Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

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Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy

1988

Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Willem A. deVries University of New Hampshire, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988)

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HEGEL'S THEORY OF MENTAL ACTIVITY

An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit

WlLLEM A. DEVRIES

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

All rights reserved. Excep brier tfo f quotation reviewa n si , this book, or parts thereof ,reproduce e musb t fortno y man dn withoui t permissio writinn i g fro publishere mth informationr Fo . , address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 198 Cornely 8b l University Press.

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Contents

Preface xi A Texte Notth n se o xvii Structure Th Subjectivf eo e Spirit xxi

1 Science, Teleology, and Interpretation i Physicalism and Causalism i Our Relationship to Nature 4 Approacheo Tw Naturo st 4 e Objective Purpose 7 Universal Purpose 10 The Need for Philosophy 13

2 Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 18 Philosophical Psychology: Hegel's Predecessor8 1 s Against Rational Psychology 19 Against Empiricist Psychology 22 Philosophical Psychology: Hegel's Methodology 24 From Soul to Spirit 25 Subjective Spirit 26 Philosophy and Psychology 28 The Philosoph Spirif yo 1 3 t

3 Nature and Spirit 33 Metaphysic Structure th Sciencee d th san f eo 3 3 s The Languages of Nature and Spirit 35 Hegel as a Weak Monist 41 viii Contents

Distinguishing Nature and Spirit 46 Externality and Self-determination 46 The Nature of Spirit 49

3 5 4 Sensation: Mind's Material Sentien e Nonsentiene th Th d tan 4 5 t The Nature of the Animal Organism 55 The Sentient Organis6 5 m Objece Th Sensatiof o t 0 6 n Inne Outed ran r Sens1 6 e Mediat Immediatd ean e Object Sensf so 3 6 e Sensation as Noncognitive 67

1 7 5 Feeling The Role of Feeling 72 Feeling and the Self 74 The Soul's Relatio Realito nt 8 7 y The Liberation of the Soul 84

6 Phenomenology: The I Emerges 87 Consciousnes9 8 I e th d san Does "I" Refer? 90 Th2 9 e Sens" "I f eo The Reference of "I" 97 Thinkine Th g Subjec9 9 t Universality and Self-relation 99 Thinking as a Subject 104

7 Intuition 108 The Role of Intuition in the Psychology 108 Attention, Space, and Time 111 Intuition Proper 116

8 Representation and Recollection 119 Role Representatiof Th eo 9 11 n Recollection 125

9 Imagination: Universality and Signification 135 Associative or Reproductive Imagination 135 Symbolic Imagination 141 Sign-making Imagination 143 x i Contents

10 Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 149 Significatio Languagd nan e 149 The Stages of Memory 153 Recollective Memory 153 Reproductive Memor4 15 y Mechanical Memory 157

11 Representing versus Thinking 164 Traditional Accounts of Thought 164 The Classical and Symbolist Theories of Mind 164 Problems with Symbolism 167 Problems with the Classical Theory 169 Problems with Representationalis0 17 m Hegel's Respons Traditione th o et 1 17 s Active Th e Concrete Universa1 17 l Rejectioe Th Inspectivisf no 4 17 m

12 Thought 176 Immediace Th Thoughf yo 6 17 t Nature Th Thoughf eo 8 17 t The Formal Structure of Thought 179 Concepts 179 Judgment0 18 s Inferences 190 Nature Th Thinkinf eo g Activit5 19 y Transitioe Th Practicao nt l Spiri8 19 t Conclusion 200

3 20 References 7 20 Index

Preface

I have high hopes for this book. First, it should fill a conspicuous Hegee th n i l literaturep ga Philosophye th r fo , of Subjective Spirit is— unjustly—second e Philosophyonlth o yt of Naturee lacth f k o n i attentio receivest ni . The book should also helmort bi pa e sti p interesru Hegen ti n li Anglo-American philosophical circles, wher e philosopheth f yo mind is currently one of the most active and exciting fields. It is in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit that Hegel confronts the questions abou nature tth humaf eo n understandin thoughd gan centrao ts o lt the British tradition after Locke. I think I show here that Hegel's appreciation of the complexity of our minds and the peculiarities of our discourse about them is quite sophisticated—more so than that of his major contemporary rivals. My own philosophical language is that of the Anglo-American tradition, but few of my comrades have devoted enough time to Hegel's works to appreciate him. There is surely no excuse for Hegel's writing style; it is simply abominable. But the stylistic diffi- cultie Aristotle'f so s Metaphysics Wittgenstein'r o s Tractatus havt eno prevented them from being read carefully and often. Hegel's technical language cannot be the only way to express his insights, so I have trie mako dt e Hegel speak Anglo-American "An y hersa I -e( glo-American" rather than "English" because I am not just translat- ing intnativy om e language) doubo N .efforty m t s will distress many readers, both becaus ehavI e made Hege Anglo-Amerio lto - i xi Preface

becausd an n thoroughlehavI b ca t donjo eno e eth y enoughf I . opinion on this matter is roughly split, I will be content. Third, I hope that the book is controversial. A fight has been brewing among Hegel scholars, one that has been kept relatively quiet because the field is small. It is not quite.the old battle between left and right Hegelians, which centered on religious and social (thougw ne issues a ht relatedbu , ) battle centere correce th n do t Hegelian treatment of the empirical sciences. Everyone has to admit that Hegel paid close attentio empiricae th o nt l sciences dise -Th . agreement is over whether philosophy itself emerges out of them and depend then so msomn i e real sense (this woulpositioe th e db n of the Hegelian left, I suppose) or comes to the empirical sciences from outside, with a fund of knowledge both independent of and superio empiricae thao th r t f to l sciences (the positio right)e th f no . Neither extreme position is correct (of course), but on the whole readers will find this book constantly straining towar lefte dth , despit mane eth y right-wing pronouncement f Hegeso l himself. The Hegelian systeequalle b n mca y consistently developed toward the left—and it is so much more vital and interesting when it is. Thus sreaa I n d Hegema greaa w s sa la to naturalistwh e on s a , continuoud an arisinf o t gou s with natur capabld ean f beineo g understood only in this natural context. He was certainly not a total naturalist, but no ultimate break is to be found between nature and spiri Hegel'n i t s system s dislikhi f n absolutI o e. e dichotomies Hegel share importann sa tmos e traim to t (t congenialwit s hhi ) successors, the pragmatists. I must point out right away that this is not a book about the Phenomenology of Spirit. There are plenty of those (new ones, too) already havI . e focused almost exclusivel Hegel'n yo s mature sys- founs s Encyclopediai t hi i s n di a m te Philosophicale oth f Sciences. This work, supplemente lecturs hi y db e notes, constitute consideres shi d finad an l opinion philosophe th n si mindf yo earl e .Th y Phenomenol- ogy, as fascinating as it is, is by Hegel's own admission a "peculiar early work." In particular, as even a cursory glance shows, it lacks precisely those systeparte th f smo whic mose har t important foe rth philosophy of mind, the Anthropology and the Psychology. The attention lavished on the early Phenomenology has probably been the major reaso Philosophye nth of Subjective Spirit bees ha n slightedt I . woul ease db thin yo t k tha earle tth y Phenomenology, likgreatee eth r Preface xiii

Logic, contain fule sth l versio f somethinno g tha Encyclopediae th t has only in outline. I think such a view is simply wrong; Hegel did a great deal of rethinking while he was in Nurnberg, but I cannot argue that point here. I hope that this book will spur a greater interest in the relation between the early Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia. more On e wor cautionf do havI . e often used material froe mth Zusatze Encyclopedia,e th n i additione th s base Hegel'n s do hi d san students' lecture notes inserte clarificators da y materia Hegel'y lb s posthumous editors. Because this material doe t alwaysno s stem directly from Hegel's han becausd dan e originasome th f eo l sources have disappeare cannod dan checkede tb Zusatzee ,th arouse suspi- cion among many Hegel scholars, especially now that, thanks to the editors of the new critical edition of the corpus, we are finally becoming accustomed to reliable texts. In the case of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, however, wher completo en e collateral texte sar available wherd ,an Zusatze e eth compris bule e th wha f ko t material we have, using these notes is almost unavoidable if the interpretatio goins ni hav o great y e lan bones s meait thinn o to T . k thae th t Encyclopedia could be interpreted adequately without the Zusatze is simpl ignoro yt face eth t thar backgrounou t d understandinf go Hegel and his project—a background on which any further or new interpretation must draw—has already been deeply affected by the Zusatze, which have bee ncorpue parth f o ts since Hegel's death. Our understandin Hegef go alreads ha l y been influence thiy db s material; we probably cannot extirpate its influence, so it is best to make it explicit. Sufficient amounts of the annotation can be traced to independent sources (especially the Kehler and Griesheim manuscripts attespedigreeo s )t it o t . Judiciou thif o se materiasus l is possible, justifiable, and certainly helpful. I have been careful, though, to indicate whenever a quotation comes from a Zusatz. The first chapter of the book is an account of Hegel's most important systematic commitments tha philosophe t beath n ro mindf yo . quits Ii t e genera should lan d held pha oriens readee ha th to rwh little contact with Hegel's texts secone Th . d chapter narrowe sth view to Hegel's philosophy of mind, emphasizing its relations to its well-known predecessors. Again familiarito n , y with Hegel's texts should be necessary. In the opening chapters I have sought to avoid "front-loading booe "th k with explanation Hegeliaf so n terminol- xiv Preface

ogy. People very familiar with Hegel will find frustratingt thabi ta , for the usee y ar discussin o dt g Hege Hegel'n li s terms onln ca y I . ask that such readers bear wit . Severahme l non-Hegelian readers have tolthae dm t these chapter gettinf gooo a b o sd jo g Hegel across precisel terminologe y th becaus t firsge y o tr t tt e ytheno o yd acros onld san y position e lateth filo n rt i l . In the third chapter the view widens again temporarily in order to make the Hegelian distinction between Nature and Spirit clearer. I argue that this distinction is not an absolute dichotomy, that there is a vague gray area betwee polao tw r e conceptsnth als.I o proposn ea interpretation of the relation between the natural (bodily) and spiritual (mental) aspect of a person that, if correct, shows Hegel's sophisticatio philosophera s na . Althoug detaileo hn d knowledgf eo Hegel's text requires si thin di s chapter, withou generaa t l familiarity wit systee hth largee mth r pictur tryinm a e I mak go t e sensf eo will not be clear. Fro fourte mth h chapte thice th Hegel'f kro n i onwar e ar s e dw philosoph mindf yo thit .A s point real textual exegesi unavoids si - able. I have cited much of the relevant material, which is often quite skimpy, sinc Encyclopediae eth onls i outlinn ysystema e th f ed o ,an have trie mako dt essentiae eth l point cleas sa possibls ra y m n ei interpretations. The order of the chapters basically follows Hegel's own ordering of the topics: sensation, feeling/ the I, intuition, the varieties of representation, and, finally, thought. Chapter 6, on the , serveI timela s sa y centerpiece, recapitulatin previoue gth s chap- terforeshadowind san g what follows distince . th Chapte n o - , r11 tion between representation and thought, sets off the last chapter, thinkingn o showiny b , thiw sgho most Hegelian par Hegel'f o t s system relate long-standinga o st , fundamental disagreemene th n ti philosoph mindf yo realls i t ;i y onl thit ya s point tha fule tth l scope of Hegel's philosophy of mind comes into view. In many ways this book is only an introduction to Hegel's philosoph f mindy o issue e Th extremele . sar y complex; questionf so textual interpretation are very thorny. But work on this important part of Hegel's system has to begin somewhere; the reading of his philosophy offered here will have served well ipromptt fi s otherso t challenge it, rebut it, and dig still deeper into Hegel's philosophy of mind. Preface xv

As I near the end of this project, I realize humbly how much help I have received havI . e been fortunat havo et e been generously sup- Germaportee th y db n Fulbright Commission; without their support I could not have attempted to write about Hegel. Chapter 6 was written while I attended an NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers give t Cornelna l Universit Sidney yb y Shoemakerm a I ; grateful to everyone involved, especially Professor Shoemaker. Amherst College provided fund researcr fo s h expensese th d an , final revision manuscripe th f so t were undertaken whil eenjoyeI d an Andrew W. Mellon Faculty Fellowship at Harvard University. Though financia thir fo s projectln supporno sina a e s eth ,qu twa peopl helpeo e werwh e d lifebloodm s eit . Starting wit wory hm n ko Hegel in graduate school at the University of Pittsburgh, a setting t knowno cultivatinr nfo g Hegel scholars havI , e received helpful advice and searching criticism from Wilfrid Sellars, Paul Guyer, Annette Baier, and Nicholas Rescher. The time I spent at the Hegel Archive of the Ruhr University in Bochum was crucial to this enter- beholdem a prise I d Walte,no an t r Jaeschke, Hans-Christian Lucas, Kurt Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Manfred Baum, Wolfgang Bon- siepen, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, and Klaus Diising for their assistance speciaA . l worFrao t f thanke udo Exnerdu s o si wh , /made extra efforts to make both research and life in Germany easier. y formeM I r colleague t Amhersa s t College were sometimes amuse interesy m y dHegeb n ti t alwaylbu s supportive; Willia. mE Kennick, however, went beyond the call of duty to read and com- e entirmenth n eo t manuscrip earlien a n i t r draft s constanHi . t encouragemen vers ytwa importan Contact. me o tt s amon gsmala l but growing group of "young Hegelians" also provided needed comment and support. Harold Kincaid, Crawford Elder, R. C. Sol- omon d Kennetan , h Westpha l deserval l thanksy em . Michael Hardimon is another brave soul who dared a large chunk of the manuscript and thereby made it better. My final scholarly thanks also go well beyond the scholarly. The philosophical discussion grou pparticipateI yeare x th si r n si fo dn i Pioneer Valley infamoue th , s Prepositional Attitudes Task Force, has been a constant source of philosophical and personal support. What philosoph minf ythemo o t thankdy knoI e M . d ow w I san more to the PATF and the visitors who have joined us: Murray xvi Preface

Kiteley, John Connelly, Thomas Tymoczko, Janice Moulton, Thomas Wartenburg, Meredith Michaels, Lee Bowie, Herbert Heidelberger, Bruce Aune, William Lycan, Lynne Baker, Christo- pher Witherspoon, Steven Weislerextrn a ad thankan y , Ja o t s Garfield, a colleague in graduate school and in the Valley, perhaps the closest member of my philosophical family. An honorary mem- PATMelloe a th d f Fo an nr fellobe Harvardt wa , Daniel Lloyds ,ha endure entire dth e manuscrip becomt ye d closetan a e friend spenI . t a wonderful year at Tufts University while the manuscript was being turned int obooka likd thanI' .o et colleaguey km s theres a , studeny welm s la t Daniel Mullen scoureo ,wh d page proofs . forme Cornell University Pres bees sha npleasura woro et k witht A . every tur prese nproveth s sha d itself efficien graciousd an t coul;I d havt no e dreame moref do thank y .M Joho st n Ackerman, Barbara Salazar, Joh othere n hav th o Thomasl wh seal madd an , e this manuscript int obooka . gratefum a I Kluweo t l r Academic Publisher permissior sfo o nt quote from M. J. Petry's translation of The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (copyrigh 197© t 8 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Holland) Idealistico t d ,an Studies permissior fo segmente us no t f so my article "Hege Representation o l Thought,d nan " publishen di vol. 15 (May 1987). Finally thano ,t family—boty km greatese hth t inspiratios (a d nan wl knoweal greatese th ) t impedimen work—seemo t t s fatuous: presume on n thanca o e t w raisoka ho n d'etre wifey ?M , Dianne, uncanne th s ha y abilit mako yt write em e clearer, better prose, even thoug claime hsh understano st d Hegel neither befor r aftereno - ward. My respect for her intellect and my reliance on her love have never stopped growing. I hope my children look at the book some- t surno ewisI daym a hI ; familythay I resm e t tf th fato tbu ,n eo thank the their mfo r unfailing support mothery M . . JennDr , . yB deVries, helped as both a supportive parent and an expert in the Germa muco nto languagecatalogr o ht he e .ow ;I

WlLLEM A. DEVRIES Ashland, Massachusetts A Note on the Texts

Hegeo t w l ne ofte Readere ar n o finreferencee sdwh th s hi o st works confusing. Ther standaro n es i d citation formabookss hi r tfo , and it is not even clear from the titles to the translations just how they correspond to the German editions. Let me take a moment to revie neophyte textth statue e wr th th sfo f so e Hegelian. Hegel published only four books in his life: The Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807; The Science of Logic, in three volumes, published n 1811i , 1812 d 1816an , ; Encyclopedia Philosophicale oth f Sciences, whic originalls hwa y publishe 181n di revised 6an 182n di d 7an Philosophye Th 1830 d an ; of Right, publishe 1822n di alse .H o published some articles caree s earl hi durin d n yi ran Berlis ghi n period in the 18203. After Hegel died, his students and admirers (they called themselves the "society of the friends of the eternalized") decided to publish a collected edition of his works. Besides collecting the pieces Hegel had published himself, they assigned various members of the group to collect and edit texts of Hegel's lectures on art, religion, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history. The editors used Hegel's own lecture notes (often several sets from different years studend )an t note wels sa reconstructinn li ga single text for each topic. This posthumous edition became the basis subsequenl foal r t edition Hegelf so ; only now criticaw , witne e lhth edition being assembled in Germany, is a serious effort being made to reconstruc Hegeliae tth n originacorpu basie e th th f sn o so l texts. Of particula fate rHegel'f th einteres o s i s u so tEncyclopediat of the Philosophical Sciences. This is not quite (though almost) the hubristic xviii A Note on the Texts

adventure that its title makes it seem; it was written to be a lecture guide for Hegel's students. By the time Hegel wrote the Encyclope- dia, he thought he had developed a unitary, coherent system within which each philosophical topic, from logic through political theory to aesthetics and beyond, could be treated. The Encyclopedia is the outlin thif eo s system, made available primaril tha o ystudents s thi s could locat lectures ehi thein si r broader context sectione e .Th th f so Encyclopedia offer mere summarie whaf so t sometimes took Hegel several lecture acrosst ge o st . (For readers unfamiliar wit overe hth - all structure of the Hegelian system, W. T. Stace's book The Philoso- phy of Hegel contain sfold-oua t synopsi orderine th f so subord gan - dination of all the concepts in the system. It is, in fact, a properly laid-out tabl contentf eo Encyclopedia.e th r sfo Heger Fo l even more tha Kantr n fo architectonie th , systes hi f majoa c o m s i r elemenf to the system, perhaps even the single most important aspect of it. I have included an outline of the part of Hegel's system dealt with here—the structur subjectivf eo e spirit—following this note.) When the Encyclopedia was included in the posthumous edition of Hegel's works, the editors, cognizant of the fact that its extreme compression make verr sfo y obscur difficultd ean reading, added supplementary material taken from Hegel's lectures (both Hegel's notes and his students') to the relevant sections. This procedure undoubtedly mad Encyclopediae eth raises easieha t readdi o r t t ,bu numerous worries abou e authenticitth t e supplementarth f yo y texts—called Zusatze Germann i hav.I e defende Preface th n dy i em Zusatze.e th f o e us Encyclopediae Th divides i d into three major sections—Logic, Phi- losoph f Natureyo Philosophd an , Spirit—anf yo d German publishers usually issue them as separate volumes of the Encyclopedia (the one-volume Poggeler-Nicolin edition omits the Zusatze). The English translations have been published as separate titles—The Logic of Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, and Hegel's Philosophy of Mind—with indicatioo n n that the parte largeya ar f so r worke Th . Encyclopedia consists of consecutively numbered paragraphs (de- marcated by the symbol §), and the English translations preserve the paragraph numbers. Because the paragraphs are generally quite short, even with the Zusatze, I have used them as my citation markers in all references to the Encyclopedia; thus readers may use any edition, Englis Germanr ho traco t ,references e kth . A Note on the Texts xix

Recently Michae . PerrylJ , notin shamefue gth l lac attentiof ko n that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has received, published a very scholarly bilingual editio f thino s portio Encyclopedia.e th f no - Ap pearing under the title Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, this is not a separate book but simply a new and scholarly edition of the firs t e lasthirth t f thirdo d (the philosoph f spirityo f Hegel'o ) s Encyclopedia. Perry does, however, includ materiaw ene l beyond that included in the original posthumous edition: he traces some of Zusatzee remaininth o tw e bacth ko gt sets of lecture notes available, an alse dh o include unfinishen sa d wor whicn ki h Hegel hopeo dt expand this part of the Encyclopedia. Hegel's Philosophy of Right is an i expansio materiae th f no l containe philosophe th dn i f objectivyo e spirit, the part of the Encyclopedia that follows the philosophy of subjective spirit. After publishing the Philosophy of Right, Hegel started wor similaa n ko r expansio earliee th f n o rEncyclo- e parth f to pedia, but he never finished it. I hav t citation epu texe th t n whenevesi r possible. Standardized citations have been used when they were available. Full biblio- graphic detail bibliographye givee th sar n ni keeo Hegee T . pth l citation texe th t n shortsi I hav, e indicated their sourcee th y sb following abbreviations:

. HegelF . W . PhG PhiinomenologieG des Geistes. Edite . HoffmeisterJ y db . 6th ed. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1952. PhS G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. SL G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. London: George Alie Unwinn& , 1969. WdL G. W. F. Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik. Edited by G. Lasson. Ham- burg Meiner. :F , 1934.

All references to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences are by section number citatiose (§)th textuao f t I . s ni l material addey db the editor posthumoue th f so s editio Hegel'f no s works indicat,I t ei as a Zusatz. The current standard edition of the Encyclopedia in German (Enzyklopedie philosophischenr de Wissenschaften, edite. F y db Nicolin and O. Poggeler [Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1959]) does not contain the Zusatze, so I have worked principally with the Suhr- kamp Theorie Werkausgabe . HegelF . W ,. Enzyklopedie(G phi-r de Textse NoteA th n o xx

losophischen Wissenschaften, vols. 8-10 of G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970]). Whe provenance nth cleat no res i froe mth context, I distinguish references to sections in the Encyclopedia Logic and the Philosophy of Nature by marking them EL and PN, respec- tively. Most reference Philosophye th o t e sar of Subjective Spirit (PSS). I have worked largely with the available English translations of the Encyclopedia, especially Petry's havI t hesitatet eno bu , supplo dt y my own translations for greater accuracy. Unless I have noted otherwise, translation f substantiaso l quotation Petry'se sar e Th . English editions are:

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Translate Miller. . WallacV . w W A y .dNe d b ean York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Translate . MillerV . Wallac. W A . y d b ean Yorkw Ne : Oxford University Press, 1970. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. 3 vols. Translated and edited by M. J. Petty. London: George Alien & Unwin, 1970. Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. 3 vols. Edited and translated by M. J. Petry. Boston Reidel. :D , 1978. The Logic of Hegel. Translate . WallaceW y dYorkb w Ne . : Oxford University Press, 1892. StructureThe of Subjective Spirit

I. Anthropology—The Soul A. The Natural Soul 1. Natural Qualities 2. Natural Changes 3. Sensibility B. The Feeling Soul 1. The Feeling Soul in Its Immediacy 2. Self-feeling 3. Habit C. The Actual Soul Phenomenologe IITh . Spirit—Consciousnesf yo s A. Consciousnes Sucs sa h 1. Sensuous Consciousness 2. Perception 3. Understanding B. Self-consciousness 1. Desire 2. Recognitive Self-consciousness 3. Universal Self-consciousness C. Reason „ III. Psychology—Spirit A. Theoretical Spirit i. Intuition a. Feeling b. Attention Structuree Th of Subjective Spirit xxii

c. Intuition Proper 2. Representation a. Recollection i. The Image ii. The Unconsciously Preserved Image iii. Recollection Proper . Imaginatiob n i. Associative, Reproductive Imagination ii. Symbolic Imagination iii. Sign-Making Imagination c. Memory i. Name-Retaining Memory ii. Reproductive Memory iii. Mechanical Memory 3. Thinking a. Understanding . Judgmenb t c. Formal Reason B. Practical Spirit 1. Practical Feeling 2. Impulse Willfulnesd san s 3. Happiness . FreC e Spirit HEGEL'S THEORY F MENTAO L ACTIVITY Science, Teleology, and .Interpretation

PHYSICALISM AND CAUSALISM

A philosoph minf yo supposeds i tel, amono dt l us g other things, descriptionr ou natur n e concepti e th e th explanaf d us e o se an sw - tions of mental phenomena. Behaviorism, as a philosophy of mind, tell thas su t concept mentae th f realle so ar l y concept complif so - cated complexe dispositionf so overo t s t behavior. Functionalism maintains that concept mentae th functionallf e so ar l y defined concepts of states of the individual differentiated by their typical causal role in the overall (internal and external) behavior of that individual. Both of these modern philosophies of mind tell us that mental concepts are not concepts of occurrent properties of mental substance conceptt sbu complef so x causal properties.1 Fundamentao t l both philosophies is a commitment to the priority of the causal, physical order; our concepts of the mental are to be made sense of by showinmentae th w lg ho fit s int causae oth l orde naturef ro . The associationist psychology of the Enlightenment that Hegel was so familiar with is a bit harder to specify exactly, since mental states tended to be reified into entity-like ideas. Nonetheless, it is clear that the associationists share the commitment to the priority of the causal with their present-day counterparts. Thi clearls si y con- fessed at the very inception of associationism, when Hume com-

i. Functionalism itself is actually mute about whether the functionally defined concept mentae th f sinstantiateo e lar mentaa dn i materiaa r lo l substance—but they are not, in any case, concepts of purely occurrent states. 2 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

projecn pareow s t shi wit h Newton' principles hi d san associaf so - tion with Newton' gravitationf o w sla . In this chapter I argue that Hegel offers us a significantly different understandin basie th f cgo natur conceptr ou mentaf e eo th f d so lan that, unless we recognize this, his entire project will remain opaque to us. Hegel's disagreement with the standard reading of our con- ceptconfinet conceptno r s i ou mentale o dt th f so , however; Hegel gives us a thorough reinterpretation of the systematic interrelations amonconceptsr ou l gal , thoug confine hw argumenr eou t hero et mental e vies th hi f wo . Since Descartes (certainly at least since Newton), the natural sciences (especially physics) have provided the model of empirical knowledge thas dominateha t d philosophical reflectione th t Bu . natural sciences have served as a model in different ways. Some philosophers have tried to mimic in their own philosophies of mind what they took the structure of physics to be. Thus the resemblance Hume apparentl betweew ysa s philosophnhi Newtoniad yan n mechanics was the postulation of elementary atoms with the primitive property of attracting other atoms and complexes thereof. Other philosophers have taken physics to be the sole exemplar of empirical knowledge and have therefore sought to reduce the mental physicale toth manr Fo . y philosophers, though, physice th d san natural sciences provided a model, not through the particular claims physics makes, but as an example of proper scientific methodology suco .T h philosophers physic exemplars i y because th f eo clearly intersubjecrive, repeatable natur evidence th f eo e employed, the rigorous formulation and generality of its laws, and so forth. If ther scienca minde s ei th f eo , accordin thio gt s grou philosof po - phers t musi , consistene b t t with othee physicth rd naturasan l science likd esan them thesn i , e general, methodological respects, even if it does not ultimately reduce to physics or physiology. And if r presenou t concept mentae th f so l cannot fin placda sucn ei ha scienc mind—welle th f eo muco s , worse hth themr efo . We coulunderstano t y dtr d Hegel's projec philosophe th n i t f yo subjective spirit, indeed in the Encyclopedia as a whole, along these lines witt ,bu h little hop successf eo somn .I e sense, surely, Heges li committe psychology'o dt s being consistent with physics ther fo ,y bote ar h aspect onf so e world t "naturalizing;bu " psychologt no ys i understano t y wa e th d their consistency, accordin Hegelo gt . Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 3

The scientistic philosophers share the assumptions that all objects and events arise within one causal order and that physics is the most genera completd an l e descriptio f thano t causal ordere Th . principle of these philosophical physicalists is that to understand something fully (i.e., scientifically) is to locate it within the causal order, showing how it depends on the objects and events physics deals with. These assumptions are not shared by Hegel; he offers us a very differen worle tth picturdw hangho f eo s togethert no s i t I . that Hegel denies that ther sensa es i whicothee n i th l rh al object s and event worle th f sdo depen thosn do e dealt wit physics—thhn i e existence of the physical is a necessary condition of the existence of biological and spiritual phenomena in his system as well. But this dependency relation is not the right one to be concerned with; that is, Hegel denies the conceptual and ontological priority of the causal, physical order. In particular, truly understanding something is not, according to Hegel, a matter of locating it within the causal order mattea t locatin,bu f ro gwithit i self-realizatioe nth f no the Absolute teleologicaa , l structure that transcend physicale sth . The teleological order, not the causal order of efficient causes, is the ultimate touchstone. This change (which leaves untouche dgreaa t deal of the hierarchical ordering of disciplines on which both Hegel anphysicalise dth agreen ca t ) means that Hegel's philosophical enterpris quites i e different from philosophicae thath f to l physical- ist. Philosophical physicalis ms veri y familiar, perhaps evee nth dominant vie contemporarwn i y philosophy moss It . t venerable opponent is straightforward dualism—the claim that some of our concepts (usuall conceptr y ou mental e th f so ) have nothin pargn i - ticula wito causale d ho th r t , physica aboule ordear t disjointa rbu t order of things. The mental order is usually conceived to be itself a causal order t mentabu , physicad an l l causatioe hele b nar o dt different specie same th f eso genus. Cartesian dualis mthus i s sa committed to the priority of the causal order as philosophical physicalism; unabl everythint fi o et g int physicae oth l order t accepti , s the existenc anotherf eo , disjoint causal orde accouno t re th r fo t leftovers. Hegel doe want s no accep o t t either position rejecte h o s ,s their common assumption, the priority of the causal. What he proposes in its place is the priority of the teleological. To support this position 4 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Hegel breaks wit predecessors hhi proposinn si gdifferena t analysis concepe oth f teleologf to differena d yan t approac legitimatinho t g the concepts we use.

