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Appendix a — Explanations of Investment Risk Factors

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Appendix a — Explanations of Investment Risk Factors Authorized Participant (as defined in the Creations and APPENDIX A — EXPLANATIONS Redemptions section of the Fund’s prospectus (the OF INVESTMENT RISK FACTORS “Prospectus”)) may engage in creation or redemption The information provided below is a summary of the main transactions directly with the Fund. The Fund has a limited risks of the Underlying Investments. Each Underlying number of institutions that may act as Authorized Participants Investments published “at Max Load statement of additional on an agency basis (i.e., on behalf of other market information contains information not summarized here and participants). To the extent that Authorized Participants exit identify each additional principal risks to which the respective the business or are unable to proceed with creation and/or Underlying Investment may be subject. redemption orders with respect to the Fund and no other Authorized Participant is able to step forward to create or redeem Creation Units (as defined in the Purchase and Sale of Ameritas Investment Risks The Plan allocates assets invested in the Principal Protected Fund Shares section of the Prospectus), Fund shares may be Portfolio to a Funding Agreement issued by Ameritas Life to more likely to trade at a premium or discount to NAV and the Trust. possibly face trading halts and/or delisting. The Funding Agreement is a general obligation of Ameritas Call Risk. During periods of falling interest rates, an issuer of Life to the Trust. All deposits made by the Trust through the a callable bond held by the Fund may “call” or repay the Funding agreement are deposited into the general account of security before its stated maturity, and the Fund may have to Ameritas Life and not into any separate account insulated from reinvest the proceeds at lower interest rates, resulting in a the claims of creditors. As such, the guaranty provided by the decline in the Fund’s income. Funding Agreement is based on Ameritas’ ability to meet its obligations under the Funding Agreement. Furthermore, the Cash Transactions Risk. The Fund expects to effect all of its Funding Agreement provides the guarantee described herein to creations and redemptions for cash, rather than in-kind the Trust for the benefit of the Participants who have selected securities. As a result, the Fund may have to sell portfolio this Option, but the guarantee is not made directly to securities at inopportune times in order to obtain the cash Participants or Beneficiaries. needed to meet redemption orders. This may cause the Fund to sell a security and recognize a capital gain or loss that might No financial information on Ameritas Life is provided in this not have been incurred if it had made redemption in-kind. The disclosure document but its Annual Statement is on file with use of cash creations and redemptions may also cause the the Nebraska Department of Insurance and is available on the Fund’s shares to trade in the market at greater bid-ask spreads internet at www.ameritas.com. There is a risk that Ameritas or greater premiums or discounts to the Fund’s NAV. Life could fail to perform its obligations under the Funding Agreement for financial or other reasons. Concentration Risk. The Fund may be susceptible to an increased risk of loss, including losses due to adverse events that affect the Fund’s investments more than the market as a BlackRock (iShares) Investment Risks whole, to the extent that the Fund’s investments are As with any investment, you could lose all or part of your concentrated in the securities of a particular issuer or issuers, investment in the Funds, and the performance of the Funds country, group of countries, region, market, industry, group of could trail that of other investments. The Funds are subject to industries, sector or asset class. certain risks, including the principal risks noted below, any of which may adversely affect the Funds’ net asset value per Consumer Discretionary Sector Risk. The consumer share (“NAV”), trading price, yield, total return and ability to discretionary sector may be affected by changes in domestic meet its investment objective. and international economies, exchange and interest rates, competition, consumers’ disposable income, consumer Asset Class Risk. Securities and other assets in the preferences, social trends and marketing campaigns. Underlying Index or in the Fund’s portfolio may underperform in comparison to the general financial markets, a particular Credit Risk. Debt issuers and other counterparties may not financial market or other asset classes. honor their obligations or may have their debt downgraded by ratings agencies. Assets Under Management (AUM) Risk. From time to time an authorized participant, a third party investor, the Fund’s Currency Hedging Risk. When a derivative is used as a adviser or another affiliate of the Fund’s