NJSS VoL 4, No.1, 2007,p. 187- 210

Executive-legislative Relations in : the Presidency and the National Assembly, 1999 - 2006

Peter Mbah Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka [email protected]

Abstract This study examines the rancorous relationship between Obasanjo's Presidency and the National Assembly from 1999 to 2006. It argues that recent attention to executive-legislative relations has tended to focus on the perceived adverse impact of conflict between the executive and the legislature. A variety of viewpoints have also been expressed both about conflict and cooperation. The extant literature has been suggesting that one or the other dominates, and benefits or liabilities result from either. Writers see conflict between the two branches as the unavoidable teething problems of the nascent democracy. The article contends that the rancorous relationship between the Executive and the National Assembly were based on personal interest and personality clashes and constitutional ambiguities in the 1999 constitution concerning the powers of the two organs. The article also examines the theoretical insight to this problem and comes to the conclusion that since Nigerian state came into existence albeit as peripheral variant of monopoly capitalism, this state shows all the interventionist character in addition to its unique form especially its underdevelopment and dependence, its authoritarianism and its low autonomy. These situations have made the relationship between the two leading branches of government conflictive in nature.

Introduction Nigeria is a new nation, a heterogeneous and multi-ethnic society beset by numerous cleavages and centrifugal tendencies. It is usually difficult to achieve and maintain cordial relationship between the executive and the legislature in stable democracies and even more so in a post-colonial, plural and emergent democratic system like Nigeria. This is because deep social divisions tend to be over politicised and easily support instability. As a colonial state the structure left behind by the British colonial power proved incapable of welding the multi-ethnic society into virile nation. Thus Nigeria was born, bearing the trappings of a republican style of civilian administration but lacking the socio-cultural and political nexus necessary for its sustainability. The long association between Nigeria and Britain meant that in transition from colonial status to independence, the pattern of government was built

187 188 NJSS Vol. 4, No.1, 2001

on the outlines of "West Minster Model" - a system, similar to that operative in the United Kingdom. The fate of government as well as executive-legislative relations under the parliamentary system hinges on the management of relationships among the parties, as well as on the government's ability to muster and hold together a reliable majority of supportive votes. The executive-legislative conflict that ensure when the supportive votes ofNCNC were withdrawn and the tragic end of the first Republic reflected the very worst of what could happen under the parliamentary system. A cynical manipulation of parliamentary votes, could keep a government in power with indifference to the democratic yearnings and needs of the people. The decision to abandon the West Minster model constitution for the more , radical' Washington model' was taken in the hope that it would usher in a clean political life in the second Republic. Nigerians greeted the presidential system at inception in October, 1979 with euphoria. But the second Republic (1979-1983) may be described as the most callous so far in Nigeria's history. It was an opportunity for politicians to exhibit the experience they had acquired during the thirteen years of military rule. But as it turned out, the political class then, in brazen departure from the expectations of Nigerians, lost sight of their responsibility to their people and constituencies. Instead, the business of governance was turned into a frenzied orgy of inglorious plundering and looting of public treasury (Agi, 1985: 23) . Executive -legislative relations was far from being cordial. The National Assembly during this period (1979-1983) tended to destroy what it could not create. While attempting to make the executive uncomfortable, they at the same time tried to make themselves as comfortable as possible, sometimes at the expense of the executive and the masses (Nigerian Economist, 1993: 12). The Third Republic is a bit more difficult to define in terms of date and the relationship between the executive and the legislature at the federal level. During this period (1985-1993), civilian governance had been instituted at local government and state levels, yet a military dictator was heading the federal government. The National Assembly had also been functioning but it was apparently difficult to explain the relationship between the elected members of legislature and the military dictator in the person of general Babangida who then still held the position of a president. th On May 29 , 1999 Nigeria completed its transition programme that enthroned democracy after sixteen years of military rule. The presidential system was retained. Today, the political terrain is however difficult because of many years of military neglect and mismanagement of the Nigerian economy. The present National Assembly is dominated by politicians from the president's party; Peoples Democratic Party (POP). We have a president with strong views, a penchant for straight talk and impatience to get on with the job. It is an explosive mixture (Ukwu, 2001: 6). However, the conflicts between the executive and legislature have been noted more for intrigues of interests and personality clashes than -conflicts-of

,. "'- .. -- ." .. PeterMba 189 principles and programmes. The moribund political structures consequent on military rule, have become problematic today. The relationship between the executive and the legislature has been fraught with series of crisis in the last three years. There have been sharp conflicts in the 1999,2000,2001,and 2002 appropriation bills between the National Assembly and President Obasanjo over the passage of the bill. There were also disagreement between the National Assembly and the President over skewed ambassadorial appointment, National Assembly pay details, the May 29 public holiday issue in 2000 among others, have constituted serious areas of conflict between the two leading institutions of government since 1999 in Nigeria.

Understanding Executive-Legislative Relations Recent attention to executive-legislative relations in Nigeria have tended to focus on the passive adverse impact of conflicts between the executive and legislature. A wide variety of view points have been expressed, both about conflicts and co-operations, where one or the other dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either. Journalists, scholars and other observers, (for instance, see conflict between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria as necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling the government). Others view it as constituting a gridlock in major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective. Struggling in climate of partisanship and distrust in the National Assembly and the Executive branch often appear paralysed and locked in a permanent political standoff. More often, they relate with each other as adversaries, not as responsible partners in governing. One of the most open secrets of the present civilian government in Nigeria is the crisis between President Obasanjo and the National Assembly. Within two years, two senate presidents have been impeached, one speaker of the House of representative have been disgraced out of office, his replacement has come close to impeachment at least twice and there have been financial scandals/probes in both the senate and the house of representatives. Many legislators see the proverbial "hand of Esau and voice of Jacob" in these events. Consequently, many allegations have been made. Accusing fingers have been pointing at President Obasanjo of bribing some legislators to destabilize the National Assembly. On one occasion, sacks of money supposedly returned by conscience-stricken legislators were tended in evidence. On its part, the House of Representatives have censured the executive. Severally, the Senate have probed financial transaction in at least one ministry and article of impeachment have been raised against the President. These events are related directly and indirectly to the increasingly strained relations between the executive and kgislature, and they undermine democratic consolidation (Ibcanu, 190 N.JSS VoL 4, No.1, 2007