OUR RELATIONSHIP TO NATURE Two Approaches to Nature

Hegel's strategy for arguing the priority of the teleological order set forth in his system is basically straightforward: he claims that the approach of the physicalistic philosopher is really a one-sided abstraction fro mmora e adequate, integrated, teleological approach. Since the physicalistic approach is only an abstraction from this more adequate approach, it must also be thought of as posterior to it. Hegel differentiate relationshipo stw havn natureca o et e sw e th , practica theoreticale th d lan . Neithe adequats ri isolationn ei ; both point beyond themselves to an integrated view of nature which sublates them (that is, preserves in a unified view what is true and valuable in both while abandoning their individual weak points). In our practical relationship to nature we behave as individual beings for whom nature is a means, an instrument for our purposes. Natural things themselve (correctlye sar )s a treate s u y db devoid of intrinsic purpose, but we (incorrectly) treat them as if we can impose our purposes on them without resistance, as if their purpos thiservn o I t s. es i practicae us l relationshi naturpe o t ar e ew concerned witt universae ,no hth l characteristic thingsf so witt ,bu h turning the individual things immediately at hand to our own individual purposes:

Two further determinations are immediately apparent here, (a) The practical approach is only concerned with the individual products of nature witr ,o h certain aspect thesf so e products Natur. . . . e itselfs a , it is in its universality, cannot be mastered in this manner however, purposee benr th no o t manf so .othe e (b)Th r aspecpracticae th f to l approac thas hpurposr i tou e override objecte sth naturef so thao s , t they become means, the determination of which lies not in themselves but in us. (PN §245, Zusatz) Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 5

The practical relationship to nature affords us only a thoroughly subjective, highly limited poin vief to w which, when generalized, quickly lead absurdityo st believeo T . instancer fo , , that cork trees exist in order to provide us with bottle stoppers is just "silly" (PN §245, Zusatz). The second relationship to nature we commonly adopt, the theoretical relationship equalls i , y inadequate.

In the theoretical approach (a) the initial factor is our withdrawing from natural things, leaving them as they are, and adjusting to them. In doing this we start from our sense-knowledge of nature. If physics were based only on perception however, and perceptions were noth- evidence th sensese t th bu f activite eo g th , in naturaa f yo l scientist would consist onl seeingf yo , smelling, hearing, etc. thao s , t animals woul dsecone alsth physicistse on I b d ) relatio(b . . . .n of thing, us o st they either acquir e determinatioeth e f universalitw no r o , us r yfo transform them into something universal more Th . e thought pre- dominate ordinarn si y perceptiveness muco s ,mor e hth e doee sth naturalness, individuality immediacd an , thingf yo s vanish aways A . thoughts invade the limitless multiformity of nature, its richness is impoverished, its springtimes die, and there is a fading in the play of its colours. That whic naturn hi noiss ewa y with life, falls silene th n ti quietud f thoughteo wars it ; m abundance, which shaped itsela n i f thousand intriguing wonders, withers into arid forms and shapeless generalities, which resembl edula l northern §246 fogN (P ., Zusatz)

The theoretical approac naturo ht intendes ei capturo dt e naturs ea it is in itself, but it can grasp nature only by transforming it into an abstract structur forcesf eo , laws generd an , a (se §246N e P wels a , l as EL §2off.) theoreticae Th . l approac naturo ht e therefore cannot fully succee intentios it n di grasno t p . naturis t i s ea The practical approach to nature is concerned only with the immediate individuality confronting it, and the theoretical approach is concerned only with the abstract universality of nature. Neither approac adequaths i understandinr efo actuar gou l intercourse with natur understandinr fo r eo g natur ewithit itselfac e nW . natur- eun derstandingly, rationally. We do not normally combine the practical and theoretical approaches by alternating between them; rather, they are more properly conceived of as abstractions from a total and fundamentally sound relation that we normally bear to nature. 6 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Constructin gbalancea adequatd dan e approac naturo ht a s ei problem, a problem contemporary philosophers must face as well. I shall bow to contemporary practice and put the point in a linguistic mode. The pure language of science contains no practical vocabu- languaga t no lary deliberats n i whict n eca ;i i e formulathd on ean e intentions language .Th sciencf eo e ca usee nb d within such deliber- ations to formulate some of the premises of our practical reasoning, but it is not itself sufficient for deliberation. It is, as well, a thoroughly objectifying language, without resources for the expression subjectivee oth f . Theory aims, apparently thoroughla t a , y objective, impersonal comprehension of the world; practice, however, seems essentiall ysubjectivee th tie o dt , personal agent lane -Th . guage of science cannot, therefore, be the sole language we use in confrontin worle gth d unles abandoe sw humanitr nou subd yan - jectivity. The languag practicef eo , however complett no s ,i e either. Practi- cal reasoning and the proper formulation of intentions require an understandin world'e th f go s independenc universas it f o , us lf eo patterns. Our subjective intentions make sense only against an independent, objective world. But this means that a language of pure practic impossibles ei must ;i conjoinee tb d wit htheoreticaa l language. A language of pure theory may seem to be still a viable possibility—but it is not hard to see that it must also be conjoined wit hlanguaga functioo t f practic practice eo s i th t i n i nf f e i eo science. A havsI e already intimated, this distinction betwee theorete nth - practicae th icad connectelan s li equalle th o dt y important distinction betwee objective subjectivene th th d ean . Statements froe mth theoretica objectivle pointh n vief i to e wear mode: "Unsupported bodies nea surface earte rth th f heo fal 2gtt a l 2." Although thern eca be no theories without theorizers, the theorist per se never shows withinp u theore th least y(a t outside quantum mechanics) face t.Th that the objectivity of the theory emerges from the subjectivity of theorise th extratheoreticaln a s ti theoreticafacte objecTh e . th d - lan tive approache worle th hano o dst g handn di . Statements from the practical point of view usually wear their subjective origin on their sleeve, for they point to human purposes, often explicitly. Eve "objective nth e practice" enjoine ethicy db s sha to root in our personal motivational structures in order to be real- Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 7

ized. Unlike theory, practice cannot even superficially ignore the subjectivity of the agent without obvious incoherence. This general conflict between subjective and objective, theoretical practicad an l approache worle th bees o dst ha n addresse difn di - ferent shape variouy sb s present-day philosophers. Thomas Nagel has spent a great deal of time exploring the conflict between the subjective and the objective points of view.2 Wilfrid Sellars has noted the distinction between the theoretical and the practical languages with whic engage suggestes hw worlha e eth d dan d that they must be conjoined into a "synoptic vision" of the world. 3 Hegel, however, would strongly disagree with the idea that the two can be simply conjoined—a deeper synthesis must be reached, one i napproacheo whictw e hth languager so t simplno o ysd coexist alongside each other but inform each other and meld into a complete and unified vision of the world.

Objective Purpose Accordin Hegel'go t s diagnosi tensioe th f so n betwee practie nth - theoreticad caan l l approache natureo st propee th , r resolutiof no that tension concepa call r fo s f objectiveo t purpose. e practicaTh l approach to nature is overly subjective, considering nature only in relation to practical, subjective purposes. Any attempt to adapt the subjective, practical approac universalite th o ht objectivitd yan f yo nature must involve a significant revision of the concept of purpose, however; simply extending the concept of purpose applicable to individual subjectivities to cover the whole world (say, by taking natur God'e b eo t s instrument) cannot prove satisfactory objecn A . - tive purpose cannot be just a very big subjective purpose.

Hegel has provided us with a relatively detailed analysis of the concept of purpose in his two Logics. I summarize his analysis here.4 In Hegel's time, purposes were standardly treate arisins da g from the beliefs and desires of some subjectivity. Knives are sharp in order to cut (or knives are for cutting) because someone has created

2. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere. 3. Wilfnd Sellars, "Philosoph Scientifie th d yan c Image of Man, Science,"n i Percep- tion, and Reality, pp. 1-40. 4 For details see, W. deVries, "The Dialectic of Teleology," Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 1980. 8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

them with the intention that they serve as cutting devices. A subjectivity suffusepurposen ow s sit s int odistinca ofted tan n recalcitrant objectivity in all such cases. Such a conception of teleology, however accounn ,ca t purposivenese foth r naturaf so l things only with difficulty. If the heart beats in order to pump blood (or the heart is for pumping blood), then there must be someone who created hearts wit intentioe hth n that they serv pumpss ea that tBu . some- particular y clearls i an e t yon no , finite subjectivity. There muse tb some subjectivity that stands outside the finite and objective realm and works its will upon it, namely God. Hegel thinks that this line of thought presupposes a completely unsupportable conception of a transcendent God. If there is natural teleology, Hegel realizes that cannot i understooe tb extensioy an subjective y db th f no e model. Indeed, reflection on the subjective or intentional model of teleology is sufficient to demonstrate the need for a concept of natural or objective teleology, Hegel believes intentionar fo , l teleology actually presupposes natural teleology. In the intentional model of teleolog ysubjectivita y work wils sit l upo ndistinca t objectivity; normally it does so by employing an instrument, a means for its end. But sinc e instrumeneth e objectivs itselfi t th n ^e i th e s i order w ho , subjectivity to work its will upon it? There must be something that bridges the gap between the subjective and objective realms, normally the body. The possession of a body, a single, unified entity with both subjective and objective aspects, is the necessary presupposition of intentional teleology. But the body itself is ideologically saturated heare :th t beat orden si pumo rt p blood bode ;th y moves in orde nouriso rt h itself. Intentiona subjectivr lo e teleolog builys i t on the natural, objective teleology of the organism. In all teleology there is at least implicit reference to the good. In intentional teleology this reference is itself intentional; intentional action aim subjectivela t sa y valued end naturaln .I , objective teleology activity aims at the objective good of the organism. But Hegel doe t conceivsno naturae th f eo l gooorganisn a f do mattea ms a f ro its mere survival or even the survival of its species; rather, Hegel believes tha eacr tfo h thing-kind theridean a s ei l paradig thamf o t thing-kind of which all the individuals of the kind can be seen as approximations. Natural organisms (unlike artifacts) see realizko t e their idea thein o l r own, with mor lesr eo s succes individuan si l cases natural Al . l teleology, includin beatine gheare th th n f i gto 9 Science, Teleology, Interpretationand

order to pump blood, is subordinate to the striving of the individual to realizideas it n lbess etypeca a t ti . Accordin Hegel'go t s analysis, all natural teleolog heart a ys i t self-realization. Hegel accepts Kant's second criterion for a Naturzweck, namely, "tha parts tit s shoul combino ds wholunite e th th f yen eo i that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form" (Kant, Cri- tique of Judgment §65, Bernard p. 219, Ak. p. 291). But while Kant admits that the whole is there because of its parts and the parts there because of the whole, Kant also believes that these two "becauses" are radically different. The first is objective, capable of dear justification secone ;th d "because best a s "ti subjective, regulative, useful in spurring further scientific research. But in Hegel's view both "becauses" are equally objective. Teleological explanations appeal paradige toth relevane th f mo t thing-kind t thibu ,s t ideano s i l subjective whas i t i , t defines that thing-kind. (Thin Aristoe th f ko - telian dictum tha knoo tt w somethinnaturey "b knos o i t t "s i i w s ga somethint best.s no it s t i i ta t ) I there s dreai e t gi w ; ,m objectivelup y present and explanatorily unavoidable. To say that such an ideal is merely subjectiv subjectivizo t s ei worle eth d entirely mako t , e eth ontological structure of the world an artifact of our point of view alone. Hegel refuse thiso d .o st The ontological structur worlde th f articulatioes o ,it n into natural kinds, is intrinsically teleological, according to Hegel. The behavior of organisms must be understood as a striving to realize the organism's idea therebd lan realizyo t e itself fullyeved articulae nAn .th - inorganie tioth f no c realm devois ,a internallf do y active purposs ea the inorganic is, must still be viewed as a structure contributing to the realization of a higher end, the self-realization of the Absolute. But granevee w nf i t Hegel's argument that intentional teleology presupposes natural teleology thud an ,s grant that ther some ear e objective purposes aimeorganismy b t da s capabl f intentionaeo l action t certainli , y doe t follosno w that there objectiv n musa e tb e purpos whole th r eefo world. Hegel's analysi teleologf so y might establis possibilite hth objectivf yo e purpos eved realite an nth f yo some objective purposes, give realite nth subjectivf yo e purposes, but it cannot justify belief in the existence of one universal objective purpos whole th r naturef eo fo . Hegel was believe,I , cognizanf to this shortcoming and argued for the existence of an ultimate objective purpose from a different angle, namely, from the inadequacy of 10 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity theoreticae th l approac natureho t othen .I r words inadequace th , y of the practical approach to nature justifies employment of the concept of objective purpose, and, as we shall see, the inadequacy of the theoretical approach justifies belief in the existence of a universal objective purpose.

Universal Purpose Like most post-Cartesian philosophers, Hegel recognizes the importance and generality of physics. Nevertheless, he believes that it doe t evesno n potentially provid ecompleta e understandine th f go world. "The inadequacy of the thought determinations used in physics may be traced to two very closely connected points, (a) The universal of physics is abstract or simply formal; its determination is not immanent within it, and does not pass over into particularity, (b) Thi precisels i determinatreasos e it y th y nwh e conten exters ti - nal to the universal, and is therefore split up, dismembered, particularized, separated and lacking in any necessary connection within itself; why it is in fact merely finite" (PN §246, Zusatz). Hegel's complaint against the concepts used in theoretical physics is not very clear in any of his writings, partly because it is a complaint quite foreign to our modern scientistic consciousness. But the basic thrust of his objection can be made sufficiently clear. The "universal physicf "o , firs sis allf o t , some explanatory posit, suc forca lawa s r ha eo .beins Parit f tgo abstrac surels o tha d o yt with the fact that it is supposedly reached by abstraction from the rich world of ordinary experience, but that is not all that is carried by the term "abstract." It is also abstract in that the various forces and laws governing the behavior of things are all independent of each other, withou intrinsiy tan c connection; whateve ultimate rth e laws are, they are simply primitive givens, each independent of the others. Thi supposes si furthea e b o rdt fault wit abstrace hth t universal theoreticae th f so t immediatell no approach s i t i t ybu , obvious why. I think that Hege worries li d abou differeno ttw t things whee nh complains about the way the theoretical approach (or what he calls "the attitud understanding,e th f eo " which come muco st e hth same thing) divides and analyzes things into disparate and uncon- nected elements. First, Hege botheres li idee th a y thad b ultie tth - 1 1 Science, Teleology, Interpretationd an

mate structur worle th f edo migh t havtno unitarea y principle, that we might have to accept a plurality of principles as ultimate. Such a situation would always leave questions about why just those principles were ultimate givens and whether they in turn depended on some unitary and still more fundamental principle. The desire for unit completenesd yan s seems overwhelmin Hegelgn i , althoughI irrefutablo n cae nse e argument tha worle th t d ultimately muse tb unitary. Second, Hegel often complains that the analytic approach of the theoretical attitude loses the inner unity of the things it dissects, killing them: "Tak eflowea exampler rfo understande .Th - ing can note its particular qualities, and chemistry can break it down and analyse it. Its color, the shape of its leaves, citric acid, volatile oil, carbon, hydroge distinguishedne b etc.n ca , thee y w nsa d ;an that the flower is made up of all these parts" (PN §246, Zusatz). He goes on to agree with Goethe that such an analysis "holds the parts within its hand,/But lacks, alas, the spiritual band." But Hegel does not want to suggest that philosophy is necessary because it can find something else, something abov beyond ean elemente dth s isolated by the1 sciences, namely, the spiritual band; rather, Hegel's complaint believeI , , mus reacomplaine a tb s da t abou inabilite tth f yo the science supplo st y adequate analyse conceptr ou f so naturaf so l kinds. propeA ' r understandin nature th thing-kinda f go f e o , which is more 'tha nmera e assemblag partsf eo , shows tha "spirituae tth l band" is immanent within the thing, the ideal toward which the thing strives. The scientific, empirical analysis of a flower can show us how the flower elements worksit w ho , s interactitsely b t doei t ft sno bu , show us why those elements together constitute a natural kind. Natural s opposea , artificiao dt r artifactualo l , kinds naturale ar , (and therefore, Hegel believes, nonarbitrary) unities. Natural kind concepts play 'an extremely important explanatory rol Hegelr efo , because every chain of explanations must ultimately come to a close explanationd an , propen i d sren classifications. Every explanatory enterprise presupposes some basic set of entities with certain primitive powers; whe explanation na bees nha n pursued dowo nt this basic level, any further questions about the basic entities or primitive power onln answerese ca y b sayiny db g that the thae yar t kin thingf do . Every explanatory enterprise takes certain kinds te ob natural; seeking further explanation of those natural kinds opts out 12 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

of that explanatory enterprise in favor of another, perhaps more general form of explanation. The natural kinds articulate the primitive structures of the world. The paradigmatic natural kind Hegelr sfo , biological genera, consist of self-developing, self-maintaining organisms with common structures and behaviors and, most important, a common ideal type toward which the individuals strive. But the theoretical attitude analyze e naturasth l r worlkindou f do s away, Hegel believes, decomposing them int ungainln oa y conglomeratio propertief no s with no clear unity to them. The theoretical attitude thus constructs a world bled of all internal structure into which any organization is introduce us—whicy db h contradict essentiae sth theole goath f -lo retical attitude, namely, the grasping of the world as it really is. The only remedy Heges a , admio t l insufficiencs seee i th , t sit e th f yo analytic tendencie theorf so y and, indeed counteo t , r the takmy b - ing nature, the world itself, to be a natural kind—that is, to be determine objectivn a y db e ideal. Thilarga s si e mouthfu swallowo t l uncleas i t I . r tha innee th t r cohesio naturaa f no l kind mus sole tb d shor analysisy tb . Truen i , Hegel's tim organie eth c real stild mdi l seem quite separate froe mth inorganic, and impervious to chemical or physical analysis, but this barrier was initially overcome in Hegel's own lifetime and has been totally done away with in the modern development of biology, through both evolutionary theor moleculad yan r biology evet Ye .n progrese th biologicae n i th f so l science conceptioe sth teleologf no y t completelno s ha y vanished. Ther propertiee ear organf so d san organisms thastile ar tl best explaine referency db largee th o ret organi environmentar co l context. Accordin Hegelo gt , this would signal strictldefeae th r yfo t analytic strateg understandinge th f yo . notioe naturaTh a f no l kin perhapds i cleareo s n tha w wa nt rno i in Hegel' certainls i s t dayi t evident ,bu y no t tha natural tal l kinds mus like b t e biologica e casth ee thab l y kindst througma t I . h scientific research certain natural kinds, or what were taken to be such, are indeed analyzed away, but it is more important to realize that science is really offering us a new and even more powerful set of natural kinds with much broader and better defined explanatory powers. Hegel's instrumental interpretation of the empirical sci- meany an onl e possiblee y sth b y on encet no s s.i Hegel strains the boundaries of the concept of a natural kind 3 1 Science, Teleology, Interpretationd an

when he effectn i , , take world-whole sth naturaa e b o et l kind with the structure appropriate to his paradigmatic natural kinds. Per- haps the strongest thing that can be said in favor of this assimilation is tha nature world-whole th tth f eo ultimate th s ei e explanatory dead end. If natural kinds are explanatory resting places, then, sinc natur e world-whole eth th f eo fina e ultimatd th an ls e i e resting place, it must be the highest natural kind. But totalizing concepts are notoriously dangerous totalite th : f finityo e numbera t no s si finite number; the set of all sets is impossible. We have to be extremely suspicious of Hegel's rather dogmatic belief that the world-whole does form a unitary totality.

THE NEED FOR PHILOSOPHY

We are now in a position to say why, according to Hegel, the empirical sciences cannot delive completra e understandine th f go world, why philosophy itself must rework the results of the empirical science orden si completo rt taske eth . Eve Hegel'nf i s arguments were sufficient to justify our use of the concept of objective purpose wouly wh , d mattethia e sphilosophyb r rfo , rather thaa r nfo slightly revised empirical science s sureli t e ?casI yth e thae w t discover empirically what the purpose of the heart or brain is; why not believe that particular teleological connections, like particular causal connections, must be discovered by observation and experi- ment? s undoubtedlIi t y right that particular teleological connections mus ascertainee b t d experientially. Such particular connections, however, are not the ones that the Hegelian philosopher claims to be able to supply. His concern, rather, is with the ultimate end, the self-realization of the Absolute, the world-whole's fulfillment of its potential. As we have seen, Hegel believes that the world-whole, like every natura thert e Bu e ar lidea. n a kind to liv o s t lp eu ha , certain peculiarities about the world-whole kind: there can be only one world-whole accordin principln i n Hegelgo t ca t i e o hav,s e only one instance; becaus universae eth idead lan wha s li substantias ti l about the world, according to Hegel, the world-whole cannot in the lon faln glru ideale shorth everf s a ,o t y finite being does; because ther nothins ei g els coult ei d depenworld-whole th , don e muse tb 14 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

absolutely independent and self-contained, even to the point of being self-explanatory have W .e questioned Hegel's righ thio t t s concept of the world-whole, but he undeniably employs it, and a full examination of his arguments to justify it would be a complete examination of virtually his entire philosophical system. Since our primary purpose here is to understand Hegel's philosophy of mind, I do not question this assumption further. Let us rather examine its systeme rolth n ei . Hegel easily grants that particular teleological connectione sar available to empirical discovery and confirmation, but the case is nosame tth e wit ultimate hth e goal. Because ther strone ear g constraints ultimatn a n o e goal, Hegel thinks tha nature tth sucf eo ha telos is not merely de facto but can be established a priori and shown to be necessary.5 Absolute teleology, then, is not an empirical matter. But if the world as a whole must be seen as a unity strivin particula n realizo gt ow s eit r intrinsic end, then this must affect the way we understand the empirical detail of the world as well. There is then an added dimension to the finite things of the world, fomuse rw t understand thewhethew yho contributd ran o et the realization of the Absolute. 5 Hegel is not committed to being able to say of any individual finite thing how it contributes to the realization of the Absolute, any more than a thorough comprehension of any natural kind by itself give knowledge son particulay an f eo r membe thaf ro t kind, Hegel, claimede h s a , cannot deduce Krug's pen. therpriort a e Bu ear i 6 constraints on the totality, the Absolute, simply by virtue of the fact

r convenienc5Fo . priori-a e th eI writf i a s posteriorea i distinction wer- eun problematic factn I . , though, Hegel doe believt sno e that ther cleaa s ei r distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori—not because the distinction itself is unclear becaust bu , realls i t ei ymattea degreef ro ordeHegen o I .d o rt l full justice, we nee abandoo dt priori-a e nth a posteriori dichotom emplod yan y insteae dth notio f degreeno empiricaf so l sensitivity develoI . p this notio morn i e detain i l Chapter. 3 d an s2 6. Wilhelm Traugott Krug attacke e grandth d system f Germao s n idealism— Fichte was his particular target—by demanding that they deduce even something minor, such as his pen, from the system. Hegel first attacked Krug in a review article in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which he edited with Schelling in Jena in 1802-5; G. W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften, 1801-07: Werke in 20 Banden, pp. 188-207. He returned to the problem of Krug's pen in a footnote to Encyclopedia (PN) §250. Hegel's answer t consistentl Kruno o st e gar y satisfying classiA . c modern essa. HenD s y-i rich, "Hegels Theorie uber den Zufall," in Hegel im Context, pp. 157^86. Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 15 ultimate th thas i t ti e totality must .I self-sufficiene tb independ an t - dent (since there is nothing else it could depend on), capable of encompassin conflicte variete worldth e gth th d f yan o s , unifying them without nullifying them. Perhaps most important, in Hegel's view the Absolute must also be explanatorily closed. This means, essentially, that philosophical explanations must form a neat curve in which nothin acceptegs i bruta s da e primitive. Although explanatio world'some n i th f eo s dimension ofn fru inty os ma infinit y (this is notabl case causar yth efo l explanation), philosophical, that is, teleological explanation does not proceed into infinity. Philo- sophical reflection expose self-developing a worl e e sth b o dt , self- realizing structure, and no further demands can be made for explanation whe have nw e seen what kin thinf do worle gth donle isy.Th further demand further made sfo b thae n erar ca tdetai deeped lan r insight into the structure thus realizing itself. Since the concept of the world-whol highese th s ea t kind ca constrainee nb dprioria d ,an since in this instance alone concept and reality, kind and instance must fully coincide havo d e considerabl,w epriora i knowledgf eo the structur worlde th f eo . Hegel's argument that philosophy is an essential element in our knowledge of the world has two parallel forms, one to the effect that the sor thinf to g philosoph metaphysicalls i tel n s ylu ca y fundamen- otheeffectale e th th , o rtt thaalss i t oti epistemologically fundamental. These argument summarizee b n sca followss da :

1. Individuation and classification are both metaphysically and epistemologically fundamental. From the metaphysical point of view, there is no.entity without identity cruciad ,an ano lt y thing's identit whays i t kind' of thing it is. Epistemologically, one knows nothing about a thing unless onsubsumn eca undeet i r some thing-kind mose th td ,an important piec knowledgf eo normalln ca e eon y have about something is what kind of thing it is.7 2. Natural kinds are ideologically determined and must be understood teleologicall idealss ya , objective purpose naturaf so l things. 3. Purposes can be subordinated to each other; for example, the objective purpose of the heart is to pump blood, but its pumping blood

7- Hegel still think knowledgf so primarils ea "objectsf yo " rather tha factf no r so propositions. Some of the complex reasons for this tendency are explored in Chapter 16 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

subserves the purpose of keeping the organism alive, which itself might subserve the purpose of keeping the species alive. 4. What something is, its kind, is determined not only by its immediate objective purpose but by its superordinate purposes as well. Sim- ilarly, understanding (completely) what somethin entailgs i s understanding all the objective purposes defining it. world-whole 5Th . kinda ultimats e ei th , universae e th kind s i t i ; l objective purpose. Because it is the universal objective purpose, all other purposes are subordinated to it. 6. What anything really is depends on how it subserves the universal objective purpose, the self-realization of the Absolute. Understand- ing anything completely entails understandin t helpi w sg ho realiz e the Absolute.