adviser or the Fund hedge against a position that the Fund holds, any loss may invest in the Fund and hold its investment for a specific generated by the derivative generally should be substantially period of time in order to facilitate commencement of the offset by gains on the hedged investment, and vice versa. Fund’s operations or for the Fund to achieve size or scale. While hedging can reduce or eliminate losses, it can also There can be no assurance that any such entity would not reduce or eliminate gains. Hedges are sometimes subject to redeem its investment or that the size of the Fund would be imperfect matching between the derivative and its reference maintained at such levels which could negatively impact the asset, and there can be no assurance that the Fund’s hedging Fund. transactions will be effective. In seeking to track the performance of the Underlying Index, the Fund will attempt to Authorized Participant Concentration Risk. Only an hedge the currency exposure of non-U.S. dollar denominated A-1 securities held in its portfolio by investing in foreign currency losses regardless of the length of time they intend to hold Fund forward contracts, which may include both physically-settled shares forward contracts and NDFs. NDFs may be less liquid than deliverable forward currency contracts. A lack of liquidity in Custody Risk. Less developed securities markets are more NDFs of the hedged currency could result in the Fund being likely to experience problems with the clearing and settling of unable to structure its hedging transactions as intended. In trades, as well as the holding of securities by local banks, addition, BFA may seek to limit the size of the Fund in order agents and depositories. to attempt to reduce the likelihood of a situation where the Fund is unable to obtain sufficient liquidity in an underlying Cyber Security Risk. Failures or breaches of the electronic currency hedge to implement its investment objective. Foreign systems of the Fund, the Fund’s adviser, and the Fund’s other currency forward contracts, including NDFs, do not eliminate service providers, market makers, Authorized Participants or movements in the value of non-U.S. currencies and securities the issuers of securities in which the Fund invests have the but rather allow the Fund to establish a fixed rate of exchange ability to cause disruptions and negatively impact the Fund’s for a future point in time. Exchange rates may be volatile and business operations, potentially resulting in financial losses to may change quickly and unpredictably in response to both the Fund and its shareholders. While the Fund has established global economic developments and economic conditions in a business continuity plans and risk management systems geographic region in which the Fund invests. In addition, the seeking to address system breaches or failures, there are Fund’s exposure to the component currencies may not be fully inherent limitations in such plans and systems. Furthermore, hedged at all times. At certain times, the Fund may use an the Fund cannot control the cyber security plans and systems optimized hedging strategy and will hedge a smaller number of the Fund’s service providers, the Index Provider, market of component currencies to reduce hedging costs. In addition, makers, Authorized Participants or issuers of securities in because the Fund’s currency hedge is reset on a monthly basis, which the Fund invests. currency risk can develop or increase intra-month. Furthermore, while the Fund is designed to hedge against Derivatives Risk. The Fund will use currency forwards and currency fluctuations, it is possible that a degree of currency NDFs to hedge the currency exposure resulting from exposure may remain even at the time a hedging transaction is investments in the foreign currency denominated securities implemented. As a result, the Fund may not be able to held by the Fund. The Fund’s use of these instruments, like structure its hedging transactions as anticipated or its hedging investments in other derivatives, may reduce the Fund’s transactions may not successfully reduce the currency risk returns, increase volatility and/or result in losses due to credit included in the Fund’s portfolio. The effectiveness of the risk or ineffective hedging strategies. Volatility is defined as Fund’s currency hedging strategy will in general be affected the characteristic of a security, a currency, an index or a by the volatility of both the Underlying Index and the market, to fluctuate significantly in price within a defined time volatility of the U.S. dollar relative to the currencies to be period. Currency forwards, like other derivatives, are also hedged, measured on an aggregate basis. Increased volatility subject to counterparty risk, which is the risk that the other in either or both the Underlying Index and the U.S. dollar party in the transaction will not fulfill its contractual relative to the currencies to be hedged will generally reduce obligation.
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