2002: 7). Additionally, there exist a plethora of questions on issues pertaining to these conflicts between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria since 1999. The 1999 elections made People's Democratic Party (PDP) pivotal in the National Assembly. Nigerians expected that acting upon their strengthened bargaining position in the National Assembly that the President's bills would sail through with minimum difficulties. It was assumed that a party with a majority in the legislature and controls the executive will then be able to carry out its platform. This has not been the case. Commentators have predominantly explained the conflictive relations between the National Assembly and the Presidency in two related ways. According to Ibeanu, some see them as the unavoidable teething problems of the recent democracy. Consequently, relations will smoothen as the president and legislators realize the co-ordinate character of executive and legislative powers and therefore the desideratum of cooperative work. Increasingly, this explanation is proving to be an optimist's dream. If the rancorous executive-legislative relations are simply the birth pangs of democracy, we should expect it to be on the decline after three years. This has not happened. Other observers see the conflict as one of the lingering effects oflong military dictatorship in the sense that politicians are yet to internalisc the spirit of bargaining, negotiation and compromise. The military background of President Obasanjo and some of his ministers assuredly underscore this. Accordingly, their mind set, derives from the dominance of the military high command and the supremacy of the executive arm of government, which characterize military rule. There is no doubt that Nigeria's military past still looms in executive-legislative relations in the new democratic dispensation. Obasanjo's long experience as a soldier and as a military head of state has to a great extent moulded his thinking and behaviour. He thought that the best ways of doing things are through military dispatch. Under such conditions, it becomes difficult to run a democratic government without conflict in the process of governmental administration. Yet another school of thought believes that the lawmakers are unnecessarily interfering in issues that are dearly day-to day executive functions. However, Ibeanu has correctly observed that to offer these as principal explanations of those relations begs the question. For one thing, it suggests that the problem is simply attitudinal and therefore ephemeral. For another thing, it is subjective in that, it attributes the situation to individual actors, their political behaviour and perhaps their political will, This focus on actors and institutional issues are inadequate. Other scholars equally express different viewpoints. For example, report of the presidential committee on the review of the 1999 constitution asserts that the inter-dependent and dynamic nature of the roles which both the legislature and the executive perform have on several instance, constituted a source of strained relations between these two leading institutions (Federal Republic of Nigeria; 2001: 52). This PeterMba 191 arrangement, the report stated, has bordered more on political calculations, and the emerging rivalry between the National Assembly and the Executive branch in Nigeria, although seemingly diversionary and principally grounded on political calculations than on constitutional construction. The report views these conflicts between the branches of government as a healthy development. But how healthy is this development? In the face of these developments and unlike the other authors, Oyeleye Oycdiran puts forward three types of executive-legislative relations in Nigerian Second Republic. The first is what he called "Rubber-Stamp" assemblies. The records of house of assembly typify this he said where the speakers very often misled legislators on their power. The second type of relationship found between executive and legislature is that of hostility. This hostility is not peculiar to the state in which one party occupies the executive office and another party controls the legislature. At least, in one state both arms of government are controlled by the same political party, this hostility has been fierce. The two hostile assemblies are found in Kaduna and Bendel (Oyediran, 1980: 29). In Kaduna state, the Governor was elected on the platform of Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) while the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) dominated the legislature. If the situation in Kaduna state was self explanatory, the executive-legislative relationship in the then Bendel state was more difficult to understand since the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) which won the governorship election also controlled a comfortable majority in the State House of Assembly. Cooperation is the third type of executive-legislative relationship which Oyediran categorized. He argues that there appears to be two variations of cooperation. One is what he said is based on genuine respect, while the other is due to ignorance. Thus he concluded that the success of any legislative assembly depends to large extent on the style and type of people holding positions of leadership in that group. Thus, Loewenberg et a/(1986:535) also explains why the executive-legislative relations have become problematic. They argue that legislative support for political policies of the executive is problematic when the legislature and the executive are independent of one another, and when party discipline is not enforced. Although, the legislature and the executive are independent yet interlocked institutions, each branch is in a position to thwart the other, yet they must bargain and concur with each other to achieve common objectives whether one party controls the chief executive office and the other party controls the legislature. Thus many authors see the conflictive nature of .executive-Iegislative relations in Nigeria as inherently a power relationship and apower struggle. Hence, pyqn (1984:12) asserts that the ~eagan's suc.cess 'wi~h' the ~ongtess,c~n b~· ti.a~~~.nor. only t~.)-hi.s personal. involvementin lobbying congress but also to the i#~\ion of the legislative strategy . ~ .•. ,. ~ " ~'"' •. , ., ,.~:". -: ,'" .'.~. .j . - < . • .I', It" ' 192 NJ,S,S Vol. 4, No.1, 2007 group within the White House. The legislative strategy group revolves around White House assistants who map out strategy, co-ordinate work with the cabinet and apply pressure on the congress to pass administrative bills. Therefore, there are institutional reasons that make it difficult for congress and the president to see eye to eye, and there are characteristic practices and tactics that help on some occasions to over-come these differences. In Nigeria, the shortcomings of the National Assembly were less attributable to a power tussle between it and the executive than its inherent institutional weakness of a body devoid oflong standing traditions. Many members of the National Assembly were unschooled in the business of law-making and therefore slow in developing legislative initiative. While the executive inherited staff and facilities good enough for a smooth take-off, in addition to a considerable civil service from where it could draw the required experts, the National Assembly had only skeletal staff which was also inexperienced in legislative procedures and operations (Anyanwy, 1999: 47). We therefore contend that the relationship between the National Assembly and the Presidency is much deeper and structural. The explanations offered by these schools of thought are therefore secondary in nature. To this end, the fundamental issues have to do with personal interests and personality clashes including the 1999 constitution. The state has been turned into a primary source of capital accumulation and this appears to account for the existence of conflict between the executive and the federal legislature. The business of governance was turned into an inglorious plundering and looting of public treasury. The 1999 constitution also contains so many parallel clauses that fail to clearly define spheres of authority between the executive and the legislature. It is a military document for self -succession by late General Abacha and a mechanism for quick hand over to civilian-elected democratic government by General Abubakar. Consequently, the document was full of ambiguities, which accounted for the executive-legislative conflict immediately it came into operation in May 29, 1999. Prevalent explanation which attribute their conflictive relations only to greed, Obasanjo's military background and teething problems of a new democratic experiment need to be transcended. To do this, this study seeks to observe the following questions:- • Can executive-legislative conflictive relations be traced to personal interest and personality clashes between the two organs in Nigeria? • Can ambiguities in the 1999 constitution concerning the powers of the two arms of government induce executive-legislative conflict? PeterMba 193