Give role nth e philosophy play Hegel'n si s understandinr ou f go world, we can see that philosophy must accordingly be essentially interpretive. We have to be a little careful with the notion of "interpretation," for the word is often used quite broadly and in such uses doe havt speciase no eth l meanine th greservI e hereus t i I r s efo .A term, an interpretation is an attempt to understand a set of complex relations amon ggroua itemsf po , including part-whole relations means-endd an s relations. This muc s commohi l useal f so o n t "interpretation," including a statistician's interpretation of a set of data. Interpretatio speciay m n i l sense, however singles ,i y b t dou being explicitly holisti makind can g individualsense th f ee o th d san relation groue th termn n psi i projecte a f so d whole with certain normative characteristic whico st h the assumee yar belongdo t e .Th whole to which they belong must impose some real constraints on the interpretation, constraints derivative from the fact that the projected whol assumes ei havo dt e certain valuable traits. Interpreta- essentian a tios nha l axiological component. Furthermore value ,th e realizee b whol e o t th n dei mus somn ti e sense hav econstitutiva e tie to the individuals within the whole, as truth does to meaning. I believe that this characterization separates linguisti literarr co y interpretation from statistical interpretation, becaus statisticiae eth n purifiey m n doe(o d t pictursno statisticaf eo l endeavors)n rela n yo antecedent (much less a priori) projection of an axiologically characterized whole. (To the extent that statisticians do do something like that, e.g., assume that their populations have certain valuable traits, they are involved in interpretation in my sense.) Linguistic 7 1 Science, Teleology, Interpretationd an

interpretatio s constraineni e principlth y db f charity- eo in r fo , stance, which project essentialln a s y truthfu r leac beliefo ht se f speake communityr ro whole Th . e projecte literarn di y interpretation is much vaguer and harder to characterize, but the literary work mus interpretede b t exampler fo , havins a , g some thematic structur portrayins a d e an fullt no yga determinat stilt ebu l coherent world. (Note that on this reading much of the actual procedure even e scienceinth s coul takee interpretivee db b o nt f principlei , f so conservation or least action or theoretical desiderata such as econ- om simplicitd yan y were considered axiological.) A complete understanding of the world, according to Hegel, involves comprehending a projected whole—the Absolute—and then constraining one's understanding of the particularities of the lighworle th thaf o tn di t projected whole. Furthermore true th ,e character of the individuals depends on their connection to the whole; their potential contribution to the realization of the ultimate value is what makes them what they really are. Such an interpretive methodology is quite different from either a deductive or an (enu- merative) inductive strategy thest .Ye e latter were stil dominane lth t paradigms in Hegel's era. Kant realized the necessity of employing an interpretive strategy but relegated it to a merely regulative role in our construction of knowledge. Hegel insists that an interpretive approac worle unavoidabln th a o hs dt i essentiad ean l featura f eo proper relatio worlde th o nt . Hegel's Reconceptionof Philosophythe of Mind

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S PREDECESSORS

Many historie philosophf so y attemp classifo tt y Hege lattera s la - rationalisty da . While ther muc s esaii e sucr b dfo ho t hclassifica a - tion, in the philosophy of mind1 it can be misleading. For however much Hege shary lma e wit rationaliss hhi t predecessors philoss hi , - oph minf yo dominateds i very db y different concerns. centrae Th l question rationalise th n si t philosoph minf yo d concern the substantiality, simplicity, immortality, immateriality, and freedo soule doctrinee th Th f .m o f concepso t acquisition, judgment e naturth , f sensatioeo perceptiond nan forto s e ar hd an , developed to support the metaphysical positions at the center of rationalist concern. Despite their interes concepn ti t acquisitione th , empiricists thein i , r reaction against rationalism, retai nstronga , though critical, interes searcattributee e th th r soule n ti hfo th f .so Even in Kant we find that, alongside his revolutionary doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment nature th f sensatiod eo an , d nan perception attributee th , soue th lf sreceivo e careful attentioe th n i first Critique.2 But virtually all of these questions simply disappear

N 1. I am using "philosophy of mind" in its contemporary sense, where "mind" is not a translation of the Hegelian term Geist. In extension, the contemporary "philosoph mindf yo closes "i Hegel'o rt s "subjective spirit." 2. Karl Ameriks, in Kant's Theory of Mind, has recently argued that Kant is not simply critica rationaf o l l psycholog t alsybu o holds positive doctrines aboue th t attribute soule th f .so Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 19

whe ture nHegelw o n t givee terH .e sth m "soul quit"a e restricted meanin systes placd hi g an claimd n ei m an s tha predecessors hi t s asked the wrong questions about the soul. McTaggart remarks, for instance, that Hegel just doe t seesno m intereste immore th n di - tality of the soul.3 In Encyclopedia §389 Hegel claims immateriality for the soul but then turns right around and says that this is of no real interest unles makee son s some faulty presuppositione s(w analyze this passage more closely below). The attributes of the soul pose dcentraa l philosophical tangle fopredecessorss rhi Hegel'n ;i s philosophy this tangle has dissolved, leaving but few residual questions scattered around the system.

Against Rational Psychology In his introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel makes it quite clear tha thinke th s that bot rationaliste hth empiricistd san e th d sha wrong approac philosophicao ht l thinking aboue t th spiri d an t mental (§378). He gives Kant credit for having freed all subsequent philosophers from the need to do rational psychology (§47). But on a closer look at §47, it is not clear why Hegel lauds Kant for freeing s frou m rational psychology claime h r fo s, both that Kant's criticisms! are not essentially different from the criticims of the empiricists particulan i , r Hume's thad an ,t the faultye yar . Why, then, should the destruction of rational psychology be credited to Kant? Perhaps the answer is simply that the power of the Kantian system and its greater acceptance (at least in Germany) made rational psychology impossible in a way that Hume's philosophy did not. The destruction of rational psychology would then be attributed to Kant a mattesa historicaf ro l fact. In any case, Hegel disagrees with Kant's (and therefore Hume's) reasons for rejecting rational psychology. In both cases, according to Hegel, their objection amount pointino st that propertiee gou tth s that rational psychology seeks to attribute to the soul are not sensible, cannot be found in sense experience. For both Hume and Kant this entails that we do not have and cannot employ any meaningful concept of them. But this objection does not bother Hegel in the least repliee h ; s tha whole th t e poin thinkingf o t theorizingf o , s i ,

. M3. McTaggartJ . E . , Studies Hegeliann i Cosmology,. 5 . p 2O Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

the construction or development of concepts that go beyond what can be found in sense experience, so that the use of such concepts cannot be what is wrong with rational psychology.4 When he intimates what is wrong with rational psychology, Hegel criticizes the rationalists for having treated the soul as a thing; for having used abstract categories of the understanding which are, properly speaking, too lowly to grasp the nature of spirit; and, last leastt no t , fobu r having misconceive vere dth y natur philosophf eo - ica nature l th trut d predicationf eo h an . These charge conl al -e sar nected, each cutting a little deeper than the preceding one. In accusing rationalists of treating the soul as a thing, Hegel argues that the "merele yus y abstract categorie understande th f so - ing":

The old metaphysics considers the soul as a thing. "Thing" is, however, a very ambiguous expression. As a thing we primarily understand something immediately existing, somethin represene gw t sensi- sense bly thispoked th e whicb s s n an ,ei i o t sou e s s nhth ha ofl ha t I . accordingly been asked where the soul has its seat. As possessing a seat the soul is in space and is represented sensibly. Similarly it is appropriat conceptioe th o e t whethesou thinge k a th s as la f no o t s i t ri simpl compositer eo questioe Th . particularls ni y interestin relan gi - tion to the soul's immortality, insofar as this is thought to be conditioned by the soul's simplicity. But in fact abstract simplicity is a determination which corresponds to the essence of the soul as little as composition does. (§34, Zusatz, my tr.)

deaIs ti thin ri s passage that Hege chargins li rationaliste gth s with something lik ecategora y mistake. Their notio soue th lf nmisloo - cates the heart of the matter, and when one sees this, many of the earlier troublesome questions abou soul'e tth s attributes simply fall away. Yet Hegel's critique is more radical than the mere accusation ocategora f y mistake abou believe e soule h r tth fo , s tha similaa t r confusion occur othen si r central concepts:

4. Hegel does not think that concepts can be simply divided into the sensible and the nonsensible. While some concepts—e.g., red or sweet—are clearly sensible, ther wida s ei e rang progressivelf eo y less sensible concepts, from suc fragilits ha y through suc electromagnetis ha c radiatio eveo n t concep e nth spirif to t itself. Con- cepts vary in their degree of empirical sensitivity. Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 21

The question of the immateriality of the soul can still be of interest only if a distinction is drawn in which matter is presented as true and spirit as a thing. Even in the hand of the physicists, however, matter has become subtle morn ri e recent times ther ,fo y hav upot ehi n imponder- able materials suc heats ha , light, etc. whico t , h they have founo dn difficult addinn i y g spac timed ean . Although these imponderables have lost not only gravity, the property peculiar to matter, but also to a certain exten e capacitth t f offerinyo g resistance, they still havea sensuous determinate being, a self-externality. Vital matter however, which can also be found included among them, lacks not only gravity but every other determinate being which might justify its being re- garde material.s da (§389)

Here Hegel dismisses the question of the immateriality of the soul, not as senseless, but as simply uninteresting. What interest it may hav confusionsf o foundes et i se a n do . Noteworth thiyn i s passage is that Hegel does not attack the confusion of treating the soul as a thing but rather points to the difficulties and confusion surrounding the concept of matter. The scientists of his day were busy extending Newtonian physics tryindiscoverinr y ,o b , gto formw g "matne f so - ter" which were successively more divorced from their original model notioe Th . f "vitano l matter" takes this developmena o t t ridiculous extreme woult i r ,fo d share essentiae nonth f eo l propertie matterf so soue clearls .Th l i Newtonia a t yno n particlee w f i t ,bu let the notion of matter wander too far from this paradigm, Hegel believes, the question of the immateriality of the soul becomes empty and loses interest. Those who ask about the immateriality of the soul, then, are subject to a double confusion. They commit a category mistak treatinn ei southine a gexhibith s d la gan wels ta la lack of real understanding of the notion of matter. They are, as it wronweree th n i ,g categorial ballpark. A standing faul rationalistif o t c dogmatism, accordin Hegelo gt , tendence ith s elevato yt e commonsense, everyday concept- sab stracted from sense experience into universal and necessary metaphysical principle categoriesr so kine conceptn th f i dt o e .Bu us e sw our everyday encounters wit finite hth e worl quite dar e insufficient to expres universae sth necessard lan y truth contene s th tha e f tar to metaphysics: 2 2 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

metaphysic d thinkine ol Th e th f g o finits swa e thinking movet i r fo , d along thought determinations, the limits of which were supposed to t furtheno fixe e d b r dan negatable askeds wa exampler t I .fo , , does existd Go ? [Hat Gott Dasein?] existencd An consideres ei d something purely positive, something final and excellent. We will see later that existence is in no way a pure positive, but is rather a determination which is too base for the Idea and not worthy of God. ... In the same way one asked whether the soul is simple or composite. Thus simplicity as well counted as a final determination, capable of grasping the True. Simple is, however, as poor, abstract and one-sided a determinatio existences na determinatio,a n whic untruewils e a h w , l lateis e , rse incapabl graspinf eo Truee gth sou.e If th treate s li onls da y simples i t ,i determine sucy db abstraction ha s one-sidena d finitedan . (§28, Zusatz, my tr.)

Rational psychology trie capturo st soue esimplth n li abstracd ean t concepts that cannot do justice to the actuality of the soul, and it proceed tryiny sb assiggo t n these predicate thoroughla n si y external fashion.5

Against Empiricist Psychology Hege quits li e aware that ther perfectla es i y legitimate enterprise called empirical psychology. This is as much a science as physics or chemistry, although its practitioners, according to Hegel, tend not vere b yo t clearheaded about their enterprise. Insofapurels i t i s yra empirical limites i t i , gatherino dt classifyind gan empiricae gth l phenomena of mind. But many psychologists also attempt to phi- losophize abou mine tth thi n do s empirical basis worser ,o claio ,t m that empirical psycholog alreads yi y philosophy—an idea Hegel completely rejects. While philosoph empirica e neven th yca t rle l realm out of its sight, empiricz'sm is a deadly antiphilosophical dis- ease. According to Hegel, empiricism is methodologically no better off than rationalism perhapd an , s worse botn I . h cases abstract con-

discussio5.A Hegel'f no s theor predicationf yo , however centra metas hi o t -l physics, would take us too far afield. A good introduction to this topic is provided by Richard Aquila, "Predicatio Hegel'd nan s Metaphysics, Inwood. J . Hegel,"n M i . ,ed pp. 67-84. Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 23

cepts are assigned externally to the subject; both have faulty views of predication sinct Bu .e empiricism restrict sensi e vies sth it wo t - ble, it is blinded entirely to the metaphysical and incapable of dealing at all with the universal and necessary: "An empiricism that is consistently carried out, insofa t restricti s a r contens sit e th o t finite, rejects the supersensible in general, or at least the knowledge determinatiod an leaved an though, o sit t f no t only abstractiod nan formal universalit identityd yan " (§38 tr.)y ,m . Hegel clearln a s yha extreme "ideal type empiricisf "o mminn i d here thae on ,t allows onl collectioe yth classificatiod nan empiricaf no l data without per- mitting the essential theoretical move to nonsensible predicates or modal qualifiers; as such, it makes science and philosophy impossible: "The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, and certainly also of one, many, universalit infinituded yan , etc.; infer accordancn si e with such categories, and thereby presupposes and applies the form inferencef so while th t knowin l eno al , g tha thut i t s contains and practices metaphysics itself; and uses these categories and their connection completela n si y uncritica unconscioud lan s way" (§38, my tr.). Hegel also has a particular objection to the empiricist's practice of "philosophical" psychology empirican "I : l psychologye th s i t i , particularizations into which spiri divides ti d whic regardee har s da being rigidly distinct, so that spirit is treated as a mere aggregate of independent powers, each of which stands only in reciprocal and therefore external relation to the other" (§378, Zusatz). The empiricist collects various phenomen tried asoran o st t them under different classifications differene Th . t kind mentaf so l phenomene aar then attribute variouo dt s different mental faculties. But, Hegel complains, therprinciplo n s ei e behind this divisio facultiesf no ; shoo t y wthe though e wa thei yhocar d therd o a n ran ,p s eu i t intrinsic unity. Only someone with an independent (philosophical) conceptio prooe whole b th n f no eca agains t this danger. This conception of the whole must be validated independently of the particular empirical phenomen musd aan capable b tt leas (a f teo partially) justifyin e classificationth g s employe workine th y db g empirical psychologist suc empiricisto e n th h s t concepha .Bu o ,wh - tion, cannot but remain captured in empirical detail, unable to find 4 2 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity underlyine th o t y ke ge phenomenunite th th yn i a precisely because underlyins ii t supersensibled gan empiricise Th . liks i t buildeea r with all the raw materials but no plans or idea of what is to be built. The problem for both rationalism and empiricism, then, is that they trea sou supersensible.thinge a ts th la . Thinking.of.the soua s la thing, rationalism tries to conceive of it using only the concepts that are appropriate to finite objects and thus necessarily falls short of its_ goal. Empiricism, on the other hand, noting that the soul is supersensible, anythiny sa o t refusey g tr interestin o t s g d abouan t i t restricts itself to botanizing the empirical phenomena of mind un-_ critically. Empiricism is correct in holding that one cannot use concepts compounded from sense experienc describo et conceivr eo e the supersensible; it is wrong in thinking that therefore the supersensible canno conceivede b t . Rationalis mcorrecs i tryinn i t o gt conceive the supersensible; it is mistaken in attempting to do so by simply assignin t predicategi s constructed from sense experience uncritically.

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S METHODOLOGY

Having seen what Hegel think wrons i g wit philosophicae hth l psychology of his predecessors, we now face the more difficult task of figurin philosoo d what o t righgbelievee ou e y -th th twa e b o st mindf o y . ph When Hegel attempt stato s t prope e eth r methon di philosophy, he often describes it as being basically passive. One needs merel watco yt appropriate hth e concepr case ou eth n (i t concept of spirit) develop or unfold itself. Even more frequently Hegel drops all reference to the philosopher and claims that philosophy deals only with the self-development of the concept. Today we find suc hdescriptioa philosophicaf no l method quite unillumi- nating, and to understand what Hegel means by such talk one has to work out in some detail his theory of the nature of thought. By the end of this book, Hegel's descriptions of a passive philosophical method will make sense, but for now let us approach the task from anothe reconstruco t y tr r s angleu t t Hegel'Le . s intentions hi n si philosophy of mind without relying explicitly on his own methodological pronouncements doe w contene sth .Ho practicd tan f eo Hegel's Reconception5 2 Philosophy e oth f of Mind

, his philosophical psychology distinguish his enterprise from the unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors?

From Soul to Spirit The first difference between Hegel and his predecessors, one notices immediately, is a shift from a focus on the soul to a focus on spirit. The word "soul" is reserved by Hegel for the lowest level of spirit: "Spiri s distinguishei t d fro e soulmth , whic bots hi e hth middle between corporealit betweee ti e th spirid nd y an them an t . Spirit as soul is sunken into corporeality and the soul is what animates [das Belebende] the body" (§34, Zusatz, my tr.). Thus "soul" acquire restrictesa d meaning, namely, spirimoss it t a t thinglike level—a meaning Hegel probably adopts becaus predecess hi f eo - sors' predilection for treating soul asji thing. Its successor concept, spirit, is not thinglike at all: rather,' spirit is thought to be a pure, self-generating activity. Rather than being though particua s a f to - 6 lar kin thinf do g with specific propertie interactiond san s with other things, spirit has to be thought olas a particular pattern of activity, a special kind of organization which interactions among things can exhibit. Spirit cannot be adequately grasped through categories or concepts abstracted from finite things, much less from sensible things thin,a becaust ever gno o s i n t ei lik thingea . And "spirit" has a much broader use than "soul," for it denotes the underlying activity informing^and accounting for not only the mental activit individuae th f yo t als sociae bu lo th historicad an l l activity of a community. .Hegel's shift from "soul" to "spirit" emphasizes the nonthingishness, the active nature of the human es-

senc wels ea its_communa s la socia, lor l nature.v Hegel thereb- yem phasizes that he is investigating what is universal to us all, one and the same in us all, something in which we each participate_rather than an entity_we.each individually possess (or are) independently l othersoal f . As comprehension of the nature of spirit, which informs not only the intellectua practicad lan individuae l th lif f eo l biitb wKoTe'oe fth f gooa r dFo 6introductio concepe th . Solomon C no t . spiritf R to e se ,, "Hegel's Concept of Geist," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Maclntyre, pp. 125- concepe 4Th 9 spirif to treates ti d agai morn i e detai Chapten li . r3 26 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity humanit wells y a philosoph e th , spirif yo t mus see e muca tb s na h broader discipline than the philosphy of soul. Describing something as a spiritual phenomenon presupposes for its individuation as explanatio s welit s la certain a explanator f o t nse y principlet sno applicable to the merely mechanical, chemical, or organic but perva- sive throughou psychologicale tth , anthropological sociologid an , - cal. ' Hegel characterize spirituae s internalth e th s la contrasn ,i e th o tt externality of material objects (see, for example, §381). This contrast between interna externad lan bess li t understood believe,I termn ,i s of self- and other-determination. Spirit is what is self-determined; tha , spirituatis l phenomen construeae arb o et manifestations da s of a self-productive activity. A .self-productive activity is a special form of teleological activity, namely, one in which the telos is itself such self-productive activity.7 To describe something as spiritual, then, is to commit oneself to the notion that it can be adequately explained manifestatio e onlth showin y s yi b t i w g sucho f no hselfa - producing activity. This explanatory schema has a broad-ranging field of application. Mechanical interactions, such as those studied by Newton, are not themselves to be explained in terms of manifesting a self-producing activityvere th y t existencbu , mechanicaf eo l interactione th n si world is to be explained in those terms, for their existence is itself spirituaa l phenomenon. .Virtuall l formyal f humao s n activity— whether individual or social—are to be understood as manifes- tation a self-productiv f o s e activity philosophe Th . f spiriyo s i t (devoted to showing how human activity embodies the defining structure of spirit

Subjective Spirit With this introductory understandin Hegel'f go s general conception of the philosophy of spirit8, we can also see what a philosophy of subjective spirit—what we today call the philosophy of mind—

7. See Crawford Elder, Appropriating Hegel, for more discussion of this form of teleology. 8. I return to a fuller description of spirit in Chapter 3. Hegel's Reconception7 2 Philosophy e oth f of Mind

should be. A philosophy of subjective spirit is devoted to showing psychologe th w ho individuaf yo l humans embodie defininge sth , structure of spirit. Particular explanations of particular human action note sar f course ,o purviee th philosophere n th i , f wo t bu , discovering and explicating the form such explanations must take, as well as relating these forms to their counterparts in other disciplines, including logi philosophyd can , philosophearee Th . a s rha dual relatio empiricao nt l psychology philosophicae th ; l under- 1 standing of the specifications of the general concept of spirit must be tested against the empirical facts, and the results and methods of empirical psychologists mus testee tb d agains priora e tth i analysis concepe o th fspirituale th f to . We must thin Hegef ko directins la efforts ghi s inter alia toward constitutioe th mora f no e adequate empirical psychology. That this indees i cas e recentls dth eha y been heavily emphasize My . db J . Petry's wor translatinkn i editind gan Philosophye gth of Natured an the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Hegel shows throughout his work a good knowledge of the contemporary state of the sciences, and it is constantly his concern to show how the empirical disciplines and his own system coalesce. Perhaps the most convincing evidence tha psychologs thi e state practices th th f yewa o n o e d ey wit e hon empirical disciplines is that in his manuscript of 1822 the second main factor sai contributo dt demise oldee th th o et f r eo philosophie minf so itsels di empirican fa l one, namely discovere th , f yo hypnotism (called in Hegel's time animal magnetism) (PSS, vol. i, 99). p . Here, Hegel thinks empirican a s ,i l phenomenon that resists explanation by any of the old methods; it confounds the categories of the understanding. Hypnotism prompte understandabln da e fascinatio Hegel'n i s time. Besides being good for parlor games, it was also seen to provid seriouea s challeng psychologicae th eo t l theorie daye th .f so Familiarity has perhaps bred contempt in contemporary psychological theorizing for the still amazing features of hypnotism. We have today a fairly divided stance toward it: we regularly turn to it to help in police work, psychotherapy, and self-development programs, but we also regard its results skeptically, since no theory has yet explaine accommodater do . Hypnotisdit m attracted considerable attentio earln i y nineteenth-century Berlin, including special stud- 28, Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

committeey b s ie Berlie th f sno Akademie. Hegel's interese th n ti 9 phenomenon mirror importance sth playet ei psychological al n di l speculatio erae th .f no Hegel does not cite the phenomenon of hypnotism as itself revealing a higher point of view; that is, he certainly does not believe tha hypnotie tth c subjec hypnotise th r o t specias tha l accesn a o st epistemologically privileged position—quite the contrary. Nor does he claim that hypnotism is incomprehensible, miraculous, or mysti- thereford caan l e overcome philosophiee sth - ra e minf so th f do tionalists and empiricists. Rather, he claims that hypnotism present wits su hphenomenoa n that canno explainee b t d usine gth abstract thing-based concepts commo rationalisno t empiricisd tan t philosophie beyono g mindf se o w df I .thes e concepts, however, understanwn eca d hypnotic phenomena Heged ,an e l takeon s a t si strone oth f g point philosophs hi f so subjectivf yo e spiritn thaca t ti accommodate hypnotic phenomena, wherea competitors sit s cannot. Here, then, is a clear case in which Hegel calls on empirical phenomen supporo at philosophicas thi l doctrine whicn i d e hh ,an show cleaa s r expectation that philosophical doctrine will make contact with the empirical sphere.

Philosoph Psychologd yan y refinWn ideer ca whaef ou a o t Hegel think relatioe sth n between philosophy and the empirical sciences ought to be from a remark in his text of 1822 about Eschenmayer's psychology:10

The first part, psychology s empiricala , , make claio n s beinmo t g scientific secone th ; d part, pure psychology, ough havo t detere eth - mination of exposing the principles of this empirical material and of discovering the structure of the schema simply presupposed thereby and indicating its derivation. Eschenmayer, however, without further

accounn a controversiee r th 9f Fo .o t s surrounding hypnotis mnineteenthn i - century Berlin Waltee se , r Artelt, Der Mesmerismus Berlin.n i . EschenmayeA . C . A . 10 r (1768-1852 practicina s )wa g physicia 181n i o 1 nwh became professor extraordinarius medicinf o philosophd ean Tubinget ya n (Hegel's alma mater), where later (1818 alse )h o hel chaie d th practica f ro l philosophys wa e .H influence Schelliny db earls hi yn gi caree thud an rs shared common roots with Hegel s fascinatioHi . n with hypnotis s oftemwa n satirized s psychologhi t bu , y textboo particularlt no ks i y distinguished. Hegel's Reconception9 2 Philosophye th f o of Mind

simplo ad y put speculative sth e knowledge that should com hern ei e into (i) reflections by means of concepts, judgments, and inferences, anidea) d(2 l intuitions, (PSS, vol. . 101i ,tr.)p y ,m .

