sales 298 305 476 - Cost of production 1±1 l. fizessnznfi 169 238 287 - Overhead costs 144 202 238 - Other revenue 13 26 35 - Incometax 1 i n Met result of the year 26 19 26 Cumulative profitiloss 9 30 54 Source: PPNB Other institutions 18. Other institutionsinvolved in food crop marketing include the National Distributors Ltd. (NDL) and the Regional Trading Companies (OTC). in addition to cooperative shops, private retailers, etc. I9. National DistributorsLtd. INDL): NDL was established in 1966 following the party directive to the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika to manage and control the distributionof essential goods for the Par-es-Salaam residents. NOL is owned equally by the Cooperative Union of Tanzania and the National Killing Corporation. NDL is involved in the distribution of essential food items namely rice, sugar, wheat, wheat flour, maize, maize flour, beans, cassava and cassava flour, sorghum and sorghum flour. NDL also serves farmers in the distributionof animal feods. NOL obtains the food items from N"C. sugar from SOC and animal feed from TAFCO. NOL has about 18 Working PaPer No. S Page 7 wholesaledistribution centres and proposesto have 12 retailshops. The fAO food securityreview mission, considered that NDL is an additionallink in the marketing chain, addingto costsand consumerpriees, and recommended that Governmentexamine the possibilityof allowing wholesale buying directlyfrom HNC storesto distribute essentiolfood items. 20. Trading-companies_eajonal (RTC): RTCs are supervised,with some managementcontrol. by the Boardof InternalTrade (S1i).RTCs are located in the regionsas wholesalersand retailersof productioninputs. etc. and consumergoods, including foodgrains. Nowever, it is felt by the Cooperative Unions and NHC that RTCs are unnecessaryin food distributionand that they shouldrather concentratetheir activitieson the sale of industrial consumergoods. III. UARIEXI.Zli NistoricalDeyvlooment J1 21. Priorto 1974,the collectionand marketing of most agricultural products was the sole responsibilityof the cooperativesocieties and unions.The developmentof the ovillageconcept* or *Ujsmaa Village was consideredi6co6pstible-with the cooperativemovement and, hence,the latter was abolishedand a new marketing structure for foodgrainsdevised. In particular,the role of a singlemarketing system was emphasized.However, despitethis officialposition, a parallelmarket operated by the private sector also developed,except in Dar-es-Saleamwhere strictcontrol was in force.The assetsand functionsof the cooperativeunions were transferred to the harketingboards, which then evolvedinto 'Authorities'(i.e. semi- autonomousstate institutions), and those of the primary societies to village administration.The declared aims of this transformationwere to roducecosts of operation;to creategreater officiency in marketing; bring higher prices to the producers,and therebyincrease production. Another interpretationis that it was the culminationof the process which started with the Arusha Declaration,i.e. to increasenationalization anG state trading.The tonsequenceof these changes was the formaldissolution of the marketing cooperativesin hay T9Y6 and the transferof their functionsto the new crop authorities,responsible for the handling and processing of agriculturalproducts either between villages and exportoutlets or between villagesand wholesalers.The Authoritieswere to fulfil the necessary marketingfunctions, implement Government pricing and marketingpolicies and cover all their costs, including an adequate rate of return. These expectationscould not be met; to cite from NOB's reportJ/ on this subject: . '.-inmany casesthe increasein handlingcosts by cooperativeswas much lower than thoseof the crop authorities..,while the cooperatives'margin whichwas 16.S5in 190-71, declined to 11.92 in 19?4-T5, the cotton authority'smargin increased from 15.2 to 40.52 duringthe corresponding period.'Host crop authoritiesbegan incurring substantial losses. 11 This is the same as that presentedin WorkingPaper 3 with minor differences. jI Ruralcooperatives, unions and boards.HALO - MOS, Nsy 198S. Working Paper No. 5 Page 8 22. The performance of the Authorities was disappointing. Cost control as exercised by them was poor. reflecting lack of performance incentives and management constraints end leading to additional losses. Some factors, however. were not within the parastatals' control: marketing agencies in regulated markets have to operate with the official prices decided and declared by Government. Neither boards nor authorities are free to set the producer/acquisition prices according to the supply and demand situation in the internal andlor external markets in which they sell. Government had to increasingly subsidize the operations of the crop authorities, taking over parts of the accumulating overdrafts. The high rate of 'lending' to the agricultural marketing sector eventually became unsustainable. 23. Government recognized in 1983 that the existing marketing system was bankrupt when it published its new Agricultural Policy. It was stated: 'There is an urgent need to improve the efficiency of agricultural marketing and morketing institutions, and this will require some investment in marketing infrastructure and the training of personnel specialized in its differont functions, including storage mangement and financial record keeping. To ensure that marketi6g expertise is given the necessary emphasis and scope, national marketing institutions will generally be relieved of production and processing activities. But although these and other changes are essential now, it is also recognized that frequent and drastic changes in the institutional marketing system are very disruptive for everyone concerned - including the producers; they will therefore be carefully plsnned and their introduction logically phased. In that context. agricultural mrketing will be reorganized.' 24. The legislative and legal requirements for this reorganization process had already started in 1982. when Parliament passed a new Cooperative Societies Act. In 1964105, the cooperative unions were revived and crop authorities reverted to their former status as Narketing Boards. with a few exceptions. The cooperative unions hove taken over the trade between villages (primary cooperative societies) and boards or other customers. The official marketing system consists now of the agricultural producer, the primary society as the assembly institution, the cooperative union as the wholesaler and in important cases as the processor, and the marketing board as final processing, rogulating, controlling and exporting (as the industry requires) institution. 25. In the case of cereals, private traders, who constitute what has variably been called the free, parallel, informal or open market, are now recognized and tolerated by the Government because the official system was incapable of clearing the market, since 'the system, adopted by tne National Price Comission in the early 1970s is no longer tenablo'. The reason for that is 'that availability of goods and services in the market, a foremost assumption of the pricing mechanism, has since been negated by persistent scarcities.' 1/ . The Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning is cited as saying: *In this situation, the fixing of fair prices of goods and services for the masses has become untenable. People can no longer obtain their basic needs at the controlled prices.' If demand is not met by officially marketed products, consumers have to look for alternative channels. 1/ Daily News No. 4105 of 30 April 1956. Working Paper No. 5 Page 9 26. The relative importance of these two channels will fluctuate widely with the marketing conditions, especially prices and liberalization of food crop transport and trade. Official Marketing Channel 27. Under the Agricultural Policy of Tanzania document, which came into force at the beginning of the 1985/86 season, the newly established cooperatives were also given the responsibility of marketing both cash and food crops. The farmer, wiLling to use the official marketing channel, sells his produce to the primary society to which he belongs. at the official producer price. Because storage facilities at village level are inadequate in most cases (para.34) primary societies try to hand over the collected crop to the regional cooperative unions as soon as possible. The regional cooperative unions are responsible for redistributing the produce within and outside the region. Within the region the cooperative unions market the produce through their own cooperative shops in district centres, if they exist. However, it appears that a;though most unions have their own input distribution system. only a few of them are using this network for food distribution, mainly due to lack of capital and limited transport capacity. Where unions have a surplus of a specific food commodity over and above regional requirements, this is expected to be sold to the NMC branch in their region. The Agricultural Policy document appears to recommend inter- trading between primary societies only within the same region, and trading between Unions in different regions does not appear to be part of the Cooperatives* brief with respect to foodgrains. However, the interpretation of the Cooperative Society Act. 1982 is not clear in this respect. and nor does it make provision for or against inter-regional trade amo'ng Cooperatives. In practice. some unions are actually involved in this type of inter-regional trade. aLthough in some regions (e.g. Shinyanga), the regional NNC branch objects to such transactions, claiming that only NMC is legally allowed to be involved in inter-regional trade of controlled staples. The abolition of the use of permits for transportation of specified agricultural produce between regions, as announced by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development on B March 1987. has not helped to clarify this matter as it only refers to the actual act of transporting controlled staples and not to who is allowed to buy from whom. 28. The inter-regional trade flows for maize, rice and wheat as reported by the Market Information Service of MOB (MALD) during 1984-85 marketing year are presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. It should be noted that due to the seasonality of production and the lack of appropriate storage facilities, these flows are seasonal and could not represent the flows throughout the year. The following diagram shows the expected procurement and distribution channels for food crops in two given regions: A and B. Working Paper No. 5 Page 10 29. Food cropseollected 'by NNC are stored in both distri.ctand regional go-downs and distributed to the following outlets: - NNC branches in other regionsof the country(under instructions frotmheadquarters); - localregional trading companies (OTCs); - sub-wholesalersand retailers;and - local processors(private mills and NNC feed manufacturingunits); institutions(schools. hospitals. etc.); 30. the importanceof each individualregional branch of NMC differs according to the productand the area. In the major surplusregions, NNC NO directsthe surplusto be shippedto Dar-es-Salaam.to be distributedboth through the RTCs and the variousinstitutions (army, schools. hospitals. publicoffices, etc.). The RTC _i/supplies consumers via approved retailers who are then responsiblefor supplyingward shopsin individualdistricts .I/ In Dar-es-Selaamthe RTC is the NationalDistributors Limited. Working Paper No. 5 Page 11 who are then responsible for supplying ward shops in individual districts and, in some instances, private shops. The wholesale function is a monopoly of the RTCs who operate on a margin of 6-101. Retailers purchasing from the Dar-es-Saleam RTC are required to deposit funds with the RTC before any grain is allowed to lesve the depots. 31. The quantities allocated to each of these local retailers are subject to quotas established by Food Allocation/Regional Distribution Committees, chaired by the Regional Commissioner. The region itself has a quota of the nationally distributed produce. Based on 198416S sales data. / Dar-es-Salaam received 452 of NNC maize grain and 70t of the maize flour; equivalent to about Sit of NNC's total maize sales. The next greatest amount was received by Dodoma with 92 of total maize sales. The quotas are required as the official marketing channel cannot possibly supply total demand for food grains. The low producer price relative to parallel market prices. reflected in low consumer prices, reduces quantities of grain available to W"C and increases demand for NNC produce. An overall quota is established after taking into account the institutional sector requirement and the population level. O^e Mrketin Chnl 32. The open market trade in food commoditieshas establisheditself as a permanent feature of the food distribution system, and has flourished rapidly. The major reason for its rapid developmentwas the wide span between official and unofficialproducer prices, the latter during some periods being up to 2-3 times the official prices. It was only the parallel market prices of cereals that enabled farmers to buy scarce consumer goods which are. in turn, only available on the more expensive parallel market. The Government introduced certain changes to improve the supply of deficit regions, by loosening the transport restrictionon food crops. i.e. in '9O5 all road blocks were discontinued,and transport licences required for more than 5 bags of maize per person were abolished. However. the legal implicationsof trade ot food crops (controlledones) are still not very clear, making these changes sowetimes appear inconsistent,since certain aspects are now legal while others remain illogal. For instance, traders no longer need licence for the transport of food crops but are not allowed to buy from producers, and the latter are obliged to sell their produce to their primary societies. storage 33. On-fgrm stogage: Since almost 75-861 of food crop production (maize, sorghum and cassava. etc.) remain on-farm for smallholder subsistence consumption, on-farm storage is very important. There are two types of traditional storage structure: - the Kilnda. which consists of a cylindrical bin of a 200-400 kg capacity, made of tree bark stitched together with local fibres. generally placed inside the house, and - the K,bmaga. which consists of a woven structure of reed, stick or bamboo construction, of 0.4 to S ton capacity usually on a raised platform, mounted outside the house. X1 PriAe PnlirevX * aeMngatianst Ir the 195C riee Reviq., VOL" 1, inistry of Agriculture, 1985. Working Paper No. 5 Page 12 These structures, if well constructed and maintained, can provide reasonable protection. However, the traditional skill required to construct them is gradually being lost. Nowadays, farmers tend to prefer gunny bags as a convenient method of storage inside the house. 34. Cooagrativelvillaoe level atotsge. No data are available to permit assessment of the storage capacity-at village level. While, with the re- establishment of the cooperatives there is renewed emphasis on the need to improve cooperative and expand storage capacity, the 1985 FAO Food Security Review Mission pointed out that the existing marketing systems do not provide aty incentives to cooperatives to construct their own storage facilities, due mainly to the fact that official prices remain stable throughout the year. However, under an FAO village storage project scheduled for completion in 1985. about 44 stores have been built on a self-help basis in Arusha and Dodoma areas. 35. National level. Storsge capacity at the national level consists of the facilities owned by NKC and the private sector: the latter are partly rented to and operated by NMC. 36. Total storage capacity owned by the public sector for the storage of food grains was estimated at 465,600 tons in 1985. of which 44,600' tons capacity represented silos associated with NNC flour mills, and the remaining 421.000 tons' capacity shed-type go-downs. A further 40,700 tons of go-down capacity is under construction and due to be completed in 1985186. The Government also plans to build additional storage capacity of some 58.300 tons between 1986 and 1988. Of the latter. 25.000 tons will form part of the proposed World Bank Grain Storage and Marketing Project. In addition to the publicly-owned storage capacity. NHC also hires storage facilities of 64.300 tons' capacity from the private sector (table 3.4). 3T. With the exception of the purpose-built Strategic Grain Reserve (S6R) stores which are owned by the Government and only managed by NhC, all publicly-owned food grain silos and go-downs were, until 3une 1985, owned by NMC. However, negotiations are currently in progress between NMC and the recently re-established cooperatives for the transfer of selected go-downs at district and regional level to the cooperatives. It was reported that about 101.400 tons' capacity is being transferred to the Cooperative Unions, leaving N"C with 428.500 tons' storage capacity: E£istina Unger Construction ...... ( 000 tons)...... - Go-downs 201.9 10J7 - S6R go-downs 60.0 30.0 - Silos 55.6 - - Hired go-downs _.62 - totkl: al?- R iLl 38. In addition to the stores released by HNC (101.400 tons' Capacity). the cooperatives were allocated stores by other parastatal marketing boards, agencies and village/district authorities. Furthermore. NMC claims to have many small shed-type go-downs throughout the country at vill99e and district level with capacities ranging from 100-300 tons which could be transferred to cooperatives. Until such time as these transfers are effected, the actual cap4city available for use by the cooperative societies and unions remains unclear. Workina PMPer No. 5 Page 13 39. Most storage facilities. especially the larger regional go-downs of 500-10.000 tons' capacity listed in table 3.4. are suffering from lack of maintenance and even major construction defects, and therefore require rehabilitation. However, due to recent changes allowing the parallel market to handle part of the produce. the official storing capacity does not appear to be a major constraint in the medium term. 40. J&orage losses. No reliable data regarding the level of on-farm storage losses are available. However. the HALO 1/ estimates, roughly that annual losses average around 10. Losses in NMC stores are estimated to be about 201 per annum, due mainly to the poor condition of many godowns, the lack of tarpaulins for controlled open storage, the shortage of fumigants, insecticides, and pest control equipment. etc. There is considerable scope for reducing the level of storage losses if these constraints were to be addressed. Strategic-rain Reserve 41. It is essentialthat in's countrysubject to climatic fluctuations and their effect upon food productionand availability,the Government shouldhave at its disposal an effective mechanism to assess the food situation and project food supply,in orderto avoidfood shortages.For this purpose,the Government2/ initiateda StrategicGrain Reserve(SGR) in the late 19?0s. The FA0 - Food Security Mission envisaged a regular reportingsystem to provide Governmentwith up-to-dateinformation and forecasts of the food situationin the country.The equivalentof a food securityunit (FSU)was also put into operation,but, due to frequent staff changes, lack of competentstaff, etc. the unit was unableto carry out its role effectively.The revisedregulations governing the reconstitutionand operationof the SEP are presentedin Appendix2. 42. In establishing the SOR, littleconsideration was given to the compositionof the reservein terms of grain type. The 19?6 FAO Food Security Mission anticipatedthat 'stockswould consistof the preferred staples(maize, rice and wheat).However, drought resistant staples such as cassava. sorghum and bulrush millet, t.n&chconstitute the primary subsistencecrops for the rural populationin the drought prone, semi-arid and least food secure areas of the country were neverconsidered for inclusionin the S6R despitethe fact that 50 of the 80.000 tons' SGR godown facilitieshave been constructedwithin the semi-arid central regionsof Dodomaand Shinyanga.Relying solely on preferred staples to stock the SGR would seem to conflictwith the major agriculturalpolicy objectiveof improvingfood security,in as much as the provision of maize to subsistencehouseholds in semi-aridaress at times of crop failurecan only stimulatedemand and, hence,production of such climaticallyvulnerable crops and furtherreduce the popularityof more suitabledrought-resistUnt crops. t1/ Proposalsfor a nationaldrought resistant cereals strategy. HALO - FSU, December1986. 21 As recommendedby the PAO Food SecurityMission - 1976- Food Security AssistanceScheme Report, 19?6. Working Paper No. 5 Page 14 43. With donor assistsace,a total of 60.000 tons of storage capacity has so far been constructedto house the SGR and a further 10.000 tons' capacity will be constructedsoon in bar-es-Salaam.Location and capacity of these godowns are as follows: tapnaitv (tons'000) Arusha 20 Hakambako 10 Oodoma 30 Shinyanga 10 Dar es Salaam J1 o0 Apart from financing the construction of godown facilities,donors also provided a contributionof grain. between 1978 and 1981 a total of 77,000 tons of yellow maize and wheat were supplied.However, steadily worsening food shortages on the subsidized official market led to the drawing down of the reserve without any subsequent replenishment.As a result, by the end of 1981 the reserve had been exhausted. 