Theorising Executive-legislative Conflict One basic concept of modern democracy is derived from the theory of separation of powers as propounded by Baron Montesquieu. This theory has been assumed to be the cornerstone principle of democracy in the last three centuries. In 1748, Montesquieu published the Spirit oftheLaws (Esprit deLois) in which he reformulated an ancient idea in political theory. In Book XI of Spirit q/ Laws, Montesquieu ascribed liberty in England to the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and to the balancing of these powers against each other (Sabine and Thorson, 1973: 513). In medieval European constitution making, the idea of division of powers came to be a counter force against the divine sovereign powers claimed by monarchs. And in England, the long struggle between the crown and both parliaments and courts of common law, which climaxed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, underscored the importance of separation of powers and checks and balances. The genius ofMontesquieu lay in reformulating an idea connoting a political balancing of economic and social interests into a system of legal checks and balances between parts of a constitution. Montesquieu conceptualizes a system of government in which each traditional arm of government (i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary) maintains clear and distinguished functions of its own as allotted to it by the constitution with checks and balances from the other two arms. American Federalists later adopted the propositions of Montesquieu especially Madison, as the organizing framework of the American constitution (Fabrini 1999: 95 cited in Ibcanu 2()()2). Madison, defending the newly proposed constitution in 1788, noted an underlying principle of competition and rivalry among the branches, as means of limiting and controlling government. He also reflected on the checks and balances system and the need for auxiliary precautions to sustain it. The constant aim is to divide and arrange the branches of government in such a way that each may be a check on the other to check tyranny and conflict between the arms of government. Although the idea to separate and co-ordinate the power of the three arms of government has been a major principle of liberal democratic constitution making for many years, political scientist, often neglect its organic connection to competitive capitalism. Consequently, there is no attempt to theorize its general and fundamental basis especially the relations between executive power and the legislature. Therefore a fundamental understanding of separation of powers and the changes it has undergone in specific countries lies in the character of capitalist production and the capitalist state. Being a market oriented commodity driven system, the capitalist society invariably evolves an executive force seemingly standing above society and appearing as the guarantor of the collective interests of the people 194 NJSS VoL 4, No.1, 2007

(Ibeanu, 2002: 6). In the west, separation of powers was particularly important at the phase of competitive capitalism for it served to balance conflicting interests of fractions of the ruling class, for example, the estates in medieval Europe, because these interests were usually inscribed in the arms of government, the liberal state which corresponds to competitive capitalism, appears as non-arbitrary, impartial and therefore capable of guaranteeing both the interests of the dominant and dominated classes and fractions. From the preceding opinions two critical points have to be made about executive - legislative relations from competitive capitalism and the liberal state. First, the political function of the state, which consists of exercise of legitimate violence and the reproduction/ inculcation of the dominant ideology, takes precedence over its economic function. Indeed, the liberal states rarely intervened directly in the market. Second, the legislature, which symbolizes popular representation and popular power, tends to be dominant over the executive and administration. This dominance arose because parliament as the sanctuary of law and legislative power incarnated general norms whose universal and formal character constituted the essential features of modern law. However, at the period of monopoly capitalism the above logic changes fundamentally. The liberal state is superseded by a monopoly capitalist state, a process marked by a progressive movement away from separate/ co- ordinate power of the arms of government to a pre-ponderance of the power of the executive and administration. This arose because at this stage, the capitalist free competition is replaced by capitalist monopoly. The legislature has become a declining and hopelessly fragmented body trying with little success to cope with the expansive and over dangerous power of a stronger institution, the executive. In advanced capitalist democracies, there are adequate institutional checks to executive -legislative conflict. Here, inter- branch and inter-party cooperation have been highly emphasized rather than conflict. Consultation has been the desirable approach. Bargaining and negotiation have been the central characteristics of the American inter branch relations. This has helped to make the inter-branch conflict a minimal issue. There are characteristic practices and tactics that help to overcome executive - legislative conflict. However, it was in the phase of monopoly capitalism that Nigerian state came into existence albeit as its peripheral variant. This state shows all the interventionist character of the monopoly capitalist state in addition to its unique form especially its underdevelopment and dependence, its authoritarianism and its low autonomy; it was at this stage also that its present class formation evolved. The Nigfrian state as a peripheral capitalist state and the emergence of the Nigerian , ruling class at the stage of monopoly ,capitalism, which has been shaped by it, also has focused .attention exclusively at the lev_~lof superstructure and were .de> where Peter Mba 195