Hegel subsequently castigates Eschenmayer for the all-too-common faul f discussino t materiae g th empirica n a n i l l endande th n ,i arbitrary fashion. And Hegel dismisses any possible call on ideal intuition out of hand; intuition is a fickle lady on whom anyone can call. What emerges from this passag characterizatioa s ei whaf no ta pure psychology is supposed to accomplish and a warning about purA . eit psychologo d o t ho t wno dedicates yi "exposino dt e gth principles of this empirical material and of discovering the structure of the schema simply presupposed thereby and indicating its derivation" (PSS, vol. . 101)i,p . This endeavor breaks down int otwoa - part task firse taskt.Th e parth f , to enunciatin principlee gth e th f so empirical material, is only vaguely stated. Could Hegel mean here thapure th t e psychologis responsibls i e twore th th f l ko al r efo theoretician, namely, stating laws and making empirical generalizations to be tested against empirical data? In this case the "pure" psychologist would hardly differ from the normal empirical psychologist coule w r d fo ,hardl y expec empiricae tth l psychologiso t be content with merely gathering data without reworking it into a theory. By the "principles" of the empirical material, however, 11 Hegel does not mean the empirical generalizations covering that material; rather, he has in mind the principles governing the organizatio ford nsucf an m o h first-level generalizations pure Th .e psychologis metatheorisa s i t t clarifyin principlee gth s (an cone dth - cepts, we might add) that govern the construction of particular descriptions and explanations in empirical psychology. Hegel engage sucn si h philosophreflectionn ow s hi n subjectivf si y o e spirit when he attempts to clarify the concepts of imagination, feeling, sensation, or thought and when he attacks associationist psycholog generan yi beins a l g buil faultn o t y assumptions. The second part of the pure psychologist's task is to discover the constructio e derivatioth e schemd th n an f no a thereby presup-

11. In Hegel's terminology the empirical investigator, qua empirical, is confined to gathering data—but suc investigaton ha scientista t no s ri . Theorizatio essenns i - tial to science. 0 3 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

posed. Again Hegel's descriptio fror fa m ns i clear, particularl- ybe t cleano caus rs i whethe empiricat e ei th s i t ri l material that presuppose scheme sth discoveree b o at enunciatioe th r do e th f no principle materiae th f so l which presuppose sought-foe sth r schema. I think it is the latter that Hegel intends, that is, that the second part of the pure psychologist's task is to put the set of principles he promulgate firse th tasts n spari hi k f intto obroadea r contexd tan onto a firm philosophical foundation. Thus Hegel says, a bit later in e 182th 2 manuscript n eac"I , h particular philosophical science, what is logical is presupposed as the purely universal science, and scientifie th ss oa c sciencel factoal n i r " (PSS, vol. . 103)ie ,p Th . pure psychologist who discovers a set of principles that will handily deal with all the empirical material at hand is not yet finished, for an explanation of why the principles take the form they do and how they fulfill the conditions of science in general must also be given. The philosophical psychologist must therefore operat thren eo e levels, developing bot empiricae hth lmetatheor e theorth d yan f yo empirical psycholog puttind yan g them int obroadea r context. These tasks canno performee tb d serially, either pure ;th e psychologist cannot awai completioe th t eithef no empiricae rth l theorf yo psycholog s metatheorit r yo y before beginnin develoo gt e pth broader viewpoint. These distinguishable tasks musn i fac n i te b t constant reciprocal developmene contact goae th th s i lr fo , a f o t maximally coherent worldview. We must ask, however, what would coun s indicatina t e gth derivation of the model with which One explains empirical material. This task belong thire th do s t leve reflectiof o l n isolated above. Ther alternativeso etw seee b mo t : eithe modee rth itsels li f derived from the empirical materials it is eventually used to explain, or it is derived from a priori principles. Hegel insists that "all cognition derives subjectively from perceptio observationsd nan e th d an , cognition of appearances is not only of the utmost importance, but is completely indispensable" (PSS, vol. i, p. 97); thus he recognizes causae th l role perception play knowledgen si philosophyt Ye . — tha tjustificatio e is,th philosophicaf no l truth—is also supposedo t pur e (ab d tean least relatively) independen experiencef o t e Th . three different levels of psychological investigation cannot be independently practiced, for bottom-level observations pla ynecessara y causal rol spurrinn ei thinking,r gou wherea observationar sou d lan Hegel's Reconception1 3 Philosophy e oth f of Mind

experimental techniques, as well as the categorial structures employed, all have aspects that are extremely empirically insensitive, aspects deeply enough ingrained int practicer oou resistante b o st , thoug necessarilt hno y impervious empiricao t , l counterexample. Such solution nevee sar r really neat thileaved e s,an on wits su ha residual problem. The highest level of philosophical reflection is apparentl yprioria , accordin Hegelo gt practice Th . empiricaf eo l psychology, though clearls i , y empirical. How, then theso d ,- een tirely different enterprises mesh? All theorizing, and therefore all science, involve applicatioe sth conceptf no s thaempiricalle ar t y insensitive, concepts tha intentl t areal r purposesd ,fo san priora , i (this much Hegel shares with Kant). The theorizer employs no concepts that do not have an a priori basis, for even those concepts that seem paradigmatically abstracted from sense experience alone contain or implicate a categorial structure that could only have an a priori justification. 1Hegey 2 Thiwh s lsi accuse empiricise sth f o t operating with metaphysical concepts without appreciating that fact. There can be no clear boundaries drawn between the philo- sophicaempiricale th attemptl d al lan r fo , describo st theorizr eo e about eve simplese nth t empirical phenomena involve philosophical commitments. The conscientious theoretician must therefore also be a philosopher.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

Let me attempt to summarize Hegel's understanding of the philosophy of mind. As he himself explicitly acknowledges, "the Phi- losoph neithe e Spirif b y o n tca r empirica metaphysicalr lno " (PSS, vol. i, p. 103); that is, the philosophy of spirit is not an empirical effort to systematize a certain set of phenomena, nor is it concerned to elaborat abstracn ea t concep souf to l contacwhico n l s al ht ha ta with empirical reality philosophe .Th spirif yo t attempt uncoveo st r the universal and necessary structure inherent in the empirical phenomena of spirit. Because it is concerned with the embodiment of this structure in empirical, individual facts, it must answer to

simplese 12Th . mosd tan t straightforward exampl Hegel'es i s insistence thae tth copulae th f o ,e eveus n predication itself, involves metaphysical concepts (see §38). 2 3 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

them by being able to cast light on their nature. But the structures it claims to find embodied in the world must themselves ultimately prove themselves universa necessaryd an lthi o t ss i degret I . ea pure, a priori science. Whether we accept Hegel's attempt to bal- anc recogniz empirican priorie a eca e th e th ,w d elan several significant advances in his treatment of the philosophy of mind. First, he wrenches the attention of philosophers away from the fruitless, age-old question rationaf so l psychologyy doetr e t .H sno to refute the rationalists' answers; if he says anything one way or othere th mose h , t likely agrees wit rationalistse hth breake h t sBu . fascinatioe th thesf no e question more th l es al radicall simply yb y ignoring the spendind man tims energd ghi ean morn yi e fruitful pursuits. After Descartes apparentle th , y central problee th f mo philosoph nature minth f yo s mentaf eo d wa lt i substanc w ho d ean differs from and is related to material substance. Hume and Kant realized that ther othere ear , more important questions about mind answerede b o t onlt ,bu y with Hege thers li e recognitio face th t f no that Descartes's whole line of thought is founded on a mistake. Second, because he does not worry about the attributes of the soul, Hegel focuses more on explicating the structure of spirit, that is, the structure of the explanatory principles to which the use of the concept commits us. We shall see that Hegel has a keen sense of the nature and complexity of the concepts necessary to do justice to human activity. Finally attemps hi n i , accommodato t t wealte eth empiricaf ho l phenomen transcendentae wels ath a s la l aspect sknowledger ofou , Hegel develops a nonreductive approach to mind, which we ex- plore in more detail in Chapter 3. Such an approach is finding increasing sympathy among contemporary philosophers. It offers mora s u e sophisticated understandin relatione th f go s betweee nth various sciences and promises deeper insight in particular within sciencee th manf so . Contemporary philosophw minf no y o n dca reclaim Hege ancestorn a s la . Nature Spiritand

METAPHYSIC STRUCTURE TH SCIENCED E STH AN F EO S

Hegel' sphilosophs goahi n i l subjectivf yo e spiriempirin a s i t - cally sensitive yet basically a priori science of mind. That sounds oxymoronic: How can a discipline be at once a priori and empirically sensitive? Here the elaborate structure of the Hegelian system serves a clear purpose. We have, first of all, the logic—the a priori element in all thought.1 The system's following two parts, the philosophie naturspiritf f so o d ,e an brin priora e gth i structuref so logic to bear on the empirical phenomena and thus are empirically sensitive as well as containing an a priori element. But empirical sensitivit mattea s yi f degreeo r . What kindf o s empirical discoveries would persuade Hegel (or us) to abandon the distinction between natur spirid ean t altogether? Certainly there ear cases in which the distinction is far from clear, just as the distinction betwee non-livine livine th nth d gan uncleargs i that tBu . there ear indeed such distinctions, and that they are highly immune to empirical potshots, seems apparent. Hegel's systey mwa a offer m shi

i. Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a circle of circles. One of the consequences of this doctrine, whic hbelievI e Hegel willingly accepts thas i , t even t logino s ci absolutely a priori. The system is a closed curve: the achievement of the final stage of the philosoph spirif yo t cycle inte logice soon th . Logic therefore als roote s oth ha n si empirical, for it has emerged out of nature itself. Hegel denies any absolute distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori—the a priori is rather an element or aspect of every truth in varying degrees (see §12). 4 3 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

represeno t differine th t g empirical sensitivitie distinctione th f so s and concept ssciences e useth n dmori e .Th e subordinat cone eth - cept is, the more sensitive it is to the empirical.2 Nature and spirit are superordinate concepts and relatively immune to empirical considerations, as is the essential contrast between them. The more subordinate concept more sar e empirically sensitivee least th .A n ti Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, placemene th explanatior to suborf no - dinate concepts (e.g., feeling) was more readily altered by Hegel in apparent response to empirical developments, and further research on the development of the Encyclopedia will probably show that to b patterea n throughout. The fundamental conceptual relations are worked out in the Logic. Nature and spirit manifest the conceptual structures discussed in the Logic, and the general structures of nature and spirit can be determined without much empirical input accordingly. This means that withi realme nth naturf expecso n spirid ca ee an o t t w find structures that embody the distinctions between being, essence conceptd an , thad subordinate an ,th t e structure thesf so e divisions again roughly limn those of the Logic. But the further we move from the general features of the realization of the conceptual structures discussed in the Logic, the less able are we to describe a prior more ith e particular featuremore th ed vulnerablsan - em eo t pirical refutation is our attempt to organize the phenomena. 3 We have not yet distinguished between the philosophy of nature " philosophe th d an f spirity o methodologica e Th . l remarky m f so first two chapters hold equally for both. What is the difference between natur spiritd ean neee ?W d some accoun differe th f o t- ences and the relations between various stages of the Encyclopedia.

calI . l z more subordinate those concepts occurring within tertiary, fourth-level, or deeper triads. Every philosophical concept occurs within some triad and most concepts have further triads subordinated to them. Perhaps ideally every concept governs some other concepts, but Hegel is not clear on this point. In a typical listing system'e oth f s determinations outline (sucth s hf a subjective o e spirit included here), simple indentation shows subordination. Thu concepte sth f spiriso d an t nature are superordinate concepts, whereas those of imagination and galvanism are subordinate concepts. y. One might imagine Kant getting quite bothered trying to locate precisely the syntheti empiricae cpriora th d ian l element say, sin , physics Heget .Bu l woult dno have thought such a project very sensible, for even the lowliest assertion presuppose containd san s metaphysical categories. Seekin drao gt w boundara y between empiricae th priora r knowledg e d ou th an in i l e show sthorouga h lac comf ko - prehensio absolute th f no e interpenetrario twoe th f .no Nature and Spirit 35

And though we need to distinguish nature and spirit, we must also distinguish subjective spirit from objective spirit and from absolute spirit. Finally, we must be able to explain the relations between the various levels within the philosophy of subjective spirit. One noticeable feature of the progression in the Encyclopedia is that at the higher levels the distinctions correspond fairly well with disciplinare th y boundaries between science degree least th s (a o tt e they are still recognizable). It has been common in the twentieth centur treao yt t questions about relations betwee varioue nth s sciences in a linguistic mode; I follow suit here, for little is lost by such a treatment, and it brings out with striking clarity the relevance of Hegel's philosophy to present concerns.

Languagee Th Naturf so Spirid ean t Let us ask, then, what Hegel takes to be the differences between the language by which we explain and describe nature and the languag whicy eb explaie hw describd nan e spirit certainls i t .I t yno often easy to separate these two "languages," but it is clear that 4 Hegel thinks tha concepte tth s structuring thes differeno etw t forms of discourse are quite different from each other. Furthermore, in his discussions of the differences between nature and spirit, Hegel does not intend to summarize and condense an understanding of their relation whic alreads hi y common coin eace W .h possese sth beginnings of a fully adequate understanding of the differences and relations between nature and spirit, but the common view is still mired in the rigid and reifying distinctions characteristic of the understanding. Hegel is therefore offering us a revised and im- proved understanding of nature and spirit, one that avoids the pit- falls plaguin commoe gth n understanding linguistie th n I . c mode,

4. Separating a language for describing and explaining the mental from the language for describing and explaining the physical is a convenient mode of speech. The two vocabularies are, of course, not separate languages at all, but parts of unitary natural languages t separabl. Theno e yar anythinn eo i tw y gwa like eth different natural languages are. With this warning, I adhere to present convention and talk of two (or more) languages. Discussing philosophical issues in a linguistic mode is not as foreign to Hegel as might be thought. It is not uncommon that he makes use of linguistic facts in his own argumentation, but, more important, he expressly affirms that "the form thoughf so firse t areth t n instance,i , displayed dan store human di n language?' Mille, (S3 . Lp r tr.). Approaching philosophical problems through a focus on language is entirely-consistent with Hegel's beliefs. 36 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Hegel is trying to reveal the ideal language pointed at by our present, imperfect, ordinary languages of the understanding. Bu Hegel'n i t s view thersimplo n s ei e distinction between the, languag whicy eb describe hw explaid ean n lane naturth - d ean guag whicy eb describe hw explaid ean n spirit. Althoug distine hh - guishes nature and spirit, it would be a major mistake to think that that is the end of the matter. Beginning in the seventeenth century, a straightforward dichotomy between the two realms was common, typified in Descartes's distinction between extended and thinking substances. Descartes's distinction amount claie th mo st that there are two (and only two) vocabularies necessary for a complete descriptio explanatiod nan world—the th f no e geometric vocabulary of physicmentalistie th d san c vocabular soule Descartesr th f .yFo o , all extended things are of a kind, with only accidental differences between them animate ;th e bod jusys i t more complex tha nstonea , not in any other way different from it. Similarly, in the realm of the nonextended, all things are of a kind, namely, thinking substances' and their modifications. Hegel, however, make suco sn h claims abou homogeneite tth naturf yo spiritsyster s eo hi n .mI thero n es i one language of nature, nor any one language of spirit. We find, rather, tha language th t naturf eo e includes language describr sfo - ing and explaining the mechanical, the chemical, the organic, and that none of these can be simply eliminated without loss. Both nature and spirit have various stages, each of which builds on its predecessors. To each of these stages corresponds a special science, thud have an s w conside o et t onl relatioe rno Natury e th th f no - wissenschafte Geisteswissenschaftee th o nt alst relatione nbu oth s amon subdisciplinee gth eacn si thesf ho e categories. These relations have been a subject of much concern in contemporary philosophy of science, so we have several different models for them. The classical reductionist model claims that each of the predicates of a higher science is connected by some bridge law to (a set of) predicates of the reducing science. Any law of the higher scienc then rewrittene ca n b , perhaps clumsily preservint ,bu s git nomological character, in the vocabulary of the reducing science. 5 Johe Kemen. Se nG . 5 Paud yan l Oppenheim Reduction,n ,"O Readingsn "i e th n i Philosophy of Science, . Bed . Brody . 307-18pp , d Ernes;an t Nagel Structuree Th , of Science: Problems Logice th f Scientifico n i Explanation. e alsSe o Jerr . FodoryA e Th , Language of Thought, Hilard an y Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol : Mind,2 . Language and Reality. 7 3 Nature Spiritd an

This would be a convenient and pretty picture of the relation among the sciences, for then (supposedly) physics would be the only essential science, statements of any other science being mere abbre- viation f muco s h longe d moran r e complex physical laws. But, unfortunately or not, this picture of a unified science is just too simple. Ther gooo n s dei reaso thino nt k tha sucy t theran h e ear bridge laws between the realms of nature and spirit. To use Fodor's example, there is no good reason to believe that there is a bridge law connecting "monetary exchange," a theoretical term in economic theory, to any set of predicates from physics. Monetary exchanges vary widely exchangee ; theb n yca metalf so , paper wampumr ,o r ,o change binarn si y datcomputera n ai . Ther simpls ei reasoo yn r nfo believing that monetary exchange connectee sar lawlikea n di fash- wit n sety io h,an however, disjunctive physicaf o , l predicates. 6 Onc reductionise eth t mode intersciencf o l e relation bees sha n rejected, there are two different directions one can go. Those of strong reductionist conviction make the radical move to eliminative materialism, claiming that the reducing science, usually physics, answers every worthwhile question. Even if some slight expressive power is lost, it is argued, the language of higher theories, including psychology, can be simply eliminated without significant loss. Becaus supposedls i t ei inadequaciee yth earliee th f so r stages that drive the dialectic onward in the philosophies of nature and spirit, it is clear that Hegel could not accept the eliminability of higher sciences; the whole Encyclopedia is an argument for their ineliminability. Eliminative materialis independentlt no ms i y attractive either. One could at most claim that psychology and other higher sciences are totally eliminable only in principle. That we could never in practice eliminate them is clear. Second, to argue for eliminative materialis maintaio t s ha e nm thaon eliminatinn ti e gth vocabularies of the higher sciences nothing essential is lost. But what exactly counts as essential? Is the usefulness of the vocabulary essential game outsetth e vocabulare , loss th eth i t so r ta f ?I ,fo f yo physics is unusable for describing and explaining psychological or economic or many other kinds of events in any practical manner. The eliminative materialist must write a promissory note on an imperceivable future to claim plausibility for this doctrine. A less radical and more attractive alternative to classical reduc-

Fodore Se . 6 , Language of Thought, . 9-26pp . 38 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

tionism is the token-identity version of noneliminative materialism. Accordin thigo t s view, althoug predicatee hth highea f so r science cannot be either eliminated or redefined in favor of the predicates of reducine th g science s stilcasi e t th li , e thainstancy e an t th f eo predicates of a higher science is also an instance of the predicates of the lower science, and that the lower science (again, physics), as more universal, retains priority.7 Thus, although there is no lawlike relation between monetary exchanges and the predicates of phys- nonethelesicss i t ,i case sth e that every monetary exchang alses i oa physical event (albei complea t x one). Instanc instancey eb , then, there is an identity between the events described and explained by the higher science and those described and explained by physics. There are several things to be noted about this position. Phrased thesia oftet s i a s ss a ni abou t objects sayst i , exampler ,fo , thae ton and the same object can have the mental property of now wanting to go sailing and the physical property of weighing 164 pounds— mental and physical predicates pertain to the same subject of predication thit s.Bu accoun clarift t doe ye relatio e t yth s no n betweee nth mental and the physical. The token-identity thesis is that my want- sailino g o t itsel gs i g in f identical somo t e (complex) physical propert yinstantiateI difference .Th e between typ toked ean n identitys i this: type identity woul correce db t if every desir sailino t g a eo r t g(o least all my desires to go sailing) were identical to one and the same physical property, whereas token identity requires only that any instance of a desire to go sailing be identical to some instance of some physical property (bu necessarilt tno y alway same sth e one). Here is an analogy. The quarters of the 6th Battalion are the quarters of Harry, Sammy, Ben. . . . But although this is an identity statement doet ,i exprest sno typsa e identity, onl ytokea n identity, for when Harry is mustered out of the service, the quarters of the 6th Battalio longeo n quartere e nrar th Harryf so , Sammy, Ben. . . . Surely ther differena s ei t identity statement, namely, thae th t quarters of the 6th Battalion are the quarters of Tommy, Sammy, Ben . . ., which has taken its place. There is no one set of persons to Battalioh whic6t e hth identicans i evern li y case, althoug everhn i y case it is identical to some set of persons. This vie seemes wha d quit difficultieses promisingha o to t i t . ,bu

7. Ibid. Nature and Spirit 39

The doctrin s ofteeha n been frame termn di eventsf so , wite hth assertion that, although mental t type-identicaeventno e sar o t l physical events, they are token-identical to them. Let us assume for the moment that events are exemplifications of properties by individuals at a time (so-called Kirn events); that is, we can identify an event wit orderee hth d triplindividualn a f eo propertya , a d an , time. Thi simplificatioa s i ordinarr ou f no y concep eventn a f t to ,bu t wil i nicelo d l nowr yfo . Token-identity theorists claim thal al t mental event token-identicae sar l with physical events. This must mean that every exemplificatio mentaa f no l propert tima t ys a ei identical with some exemplificatio physicaa f no l propert t thaya t time. Assuming thaindividuale th t timed san s involvee th e dar same, the ordered triples constituting the events can be identified propertiee onlth yf i s involve samee th e .d ar Thi s seems inevitably puso t bacs hu k toward type identity propertier fo , typese sar s i t .I difficul whay sa to t texactl y constitutes identity between properties, bu doet ti s seem clear propertiethao ttw s identica e coulb t dno n li instantiatioe on disparatt nbu e otherwise propertiee th t f I . no e sar identical, neither can we say that they are coextensive in one in- otherwiset stancmost thaa no y n t tsa t e ca bu the e coinstane y.W ar - tiate thin di s instanc t otherwiseno t e bu coinstantiatiot Bu . t no s ni strong enough to please a token-identity partisan. In discussion token-identitf so y theories, these point oftee sar n i obscured by the treatment of the mental and physical events themselve particulars sa s tha identifiede tar , apparently virtun ,i theirf eo properties muse t losw d t tno ean facBu .e sighe th t on f thats o i t ti same th e thing—a person—tha bots ha th menta physicad lan - at l tributes neee explicatt .W d no persounite e eth th f identifyyy o n b - ing the two different kinds of attributes with each other. An important question remains to be answered: Is there no rela- betweel tioal t na nperson'a s menta physicad lan l propertiese ?Ar thes distinco e s menta f o t tse thal y propertietan coexisn sca t with any set of physical properties? Our immediate reaction is that this cannocasee th ;e b thert soms ei e important connection between one's physical and mental properties. It has long been supposed that there are at least causal connections between mental and physical states, but this is not the kind of relation we are looking for here. The causal relation is a dynamic relation; we are looking for some nondynamic, ontological relation between the mental and the phys- 40 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

ical that capture belier sou f thamentay m t l attributes dependn i , their ver attributes—thas y it bod y beingd m yan n o , t menta- at l tributes require a physical substratum. A new tack on this problem has received a great deal of attention lately, namely, the claim that mental properties supervene upon physical properties concepe Th . superveniencf o t firss ewa t introduced in discussions of the relations between moral properties and natural (or physical) properties. The idea is that what physical properties a person has determine that person's mental (or moral) properties thao s , t anyone with just those physical properties (and relations, of course) has the same mental (or moral) properties, and a chang mentaen i moralr l(o ) properties mean changsa physicaen i l propertie well.s sa 8 This claim that menta morar lo l propertien sca be determined by physical properties is then complemented by a claim that this determination does not yield a reduction of the mental or moral properties to the physical. To avoid gettin technicao gr to purposes ou r fo l offeI , metaa r - phor. Philosophers often talk of properties or predicates as ways of "cuttin r sortino " worlde taks u gup th t e thiLe . s metapho- se r riousl momenta r yfo ; suppose that therprivilegeo n s ei d catalogue entitiee worlde oth f th s possibl i n t si I . e that ther severae ear l different, nonconflicting way f sortinso direco worle n g th t tdbu way of getting from one way of sorting (or even the entities sorted) anothero t inferrinf o r o , g fro item'n ma s classificatio e placon n ei n placs it eve r o eoccurrencet (o s nit anothern )i thin .I so senstw e eth sorting scheme simple sar y independen reductioo n d tan possis ni - ble, although they sort "the same thing." Nonetheless coult ,i d still case beth e thasortine on t g schem sense basis ei th n eci thaa t complete inventory of the world in the basic scheme determines the world sufficiently well that only one sorting in the other scheme is possible, thoug t vichno e versa. Thi particularls si y possible th f ei second, supervenient schem somn i partialy s ei simpld e wa an y doe t attempsno universata l classification .pictur e Thith s si e that supervenience theorists propos worldr ou f eo : thermappino n es i g on an entity-by-entity, or property-by-property basis, even using logical constructs of the entities or properties, between the mental

8. See D. Davidson, "Mental Events," in Experience and Theory, ed. L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, p. 88. Davidson uses the notion of supervenience to defend the token-identity thesis, but the two need not go together (see sources cited in note 10). Nature and Spirit 41 e physicalth completa d t an bu , e physical histore worlth f dyo psychologicae sufficeth x fi o st l histor wels ya l (an vict dno e versa). My thinking that Cookie greaa Roja s ts wa ballplayer , although identicat no l wit physica y superveny han ma , lin statem a upo eI n my physical states — that is, any person in an indistinguishable physical state is also thinking that Cookie Rojas was a great ballplayer. This leaves ope possiblite nth y personthao ttw s have content-identical thoughts without bein physicalln gi y indistinguishable states. This notio attractes nha d attention becaus seemt ei offeo st r con- firmatio intuitionr ou f no s abou primace th tmateriae th f yo l without the untoward consequences of identity theories. An interesting further development of this new position is that there also seems

reason to(abandon individualism, the position that the mental properties a person instantiates supervene only upon the physical state of that person's body relevane Th . t physical state upon whicha given mental state supervenes is certain to be very complex, and it may include state objectf so s outsid person'e eth s body argue Th . - ments against individualism are too complex to rehearse here, however.9 To recast the supervenience thesis in the linguistic mode, we can thay e statementsa th t highea f so r languag superveneS e upon thos lowea f eo r languag truthe lowee fixinf i th th e l P f sgal o r language also fixes the truths of the higher language. Alternatively, we can also say that S supervenes upon P if two worlds indistinguishable with the resources of P are also indistinguishable with those of S.10

Hegel as a Weak Monist How does this modern speculation about intertheoretic relations bear on Hegel? Does one of these patterns fit the subdisciplines in