44. The 1986 FAO Security Review mission proposed that the fSU assume responsibility for the day-to-day management of the SfR on behalf of the Government.This entailed ensuring that: (i) the level of the S6R be maintained both in terms of quantity and cash equivalent {ii) NMC. which would be acting as warehousemanon behalf of the Govarnment for storing the SGR. maintain the stocks in good condition; (iii) the SGR be rotated, as required, to maintain quality: (iv) administrative and storage costs incurred in holding the SGR be paid; (v) releases be made accordancewith the regulations governing its use (in this respect the FSU should participate in the decision-makingprocess regarding grain release and be the sole authority responsible for sanctioningreleases once a decision is taken by Government); and (vi) all transactionsconcerning the reserve be recorded. 45. The Task Force set up by the Government to review the marketing arrangemnt (Appendix 1) recommended that: NMC should be responsiblefor the SGR; and that only 00.000 tons of maize (no rice and no wheat) should be kept in the 56. "aanamzrt 46. Marketing of food crops, and their movement from surplus to deficit areas, have suffered, as have other export crops, from: li) the inadequate and poorly maintained road network; (ii) the lack of all-weatherroads, particularlyin the southern surplus areas, restricting movement of food during the rainy season; (iii) the shortage of trucks and spare pasts and tyres to keep them operational;and (iv) the limited rail and shipping capacity. As a result, lorry owners are reluctant to serve certain areas. and when they do, charge high tariffs. 47. Donor assistance has hitherto tended to concentrate on supplyiiq new vehicles to parastatals.which after a short period to suffer the same problems. The private sector, which accounts for a high proportion of the movements by road, has generally been unable to obtain its needs. To improve this a greater allocation of foreign exchange must be made to this sector to enable vehicles in both private and public areas to be rehabilitatedto increase their availability, giving even some priority to the private sector. Rail transport capacity is severely limited by the shortage of locomotivesand railway wagons and the lack of spare parts. Donor assistance Working PaPer No. 5 Page 15 should also be sought in this case. IV. PRCtESSlNG 48. Both maize and wheat are milled into flour by NMC, which also subcontractssome maize flour productionto private mills. Despite recent changes in the Government position regarding grain marketing, official distributionand marketing of maize flour and wheat flour is still subject to restriction.In practice, owing to persistentshortages as the production of NMC mills could not meet demand, a parallel market also exists for maize flour and wheat flour. 49. Not being an export industry,milling has received little in the way of funds or attention from either Governmentor external agencies and, hence, milling facilities are extremely run-down. SO. Following nationslization of all major local and foreign owned milling companies in 196?, tNC was Appointed to take over the major portion of the cereal milling industry. NKC has 18 mills widely spread over the country - seven of which are roller mills which may be used for maize or wheat, four are ha_ er mills used only for maize, and the remaining seven are huller mills for turning paddy into rice. Most NMC mills are old with obsolete equipment and, following years of inadequatemaintenance, tteir performance is far below their rated capacity. Details of these mills, showing installed and actual operating capacitiesin 1905. are shown in Table 3.5. There are also a number of very small privately owned mills. Si. Tables 3.6 and 3.10 show the total NMC sales of maize, maize flour. rice, wheat, sorghum, cassava and millet since 1974/?5. From this it is clear that NMC productionand sale of maize flour has fallen significantly while, at the same time, grain sales are rapidly increasing.This can be attributedto several factors, the two main ones being: 1) NMC's milling capacity is limited primarily due to frequent breakdown of the old machinery. If unable to mill all maize, NMC prefers to sell unmilled maize rather than hire private millers, which can be expensive. 21 Many consumers prefer to mill the .aize themselvesin order to get better quality flour compared with "MC's product. 52. NtC nurchae rxodUCtiog. Purchases of maize. paddy, rice and wheat by N"C and its predecessor,the National AgriculturalProducts Board, since 1910/71 are shown in Table 2,9. Tables 3.7, 3.e and 3.9 shOw the total productionof maize flour, rice and wheat flour in individual NMC mills * between 1981182 and 1984165, as well as hours worked and raw material usage. The figures are-summarizedbelow: Years flour iie baile_heat Poduction Hours Productio-n Hours ±Puction NMou worked worked wgrked (tons) (tons) (tons) 1981/82 76,382 37,659 043 945 29,180 7.557 1982/83 66,210 37,907 5,430 8,693 45,337 10,518 1983/84 56,310 37,604 5.200 9,375 28,019 7.102 1984(85 5?,934 3?,822 1,769 2,146 43,090 11.61? WorKingraper No. O Page 16 On the basisof the abovefigures. it is apparentthat whilemaize flourand rice productionhave fallensignificantly, wheat flour productionhas been erraticand has shown a large increase in the 1984185 sesson over the preceding year. The hours workedto producethese totals,however, present an interestingcontrast. While the hoursworked in mills producing maize flour are remarkablyconsistent at an averageof 3?.750hours per year. less and less flourhas been produced, which means increasedprocessing costs. In the case of rice, hoursworked increased out of proportionto production, averaging1.2 hoursworked for every ton producedin low seasons but 1.? h/ton when productionincreased in 1982/83and 1983/84.This is the opposite to what would be normally expected and suggests that high production, instead of being more efficient. puts a greaterstrain on machineryand leads to more breakdownsand interruptionsof production.for wheat, hours workedas a ratio of productionare relativelystable, suggesting that wheat mills may be in somewhat better condition than other mills (or maybe consistentlybad). Comparingmaize flourmanufactured by NMC in 1984/85at 57,934tons againstactual sales of 114,000tons (Table3.?), it is apparent that NHC has had to subcontractv millingto privatefactories. Over recent years,""C have processedless than.'50?of totalmaize flour sales,and even with external processing,total maize flourproduction has been well below consumerdemand. However, looking at the overallpicture, it is clear that NMC mills in-generalare rapidlydeclining in their abilityto performtheir essentialtask and many are close to collapse.Most of the privatemills are in a similarrun-down condition. Only the NMC mill at Wwanzais new; it was commissionedin 1986 and was establishedto serve this remote area more efficientlythan had been achievedby deliveringmilled flour from outside the region.It is too early to say if this objectivewill be attained. 33. Againstthe backgroundof constant machinery breakdowv,4,storage and hindling problems, and total lack of incentive,it is not surprising that managementshould be indifferent.NMC mills are run as servicecentres. but any attempt to convert them to a profitcentre basis would probably achievelittle, given the equipmentand infrastructuralproblems. Estimated NMC milling cost for paddy and wheat were TSh 760 and TiS 670 per ton of rice and *lour respectively(tables S.13 and 5.1M). ...... tSh/ton). Directcost s5o 590 By-products (160) (300) Packingmaterial 270 300 Overheadcost __n on otaolmilling ecat 760 670 Bas released (300) (240) Page 17 V. PRICING SYSTEMAND PRICES .1 The Prieina Proe.s S4. The 6overnment sets annually prices for agriculturalcrops at three levels: i) producer rires, with the aim of providing a minimum income to the producer, as well as covering hiS productioncosts; ii) wholesale or into-store EXies, at which cooperatives sell the produce to official marketing institutions.These prices aim at covering all costs incurred by the cooperativefrom collection at village level to delivery at the marketing institution'stores; and iii) eonsumer or ex-store RZjoAa for domesticallycQnsumed commodities. at which the produce is sold to official trading institutions. consumers, etc. These prices are determined taking into account political, social, financial and other aspects (purchasingpower of consumers,deficit of marketing institutions,etc). 55. Eighteen major agriculturalexport and food crops are reviewed annually by the Government.The whole procedure of annual price fixing is conducted in several steps (*multistageprocesse) which commences with the Marketing Development Bureau (MOSI technical analyses of prevailing conditions in the economy and in special agriculturalmarkets. On the basis of this analysis. MOO drafts price recommendationsfor discussionwithin HALO. Most important points of interest in this discussion are the losses (or profits) incurred by the Authorities or Marketing Boards and the assessmentsof returns to labour at the farm level; the first as an indicator of the costs of the market regulation and the second as a quantificationof farmers' income. 56. NOB was established in 1970 with FAO/UNDP assistance, and subsequently it received World Bank funds. Over the years, the work programme of MOB included: - market research and export promotion; - training of marketing staff for Government services at the CooperativeCollege in Moshi; - issuance of marketing intelligencebulletins; - provision of advice on pricing policies; and - review of the operations of parastatal marketing bodies and assistance in solving their problems. 13 This is the same as that presented in Working Paper 3 with minor differences. Working Paper No. 5 Page 18 V. Since 116. MO$ has prepared annual reviews of agriculturalprices. The reviews are based on information received from their own Market information system, from publications of other institutions and from discussionsheld with market participants.Government institutions, the Sank of Tanzania and the Board of External Trade. On the basis of this informationand instructionsfrom the Inter-MinisterialCommittee, the MOB prepares initial price policy recommendationsfor major crops for approval by the Government. So. Arising from these discussions,a set of prices recommendations is formulated by HALO and submitted to the Inter-MinisterialCommittee. Members of the Committee are the principal secretariesof the Ministries interested in agricultural prices, e.g. Agriculture.Finance and Planning,Labour and Manpower Development,and also a representativeof the Bank of Tanzania. At this step, the prices are considered in terms of parastatal financial deficits and their impacts on the macro-economic situation. The Inter- Ministerial Committee gives instructions as to the contents of the price recommendationpaper to be prepared for the economicCommittee of Cabinet. At this stage there is a feedback tU MOO as it has to reassess the impact on the economy of the Inter-MinisterialComnittee directives. So. The Economic Committee of Cabinet may be regarded as the inner circle of the Government.Here the final decision is taken with regard to the agriculturalprices from the political point of view. The Cabinet usually meets in July of each year to deal with the price recommendationsso that final decisions can be taken before the new growing season starts. The Cabinet sets the producer prices after consultation with the Inter- MinisterialCommittee, and this passes the decision back to tfie HALO for announcement. 60. According to MOD. the main factors affecting the Government's decision in setting food crop prices are: - the supply-demandbalance for each domestic scheduled product; - the general price relativitybetween export crops and food crops; - the level of profit or loss incurred by the NMC; - the cost of production; and - the resulting consumer prices. ProducerPrice& 61. Prices for annual crops, including foodcrops, are normally announced in September and relate to the following marketing year. This timing was fixed so as to reduce the tendency of farmers to withhold marketable surpluses from the market, but prior to sowing to help farmers in their decision making. 62. Following recent changes in marketing arrangements, and the adjustment in the exchange rate, the Government reviewed producer prices. The MALD suggested that S986I87 prices should be regarded as floor prices, and therefore, if commerciallywarranted, cooperativesshould be able to pay higher prices. However, this is not expected to happen since cooperatives are not sure whether or not a higher price would reduce their margin. Working Paper No. 5 Page 19 63. Over the past 10 years prices in current and constant terms have increased as follows: (see figures 4, 5 and 6) 12?6/71 1901162 12861L6 A.nnua tacreast ^/ ...... (TSh/kg) .() Current Prices - maize 0.60 1.50 6.30 23 - Paddy 1.00 2.30 9.60 25 - Wheat 1.20 2.20 7.20 20 Constantpricets (12§3114-pric2s) - maize 3.39 2.53 2.25 (4) - Paddy 4.23 3.8? 4.02 (1) - wheat 5.08 3.70 3 06 (5) i/ Compound rate. , While the foregoingtable indicates that prices of foodcrops in current terms have increased by 20-25Z per year over the past 10 years. in real terms they have decreased by 1 - 52 annually. This means that despite the last 2 years considerableincrease in producer prices, their levels did not reach those of 1976-77. 64. On the open market producer prices varied very much according to the region, the season and the period of the year. Open market producer prices of maize, rice and wheat in 1985186 are presented in Tables 5.4. 5.5 and 5.6 and summarizedas follows: (2) (a) (2) (a) (2) {a) Onen market arices as X of offitfilprices Region - Minimum l7 Sumbawanga 193 Mbeya 156 Mbulu - Maximum 236 horogoro 554 horogoro 712 I4usoma - Minimum 116 819-6S 221 619-65 304 6,9-85 - maximum 176 2/3-86 424 4S5-86 407 4/5-S6 &/ Name of the region, or period of the year (ex. 8/9-85 August/September 1905). 65. As will be seen from the above table, open market producer prices are way above official prices for rice and wheat and also for maize in certain regions. maize producer prices on the open market were below official prices inpsome southern markets (Sumbawanga and Songea) for almost the whole of 1986687. Paddy sold on the open market is usually milled, since it fetches a much higher price in relation to paddy. In fact, in Songes region rice and paddy prices as a percentage of official prices were 3682 and 1222 respectively. Being in high demand throughout the country as food for special meals or celebrations, people will occasionally afford to pay a Working PaPer No. 5 Page 20 high priCe for it. In Hbeya. however, which is one of the eiajow suPPlY centres. the price of rice was TSh 17.4/kg compared with the official price of TSh 9/kg. Regarding wheat, farmers purchase their wheat requirements from other wheat smaliholders since the large mech4nized farms supply NtC. Wheat producer prices on the open market have been rising and the price gap to the official market is still widening. On average (April 1986), the open market producer price of wheat was 4 times that of the official price ranging from 1.6 times in "bulu to 7.7 times in Husoma (TSh 46/kg). 66. On the basis of the above analysis, it could be concluded that: - the open market is not functioning well, as a result of the lack of information rgarding regional supply and demand. Thus traders proposeprices in relationto a very shorthorizon projectionand Wo not sttemptto ptojectthe possibledemand over a longerterm; - differencesin price betweenregions reflect transportation costs. Whilethese differences appear relatively high, account has to be taken in cost-pricecalculations, all constraintsinvolved in inter-regionaltransfer (degradatedinfrastructure, shortage of fuel and spareparts, bribe payments,confiscation, etc.). 6. ReAionalorice differentiation. Pan-territorial producer prices for scheduled agriculturalproducts were introducedet the beginningof the 1976-7?marketing year. Beforethat time, the individualcooperative unions determined local producer price levels, reflectingthe operating and marketingcosts of the cooperative.With the advent of pan-territorial prices for agriculturalproducts and inputs,there was a marketincrease in officiallymarketed surpluses from remoteareas. In 1962-83.regional price differentiationwas re-introduccoufor some food crops.Areas which are supposedto have a comparativeadvantage in production (premium areas) in staple cereal production receive higherprices than the other areas.The rationalebehind this is to discourageproduction in less productivear^as. However,it is not clearwhether or not the new differentiationreflects the economiccompetitiveness of the regionsand it could be argued that this differentiationmight not necessarilylead to highereconomic efficiency, e.g. the resultmay be excessivelyhigh costs of crop and input procurement. and therefore the systemof pan territorialprices may be more efficient. The suitabilityof an area for growinga crop is only one of many factors affecting the comparativeadvantage. The officialproducer prices fixed by the Governmentfor the 1986/8?season for premiumand non-premiumareas are as follows:(Tables 5.2 and 5.33: Premiumareas Non-premiumareas ...... (TShIkg). HAze 6.30 4.20 Paddy 9.60 5.69 Wheat 7.20 - 68. Farmerreturns. As mentionedabove, producer prices are set up takinginto accountcosts of productionand the expecteSreturn to farmers. However, it is very difficult to estimate a repr0entative cost of production,because of the greatdiversity in productionmethods, cropping patterns,soil characteristics,rainfall, etc. (Haps3 and 4), throughout the country. An estimate of farmers' returns has been attempted to illustrate the situation in certain regions and with various production Working Paper No. 5 Page 2. methods, for maize and for paddy. No reliable data are available on which to base an estimated wheat crop budget. Crop budgets for maize, paddy, sorghum, millet and cassava are shown in Tables 6.3 to 6.8, and a summary of return on labour is shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. These results are summarized below: iZos. Marain Laiu= Farmer's Rteturn (a) (b) £snui.emDntA (a) (b) (TSh'000) (man-days) (TShiman-days) Nand Cultivation - Mundemu 0.56 2.58 76 7.3 35.3 - mpwapwa 2.G2 4.61 83 24.3 55.5 - Bereko 2.79 6.35 76 35.7 83.5 Maize - Imoroved Cultiyat'g - Non-premium areas 2.06 4.70 103 20.0 45.7 - KilimanjarolArusha 7.99 12.45 9 86.9 135.3 - Ruvuma L/ 8.19 Al 136 60.2 L/ tiiZe: - Upland 1.75 4.15 78 22.4 53.2 - Lowland 1.56 3.78 155 10.2 24.4 Paddy - Typical& ImoroXed - by hand 8.78 12.18 163 53.9 74.7 - With oxen 8.74 12.48 130 67.2 96.0 - With oxen, improved 12.71 17.81 151 84.1 117.9 Pjdvy: - Lowland (Lindi) 5.82 11.22 329 1?.? 34.1 - Coast 7.22 11.22 217 33.3 51.7 pII At official prices. la/ At marketprices. £.I Market prices are below Qfficial prices. 69. It appears from the above table that at official prices farmers' returns range from TSh 7 in Mundemu to TSh 87 in Kilimanjaro/Arusha region with improved cultivation for maize production, and from TSh 18 in Lowland to TSh 84 with improved cultivation for paddy production. At open market prices, returns from maize production are significantly higher, except in surplus areas (Ruvuma), where the market price of maize was lower than the official one. Into-Store Prices 70. The re-establishment of the cooperative movement affected the marketing, costs and prices of major agricultural products. The present pricing system is based on a uniform grower price which is determined for each scheduled crop and, in some cases, even for quality grades. To this price are added the estimated cost of transport and other marketing charges to arrive at the NMC into-store price per crop for each cooperative union separately. NMC negotiates the into-store prices with the cooperatives on the basis of Government-set producer prices for food crops. It is also responsible for setting consumer prices on a full cost basis since the ending of Government subsidies. Taking into account the cooperatives' budget for the following season, DOB assists in irto-store price negotiations by calculating the marketing costs of the institutions involved and assessing Working PaDer No. 5 Page 22 their efficiency. Consumer prices are recommended taking into account the budget of the N"C. 71. Among the main objectives of the re-establishment of cooperatives are improved marketing efficiency and reduced costs. However, the mere transfer of operational responsibility from one body {""C) to another would not reduce marketing costs, unless better operational efficiency were achieved, and other improvements istorage. transport, etc.) introduced. The lack of consolidated accounts from the unions for the past season makes it very difficult to assess the financial impact of the new marketing channel. Cooperative marketing cost for maize, paddy and wheat for 1S84/85-1986687 are shown in Tables 511, 5.13. and S.15. and summarized as follows (for 1985166): haize Paddy wheat ...... (TShIton). Producer price 5.230 7.X30 6.000 Transport from village 1.200 1.100 550 Society levy 260 390 r 1 900 Union levy 520 780 I 9ank interest 60 90 210 Other costs I URi =LZLi URp M"c Into-Stgre Cost 8.010 12,4;0 8.200 &j Including shrinkage, bags, fumigation, handling. etc. 72. The NHC into-store costs presented above were average costs for all unions in 198S186. Real costs paid to cooperatives vary considerably from one union to another. Into-store costs of foodcrops for the different cooperative unions for1l985186 are not available. however, to show the level of price difference paid to unions, MD0 projected minimum and maximum into- store costs for maize, paddy and wheat in 198666? together with the corresponding unions are as follows: minimum - Into-store cost (TShiton) 7,090 10.630 11.410 - Union (region) Singi Mtwara Singida - Into-store cost (TSh/ton) 10.900 15.880 12,460 - Union (region) Kagera Morogoro Iringa 73. The difference in the into-store price should in principle reflett the marketing costs of each union; and since these prices are negotiable, each union has a tendency to inflate them in order to realize the highest 'savings' or levies. In addition, this way of fixing prices puts a heavy burden on NMC to monitor the cost structure of each union. The mission proposed that producer prices should be set at "MC stores, which would mean that payment to the producer would be made after deduction of all cooperative marketing costs. This would push producers into monitoring and supervising cooperative activities and, in turn put pressure on the latter to be more efficient in trying to compete with open market traders. Working Paper No. 5 Page 23 consumer Prices 7y. Consumer prices of food crops are calculated by MDB based on an assumed producer prices {from which ex-store prices are calculated), to whiCi NWC, wholesale and retail margins are added. Projected 1986187 Consumer prices of maize, rice and wheat flour are presented in Table 5.16 and summarized below: aie ic W hel . .