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Philosophical Skepticism and the Coherence of Our Epistemic Practices

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Philosophical Skepticism and the Coherence of Our Epistemic Practices Membership Matters. This publication is paid for in part by dues-paying members of the Indiana University Alumni Association. Volume XXI College of Arts & Sciences Alumni Association Fall 2006 Philosophical skepticism and the From the chair coherence of our epistemic practices Transitions s I type this article, do I know that [Editor’s note: Tim O’Connor has there is a table before me? Com- just begun a term as chair of the IU Amon sense declares that I do, but Department of Philosophy. He suc- philosophical reflection can quickly lead to ceeds Mark Kaplan.] the conclusion that common sense is incor- The face of philosophy at IU rect: no one can know or reasonably believe continues to undergo a period of anything about the world around us. This major transition. My colleagues prob- is the problem of philosophical skepticism. ably stumbled a bit in drafting me It is a kind of paradox. The arguments that to a three-year term as department generate it are not silly or easily refuted. chair, beginning this past summer. But they challenge the most basic aspiration But on the bright side, IU scored a of our intellectual lives. major coup by luring Gary Ebbs away In my recent work, I’ve tried to put from Illinois. (Gary is a specialist in skepticism to rest by reflecting on our philosophy of language and logic and ordinary ways of justifying and evaluating in epistemology.) Gary surrendered beliefs about the world. This is a neglected to the inevitable after we had already approach. Philosophers have tradition- hired away his colleagues Marcia ally created elaborate a priori theories to Baron, Fred Schmitt, Kate Abramson Margaret R. Clark safeguard the possibility of knowledge. and then snatched up two stellar phi- (Descartes, for instance, attempted to prove Professor Adam Leite studies the reality of the department’s mail boxes. losophers that God’s existence and benevolence in order to Illinois had underwrite our entitlement to rely on our the extent to which these claims are correct, tried to hire as so-called “clear and distinct perceptions.”) we can gain insight into the relationship replacements, Such approaches aspire to stand outside our between traditional epistemology and our Mark Kaplan ordinary lives and provide them with an ordinary lives, an issue that should trouble and Joan external, philosophical underpinning: a “first philosophers more than it generally does. Weiner. I know philosophy.” By contrast, a mid–20th-cen- It is tempting to think that knowledge this might tury tradition including G.E. Moore, J.L. requires evidence that “rules out” all pos- look bad, even Austin, the later Wittgenstein, and W.V.O. sibilities of error. (If you recognize you cruel, but we Tim O’Connor Quine proposed another route: to overcome could be in error, the thought goes, how didn’t set out philosophical skepticism from within our can you also claim to have knowledge?) to empty their ranks (honestly). And ordinary epistemic practices. This approach This thought gives rise to one standard it certainly had nothing to do with has been neglected in recent years. I aim to argument for skepticism: we can never payback for all their comparative suc- put it back on the mainstream agenda. attain infallible evidence, so we can’t ever cess in basketball in recent years, as I suggest that we should confront the have knowledge. An easy response to this some have alleged. Still, it’s probably arguments for skepticism in exactly the way argument is that we do not insist upon best for IU philosophy alumni to keep we would confront any other surprising completely infallible evidence in ordinary a low profile these days when visiting claim, by asking, “Why — if at all — should life or in science. It is often suggested that Urbana’s flat fine campus. I believe this?” Starting from where we this does not defeat the skeptic’s argument To understand the emerging face are, I ask, “Can I reasonably be brought to because our ordinary ways of talking about of IU philosophy, take a gander at think that I cannot know or even reason- knowledge are misleading: they are shaped our remodeled department Web ably believe that there is a table before me by the practical demands of everyday life, site: www.indiana.edu/~phil/. We now?” I believe that the answer is, “No. You and so we don’t recognize that knowledge have coverage in all major areas of can’t get there from here.” What’s more, I requires infallibility until philosophical the discipline while boasting notable believe that we cannot generate a reason- reflection leads us to ignore our everyday strengths in epistemology, early able demand for independent validation of concerns. However, this view of our ordi- analytic philosophy, ethics, and the our practices from within the framework of nary lives is wrong, as I’ve argued in “Is (continued on back