. Tyle9 r Surge, "Individualis Mental,e th d man " Midwest Studies Philosophyn i 4 (1979)73-121; "Other Bodies/' in Thought and Object, ed. A. Woodfield; Jay Garfield, "Prepositional Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental," Cognition and Brain Theory

10. Jaegwon Kim, "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables," Ameri- can Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April 1978)1149-56; John Haugeland, "Weak Superve- nience," American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January I98z):93-io4; Garfield, "Prepo- sitional Attitudes." ' Hegel's 2 4 Theory of Mental Activity

Hegel's system? Most of these models of intertheoretic relations were motivate unity-of-science th y db e doctrine doctrina , e with which, in its positivistic, particularly physicalistic, guise, Hegel would hav littld eha e patience. Hegel show intereso forsn y man n ti of reductionism classicae th o s , l picture theorf so y reductiod nan eliminative materialism are both nonstarters for capturing Hegel's view. One might wonder whether Hegel's idealism is not just materialist reductionism stood on its head, but I find no indication that Hegel thinks he is reducing mechanics to psychology, nor any indication tha intende h t eliminato st e mechanics coule H t . dno eliminate, becaus claime eh s that each dialectie stagth a f eo s cha certain truth that mus preservede tb takI d that ei ,an t that meant si makes some sort of ineliminable contributio ultimatr ou no t e understanding world e ofth nevee .H r proposes tha earlien ta r stage e ofth philosophie naturf so spirir eo simple tb y abandone favon di a f o r later stage. Moreover, reductionism is not an open possiblity, because then the stages he discovers in nature and spirit—the whole complex articulation of his system—would collapse into one basic level. It seems more plausible that Hegel migh token-identita e b t y theorist, for this position would at least preserve the specialness of the individual sciences while also accounting for the overall mo- nism of the system. But this characterization does not work either. Hegel intimates that physical explanation t applicablno e sar o et functioning organisms r physiologicano , l explanation rationao st l agents.ll A token-identity theorist must claim that both explanatory forms are applicable; any differences can be only pragmatic or instrumental. Moreover, since identit equivalencn a s yi e relation, this would commit Hegeidentite th o t lspirituaf yo l events with natural (physical) events therindicatiod o n an , s ei n tha woule th d accept that position. There are, however, some powerful reason thinkinr sfo g that Hegel has something like supervenience in mind as the relation between adjacent special sciences. This interpretation woul- dac count for the relative independence of each level of nature and spirit

Crawfore 11Se . d Elder, Appropriating reviey Hegel,m d wthif o an se booTh n ki Owl of Minerva (Decembe4 1 r ig82):^-S, (Marc4 1 d han 1983)14-8 Nature and Spirit 43

without losing worldunit e e sighth th f f y to o woult .I d also account for Hegel's ability to order the special sciences serially, for each would then supervene upon its immediate predecessor. It would also account for the systole and diastole of the dialectic, the movement from immediacy through mediation to return to a higher immediacy eact A . h stag naturf eo vocabulare eth y appropriato et that stage pick certait sou n basic object furthet s no tha e rtar analyz- abl than ei t language. Complexe f theso s e object compled an s x interactions among them can then be described and explained within the language, but at some point there may occur complexes that possess properties unanalyzable within the old vocabulary. A new vocabulary must be introduced in which these complexes are ,now treated as basic, simple units. These new, higher simples supervene upon the complexes of the old vocabulary. Most of all, such an interpretation would allow us to grant the autonomy of the spiritual without divorcing it entirely and irreparably from the natural. Contemporary theories of supervenience are far from physicalistic positivism trumpeting the unity of science, yet they show their dialiectical origin in such positivism by retaining a conviction that physics is the foundation on which all others supervene. Surely, one would think, thi countes si Hegeliao rt n idealism coulde W . , however, invert the supervenience hierarchy and take natural facts to supervene upon spiritual facts, but this is at best unconvincing. First, we would have to sacrifice the stepwise fashion of the hierarchy to make it work, since there are natural events where there biologicao n e ar psychologicar lo l events. Second, fixin facte gth n si highese th t theory (which woul whae db t exactly? history? philosophy itself?) would be tantamount to fixing all the other facts of the world whild An . e e thingsomth f eo s Hegel says poin thin i t s direction, this vie wultimatels i y irreconcilable wit doctrins hhi f eo the, contingenc f natureyo mattea s A .f fact e retentioo r th , f no matter as the basic set of objects/events upon which all others superven thoroughls ei y consistent with Hegel's idealism. Hegen li general has no particular respect for beginning points; the result, processa f o d th usualls e,i en y whainterestes i e th d in.12

12. The end of a process need not be a final product. There are processes the end of which is the process itself (for example, the performance of a piece of music). 4 4 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

mighe On t question whethe superveniencra spirif eo t upo- nna ture threaten freedome sth spiritf o , since supervenienc fora es i mf o dependence. Here several answer possiblee sar . First facte th f , so the spiritual realm are themselves a many-layered complex. The "dependence naturae th n "o l woul vere db y distant—mediated by the biological, the anthropological, the psychological, and so forth—b time truye th eth e freedo philosophicaf mo l speculations i achieved. Second, supervenient dependence is definitely not a form of causal dependence ther d questioo n ,an es i n constitutos fit - fora g freedom-deprivinf mo in g compulsion freedoe e Th . th f mo spiritual is its self-determination, which essentially means that truths about spirit have their ground in the necessary ends of spirit. Give globae nth l natursupervenience th f eo e relation, thero n s ei dependence relation between individual spiritua materiad lan l phenomena, only one form of general dependence of the spiritual on the material. The only real problem, then, is at the very beginning: spirituae th l depend naturn so objece t leasth ea whics n i a t h it__ realizes itself. How, then, can it turn around and determine nature's own existence as well?_Hegel's answer is that spirit determines nature' existencn sow e because spiri nature's ti s telos. Since nature is the realm of efficient causation, looking for an efficient caus naturf eo e itself make senseo sn . Thus, although supervenient on nature, spirit is still entirely self-determined and therefore free. We can understand this point better by observing the deep sim- ilarities between Hegel and Aristotle. Aristotle's metaphysics is hylomorphic; every objec certai a take s ti e b no nt form inherina gn i matter appropriate to it. A hierarchy of forms is thus generated, the realization of each presupposing the availability of an appropriate dowr matterfa nw thiHo . s hierarchy reache whad sbottoan s tit m looks like has been the subject of much debate, which I can ignore. Aristotle's natural philosophy can be seen as a kind of nonreductive materialism, for matter is, in one sense, basic in his scheme. Yet 13 calling Aristotle's philosoph ymaterialisa malss i o quite misleading, fo playt ri s mucdowo to absolutel e r hnth fa y central rol formf eo t I . is Aristotle's emphasi notioe th formn f nso o , what Hegel calle sth ideal element, that prompts Hegel to see Aristotle as an important predecesso idealismf ro .

13. We get something like this in E. Hartmann, Body, Soul, and Substance. 5 4 Nature Spiritd an

Hegel's philosophie naturf so spirid vere an ar t y much Aristo- s profitabli t teliani d thino an ,t e f Hegel'ko s vie f naturwo s ea similar to Aristotle's hylomorphism; the objects of a lower stage offer the material for the further mediation, the new structures and e higheformth f o sr stages.14 Even more important, Hegel also adopt steleologicaa l worldview like tha fine Aristotletw n d i . That lowee th r stage naturf so materiae ehighee ar th r lrfo stagese th e ,ar potentialit highee th f yo r stages, entails that theiactualitn row s yi achieve highee th n di r stage. Nature points towar existd dr an sfo the sake of spirit, not because nature is someone's means for realizing an intention to create spirit, but because spirit is the force dwelling within the differentiation of nature. It is the nature of nature s Conceptit , provido t , necessare eth y conditione th r sfo realizatio itsele b essentia n o a ft spirif no d tan l par thaf to t realiza- tiont mak Bu mistake—spirito . n e e forma th ,d fina an l l cause, retains metaphysical priority. Hegel's teleologism discountins hi , philosophicae th f go l importance of such natural relations as generation or material constitution (se§249)N P e , make t possibli s assero et t tha believee h t s that something like a supervenience relation holds between individual stages of nature without violating his idealism, his conviction that spirit is the true reality of the world, for his idealism is essentially supported by his teleologism.15 What we today most commonly see a thoroughlsa y contingent emergenc supervenienf eo t objectd san complea f o eventp subvenienf to x o n so t object eventsd san , Hegel understand embodimene th e b o st goal-directeda f to , self-actualiz- ing process, the self-realization of the Idea, the Absolute. / Lesummarize tm e wha taktI e Hegel's . Natur viee b be wo o t t s ei understoo consistins da variouf go s stage levelsr so . These levels form a hierarchy, one supervening upon another, and the whole ultimately serves the self-realization of the Absolute. For each level

14. G. R. G. Mure has emphasized Hegel's indebtedness to Aristotle very heavily works inhi Hegeln so alse Hartmann. o.Se N , "Hege Aristoteles,d lun " Beitragen zur Philosophic (1923). 15. One could say that, according to Hegel, the real mistake materialists make is in thinking that what something consistmose th s ti importanf so t thin knogo t w about it. He would rather have us ask about its role in the realization of the Absolute, without denying that questions of material constitution are also worthwhile. The materialist does not usually pay Hegel similar respect; materialism denies that asking about roles in the realization of the Absolute makes sense. 46 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

there is a set of concepts in which the objects of that stage can be described and explained; these concepts are neither eliminable nor reducible. The empirical sciences are consequently also irreducible; each develops and applies the concepts peculiar to a particular level to describe and explain individual phenomena at that level. Inquiry is not, however, exhausted by these empirical disciplines. We can inquire further int nature concepte oth th f eo s employee th y db empirical disciplines and their interrelations (thus philosophies of nature and spirit), into the nature of concepts in general (logic), and finally intself-realizatioe oth Absolute th f no e (philosophy iiber- haupt). These philosophical inquiries are all highly nonempirical, of course.

DISTINGUISHING NATURE AND SPIRT Externalit Self-determinatiod yan n Given Hegel's stepwise arrangement of empirical disciplines, we must now ask more specifically what motivates the distinction between nature and spirit for Hegel. How can he draw any deeper deft between the language of organisms and the language of anthropology tha drawe nh s betweeotheo tw r y adjacennan t disciplines? The answer is that Hegel perceives certain structural sim- ilarities within the sciences of nature and within the Geisteswissen- schaften, along with some important differences between nature spiritd firsan e whicf th ,o t contrasa s hi t betwee externae nth d lan internal.e th 1 have already discussed this distinction briefly- Na . 16 tur s self-externaei l becaus naturad an t ei l t selfobjectno -e ar s determining. This means, first of all, that in explaining some natural phenomenon (the movement of a billiard ball, for instance), one looks outside that phenomeno externan a r nfo l cause, some other natural phenomenon. Explanations continually lead into the thicket of natural phenomena; natural fact determinee sar othery db , distinct natural facts contrastn I . Absolute th , totalles i y self-determining; there is nowhere else to turn. The stages of nature and spirit leading up to the Absolute are stages of increasing self-determination.

16. PN §247ff; PSS §381, Zusatz; cf. PSS, vol. i, pp. io5ff. Nature and Spirit 47

externalite Th naturf yo anothers eha , deeper meanin Hegel'gn i s philosophy: "Nature's essentia distinctivd an l e characteristio t s ci be the Idea in the form of otherness." (PN §247, Zusatz). It is not just the case that understanding any natural phenomenon inevitably otheo leadt e r snaturaon l phenomena alst ,obu that understanding 1 such phenomena as natural involves seeing them in contrast to the spiritual. Spirit is self-explanatory, self-subsistent, total actuality. In contrass it spirito t , natur nons ei thesef eo mustt I . , accordingo t Hegel, be conceived of as pointing to spirit, working toward its own fulfillmen complete th n i t e actualit spiritf yo . Natur whola s ea s ei itself a spiritual phenomenon; the existence and general structure of 1 nature canno understooe tb d solel naturan yo l principle t mussbu t be referred to spirit. In that the very being of nature is realized only through spirit, natur self-externals ei . These characteristics constitut externalite eth naturf yo genn ei - levele eral th t riol naturf so bu ,al t self-externae ear same th eo t l degree. In particular, in the final stage of nature, the animal organism firse th , t for externalitf mo almostys i completely overcomer fo , organise th self-maintainina ms i g system even :n"A more complete triumph over externality is exhibited in the animal organism; in this t onlno y does each member generat other e causs eth it d s i ,ean effect meansams e it , th end d t ea s thatiman o s ,i s t s tei it itsel d fan whole Other pervadeo th s t s euniti s bu , it y ydb that nothint i n gi appears as independent, every determinateness is at once ideal, the animal remainin evergn i y determinatenes same universalse th eon , s oanimae thath n ti l bod complete yth e untrut asundernesf ho s si revealed" (PN §381, Zusatz, Miller tr.). The story of nature is the story of the increasing self-determination present in nature, a story that continue switd t broughwite en h th no hn s a i spirit t o i t r fo , animal organism. Although the animal has acquired considerable freedom within its environment, it is still bound to its natural conditions furthey An . r step toward greater self-determination would involve somehow transcending the animal's natural conditions. Ther therefores i trulo en y self-sustaining naturabeine th gn i l world. The closest thing to a self-sustaining being in nature is the animal genus, which persists in and through the demise of its members. But the genus is also self-external in that it has no existence apart from the manifold individuals, which have no consciousness of their species being. The genus is sh'll scattered in 48 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

mutually external objects. In the realm of spirit, the universal is to come int own—ts oit o achiev existencn ea et merel thano s ti y scattered among different, mutually external individuals. How exactly this occurs we discuss in detail later. The distinction between nature and spirit, then, is not an absolute cleft; nature itsel successivels fha y more spiritual stages thin .I s sens breae eth k between natur spirid e an arbitrary s ti ; ther placs ei e for a line here somewhere, but Hegel could have displaced it in either direction without obviously upsettin fine-grainee gth d struc- wholee turth f eo . Sensation instancer ,fo , occur majoa s sa r topif co consideration in both the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and it offers us an interesting case study. In the post-Cartesian tradition, sensatio clearlns i y mental physical.t ,no 17 Denying minds to animals entailed denying them sensations. In Hegel's system, sensation is clearly a property of complex organisms, but it is also the immediate, simple, first reality of the spiritual. Sensation offer pivosa t point phenomeno,a n wit fooe hn on ti both the natural and the spiritual realms. The dualist would like to force a decision one way or the other; sensation is either natural or spiritual, but not both. Hegel rejects this simple disjunction. Sensa- tion emerges as a property of complex organisms and is a form of assimilation externae th f o l object correctls i t I . y considered natural becaus sensation ei animae nth l organis mstils i l largely determined fro outsidee mth self-determinedt ,no othee th n r handO . fora s m,a of the assimilation of the external object, sensation is also spiritual internalization a insofas i t i s ra externa e th f no l object which allows further, new relations to that external object to develop as forms of self-determination on the part of the organism; that is, in organizing its sensations in ever more complex ways, the organism also acquires new relations to the external object, but now through a process that is self-determined and internal. Thus sensation has two faces—and the point of view from which one looks at it becomes crucial simpla s A . e propert complef yo x organisms, sensatio decidedls ni y natural nondestructive th s a ; e internalizatiof no externae th lfundamen e objectth s i spiritual. e t i ,th f o t 18

17. Descartes himself was not so straightforward. 18. In my discussion here it sounds as if sensation is the turning point between natur spirit—thd ean e last stag firs nature f spiritef o th o t d e.an Thi nots i , however, case e Philosophye th Th . of Nature ends with "the proces genuse th f so "e (thath , tis life cycle of the organism), and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit begins with "the 9 4 Nature Spiritd an

There is no clear break between nature and spirit; rather, these poleo tw se betweear n which ther complea es i x serie intermedif so - ate stages. Hegel draw line seth between natur spirid ean t where eh does becaust ,no e ther soms e i cleae eon r spirituae marth f ko l that suddenly appear scenee th becaus t n s,o bu that ea t poin sufficienta t numbe e characteristicth f o r e spirituath f o s l have appeareo dt justif distinctionya . From thi spirituase pointh , on t l makes itself ever more evident.

Nature Th Spirif eo t I have so far talked of spirit as if the only feature distinguishing it from nature were degre self-determinationf eo . Hegel does, however, say quite a bit more than this, and we must now turn to his fuller pronouncements about the nature of spirit to see how these further illuminat statuindividuae e eth th f so l theorys minhi n di . Three principle characteristics emerg s expositiohi n e i th f no concept of spirit at the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit—the idealit spiritf yo freedoms ,it existenc s it d an , self-manifestations ea : "We must designate as the distinctive determinateness of the concept of Spirit, ideality, that is, the overcoming of the Idea's otherness procese ,th returning—anf so accomplishee dth d return—into Idee itselth af o ffro s Othermit " (§381, Zusatz). Hegel probably derives this use of "ideality" from the Kantian notion of the Ideal of Reason unconditionede th , . Spirit overcome othes sit than ri t that othemanifestatioe th s ri spiritf no revelations ,it overcominy .B s git other, making its other a moment within itself, spirit ceases to be conditioned by anything external. It is as unconditioned that it is ideal. Since spiri s preciseli t s self-revelationyit , nature—ae on s for thif mo s revelatio spirit—if no longeo sn r absolutely opposedo t spirit. Nonetheless complete , naturth t no perfecr s ei o t revelation of spirit, and insofar as spirit's essential nature is this self-revelation, nature is not yet spirit. Spirit reveals itself in three forms (§383, Zusatz). The first and

natural soul" (including discussions of the ways the soul is attuned to large-scale phenomen situationsd aan , suc geographis ha c location, climate cosmid an , c influences) I hav. e therefore oversimplifie complee th d x relations between spirid an t nature to some extent, but without losing anything essential for our purposes. 0 5 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

lowest form, the form we find in nature, is revelation of spirit only to another, that is, some external observer. Second, the idea "creates for itself an existence conformable to its inwardness and universality" (§384, Zusatz), createt thai , tis humae sth n beinge th n .I human being, spiri t onlno ty reveals itself but, more importantt i , reveals itsel itself.knoe o t f W w ourselvee revelatioth e b o sf t n o spirit perfece .th Yett tye s finit ,t a eve , no e n so e mind ar e sw revelatio spiritf no revelatioe th , whicn ni l otherneshal overs si - come:

Spirit converts nature int objecn oa t confrontin , reflectgit s upo, nit takes back the externality of nature into its own inwardness, idealizes nature and thus in the object becomes for itself. But this first being-for- sel f spirio f itsels i t f still immediate, abstract t absoluteno , selfe th ; - externality of spirit is not absolutely overcome by it. The awakening spiri discert t doeye t nsno her units eit y wit spirie hth t concealed dan implicit in nature, to which it stands, therefore, in an external relation. (§384, Zusatz, Miller tr., adapted)

thire Ilasd nth dan t for f spirit'mo s self-revelation, spirit knows creationn ow natur naturd s it an ,finitd s ea ean e spirit losl eal externality; they are but forms of spirit's self-revelation. We normally distinguish between wha manifestes ti revealer do d (the content of the revelation) and how it is revealed (the form). I may manifest an inner insecurity either by withdrawing from respon- sibility or by seeking out ever new responsibilities with which to prove myself, for example. But the self-revelation of spirit is not subject to this distinction (§383, Zusatz); rather, spirit's self-revelation is precisely what is revealed. have w Sr eo connectefa three th f eo importano dtw t characteristics of spirit, its ideality and its self-revelation. Spirit is ideal, without an absolute other, because its apparent other—nature—is alread self-manifestatioe yfora th f mo n that spiri Spiri. tis , furthertis , free. Hegel also calls this "absolute negativity. t freedo"Bu s mi precisely the absence of dependence on an other (§382, Zusatz), self- determination. Spirit is only what it makes itself. Hegel's concept of spirit is difficult and confusing. Even with the above list of major characteristics, one cannot seem to put one's 1 5 Nature Spiritd an

finger on the concept.19 But because I am concerned only with one particular set of stages of finite spirit, I shall not try to do what I thin kcannoI t do—mak aspecte th l e al Hegel'f so s concep Geistf to perfectly clear. It is helpful to think of spirit as the ordering activity operative within the universe, an activity that is capable of self- reflection in that it is in some sense capable of metaordering, ordering its own ordering activity. Such a conception of spirit fits the three characteristics I have focused on here. The universal ordering activit overcomine th s yi others it f go , namely lace orderf th ,k o . Even a lack of order is not absolutely opposed to such an activity, for it is the presupposition of such activity, and it is far from clear thanotioe absolutn th ta f no e lac f ordeko r makes real sense.20 Order makes itself manifest neet i , revea t dno l something elsed .An the ordering activity is free, for determination is a form of order, so nothing else can determine it, bind it. Determination is a form of ordersource ordel th al onl n o f s ,eself-determinedo e r ca y b . This account is still very general, but it is enough to give us a sense of the direction of Hegel's thought. In later chapters more detail about the way finite, subjective spiri orderinn a s ti g activit addedys i , piecy eb piece, supporting this approac spirito ht . We must still specif notioe yth spirif nfurthert o bi ta thao e s , tw can finally begi deao nt l with finite, subjective spirit subjece th , f o t the philosophy of mind. According to Hegel, the point of calling anything finitassero t s ei discrepanca t y betwee conceps nit d an t the reality (§386) and, in particular, to claim that the reality falls concepte shorth f o t finitn I . e mind (spiri itseln i s i tf infinite- al , thoug containht i s finitude therefore )w e have spiri fullt thano ys ti manifest, nor fully ideal, nor fully free. Finite mind is, as it were, spirit still strugglin gaio gt n contro f itselfo l freo t , e itself from nature, whic somethinhs i gsimplt i y finds over agains Absolut. tit e spirit finds itself everywhere; finite spirit "does not yet discern here its unity wit spirie hth t conceale implicid dan naturen ti whico ,t t hi

Solomone se t Bu . , "Hegel'19 s Concep Geist";f to Charled an s Taylor, Hegel. alsI o find Josiah Royce's Lectures Modernn o Idealism, which seem havo st e been forgotten lately, quite helpful. 20. In view of the fact that nature is spirif s other, and that nature itself is not a complete lac orderf ko thin,I k tha shoule tw d conclude tha notioe t th complet a f no e lack of order cannot be made out according to Hegel any more than a concept of pure nothing can. 52 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

stands, therefore, in an external relation. . . . Here, consequently, spiri naturn ti stils elimitatioha la jusd thiy nan b t s limitatios ni finite spirit" (§384, Zusatz, tr.)y m . concernee ar Bue tw particuladn i r with subjective spirit, whichs i a stage of finite spirit. How does it differ from objective spirit? "As lon s spiriga t stands relateOthern a s onl i o itselt o t dt yi ,s a f subjective spirit, originatin Naturg n first i a td itselean f natural spirit. Buentire th t e activit f subjectivyo e spiri directes i t graspino dt g itself as its own self, proving itself to be the ideality of its immediate reality. Whe attaines ha t nbeing-for-selfi a o dt longeo , n the s i nt ri merely subjective objectivet bu , spirit" (§385, Zusatz, Miller tr.)e .Th distinction seems primaril thate b subjectivn i o ,yt e spirit, spirit finds ,itself reveale givena n di material, wherea objectivn si e spirit, constructinn o t spiri revelationn se s i tow s git , makin worle gth d over in its own image, as it were, by constructing a society and a civil state. Subjective spiri stils ti l essentially tinged with passivityt ;i receives a given passively, as if from the outside, which it subsequently recognize beins sa gmanifestatioa spirituale th f no . Equally important, objective spirit is the realm of intersubjectivity. Subjec- tive treatmene spirith individuae s i t th f o t l "I." Objective spirit treat "We,e lessth o n s"a essentia l phas spirit'n ei s self-actualization. This leads to a peculiarity in the Hegelian system: theorization cognitiod an n seem alread perfectee b o yt subjectivn i d e spirit, whereas practical being must still traverse all of objective and absolute spirit. This imbalance I believe,overcome b n ca , e onlf yi 21 absolute spirit is also the fulfillment of man's cognitive being as well as his practical being.

21. This imbalance is tellingly pointed out in T. Litt, Hegel: Versuch einer kritischen Erneuerung. Sensation: Mind's Material

If the question of sensation or perception arises in a discussion of Hegel discussioe focue th ,th f s o openin e th likelns i e b gyo t chap- Phenomenologye terth f so of Spirit 1807.f o 1 Suc hfocua s is, however, a mistake. The examination of sense certainty and perception in the Phenomenology bears on the question of the proper categories to be applied within experience t therdiscussioo n bu , s ei n e therth f eo actual nature of sensation or perception as states of organic and spiritual beings withi nnaturaa l world understano T . d what Hegel thinks sensatio perceptiod nan n themselve muse w e ts tursar hi no t Anthropology and Psychology. Hegel's theory of sensibility tries to do justice to the insights of such predecessors as Aristotle, Hume, and Kant while also provid- in gframewora k within whic empiricae hth n ca ly researcda e th f ho be comprehended systematically theors Hi . y doe t answesno l ral the desiderata imposed on philosophical theories of perception by analytic philosophers today, suc detailins h a necessar f o t se ga d yan sufficient conditions to distinguish veridical from nonveridical per-

. HamlynW . s SensationiD hi . n i ,Perception: d an HistoryA Philosophye oth f f o Perception, commits precisely this erro maked ran mistakee sth s suc erron ha r could expectee b fosterdo t attributee h ; Hegeo st "minimula attentiomf o role th f e o no t sensation in perception" and the notion that "the only thing which is 'given' is experienc whole,a s ea claimd "an s that "idealism make difficulst i t for itsel justifo ft y the claim that anything independent of ourselves exists" (pp. 144-45). Others among English-speaking authors who emphasize the Phenomenology of Spirit too heavil thin yi s regard include Charle . SolomonC s . TayloR d ran . 4 5 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

ception merr ,o e perceptual mistake from hallucination doet i t s,bu show sensitiva e consideratio problemf no ontologe th n si sensf yo e and the differentiation of various levels of perceptual experience. Hegel's distinction between sensatio highee th d r nan menta l activities, like Kant's phrases i , termn d i distinctio a f so n between activ passived ean . Although repeatedle h s a , y claims, spiris i t essentially active, Hegel does not believe that there is no passive, receptive elemen individuale th n ti , subjective spirit theors Hi . f yo sensatio intuitiod nan bess ni t attempn seea s na explicato t e eth nature of the receptive element in spirit and its relation to the spontaneous, rational essence. His most important theses are these:

1. Sensation, though clearly mental, is not itself cognitive; the intention- alit sensatiof intentionalite yo th t no ns i thoughtf yo . 2. Sensation is nonetheless basic to cognition and is the starting point of l knowledgal d experienceean . < 3. The world of one's direct sensory experience is a phenomenal workP sense inth econstructioa tha s affectionsi s t it ti f mine o t th dy ou n b . Given Hegel's metaphysics, however, this does not entail that we are confined to knowledge of a merely phenomenal world. 4. Ther differene ear t level spirit'f so s emergence fro passivite mth f yo pure sensatio spiris na t liberates itself fro dependencs mit e th n eo immediats it bod d yan e physical environment.