(TSh/ton). Average NMC ex-store 11,220 16,540 1,77T0 - NMC margin 60 410 440 - Sales tax - - 4,550 - Wholesale margin 880 1.280 1,400 - Retail margin 24 _?30 9tO Retail ariel 12.200 16,960 25,130 rounded to: 12,200 19.000 25,150 75. Since 1980, consumer prices of maize grain, maize flour, rice and wheat have remained more or less constant, in constant terms, while in current terms they have undergone considerable increase as a result of full cost pricing and the higher exchange rate, mainly affecting the cost of rice and wheat imports and internal transport eost. The price of maize flour is negotiated between NMC and local authorities, and it was not decided before the mission left. Although it is supposed to cover all costs, maize price was set at only THs 7.61kg in 1985, compared to a full cost of TSh 11.101kg. In addition, maize price for 1986, after being announced, has been cut back substantially to TSh 12.20/kg affecting consequently the producer price. Translating the minimum urban wage into terms of its purchasing power in respect of maize, rice and wheat flou. prices of food crops appear to have increased much faster than wages, with adverse effects on the living conditions of urban workers. The evolution of official consumer prices since 1973 and the purchasing power of minimum urban wages are shown in Tables S.8 and 5.7 respectively, and are summarized for selected years as follows: Workinz Paper No. 5 Page 24 JJI3 1i9 1984 198 Annual ...... (TShIkg) ...... j.clease Cgnsume? orices (t) j/ Maize - - 5.40 12.20 50.3 Maize flour 0.00 1.25 8.00 - 23.3 Rice 1.65 5.35 13.40 19.00 20.7 Wheat 1.65 5.65 14.50 25.15 23.3 - Constant (1983/84 prices) Maize - 3.80 5.20 17.0 Maize flour 4.88 2.57 S.69 - 1.3 Rice 10.07 11.01 9.46 8.10 (1.7) Wheat 10.07 11.63 10.7O 10.73 0.5 minimumurban wage IUkIl ... . tSh/month). Nominal 240 480 810 1,053 12.1 Constant (1904 prices) 1.985 1,338 81$ 634 (8.6) Purehamina DOME 2f m * . (Ikgstaple/day's wage). Maize - - 5.00 2.88 (24.1) Maize flour 10.00 12.80 3.40 - (9.3) Rice 4.80 3.00 2.00 1.85 (7.1) Wheat flour 4.80 1.80 1.90 1.40 (9.01 Al Compound rate in the period for which data is available .UZrft:MD0. 76. It should be noted that current import parity prices of food crops at the prevailing official exchange rate are estimated to be lower than comparativedomestic prices resulting in a consumer price lower than what it would have boen if there were no imports. Ex-store prices of maize. rice and wheat over the past 3 years are detailed in Tables 5.11 to 5,16. A summary of these tables for 1985/86 is presented below: Workins PaDer Po. 5 Page 25 i2s Rice ~~~~~heat ...... (TShlton) ...... ,.. Producer price 5,230 - 12,050 I/ - 6.000 - Import price - 3,420 - 5.900 - 4,320 Cooperativemarketing cost 2J780 - .. 40.L LI - Nt4Cinto-store gost 8.010 16,450 a/ 6.910 rl Milling cost - ' NMC marketing cost .2.J=8$0.t 2L0t2. 1.7.i 2L.D NMC ex-gstorecost 10,860 5.660 19,180 7.920 8.670 6,700 (II: Oomesticallyproduced. (II): Imported. J,I In equivalent rice - paddy to rice 0.65. kI Mainly from large-scalefarms. AlI Average NMC purchase price. 77. On the open market, consumer prices have generally beenrmuch higher than official prices, in relation to the restriction imposed on private traders. This is still valid for Cowanoditieswith limited supply within Tanzania such as rice and wheat. Out for maize. the open market price levels are greatly affected by the season and the liberalizationof private trade. In fact, followingGovernment decision to abolish transport licences for food crops (para. 32). open market prices of maize are for the first time about equal to the official ones. This is one of the difficultiesfacing "MC which resulted in maize stockpiling this year. Official and open market prices of maize, rice and wheat for 19841S5 and I9S/186 are as follows: Danu ° eig mulket 1 market aj ...... (TShkg) . maize 7.60 10.78 12.20 9.65 Rice 14.S0 36.07 19.00 37.57 Wheat flour 17.20 41.31 25.15 35.53 X/lAverage price. Working Paper Va. 5 Page 26 VI. tAIINRECOMMENOATIONS 78. While some progress has been made in opening 6p the internal trade in food grains, certain inconsistencies in interpreting recent changes ard recommendations tI require official clarification. For instance, it is recommended that traders be allowed to buy directly from producers, primary societies, the Unions and even from NMC depots, and yet pruducers are not allowed to sell to private traders, etc. i9. The official producer prices should be considered as floor prices, at which NHC would buy from the unions as a last resort. These prices should not be paid to the producer at farm-gate, but rather at the NMC into-Store gricg, which should be uniform for the whole country. Prices paid to the producers would therefore be calculated by the unions taking into account all their marketing charges. As a first step toward the implementation of this proposal and on the basis of 1985186 average produc&r and into-store prices for maize, paddy and whe1 t, floor prices would be 1.4 or 1.5 times the produce price,, i.e.: , .TShl/kI). maize 5.25 8.00 1.52 Paddy 8.00 12.44 1.56 Wheat 6.00 0.20 1.31 a0. In addition,' it is not considered economically )ustifiable to set prices for premium and non-premium areas, since the agroclimatic aspect is only one of many other production factors, and therefore a dual price would not necessarily result in more efficient use of the production factor. It is recommended therefore that regional price differentiation be abolished, and prices to the producer be floor prites into-store. 81. Regional Trading Companies IRTC) are felt to be redundant in food distribution. especially after the Government having allowed inter-trading between primary societies and permitted tham to have their own retail shops in rural areas to supply consumers. It is therefore recommended that RTC confine its activities to the distribution of industrial consumer goods. 82. To assess future grain storage requirements, a survey should be undertaken to identify storage availability, rehabilitation possibilities and projected storage capacity requirements at village, district, regional and national levels. 1/ See Appendix 1. Vorkingi PaPer No. 5 Appendix 1 Page 1 T6flANIA AGRICULTURiALSECIOR REVICW MliSSIQN Task Force on Food Distribution Sygtem 1. In the beginning of 198? the Government set up a Task Force to review the marketing arrangements for food commodities. The Task Force. under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Development, comprised representatives of: - Ministry of Finance. Planning and Economic Affairs; - Ministry of Local Government and Cooperatives; - Hinistry of Industries and Trade; - Cooperative Unions of Tanzania. 2. The Terms of Reference of the task Force constituted a broad review of the food distribution and pricing systems and of the functions of the related institutions, with specific empahais on the following: i) in order to ensure a smooth and timely redistribution of staples from surplus to deficit areas, streamlining of tie flow of food commodities through the various stages of the marketing process from farm level up to retail outlets; ii) the creation and. maintenance of a Strategic Grain Reserve at constant levels and of good quality, assigning responsibility for the importation of food - whenever needed - to one or more marketing agencies; iii) determining how a free flow of food from surplus regions to deficit areas can be practically monitored and, in this contexts examining the role of the official marketing agencies in this process; iv) setting up of a central food information system coordinated by HALO in close collaboration with all marketing bodies involved; v) revision of the actual pricing system, both at into-store and retail levels and discussion of ways in which the co-operative unions could be more flexible in their pricing policy and marketing operations so as to increase their share in the marketed production of the country and reduce the need for imports; vi) critical review of the functions of all marketing agencies actually involved in food marketing, i.e. cooperative unions, NMC and HDL, in order to determine any institutional weaknesses in the food distribution system and make recommandations for their improvement in order to reduce the food marketing cost and thus keep consumer prices within reasonable limits. Working Paper No._5 Appendix 1 Page 2 vii) In r:cordancewith any Possible adjustmentof the food distribution system as mentioned under vi, advise on the redistributionof the avsilablemarketing facilities,including sheds, mills, transport facilities, weighing scales, etc. aftnq t'e offiCial marketing agencies and ensure that these are used in an efficientwuy by the marketing organizations. 3. The Task force draft report was distributed to the Government institutions concerned in May 1987, for comments and review. The mission could not have acces' to this draft report but, from discussions with officials,the main recommendationsof the Task Force appear to include: i) the cooperative unions should be responsible for inter-regional trade, and therefore NMC should withdraw from some 13 regions concentratingits activitiesin the 6 branches where it has mills: ii) RTC would no longer be involved in grain marketing; iii) producer prices would become floor prices; iv) consumer prices would differ from one region to another and would be fixed by the relevant Regional Authorities; v) Dar-es-Salsamwould De served only by the NDL, excluding therefore the cooperativeunions; vi) NMC would remain the sole official importer of food grains (maize. rice, wheat); vii) licenced traders would be allowed to buy foodgrains from farmers and/or primary societies; viii) Governmentwould create a Strategic Grain Reserve of 80,000 tons of maize only. -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vforkina Paper No. 5 Appendix 2 Page 1 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALSECTOR MISSION REVISEDRCULAT!OKS XVER."G TWI ORSTRSUrITO AXD OPERAToR OF TN ?AP'.AKINSTRATECIC G2AL: RESERvE 1. G;eneral Thd Coverneent 0ofTa^Ist. of *aeasure of sect:4:y agir.s: possible shor:ages in food atv:t*, hit:. due to na:'ual d:sasters andio: unforeseen import supply deleys. hlas decided to reconsitit;:e the Strategic GrainReserve (5C.).first,established in 1978. ThisReserve is to be ke;: Separatelyfrom and additional to'th no=al w:Idng stocks of foodgrains securedasd sanagedby the K;aional MillIngCorporation (MC) for cmer- cial distribution in urban and rural cearres of the country. 2. R.eosit:utioa loadutoe*.m The SCR Is to be re-established through proeureent of dcoestical- ly producedgrains, or the settingaslde of lsported grains. Procurement vill be financ" in part from the counterpartfun.ds generated by the Sale of the originaI SCR stocks C77 00 tonnes). and fram other Covermen: funds. In the aedita to lontg-tem, stocks and/or fuds sight also be secured from ex:ernal sources. 4The SCR '411 be builtui progressively. as grafn surplusesand flnacial resourcesbecame avallable. to the original targe.t level of 100 000 tonles. Once this has beenachieved. a re"sessmeat of-tbhe sie of the reserve will be made. The SOf will be held In the SOt godows which have been specifi- cally constructed for the reserve by donors and CO7. These are stra:.- gically located at: *akmba ko 10 ^00tonne.j Dodcom 30 000 tonves Arusha 10 000 tonves Shicyanga 10 000 tonnes Dar-es-Sala IC 000 tonaes I/ 1V A second godou, of 10 000 conncs Is tb be constructed by GOT. 3. Ownership The SCR vlll be oused hy =0. wito will he resposible for A'l COsts incurred tr the procurement. salntenfance and opea.tjorn of the reserve. Specifica.l. : *:1: not ftrx par of nor58 wc-C'suo:K'Ing s:o:i4 f'r WorkinR PPaer No. 5 Appendix 2 Page 2 meeting the noma1l food needs o! tht populaton. The SOR will be monsged on behal' of the Cvermint by the Food Securlty Unit (rSu), whiehwill be responsible for enxurhng I:s Integrity either ir. terms of grain or its imputedcash value. 'a. Us. of the St The SCR will be used to provide food In mergency situations resultIng from natural dissters. As such, It Is not Intended that the reserve will be used to co.#r for itnadequacies in providingfor uiosr. no!nalarace requirements. An emergency. justify$;^%he relesse of SOt grains.is a s:tu:tion in which there sre clear inC';aotons the: at' acute and widespread food shortge. extensive suffering and dislocationIn the life of the ccunity on on emeeptionai scale are *mnart antd that these dangerscannot be overeoe by normalsupply proceitrss. Such an emergencycan be ceaed. emooaother things. by abnormalfloods, severe stoma. *eceptional droughts and civildisturbs--e. for clarity.It is understood that a food mer- gency. for the purposes of the SZR.does set ezlst If the food shortage has come about as a resultcf failure of the Coverwent and/or RIC to make adequateprovision for :he known needs of the population. or failure to move *vallablestocks Into areasof food need. Any use of the reserve under such circsstvances would obligatethe Covermsent to replacethe stocis as rapldly as possible.without recourse to donorassistance. The SCR say also be partiallyused In a situationin which.though PeIrcunsuacesover which the Covenuent has no control, the country's operationdal tocksbicome depleted to a dangerously lov level. for exmple. due to delays .ln the arrival of shlpments. Such use is acceptable provided replenis)ment can be guarnteed out of normal scheduled supplies as soon as these arrive. It is envisaged that to sost instances requiring withdrawas frce the reserve that the graitn will be released to 34C for sale In the affected areas. Any such ral"ses. Irrespective of how the reserve is to be recon- stltuted, must be covered at the time of the release by a cash paser.S by MC into the SCR fund of the full imputedvals-, of the withdraeal. This will be repaid on replenishment of tVt SOR on a tonne for tonne. :ype !o- type. basis. in exceptional cases. authority may be given to release the Crail for free distributior.. Distribution would ormally be the .esponslbillty of the VFaine Relief Deparoment in the Prime Minister's Office. The irteg- rity of the reserve would be maintained by a payment from the Treasury at the tie of the release to the Imputed value, of the grair., necessary a- rangementswould also have to tbe ade to replace the grain used. J4e Release and replacemeat of stocks It is the intention of the Goverment that the SCP.. once re- established, would be mair.:ained or a revolving basis. vithdrawals fr= the reserve belns of'se: by additionsto the reserve o' cereal grains of si ; lar kind and quality. and on a net tonne for tonne bas!s. :;o w1:hdrawa's WorkingPaoer No. S Anpendix 2 Page 3 from the reserve will be pemitted without a umitte* order fron tne ;in4.- ter. Such orders vill take one of two forms: - recognation of a "food emergetcy" by the N;ational Food Secu- ritv Comittee who wovld instruct the TSI to authorize the release of specificquantities for distribution to specific - authority to recycle food securitystocks to maintair.quality integrity. If the 1;tional Tooc Security Cottee, on the evidence presented by the rSV and other agencies, determines that an emergency eiStS, vih.in the frameworkos the otjectives of the SUR, they will i&Buetne necessary instructiotu to ralease stocks to the FS1 and advise XMC,or PNO it the event of free distribution. Thesevould specIfy the area affectecaon the quantities and typesof grainto be released from tamed locations The PSS. w11 arrangefor such stocks,t*be releasedand for the correspondig impu- ted value of the stock to be loged La the SORfuto at the time of release by the tripiet agency. To -crcumstances *here resrve stocks are releaed, on authority of the MSistet, to meet a temorary food shortage rtsulting frot san-made causes of an uncontrollable and wanticipated nature, ucbh *s shippinig delays and strikes, It will be the responsibility of Governmet to guaran- tee replacement of the stocks as soon as the delayed shipmentsor transfer has been received. ReplUcementvi be otn a set to=* for tonne basis, with grain of similar kinA and quaUty. PelUg delivery of replemet stocks to reserve warehouses, Goverment, through MC, #III credit the Food laserve Pon wIth the ful market value of the stocks released for sale. Depenaiag on the frequency with which reserve stocks are utilisec to to mt ewumecy situations , it may be necessary fron tiat to tZia "'re-cyl" cereal supplies to maintai art acceptable quality standard. The legth., of time cereal Srains ca be held in storage, ad quality win- tamed, will depend upn storage codttitns, temperature and ttidity faetors, condtion of the grain when taUe Into storage, insect ptoblms and frequeny of figation required. it is anticipatod, however, zhat even woer good "housekeplng" codi-:iotis, reserve stoc' will have :o be recycled at leas every lb to 24 soothsir hbe c'imatic conditio:s b*hlvt exst iz Tanzania. T;he responsibility for deteriint :*e Decess1ty :0- recycle specific stoeks w,II rest -ii.h the TSt, in colaboratiot Mi:4CM managment. a de:ermination has been Sade that rserve stockst ar to be tUhn toe recycled, the sesignatec stocks will be raleased to *1IC for sale it market. If at the time of such relea, )OC has available regular stocks of simila typs and qualities of grain in store in the regionS concerned, a simple transfer of stocks will take place on a^ net tonaiSe Dis, so tha. the overall volume of reserve stocks will be saint&a e6 auring the recyci- ing operation. In the even: that tZC does eo: have CO3t1ci'#4 S;;ies *$av e fos replacement oa a "spot" basis, It wi=G d'ie:'. cr*dit -'te* S<^ ru- Workint Paper No. 5 Appendix 2 Page 4 ittb the total value of the reserve stocks. fleus monies wil be utiLisd to pay for renplceMUt Supplies, as they are sequred by taC, either fgn dostic production or from Iuports. Any financial deficit is effectigg stock replacement in this maer will be covred by Goverment trough prowision under the relevant services or captal heads of tbe reSular nual expendLture bwdget. ln the rcycling process, whe feasible, reserve stocks should be modeavailable for sale at the latter part of the crop year, so that re- plemet stockssAy be acquired from now crop supples immediately after harvest comeneos to the stock repacemeotprocess 't bas beenemphasized that stock transfer must beon a net tonnage (upon receipt) basis. rS/flIC must enure that net weights, * l not gross weights, are calculatod for replacement cereals when stocks are beias recycled, or when stocks ralesd under a food emergencyare being replaced from domstic productiou. S. Oo atztwe for the Resee Ownership of the emerencyreserve wil be vested io the Goven- meatof Tanzaiaa, whch wiLl constitute a Nationa FoTodSecurity Comittes. Al decsion relative to the rl*e of stocks from the reserveto met a food nergency situation shall be made by the Urister of Agriculture aeti on the 'advice of the Comuittee. la agreeing that a foov mergency exists, the Comittes will specify the geographeal. are affected, the aommt end tp of "esrve stock to be supplied, and the location from whlcb schb "rsve shall be dran. Me declration 'il constitute autbo i:ty for the M to release szocs to SHCor other relief -agenie In the quantitie types ad locations specitie. The emrgency reserve wil be stored in approved facilties b.