Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering: Why Machine Ethics Is a Wrong Approach
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Blame, What Is It Good For?
Blame, What is it Good For? Gordon Briggs1 Abstract— Blame is an vital social and cognitive mechanism [6] and reside in a much more ambiguous moral territory. that humans utilize in their interactions with other agents. In Additionally, it is not enough to be able to correctly reason this paper, we discuss how blame-reasoning mechanisms are about moral scenarios to ensure ethical or otherwise desirable needed to enable future social robots to: (1) appropriately adapt behavior in the context of repeated and/or long-term outcomes from human-robot interactions, the robot must interactions and relationships with other social agents; (2) avoid have other social competencies that support this reasoning behaviors that are perceived to be rude due to inappropriate mechanism. Deceptive interaction partners or incorrect per- and unintentional connotations of blame; and (3) avoid behav- ceptions/predictions about morally-charged scenarios may iors that could damage long-term, working relationships with lead even a perfect ethical-reasoner to make choices with other social agents. We also discuss how current computational models of blame and other relevant competencies (e.g. natural unethical outcomes [7]. What these challenges stress is the language generation) are currently insufficient to address these need to look beyond the ability to simply generate the proper concerns. Future work is necessary to increase the social answer to a moral dilemma in theory, and to consider the reasoning capabilities of artificially intelligent agents to achieve social mechanisms needed in practice. these goals. One such social mechanism that others have posited as I. INTRODUCTION being necessary to the construction of a artificial moral agent is blame [8]. -
Classification Schemas for Artificial Intelligence Failures
Journal XX (XXXX) XXXXXX https://doi.org/XXXX/XXXX Classification Schemas for Artificial Intelligence Failures Peter J. Scott1 and Roman V. Yampolskiy2 1 Next Wave Institute, USA 2 University of Louisville, Kentucky, USA [email protected], [email protected] Abstract In this paper we examine historical failures of artificial intelligence (AI) and propose a classification scheme for categorizing future failures. By doing so we hope that (a) the responses to future failures can be improved through applying a systematic classification that can be used to simplify the choice of response and (b) future failures can be reduced through augmenting development lifecycles with targeted risk assessments. Keywords: artificial intelligence, failure, AI safety, classification 1. Introduction Artificial intelligence (AI) is estimated to have a $4-6 trillion market value [1] and employ 22,000 PhD researchers [2]. It is estimated to create 133 million new roles by 2022 but to displace 75 million jobs in the same period [6]. Projections for the eventual impact of AI on humanity range from utopia (Kurzweil, 2005) (p.487) to extinction (Bostrom, 2005). In many respects AI development outpaces the efforts of prognosticators to predict its progress and is inherently unpredictable (Yampolskiy, 2019). Yet all AI development is (so far) undertaken by humans, and the field of software development is noteworthy for unreliability of delivering on promises: over two-thirds of companies are more likely than not to fail in their IT projects [4]. As much effort as has been put into the discipline of software safety, it still has far to go. Against this background of rampant failures we must evaluate the future of a technology that could evolve to human-like capabilities, usually known as artificial general intelligence (AGI). -
On How to Build a Moral Machine
On How to Build a Moral Machine Paul Bello [email protected] Human & Bioengineered Systems Division - Code 341, Office of Naval Research, 875 N. Randolph St., Arlington, VA 22203 USA Selmer Bringsjord [email protected] Depts. of Cognitive Science, Computer Science & the Lally School of Management, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180 USA Abstract Herein we make a plea to machine ethicists for the inclusion of constraints on their theories con- sistent with empirical data on human moral cognition. As philosophers, we clearly lack widely accepted solutions to issues regarding the existence of free will, the nature of persons and firm conditions on moral agency/patienthood; all of which are indispensable concepts to be deployed by any machine able to make moral judgments. No agreement seems forthcoming on these mat- ters, and we don’t hold out hope for machines that can both always do the right thing (on some general ethic) and produce explanations for its behavior that would be understandable to a human confederate. Our tentative solution involves understanding the folk concepts associated with our moral intuitions regarding these matters, and how they might be dependent upon the nature of hu- man cognitive architecture. It is in this spirit that we begin to explore the complexities inherent in human moral judgment via computational theories of the human cognitive architecture, rather than under the extreme constraints imposed by rational-actor models assumed throughout much of the literature on philosophical ethics. After discussing the various advantages and challenges of taking this particular perspective on the development of artificial moral agents, we computationally explore a case study of human intuitions about the self and causal responsibility. -
Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence
MIRI MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence Carl Shulman, Henrik Jonsson MIRI Visiting Fellows Nick Tarleton Carnegie Mellon University, MIRI Visiting Fellow Abstract Some researchers in the field of machine ethics have suggested consequentialist or util- itarian theories as organizing principles for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) (Wallach, Allen, and Smit 2008) that are ‘full ethical agents’ (Moor 2006), while acknowledging extensive variation among these theories as a serious challenge (Wallach, Allen, and Smit 2008). This paper develops that challenge, beginning with a partial taxonomy ofconse- quentialisms proposed by philosophical ethics. We discuss numerous ‘free variables’ of consequentialism where intuitions conflict about optimal values, and then consider spe- cial problems of human-level AMAs designed to implement a particular ethical theory, by comparison to human proponents of the same explicit principles. In conclusion, we suggest that if machine ethics is to fully succeed, it must draw upon the developing field of moral psychology. Shulman, Carl, Nick Tarleton, and Henrik Jonsson. 2009. “Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence.” In AP-CAP 2009: The Fifth Asia-Pacific Computing and Philosophy Conference, October 1st-2nd, University of Tokyo, Japan, Proceedings, edited by Carson Reynolds and Alvaro Cassinelli, 23–25. AP-CAP 2009. http://ia-cap.org/ap-cap09/proceedings.pdf. This version contains minor changes. Carl Shulman, Henrik Jonsson, Nick Tarleton 1. Free Variables of Consequentialism Suppose that the recommendations of a broadly utilitarian view depend on decisions about ten free binary variables, where we assign a probability of 80% to our favored option for each variable; in this case, if our probabilities are well-calibrated and our errors are not correlated across variables, then we will have only slightly more than a 10% chance of selecting the correct (in some meta-ethical framework) specification. -
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
David Gray Grant Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence Note to the reader: this syllabus is for an introductory undergraduate lecture course with no prerequisites. Course Description In this course, we will explore the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence. Could we build machines with minds like ours out of computer chips? Could we cheat death by uploading our minds to a computer server? Are we living in a software-based simulation? Should a driverless car kill one pedestrian to save five? Will artificial intelligence be the end of work (and if so, what should we do about it)? This course is also a general introduction to philosophical problems and methods. We will dis- cuss classic problems in several areas of philosophy, including philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In the process, you will learn how to engage with philosophical texts, analyze and construct arguments, investigate controversial questions in collaboration with others, and express your views with greater clarity and precision. Contact Information Instructor: David Gray Grant Email: [email protected] Office: 303 Emerson Hall Office hours: Mondays 3:00-5:00 and by appointment Assignments and Grading You must complete all required assignments in order to pass this course. Your grade will be determined as follows: • 10%: Participation • 25%: 4 short written assignments (300-600 words) • 20%: Paper 1 (1200-1500 words) • 25%: Paper 2 (1200-1500 words) • 20%: Final exam Assignments should be submitted in .docx or .pdf format (.docx is preferred), Times New Roman 12 point font, single-spaced. Submissions that exceed the word limits specified above (including footnotes) will not be accepted. -
On the Differences Between Human and Machine Intelligence
On the Differences between Human and Machine Intelligence Roman V. Yampolskiy Computer Science and Engineering, University of Louisville [email protected] Abstract [Legg and Hutter, 2007a]. However, widespread implicit as- Terms Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Hu- sumption of equivalence between capabilities of AGI and man-Level Artificial Intelligence (HLAI) have been HLAI appears to be unjustified, as humans are not general used interchangeably to refer to the Holy Grail of Ar- intelligences. In this paper, we will prove this distinction. tificial Intelligence (AI) research, creation of a ma- Others use slightly different nomenclature with respect to chine capable of achieving goals in a wide range of general intelligence, but arrive at similar conclusions. “Lo- environments. However, widespread implicit assump- cal generalization, or “robustness”: … “adaptation to tion of equivalence between capabilities of AGI and known unknowns within a single task or well-defined set of HLAI appears to be unjustified, as humans are not gen- tasks”. … Broad generalization, or “flexibility”: “adapta- eral intelligences. In this paper, we will prove this dis- tion to unknown unknowns across a broad category of re- tinction. lated tasks”. …Extreme generalization: human-centric ex- treme generalization, which is the specific case where the 1 Introduction1 scope considered is the space of tasks and domains that fit within the human experience. We … refer to “human-cen- Imagine that tomorrow a prominent technology company tric extreme generalization” as “generality”. Importantly, as announces that they have successfully created an Artificial we deliberately define generality here by using human cog- Intelligence (AI) and offers for you to test it out. -