We begi discussiny nb nature gth sensatiof eo Hegel'n i s theory. Hegel makes several related attempts to differentiate the sentient from the nonsentient; after looking at these, we discuss in greater detail the nature of the relation between mind and object in sensation.

SENTIENNONSENTIENE E TH TH D TAN T

Sensation is a property of animals as well as humans, but we cannot recoun whol e Philosophye tth th f eo of Nature her ordeen i o rt propee th t rge backgroun understandinr dfo emergence gth f eo sensation withi animae nth l organism whan .I t follow summarizsI e what I take to be the most important points. Sensation: Mind's Material 55

The Nature of the Animal Organism The animal organism is a highly organized chunk of nature, composed of the objects of the lower levels of nature, the physical and the chemical. But it is not simply a conglomeration of such objects (see §350, Zusatz). What, e animathenth s i , l itselfe Th ? animal is a unity in a way no inorganic conglomeration is. The unifying telos is, in the case of the animal, internal, unlike the inorganic, the telos of which is some external goal. Hegel expresses this important difference, perhaps unfortunately terme n i ,th f so anima universaln beinow s git l over agains particulas tit r aspects: 2 "An even more complete triumph over externality is exhibited in animae th l organism thit n onl;i sno y does each member generate othere causs th it effect d s i ,e an mean s it , t endd a thass o an i s , t ti the same time itself and its Other, but the whole is so pervaded by its unity that nothing appear independents sa , every determinatenes onct a s i e ideal animae ,th l remainin evergn i y determinateness same universale th eon animae thath o s ,n i t l bod complete yth e untruth of asunderness is revealed" (§381, Zusatz, Miller tr.). Hegel want maintaio st n thamode th t animae beinf eo th f go l organism and even more so of the human involves a rather special relation between universality and particularity. The relation of an inanimate object to its genus is, according to Hegel, external. The individual is merely subsumed under the genus, which just collects otherwisf o t ase e disparate individuals; ther intrinsio n es i c uniting power active in them. There is, for instance, no intrinsic, active essence that all red things have in common. To this extent the 3 inanimate individual and its universal are both abstract. In the animate object, on the contrary, its universal, its concept, is dis- tinctly active within it, and the animate, organic individual actual- izes and maintains itself from within. In the animal the externality 4

2. If one recalls here the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms and its application biologn si psychologyd yan , these see t view no strangem s a o sd . propertiel al t No . inanimatf s3 o e thing equalle sar y external naturae .Th l kindo t which a thing belongs has a closer relation to the thing than do its other characteristics. self-organizatioe 4Th . n Kant attribute organismo st s (Naturzwecke) , alonis g with Aristotle's concept of the organism, an important influence on this aspect of Hegel's theory. 6 5 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

of natur overcomeonles n i ca y e explaiw r understand ,fo nan e dth animal's structur behaviord ean , Hegel thinks thinkiny b , s it f go structure and behavior as the expression of a unitary (though complex) concrete universal active withi animal.e nth 5 Botanical, animal humad an , n being self-organizinge sar e Th . animal, qua universal, is the principle that orders and gives co- herenc various it o et s element propertiesd san contrasn i t a ,bu o t des roca r kdoekt o i itselfo ss , from inside rock.A instance r ,fo t a s ,i best only nominally organized; eve complen i x crystal structures there is no need to refer to functions within a system to explain the organization of the crystal. That a rock has the structure it has and behaves as it does depends solely on the stuff it consists of and its external situation. Artifacts are more highly organized. The properties and behavior of a desk are explained in large part by the function it is intended to serve. It can be made of wood, metal, even plasticca n e slowlw ; y replace wood with metal partd san retain the same desk. The desk is free of strict dependence on its material constitution. Nonetheless, its principle of organization or essenc extrinsices i , bestowe somy b t i e n persondo organisn a n .I m principle th f organizatioeo intrinsic—organisms ni - de t no e sar signed by someone to fulfill a purpose but are themselves their own purpose. The organism is an active universal because, although a universa relation li partss it o nmust t i , mentionee tb adey an - n di quate explanation of them. The organism is its own effect and therefore must be active.

The Sentient Organism Feeling occurs in the animal, according to Hegel, "as the individuality which in the determinateness is immediately universal to 6 itself, simply remains wit preserved han s itself existine :th g ideality

5. Hegel make contrase sth t between interna externad an l greaa o d lt deaf o l work; it separates animal organisms from inanimate nature, but it is also used, as we have seen separato ,t e spirit from nature bees ha nt . I suggeste d that ther simpla es i e ambiguit Hegel'n yi s usage, there really bein differeno gtw t contrasts—one Aristo- telian, which culminate internalite th n sorganisme i th secone f yth o d dan , Carte- sian, which culminates in the internality of a subjectivity (E. Heintel, "Aristotelismus Transzendentalismud un 'Begriffn si Hegel")i be ' prefeI . thino t r k that e theron s ei univocal contrast wit articulaten ha surt thatye f eo t d .structureno m a I t ,bu . "Determinateness6 Hegelias "i qualita r nfo somethingf yo . 7 5 Sensation: Mind's Material

of being determined" (PN, §351, Miller tr.). "Feelin jusgs i t thi- som nipresenc members animae unitit e l th th al f f yeo o n li s whic- him mediately communicate every impression to the one whole which, animale i nth incipienn a s i , t being-for-self" (§381, Zusatz, Miller tr.)- Thes obscure ear unusuallt e leastpassagese no t th y ,bu sa y o ,t so among passages in which Hegel tries to distinguish the sentient fro nonsentiente mth mose Th . t complete statement Hegel makes onln subjece a th yn i n recentls o i t y published unfinished manuscrip projecteda f to , book-length versio Philosophye th f no of Subjec- tive Spirit:

If neutral wate coloureds ri exampler ,fo simpl o s d y,an possesses this quality, is simply in this condition, it would be sentient if it were not a matte s a f possibilitr o ro s u onl r yfo tha t differei t d froe mth condition, but it were at the same time to distinguish itself from itself beins a determinedo gs . Differently expressed genue th : s color only exists as blue, or as a certain specific color; in that it is blue, it remains the genus color. But if the color as color, i.e., not as blue but at the same time as color, persisted in opposition to itself as blue color—if the difference betwee universalits nit particularits it d yan y wer simt eno - ply/or us but existed within itself, it would be sensation of blue. (PSS, vol. . 123i,p )

These passages are confusing and obscure, but Hegel is trying to describe somethin evanescence gth f whiceo s frustratehha l al d philosophers. He is trying to describe what it is in the nature of certain beings that makes them sentient, that qualifies them for the predicate "aware." A nonsentient being a stone, r examplefo , havn ca , ea colo r property, say gray. The distinction between the stone and its gray- nes simpla s si e modal Cartesiadistinctioe th e us no n(t terminol - ogy) animacoloren e b .A n precisellca dn i same ye th eth f wayi t .Bu animal senses something gray, how is it then related to grayness? A dualist might say that this is again a simple modal distinction between the mind (instead of the body) and one of its properties. Being gra sensind yan g gray hav differeno etw t subjects contrasn .I t to this dualistic picture, Hegel wants to keep a unitary subject. The same thing—the animal—can bot grae senshd b yan e graye Th . difference between being gray and sensing gray lies in the relation the subject bears to the properties of its sense organs. 8 5 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

The nonsentient subjec s exhaustei t propertiess it n di , Hegel seem claiminge b o st maket ;i distinctioo sn n betweens it itsel d fan properties, although we do. The sentient being, however, retains for itsel identitn fa y over agains particulas tit r properties maket ,i sa distinction between itself and its properties. This is all pretty mysti- fying thinI t kbu , some mad e sens. b it n f eo e ca Hegel insists that the sensible quality is now posited within the soul as ideal. Hegel often uses "ideal" to characterize somethingcas being unconditioned by anything external, and we would normally thin f sensatioko prima s na e exampl f determinatioeo e th y nb external. "That the soul finds itself so determined, that is why the determinateness is at the same time posited as ideal in the soul, and tha n qualitidealita e I t . th t it no f thiyf o s y i o s determinateness si not another determinateness, which takes its place and drives out first e rathet th bu , r tha soue th t lidealite itseldetere th th s i ff y-o minateness and is reflected into itself, the finite, i.e., is infinite, the determinatenes mer a als s t i oeno state" (PSS, vol. 122. i tr.,p y );m Hegel's notion seems to be that sensations are peculiar because, although they are in one sense properties brought about by external large)d factoran y , (b swha t the depende yar s cruciall thein yo r occurrence in the context of a complex organic whole. Hegel's point believeI , is , that thersimplo n es i e connection betwee physicae nth l state o sensorfa yorganism'e orgath d nan s sensory state. Particular sensations—ho e sens e statth w th f eeo organs affect totae th s l sensory state—are dependent on that total sensory state as well. To extene th t that each sensatio alsns i o dependen totae th l n statto f eo organisme th sensatioe th , n doe upset sself-determinationo e th t n of the organism. Perhaps an example can help. Thermostats are sensitive to temperature—bu t senset theno o yhead coldr o t . Hegel would sayt i , seems, something like this: "If the temperature as temperature, that same th t ea timt temperatures bu ea ° 78 s a t no , , persisteis n di opposition to itself as 78°, it would sense 78°." In some ways our sense organs are meters of our environment, capable of recording its state with sometimes surprising accuracy. We might, then, try to r possessiothinou f ko certaia f no n r possessiosensou s ea a f no metering subsystem that feeds its output into some central pro- cesso calculatere wherb n ca et i d int totar oou l behavior functionn I . such a complex system, we might claim, the temperature as tern- 9 5 Sensation: Mind's Material

perature speciae fore th th f m o n li , metering subsystem, persistn si opposition to any specific value it may output. But clearly there are many such systems—for example, central heating systems—which do not literally sense heat or cold. What Hegel would find repugnant in the above example is not the isolation of a particular metering system—this would correspond to a sense organ, and Hegel never doubts the existence of those. Rather, he would object to the form of connection between meterine th g centra e systeth d ml an processor metee Th .con s ri - ceived of as fully independent of the central processor, adding its isolable input without regard to the state of any other part of the whole. In other words, the meter is fully modular. This is not an organic unity. The input-output function of the meter would also at least hav havo et ereciprocaa l dependenc totae th ln e stateo th f eo whole system in order for this condition to be met. Only to a system exhibiting strong reciprocity between the particular states of its totae partth ld statsan e (for Hege universals lit ) coul attribute dw e sensation. Is Hegel's view of sensation and the mind itself therefore refuted by the contemporary evidence that a number of our psychological abilitie modular?e sar Althoug consistentle hh y rails against faculty 7 psychology, Hegel does make distinctions among sensation, feeling, intuition, and imagination. Modularity is not all or nothing, and Hegel does not seem to require total nonmodularity in the mind therefore W . e canno tha y apparene tsa tth t modularity presently attributed to a number of our psychological capacities is a refutation of Hegel. But it certainly seems fair to say that the more highly modular are our abilities, the less attractive is a Hegelian theory of mind. In his emphasis on the rationality of spirit and human nature, Hege wely llma have gon fathinkino n ri e to g thal tal

Jerre Se y . Fodor7 , The Modularity of Mind, generaa r fo l discussio modularityf no . Fodor explains his terms as follows: "By saying that confirmation is isotropic, I mean thafacte th t s relevan confirmatioe th o t scientifia f no c hypothesi drawe b y nsma from anywher fiele previouslf th d o en i y established empirical (or coursef ,o , demonstrative) truths. Crudely: everything tha scientise tth t know principlen i , sis , relevant to determining what else he ought to believe. . . . By saying that scientific confirma- tio s Qujneanni I mea, n thadegree th t f confirmatioeo n assigne givey an no dt hypothesis is sensitive to properties of the entire belief system; as it were, the shape of our whole science bears on the epistemic status of each scientific hypothesis" (pp. 105-7). 0 6 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

our mental abilities have the Quinean, isotropic (that is, multidi- mensionally holistic) nature reasoning exhibits. Hegel's confusing but tantalizing remarks about sentience and nonsentience do not help us much in the end. Ultimately we are only told that the sensible organism relates to some of its states in very peculiar ways, ways that are understood by reference to the holistic, organic context in which they occur. At best, Hegel is insisting that there is a limit on the modularity of a sentient system. A sentient being mus more tb e tightly unifie morr do e closeld yan complexly self-related than a conglomeration of modular metering systems attached to some central processing device. This may be true, but without further specification of the relations involved it is not very helpful.

OBJECE TH SENSATIOF TO N

Hegel's attempt to distinguish the sentient from the nonsentient doe succeedt sno neithet ,bu anyons rha e else's. Ther mores e i b eo t found, however, whe considee nw objecte rth contentr o sensatiof o n and the nature of the relation between the sensation and its object. Hegel talks rather loosel contene th f y o objec r to sensationf to d ,an it appears that ther three ear e candidate positione th e r th sfo ) (a : external object involve causae th dn i l process that culminatee th n si perceiver's having a certain sensation; (b) the proper sensible itself—a color, tone, taste; (c) the animal or human itself. The first two candidates are familiar, but the third seems un- note m likelyet textuae somle th o f s ,e o l evidence that shows that this alternative must be taken seriously. Hegel continually insists tha sensationn ti , feeling intuitiod an , subjece nth t finds itself,d an that such mental activitie immediate th e sar e being-for-sele th f o f organism metaphora s A . self-directednese th , sensatiof so n per- vades Hegel's discussion. Furthermore, there are plenty of explicit passages such as the following: "In that the animal senses, it doesn't only sense itself, but itself as determined in a particular way" (§35/a> Zusatz). The three object sensation—thf so e external object propee th , r sensible animae th d lan ,itself—ar e "objects sensatiof "o difn i - ferent senses Heged an , l keep sensee sth s clearly separate. There Sensation: Mind's Material 61

are, however, extra complications arising becaus Hegel'f eo s distinction between inne outed ran r sense.

Inne Outed ran r Sense The distinction between inner and outer sense does not consist in certain sensations being given as inner and others as outer, for as we shall see, sensations are not given as anything at all. Neither does this distinction have anything to do with the Kantian distinction betwee forme nth innef o souted an r r sense. Rather Hegel'n i , s system distinctioe th , foundes ni etiologe sensatioth e n th do f yo n and its content. External sensations are those determined by causal processes originatin somn gi e physical objec d affectinan t e th g sense organs: "One spher sentiencf eo e distinguishes itself prin- cipalldeterminatioe th s ya etc.e e corporeitf nth o ey f ,e o th f y(o parts of the body in general) and becomes sensation in that it is recollected, internalized within the being-for-self of the soul" (§401). Internal sensations othee resule th th n rf t o ,handto no e ar , causae th l influenc physicaa f eo l objec sensora n o t y organ; they arise instead through the agency of spirit acting on itself, embodying some higher mental state exampler fo , thoughta , orden ,i r that it may be sensed: "Another [sphere of sentience] distinguishes itself as the determinatenesses which have originated in and pertain to spirit, and which are embodied in order to be as if they had been found sensedr o , " (§401). Hegel leaves it unclear whether internal sensation is something that uses its own particular organ of sense. The examples he gives 8 believo t leae don e tha actuae tth l sensin internan a f go l sensations i accomplished by the organs of external sensation, for he gives the feelings of anger and courage sensed in the breast and blood, the flushin face shameth n e i f go trembline th , pallod gan fearf d ro an , the sensation of meditation in the head as examples, and these can be considered to be sensibles proper to touch. They might, however, be considered sensibles proper to proprioception, the status of

8 .deniee b Hege o t dt lhowever no doe s thisi y t ssa :"I , tha accordancn ti e with the variety of their content, the inner sensations have at the same time a particular organ within which their primary and predominant embodiment takes place" (§401, Zusatz), but this does not answer the question of how we sense such things. 62 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

muddywhict bi a hs i .standar e Proprioceptioth f o e d on fiv t eno ns i senses, and it is peculiar in that one proprioceives only one's own body, neve externan ra l object. Nonetheless inney ,b r sense Hegel clearly doe t measno n proprioception doee t h recogniz r sno fo , e proprioception as a separate sense, and proprioception does not hav propee eth r etiology. Proprioceptive knowledg disposie th f eo - limb r gastrif tioo ou r f sno o c distress doe rest innen sno to r sensations in Hegel's sense. The etiology of the sensation is the most important difference between the inner and the outer. But inne outed ran r sensatio alse nar o distinguished with respect theio t r content Zusatze th §40n o I .t 1 Hegel talks more specifically about inner sensations, placing them into two categories. First, "there are those which concern my immediate individuality in some particular relationship or condition." His instances of this category ar emotionsl eal treatiny .B g emotion innes sa r sensahons Hegen lca account for both their purely occurrent felt quality and the often complex intentional structure they contain,- sincem e th the e yar bodiment of and therefore are involved in higher spiritual activities. The second kind of internal sensations consists of those "which relate to that which, in and for itself, is a universal, to right, to the ethical religiono ,t beautifue true. othee t th a th t o ,t d r"Ye placelan s Hegel insists tha objece tth sensatiof to alwayns i s something singular: "Now since what is unmediated is a singularization, everything forsensee th singularity"f m o s dha (§400, Zusatz). Beside spee sth - cific lis universalf o t givee sh objects sa innef so r sensation, however, Hegel also claims that all the content of the mental sphere— includin objecte gth thoughf so t itself—exist sensationn si s i w Ho . this conflic resolvede b o t t ? What would coun sensatioa s ta rightf no seem t ?thaI e e m tw o st would tal sucf ko hsensatioa n (thoug mighe hw t prefe phrase rth e "feeling of lightness") in a situation in which we are confronted with a certain state of affairs to which we immediately react, "But that's wrong!" or "That's right!" Hegel's point is that in their mental structure those reactions, insofa thes ra y hav purelea y felt, noncognitive, affective aspect (that "gut feeling"), are forms of sensation. The pure occurrent felt quality is confined to a particular agent at a particular rim responsen i particulaa eo t r situation"fore th ms ha t .I of singularity." Such sensations presuppose considerable sophisticated mental activity; they need to be learned. The ability to em- 3 6 Sensation: Mind's Material

body sophisticated content simple th n si e for sensatiof mo - ex s ni tremely important. Hegel insists tha ideae th t rightf so justicef o , , and so on are only truly and completely appropriated by spirit when they are not merely the objects of thought but have become internalized in this way. "Principles, religion etc. must be in the heart, they mus enougt sensed,e tno b s i t hi that they shoul onle db y shoule reminde have t headOn e b i . dnno th o . et . . d however, that what is religious, ethical, true, just, etc. is not justified by the form of sensation and of the heart, and that an appeal in this context to the heart or to sensation is either simply meaningless or down- right pernicious" (§400). Hegel explicitly states tha contente tth innef o r sensatio itselns i f properly handled Psychologye onlth n yi lase th ,t stag subjecf eo - tive earlspirite th t y Anthropology.A e stag th f eo , wher introe eh - duce distinctione sth concere th embodiment,e th s ni innef o r sensations. Thus the sensation of sin, qua sensation, need not be anything more than a peculiar sensation in the pit of one's stomach or some such. What makes it an inner sensation is its etiology, the face embodimenth t s thai t i t highea f o te rth spirituad an t ac l capturing of the more complex act in the immediacy of sensation. In making the distinction between inner and outer sensation, Hegel is concerned to account for the fact that our higher mental activities Can acquir epurela y occurrent affective aspect occurrene .Th t inner sensatio contena s nha t solel virtu yn causai s it f eo l connection with other states of the organism. One must take this functionalist trend in Hegel's thought seriously.

i Mediat Immediatd ean e Object Sensf so e Let us now return to the problem of the object of sensation. The point here is that such things as flashes of light, earthquakes, and one's belove mediate dar e object sensationf so ; states sensor e ofth y organimmediate th e sar e object sensationf so mediate .Th e objecs ti the thing that explains why the sense organ is in the sensation state case externaf th eo n I . in lis ti sensation objec, e othethie th th s t i rta causae th f o l chaid en n that account thar sfo tsensor e statth f eo y organs are the immediate objects of sensation. The mediate object is sioning object concepe th , righf to justicer to thin I . s context Hegel places sensation in the middle of a syllogism involving the thing 64 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

organism:e th d an "Touch exampler fo , mediatioe th s ,i n between 9 othere th althougr d fo , an distincs e i t hm i t from both e sideth f so opposition same th t ea timt i , e unites them" (§399, Zusatz). In sensation the animal stands in immediate relation to itself, in particular to the body. The relation of the body to the external object determine propertiee th s bode th r sens yf o o s e organ thid an s, propert sense th f yeo organ sucexistss soula s e i ideal hd s t th i a n ,an i sensation.e th havI s 1eA 0 trie explaio dt n Hegel's positione th , animal itself is to be more or less identified with the total state of the organism. When the external object acts on the sense organ, the sense organ's change of state is reflected in the change of the total state, although not in any neat way. The state of the sense organ, by contributing in this complex way to the total state of the organism, is a "moment" within it and in this sense exists as ideal in the animal. This moment is the sensation. Table o b assig o et nsensatioa propee nth r mediate determinate object—indee mediaty an d e object—a complex diagnostic task must be performed, a task beyond the ability of the sensitive soul as such. Such diagnosis requires conceptual abilities tha welo - g t lbe yond sensibility. Thu soue ssucth s la h make suco sn h assignation. An external object as such is present to spirit only at the higher stage discussed in the Phenomenology. We havexplainew eno sense dth whicn ei externae hth l things i objece th sensatiof o tsense th whicn ed i nanimaan e hth l senses itsel sensationn i f prope e what th f Bu . to r sensible? Where th o ed sensible qualities such as color, texture, or tone fit in? In a discussion in the Encyclopedia that occurs in expanded form in the discussion of Aristotle's theory of sensation in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel says that when he senses red or hardness his sensation is itself red or hard.11 And he says, "Heat, warmth, etc.

9. Hegel was familiar with the Aristotelian logic in which terms, not proposi- basie tionsth ce elementsar , thoughe H . syllogisa f o t mediatea s ma d relation between terms. Thi discusses si mucn di h detai Chapten li . r12 thin I s. Hege10 probabls wa l y influence Spinoza'y db s view tha ideatume th t f o the lowest-order ideas of the mind is the body of which the mind is the idea. Spinoza says accordingly thahumae th t n mind perceive modificatione sth bodye th f ,o s which means thamine th t d contain ideaattribute e sth th sn i tha thoughf e eo ar t t those modification attribute th bodn e i ss extensionth f eyo ha Spinoza. B e ;se , Ethics, . GutmannJ . , proped II . .pt , 22.. 11. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen tiber die Geschichte der Philosophic, Bd. 2, pp. 205- Sensation: Mind's Material 65

independene ar outsided an t t the juse bu ,s mucy ar a t h immediately transformed, made ideal, a determinateness of my feelings; outsides i same t i th s es a i contene , e onlth fore m yth n ms i i t different" (§3573, Zusatz). Hegel is drawing here on the Aristotelian account of sensation, according to which "the actuality of the sensi-

samee th d , an thougbl e sense objecon hth thad e f ear an o tt differently definable Anima,e (D " 425b26ff) Aquinas A . 12 s sayn si commentars hi thin yo s passage ,mode o "Colotw beings f so rha :a material mode in the object, a spiritual mode in sensation."13 Wherever we run into a claim of shared content in different form in Hegel it is helpful to think of the content as being determined by a functional role in a larger system. There are, then, several ways two thing havn same sca eth e conten different tbu t form. The havn yca e same th e content eithe playiny rb g relevantly similaro roletw n si different system serviny b r ssamo e gth e function (perhaps morr eo less adequately) withi ncommoa n system. Their forms differ inso- meane th fas whicy a rsb commoe hth n rol r functioeo n fulfilled differs. Neithe thesf o r e sense f "samso e content/different form" seems to apply to the proper sensibles in their objective and subjective existences. Sensations of red play a role in my acquisition of beliefs, in my directing my action, and so on, but the redness of things themselves cannot be said to play that role, though sensations of red can play the role they do only in virtue of their connections to red things. If having a content is playing a functional role, then many philosophers would object in principle to the idea that the proper sensibles are contents. The sensation of red, it is claimed, cannot be define explainer do termn dcausas i it f so l powers somethinr fo , g could be functionally equivalent to a sensation of red—that is, give same risth eo et beliefs, desires, behavior—an sensatioa e b t dno n of redmako t wayy .o eThertr tw thi o st e sear claim out: eithee rth organis machiner m(o somes )ha sensation tha functionalls ti y equiv- sensatioa t no s i redf alenn t o , sensatioalter a ,bu or o t d - re f no

firse th t12 n editioI . Encyclopediae th f no fine followine w dth g remark: "Aristotle also recognized the determination of sensation, in that while he recognized the sentient sensee subjecth d d an tobjec t into whic divides i t hi consciousnesy db s sa only the possibility of what sensing is, he said of sensation that the entekchy of the sentiment being and what is sensed are one and the same" (PSS, vol. j, p. 121). . K13 . . HumphriesFosteS d an r , trans., Aristotle's Anima"e Versione "D th n i of William ofMoerbeke Commentarye th d an . Thomas ofSt Aquinas, . 362p . 6 6 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

natively, the thing has some state—but not a sensation at all—that is functionally equivalen sensatioa o t redf no . The first formulation raises, in effect, the problem of the inverted spectrum. I know of no discussion of this problem in Hegel, but I thin Aristotelias khi n theor f sensatioyo n woulo t dm hi hav d ele deny the meaningful possibility of someone's phenomenal spectrum being the inverse of other people's. After all, it is the same thing—red—tha minde sinct th t n Bu objeci e .existe th d n an sti Hegel describe sensatioe sth havins a ideas na d gcontentlan a e ,w still might be able to preserve everything he says about sensations while admitting the possibility of an inverted spectrum. In that case contene sensatione th th f to , Hegel would maintain unaffecteds i , , for the sensation typically caused by red things would be a sensation of red, given that functional equivalence is maintained (where functional equivalence includes preservation of the typical connection emotionao st l states, aesthetic properties, etc.) Otherwise, Hegel would claim, we would be trapped in a subjective idealism. I am less sure of Hegel's response to the notion of a complete, but sensationless, imitation human. Such a notion is surely not a live option for him. If such an imitation is supposed to do everything we t sensedobu , tha , imagineis t , understand reasond an , , Hegel would declar impossibilityn a et i sensatior ,fo necessara ns i y condition of these higher activities. Hegel would also deny the possibility of a complete behavioral imitation devoid of internal reasoning. But tak o t impossibilite e th w e ar f sensationlesw yo ho s imitation? Doe meat si n tharationay tan l agent ipso facto sense e thao w s(s f ti succee buildindn i grationaa l agent wilt ,i l have sensations) thar ,o t to build an imitation of us one must not only make it reason but also make it sense? Surely Hegel would reject the latter alternative—it destroys the unity of spirit, chopping it into separable, autonomous units. Hegel seems well on the way to denying the possibility of absent qualia and thus sustaining the notion that sensations are specified by content, by functional role. We need, then, to worry a bit more about what role tha exactlys ti thato ,s , for example, inne hean a s tra outen a d r an state share contene son t with different formse Th . point seem thate b o ,st while natur spirid ean t constitute significantly different systems on their own sensatior ,ou np statema o sd e naturasomth f eo l propertie f thingsso , preserving their most Sensation: Mind's Material 67 importan sensatione t th relations e ar d s an ,the because yar f eo these ties to their typical causes. The content is primarily deter- abstracminee th y db t relations withi sensore nth ye rangth d ean causa lobject e linkth o st , although have w es a ,seen t musi , e b t ope otheo nt r influence wells sa .