controlling the system of production on which politics has been anchored as in advanced capitalist states. What followed was that the class resorted to the use of state power to secure economic base and built an economic empire for themselves. The state therefore becomes an instrument for the achievement of personal interests. Since everyone uses the state power for that purpose, conflicts become inevitable and, the executive - legislative conflict in Nigerian emanates from this process. From the foregoing, because the state power has assumed a major means for primitive accumulation of capital, the governing class while pursuing its economic and political interests sometimes do clash with one another. Due to the nature of their origin they sometimes have opposing economic and political views. The implication is that there has been multiplication of conflict to serve personal and sectional interests within the ruling class. And in this regard the tenets of separation of powers and the provisions of the constitution are disregarded. The consequences of the forgoing for executive -legislative relations are many. First, the quest by the Nigerian ruling class to use the state power as means of private accumulation of capital and its colonial past is routed in the capitalist economy since in such an economic system the drive and competition for private profit and capital accumulation are the motor. Secondly, since colonialism and imperialism had introduced economic distortions, it has equally created the economically weak political leaders in Nigeria. The two jointly lead to the weakening of political- institution necessary for moderating relations among politicians and therefore curtailing conflicts. One expression of weakness of political institution in the peripheral capitalist societies is the weakness of the constitution itself. The Nigerian 1999 constitution contains a lot of ambiguities and lack of clarity in its content pertaining to the powers of the executive and the legislature. This is essentially because of lack of long practice or shortness of existence of practice of constitution in Nigeria, that long lag since the last constitution leaves the legislature in a great disadvantage vis-a- vis the executive, unlike the U.S.A whose constitution has been in operation for over 200 years. There is also inadequate experience in settling constitutional disputes. These factors would in themselves lead one to expect considerable conflicts as actors in both executive and legislative branches seek to pick up key reins of governmental power.

The Role of Personal Interest and Personalities in Federal Executive- legislative Conflict in Nigeria The critical role of the state in Nigeria and other post colonial societies is becoming increasingly obvious especially as a means for the achievement of personal and sectional interest. Given the country's conditions of underdevelopment, power 196 NJSS VoL 4, No.1, 2007 offers the opportunity of a lifetime to rise above the general poverty and squalor that pervades the entire society. It has provided rare opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige. Perhaps, political power has served the private interest of the political class in Nigeria, and been used to foster self-interest and the benefit of their families rather than provide concrete democratic dividends to the Nigerian masses. Currently, the global capitalism is cumulatively making the situation worse. It has done this by creating two competing political institutions for accumulation of private property. It was global capitalism and its differential impacts on the governing class that has to some extent generated inter-branch conflict. In this situation, the state is regarded as the major source of the accumulation of private property at all cost. State power is probably the easiest means for which one enriches oneself. Furthermore, President Obasanjo because of his history and antecedents of being a military man as well as being a former head of state had not shaded off the military in him. His long experience as a soldier as well as fusion of executive and legislative functions under the military have to a very large extent moulded his thinking and behaviour. He thinks that the best ways of doing things are through military order. He lacks positive style and mastery of democratic process, which would have smoothened the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Unlike the case in turkey and some of South East Asian countries where the military utilized its cohesion, hierarchical authority and disciplinary rigidity to accelerate the modernization process. The military faction in Nigeria has proven to be an unmitigated disaster. The phenomenon of corruption and stifling structural centralization has worsened the executive -legislative relations in Nigeria. For most part, politics and politicking have become the pursuit of personal and sectional interests at the expense of the public good. Indeed politics has taken an important position in Nigerian society and all attention is focused on it. Associated with this situation is the point that since there is primacy of politics, the state has become a means of production, which in turn provides an instrument for primitive accumulation of wealth and capital. State power becomes parcelled out and personal interests become deflected as collective interest. This process has predominated the present conflict between the Obasanjo Presidency and the National Assembly since 1999. The dominant philosophy of the members of the executive and the National Assembly is oriented towards acquiring, grabbing and accumulating wealth thereby creating an antagonistic relation between each other. The relations between the executive and the National Assembly are therefore, essentially relations of conflict based on competitive materialistic interest and personality clashes. The following empirical evidence explains these clashes clearly. PeterMba 197

Senator Nzeribe's Impeachment Motion The frosty relationship between the Executive and the National Assembly came to a climax and really blew open when Senator in 2000 tabled a petition supported by some elements from his constituency to impeach President Obasanjo. The uproar from this incident was not surprisingly deafening. Not because of the substance of the allegation, but of the person, the sponsor of the petition. Given Nzeribe's antecedent, there may be more to it than meets the eye in his move for Obasanjo's impeachment. This is a man known for his anti-democratic role in 1993. Based on his action and activities, the June 12 election would not have held. The Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) then led by Nzeribe went to court and got an injunction to prevent the polls on the eve of the election. Nzeribe had wanted the then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida to transmute into a civilian President. The election was held, but it was annulled after a sustained campaign by reactionary forces like the ABN. Nigerians were surprised that Nzeribe's person and his kind should move a motion for the impeachment of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria if not for the achievement of a personal Interest. The Senate President (then ) was alleged to have been privy to that move. It was widely reported that it was Okadigbo who planned the impeachment and subsequent removal of the former Senate President Evan Enwcrcm who was described as a dependable ally of the Presidency. The presidency saw Chuba Okadigbo as a radical whom the president cannot work with and who is behind the plan to remove him. On this basis a counter offensive was launched by the presidency to have Okadigbo removed as Senate President. Blackmail, intrigues and character assassination were employed as weapons by both sides as the relationship between the two organs sours. The impeachment saga came to a climax again when in August 2002, the House of Representatives gave President Obasanjo two weeks ultimatum to resign or face impeachment process. The ultimatum itself generated a lot of heat and further soured the already rancorous relationship between the National Assembly and the Obasanjo presidency. The uproar from this ultimatum attracted sharp reactions and criticisms from the Nigerian public and brings to question how the president's party in the National Assembly could be the group to move for the removal of the president. In September, 2002, the National Assembly listed 32 constitutional breaches committed by President Obasanjo which acts amount to gross misconduct. Some of these constitutional breaches include:- 1. That you, Chief Olusegun Matthew Okikiola Aremu Obasanjo, sometimes between the months of April and July 2002 purportedly and arbitrary amended the capital provision of the 2002 Appropriation act by reducing the capital vote to 44

Assembly for passage, contrary to section 80 (4) of the 1999 constitution which act amounts to gross misconduct., 2. That you, Chief Olusegun Matthew Okikiola Aremu Obasanjo on or about the month of July, 2002 issued an executive order purporting same to constitute an amendment to the Revenue Allocation Act contrary to section 162 (1) and section 313 of the 1999 constitution, which act amounts to gross misconduct. 3. That you, Chief Olusegun Mathew Okikiola Aremu Obasanjo from 1999 to 2002 have consistently indulged in extra budgetary expense contrary to section 80 (2), (3) and ( 4) of the 1999 constitution, which act amounts to gross misconduct to wit .. (a) Expenditure on the National stadium contracts in excess of the appropriated sum of N38 billion. (b) Expenditure on the identity card project.