Machine Learning Ethics in the Context of Justice Intuition
SHS Web of Conferences 69, 00150 (2019) https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20196900150 CILDIAH-2019 Machine Learning Ethics in the Context of Justice Intuition Natalia Mamedova1,*, Arkadiy Urintsov1, Nina Komleva1, Olga Staroverova1 and Boris Fedorov1 1Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, 36, Stremyanny lane, 117997, Moscow, Russia Abstract. The article considers the ethics of machine learning in connection with such categories of social philosophy as justice, conviction, value. The ethics of machine learning is presented as a special case of a mathematical model of a dilemma - whether it corresponds to the “learning” algorithm of the intuition of justice or not. It has been established that the use of machine learning for decision making has a prospect only within the limits of the intuition of justice field based on fair algorithms. It is proposed to determine the effectiveness of the decision, considering the ethical component and given ethical restrictions. The cyclical nature of the relationship between the algorithmic algorithms subprocesses in machine learning and the stages of conducting mining analysis projects using the CRISP methodology has been established. The value of ethical constraints for each of the algorithmic processes has been determined. The provisions of the Theory of System Restriction are applied to find a way to measure the effect of ethical restrictions on the “learning” algorithm 1 Introduction Accepting the freedom of thought is authentic intuition of justice of one individual in relation to The intuition of justice is regarded as a sincere, himself and others. But for artificial intelligence emotionally saturated belief in the justice of some (hereinafter - AI) freedom of thought is not supposed - position. -
Why Machine Ethics?
www.computer.org/intelligent Why Machine Ethics? Colin Allen, Indiana University Wendell Wallach, Yale University Iva Smit, E&E Consultants Vol. 21, No. 4 July/August 2006 This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. © 2006 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. For more information, please see www.ieee.org/portal/pages/about/documentation/copyright/polilink.html. Machine Ethics Why Machine Ethics? Colin Allen, Indiana University Wendell Wallach, Yale University Iva Smit, E&E Consultants runaway trolley is approaching a fork in the tracks. If the trolley runs on its cur- A rent track, it will kill a work crew of five. If the driver steers the train down the other branch, the trolley will kill a lone worker. If you were driving the trolley, what would you do? What would a computer or robot do? Trolley cases, first introduced by philosopher which decisions must be made? It’s easy to argue Philippa Foot in 19671 and a staple of introductory from a position of ignorance that such a goal is impos- Machine ethics isn’t ethics courses, have multiplied in the past four sible to achieve. -
APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Vol. 14, No. 2
NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association Philosophy and Computers SPRING 2015 VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 FROM THE GUEST EDITOR John P. Sullins NOTES FROM THE COMMUNITY ON PAT SUPPES ARTICLES Patrick Suppes Patrick Suppes Autobiography Luciano Floridi Singularitarians, AItheists, and Why the Problem with Artificial Intelligence is H.A.L. (Humanity At Large), not HAL Peter Boltuc First-Person Consciousness as Hardware D. E. Wittkower Social Media and the Organization Man Niklas Toivakainen The Moral Roots of Conceptual Confusion in Artificial Intelligence Research Xiaohong Wang, Jian Wang, Kun Zhao, and Chaolin Wang Increase or Decrease of Entropy: To Construct a More Universal Macroethics (A Discussion of Luciano Floridi’s The Ethics of Information) VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 SPRING 2015 © 2015 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Philosophy and Computers JOHN P. SULLINS, GUEST EDITOR VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 | SPRING 2015 but here we wish to celebrate his accomplishments in the FROM THE GUEST EDITOR fields of philosophy and computing one last time. John P. Sullins To accomplish that goal I have compiled some interesting SONOMA STATE UNIVERSITY pieces from an autobiography that Pat wrote some years ago but that he added to a bit for an event held in his honor November 17, 2014, marked the end of an inspiring at Stanford. In this document he explains his motivations career. On that day Patrick Suppes died quietly at the and accomplishments in various fields of study that are age of ninety-two in his house on the Stanford Campus, of interest to our community. In that section you will see which had been his home both physically and intellectually just how ambitious Pat was in the world of computer since 1950. -
AI and You Transcript Guest: Roman Yampolskiy Episode 16 First Aired: Monday, October 5, 2020