SENSATION AS NONCOGNITIVE

Ther mora s ei e radical thesis about sensation lurking here which it is now time to flush out: that sensation is, although mental, noncognitive. The individual qua individual is, for Hegel, unknowable—another easily recognizable Aristotelian principle. Sensation is entirely singular and devoid of universality and can therefore be cognitive, conceptual, at best only potentially. One criterion of cognitivity—a necessary but not sufficient condition—is that cognitive activitie subjece sb standardo t t correctf so - ness. But when considering sensation as a pure affection of the subject, it makes no sense to ask whether the sensing was done correctl whether yo trues i t ri . Hegel adopt Kantiae sth n view that knowledge require organizatioe sth experiencf no e under certain Objective constraints. Althoug callee b hstata y dsensatioa ema n only whe participatent i complexa n si , organically structured unity in a certain way, calling it a sensation is still treating it as a simple, without consideratio specifie th f ncognie o pla y cth roln yma i - t ei tiv organisme e th lif f eo . Occupyin gplaca cognitiva n ei e system, sensations are no longer considered merely the passive affections of the animal and are no longer merely sensations; they have become what Hegel calls feelings.14 Since concepts are that which organize our experience, the unorganized materia experiencf o l e must itsel nonconceptuale b f a n I . sense Hegel believes that ther givea s ei n elemen experir ou n i t- ence—he uses the metaphor that these elements are found by the soul within itself rather than given to it—but it is not an epistemological given termd an , epistemologicaf so l appraisa applit no e -lar

14. Hegel uses "feeling" (Gefiihl) for both the sense of touch and a later stage of subjective spirit beyond sensation; see Chapter 5. 68 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity cable. trus i 1t e5I tha l experienc al t sensatione roos th it n i ts eha s found within the individual organism and taken up by spirit. But the sense in which spirit is rooted in sensation must be properly understood. Sensation is the genetic, causal root of the spiritual, but no sensory episode plays a foundational epistemological role. That Hegel's approach to the individual's epistemological situation is so Kantian is also seen in the following passages:

The subjectivity of sensation must be sought not indeterminately in man's positing something within himself through sensing, for he also does thi thinkingn si mort ,bu e precisel positins hi yn i g somethint gno in his free, spiritual, universal subjectivity, but in his natural, immediate, singular subjectivity. This natural selfa subjectivit t -ye t no s yi determining one, pursuin lawsn ow , s activatingit g itselnecesa n i f - sary manner subjectivita t bu , y determined from without, bouno dt this space and this time, dependent upon contingent circumstances. (§400, Zusatz)

Mere sensation . . . has to do only with the singular and contingent, immediatele th y give presentd nan thid san , content appeare th o st sentien concretn ow t s souit e s actualityla than .I raistI e mysele th o ft standpoint of consciousness, in contrast, I relate to a world external to me, to an objective totality, to an internally connected circle of manifold and complex objects standing over against me. (§402, Zusatz; my tr.)

Furthermore, one must take seriously the idea that Hegel believes sensation to be the immediate material of mental activity. Over against this stand form-givine sth g activit spiritf yo . Sensation nca at best onl consideree yb dagence sucripth s i r s spiritehf fo ya o s i t ;i potentially, but not actually, cognitive. How spirit's activity on this raw materia sensatiof lo n ultimately produces true knowledge th es i remaindee storth f yphilosopho e th f ro subjectivf yo e spirit. This process begins with the next stage, feeling. But, although absolute knowledg roots it man's n si eha s sensory encounter wit worlde hth ,

15. D. W. Hamlyn's criticism that only the whole of experience can be thought of as given according to Hegel simply does not hold up against the texts beyond the early Phenomenology of Spirit. The whole of experience is something that spirit constructs—it is a result of the activity of spirit. See Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception. Sensation: Mind's Material 69

Hegel claims that this beginning is ultimately overcome, that true thought, free of any sensory admixture, is ultimately achieved. Hegel's theory doe t escapsno e probleme somth f eo s that also ensnar predecessorss ehi capturn ca e e.W severa thesf lo e problems pointiny slidb e t th et ne thagr ou inou t tempte mano ds y philosophers sensatio:a paif no o/pains i n becaus paina s paii e s et ;i th nha propes it r existenc minde th sensation ei A . bluf no similarls ei y treated; it can be of blue because it is an actual case of blue in the mind t patcheBu . colof so r usually hav outlinn ea shaped ean f I . there is an actual case of blue in the mind, we then ask, is there also an actual case of shape, say, triangularity? Here, of course, the philosopher balks. The mind is traditionally treated as nonextended, shapes are certainly modes of extension, and therefore there can be no shapes in the mind. Are problems also generated for Hegel's system by this line of reasoning? There is one immediate difference to be noticed. In contrast to his predecessors, Hegel believes that shape is a proper sensible propea , r sensibl touchf eo : "Three dimensional shape also feelingf o t lo e , fallfoth ro s t feelin g alon concernees i d with general mechanical determinateness" (§401, thuZusatz).n ca se statW e eth problem in a very straightforward way. Hegel claims that, when he sees something sensatioreds hi , itselns i f red. Woul alse dh o agree that when he touches something triangular, his sensation is triangular? This questio madns i e still more comple face th t thay xb n ti the system it is not until we reach the more sophisticated level of intuition that space and time are explicitly introduced and constructed .reallt Hege spatialitno y s y wa thoughl ha e th y t entertou s into our perceptual experience. Some remarks in the Encyclopedia imply that our visual field is two-dimensional and that we infer the third dimension. But then it would seem that we have separate access to at least two-dimensional shapes through a sense other than touch. Can it be possible for sensations to have dimensions spatiale b t no simila lik?t A eye thid r kinsan problef do mcauses i d by the universal objects of inner sensation. If in sensing red my sensatio itsels ni f red sensinn ,i g righ wronr sensatioy o t m s gi n itself righ wrongr to ? earlier Ou r analysi contene th f s o sensations f to , however, shows that Hegel need not be smothered by these problems. If a sensation 7O Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity certaia s ha n conten virtun ti occupyinf eo gpositioa (mentala n i ) quality-space isomorphi essentiae th n ci l respect qualitye th o st - space applicabl objece th whicy o et b ttypicall s i t hi y caused, then some mental analogue of space suffices for us to be able to sense shapes. Inner sensation stile sar remembeprobleme a l w f i t bu , r that Hegel is after the "gut feeling" in such sensations, and that justice and right are the mediate objects of the sensation and not the proper sensibles, the problem evaporates. Perhaps the major source of disquiet in Hegel's treatment of sensation is the fact that he seemingly denies that sensations are cognitive while still attributing them content. The notion of a con- tentful state seems alread invoko yt e cognitive notions have W .e seen in what sense sensations have a content: preserving within the min dquality-spaca e equally applicabl outee th eo rt objects causally responsible for the sensations. The sense in which higher cognitive states hav contenea differents ti , thoug unrelatedt hno intene Th . - tionality of sense is not the full intentionality of the higher cognitive processes. Feeling

In sensation mind is passive, receptive, unorganized, aimed at individuale th , disperse manifolda dn i contens .It merels i t y found within itself freelt no , y create Feelin. it firs e y dth b t s gstei p toward the free, creative, thinking mind, but it is only the first step, the introductio barese th f no t unity int manifole oth sensationf do e W . have several more levels to move through before we reach normal perception. The distinction between sensatio feelind nan neves gi r given na extremely clea foune b r Hegel'o formulation t di t no s i word nan k befor thire eth d editio Encyclopedia.e th f no believI e that this distinc- lates hi rn i year thae o t orden on si d t s tioHegele o t rs n wa wa l preserv pure eth e immediacy, singularity lacd universalitf kan ,o y of sensations themselves. In the earlier version of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Hegel talk sensatiof so n more loosely, allowine gth concep strao t t y fro definins mit g relatio singularityo nt arguI . e here tha distinctioe tth n betwee sensationa feelina d n an simpl gs i y that a feeling is a sensation that has a place in a very low-level, basic, organized system of sensations.1 The fuzziness of his early concept of sensation led Hegel to see tha needee h t intermediatn da e stag t whicea h sensations could

i. This might seem to conflict with the position I have taken on the nature of sensation's content, for attributing content to a sensation presupposes its participa- systetioa n i m sufficiently organizequality-spacea p ma o dt feelingn I . , however, the relevant system musmucf o e thb greater scope than simpl ymappea d quality- totae spaceth animal'e s li syste th t ;i l al mf so sensations. 72 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

acquire characteristice somth f eo universale th f so . This coule db accomplished if they were to occupy a place in a system and thereby acquir functionaea l role within that system, because the pare n-th ticular sensation loses importance in contrast to the role it plays— roled take e universale b an mansar y n nb ca yd differensan t role players. Feeling, however, is still not explicitly cognitive, and the sensations are not organized yet through the conceptual categories that we meet in the Phenomenology:

The sensing of the universal seems to involve a contradiction, for as we know, sensation as such has as its content only that which is single. What we call the feeling soul does not involve this contradiction however, for it is neither confined to the immediate sensuousness of sensation and dependent upon the immediate sensuousness of what is present, nor does it relate itself to the wholly universal being which can be grasped only throug mediatioe hth purf no e thought. contrarye th n hast o I , a , content which has not yet developed into the separation of the universal and the singular, the subjective and the objective. . . . This content still relates itself to the feeling soul as accidents do to substance; the soul still appears as the subject and central point of all determinations of content powee th s a ,r which dominate worle sth feelinf do n a n gi immediate manner. (§402, Zusatz)

THE ROLE OF FEELING

Feeling is still clearly an animal function; it is not confined to humans. As the mention of sense and feeling in the Philosophy of Nature (§356ff.) makes clear, the functions of these powers of the animal sou directee ar l d toward enablin animae gth l organismo t maintain itself within alst bu ,o over against environments it , . The medievals noticed that on the basis of mere sensation the animal canno expectee tb succeedo t efforts it dn preservi o st e itself, tha d cannoe an tw t explain animal behavior solel referency yb o et the pure data of sense. As Aquinas says, "The sheep runs away whe seent i wolfsa becaust no , e coloos fnaturait a shape r s ro a t l,bu enemy" (Summa Theologica, q. 78, art. 4). There must be some synthetic activity of the animal beyond even that of the common sense accouno t animal'e th r tfo s behavior medievale th t .Ye s o coulg t dno 3 7 Feeling

so far as to attribute intellect to animals. They solved the puzzle by postulatin estimativen ga power, which apprehended nonsensible properties of things. To explain similar unthinking behavior patterns in man, Aquinas postulates the same power, but calls it instead the cogitative power. This was also called particular reason, "for it compares individual intentions [objects of mind], just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions." Gardeil sayf so this ratio particularis that generaln "i , functios ,it n consist beinn si ga sor mediatinf o t g faculty betwee hande on n e ,sens th whic n eo h grasp materiae sth l singular intellecd othee ,an th n r to hand , which faculte abstractee isth th f yo d essence. Thus t servei , preparo st e immediate th e phantasm consideratioe th r sfo intellect."e th f no 2 This vis aestimativa is grouped by Aquinas with common sense, imagination, fantasy, and memory as an internal sense. The feeling soul plays a role in Hegel's theory of mind similar to that played by the estimative power in Aquinas's theory. The feeling soul is a nonintellectual, immediate synthesis of the sensory material. Unlike Aquinas, Hegel takes imagination and memory to be power intellece th f treatsd o an t s Psychologye theth mn i . Yet, althoug deale hh s with these power activitier so mine - th f dex so plicitly as operations of the intellect, it is clear that Hegel uses the capacitie feeline th f so g sou accouno lt somr tfo e thing mighe sw t normally attribute to imagination or memory. In Feeling, Hegel considers those powers sou e ofth l which Aquinas'e us o ,t s phrase, ar preambla e" intellect.e th o et " Hegel's concepearliese th f o feelin f te to moderon s gi n attempts finn w theorworr a preconscioueo ca dt t ou kf ou y o s menta- ac l tivity thert constana Bu .s e i t dange readinn ri g Hegel's textd san thinking abou exampless hi t therr purelo n fo , s ei y preconscious human behavior that has not been transformed by our consciousness and our thought. Hegel devotes much attention to pathological and abnormal phenomena in the Anthropology, where feeling is discussed. Thi certainls i becaust yno e feelin itsels gi f something pathologica r abnormalo l t becaus sucn bu i , s hi t ecasei s thae th t otherwise buried preconscious activities produce a noticeable ef-

2. H. P. Gardeil, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3: Psychol- ogy* PP- 75-76- 4 7 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

feet. Inferrin existence gth naturd ean unconsciouf eo s psychological activities fro date m pathologth f a o todays i ystandara d practice. But when we read his discussion of a pathological phenomenon with which he wants to illustrate some aspect of feeling and in turn to explain the phenomenon with that concept, we must be careful no thino tt k tha persoe tth n involve operatinds i g solellevee th t lya of feeling. Perhaps ther some ear e morons who, Hegel would say, have not progressed beyond the animal stage of feeling, but normally humans are well beyond that stage, and the phenomena peculiar to feeling make their appearance only in abnormal circumstances—in cases where, due to a breakdown in these lower, preconscious function mindf so highere th , , truer beinspirituae th f go l achievedt no s i sometimes i t .I s har knodo t w which aspecte th f so case belon feelingo gt .

For observation the concrete nature of spirit carries with it the peculiar difficulty that the particular stages and determinations of the develop- menconceps remait it f tno o o td n behin particulas da r existences over against its deeper forms. . . . The determinations and stages of spirit, in contrast, remain essentiall onls ya y moments, states determinar ,o - tions at the higher stages of development. It thereby happens that the higher shows itself empirically presen lowera n ti , more abstract determination. (§380, my tr.)

Althoug t [thhi e feeling soul s therefori ] e entirely f formalo s i t i , particular interest insofar as it has being as form, and so appears as a state (§380) into whic developmene hth relapssoue y th lma f to e after having advanced to the determination of consciousness and understanding. (§404)

FEELING AND THE SELF

The notio sele th f f enterno s Hegel's discussion feelinf so o tw gn i different ways. First claime ,h s tha notioe t th sel a intimatels f fni o y bound up with the notion of the feeling soul: "Sensation involves sensitivity, and there is reason for maintaining therefore, that while sensation puts more emphasis upon the passive aspect of feeling, Feeling 75

upon finding, i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling's determinateness, feeling refers self-hoomore th o et d involved here" (§402). Tha concepe tselth e emphasizes fth i f to feelindn i opposes ga do t sensatio quits ni e clear, give interpretatioy nm feelingf no . Sensa- tions considere sucs da h exhibi organizationo tn ; organization first appears in feeling. But until some at least rudimentary organization appears among the sensations, there is no sense in talking of a self. Sensations, furthermore simplt no o yd , fall into organized patterns; they organizehave b o et d into them. Spirit thin i , s cas souls ea s i , the organizer. Feelin therefors gi othee eth r side active th , e side sensatiof o , n and is as much animal as human, for the animal soul must also bring the sensations into a unitary self to be said to have sensation at all. Nonetheless, there are considerable differences between the natur connectednese th f eo animan sa givn sensations lca e it d san that given by humans to their sensations, both because humans can moro d e than becausefeed theio an lt e r highedu , r capacities that embodieneee b do t feelingdn i , they have feelings of which animals t capableareno . Feelin preconscioue th s gi s organizatio sensaf no - tion, a "blind but indispensible function of the soul," which is the presupposition actualitye th t no havinf t o , bu , gconcepa e th f o t subjective and the objective, and a presupposition of having the concep selff to . In the later stages of the dialectic in the Phenomenology and Intuition ther categoriae ear l requirement sensatioy wa e th ns i n so organized case th e t here thit no s bu ,si . There are, however, some pragmatic requirements on the organization—namely, that it by and large suffic enablo et animae eth manueveo t l r successfulln yi its environment. But this does not require the animal to organize its sensations through concepts. Only certain success-promoting patterns of response to the environment are called for. In feeling, the soul does not construct a spatio temporally extended, law-governed, physical worl experiencf do e over agains basie t itselth sn o f of the material provided by sensation—such a construction would involve making use of those categories, universal rules of construction, which characteriz highee eth r stage f consciousnesso s and intuition. Although we can, from the third-person perspective, already 76 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

start applyin feelinnotioe e g th th sel a o f t fngo soul, withoue th t feeling soul's having any such concept itself, Hegel does attribute a minimal, nonobjective awareness of self to the feeling soul, which calle h s self-feeling [Selbstgefuhl]:3

As individuality, the feeling totality is essentially an internal division oawakeninn fa itseld e Urtheilan fth o gt [the judgment basie th , c division] within itself in accordance with which it has particular feelings and as a subject stands in relation to these its determinations. The subject as such posits these within itself as its feelings. It is sunken into the particularity of these sensations, and at the same time it unites with itself therein as a subjective unity through the ideality of the particular. In this way it is self-feeling—and it is at the same time only in the particular feeling. (§407, my tr.)

Self-feeling is a problematic concept, for how can a being have a concep self o t f without havin concepe gth non-selfe th n i f o td an , particular the concept of an external world, which we know the feeling soul doe t have sthit no ?sBu question itsel misleadins i f gn i tha t presupposei t s tha self-feelinn i t concernee ar e gw d witha concept of self. Such, I want to argue, is not the case.» ' i The only contrast availabl feeline th o et basie g th souf so n o l which it could have something that deserves to be called a feeling of sel thas i f t betwee contentn ow itselfs d n it possessose an th , f ro those contents. The feeling soul cannot assign some contents to itselsomd an fsomethin o et g else thar fo , t woul equivalene db o t positing an external world, so self-feeling is not a matter of classify- ing feelings into two different kinds, feelings of self and feelings of not-selfcontrase th t Bu .t betwee contents na it itselt d no an fs si contrast that exhibit ssensatione itselth n fi feelingr so s themselves. Sinc l feeling owns eal it evere n i , ar s y feelin soue gth feelins i l g itself, is self-feeling. The soul is not a totally passive receptor, however; as we have seen, its own state is a significant factor in its sensibility, and quite naturally the forms of organization present in the feeling soul are significant determinant higher-levee th f so l organizatio sens it f -no

. Petr3 / y translates this, incorrectl ythinkI "self-awareness.s ,a connotatione "Th s of this translatio cognitiveo to e self-feelinn i ar r certainlye fo , ar e gawart w no a f eo selfa sel s a f. 7 7 Feeling

sible states. Self-feeling is present in every feeling, because the organization of the whole, already present in the feeling soul, is a determinant of each feeling: "We have before us here feeling subjectivity; it realizes itself, is active, emerges from simple unity as liveliness. This activity belongs to the determination of liveliness; it awaken oppositioe sth t sublateitselfi n ni t preservebu d , san t si thereby, giving itself self-feeling, giving itself determinate being" (PSS, . 325 voltr.).p y soue , m ;2 . 4Th l feels itsel evern i f y feeling insofar as the content of the particular feeling, determined as it is in part by the total organization in which it participates, implies that total organization, the self. Hegel applies the notion of self-feeling to the explanation of mental illness. Mental illness, he says, is the pathological domi- nanc thif eo s lower leve spiritf o l . Hegel's reasonin somethins gi g solia s dlikha understandineo thissane wh e .eTh subjecon e th gs ti of its world and its place in it; it lives in a well-ordered world. Any subjec s certainlha t y progresse enougr dfa h tha t possessei t e sth categorial structure necessary to having a concept of self, but in derangement it puts its self-feeling in its place. This means that, rather than constructin objectivn ga e worl accordancn di e wite hth categorie understandinge th f so taket ,i immediate sth e unity found feelings init objective b o st e itself, removin thinkins git g froe mth constraint objective th f so e world.

As health self-possessed yan presensubjece e dth th s ha tt consciousness of the ordered totality of its individual world and it subsumes into that system each particular conten sensationf o t , representation- de , sire, inclination that occurs and it classifies them in the proper place.

Caught in a particular determinateness, however, it does not assign suc hcontena propee th t r plac rand ean k thae tth belongn i t i o st individual world system thasubjecta subjece s ti th thiy n I . ts wa find s itsel contradiction i f totalite th o nt y systematize consciousness it n di s and to the particular determinateness that neither flows with nor is classifie ranker do d within that totality—derangement. (§408 tr.y )m ,

4. This passage is given in Petry's text as a Zusatz to §407, but it is not one of the Zusatze supplie originae th n di l posthumous editio Boumanny nb otheo .N r edition e Encyclopediaoth f give sZusatza r §407fo . This passage comes from Griesheim's notes. Parallel passage othen si r manuscripts authenticat Petry'e Se . eit s apparatus, PSS, vol. 2, p. 325. 78 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Yet derangemenf i , t wer emattea inconsistencf ro one'yn i s beliefs, there woul differenco dn seee b mo t e between erro insanityd ran :

I can, of course mistakee ,b n about mysel wels fa abou s la externae tth l world. Peopl understandino n f eo g have empty, subjective representations, unfulfillable wishes that they nonetheless hop realizo et n ei the future. They restrict themselve totallo st y singular goal interd san - ests, hold fast to one-sided principles, come into conflict with actual- neithet ity.Bu r this narrowmindednes thir sderanget sno erroye e rar d as long as the benighted still know that their subjective representation t exisye doe t objectivelysno . Erro folld ran y become derangement only when someone takes his merely subjective representation to be objectively present and holds to it in the face of the objective reality that contradicts it. (§408, Zusatz, my tr.)

Thercleao n s rei line between stubborn erro derangementd an r , and we cannot, in the very nature of things, confront anyone with the independent, objective truth. Self-feeling has the upper hand when it is untempered by the complex principles of the understand- tried maintaian o st g in simpls nit e organizatio a face f th eo n i world incoherent wit . "Consequentlyhit , when someone speakn si a deranged manner, one should always begin by reminding him of his overall situation concrets ,hi e actuality whe, broughs .If i e nh o tt aware consideb o thif t eo d s objectivran e context stile h , l failo st relinquis falss hhi e presentation doubo n , e n theri b t s than i ee ca th a state of derangement" (§408, Zusatz).

THE SOUL'S RELATION TO REALITY

The most puzzling aspecsoue Hegeth s la f to l describee th n i t si Anthropolog ontologicas it ys i lrelatio s statu it rese f d th to san o n t reality. Early in the Anthropology, "soul" is treated almost like a mass term—soul does not come in packaged units but is the "ideality naturf "o generaln ei progrese th Anthropologe n .I th f so e yth soul is supposed to crystallize, as it were, into separate individu- alities relativel e evet th .Ye n i y late stage feelinf so habid gan t this individualization is not absolute; the boundaries between otherwise distinct person stiln violatede sca b l exampler o fo , tw y b , different persons sharing the same sensation. "The soul is truly Feeling 79

immaterial, even in its concreteness, and proof that it is capable of this substantial identity with another is to be found in the somnam- bulent [hypnotized] individual's sensing within itself the tastes and smells present within the individual to whom it is thus related. . . . In this substantial identity, consciousnes s onle subjecha syon - tivity" (§406). Similarly, Hegel talks of the feeling soul having an immediate access to the whole world, so that one can have direct feelings (one is tempted to say "intuitions," but not as Hegel uses that term) of spatially distant objects and events without, apparently, any objective, causal chain mediating between the event and the feeling: "With regard, firstly, to what is spatially distant from conscioue ar , insofae us onlw n awaked s ca an sya r e know , w somethin conditiogn o t fi n tha sublate tw distance eth mediatea en i manner envisioninge Th . t boun soulno s thiy i d b s condition however. Spac f externalo s thas n ei i i soul, e t i d tth nature,an f o t no apprehended by the soul this externality ceases to be spatial, for it is longeo n r external eithe oncs itsel o u idealitrt e r souee th o f th lf yo transformes ha (§406" dit , Zusatz). Hegel want peculiasa r double soulstatue wante th r H .o st fo t si be individuated by persons and their bodies for some purposes, so that, for example, it makes sense to speak of states of the soul (sensations, feelings, etc.) as having an owner, being someone's states. For other purposes, for example, explaining the phenomena of national character or clairvoyance and hypnotism, he wants soul to be something shareable across persons, the "ideality" of a much larger worle piecth f edo than jus singlta e body. 5 Hegel cannot have it both ways. When he treats the soul as a supraindividual reality, he seems to have to treat its states, in

5. Hegel not only deals with derangement in his discussion of feeling but also discusses hypnosis, clairvoyance othed an , r psychic phenomenae ture th th f nt o .A nineteenth century, befor rise moderf eeth o n psychology, before modern biology,a theory wit rooo h n sucr mfo h phenomen troublen i s awa . "Confirmatioe th f no factual aspect coul dprimare appeath e b yo rt need thosr .Fo e from whom might i e tb required it would be superfluous however, since they simplify their consideration of the matte dismissiny rb g account delusios a t i f impostured so nan , infinitel- ynu merous though they areaccredited an , educatione th y db , charactere , th etc f o . witnesses thein i t r se aprior . o Thes e yiar understanding onlt ,no ythas i immun t ti e evidencel toal t thebu ,y have even denied what they have seen with thein ow r eyes. . . . Comprehension of it is impossible insofar as one presupposes person- alities independent of one another and of the content as an objective world, and assumes spatia materiad lan l extrinsicalit generalle b o yt y absolute" (§406). 8o Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

particular sensations and feelings, as quite independent entities in theirightn boundariee row ;th soue wide th lar f so e because souls simple ar y conglomeration f sensationsso . Thu peoplo stw n eca share the same sensation; sensations are Humean, the soul is a bundl f suceo h states, and, sinc groupine eth g principlt no s ei spatial same differeno th , etw sensation i te b bundles n nca a t Bu . bundle theor soue th lf y comporto witl s il allege e hth d singularity and unity of the soul and clearly violates the progression of the Anthropology from sou generaa s la l existent standing over against natur whola s ea somethineo t g singularize individuadn i l sould san individual sensations. Hegel tries to combine the generality and the individuality of the sou describiny b l monada s a t gindividuai n a , l that nonetheless contain completsa e world. Leibnizian monad active s ar gener d ean - ate the whole world in representation from within themselves. Similarly soue th ,(thoug s li h admittedly only potentially locue )th s of the whole world, a "featureless mine" out of which the entire world can be generated or brought to light.