You authorized the spending of the sum of N9.5 billion vide letter of credit as against the sum ofNS.9 billion cumulatively approved in the Appropriation Acts for the years 2001 and 2002 respectively. 4. That you Chief Olusegun Matthew Okikiola Aremu Obasanjo in the year 2002 (between Jan-July) refused full payment of recurrent expenditure for the judiciary as it affects monies for the payment of salaries and overhead costs, contrary to the Appropriation Act 2002, section 80 (3) and 162 (9) of the 1999 constitution, which act amount to gross misconduct (Guardian, 2001: 9-13).

The presidency have argued that some of the allegation are not only cliche's, they had equally been defended by the president in past. Citing section 315 of the 1999 constitution, the presidency said that the President has been empowered by the constitution to modify "an existing law". However, the impeachment threat stems from the 2000 budget proposals where the National Assembly unilaterally increased the 200n budget from N570 billion to over N670 billion. In fact, the National Assembly wanted to have 22.25 billion of the entire budget figure. This represents 3.75 percent of the entire figure (Comet, 2002: 11). President Obasanjo had argued that the economy cannot carry such huge budget. And with the increment, Obasanjo became uncomfortable with the huge allocation the legislature made for themselves, and he was set not to sign the Appropriation Bill into law. Based on the selfish interest of the members of the National Assembly conflict became inevitable. But the arguments the National Assembly put up was that Obasanjo travels too frequently abroad and that each time he travels, he is accompanied by at least two governors, five Ministers and a Coterie of aids and journalists. While on the trip, he is entitled to N300,OOO per night as cstacodc, Any governor on the trip with him is entitled to N 1OO,O()(} per night while the Ministers and others senior aids are entitled to N50,O()O each per night. Why PeterMba 199

should the Nigerian economy carry such huge travelling expenses by the President and not that of the legislators? It was from here that these conflictive relations became pronounced which reflects the competition for material interest within the context of scarce resources. By this arrangement, the members of the National Assembly use their legitimate constitutional powers as a means of mobilising their members for corporate action against the executive (the impeachment threat) to extort money from the presidency. Furthermore the impeachment threat has expressed personal interest and vengeance following Na'Abba's allegation that the President had bribed some members of the House to remove him as Speaker of the House of Representatives. His allegation was based on the conviction that the president's hand was in the impeachment and subsequent removal of Dr. Okadigbo as Senate President. Ghali Na'Abba has come close to impeachment at least thrice. One is not therefore surprised that the impeachment threat and motion was initiated in the Na'Abba's lower House of Representatives. He wanted his own pound of flesh. Na' Abba as the lead actor in the face off between the President and the National Assembly has in the last three years shown that he can use his position and power to sustain the conflictive relations between the two arms of government at least by withstanding his impeachment attempts. The presidency has seen the impeachment move as being engineered by forces outside the National Assembly and being spearheaded by Na' Abba, Speaker of the House of Representatives. What Obasanjo dismissed as a joke carried too far had became a monumental crisis, especially as the nation's Upper Chamber, the Senate equally resolved to tread the path of impeachment charted by the lower House. The latest ultimatum of impeachment which originated from the House of Representatives in August, 2002 has become a medium for personality clashes and an expression of personal interest built on vengeance and blackmail.

The Ambassadorial Nominee Issue Another area of face offbetween the Presidency and the National Assembly was the skewed ambassadorial appointment made by President Obasanjo in 1999 which he sent to the Senate for confirmation. In the list submitted to the Senate, there were six nominees from a state (Ogun, Obasanjo's home state), in others one. In the case of Ebonyi, there was no career diplomat. By this arrangement, President Obasanjo has used his position for personal and sectional interest and thus this conflictive relation between it and the National Assembly. It was expected that Obasanjo would have used his position to reflect the Federal character of the country instead of this lopsided appointment of these ambassadorial designate. The senate was set to return the list to the President. But in what amounted to a deepening of showdown early in life of the administration, the Senate instead

., '.. ". 200 NJSS VoL 4, No.1, 2007 proposed guidelines the president must apply in drawing up a list of envoys- designate. In the Senators new formula, three persons must be nominated from each state of the nation in place of the President's list which they considered highly lopsided. Yet this was not acceptable to the Presidency.

The 2001 National Assembly Salary Structure In 2001, the senate rolled out new salaries, allowances and fringe benefits for political and judicial officers in the Federation without making their own pay package public, thus starting another round of controversy and crisis. The new package fixed the annual basic salary of the President of the federal Republic of Nigeria at N1,405,882 while that of the Chief Justice of the Federation is N1,346,589 which is higher than the N1,212,629 for the Vice President. The package also puts the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Ministers on the same annual basic salaries of N794,085 while Ministers of State and Special advisers are placed on N783,032 and N777,150 respectively (Comet, 2002: 12). Other prescriptions in the bill include INEC Chairman and heads of parastatals N777,150, Auditor General of the Federation N770,346, Justice of the Supreme Court and the President of the Court of appeal N990,844. Justice of court of appeal and Chief Judge of the Federal High Court N776,032 annually. Chairman ofLoc~l Government N426,528, Supervisory Councillors N404,650 and Secretary of Area Council N370,nO (The News, 2000: 9). Strangely enough, the bill did not contain remuneration of the lawmakers at the Federal level. But based on public outcry, President Obasanjo as well as the Nigerian public wanted to know how much the lawmakers earn or to know their pay details. It was as a result of this that another round of face-off started between the two arms of government. The Federal House of Representatives, in an apparent reaction to the order of President Obasanjo requesting for a breakdown of their remuneration, that created the conflict between them. In a swift manner, the House devoted two days, February 13 and 14, 2002 to debate the state of the nation. In the process, there were calls for the probe of the executive since its inception in 1999 with threats of impeachment of President Obasanjo. Legislators are themselves political officers, and also given that much financial indiscretion go on in the National Assembly, the legislative arm. For instance, it was reported in the Comet, Monday February 25, 2002 that the legislators awarded Christmas bonuses of between N1.5 million to N2 million to themselves in December, 2001 (New.fwatch, 2002: 14). The legislators also indulge in frivolous travel to collect outrageous estacode and travel allowances of undisclosed amounts. So the members of the National Assembly have always threatened to probe the executive when their personal interests are threatened especially when questions PeterMba 201 have been raised on their pay allowances. It is based on these issues that the relationship between the two arms of government has become conflictive in nature.