AI and You Transcript Guest: Roman Yampolskiy Episode 16 First Aired: Monday, October 5, 2020 Hi, welcome to episode 16. Today we have a feast, because I am talking with Dr. Roman Yampolskiy, a legend within the AI community. He is a tenured associate professor in the department of Computer Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Louisville in Kentucky where he is the director of Cyber Security. Look up his home page and Wikipedia entry because he has qualifications too numerous to detail here. Some of those include that he is also a Visiting Fellow at the Singularity Institute, he was also one of the scientists at the Asilomar conference on the future of AI, and the author of over 100 publications, including the book Artificial Superintelligence: A Futuristic Approach, which I would strongly recommend, and many peer-reviewed papers, including one coauthored with yours truly. Most of them are on the subject of AI Safety. In this episode we will talk mostly about a recent paper of his, a table-thumping 73 pages titled “On Controllability of Artificial Intelligence,” which you may recognize is talking about what we call the Control Problem. That’s the most fundamental problem in the whole study of the long-term impact of AI, and Roman explains it very well in this episode. If you’re looking at the possible future of artificial intelligence having serious negative as well as positive consequences for everyone, which is a concept that’s gotten a lot of popularization in the last few years, of course, and you’re finding computer professionals pooh-poohing that idea because AI right now requires a great deal of specialized effort on their part to do even narrow tasks, and the idea of it becoming an existential threat is just too sensationalist, the product of watching too many Terminator movies, then pay attention to Roman, because he has impeccable computer science credentials and yet does not shy away from exploring fundamental threats of AI. -
The Age of Artificial Intelligence an Exploration
THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AN EXPLORATION Edited by Steven S. Gouveia University of Minho, Portugal Cognitive Science and Psychology Copyright © 2020 by the Authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Vernon Art and Science Inc. www.vernonpress.com In the Americas: In the rest of the world: Vernon Press Vernon Press 1000 N West Street, C/Sancti Espiritu 17, Suite 1200, Wilmington, Malaga, 29006 Delaware 19801 Spain United States Cognitive Science and Psychology Library of Congress Control Number: 2020931461 ISBN: 978-1-62273-872-4 Product and company names mentioned in this work are the trademarks of their respective owners. While every care has been taken in preparing this work, neither the authors nor Vernon Art and Science Inc. may be held responsible for any loss or damage caused or alleged to be caused directly or indirectly by the information contained in it. Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition. Cover design by Vernon Press using elements designed by FreePik. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ACRONYMS vii LIST OF FIGURES xi LIST OF TABLES xiii INTRODUCTION xv SECTION I: INTELLIGENCE IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 CHAPTER 1 TOWARDS THE MATHEMATICS OF INTELLIGENCE 3 Soenke Ziesche Maldives National University, Maldives Roman V. Yampolskiy University of Louisville, USA CHAPTER 2 MINDS , BRAINS AND TURING 15 Stevan Harnad Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada; University of Southampton, UK CHAPTER 3 THE AGE OF POST -INTELLIGENT DESIGN 27 Daniel C. -
Leakproofing the Singularity Artificial Intelligence Confinement Problem
Roman V.Yampolskiy Leakproofing the Singularity Artificial Intelligence Confinement Problem Abstract: This paper attempts to formalize and to address the ‘leakproofing’ of the Singularity problem presented by David Chalmers. The paper begins with the definition of the Artificial Intelli- gence Confinement Problem. After analysis of existing solutions and their shortcomings, a protocol is proposed aimed at making a more secure confinement environment which might delay potential negative effect from the technological singularity while allowing humanity to benefit from the superintelligence. Keywords: AI-Box, AI Confinement Problem, Hazardous Intelligent Software, Leakproof Singularity, Oracle AI. ‘I am the slave of the lamp’ Genie from Aladdin 1. Introduction With the likely development of superintelligent programs in the near future, many scientists have raised the issue of safety as it relates to such technology (Yudkowsky, 2008; Bostrom, 2006; Hibbard, 2005; Chalmers, 2010; Hall, 2000). A common theme in Artificial Intelli- gence (AI)1 safety research is the possibility of keeping a super- intelligent agent in a sealed hardware so as to prevent it from doing any harm to humankind. Such ideas originate with scientific Correspondence: Roman V. Yampolskiy, Department of Computer Engineering and Computer Sci- ence University of Louisville. Email: [email protected] [1] In this paper the term AI is used to represent superintelligence. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, No. 1–2, 2012, pp. 194–214 Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011 For personal use only -- not for reproduction LEAKPROOFING THE SINGULARITY 195 visionaries such as Eric Drexler, who has suggested confining transhuman machines so that their outputs could be studied and used safely (Drexler, 1986).