- longing to the SO.. tmC, however, wl operate as a warehouseman in accor- dae vith the provisionsof a *"dlin agreemet with the M1. M1 viS be rsponsibl for the usatiesce of the rsrvoe in soud condtion,fre fm inect and rodent infstation. It shall issu wrobse receipts cocearing all stock additios to the reerve, designating quatlty, qu- itys, i and condtion of the stock, and re"a stocks only spon roper autbority in writing from the Ms, upoa surrendr of the appropriate warehouse recept for cancelltion. 34C shll be reimbursed for storage and handing charges for reserve stock in accordance with in agreed Sce- dule of Tariffs set out in a handing agreemeatwith flu. The rliisary of Finance will arrange for audit of the restrve a: si-monthly intervals. 6* Sraegc Grin, Reserve Section To ensure the efficient admnustration gad operation of the emr- goucy reserve, a sall SCR Section within the MlUwill be es:tb2shed to undertakeall administrative and supervIsory aspects of ulait:^4-'a at emergencyreserve in the country. 'hebSection wil* be headed by thes?oo Securi:yOfficer reporting directly to the Dputy Princpal Secretay, 1Eilio,and will consistof technicaland accoun:iagdepartments. Working Paver No. 5 Agpendix 2 Page 5 The **jot responsibl*ity of the ;t will be the overal ma"ae- ment of the SCR. They %iLl maintainall records of stocks, additions to and deletiots from the reserve; undertae all financialtranstloos with respect to the reserve, and mainta appropriate records of accounts, so s to fultll a necessary complemetary control function regareing the accoun- ting done by NMC. It will be responsible for verifyingthat grain stoek are maintainecit good condition, uaeertake physicalstock checs to com- try farahouses, and supervisestock movements. It I411 also advise wre- bhouse managers oa storage and fmigition procedures to maintaia high standard of storage for reserve stocks, and report to the officer on stock qualIty a*d :ze need for recycling. The Food Securitv UI: wuill esner into a handling agremen: with :HC detailing all arrangements and charges for the s:orage and maintenance o' reserve s:ocks; aid for procedures and c6s:s for recyc:.no stocks as and wane requ"red. 7. FSancia.larrasSaments The Food Security Reserve Fund should be conpod of two accounts: a) A Deposit Acout to be ser up withit the publc accounts as the SOR Fund, to whSchwill be credited contributions In cash or is comodities (imputed value); proceeds from a sales of reserve grai; and deposits by Govermt and/ot donors for t1be purchase of gragn. At all tims the funds In the deposit account shoul he sufficient to reconstitute the reserve to its target level. The accout will he asasgel by the M. b) A Ladgzr Account, to be set up witin the TSU, and whch wll serve as the iurrent account for day-to-day operations for maaaging and maintaining the ewergeacy resere. The.opera- tiom of this .-ccomt vill he the rssposihblty of the M. Expendtures wi be eharSedaganst the relevant seaVVceor capital heac on the basis of budget provisionsmade by Governmetto maintainad operatethe 3e0t The Ministry o' Finance will arrSane foO audit of t#t Tuud at six-uorthly laterva.s. Working Paper No. 6 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKING PAPER OPEN MARKETSFOR GRAIN IN URBANAREAS Southern Africa Department Agriculture OperationsDivision Africa Regional Office Workina Paper No. 6 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKING PAPER OPEN MARKETSFOR GRAIN IN URBANAREAS Table of Contents Page No. I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. EVIDENCE FROM DAR ES SALAAM AND THREE REGIONAL CITIES 3 Background on Urban Food Markets ...... 3 III. SUMMARY OF MARPET CHARACTERISTICSAND STRUCTURE 16 Numoer of Actors and Traders' Specialization 16 Varietiesof Marketing Actors ...... 16 Market Information ...... 17 Nature of Trading Links Over Space ...... 17 Direction of Trade ... 19 Government Controls ...... 20 IV. MARKETING CHAINS AND FUNCTIONS 20 Marketing Chain for Dar es Salaam ...... 21 Marketing Chains for Other Cities ...... 23 Summary ...... 24 V. MARKETINGCOSTS AND TRADERS"INCENTIVES 24 VI. CONDITIONSOF COMPETITION 29 Ethnicity ...... 29 Capital Requirements ...... 31 Government Regulation ...... 32 VII. URGAN FOOD AVAILABILITY 32 Dar es Salaam ...... 32 Morogoro, Dodoma and Iringa ...... 39 VIII. CONCLUSION 41 APPENDIX A: Maize Marketing Costs and Return on Working Capital APPENDIX B: NMCMaize Sales Working Paper No. 6 Page 1 TANZANIA AGRICULTURALADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WORKINGPAPER OPEN MARKETS FOR GRAIN IN URBAN AREAS I. INTRODUCTION In the past four to five years a more tolerant attitude has emerged in Tanzanian toward open markets and the farmers and traders who participate in them. The main policy changes associated with liberalization have been, first, a progressive easing since 1985 of statutory restrictions on inter- regional grain movement, and second, reintroduction in 1984 of cooperatives as primary-level purchasers and marketing agents. The National Milling Corporation (NMC) - previously holder of a grain marketing monopoly - has withdrawn to secondrry functions of inter-regional distribution. The NMC continues its responsibility for urban grain storage and wholesale distribution, grain milling, operation of the Strategic Grain Reserve, and external trade in grain. It is important to note as a counterpoint to these liberalizing trends that the official status of the private grain trade is presently unclear, particularly vis-a-vis the cooperatives.1 This is the policy context in which open grain markets have evolved, and their encouragement will most likely continue. To give one measure of their current importance, the Ministry of Agriculture's Marketing Development Bureau (MDB) estimates that open market channels in Tanzania now account for approximately 651 of total marketed quantities of maize, and 942 of rice.2 Food marketing policies are in the process of being reassessed by the government of Tanzania. At this writing, additional reforms are seriously being considered viz., 1. The NMC and cooperatives are slated to reduce the geographical scope of producer price support operations by purchasing only in two designated price support regions, Rukwa and Ruvuma (pan territorial and pan-seasonal pricing will still obtain at the farm-gate). 2. A Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR), will be created as an import buffer and also as a stabilizer of consumer prices, both seasonally and inter- annually. 3. Private trade will Increasingly be sanctioned at lower levels of the marketing chain. Currently private traders can only legally purchase from regional depots of the NKC or Cooperative Unions, not at the village (primary) level. 4. Modifications in the official price structure may allow greater coverage of NMC's and the cooperatives, actual marketing costs, which have been underestimated in the past due to, among other reasons. use of the cost- plus method of pricing. These changes will, along with planned cost-reduction measures, help to diminish or eliminate the implicit subsidy that up to now has appeared as a large, usually bank-financed overdraft in NMC accounts.3 Active government intervention in food markets will continue. but with changed emphasis, as public policy attempts to regulate rather than displace open markets. There is thus a pressing need to understand the nature and operation of private grain markets, and this requires a fund of basic data on their structure, cost and performance. This paper can be seen as a * This report was prepared by B. Gordon (Ph.D Candidate at Tufts University). Working Paper No. 6 Page 2 preliminaryattempt to provide that foundation.4 It is limited in scope to rural-urbanmarkets, specificallyconsumer markets for maize and to a lesser extent rice, in the cities of Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Dodoma, and Iringa. The picture it gives of the marketing and distributionsystem is partial, since it covers only a few cities, neglects rural producer markets, and leaves out village-leveland intra-ruraltrade. Despite these limitations,the discussionhas broad significancefor marketing and agriculturalpolicy, not least because of rapid recent growth in the long-haul grain trade, and the central role of Dar es Salaam in that trade. A number of basic questions are addressed. They are summarizedbelow and taken together they form a preliminary,but fairly comprehensiveframework for assessingurban grain markets, structureand performance: a. Who participatesin the grain trade as buyers, sellers, and middlemen? What marketing services are performed by participants,e.g. marketing, assembly,storage, processing- and are they performed by a specialized group? b. From what external locationsdo cities get their grain, and does it pass through several markets before reaching urban points of consumption,or is it marketed directly from producing areas? c. What degree of control does the governmentexert over the open market grain trade, and what are the purposes of such control: improved food security, market rRgulation,taxation7 I d. What are the costs incurred by traders in providing their services? Are marketing margins (the differencebetween farm-gate and consumer market prices) excessive,or do they reflect traders' actual costs? What are the main cost components of the marketing margin and can they be reduced through government investments or policies? e. What are traders' incentivesto trade between different points, and do they respond to such incentives?' f. Is the structure of trade to urban consumer markets competitive.and if not, can obstacles to competitivenessbe overcome? g. How do open markets interact with the official marketing system, for example are quantities regularlyexchanged between the two systems? Do producers,consumers and traders regularlyswitch between 'fficial and unofficialchannels, or do the two channels serve mutually exclusive groups? h. Do open market sales form a significant portion of overall urban grain supply, and is there any indicationthat their share has systematically changed over the past few years of liberalization? Do government sales still constitute a significantsource of urban supply? This set of questions is pursued, as the data permits, in four Tanzanian cities: Dat es Salaam, Morogoro, Dodoma, and Iringa. Data were collected through interviewswith traders and farmers, conducted in Kiswahili by the Working Paper No. 6 Page 3 author. Over seventy-fivetraders were interviewedin the course of research for this paper. A Tanzanianassistant cross-checked the data by conducting parallel interviewswithin markets visited, and corroboratingspecific points of fact. To give a sense of individualcontext, background data is first presented for each city in Chapter II. In Chapter III market characteristics are compared. Chapter IV pursues the question of marketing functions in more detail, and marketing costs are the primary concern of Chapter V. Competitive conditions in open markets are discussed in Chapter VI, and finally in Chapter VII evidence on urban maize availabilityis presented, with particular emphasis on recent trends in Dar es Salaam. A concluding section sums up the evidence and attempts to address policy questions posed at the outset. II. EVIDENCE FROM DAR ES SALAAM AND THREE REGIONAL CITIES A. Backgroundon Urban Food Markets 1. Dar es Salaam, with approximately1.87 million residents in 1988, is in population terms the largest food deficit region in Tanzania.5 The city containsnumerous large retail markets which sell grain, fruit, vegetables and household items to city residents. Examples are Kariakoo,Mwananyamala, Kisutu, Tandika, Temeke.Magomeni, Kinondoni, Ilala, Buguruni,Mlandege and Ubungo markets. None of these markets appear, on investigation,to receive significantquantities of grain during the year direct from Tanzania's producing regions, although small wholesale quantititiesare sometimesbrought in. This observation is based on in-depth interviewswith over twenty traders during the June-Augustperiod, shorter interviewswith traders from November, 1987 to the present, and visits to several of the above markets where these issueswere discussedwith wholesale and retail traders. It is important to stress the ongoing nature of this research since it is possible to get an inaccuratepicture of comnodity flows from only one or two visits to a market. Manzese Market is the primarywholesale trading center and unbulking point for grain in Dar es Salaam. The market also sells grain on a retail basis, as well as fruits, vegetables and household items. At the market, trucks of ten to thirty tons (or up to sixty tons, with trailers attached) are received every day, year-round, from the country's grain producing regions. As the main wholesaling center in Dar, Manzese is the primary source of externallyproduced maize and rice for the city's retail markets and for retailers who operate neighborhood shops around the city. The contribution of local grain production to overall city supplies is considered small, although small home gardens and plots may be important seasonal stabilizersfor urban residents. (Chapter VII treats this question in more detail). Typically, grain is distributedaround the city by one-ton trucks, which are either owned or rented by shopowners. Shorter distance hauls are accomplished by hand-drawn carts, called mikokoteni. Working Paper No. 6 Page 4 Grain from Manzese is not only consumed within the city but is redistributedto other towns in surroundingCoast Region such as Bagamoyo and Kilwa, and also to offshore islands such as Zanzibar Island and Mafia. In September,rural traders came to the market to purchase grain for resale in the Rufiji Valley which is part of adjacent Coast Region (but over one hundred kilometers from Dar es Salaam). Grain traders actively seek customersoutside Dar es Salaam. Several traders with whom I talked have expressed interest in exporting grain outside Tanzania, and several are trying to obtain export licenses,although according to traders, private export is still not permitted. The total number of residentwholesale grain traders in the market is in the range of seventy to eighty. This is the estimate given by officials of the market council as well as by market participants,although fifty traders hold licences, accordingto the market council secretary. Two traders with long experiencein the market said that in the early 1980s there were only fifteen residentwholesale traders operating. Market activity has therefore increasedconsiderably. Several experienced traders see 1985 as a turning point in the evolution of Manzese, it being the year in which overall market volumes showed their sharpest upturn. Resident traders, or *wafanyabiasharava sokos (they are often inaccuratelycalled 'madalali',or auctioneers)typically do business from small plots in the market, which they either rent or occupy without rental on a first-come-first-servedbasis. Resident traders' primary function is to purchase grain from incoming farmers and non-residenttraders since they both originate from outside Dar es Salaam - and resell the grain in Manzese market on a wholesale basis. Resident traders sometimes travel to distant grain producing areas to purchase grain to bring to the city, but this usually happens only later in the marketing year, usually after October, when the flow of incoming non-residenttraders diminishes. The reason give for this reduction in marketing flows is that after October land preparation and cultivationbegins in rural areas and farmers are too busy with their farms to bring their crops to market. a) Market Transactions In a typical transactiona farmer or non-residenttrader arrives in the market after engaging a truck to transport his grain from a rural producing area to Dar es Salaam. The outsider - again, it can be either a farmer or outside trader - is approachedby several resident traders, each calling out a price aimed at securing his business. The outsider seeks a remunerativesale price for his grain, and additionally, he desires an immediate short-termloan from the resident Manzese trader with which to pay the trucker. This latter point is important.Most of those who market grain to Manzese hire transport without paying the truck-driveruntil arrival in the market. A sale prvse is negotiatedand the outsider transfers his grain to the resident trader's plot. He invariablyhas to wait in Dar es Salaam to get his Working Paper No. 6 Page 5 cash, usually staying in one of the hotels which surround the market, and for his lod5ing and food he must often borrow additionalfunds from the resident trader. Sale of the grain sometimestakes several days, since the Manzese trader may have to wait to find a buyer, or he may spend time negotiating for a more remunerativesale price. In any case, the outsider receives payment for his bags of grain after waiting several days, at most, and returns to his home region. Payment is based on the initiallycontracted sale price, net of the Manzese trader's initial loan for transport and lodging, with no explicit interest cost deducted. There is a limit to how long the Hanzese trader can wait in selling the outsider'sgrain. Traders have no permanent storage, only an open plot at the market which is watched at night by hired guards, and which can hold approximatelyfifteen tons of stacked bags (plot sizes vary). Turnover of goods is thus extremely fast since traders do not want grain to spoil in the open, and in addition farmerswant to be paid cash quickly and return to their farms. Hanzese traders perform other importantservices besides connecting sellers with buyers. They sometimesextend cash credit to farmers or others trading to Hanzese, on the order of TShs. 20,000 to TShs. 100,000 per loan (the August '88 exchange rate was about TShs. 98 to the dollar). Loans in the upper end of this range were recorded in December, 1987, during planting season, when farmers cash needs were high. Amounts loaned vary, and fanmers themselveshave been observed lending to traders on occasion. Traders also make short-termloans to other traders who need working capital. It seems that traders use loans as a trade facilitatorand as a way of strengthening trading links with trustworthycustomers. The most frequent interest rate charged for large loans with a six-month repaymentperiod is lOOS. Cash credit is very risky for the lender, so it is often extended only to personal acquaintancesand good business contacts. In fact, there exist a variety of cash and in-kind credit arrangements,and many rely on family members for loans, which carry little or no interest. The notion that there exists a unified informal credit market with wide access is not correct, but limited cash credit is available through several different channels,which offer both short and longer-termcredit, as well as various types of in-kind loans. In sum, the main services provided by resident traders are: - Connection of sellers from rural areas with urban buyers, - Provision of credit and/or cash advances to farmers (or incoming non-resident traders) to pay for transport,lodging and marketing and other costs. An additional service provided is: - Information on anticipated market conditionsto farmers and traders who are considering bringing future Working Paper-No. 6 Page 6 loads to the market (this service is not one for which resident traders are directly compensated). b) Traders' Economic Behavior and Assets The majority of resident traders are specializedin grain and fruit and vegetable trading, but a few have side businesses such as a small shop in Dar es Salaam. Most are the sole proprietors of their grain businesses, although joint partnershipswith two owners are not uncomon. The primary economic motivationof a resident trader is to increase the volume of sales on his grain account, which comprises the major portion of his business (beans are considereda grain for this purpose by traders). When asked what their investmentpriorities were (how would you spend a gift of TShs. 50,000?"),a random sample of ten traders indicated that increasingthe volume of grain purchases and sales was paramount. Another top priority was to build a house in Dar es Salaam. Altogethertwenty Manzese traders participatedin extended interviews which explored their agset ownership. It is significantthat not one trader interviewedowned storage facilities (or admitted to it). Privately-owned permanent storage does not appear to exist in the market or in the surrounding neighborhood,or indeed anywhere in Dar es Salaam. Authorities of the market council affirmed this, and my research assistant,who is a resident of the market area, consistentlyupheld this view. In addition, those intervieweddid not own milling equipment or transport facilities. Traders expressed an interest in acquiring these but they consideredthe cost far beyond their means. It was also evident that to some, cost considerationsincluded the cost of risk - in the case of transport equipment,the risk of theft or destructionon bad roads, and in the case of storage, the risk of confiscationby authorities. c) Structureof Trade and Other Data At Manzese over thirty rice retailers and more than fifty maize grain retailers sell in the market on a given day, but this is a tiny percentageof the total number of retailersin the city. The retail market at Manzese is substantial,but as mentioned, there are numerous other retail markets in the city of similar size.6 In recent years, five regions have habitually sent maize to Dar es Salaam via the private market according to traders: Hbeya, Iringa. Ruvuma, Dodoma and Morogoro. I asked twelve resident traders in Manzese - 15S of the total - to rank these grain-sendingregions in terms of their importanceto total maize supplies in Manzese during the last (1987/8)marketing year. The results were as follows: Songe, (Ruvuma Region) was the first choice of most, and Iringa was second by a large majority. Rankings for Dodoma , Morogoro, and Kbeya Regions were not as clear-cut. It is significantthat Ruvuma. a region generally consideredremote and bypassed by the open market, is judged Working Paper No. 6 Page 7 by traders to be the most important single source of maize for Dar es Salaam over the year. Three regions send rice - Mbeya, Morogoro, and less regularly,Iringa. Shinyangaand Tabora are beginning to sentdsignificant quantities this year, accordingto traders. (Map A.1). Most of these regions are normally producers of surplus quantitiesof grain. Dodoma's year-to-yearmaize production can be erratic and in some years the region is a net importer. An importantcharacteristic that these regions share however, is fairly easy access to the Tanzam road, the main conduit fe~rgrain marketed by private traders to Dar. Another main road which passes through the central corridor of the country via Dodoma, Sindiga, Tabora and Shinyanga,then to Burundi, has been of increasingimportance. It connects with the Tanzam road in Morogoro (see map A.1). Quantitiesmarketed to Dar es Salaam within a given month from maize producingareas may vary dramaticallydepending on a variety of factors such as transportconditions, harvest and market expectations,and conditions in other potentialmarkets, which include other urban and rural markets, as well as opportunitiesfor sale to the official system through cooperatives. for example expectationslast February of a late harvest, induced storage by Dodoma fanmers in anticipati3n of future price rises, which reduced the amounts of grain they sent to Dar es Salaam according to traders and farmers interviewed. Similarly, grain shortages and high prices in southern Masasi District (Mtwara Region) in June, 1988 reportedly led to reduced marketing from Songea District (Ruvuma Region) to Dar, as Songea traders diverted supplies to adjacent Masasi. (Map A.1.) an Tanzania, rice and maize are usually harvested once a year, in the months from late May to July. The marketing year thus runs from about June to May, and this is the official marketing year used by the NMC. At the time of the four city study, in early June, 1988, it was the end of the lean pre- harvest period, and maize and rice prices were quite high. Small amounts of grain were being marketed from few grain producing areas, and traders told us that, in their opinion, most farmers had exhausted their commercial stocks for the year. Mansese was receiving maize primarily from Songea and Mbeya in June. Rice was very short and party leaders as well as PresidentAli Hassan Mwinyi. were calling an rice sellers country-wideto avoid *price-hikingO. 