The Senate Contract Scandal The second Senate President, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo was elected on November 18, 1999 after the impeachment of . Barely five months in office Okadigbo was removed as the second Senate President after the result of the Kuta panel indicted him of misdemeanour and corruption .. Allegations of corruption were levelled against the Senate President and his principal officers in the Senate. Because of this, an ad-hoc committee was set up by the senate to investigate alleged financial impropriety in the Upper House of the National Assembly. Senator Idris Kutah was the Chairman of the seven-man committee for the investigation. To the dismay of Nigerians the investigation and report submitted to senate whole house reveals a high level of corruption going on in the Upper House of the Natioanal Assembly, it was discovered that a lot of financial recklessness and personal enrichment have taken place, especially by the Senate President and his principal Officers, in the award of contracts. Senator , Deputy Chief Whip, testified that some of the contracts specified in the sharing of contracts were earmarked for the office of the Senate President and that he Aluko, personally executed some of those contracts on behalf of the Senate President. Contracts in which the Senate President was said to have been involved include: 1. The welfare package ofN22.95 million for Salah/ Christmas. Though he was not the approving authority for it yet he received it without questioning. This amount cannot be justified if one considers the state of the economy. 2. Part of the inflated N175 million street lighting project (from N57 million) in which both the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are allegedly involved and which he did not deny when asked by the committee. 3. Nl00 million allocated for the purchase of computers and information equipment at inflated prices were identified. 4. Total ofN32 million for the purchase of eight additional cars (which could not be accounted for) for the office of the Senate President bringing his fleet to 32. 5. The N37 ,211,570 for the furnishing of the Senate President's resident which was above the senate approved N2.5 million. 6. N5 million plus for security gadgets in the Senate President's resident without authorisation. 202 N.JJJ Vo!' 4, No.1, 2007

7. The installation and commission of 1OOKVA generator for the Senate President's residence at an inflated price of N15 million without authorization (Newswatch, 2002: 12).

Senator Gbenga Aluko, the Deputy Chief Whip is at the centre of all the contract scam in the senate. He awarded several contracts at inflated prices including two companies owned by himself and his wife. Specifically he awarded the computer contract for the supply of Laptop Computers to Tritech Computers Ltd, and that for N66 million office equipment to a total of eleven companies, all at inflated prices. Evidence before the Kuta Committee revealed that he withheld the sum of N35 million out of the N45 million provided for disbursement to Senators for the repair of their quarters (Newswatch, 2002: 13). Senator Florence Ita-Giwa, APP Deputy Leader, her company Labonil Ltd, was involved in two separate contracts, the supply of office equipment worth N4,506 million and the fencing of her official residence at an inflated price of N1,062,593.04 (Newswatch. 2002). Senator Bala Adamu, Chairman Senate Committee on Special Duties, was given NlO million by the Senate for relief material to riot victims in Kaduna and other affected areas. He inflated the price of the items bought as relief materials and he could not explain how he incurred N1.5 million paid for demurrage came about. Senator Abubalar Girei, Chairman Senate Services Committee admitted to have collected N6.2 million to purchase sallah gifts for the Senators in which most of the items were over priced especially the cows and rams. Excess price of N2, 180,000 was discovered (Newswatch, 2002: 14). Senator Mukhtar Ahmed Mohammed, who handled the allocation of the 117 official cars for Senators could not account how those cars were allocated, albeit he told the Kuta Panel that one of the cars was missing (Peugeot 504 Station Wagon). Senator Ahmed was again responsible for the 66 new cars bought for the National Assembly at inflated prices totalling over N2 billion. He was also connected with street light project from the National Assembly to the Eagle Square all at inflated prices. The list is countless. It seems to suggest that the Nigerian state has become what St. Augustine described as high way robbery on a large scale. It is neither a state for ethical purpose nor is it held together by moral ties. The present relationship between the National Assembly and the Obasanjo presidency suggests that politics has been transformed into a bitter personal wrangles, unremitting and unconstrained struggle for possession and access to State offices, with the chief aim of procuring direct material benefits to oneself and one's acknowledged communal .group: What marks the relationship between the Executive and the National Assembly since May, 1999 has been exhibition of a~~ressive and acquisitive

( . PeterMba 203 compulsion for accumulation of capital. This makes Dudley B.J. to state that "the shortest cut to affluence and influence is through politics. Politics means money and money means politics. To get politics, there is always a price ... To be a member of the government party means open avenue to government patronage, contract deals and the like (Dudley, 1973: 27)". The result of the Kuta Panel report has been vindictive tool in the hands of the executive. There was serious indication that the presidency was involved in the senate probe. It was used to impeach the Senate President Chuba Okadigbo and other principal officers of the Senate. However, in October, 2002 the Senate met and wrote off the Kuta report and also announced that it has forgiven those indicted in the Kuta Panel report. Before, then especially at the outset of the current administration, the stage for confrontation was set when President Obasanjo sought and imposed Evan Enwerem as first Senate President of the Fourth Republic. Earlier on, the Senate caucus of the majority Peoples Democratic Party, (PDP) had selected Chuba Okadigbo, as the candidate for the Senate President. On a swift move Chuba Okadigbo was dropped from being the candidate for the Senate President through the manipulation of the executive arm. Although Okadigbo contested and lost, political cnernity was created between the Obasanjo presidency and pro-Okadigbo. Instead, Evan Enwerem was preferred by the President whom he eulogised as "mature" and Okadigbo who he described as intellectual but with whom he obviously was not comfortable. This was not without cost. Each senator received NSOO,OOO to have Evan Enwerem as Senate president, and this was administered by Chief Tony Anenih. When Evan Enwerem was removed as senate president on November, 8, 1999, Okadigbo again emerged as the next senate president. Obasanjo was not comfortable. Several attempts were made to remove Okadigbo. On those occasions, the president was accused of being behind the attempts. The plan to remove Okadigbo materialised through the Kuta panel which probed the allegation of corruption in the Senate. Okadigbo and his principal officers were found guilty and subsequently removed and Pius Anyim became the third senate president of the Fourth Republic.