page) our ordinary epistemic lives. By exploring (continued on page 2) Skepticism (continued from page 1) Faculty update: Nino Cocchiarella Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcom- n November 2005, Professor Emeritus Nino B. Cocchiarella delivered a paper, ing?” (2004). We are, consequently, free I“Infinity in Ontology and Mind,” at an international interdisciplinary conference to insist, in accordance with our ordinary on infinity at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome, Italy. The conference was practices, that the fallibility of our evidence supported in part by the John Tempelton Foundation for a multiple-year project on does not prevent us from having knowl- Science, Theology and the Ontological Quest. Cocchiarella had also given an inten- edge. We thus have good reason to reject sive course in the previous year at the Lateran University on formal ontology under this skeptical argument. the STOQ project, and his paper was an extension of that course. A second skeptical argument, known After the conference on infinity in Rome, Cocchiarella delivered a lecture on as the “problem of the regress,” runs as potential infinity at the classical liceo in Benevento, the capital of the province of follows. To be justified, you must be able Benevento, Italy. In the previous year, Cocchiarella had been presented with a to provide a good reason for your belief, Gladiatore D’Oro (Golden Gladiator) award as a distinguished sanniti for his work a good reason for believing that reason, in logic, formal ontology, and philosophy. The sanniti are a people who have lived in and so on. But then it seems that you can the south-central part of Italy, called the Sannio, for the past 3,000 years. never justify any belief. To refuse to provide Cocchiarella has completed a forthcoming book, Formal Ontology and Conceptual reasons at any point would be arbitrary and Realism, based on his lectures in Rome. Also forthcoming by Cocchiarella, together dogmatic. To repeat yourself is to argue in a with Max Freund — who wrote his PhD thesis under Cocchiarella here at IU and circle. And, of course, you can’t offer an in- who is now a professor at the University of Costa Rica — is a textbook, Modal Logic: finite series of reasons for your beliefs. In “A An Introduction to its Syntax and Semantics, based on Cocchiarella’s lectures on Localist Solution to the Regress of Justifica- modal logic here at IU and covers his work on second-order modal logic, both pos- tion” (2005), I develop a new response to sibilist and actualist, as well as standard sentential and first-order modal logic. this puzzle. I draw on our actual practices to show that no vicious regress results from ac- cepting (1) that in order to be justified, you tech age, that you are being subjected to there from here.” We will have inoculated have to be able to provide a good reason for deceptive sensory stimulations by a crazed ourselves from the threat of skepticism. your belief, and (2) that you must be justi- neuroscientist). It seems that you can’t know For more details about my current and fied in believing whatever you might offer or reasonably believe that there is a piece of upcoming projects, as well as copies of as your reason. To be justified, I propose, paper before you unless you have reason to the papers referred to in this article, see is to possess a certain ability: the ability believe that these possibilities are not the my Web page — http://mypage.iu.edu/ to draw upon your background beliefs to case. But it also seems that you can’t know %7Ealeite/. Whatever you do for a living, provide good reasons for holding the belief that you aren’t being deceived in these ways! happy philosophizing! in question, ultimately by providing reasons Any evidence you might appeal to could — Adam Leite that you recognize there to be no reason to itself be the product of a dream or of the Associate Professor of Philosophy doubt. This is an ability that we can possess. neuroscientist’s machinations. So it seems Even if all this right, you might still that there is nothing you could appeal to in feel dissatisfied. You might also want an support of the belief that you aren’t being independent or external validation of our deceived. It consequently seems that you practices, an argument that shows how and can’t know or reasonably believe anything why they enable us to arrive at knowledge. about the world around you. But that can’t This newsletter is published by the Indiana University Alumni Association, This demand can take several forms. One be right. What has gone wrong? in cooperation with the Department of prominent form is the attempt (initiated One common response is to say that you Philosophy and the College of Arts and by Descartes’ Meditations) to explain our can know there is a piece of paper before Sciences Alumni Association, to encourage knowledge of the world without presuppos- you even if you don’t have any reason to alumni interest in and support for Indiana ing any claims about the world.
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