2. Moroporo town, with a population estimated at 148,000, is located in Morogoro Region directly on the Tanzam highway, about three hours' drive from Dar es Salaam. It contains tvo large retail markets. The Main Market is located in the eenter of town and is run under the authority of the City Council. The second market, called Mawenzi, is a short distance from town center and comes under District Council control. 7 These retail markets sell a wide range of grains, fruits, vegetables. Roadside traders were also evident on our visit and sold mainly maize in retail quantities. There Workint Paper No. 6 Page 8 A P A. I 7TA NZANIA. SuUtDAI4)l 14 A RSH 81.AFdWNfXu' 0 O R.A' 'X <----'~~~~~~5 4% I"*tb key: Working Paper No. 6 Page 9 exists, in addition, an importantwholesale maize market called Faya which provides much of the city's maize and acts as a redistributionpoint to retail markets and roadside sellers. It is registeredas a cooperativeand comes under regulation of the City Council. There are approximatelyfifty-seven licensed maize/rice sellers in official markets in Morogoro town, according to those we talked to. Fifteen were interviewed,but there was no opportunityto talk to market officials in Morogoro, as was done in other towns. Of the total fifty-sevensellers, fifty are retailersand seven are wholesalerswho work out of Faya market. Most of these sellers buy and transportmaize and/or rice from rural producingareas to Morogoro town (see list below). However, the larger wholesalers,who are better financed and tra_.ein larger quantities,obtain their grain exclusively by this channel, whereas smaller traders often get their grain from the wholesale market. Neither retailersnor wholesalersown transport,milling or storage facilities. Transport is hired in town or in rural areas; mills owned by local businessmen are used for hulling and grinding maize and for hulling rice (althoughmuch rice comes to the city already hulled); and private storage occurs only in the open within the market where, as in Dar es Salaam, small quantitiesare guarded overnight. Morogoro's markets customarilyreceive maize and rice from within the region,with a few exceptions. Maize is marketed from Kilosa and Kilombero Districtswithin Morogoro Region. Rice normally'comesfrom the Uyole area of Mbeya District, an area surrounding Uyole town which itself is near Mbeya town; from Kilosa and Kilombero Districts in Morogoro Region; and from Turiani ward in Morogoro District,Morogoro Region. (Map A.2). At the time of my visit to Morogoro the new harvest had not come in and predictablymaize and rice prices were high. Rice was particularlyscarce and on the second day of our visit armed policemen stopped all rice sales in the town markets. Sellers simply kept what little rice they had for sale out of sight to avoid confrontationwith police. They were selling at more than twice the official consumer price of TShs. 32 per kilo. Surprisingly, almost all maize in town originated from Iringa Region where it was bought by MNrogoro traders from IMUCU (Iringa-Mufindi Cooperative Union, a Regional Cooperative Union, or RCU) and transportedto Morogoro town for resale. This was an extremely unusual situationbecause cooperativesat the time of the study in June were considered part of a single-channel marketing system, and did not as a matter of practice sell to the open market. The existence of such trade provides an interestingexample of a beneficial interactionthat can occur between the official and unofficialmarketing systems, and the increasedflexibility that open markets provide in responding to marketing bottlenecks,particularly later in the season. This unorthodox trade occurred because first, it was evident at the time of research that cooperatives' grain stocks were overflowing.both in villages within Iringa Region and at the level of RCUs. Old stocks create two problems. First, they take up valuable space that is needed for new crops. Working PaperNo. 6 Page 10 MA^PAZo . TANZANIA ke-y- kcy~ -.. - -s - - O ;sf 'o. iV4v Working PaPer No. 6 Page 11 Secondly,they deterioratewith time and their saleabilityaad value declines. In June, cooperativerecords covering all cooperativesindicated tha 60,000 tons of maize still remained in storage in regional depots or primary societies. Total maize purchasesthrough official channels were about 220,000 mt in the 1987/8 marketing year. Thus about 27Z of official purchases had not been cleared out of cooperativesat the end of the year. Morogoro traders said that they bought maize in Iringa from IMUCU because Morogoro farmers'private stocks from the previous marketing year were finished. A second reason was that the new harvest had not yet come in, hence retail prices were still high in Morogoro town, making it profitable to purchase in Iringa. There the RCU was willing to sell its previous year's stock at TShs. 1400 per 100 kg bag. This is somewhathigher than the official into-storeprice at which RCUs were supposed to sell - TShs. 12.31 per kg. or TShs. 1231 per bag (100 kg bag). (See Appendix A for prices and marketing costs from IMUCU to Morogoro. There the IMUCU price is expressed in terms of 120 kg bag units.) Morogoro traders not only bought maize stocks of the RCU in Iringa town. They also cleared out stocks in remote areas as far away as Iringa Region's southernmostdistricts, Makete and Ludewa (Map A.2), and had apparently been doing so for severalmonths before our early June visit. I talked to several smaller traderswho had marketed maize from those districts, and was told that they first had to get an authorizationfrom the RCU office before venturing to villages (to go to Makete and Ludewa they would have needed authorizationfrom a differentRegional Union, NJOLUMA - Iringa has more than one union). Apparently,primary cooperativesocieties (or at least some of them) hold fairly strictly to the single-channelmarketing structure and will not sell to private traderswithout authorizationfrcm above, although individual farmers do not feel constrainedfrom selling outside primary societies, as the considerabletrade to Dar es Salaam and other cities attests. 3. Dodoma's Main Market is both a wholesaling and retailingcenter for maize and rice, located in the center of town and run under the City Council. It is the main distributionpoint for other, smaller retail markets in town such as Chamwino and Mwembeni markets. The Main Market, like Morogoro's has concrete floors and a sheet metal roof, but there are more traders' booths than the market can contain, and they spill out of and surround the market. It sells household goods, fruits, and vegetables as well as grain to many of the city's estimated 173,000 inhabitants. Twenty licensedmaize and rice sellers,most of whom were interviewed, work out of tbe Main Market according to the market master, a market official who oversees trading activitiesand collects li-ensing fees and taxes for the city government. I interviewedsix traders in his office, all of whom were wholesalers,and another twelve retailersin the marketplace. All of the Main Market sellers normally buy their grain in far-off villages (see list of grain-sendingareas below) and resell in the Main Market in wholesale as well as retail quantities. Some of the smaller sellers, as in Morogoro town, at ttorkint PaDer No. 6 Pa - 12 times buy their grain direct from the larger wholesalers,rather than marketing from rural areas. Transport and storage facilitiesare not owned by traders. This accords with the situation reported in Morogoro town and Dar es Salaam where traders consider such investmentsto be beyond their means. Dodoma town normally receives its maize and rice from outside the immediate region, to a far greater extent than Morogoro or Iringa towns. According to traders, producing areas customarilysending maize to Dodoma markets are Kondos and Kpwapwa Districts in Dodoma Region; Kiteto District and the Babati section of Hanang District in Arusha Region; parts of Mbeya; Njombe District in Iringa Region; parts of Singida Region; and parts of Tabora. Rice is usually marketed from Kahama District in ShinyangaRegion; Nzega District in Tabora Region; and Kilosa District in Morogoro Region. (Map A.3.) New rice and maize harvests for the 1988/89 marketing year were just rearhing the market in June, and prices were falling. Most maize came from Tabora Region and Rondoa District (DodomaRegion), where the earliest harvests had occurred. Similarly for rice, new shipmentswere being received from Shinyanga and Tabora Regions. 4. Iringa, with an estimatedpopulation of 140,000. has as many as five markets wbich sell maize and rice, but only two sell in quantity year-round. The Main Market in town center serves as both a vetailing and central wholesalingand redistributionpoint, similar to the arrangement in Dodoma town. As in Dodoma and Morogoro, the market is a well covered structurewith concrete floors and the number of traders and stalls is overrunning the capacity of the market to contain them. Mlandege Market, located five minutes' drive to the south. is more makeshift, and is the second largest market in town, dealing primarily in retail quantities. Both markets are regulated by the City Council and also sell fruits,vegetables and household goods. The Market Master in the Main Market said that the market has thirty licensed rice sellers and five licensedmaize sellers, all retailers. Rice and maize wholesalers said that there were, in addition, twenty rice wholesalers (large traders) operating in Iringa town, several of whom also market maize. The predominance of rice over maize in trading activity was the reverse of the pattern observed in all other towns visited, and showed the relative unimportance of maize as a commercial good in Iringa. Many city residents grow their own maize on the outskirts of town, or have relatives or friends who do. A total of twenty retailers and wholesalers were interviewed. All of the wholesalers market directly from villages in rural producing areas to Iringa town (see list of grain-sending regions below). Half of the small retailers interviewed travel to villages at certain times of the year to buy grain, and half do not, preferring to buy from wholesalers in town. All at times have to depend on the wholesalers for their supplies. Workinu Paper No. 6 Page 13 MAP A3. r.ANZANIA 0<~~~A A.v'bA s f h~~,r8 RA _t w : 8 k~~~~~~~~~~~~y~~~~k k d sw;2 [email protected] bei/cw .0 ....X.. 1.. Dstrt bo- 4u6ry ------s , _Vvi WorkingPaper No. 6 Page 14 None of the tradersown transportfacilities, and none have godownsfor storinggrain. This is consistentwith the low level of fixed-assetownership recordedin other towns. As in Morogoro,most of the maize sold in Iringa town is marketedfrom withinthe region. Areas usuallysending maize to Iringatown are Ludewa, Iringa,Njombe, and MufindiDistricts in tringaRegion. However,much rice comes from outsidethe region. Rice normallycomes from Rujewasection of MbeyasPawaga division of IringaDistrict in IringaRegion; and parts of MorogoroRegion, probably Kilosa or KilomberoDistricts. (Map A.4). While the Iringatown has a relativelysmall commercialdemand for maize,demand for rice is high year-round,and little is grown in the city environs. At the time of our visit,very littlemaize was evidentin town marketsalthough traders anticipated somewhat more when the new harvestscame in. What maize we saw came mainlyfrom the Dabagaarea of IringaDistrict, IringaRegion. The new rice harvestwas just arrivingto market at the time of our visit and most was beingmarketed from R~ujewaarea in Mbeya. Workint Paper No. 6 MAP A-4' TANZANIP Page 15 T,ANZ-AN _ I Key:SEY - *O A Workina Paper No. 6 Page 16 III. SUMMARY OF MARKET CHARACTERISTICSAND STRUCTURE The background informationgiven above gives some idea of the structure of maize and rice marketing for four cities. What follows is a summary and comparison of marketing characteristics. A. Number of Actors and Traders' Specialization In all cities grain markets contain numerous retail sellers. Wholesalersare present in fewer numbers, as one might expect given the higher capital requirements. In Dodoma and Dar es Salaam wholesale traders deal in a wide range of foods (grains, fruits, vegetables,etc.), while in Morogoro and Iringa traders tend to specialize in one or a few grains. In Dar and Dodoma grain trading is the largest and most profitable segment of traders' activity, in comparisonwith their trade in non-grain foods, such as fruits and vegetables. (Again, for most traders dried beans fall under their definition of grain. The generic name is 'nafakakavu'.) For some grain traders in every city visited, the fruit and vegetable trade provided the initial experience,start-up capital and contacts with which to begin grain trading, and fruit and vegetable trading is often maintained as a small part of the business. Movement into wholesale grain trading is seen as a step upward in economic terms. It requires a larger base of working capital, more extensive business conticts, and promises higher returns. S. Varieties of Marketing Actors In the case of Dar es Salaam, resident traders estimate that over the year. on average, half of the people marketing grain to Dar are farmers. This is a rough guess. The proportionchanges seasonally,with farmers - especially smaller ones - taking a greater share in the immediate post-harvest period and a declining share thereafter. Small farmers often sell immediately after harvest, traders say, due to their immediateneed for cash or lack of on-farm storage, the latter making it difficult for them to engage in seasonal trade. The concept of a "small farmer'must be considered a relative term. and applies to farmers cultivating shambas of under 8-10 acres. Larger farmers can cultivate individualholdings exceeding fifty or one hundred acres. They are better able to store their crops for a long period. sometimes using chemicals to do so, and engage in seasonal trade. These changing seasonal patterns were noted in interviews over the course of the last marketing year with incoming farmers and resident traders in 4anzese, and one could observe in August and September (1988) the predominanceof farmers among those bringing grain to the market. In October, preparation for planting starts again in some areas, and the number of farmers marketing their crops to Dar diminishes as they become occupied preparing their plots. As farmers' trading activity to urban markets falls off, urban Working Paper No. 6 Page 17 traders become more active searchingout farmerswho have stocks to sell in rural areas. Small farmers also participatein open markets by selling their crops to neighboringlarger farmers or to individualtraders, either of whom resell the grain in outside markets. There are economies of scale in the marketing of grain. particularlyin assembly and transportfunctions, which make it difficultfor smaller actors to get directly involved in marketing unless they coordinatewith others to assemble marketable quantitiesof grain, to find a buyer, or to hire a truck. Coordinationis itself costly. Interviewswith small farmers have revealed that sometimesthey collaborateto hire an eight to ten-ton truck, which none acting individuallycould manage to fill with the small quantitieswhich he has to trade. C. Market Information Marketing links are often based on personal business contacts that traders have in rural areas, but these are not necessarily family or ethnic connections. It should be noted that most resident traders in Manzese have trading contacts in all of the regions sending grain to Dar es Salaam. Personal contacts provide knowledgeof local harvest and price conditions. Other sources of knowledge about market conditions are: - informationprovided by outside farmers and traders marketing their grain to urban markets, _ expeditionsby traders in search of informationin rural areas, usually accomplishedby bus. - newspapers. This was especiallyevident in Dar's Manzese Market. Traders indicatedthat the Kiswahilidaily Uhuru was an important source of market information,both in terms of the informationit provided on crop harvestsas well as on governmentpolicy actions. The paper is readily availablein the market,and most traderswhom I talkedto were able to read it and did so regularly. - one or two traderstell me that they communicateby telephonewith the regionsto conductbusiness deals and inquire about marketingconditions. D. Natureof TradingLinks Over Space Maize tradinglinks for Dar es Salaamand Dodomaare more far-flungthan those for the other two cities,which tend to rely on supplysources within the inmediate region. The primary reason for this is that Dar and Dodoma are located in less fertileareas and cannotdepend on local suppliesin the same measureas Morogoroand Iringa. One would also expecttrading links to be longerto higherincome consuming areas such as Dar es Salaam,which have the effectivedemand to draw suppliesfrom far-offareas. Workina Paper No. 6 Page 18 Secondly, as a rule, trading links for rice cover a larger geographical area than those for maize, due to the importanceof Mbeya and increasingly Shinyangaand Northern Tabora as producing regions for the open market, and their remotenessfrom urban consumingareas. Thirdly, and this is a key point, marketing links from rural areas to cities predominateover urban-urbanlinks. According to those interviewed, trade occurs only very rarely between Dar, Morogoro, Dodoma and Iringa. Traders tell me that despite the extra costs of searching for sellers. assembling,and coordinationin rural areas, it is less costly to market from villages to Dar than from other cities to Dar. The reason lies in the fact that transportcosts from villages straight to Dar are often less than the cost of sum of the transportfrom villages to Dar via regional cities. An example illustratesthe point. The cost of transport for a bag of maize from Kondos (a fairly remote northern district of Dodoma Region) to Dar was in August about 2501=. The combined cost from Kondoa to Dar via Dodoma town - that is, the cost of two separate trips added together - is 4001=. This latter cost breaks down to 2001- from Kondoa to Dodoma town and another 200/- from Dodoma town to Dar (see transport costs table below). Transport from Kondoa to Dar about 10/1 cheaper than the combined cost from Kondoa to Dar via Dodoma town. 3ince Dar traders' markups over cost in my interview sample were around 300/- to 3801/ (see Appendix A), one can see, at least in this example, why marketing from villages is the favored strategy. ------Transport Costs June, 1988 (expressed in TShs. per 120 kg bag): Direct Trip Two Separate Tries Kondoa--->Dar: 250/- Kondoa--->Dodomatowns 200/= Dodom&town------Dar: 200/1 Totalt 400/. To take another more extrome example, the wholesale price of maize in Irings town in Appendix A (early June) was cited as 15001/ per bag, and the wholesale price in Dat es Salaam was 20001- at that time. Transport costs from Iringa town to Dar at the time of the survey were about 500/- per bag. Thus, there was no opportunityfor profitable arbitrage between the two towns. Unfortunately,I have not explainedwhy transport costs are structured in this way. There is no obvious reason why they should be, and the answer undoubtedly can be found by lookingmore closely at transport availability, cost, and means of hiring transport. Traders say that only very occasionally,in the lean or pre-harvest period when rural stocks have become exhausted, does Dar es Salaam receive grain direct from other cities. Indicationsare that all cities investigated, Working Paper No. 6 Page 19 includingDar es Salaam, get almost all of their open market grain directly from the farm or from rural assembly points (which may be in villages),rather than from other cities or via other indirect links. E. Direction of Trade The directionof trade described thus far is one-way, but this must be qualified. In the period precedingharvest, grain sometimes also flows out of cities towards grain-deficitrural areas. During that period, farm stocks run down, prices in rural markets rise, and an outflow of food from the city to rural areas results. Crop failures or shortages in far-off rural locations often result in the appearanceat town markets during the pre-harvestperiod of small-scalerural traders,who buy grain in town for resale in affected villages. This was an accountwhich heard again and again in each of the regional cities visited. During June, 1988 in Mo,:ogoroit was discoveredthat villagers from Turianiward in Morogoro District (HorogoroRegion) depended on maize marketed from Morogoro town by rural traders since January. 