Constitutional Ambiguities as Sources of Executive-legislative Conflicts in Nigeria The 1999 constitution deals with delineation and functions of the executive and the legislature. In fact section 5 (1) (a) provides as follows:- "Subject to the provisions of this constitution, the executive power of the federation: 204 N1JJ VoL 4, No.1, 2007

(A) Shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: 3).

In this connection section 5 (1)-(5) in fact shows the extent the powers of the executive can go. Section 4 (1) of the constitution also delineates the function of the legislature inter-alia. The legislative power of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: 2). In fact section 4(1)-(9) illustrates the powers of both the Federal legislature and that of the states of the Federation. However, section 315 of the 1999 constitution raises questions. This section empowers the executive to modify existing laws without recourse to the legislature. Section 315 (1) provides that "Subject to the provisions of this constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this constitution and shall be deemed to be ... " Subsection 4, a-c goes on: In this section, the following expressions have the meanings assigned to them respectively: (a) Appropriate authority means- (i) The president, in relation to the provlSlons of any law of the federation. (ii) Any person appointed by any law to revise or rewrite the laws of the federation. (b) Existing law means any law and any rule oflaw or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this section comes into force or which having been passed or made before that date comes into force after that date; and (c) "Modification includes addition, alteration, omission or repeal (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: 117).

By this arrangement, section 315 of the 1999 constitution therefore is inconsistent with the functions and powers of the legislature as in section 4 of the same constitution. Such inconsistency have been a major source of executive -legislative conflicts since May 291999. Therefore questions have been raised on section 315 which empowers the executive to modify existing laws without recourse to the legislature especially when such modification has been defined in the constitution .as including addition, alteration, omission or repeal of an existing law. Section 315 Peter Mba 205 thus breaches the principles of separation of powers by invading the legislative powers of the National Assembly. The ambiguities are understandable especially if one understands the intention of the detractors. The detractors, General Abacha and Abubakar did not intend to put in place a democratic government based on popular consent. For Abacha, it was meant for self-succession, Abubakar as a mechanism for quick handover to civilian elected democratic government. The constitution, therefore did not address the national question and other nagging issues pertaining to Nigerian federalism. In all, the process that culminated in the constitution ignored both the structural issues that have bedevilled the country's ability to enthrone a truly accountable, transparent, and democratic political order. Consequently, it produced a draft that was full of ambiguities, which have led to the executive - legislative conflicts immediately it came into operation, in May 29, 1999. Its implementation has also been rather difficult because it contains so many parallel clauses that fail to clearly define spheres of authority especially between the executive and the National Assembly. The following empirical evidence testifies to these ambiguities.

The Petroleum Trust Fund Saga The Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) was set up by Decree 25 of 1994 as an octopus infrastructural development institution whose activities encompassed the spheres of many ministries and parastatals. It was funded directly from the revenue accruing to Federal government in the Sale of Petroleum products. Of the total funds accruing from this source, the PTF collected 32.98 percent directly,. Federal government got 34.79 percent, NNPC, the oil institution generating the fund got only 23.20 percent. Armed Forces and Police got 8.40 percent and the Federal Capital Territory got .63 percent (NewJwatch, 2000: 10). The coming into effect of 1999 constitution on May 29, 1999 rendered the PTF an anomaly since it's funding made it a parallel government. On June 29, 1999, President Obasanjo announced the scrapping of the PTF, which was established by the military government of Late General . The announcement triggered a swift and sharp reaction from senate, which became the first official disagreement between the federal legislature and executive. When the members of the National Assembly kicked against the decision of the president, their argument was that under the 1999 constitution, the president did not have the powers to scrap the PTF since an existing law, Decree 25 of 1994, established the fund. Only the National Assembly, they argued, had the power to review existing laws. So on July 2, National Assembly (senate) passed a resolution nullifying the action of the president, which was seen as 'unilateral', and effectively a usurpation of the function of the legislature. The executive defended its action by citing section 315 (a) and (c) of the constitution, which gives the president the power to review or

... '. .,. •.... 206 NJSS Vol. 4, No.1, 2007

modify existing and repeal any law that is not in conformity with the constitution. The Executive argued that the president did not need to refer first to the legislature in exercising his stated powers. By this, the constitution is no more consistent with the principles of separation of powers. The frequent feuds between the executive and the legislature are derived from such ambiguities. Legal luminaries argued that the PTF is an unconstitutional body and its very fundamental inconsistency with the constitution rendered it "impliedly repealed", therefore, the president's action was in order. The Senate subsequently reversed its earlier action and president Obasanjo in order to avoid constitutional crises appointed a new management team to wind down the fund.

The Public Holiday Issue Compounding this frosty relationship between the executive and legislature was the declaration of May 29, each year a public holiday by the president. The National Assembly considered it a usurpation of its function by the president. In the view of the senate president, Chuba Okadigbo, the declaration by the executive was unconstitutional. The senate president asserted that it was the exclusive right of the National Assembly to declare a day as public holiday. "No body can declare any public holiday except the one already given in the constitution and establish in the tradition of this country without an express law as enacted in the National Assembly and signed into law by the president", the senate president argued (New.rwatch, 2000: 11). The Attorney General, Kanu Agabi, has argued that contrary to the position expressed by the National Assembly, the president of the Federal Republic is a competent authority to declare any day as public holiday in Nigeria and such a day so declared shall be kept as a public holiday by all including the national assembly. Agabi further reasoned that the friction caused by the opinion of the National Assembly on the powers of the President to declare public holidays could have been avoided if the position of the law had been properly checked before their decision was taken (Po.rt Express, 2001: 12). On his part, Dr. Doyin Okupe, the then Personal Assistant to the president on Media and Publicity, argued that the proclamation of the 29th of Mayas Public Holiday was an act of the Federal Executive Council which rested principally on the law that existed prior to the 1999 constitution that is the public holiday Act Cap 278 section 2. Being an existing law and relating to matters that are directly under the jurisdiction of the exclusive legislative list, it becomes an operational law by the power of section 315 of the 1999 constitution which gives the president the power to review or modify existing and repeal any law that is not in conformity with the constitution. But Honourable Babatunde Odunyoye of the House of Representatives disagreed with Agabi and Okupe and pointed out that section 4 of the second schedule which establishes the legislative power of National Assembly grants it PctcrMba 207 authority to make laws on the matters listed in the exclusive list. It was on this basis of the controversy and legal tussle that the Senate President and the Speaker of House· of Representatives kept away from the May 29 celebration