1988. Urban traders from Horogoro did not engage in marketing to rural areas. The size of this trade was large, accountingfor one-thirdof wholesale sales from Paya in the last five months, accordingto wholesalers. In Dodoma, a region often affected by irregularrainfall and drought, traders in the town market said that in December-ofeach year rural traders from distant areas experiencinghunger appear in town to buy wholesale grain for resale in affected villages. Sometimes such traders travel from outside the region, from as far away as Singida or Tabora Regions. This year according to traders, food shortagesare expected in Kondoa and Mpwapwa Districts (DodomaRegion). This sort of reversal of marketing flows does not seem to occur, or at least only very rarely, in trade between rural areas and Dar es Salaam. There grain comes daily from rural areas but is not redistributedin substantial amounts to far-off rural localities(e.g. Morogoro or Dodoma), although it has been noted that parts of Coast Region such as Bagamoyo receive grain from Dar's wholesale market. The reason for this lack of reverse trade, according to transportersand traders interviewed,is that the opportunity cost of transportinggrain from the city to faroff rural areas is quite high. Specifically,many trucks travellingout of Dar carry high value-for-weight goods over long distances,for example to Zambia or Malawi or, on the central artery to Burundi. Grain has low value for weight, and cannot compete, unless very large price differentialsexist between Dar es Salaam markets and rural deficit areas. It is profitable,in contrast,to carry grain from points south on the Tanzam road to Dar since often trucks are returning from Zambia, Malawi, or the Southern Highlands, and lack backloads. In fact, the marginal cost of maize backloads is almost zero for such trucks. The same account is given for grain trade to Dar along the central Tanzanian route, which carries long-haul traffic to Burundi. (The road route westward is Dar---->Dodoma town------Working PaDer No. 6 Page 20 >Singida town----->NorthernTabora Region------>Southern Shinyanga Region---- 'west to Burundi). F. GovernmentControls It was found, contrary to expectations,that various tiers of government exert direct control over open markets - through licensing,taxation, moral exhortationagainst price-hiking,and more indirectly though official grain sales, which may affect local open market prices. Direct controls on consumer prices appear only to be enforced for rice (the exception in Iringa is noted). and only in the pre-harvestperiod when open market prices are at their highest. At the time of June research,police enforcementof official consumer rice prices was observed in all towns but Dodoma, where the new harvest had just come in, thereby easing official fears about high prices. Other forms of control include sales and income taxes, and licensing procedures and taxes for grain sellers (see Appendix A for documentionof purchase and sales taxes, and Chapter VI.C below for documentationof income and licensing taxes). The message conveyed by market officials in the three regional capitals visited was that local governmentsimpose taxes with revenue-raisingin mind rather than explicitmarket regulation. In addition,NMC sales in all urban areas visited are still significant and may influenceopen market prices, constitutinga form of price control or stabilization. With the establishmentof seasonal links between urban areas and food deficit rural areas, mentioned above, the possibilityexists that governmentsales in urban areas may affect rural as well as urban prices. A final point iLkthat the degree of market control varies substantially between regions, depending on the inclinationsof regional and city officials. For example control of markets through direct price controls and taxes was much stricter in Iring. than in other areas. IV. MARKETINGCHAINS AND FUNCTIONS What follows is a graphical description of maize marketing from rural areas to cities on the open market. The marketing chain diagram is a summary of the most Mportant characteristics of the marketing relationship. Its purpose is to show where and between whom exchange occurs, to illustrate the degree of specialization of functions in the marketing chain, and to identify the actors involved in different marketing functions. Each diagram is followed by supplementaryinformation on market actors and storage and transport functions. Working Paper No. 6 Page 21 A. Marketing Chain for Dar es Salaam Maize Grain Marketing Chain to Dar es Salaam (DSM) from Villages in Morogoro, Dodoma, Irioga, Mbeya. and Ruvuma S,L,T U P,T farmer -----. wholesaler----- > retailer b------consumer (village) (DSM) (DSM) Note: Dotted lines representexchange of goods - for cash or credit - between two actors located at endpointsof each dotted line. Arrowheads show directionof trade which is here shown as one-way. Parenthesesunderneath indicate geographicallocation of physical exchange of goods. Marketing functionsare coded above. functions S - storage for more than a brief period. L - assembly of maize into bags; loading into lorries using hired labor. T - transport. U - unloading in DSM using hired labor. P - processing (retailermay or may not process maize into flour, called sembe or dona, at local privately owned hammer mills, before selling. In addition,consumers often buy maize grain and process into flour at local mills, although this is not indicated in diagram). 1. Actors - holesaler is a resident of DSM who travels to village to purchase grain from a farmer or farmers. He or the farmer may assemble goods, but the wholesale trader coordinatesloading, and arranges hiring of transportin DSM or more commonly in regions. In an alternativescenario, a farmer or rurally-basedtrader markets grain to the city. The marketing chain diagram for this arrangementdiffers very little from the one presented above, except that it is the farmer/localtrader who performs the functions of assembly and loading (L), initial transport (T), and. unloading (U), rather than the wholesaler. retailer is resident of DSM who buys from wholesaler at Manzese and transportsmaize to retail sale location. - consumer purchases open market maize grain or flour from retail shops (reja reja). or retail markets. 2. Marketing Functions a) storaget An important feature of the above marketing chain is the virtual absence of storage along the chain, except at farm-level. This means, for example, that in Dar es Salaam storage is a function in which the private sector essentiallyhas no role. That leaves the official system, the NlC and National Distributors Limited (NDL), performingall urban storage functions. When asked why they do not store for more than a short period, urban traders Working Paper No. 6 Page 22 invariablymention the high cost of buying land and building storage structuresin urban areas. b) transport functions:Transport is hired by traders, since neither they nor most farTers own vehicles. As previouslymentioned, much grain comes to Dar es Salaam in backloads on large trucks. These are usually hired while returning from Zambia, Malawi, Burundi or other locations linked to the Tanzam or Dar-Burundi roads. Trucks often wait to be hired at truck stations called Ovituo' located along these major arteries, as well as in rural grain producing locationsclose to the large highways. Farmers frequentlytransport crops from their farm to a station, e.g. by hired tractor, and hire transport there for the longer haul to urban consumermarkets. I have interviewedrurally-based traders who market to Dar es Salaam, and they say that they usually purchase directly from the farmer in the village, but that farmers will occasionallysell their crops to them (or more infrequently to directly truckers)at truck stations. In such cases stations act as rudimentaryrural assembly markets, although there exists no specializedgroup of intermediariesbuying and selling at such locations. Ownership of large trucks, which cost millions of shillings,is beyond the means of most Tanzanians. The owners are, according to traders, primarily ethnic Somalis, Indians and Arabs, who use them for the long-haul trade from Dar es Salaam to countries south of Tanzania such as Zambia, and west to Burundi. It is important to stress that truckers do not organize the grain trade, nor do they habituallybuy or trade on their own account. Rather, they are in most instanceshired in Dar es Salaam or more commonly at the aforementionedway-stations in rural areas, which are close to the Tanzam highway or the Dar-Burundi road. Truck owners (or drivers, who may carry backloads of grain without the vehicle-owner'sknowledge) say that they do not normally engage in buying and selling themselvesbecause of the time and effort required to coordinatetransactions. Smaller trucks in the ten to fifteen ton range also bring grain to Manzese, particularlyduring the post-harvestperiod. For the return trip from Dar es Salaam to their region of origin they may or may not get a backload in Dar. The owners are private, rurally-based,professional transporters,many of whom are ethnic Africans, who rent out their vehicles for general purposes (not just haulage of grain). There are many of these smaller vehicles in rural areas according to farmers and non-residenttraders, and my own observationssupport this. Such trucks may be hired at truck stations or other rural locationswhich are known to farmers and traders. Transport costs crucially affect incentivesto market according to traders and farmers. This is supportedby evidence below in Chapter V. which shows as expected that transportcosts constitutea significantportion of the marketing margin. Working Paper No. 6 Page 23 B. Marketing Chains for Other Cities In most respects the marketing chain diagram for Dar applies to the three cities. In what followsmarketing functionsare discussed. 1. Marketing Functions a) storage: Comments made above about storage in Dar es Salaam apply to the three towns. Traders interviewedsaid that farmers are the main holders of commercial stocks in the rural-urbanmarketing chain, and that they (traders) do not hold stocks because of the high cost of urban storage. At Faya, the wholesale grain market in Morogoro, traders said that they desired to build storage, but needed over one million shillingsto build a 30 ton godown for the matket. The city council would not give them a loan and they said that this hindered their efforts. Some effort was made to investigatethe state of on-farm grain stocks. During research in June I visited one farmer who was known to be sending maize to Morogoro town, who lives in the Gairo section of l4orogoro. He had exhaustedhis commercial stocks at the time of the visit and was waiting for the new maize harvest to come in. His shamba was 100 acres in size, and when questionedhe said he customarilystored over 60 tons of his own maize crop at home (about 600 bags), plus any maize which he was able to purchase from smallerneighbors. Like several other large farmers I have met, he lives in a big plaster-walledrectangular compound, comprised of six or seven separate rooms. These rooms are his storagearea, and we were shown how, through proper stacking, they could be made to accomodate'the 600 or so bags of maize which he normally harvests. Such farmers store primarily for purposes of seasonal trade. Each marketing year he awaits the arrival of city traders from Dar es Salaam and Morogoro town. As traders arrive to bargain, he decides whether to commit himself to sale to traders from either city, or to local rural markets, and he depletes his stocks over the marketing year, as he deems profitable,by selling to any of these alternativechannels. He sometimes travels to Manzese, transportinghis own grain there when the timing is right. The other possible marketing channel is the village primary cooperative society. This farmer related that he used to sell one-thirdof his crop to the village primary society, but that he became tired of not receiving cash payment, and now looks to other channels in which to sell his grain. This was a story heard repeatedly in the course of research from both large and small farmers. b) transport: As with the grain trade to Dar es Salaam, in regional cities marketing agents do not own transport,but must hire it. However, the vehicles are smaller, in the one to fifteen ton range, in contrast to the larger vehicles used to haul grain to Dar. In none of the towns visited were there enouh vehicles in urban areas to satisfy traders' demand, so trucks were often hired in rural areas, where traders said they were plentiful It is somewhat surprisingto learn that vehicles are readily available for hire in rural areas. Lack of vehicles was thus not cited as an impediment to trade by marketing agents, but bad rural roads were seen as a key problem by a group of wholesalers queried in Iringa town. Bad roadsmean higher Working Paper No. 6 Page 24 transportprices for traders. Any damage to vehicles during transport operationsis borne by the owner, so this considerablerisk is reflected in the price charged for truck hire. As in Dar et Salaam, the cost of transport is seen by traders as a key factor affecting the profitabilityof alternative marketing options. C. Susmmr Market integrationbetween the cities investigatedis generally poor, but direct links between surplus rural areas and cities are stronger. In addition,marketing chains are very unspecialized,having many functions performed by few actors,with very direct links from points of productionto points of consumption. This type of marketing arrangement William 0. Jones calls a "point-to- point' configuration. It is also usually characterizedby extensive use of on-farm storage, lack of credit, insecurityof contracts, limited market information,and the prevalenceof 'singleproprietorships', conditions which are all evident in the markets studied (a few of these items have not been discussed).8 These are qualities that one might expect in markets emerging from a period of heavy control. V. MARKTINGCOSTS AND TRADERS' INCENTIVES In this section traders' costs and margins are compared for different cities during the period of early June. 1988. This data is used to explore the basic issue of marketing efficiencyby looking at the cost components of the wholesale price and comparing it between cities. The first issue is to determine the main cost componentsof the margin, and whether real marketing costs account for the major portion of the spread between the farm-gateand wholesale prices. If wide spreads between purchase and sale prices are indicativeof high real costs, and if identificationof specific cost elements is possible, then governmentcan possibly reduce those costs. A second and related problem is to determine the size of reasonableor 'normalu profits for the trader. Timmer, et al's solution to this problem is as follovat *To de.ermine if the return to capital representsnormal profits.,the analyst must compare 't with the prevailing interest rates in the credit markets to which the food crop merchants have access. If the prevailinginterest rate (which contains a premium for the riskiness of the marketing investment)is less than the earned rate of return, the earned level of profit is above normal.' 9 Working Paper No. 6 Page 25 Cost informationwas relativelyeasy to collect and check since out-of- pocket costs are readily discussedamong traders, and basic expenses such as the per-bag cost of transport are widely known. The cost data presented below can be consideredvalid for a representativetrader in each city since cross- checking of data among many traders in each location revealed similar information. Data are supplied for all four cities and apply to the period from May 30 to June 11, when traders were interviewed. Graph V.1, below, summarizesthe percentageshare of each of the major marketing costs in the final wholesale price for maize (basic data on which this graph is based can be found in Appendix A). The elements of the wholesale price are distributedbetween: 1) returns to the producer. 2) returns to the transporter, 3) returns to the trader net of out-of-pocketmarketing costs, and 4) 'other*costs, that is the costs of bagging, labor for loading and unloading bags, and taxes to local government. It can be seen that the cost of transport,which varies from about 122 to 302 of the wholesale price, is the major marketing cost incurred (cost of purchase from the farmer is not, strictly speaking,a marketing cost). This is an important insight. It shows that reduction in transportcosts could have as a major consequencea reduction in wholesale,and most likely retail maize prices. The second largest componentof marketing costs is the trader's markup over out-of-pocketcosts. This varies considerablyfrom town to town, from zero (Iringa)to about 202 of the wholesale price (Dar es Salaam). Official consumer prices for maize were enforced in Iringa, but not elsewhere,and this explains the absence of profit for traders in that town. The data show that Iringa traders are absolutelyunable to cover their high marketing costs at the enforced official price. They complainedbitterly about this, but acknowledgedthat official prices are enforced only in certain periods, e.g. directly before the harvest. At the other end of the spectrum,traders' markups are relativelylarge in Dar es Salaam. To determineWhether these are excessive i1 each town. a comparisonis made below between traders' returns on working capital and the opportunitycost of borrowed funds (the interest rate in informal credit markets to which market participantshave access), which *interviewsin the four towns revealed to be lOOZ over a six month period (or, 5.81 per two week period). A typical maize transactiontakes from one to two weeks to conclude from purchase at farm-gateto resale in the wholesale market. It is therefore appropriateto compare the two-week 5.8Z rate to traders' return on capital, which is here defined as working capital only. The reason for this restricteddefinition is that traders lack fixed capital, thereforeworking capital is a good approximationto the trader's capital investment. The calculationsare done for each city in Appendix A and are summarizedin Table V.1 below: WorkingPaver Lo. 6 G;RAPH V. Page 26 MaizePurchase and Marketing Costs %of WbdI PNMa:Jng. 11 7O9 0 - 0 UU a +t^e a }Trevat abo ETrodgr *cost of bags, labor,taxes. 1) Note that Iringaconsumer price is controlled.With a higher uncontrolledprice, the percentagesfor costs shownwould be smaller. 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Maize Prices - National Average (Sh/Dcbe) Real Pticr (jqn 198) 900 - -. ______-_._, . 700- 600 500 | MMARKET PRICE(Vrb6rn .. nsu'A-'r) 4300 100 Xihl -. & ji I I;i*tiIg 1 I lII IiiX lIIIt I I *1 I 111 iftI'II - III 'U 1/1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 0 Year o sautrce: /D63 Workint Paper No. 6 Page 28 Table V.1: Comparisonof Traders' Return on Working Capital and Cost of Borrowing Moroaoro Dodoma Iringa Dar Traders' return on capital 5.63% 7.36% 0.0% 23.46% Local interest rate (two weeks) 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% Evidently,traders' profits in June were at competitive levels everywherebut in Dar es Salaam since traders' returns are close to or below the rate of interest. There may be several reasons why traders' profits seem so high in Dar: 1. Certain costs have been excluded from our calculations(e.g. risk, management costs) and therefore traders' net profit may be smaller. It must be mentioned that trade to Dar es Salaam is extremely risky, probably more so than that to other cities. Farmers and traders often lose money in trading to Dar since the price informationon which they base their initial decision to trade is inaccuratedue to their relative distance from the city and lack of reliable communicationlinking urban markets to rural areas. 2. It may be that Dar traders' profits are too high now, but that this is a short-termoccurrence and will change. The analysis is thus deficient because it is static, consideringonly one point in time. The Dar trader might thus reap excessiveprofits for only a short time, after which market conditions would assert themselves,with profits falling to more normal levels. 3. It may be that profits are excessive,indicating uncompetitive conditions, trader collusion,price-hiking, etc. Readers hoping for a definitiveanswer to these questionswill be disappointed. What the above analysis has pointed out however, is that the real costs of marketing are indeed high, and that their markup includes a difficult to measure risk premium. Public policies can help to lower these costs. If traders do indeed act in a collusivemanner, this may also be amenable to public intervention. Considerationof this latter possibility leads to an examinationof conditionsof competition,which affect the degree to which collusion is possible in grain markets. Working Paper No. 6 Page 29 VI. CONDITIONSOF COMPETITION One way of measuring competitivenessis to ask whether the market fulfils conventionalrequirements for a competitivemarket structure. According to Timmer et al, ... if these five conditions- divisibility, rationality.small firms, equal access, and complete knowledge - characterize * a marketing system, the market will perform efficientlywith no scope for excess profits. Fulfillmentof these conditions is sufficient,but not necessary, for a market to be competitive...(and) the princinal focus is on the conditionsof market access (or entry) and knowledge.010 In the Tanzanian context, the blanket applicationof the above efficiencycriteria may seem harsh standard by which to judge market performance,particularly since open markets are just getting on their feet. One should not expect grain markets to operate with great efficiency and responsivenessgiven the infrastructuralweaknesses, poor information, uncertaintyover governmentpolicy changes, and other problems that still beset the system. A realisticappraisal must take into account the constraintsunder which markets operate, and there can be some presumption that market performancewill improve as infrastructuralproblems are addressed. Conditions of market entry are scrutinizedhere in an attempt to discover potentialhindrances to competitionand in particular to see whether certain commonly held assumptionsabout tradershold up. On the topic of market entry questions in turn are asked about the ethnic background of traders; capital requirementsfor engaging in trade; and the potential effect of government regulationon entry. A. Ethnicity: The assumptionis often made in East Africa that trading is an activity dominatedby collusive ethnic minorities,notably people of Asian background. However, it was observed that trading activity in the towns under study was the domain of ethnic Africans, not Indians. Certain ethnic minoritieswork on the periphery of the grain trade, it is true. For example, the large-scaletrucking industry is dominatedby ethnic Somalis, Indians and Arabs. In Dar es Salaam, retail stores which sell grain are often, although not exclusivelyowned by Tanzanians of Indian origin. In Morogoro, grain milling machines were often owned by ethnic Indians. However, black Africans, both farmers and urban traders, are the movers and shakers of the grain trade in areas in which I have done research. There is, in addition, little evidence that trading activity is the monopoly of a few groups. The following is a list of ethnic groups commonly acknowledgedto engage in grain trading in the towns visited. That is to say that members of these groups are resident traders in the towns studied (non- resident traders are not included, and their inclusion would increase the variety of ethnic groups considerably). The order of ethnic group does not indicate degree of representationexcept in the case of Dar es Salaam. Traders' region of origin is indicated in parentheses: Working Paper No. 6 Page 30 Ethnic Background and Region of Origin of Resident Urban Traders (researchconducted during June-August,1988) Moroporot Waluguru (Morogoro) Wazigua (Tanga) Wabondei (Tanga) Wachagga (Kilimanjaro) Wasambaa (Tanga) Waukwele (Coast) Wakangii (Dodam Region, Kondoa Dist.) Wahehe (Iringa) Wakinga (Iringa) Dodomas Wagogo (Dodoma) Warangi (Dodoma) Wasukuma (Mwanza,Shinyanga) (These were ethnic groups of the six large traders interviewed. Data were unfortunatelynot collected for more numerous smaller traders.] Irinpa: Waluguru (Morogoro) Wahehe (Iringa) Wabena (Iringa) Wakinga (Iringa) Wachagga (Kilimanjaro) Oar es Salaam* : Waluguru 15 (Morogoro) (Manzese)Wahaya 6 (Kagera) Wasambas S (Tanga) Warangi 3 (DodamaRegion, Kondoa Dist.) Wapemba 3 (Pemba Island, Zanzibar) Vachagga 2 (Kilimanjaro) Wangoni 2 (RiwumaRegion, Songea Dist.) Wagogo I (Dod m) Wahehe 1 (Iringa) Wapare 1 (Kilimanjaro) Wayao 1 (RuvumaRegion, Tunduru Dist.) Wazaramo 1 (DSMand Coast Regions) Wandengereko 1 (Coast) Wazigua 1 (Tanga) Working Paper No. 6 Page 31 *Note: Names of ethnic groups are immediatelyfollowed by the recorded number of that ethnic group. These data remain incompleteas they were collected for forty-threeresident traders,while there are as many as seventy or eighty operating in the market. In Dar es Salaam, one notices the prominence of one ethnic group which comprises 332 of the total, the Waluguru from Morogoro. The other 67? are scatteredamong thirteen differentgroups. The predominanceof the Waluguru in the grain trade is undoubtedlydue to the fact that they have for decades been involved in the fruit and vegetable trade from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam. It should be borne in mind that during the years of heaviest government interventionin marketing in the 1970s, only the fruit and vegetable trade remained uncontrolled. It appears that the easing of control somewhat favored the Waluguru, who enjoyed extensiveexperience in the long-haul trade and an accumulationof trading skills, business contacts and capital, which enabled the group to branch out from existing fruit and vegetableactivities to more profitable and larger scale grain trade. Yet entry into the trade by other ethnic groups has been rapid in recent years according to market participants,and none of the non-Walugurugroups interviewed,when asked, indicatedthat entry into trading activity was made harder by not being a member of that group. Tribal affiliationdoes not seem to be a barrier to entering the grain trade, and traders' observationssupport this. B. Capital requirements In all areas visited, start-up capital and working capitalwere required to engage in trading activity. Traders have virtually no fixed capital - no godown, transportor processingequipment, and little or no office space. Working capital requirementsare therefore their main preoccupationon entry into the profession. Traders in Ianzese see the greatest barriers to entry as: a) working capital requirementsfor market entry, and b) the necessity that traders initially entering the business have a small regular network of clients from whom to purchase,who can be used as a base from which to expand the scale of business. As expected small retailershave different requirementsfrom larger traders. Start-up capital for small traders in Horogoro in June was put at TShs. 20,000. Manzese resident (wholesale)traders also say that TShs. 20,000 is the lower limit for market entry. The sum for larger traders is TShs. 100,000. These sums roughly coincide with the resourceswhich a trader p actually needs to conduct a transaction. The main use to which such cash is put in Dar es Salaam is to pay the initial cost of transport for an incoming farmer or non-residenttrader. As previously explained, traders do not customarilypurchase the seller's grain outright, but rather take possession of it after paying the cost of transport, sell it after several days, and with the cash obtained pay the initial seller his agreed payment (he waits around the market for payment). Such an Working Paper No. 6 Page 32 arrangementconsiderably lowers the cash threshold necessary for doing business as a trader in the market. In the absence of such arrangements, start-up and working capital requirementswould be much higher than the figures mentioned above. C. Governmentregulation: For traders who want to have a selling base in an urban marketplace the followingmonthly and yearly fees are potential barriers to entry into business, and they presumably increase the prices that consumers pay. However, the amounts are small in relation to traders' other costs: Morogoro: TShs. 300 per month retail stall rental (to District Council). TShs. 7000 income tax (or higher depending on income). Dodomas TShs. 250 per month retail stall rental (to Market authoritiesand then probably to City Council). TShs. 4,000 per year retail license fee (to GoT, Dodoma). TShs. 7,000 per year income tax (or higher, depending on income - to GoT, Revenue Office). Iringai TShs. 200 per month retail stall rental (to City Council). TShs. 2,000 per year income tax (or higher, depending on income - to GoT. Revenue Office). - VII. URBAN FOOD AVAILABILITY The purpose of this section is to document the overall size of open market grain flows in relation to the official system; to examine trends in open market flows over the past few years; and to determinewhether there exist seasonal changes in NMC sales patterns. If the latter is true, then the official system may indirectlyaffect open market prices. Dar es Salaam is treated first, and subsequentconsideration is given to the other three towns. A. Dar es Salaam Yearly maize availabilityin Dar es Salaam is the sum of official sales (which include imports),open market sales, and local or home production. With regard to the latter, the potential for rainfed production of maize in Dar es Salaam and Coast Region is considered poor by agronomists. Current productionestimates lend credence to this view. Dar es Salaam's maize production was estimated to be nil in 19856 by the Ministry of Agriculture's Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit (althoughcity residents can be observed growing maize in home gardens and in small plots). The estimate for the surroundingCoast region in the same year was 12.000 tons which, divided by an estimated 1985 population of 499,292. yields a per capita productionfigure of 24 kg. A primarilymaize-eating population would have per capita requirementsfar above this figure, perhaps by a factor of five or more. Several conclusionscan be drawn from this. First, the marketable surplus from local maize productionmust be quite small. In Working Paper No. 6 Page 33 addition,since s0 little is maize is produced in comparisonwith requirements (conservativelyestimated), many inhabitantsmust purchase a large share of the maize they consume throughmarket channels.11 Table VII.1 below shows trends over the last eight years in yearly maize availability,defined as the sum of official and open market sales. The open market data were obtained from officialsat Manzese Market and considerably understate volumes flowing through the market. The data were collected for the purpose of income tax collectionand traders had a strong incentive to understate actual marketed amounts. In addition, it is evident that market officials do not have the manpower to fully monitor grain inflows to the market, so they are unable to count some of the grain which enters. This has become more of a problem in recent years as volumes coming into the market have increased,making the task of monitoring more difficult. Nonetheless, open market evolution does show a marked upward trend: Worklng Paper No. 6 Page 34 Table VII.1 Dar es Salasam:Trends in Maize Availabilityin 1980s (mt) (1) (2) (3) Total NMC Open Market Sales Sales* Flows 1980/1 146,954 137,609 9.345 198112 152,576 139,863 12,713 1982/3 149,133 135,875 13,258 198314 176,819 152,681 24,138 1984/5 167,884 133,140 34,744 198516 175,409 91.126 84,283 1986/7 118,034 49.424 68,610 1987/8 130,020 62,346 67,674 Source: NMC data from NMC files. Open market data are records of wholesale maize grain receipts obtained from market officials at Manzese Market, Dar es Salaam. * Sales re of "maize grain equivalent',which include sembe converted to grain e &ivalentat an 82Z milling rate. Several patterns stand out from the above data. First, total maize sales in coluzm (1) fluctuate between 147,000metric tons at the beginning of the period, to 130,000 mt at the end. This evolution is implausible. The populationof Dar es Salaam is estimated to have increased steadily at a rate of over 92 per year during the last decade, and one would expect a large commensurateincrease in total sales from the beginning to the end of the period if per capita availabilitywere to remain stable (we will return to this issue below). Turning to column (2), official sales declined steadily during the period, but the decline is particularlysharp after 1984/5, when the sembe subsidy was lifted by the government. Finally, in column (3), open market receipts increased each year, with the exception of declines in 198617 and 198718. The percentage increaseseach year are shoan in Table VUI.2, below. A sharp sales increase is evident - in percentage as well as absolute terms - in the 1985/6 marketing year. That year's increase occurred simultaneouslywith significantchanges in government policy which partially relaxed restrictionson inter-regionalgrain transport. Increases in the volume of maize grain marketed thus appear to be a direct result of policy initiativestaken by the governmentallowing greater scope for private traders to engage in trade between regions. Favorable harvests in the marketing years 1985/6, 198617 and 1987/8 obviously contributed to the rapid increase in grain flows to Dar, but it is difficult to see how a 143? increase in maize marketings could have come about without an easing of inter- regional restrictions. Workina Paper No. 6 Page 35 Table VII.2 Dar es Salaam: Trends in Open Market Maize Flows in 1980s (mt) Open Market Rate of Change Flows From Previous Year 1980/1 9,345 1981,2 12,713 +36.0O 1982/3 13,258 +4.32 * 1983/4 24,138 +82.12 1984/5 34,744 +43.92 1985/6 84,283 +142.62 198617 68,610 -18.62 1987/8 67,674 -1.42 The decline in open market receiptsduring the 1986/7 and 1987/8 years is puzzling and is related to the question raised earlier of why total maize sales did not increase over the 1980s as populationwas continuously increasing. One would expect per capita maize availabilityto have at least remained constant over the period, with perhaps reductionsduring the famine years of 198314 and 1984/5. These questionsare addressed in Table VII.3, below: Table VII.3 Oar es Salaams Trends in Per Capita Maize Availability (1) (2) (3) Total Population Maize Sales kg/per cap 198011 146,954 962,848 152.6 198112 152,576 1,052,778 144.9 198213 149,133 1,151,107 129.5 1983/4 176,819 1,258,620 140.5 1984/5 167,884 1,376,176 121.9 1985/6 175,409 1,504,710 116.6 198617 118,034 1,645,250 71.7 1987/8 130,020 1,798,917 72.8 Sources column (1) is from Table VII.1, above. Column (2) is exptrapolated from 1978 Po_ulation Census, Volume lIl, United Republic of Tanzania, Pooulation of Tanzania, 1978, Bureau of Statistics,Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, 1983. Maize availabilityas depicted here fell particularlysharply in per capita term after 198516. Again, this is difficult to accept, since open market maize prices remained constant or fell in real tems in those years from the high levels attained during the previous years of food scarcity. Real price trends are documentedin Graph VII.1, below. Working Paper No. 6 Page 36 Two explanationsmay be advanced for this apparent decline, first that it reflects changes in consumer purchasinghabits away from maize, and toward wheat or rice. Second, it may be that the data is deficient,a possibility mentioned earlier. If errors in the data understatemarketed volumes in 198617 and 198718, thereby lowering the figure for total sales and for per capita availability, one way of dealing with this problem is to proceed on the assumptionthat per capita levels of 1985/6 have been maintained since then (open market price data supports this view, as mentioned),and calculateoverall maize availabilityfrom population data and from an imputed figure for maize availabilityof 116.5 kg per capita (column three, above). Note that this figure is low for the 1980s, and presumably a conservativeestimate. The following Revised Table VII.1 recalculatesmaize availabilitybased on this imputed per capita figure, and in addition calculates open market sales as a residual of total maize sales, after official sales (Table E.1, column 2) have been subtracted. The recalculateddata for total and open market sales for 1986/7 and 1987/8 are presented below. along with unaltered data from precedingyears from Table VIX.l (the table below is the same as VII.1 except that revised figures for the last two years are shown in bold). This forms a series which shows large increases in open market maize availability,particularly in the last few years. To repeat, these calculationshinge on the premise that relativelylow maize per capita levels of 1985/6 have been maintained in the past two years. This argument is supportedby constant or declining trends in real open market maize prices. but lower maize prices are also consistentwith demand shifts toward other foodss Table VII.I (REVISED) Dar es Saluma Trends In Maize Availability In 1980s (at) (t) (2) (3) Total NKC Open Market Sales Sales* Flows 2 Total 1980/1 146,954 137,609 9,345 6.42 198112 152,576 139,863 32,713 8.3Z 198213 149,133 135,875 13,258 8.9Z 198314 176,819 152,681 24,138 13.62 19841S 167,884 133,140 34,744 20.72 1985/6 175,409 91,126 84,283 48.02 1986/7 191.671 49,424 142,247 74.2? 1987/8 209,574 62,346 147,228 70.32 Sources NIC data from NMC files. Open market data, except for the last two years in the series, are from records of wholesale maize grain receipts obtained from market officials at Manzese Market, Dar es Salaam. * NMC grain sales are sales of "maize grain equivalent",which include sembe converted to grain equivalentat 822 milling rate. Working Paper No. 6 ?age 37 Clearly. the overall picture conveyed by both versions of Table VII.1 is of a declining share of total sales taken by the NMC, with an increasing share for open markets. NMC sales of maize grain equivalent show their largest downturn after 1984/5. This is due in large part to lifting of the maize flour (sembe) subsidywhich occurred in that year as part of a government reform program. The dramatic effects of lifting the subsidy are shown below in Table VII.4, which documents large reductionsin ?4HCsales of sembe in 198415 and an accompanyingincrease in maize grain sales. The increase in the latter was not, however, sufficientto compensatefor the decline in sembe sales, so that overall sales of maize grain equivalentshow a sharp decline starting in 198415, as shown in Table VII.1 above (column (2)), and reproduced below in column (1). Table VII.4 Dar es Salaam% NKC Sales of Maize Grain Equivalent,Maize Flour, Maize Grain (Mt) (1) NMC Sales (2) (3) (maize grain Maize Flour Maize Grain equivalent)* 19801. 