Budget 1999 and the Power of Appropriation Another area that has generated conflict between the executive and the legislative arm in the Federal Government since 1999 due to constitutional ambiguities concerning the powers of the two organs was over the power of appropriation. The real executive-legislative conflict came with the submission of the 2000 budget to the National Assembly by the presidency. Obasanjo was accused by the National Assembly of violating the constitution by its selective implementation of the 1999 Appropriation Act. Has the president such powers to selectively implement the budget since the appropriation is a law signed by the President? The National Assembly reasoned that he has not such powers thus the crisis surrounding the 1999 Appropriation Act. In a letter by the National Assembly to Obasanjo NASS/S/SP /H/77 and dated December 3, 1999, the senate raised a number of issues concerning the implementation of the Appropriation Act. The issue raised led to the suspension by the senate of further deliberations on both the second supplementary Appropriation of 1999 as well as the Appropriation Bill of 2000 submitted to the National Assembly. Some specific instances where the president violated the provisions of the 1999 Appropriation Act according to the letter are: i) The expenditure of N200 million over and above the N400 million approved by the National Assembly for furnishing of the new wing of the Federal Secretariat. ii) The expenditure of over N78 million as contribution to Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Niger Basin Commission that was not provided for in the Act. iii) The use of N2.7 billion to purchase houses for public officers when such provisions were not made in the Act. iv) The letter went further to accuse the President of deliberately refusing to release funds to Ministries and departments as well as Judiciary when the Act provided for the release of such funds. v) The executive was accused of the diversion ofN144 million meant for capital projects of the Ministry of Education to the war against cultism in Nigerian Universities (Thi.r Dqy, 2002: 15).

But most often Obasanjo has always hidden under section 315 of the 1999 constitution to protect his actions as in the PTF and Public Holiday issues. However, the delay by the National Assembly in the passage of the 2000 Appropriation Bill, in the opinion of the Presidency, more expeditiously was the 208 N]SJ VoL 4, No. I, 2007 upward review of some of the allocation particularly that of the National Assembly. On several occasions, the National Assembly has increased the prepared budgetary allocation as presented by the president to it of which Obasanjo has said that the economy cannot carry such huge financial burden. These issues set the tone for a bull fight between the two arms of government. The inherent conflict between the executive and the legislature had, therefore, stemmed mostly from varied understanding or perception of constitutional provisions and its associated ambiguities (see section 315). Each branch has strived to expand the meaning and frontiers of the powers which the constitution has granted to it. These inconsistencies and ambiguities go to support the views of Chris Anyanwu when he stated that: the 1999 document is only another one of such military imposed constitution. More especially, the inclusion in the draft committee of some individuals known to have been instrumental for some of the obnoxious anti-people decrees used by General Abacha in his violent repression, tainted the whole exercise in the eyes of many Nigerians. How to built confidence in a system whose opcrating rules are perceived by vital segments of the society as fundamentally flawed and alienating, will be the challenge in the next few years (Anyanwu, 1999: 48).

Thus, there are problems with the process of making the 1999 constitution as well as the content of the constitution. The constitution was made during a military regime and approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council made up of 26 persons. The people of Nigeria did not participate in the process of making the constitution. This is why the preamble which begins with "We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following constitution" has been severely criticised in Nigeria as being a false claim.

Conclusion Good governance requires structured and harmonious interaction between the executive and the National Assembly at all points where their responsibilities meet. These interactive responsibilities meet at three main areas- legislative functions, scheduled appointments and oversight functions. With regard to legislative functions, the most critical area of interaction as well as the area that has generated a lot of conflict between the two branches of government is the budget exercise. The legislature sees the most important of their functions as being consigned by the law of the land to the work of appropriating funds and overseeing how these funds are used. PeterMba 209

It is our contention that the modern Nigerian state is the heir as well as the legacy of the British colonial rule. As such, the present Nigerian governing class lacks the economic base for effective governance and depends on the state power for capital accumulation. They are therefore parasitic in nature. And because they are parasitic, there is a very serious struggle for state power and those who have acquired it use for personal goals. There is therefore very serious struggle and competition within those who have acquired the state power for capital accumulation, and the present rancorous executive-legislative relations in Nigeria can be situated in this context. Unless the governing class makes serious and genuine efforts to achieve economic power through industrialization before assuming political power, it will be very difficult for executive -legislative conflict to abate. The state power will ever remain very attractive and competitive since it solely provides quick economic rewards for those who have acquired it.

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Okolo, C.E. (1994). Squander Maria Mentality: Riflections on Nigeria Culture, Nsukka: University Trust Publications Okolo, A (2000) "Tackling the President" The News, July 29. Olawale, S. (2002) "The Kutah Panel", Neu/stuatch, August 14. Oyediran, O. (1980). Nigerian Legislative House. Which Wqy?, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Pols by, N. (1989). Congressand Presidency,New Delhi: Prentice Hall. Pynn, R. (1984). American Politics- Changing Expectations, California: Cole Publishing Company. Sabine, G. and Thorson, T. (1973). History ofPolitica! Theory, Oxford: IBH Publishing Company. Ukwu 1. U, (2001). "Management of Executive-Legislative conflicts in governance", A paper presented at the workshop on Strategic Leadership Management, Port Harcourt, June, 2001 p.6