137,609 109,807 3,697 198112 139,863 113,604 1,322 1982/3 135,875 110,927 598 1983/4 152.681 119,020 7,534 1984/5 133,140 74,045 42,841 1985/6 91,126 37,027 45,972 1986/7 49,424 14,366 31,904 1987/8 62,346 20,862 36,905 *note that columns two and three do not add up to column one because column one reconverts sembe to maize grain equivalent. A second factor affectingNMC sales was the increased competitivenessof the open market with the NKC. As Graph VII.1 above shows, open market consumer prices (adjusted for urban inflation) fell after 1984/5 to levels close to, and sometimes below official consumer prices, which had been raised in real ters. This made it much more difficult for the NMCto sell to urban consumers, who chose to purchase through cheaper open market channels. Thirdly, NMC competitiveness in urban consumer markets was further weakened by the poor quality of its grain. NKC lacked a grading system at point of purchase, consequently it offered poorer grain to consumers which was less saleable than that offered by the open market. In addition, the availability of lower priced, higher quality grain on the open market led to Working Paper No. 6 Page 38 longer average storage periods by the NMC, which promoted further deteriorationin grain quality.1 2 B. Moroporo. Dodoma and Iringa For Morogoro town, open market maize flows are calculatedfrom estimates given by grain traders at the main wholesale market, Faya, for the previous five months. These are of necessity very rough since there are no continuous records kept of grain sales in the market. In Morogoro, unlike Dar es Salaam, it is difficult to estimate open market supplies from flows through one market, since there are many other open market channels through which maize enters the city. The below data should therefore be consideredvery rough indicators,though underestimates. From January to May, 1988, total flows at Faya were estimated at 2700 mt of maize grain. This was calculatedfrom traders' weekly estimates,based on recall of average weekly transactions. This figure compares with NMC sales of maize grain equivalentin Morogoro town during the same period, of 1673 mt (AppendixB). The open market comprisesabout 602 of total supplies on this account, compared to a figure of 7OS for Dar es Salaam during 1987/8 (Table VII.1, revised). It is clear that the open market is a predominant factor determining overall food availabilityin both cities. It is probably now the overriding factor given the understatementof open market sales data. In addition, the open market has increasedeach year, over past few years. Traders interviewed in Morogoro said that the volume of grain sales increasedevery year in the 1980s, but could not relate increasesin particularyears to specific policy changes. NMC sales figures for Morogoro (AppendixB) show that the town is a low- priority distributionarea for the NMC in comparisonwith other areas in the country. Morogoro Region received only 2U of total NMC maize distributions during the 1987/88 marketing year. Proportions going to other cities are shownbelow in Table VIU.5, which sumarizes part of Appendix B: Working Paper No. 6 Page 39 Table VII.5 1987188Marketing Year: Regional Share of Total NMC Sales of Maize Grain Equivalent Region Share 1. DSM 492 2. Tanga 9% 3. Dodoma 7S 4. Arusha 72 S. Moshi 62 6. Mtwara 42 7. Tabora 42 Other* 142 *note: *other' regions received individualNMC maize allotments amounting to 22 or less of total N14Csales in Tanzania. The overall pattern of maize redistributionshown by the above table is of priority given to coastal and northern citiesz Dar, Mtwara and Tanga being located on the coast, and Moshi, Arusha and Tanga in the north. Dodoma is prominentpartly because it is Tanzania'snominal capital, and it contains national party (CCM) headquarters(on which more below). Finally, NMC may play a seasonal price stabilizingrole in Morogoro. Flows increasedmarkedly from January to May, 1988 during the pre-harvest period. Average flows from June to December, 1987, during post-harvest,were 111 mt per month, and from January to May average flows increased to 335 mt per month. In Dodoma town. open market maize supplies coming to the Main Market were estimated at 4500 mt over the January to May, 1988 period, according to market traders and officials interviewed. The NMC sold 3997 mt during the same period. This puts open market supplies at 532 of the total, vs. 602 for Morogoro and 70 for Dar es Salasm. Here, too, the data understatesopen market availabilitybecause other channels beside the Main Market were not included. Traders also asserted that the volume of open market maize trade has increasedevery year since the early 1980s, when the CCM established its main office in town directly across from the Main Market. The establishmentof the CCM office was seen as having a direct effect on open market sales and urban food availabilitythrough its increase in urban demand. The importanceof official governmentactivities in affectingmaize demand can also be seen by inspectingmonthly MC sales of maize in Dodoma during 1987. Table VII.6, below, which is extracted from Appendix B, shows that official maize sales jumped considerablyin October, 1987, the month of the national party conferencewhich reelectedMwalimu Nyerere as party chairman: Working Paper No. 6 Page 40 Table VII.6 Dodoma: Monthly NMC Sales of Maize Grain Equivalent (mt) Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 38 86 43 149 2028 177 1357 1182 2061 510 117 Note: Sembe is converted to grain equivalent at 82Z milling rate. Party and Governmentactivities are thus one likely explanation for the fact that sales to Dodoma are the third highest in Tanzania. after Dar es Salaam and Tanga (see Table VII.5). The above data also reveals a seasonal pattern of NMC sales in Dodoma town, as average sales increased from 420 mt per month in the June to November period, to 1045 mt per month in the December to April period, the latter which coincideswith the pre-harvestseason when open market prices are rising. Finally, in Iringa town, calculationsof open market maize flows were not possible as traders found it difficult to estimate quantities entering the market. In any case, Iringa is less dependent on the open market for maize than other towns, since it lies in the midst of very productive countryside. Many inhabitantshave access to land outside the city, which they or relatives cultivate. NMC sales in the town amounted to 2X of ovErall sales in Tanzania (AppendixB), a total quantity of 2109 at of maize for the 1981188 marketing year. Thus, official sales were also small, emphasizingagain the town's degree of self-sufficiencyin maize grain. A seasonal NMC sales pattern was not apparent - average monthly sales from June to November were 242 mt, and the figure for December to April was 131 mt. VII. CONCLUSION Assessment of open market performancepresents a somewhat mixed picture. Competitivenessis not inhibitedby ethnic dominance of trade, and excess profits do not appear common. Favorable trends in open market consumer prices (Graph VUt.1, and greater open market maize availability(Tables VII.1 and VII.1 (Revised)),give cause for some optimism about the direct effects of marketing liberalizationon food availabilityand prices in open markets. It remains that the real costs of marketing are high, especially the cost of transport; in addition, costs arising from the riskiness of the trading environmentare passed along in the marketing margin, to be reflected in the price that consumers pay. The kinds of interventionsthat can improve market performance are not difficult to comprehend, and some are now being pursued. For example, high transport costs are seen by traders as the result of the poor quality of roads. Rural road rehabilitationis on the list of government and donor investment priorities and should at some point have the Working Paper No. 6 Page 41 effect of lowering costs. Rural truck stations can perhaps be made more accessible,or their facilitiesimproved, and it is possible that they cculd provide a future basis for the establishmentof rural assembly markets (althoughthis may already be happening - this is a subjectwhich requires further research). This would help farmers by allowing them the choice of selling to a well-developedlocal market or marketing to more distant urban location. Secondly,the prevalence of on-farm stocks greatly increases informationalinefficiency and risk, because farmers must base their stock release decisions on knowledge of urban prices, which is exceptionallypoor. I have talked to numerous farmers and non-residenttraders who have been disappointedon arrival at Dar es Salaam, thinking that the market price was at one level, and finding it at lower one. Improvementsin farmers, ability to get reliable daily market price information(via radio, for instance),and developmentof off-farm stocks,would help alleviatethis situation. Marketing links are fragile in Tanzania,and this is what one would expect after years of suppressionof open markets. The specific structure linking cities and producingareas in Tanzaniawas earlier described as a *point-to-point marketing system. William 0. Jones provides a fitting suvmary of the limits such a system: Point-to-pointtrading, and the two-level system with which it is associated,may be seen as a response to deficienciesin markets. Its consequences are a certain rigidity in trading channels and a slug- gishness in the reactionsof prices to localizedshortages and surpluses. If it could be removed by some sweeping decree... all of the...problemspresented by farm storage, and the lack of specialization would come into full play. As things are, broker and trading partner arrangements permit the system to function reasonably well, as long as it does not have to adjust to large and rapid changes...l3 It is difficultto come to an all-things-consideredjudgement about the operationof open markets, since investigationof their operation is at a rudimentarystage. The current reality in Tanzania is that the official food marketing system - at the cooperativeas well as the marketing board levels - imposes a large and destabilizingfinancial burden on the national economy. The governmenthas recognized this and has as a practicalmeasure placed greater reliance on open markets. The trajectoryof reform in public policy is clear enough, and Tables VII.1 and VII.1 (Revised)exemplify the favorable path of change brought about, in part, by this movement in policy. That said, the limitationsand strengthsof open markets must be better understood if increased reliance on them is to take place.- Otherwise, the rigidity of the point-to-pointsystem will become apparent as the 'large and rapid changes' that William Jones describes,occur. Working Paper No. 6 Page 4Z ENDNOTES 1. Cooperativesstill hold a legal monopoly on crop purchase at the village level. This formally excludes private traders and even the NMC from purchasing in villages. In fact, and as this research confirms,village-level purchase is an important facet of the private trade, and many private traders purchasing in villages even pay a tax on their supposedly lillegal trade to the local village council (traders call it a tax, or 'kodi ya kijiji' although it may be seen as a bribe). However, many farmers get around strictures against local sale by marketing their own grain - and sometimes their neighbors'- to externalwholesale markets and assembly points. 2. Marketing DevelopmentBureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development,Agricultural Price Review for Maize, Rice and Wheat. 198i188. 3. In Gray and Baker's ODA-sponsoredreport, 'A Review of the Marketing of Basic Food Commoditiesin Tanzania..."(May, 1988). Gray observes that the NMC's accumulatedoverdraft for the 1987/88marketing year amounted to approximately 42 of GDP (p.8). The NMC's and cooperatives'overdrafts are widely recognizedas an impediment to macro-economicstabilization. Other measures to reduce costs include: a reductionin the number of regional depots which NMC maintains; introductionof a pricing system that applies quality grades to maize; improved management and cost control within the NMC; introductionof regionallydifferentiated pricing; and increased external trade in grain. Only the first through third measures seem likely to be implementedat present. 4. Data Collection and Source. This paper was written during the period of June-August,1988. Some of the data presentedwas collected during a one-week trip sponsoredby the World Bank to the cities of Morogoro, Dodoma, and Iringa from May 30 to June 6, 1988. The NMC was the main source of data on the official system. Various data from Dar es Salaam was collected at Manzese Market from late Decembe, 1987, to the present, as part of my ongoing thesis research on grain marketing in Tanzania. Acknowledgements: Many people have helped me in the course of research, and I would like to thank them. Jose Olivares of the World Bank, Washington, and members of the World Bank office in Dar es Salasam, were extremely supportive and this paper has been greatly improved as a result of their critical cozuents. The National Milling Corporation (DKC) main office in Dar es Salaam was cooperative in providing information on the official marketing system. General Manager E.D.Z. Mollel and Director of Operations and Planning Erastus Andrew were generous in providing an ECC car and driver for a one-week research expedition to the regions. I would also like to thank the masters of Iringa and Dodoma Main Markets, as well as Idi Ramadhani (Tito) for helping research while we visited regional cities and a few farms. In addition Doto Abdallah, my research assistant, cross-checkedmarket information. Dianne Dumais helped to draw the maps and John Sigda of UNICEF/Dar es Salasm gave assistancewith recalcitrant computer software. M. Seenappa of UNICEF's JSNP office in Iringa gave invaluableadvice and support at various stages of my thesis research. The views expressed in this paper are my own and should not be attributed to the World Bank or any institutionmentioned herein. Working Paper No. 6 Page 43 My dissertationresearch has been conducted in Tanzania with the approval of UTAPITI (the National ScientificResearch Council), and in affiliationwith The World Food Program office in Dar es Salaam. The Fletcher School. at Tufts University,Boston, MA. USA, financiallysupported the early stages of researchwith its awarding of a Shell InternationalStudies Fellowship. Special thanks are due to Charles Ponera and Tony Marsh of the Shell Oil Company Office in Dar es Salaam,who gave crucial assistance in early stages of research. Charles Ponera's special efforts on my behalf are particularlyappreciated. 5. At the time this report was written, Tanzania'smost recent published populationcensus was that of 1978. Urban population figures given here and elsewherein the paper are extrapolationsfrom that base, at an estimated overall urban growth rate of 9.342 per year. Base urban populations in 1978 are as follows, ranked according to size: Dar - 769,445; Morogoro - 60,782; Iringa - 57,164; Dodoma- 45.807. The 1988 estimates are: Dar - 1,877,445; Dodoma- 172,668; Morogoro- 148,308; Iringa - 139,480 One caveat applies. A 14.192 rate has been applied to Dodoma based on district towns' overall growth rate in the 1978 census. This assumption is made because the naming of Dodoma as Tanzania'scapital in the 1970s probably led to higher than average growth, therefore it was decided to apply the highest known urban growth rate. The source for this data is: 1978 Population Census, Volume III, United Republic of Tanzania,Population of Tanzania, 1978, Bureau of Statistics,Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, 1983. 6. In what follows referenceis continuallymade to wholesale and retail sellers. Wholesale sellers in all of the four cities under study sell in units of one bag or above - usually above (a single bag weighs about 100 kg to 120 kg). Maize bags are not weighed before sale, but rice bags are. Retailers in all cities customarilysell in quantities of one debe (18-20 kg) or below. Debe sizes are fairly uniform since plastic buckets of standard size (or sometimesmetal tins, but these are less preferred because they are less uniform) are used for measurement. Smaller quantities are usually measured by the kilogram, using table scales. However, in Morogoro, market authoritiesset market measures according to standardized liter measures. 7. In Tanzania, regions are the largest sub-nationaladministrative units, followed by districts. Each region has at least three, and in some cases many Working Paper No. 6 Page 44 more districts. Councils are organs of local government in Tanzania, reinstitutedin 1984 as part of a decentralizationplan, and operate at the district, city and village level. 8. See William 0. Jones, *AgriculturalMarketing and Agricultural Development',paper presented at Cornell Workshop on Some Emerging Issues accompanyingRecent Breakthroughsin Food Production,March 30 - April 3, 1970, Ithaca, New York. 9. Food Policy Analysis, C. Peter Timmer et al, World Bank and the Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1983. p. 170. 10. Food Policy Analysis,C. Peter Timmer et al, World Bank and the Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore,1983. pp. 165-66. 11. Estimates of maize production potential. and 1985/86 Early Warning Unit production figures come from a consultant'sreport entitled Assessment of Land Resources Potential for Rainfed Production of Maize. Bunded Rice and Wheatj. by Harry van Velthuizen,written for the World Bank Southern Africa Department,Agricultural Operations Division, June, 1988. Population estimatescome from 1978 PopulationCensus, Volume IUI, URT, op cit. 12. Gray and Baker deal with this issue (see footnote 3). 13. W.O. Jones, op cit., p. 189. Working Pa-er No. 6 Appendix A Maite MarkotingCot, and Returnon WorkingCapital From IringaCoop (IMUCU) FromMufindi Dist./Iringa FromTaborr Region to Morogoro Markot to IringaMarket to DodomaMarket Por-bag cost (TShs)% Per-bag cost (TSha): Per-beg cost (TShs) buying pric./120 kg 6l80 buying price/100kg 1200 buying price/Jlo k 1000 empty bag 40 empty bag 60 empty beg s0 labor loading 20 villagetax 10 village tax 40 transport 350 labor loading 6 labor loading 10 labor unloading 20 transport 20 transport w00 market sales tax 20 laborunloading 10 laborunloading tO Total: 2130 market*sles tax 20 marketsales tax 20 wholesaleprice 2260 Total: 1605 Total: 1630 wholesaleprice 1600 wholesaleprice 1760 trader'smarkup: 120 trader'smarkup: 0 trador'smarkup: 120 returnon capitl: 6.83% returnon capital: 0.001 returnon capital: 7.36B FromMboya Region NMC CostingEstimates to DSM (Menzes) fromMD)/Kilimo (Jan. 22, '88) Per-bag coot (TShs): Per-bag cost (TShs): buying price/120 kg W0 buying price/leekg 807.7 empty beg SO union marketing cost 423.3 villagetax a8 NMC transport 125 laborloading 15 NBC Intereston 0/0 102 transport 60W NMC handling,admin, laborunloading 20 overhead,storage 63.4 Total: 162W Total: lSl1.4 wholosel,price 2000 NMC sellingpriceo 1090 trader'smarkup: B80 NMC markup: -421.4 retaurnon capital: 23.46X NEC Maize Sales (Mt) Branch as 1987/88 Marketing Year X of Total BRANCH JUNE '87 JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOY DEC JAN FEB MARCH APRIL WAY TOTAL osM 2468 2763 2264 l118 1585 1812 2832 4038 3228 4126 5057 8059 38905 42.7X COAST MOROGORO 12 25 l l 20 17 22 204 216 254 226 108 1124 1.33 TANGA 121 878 2?1 748 27 48 146 2?41 956 1018 2224 1521 10193 11.8X MTWARA 142 61 208 23 216 187 826 83s 180 613 523 6 33869 3.9% LDNDI 37 se 803 244 409 171 76 44 63 1394 1.68 ARUSHA 7 6S 49 39 437 2159 1466 1649 1002 176 538 953 8520 9.9W umSHI 486 693 760 326 118 e6 40 802 826 991 1682 e6s 6973 8.1X DODOMA 4 42 43 69 1912 98 1251 106e 1883 195 18 127 6683 7.7W SINOIDA 2 84 90 49 6 74 7 28 11 40 341 0.4X TA ORA 1s 13 40 20 7o 290 429 1166 500 641 100 6s 3251 3.8W KIOWA 6 8 28 so 44 20 214 75 91 9 29 580 0.7X RKWA 2 15 70 23 63 6 259 46 26 37 376 12 933 1.1W WANZA 7 6 2 11 46 183 40 124 288 166 74 31 878 1.oW MUSOMA a 21 8 18 22 84 26 95 63 41 38 38 397 0.5X SHINYANO 6 1i 17 90 140 187 262 876 322 278 177 38 2153 2.5X KAGERA 1 16 S6 52 276 146 89 201 212 47 146 69 1309 1.5X IRINSA 1 1 3 6 0.0% MBEYA 18 13 0.0W SONGEA 2 682 62 126 19 272 288 1440 1.7W TOTAL 8308 4080 8915 3219 5078 5810 7247 14396 9626 8696 11511 10183 86461 100% NEC Sambe Stles (mt) Branch as 1987/88 marketing Year X of Total BRANCH JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY TOTAL DSM 1186 1689 1139 1870 186e 1181 1700 23S1 2303 2410 2226 1642 20882 66.9% COAST MOROGORO 122 67 76 125 79 82 46 8e 29 le 107 226 1112 3.6W TANGA S8 683 74 70 8s 88 6s S8 as es 118 83 0.0x MTWARA 70 84 71 92 lee 120 6e 128 90 283 76 138 1378 4.4X LINDr ARUSHA MOSHI DODOMA 28 as 74 96 69 87 103 148 268 81 104 1081 3.6X SINOIDA 48 0.0% TABORA 44 46 66 64 57 6S 46 84 69 66 77 50 702 2.2% KIGOMA 4 61 16 0.0W RIMWA 14 19 20 41 24 2 120 0.4X MWANZA 94 107 77 92 107 92 112 07 107 111 94 77 0.OX > MUSOIA se 60 82 81 58 70 39 s8 20 38 69 46 651 1.8S1 SHINYANO 59 25 70 41 34 29 43 Se 39 44 40 12 0.0X KAO£RA 21 82 78 88 105 78 40 6e 59 12 40 73 739 2.4% IRINGA 200 228 105 479 45 183 4S 188 135 102 6e 106e 0.% OQI MBEYA 27 27 20 20 12 108 0.3X1 X SONGEA 72 28 0.0x TOTAL 19680 2386 1802 2678 2f91 1917 2461 3260 3049 36t5 2988 2657 31201 100l UC Sales of Mali. Grain Equivalent (at) 1987/88 Varketing Year Oranch as X of Total BRANCH JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV OEC JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY TOTAL oSm 8874 4ss8 858 2789 3957 8952 4705 6905 6039 7064 7772 8061 82346 COAST s0.1i MOROOCRO 161 107 103 182 le so 77 248 261 459 385 384 2480 2.0% TANGA 192 450 361 841 110 94 228 2812 1029 1119 2388 1622 11226 MTWARA 168 9.0X 227 295 185 410 813 406 991 290 969 le 244 6049 4.1% LINDI 87 58 8e3 244 409 171 75 44 63 1394 ARUSHA 1.15 7 65 49 39 437 2169 1466 1649 1002 176 638 963 8620 6.6X NMSHI 486 693 780 826 118 6 40 802 a26 991 1682 U66 6973 5.6% OODOMA as 86 43 149 2028 177 1357 1182 2061 510 117 264 80l 6.45 SINOIDA 2 84 90 49 e6 74 7 28 11 40 400 0.85 TABORA 69 68 107 104 140 388 485 1267 672 621 194 117 4107 8.85 KIGOMA 11 8 28 66 44 94 284 75 91 9 29p 879 RUKWA 9.s5 2 82 70 46 87 8 809 76 27 87 376 12 1079 0.9X NWANZA 122 1S8 96 128 178 245 177 280 868 80l 18 126 WUSOA 2289 1.8% 64 82 46 61 93 119 74 166 87 87 107 94 1069 0.9% SHINYANO 78 41 102 140 181 172 814 786 870 882 226 58 2746 KAGERA 1le 2.2X 27 148 159 408 241 1S 280 284 62 195 18 2210 1.8% IRINGA 246 279 128 584 55 162 66 232 16S 124 79 129 2238 WBEYA 1.8% 38 a8 24 24 28 142 0.1% SO4EA 90 84 662 52 126 19 272 288 1562 1.3X TOTAL 6s98 68es 618 63683 8865 7648 10248 16872 18244 1IMs5 16149 13301 124511 100% Note:sambo sale. converted to grale equ)v. wlth .82 milling conversion factor. 00 Od 00 a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s * 40~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~01