The filling of the soul has yet another aspect however, for apart from this material [sensation] actuan a s a ,l individualit alse - ar o im e yw plicitly a world of concrete content with an infinite periphery, and have withi numberlesa s nu s multitud relationf eo connectionsd san , which eve doet i t entenf i sno r int sensatior oou presentatiod nan alwayns i s within us, and still belongs to the concrete content of the human soul regardless of the extent to which these relations are able to change constantly even withou knowinr accounn ou t O infinits . it it f f gto o e wealth of content, the human soul may be said to be the soul of a world, the individually determined world-soul. Since the human soul is a singularity, determined in all its aspects and therefore limited, it also relates itsel universa o ft e determine accordancdn i e wit individuals hit standpoint. That by which the soul is confronted is by no means a being external to it, for the totality of relationships within which the individual human soul finds itself is rather the actual life and subjectivit thif yo s universe. (§402, Zusatz) N

In another place Hegel says, 'The concrete being of an individual involve entirete sth s basi it f cyo interests essentiae th f o d , an l 1 8 Feeling

particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other people and the world at large" (§406). This comparison of the soul to a monad limps badly, for a monad completa s i e worl representatiodn i nnotioe onlyth t repref no .Bu - sentation doe havt sno e clear applicatio reale th mn i of soul, foe rth sou supposes i l pre-representationale b o dt face tTh . that Hegel attributes conten feelingo t s inevitably force towars su d interpret- theg in representationams a l categoria e statesth t Ye . l (and syntactic) structures necessary for being truly representationa lackinge lar . Ther weakea s ei r sens representatiof eo n accordin whico gt h anything registerin gfeatura worle th f somedn o i e law-governed fash- saie represenb o dt n ca n io t that feature—thi sense th whics sen i i h sensations represent the properties of physical objects. But feelings are supposed to be more complex than sensations, without achieving the status of representations in the full sense. What Hegel coul gettine db puzzlings i t interpretatioge a th t ,bu n I have been developing casts some interesting light. Hegel seems to denyine b g tha state tth e of one's bodsole th e ys importani t facton ri determining the state of the soul. We earlier described sensations as being firse th t n place,i being-for-mine th , statef sensore do th f so y organs heret feelingBu .n i , , where such states begi acquiro nt ea meaning in virtue of their participation in an organized system, we find tha scopfactore e tth th f eo s relevan thao t t organization goes far beyond the immediate state of the sensory organs. The soul, as a totality, include "fillings pars it s a f to " everything relevan. it o t One way to uncover what Hegel might be driving at here is to r suggestioreturou o nt n thaspirituae th t l supervenes upoe nth material poine bees Th . ha t n made several time thosy sb e inves- tigatin supervenience gth e relation that mental facts f supervei , - nient upo physicale nth , must supervene upon very large setf so physical facts; not even an exhaustive set of physical facts about one person's body would suffice to determine that person's mental states.6 Hegel may be making a similar point here. What he calls the

6. See Burge, "Individualism and the Mental"; idem., "Other Bodies"; Garfield, "Prepositional Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental." But notice that the arguments give thin i s literatur explicitll eal y concern intentional, representational mental states remaint I . open sa n question whethe individuatioe rth sensationf no s or feelings is individualistic. 82 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

concrete bein soua f go l involves virtuall entire yth e worln i d dan such a way that it need not enter into sensation or representation. idealite thoughe th b s souo e a t thif yo f s Th i lso t broad-ranging "world takn thin I factsf ca e" o d e thik w an mea, o st n tha soue tth l supervenes upon this whole "world." In the interpretation of someone's feelings, which involve specificatioe sth theif no re rolth n ei unconscious organizational patter soule this i th t f s,i n o worl d that form appropriate th s e backgroun interpretatione th r dfo hypn I . - nosi clairvoyanced san , sensation feelingd san s occur which Hegel believe onln appropriatelse yca b y interprete beins da immedie gth - ate appearanc mine th somf do eo t e even objecr to whico t h there can be no normal, causally mediated perceptual access. Should a woman have a sudden image of her husband dying and experience a feelin lossf go , whe that na t momen husbanr the facn i dts i dyin g in an army hospital on a distant continent, Hegel might be perfectly willin countenanco gt possibilite eth somf yo e fairly mundan- eex planation of the image and feeling—that it was occasioned perhaps by a piece of spoiled mustard taken at dinner. But he would object insistenctn oa e that thi occurrencee s th therl muso al t e s ei tb r fo , suc insistencn ha e humble soue mera sth o t l e upsho core th f -) o t poreal. One's bodily states are causally coherent, but the states of one's soul are not subject to that same requirement, for, as nonspa- tial and immaterial, they lack the proper ontological presupposition causar sfo l interaction eventf o t ne s e relevan interTh .e th o -t pretation of a spiritual event is wider than the immediate causal substratum. Anothe thit t othay s pu i rwa t what count coherena s sa t explanatory account of our feelings is not logically required to coincide with causae th l accoun sensorr ou f to y states feelingr .Ou explainee sar d by an interpretation against the background of our "concrete being, entirete "th y basir ofou c interest example r fortho s ou d n I . san , logicallt no we ear y require insiso dt t that wha womae tth ns felwa t a bit of spoiled mustard, and to do so is to misunderstand the relative prioritie spir f mattersd o lone tan welth y gn e run.I l b ma t i , more enlightenin regargo t occurrence dth casa immediats f eea o e spiritual contact between loved ones spoilee Th . d mustard would, weret i s a ,enablin n sina o kt g condition. Hegel seem assumine b o st implicitle g ar tha e tw y representing entire th e supervenience base thimistaked a s san ,i supervee Th . - Feeling 83

nience base determine charactee th sr representation ou f o r o n , doubt, but we cannot infer that we are therefore constantly, though only implicitly, representing the entire base in such a way as to be abl calo edistant p u l t portion t directli f so occasionn yo . Hegel appear takine b relatioo se t gth n between natur spiritd ean , whichI have classifie supervenienca s da erelatioe relationth e f b n o o t , expression. Jusfa Leibniziae sth n monad expresse worle sth d froma certain point of view, the Hegelian soul expresses the world from a poin viewf to feeling y expressioe M .th e entirsy ar m f neo concrete actuality, my world. And indeed, the correct description of numerous feelings depends on my broader situation—on, for example, the difference between pride and false "pride or anger and righteous indignation t seemi t Bu s. illegitimat movo et e froe mth fact thamentay tm l states t whateve,a r leve descriptionf lo , havea broad supervenience base that extends far bod beyonn yow o t y dm idee th a that spatial determinations hav truo en e realit soulr yfo r so persons, that soul expressione sar whole th f seo world fro mpoina t of view. "Expression" itsel stronfweaa a alsd s koan ha g sensen .I the weak sense, expression is just reliable indication; in the strong sens involveet i s full representation. Feeling expresn sca worle sth d at most in the weak sense—yet Hegel decries their unreliability. A written text constitutes an expressive being, and what it expresses—its meaning—supervenes on the physical text. But it does t (aparno t from questionable case f self-referenceso ) exprese sth written tex t supervenei t expressioe Th . ssuperveniencon d nan e relations rarely, if ever, coincide. As comple metaphysicae th s xa l issueHegel'n i e sar s accounf to hypnosis, clairvoyance feeline th d g an ,soul epistemologicae th , l issues are treated straightforwardly. Knowledge strictu sensu involves rule-governed constructio f the^faco n r objeco t t known withi minde nso-callet th Bu . d immediate knowledg accesn eca s sit internal world without recours e stepwisth o et e constructiof o n consciousness. The soul can be the "soul of a world" without external limit becaus constrainte eth spacf s o time d ean , whice har exact, determinate understanding e giv d rule th an e,th o e t t no e ,ar operative here. This immediate access to the whole of the world is unreliable and not objective, and it is cognitive at all only when the content dredge subjectes i p du categoriao dt l constructio somo nt e minimal degree. "Visionary knowledge," as Hegel sometimes calls 4 8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

it, is really a misnomer—it would be better described as a "visionary cognitive state" because it is not knowledge at all.

THE LIBERATION OF THE SOUL

The material and the spiritual are not divorced from one another—although they are certainly not strictly identical, they are unified. But the merely formal organization of spiritual material which constitutes the form of feeling must express itself in the body, for otherwise the bodily states of the individual would di- verge increasingly fro self-determinatioe mth spiritf no spirif I . s ti t divorceno d from body must ,i t gain contro bodye th f lo , make eth bod means yit expressionf so . This organizatio bodye s i th t i f nf o i , to embody the spiritual unity of the determinations of the soul, must be an organization of the body over and above that merely organic organization already present. This form of organization is habit. Notice that habit is purely formal; virtually any content can be embodie habitn di . "The for habitf mo , likothery ean certainls i , y open to complete contingency of content. ... At the same time however, habit is what is most essential to the existence of all spirituality within the individual subject. It enables the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an ideality of soul, so that the religious or moral etc. content belongs to him as this self, this soul, and is in him neither merely implicitl endowmentn a s y a transien a s a r no , t sensation or presentation, nor as an abstract inwardness cut off from action and actuality, but as a part of his being" (§410). Hegel says several times that graspin determinatioe gth habif no t is very difficult, and he seems to have considered the emphasis he fairla placee role b ygive e th ehabio h n nove t so d t d si an t an l important contribution to our knowledge of the mental. We can question the novelty of such an emphasis in the light of the importance-of custom in Hume and his followers, but not its importance. The essential determination of habit, Hegel says, is that it is our liberation from sensation and feeling. It is this we must now seek to understand. lif e feelinf eo Th sensatiod gan thasouns a i f to l totally sunken i sensations it feelings—id san "distanceo n s tha " from s i them t i t ,bu overwhelmed by them and indeed is at best a merely formal point of Feeling 85

unity within them. Whe soue nth l acquires habits, however, sensation and feeling lose their commanding grip on the soul; they no longer dominate it. "It is free of these determinations insofar as it is neither interested in nor occupied with them" (§410). This aspect of habit is called inurement when considered as a theoretical attitude; in its subjective practical aspect it is indifference to satisfaction, and objectivels a y practica soue lth liberates li d fro particularitiee mth s of its existence by acquiring skill. "In habit the soul makes an abstract universal bein itsel f greduceo d an f s wha particulas i t n ri feelings and consciousness to a mere determination of its being" (§4io). Up to this stage the soul has been a self only formally, which meancompletn i t sno e actuality s simplesit t A . t level, soua s i l panopl singulaf yo r determinations; thes thee ear n connected with anothee on eved ran n com weao et r their connectednes thein so r sleeves, although only abstractly, in self-feeling. But when in habit the soul makes itself an abstract universal, it must free itself from e immersioth n int s particulaoit r feeling sensationd an s s which characterizes even the level of self-feeling. It does so in taking the pattern unificatiof so feelinn ni makind gan g them natural, imme- diacies presuppose withid an y dnb which spirit realizes itself. Habit makes the feeling organization of the determinations of soul into a second nature. Thus this whole leve organizatiof lo relatew no ns di e furthetoth r progres f spiriso s sensatioa t feelind o t n an e gar organic being. In habit the particular sensation or feeling is unimportant particulae th s a , r piece mattef so unimportane rar e th o t body. And the soul, in having habits, relates itself not to a singular determinatio universaa o t itself nt o persistend fbu lan t determina- e universatio th f itself no s i o . lSinceg itsel e eth f (accordino gt Hegel), it relates itself to itself more adequately in habit. "Nev- 7 ertheless universae th , whico t l e souhth l relates itsel habin i f t differs from the self-determining concrete universal present in pure thinking, in that it is only the abstract universality brought forth through reflection fro repetitioe mth numerouf no s singularities" (§410, Zusatz). Because in habit its immediate determinatenesses are reduced to unimportance, the soul, as their abstract universality, is now left

7. Hegel's conceptio selr discusseo s fi o neg e ofth d more thoroughl Chapteyn i . r6 6 8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

free of them. By no longer being exhausted in its particular states, by acquiring interesting higher-orde longer-terd ran m properties, the soul gains independence, a character of its own, an identity. Thus through habit soul also gains dominance ove corporealits rit y and come controo t s bodys it l , "somethinw whicno s hi g unre- sistingly pervade soule th ,y db somethin g subjecte libere th -o dt ating power of the soul's ideality. It is therefore through this sep- aratiosoue th lf no fro s corporeitmit sublatioe th d yan f thi no s separation, that this inwardness of soul and externality of corporeity emerge as a mediated unity" (§411, Zusatz). In this, the soul as actual, the body is the sign and the expression of the soul. In acquiring habits the soul has learned to withstand certain pains, to forg r ignoro e certain pleasures beyono g o immediate t , dth e material of sensation. By acquiring set patterns of simple behaviors, reads i t i mako yt leae eth p into large larged an r r compounded patterns that mar ksignificana t increas complexitn ei sophisd yan - tication patterne .Th s of habitual action for presuppositioe mth r nfo the rule-governed forms of behavior of later stages. The behavior- ists were not totally off the mark; they just mistook one of the lowest levels of mental organization for the totality of mind. Actual sou bots li conclusio e hth Anthropologe th f no e th d yan germ of the Phenomenology, for the self now sets itself as ari abstract universality over against its particular determinations, and "soul which posits its being over against itself, having sublated and determined it as its own, has lost the significance of being soul" (§412). This abstract universality is the I, the ego. Phenomenology: I Emerges The

, The Phenomenology of Spirit poses a major problem for Hegel scholarship. Hegel composed a book entitled the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1806 while at Jena.1 This volume was to provide an introductio Hegel'o nt s system, showin readee naturagth w ho r l consciousness (and therefore the reader's own as well) achieves the standpoin absolutf o t e knowledge standpoine th , systeme th f o t . Ten years late Phenomenologe rth Spirif yo t appears embedded withi Encyclopediae nth system, surrounde Anthropologe th y db y ane Psychologydth . Indeed/i cleas i t r that very soon aftee th r earlier book had been published Hegel began treating the Phenom- enolog preliminars ya Psychologye th o yt , rather than prefatoro yt the Logic 181 y Anthropologe B .2 th madd y ha appearancs eit s ea the predecessor to the Phenomenology.2 The two Phenomenologies do not correspond exactly in content either. In the early Phenomenology the major divisions include Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. The version

1. This volume's original title, changed in proof, was Science of the Experience of Consciousness. 2. Ther extensivn a s ei e debate ove relatioe Phenomenologre th th f no e th o yt systeme rese th f Logith Hane to d se ; can s Friedrich Fulda Problems Da , einer Einlei- tung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik; and Otto Poggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phanome- nologie Geistes,s de principae somr th fo f eo l contribution thao st t debate. Unfortu- nately, much of this debate has taken little account of the evolution in Hegel's thought during his Niirnberg period. At present, however, there is simply no reliable edition of the Nurnberg materials. Until a reliable edition appears, Hegel scholarship must acknowledg eserioua s handicap. 88 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

we find in the Encyclopedia is much briefer. Spirit is no longer included (many of the topics discussed there show up in the philosophie objectivf so absolutd ean e spirit) Reasod ,an n is highly trun- cate wells da , shrinkin mera o gt e transition paragrap Psye th -o ht chology. The early Phenomenology seems to start where the later, Ency- clopedia version does, but it continues on, including most of the themes and topics of the rest of the system.3 Yet we cannot say that in writin earle gth y Phenomenology Hegel simply forgo stoo t t p systeme resaddeth e d f th therto an r n d,fo o goo es i d evidence that he did not see the book that way. Furthermore, inspection of Hegel's collateral wor 1805-kn i 6 indicates that wha presentes ti dn i the early Phenomenology does not coincide with his explicit attempts at the time to elaborate his system. It seems reasonable to suppose that Hegel did indeed continue beyond what started as the "Science of the Experience of Con- sciousness" to write something larger and slightly different, but not tha simple th y annexe dchun a syste s originas hi f hi k o m o t l manuscript Phenomenologe ;th organicallo to r fa ys i y unifie suce b ho dt an amalgam. I believe, rather, although I lack the space to argue it here , Phenomenologe thacore th f th te o botn yi h versione th s si analysi concepe th independenf n sa o f to t objec experiencef o t e .Th Phenomenology is about the subject-object relation; it is an analysis of wha tcas e mus th thaf ei e tb t relatiotruthful.e b o t s ni Hegel's analysis is essentially complete by the end of the sections on Self'consciousness earle Th .y Phenomenology then o goet n so interpret an astonishingly wide range of phenomena in terms of basie th c structures identifie earle th yn d i chapters Encyclo-e th n .I pedia the conceptual structures outlined in the Phenomenology are t abandonedno t neithebu , thee e expliciar r yth t e modeth r fo l interpretatio highel al f no r phenomena earle .Th y Phenomenology is intended to show that the structures constitutive of consciousness (the subject-object relation) are revealingly applicable to all form humaf so n life—tha fora t lifr sociaf mo e(o l institution, etc.)

3. Even their beginnings are not perfectly congruent, for Hegel admits in the Encyclopedia versio mistaka ns tha wa includ o et t i t e specifically spatiotemporal concepts like "here" and "now" in the argumentation of the chapter on sense certainty (see §418). Phenomenology: The I Emerges 89

is also a form of consciousness and vice versa. It is to demonstrate that neither abstract discussions of the foundations of our knowledge, such as Descartes's, nor psychological explanations, such as Hume's, adequately portray the concrete, social reality of the subject-object relation. Thus scientific observation, morality, and religion are all treated as manifestations of knowledge, as forms of consciousness, which means interpreting the mtermsube n i th -f so ject-object structure Encyclopedia,e th n I .othee th n r o hand , each phenomenon is examined on its own terms, not primarily as a form of consciousness. There is no commitment to putting the subject- object relation at the center of every case. In the Encyclopedia, therefore e Phenomenologth , s confineyi examinatioe th o t d e th f no forms of consciousness as such. Accordin Hegelo gt , Kant's philosoph nothins yi g more thana phenomenology, sinc concernes i t ei d wit analysie h th sub e th -f so ject-object relation (§415). Kant give theora s su consciousnessf yo , according to Hegel, a theory of how an object can appear to a subject—but Kant doe t successfullsno y push throug undero ht - standing the basis of the whole subject-object relation, to showing us the truth of that relation, for he never goes beyond the appearance relation. Because Hegel's phenomenology (primarily in the version of 1807 alreads )ha y attracte muco ds h commentar criticad yan l atten- rehearst no tion o d dialecti s ,I e it thin ci s chapter. Becaus topir eou c philosophe isth focuI , minf se ys o r insteadpe Hegel'n do s concep- subjece tioth f nconsciousness o f sometimee to h s a , or , sI calle th , s abstrace itth , t ego.4

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE I

Ther considerabls ei e transcendental confusion surroundin- gHe gel's concept of the I. To minimize the dangers, I treat this topic, like the topics of my opening chapters, in a linguistic mode. All the

4. As Retry remarks in the introduction to his edition of the Encyclopedia Phenome- nology, there has never been a systematic comparison of the two Phenomenologies. (Actually, there may be more Phenomenologies, since the Encyclopedia went through three editions, and there are versions left from the Niirnberg period.) This is a study beggin writtene b o gt . 0 9 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

essential points can be made for my purpose without treading heavil swampyn yo , transcendental ground. Accordinglyo t y tr I , answer two questions in this chapter: (a) What does the word "I" 5 mean, accordin Hegelgo t Fregean ;i n terms ,sens s whait d e ean tar its reference Wha) ?(b t wor kine th creatur f de o "I"us n ; ethaca , tis wha presupposes ti d abou uttere significane e y tth th an f n o ri e us t word?

Does "I" Refer? Because sense supposedly determines reference might i , t seem bes staro t askin y tb Hegel.r gfo ther t s whai sense " Bu et"I th f eo 6 ipriosa r issue commo:a n interpretatio Hegef no l claims tha" "I t does not refer at all, that reference to individuals, or at least singular demonstrative reference, is impossible.7 This claim is based on passages like the following:

[Whe "I"indeey o mord o sa ] I n I y dn esa meanca I t singla bu , eT what I mean in the case of T than I can in the case of 'Now' and 'Here'. When I say 'this Here', 'this Now', or a 'single item', I am saying all Thises, Heres, Nows singll al , e items. Similarly , thi,T whesy sa nI singular T, I say in general all Ts'; everyone is what I say, everyone is T, this singular T. (PhG, p. By, PhS, p. 62. Quotation marks added by Miller)

A parallel passage fro muce mth h later Berlin Encyclopedia shows that Hegel retained this view throughout his career.

Since language is the product of thought, nothing can be said in it which is not universal. What I only mean [meine] is mine [ntein], belongs

5. Although Hegel does treat the word "I," his principal interest is in the concept expressed by the word and what it stands for. His discussions shift without much warning between the explicitly metalinguistic and the straightforwardly metaphysical. I follow suit and shift rather casually between the formal and the material modes. emploI . 6 Fregeae yth n terminolog sensf y o referencd ean thin ei s work without worrying about faithfulnes withoud an e Frege'o us t s attributinn sow sucy gan h distinctions to Hegel. This terminology allows us to raise some important questions about Hegel's understanding of the I. . Hamlyn7 , Sensation Perception,d an . 140-46pp ; Ivan Soil Introductionn A , o t Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 91-110; Gilbert Plumer, "Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy (1980); M. J. Inwood, Hegel, pp. 311-17. Phenomenology: The I Emerges 91 this a se onl particulam yo t r individual languagf i t ;bu e expresses only wha universals ti cannoI , whay tsa onlI t y mean. whad An unsay-s ti able, feeling, sensationmose th t t excellentno s i , mose th , t truet bu , rather the least significant, the least true. If I say: "the individual," "this individual," "here," "now," then these are all universalities; anything even/thingd an individualn a s i thisa , ,sensuouss i and t i f i , hers i t i ,e and now. Similarly when I say "I," I mean myself as this self which excludes all others; but what I say, "I," is just everyone; I, which excludes all others from itself. (§20, my tr.)

From our supposed inability to refer to individual objects it is thought that Hegel infers their metaphysical unrealite wels yth a s la impossibility of any knowledge of them. But in these passages 8 Hegel doe t den sno refen y individua ca o t tha r e w t l objectss Hi . argumen s directei t d agains differena t t doctrine beliee th : f that indexical reference affords us a direct, preconceptual access to individuals.9 He attacks the position that "our approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from tryin compreheno gt PhS, ; (PhG," dit . 79 58) p . p . Besides direct referential access, the empiricist Hegel is attacking also attributes to indexicals an epistemological role—that of provid- ing direct, preconceptual epistemological acces objectso st . Hegel attacks this position by arguing that even indexical reference is conceptually mediated and therefore cannot afford us preconceptual epistemological access.10

8. G. E. M. Anscombe has lately defended the position that "I" is not a referring expression. Hegel's supposed rejection of indexical reference cannot be assimilated to Anscombe's position, however. Anscombe wants to treat "I" as similar in use to the "it" in "It's raining," claiming that "I" has only a use, and neither a Fregean sense no referencera . Hegel contrastn ,i universala ,s i seemtha y " sa t"I o st , implying that it is a general term applying to all conscious beings—really a predicate in its depth grammar, not a singular referring expression at all. Again, Anscombe thinks that "I" is quite peculiar, different from other indexicals, whereas Hegel lumps them all together. See G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The First Person," in Mind and Language, ed. S. Guttenplan . 45—66pp , . positioe 9Th . n Hege attackins li g seem havo st e been most closely approximated by Bertrand Russell. I have discussed Hegel's position on indexical reference,,,' names, and knowledge in more detail in "Hegel on Reference and Knowledge," Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1988): 297-307. 10. Plumer misinterprets Hegel's position here because he thinks that sense certainty's "basic aspiration is the relation of [singular demonstrative] reference"; "Sin- gular Demonstrative Reference," p. 73. But this is not right. Sense certainty's basic aspiratio immediates ni , direct knowledge. 92 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Denying our ability to refer to individuals is unnecessary to Hegel's goals; the arguments he presents actually assume that we can successfully refe individualso t r returne .H s agai agaid nan o nt poine th t that utterances containing "now" change truth-value over time, that utterances containing "here" change truth-valu- de e pending on the place of utterance, and that utterances containing "I" change truth-value depending on the utterer. These changes in truth-value depen reference th indexicals e n th do f eo . " 'Here, is ' e.g. treee turI th ,f I .n round, this trut vanishes hha cons i d - dan verted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'" PhS,; (PhG, 82 . 60) p . p . Hegel's position on indexical reference is an attempt to assimilate indexical referenc descriptivo et e reference. Referenc descripa a evi - tio clearlns i y mediate concepte th y db s (the universals) involvedn i descriptione th . Contrastin descriptivgo t e referenc referencs ei a evi a proper name, which Hegel admits is immediate, for proper names hav meaningo en :

s Eve expressioe nth n this contain distinctiono sn ; eac everd han y somethin exactls gi othern a mucmeanss e ya s i On t .expres i o hthisa t s a s something completely determinat overlooke"this"s y i et b i t ;bu d that language understandingwore e th th f ks o , a , says only wha univers ti - sal, except for the name of an individual object; the individual name, however somethins ,i g meaningless [Sinnloses] sense th en i tha doet ti s not express a universal and appears as something simply posited, arbitrary, for the same reason that proper names [Einzelnamen] can be arbitrarily assumed, given, or even changed. (WdL, vol. i, pp. 104-5, my tr.; SL, p. 117)

Bu indexicalf ti descriptiond san s both refe conceptualla n ri y mediated manner, they nevertheless refer. Furthermore, indexicals- ,un like names, have a meaning. This returns us to our original question, What does the word "I" mean?

The Sense of "I" Hegel himself never precisely explain meanine sth "I.f go " What, then, should we be looking for? The previous discussion of Hegel's treatment of indexical reference gives us a hint. Hegel classes "I" Phenomenology: The I Emerges 93

together with "here," "now, beet no "this.d ns "uncoman ha t "I - mo tak no wort e eth d "this basie th cs " a indexica l word, treatine gth others as somehow derivative. And several things Hegel says indicate that he also thinks of indexicals in this way: "if we take the This' in the twofold shape of its being, as 'Now' and 'Here' ..." (PhS, p. 60; see also the passages from PhS, p. 62, and WdL, vol. i, . 104-5pp , quoted above).11 Hegel seems aware that "this," unlike the other indexicals, admit f completioso sortay nb l predicates: "this man," "this ball," "this color." Indeed, given that indexical reference is always conceptually mediated, there must be some sortal completion at least "this.f o obvioue e implicius " Th y an s n derivationti "nowf so d "an "here" from "this" seem, then, to treat them as already having a sortal built in—"this time" and "this place." Such an approach seems consistent with what Hegel says about "here "nowd "an " and suggests case wha "I"f th neee eo n w ti :loo o dt r som kfo e appropriate completion or specification of "this ____ ." But what counts as an appropriate specification? Even if we could assume that persons are the appropriate referents of "I," we still coul t infedno r that "person correce th s "i t completio "thir nfo s ____," because coextensionality does not guarantee sameness of sense. Furthermore, many of the things Hegel"says~about "I""seem precludo t havins eit sense gth "thif eo s person. muse "W t therefore look more closely at what he actually says about the I. The passage quoted earlier from Encyclopedia §20 is a useful starting point; in its continuation Hegel sounds most of the themes that dominat discussions ehi : I e th f so

Kant made use of the awkward expression that I accompany all my representations, also sensations, desires, actionse th s i I , e etcTh . itselfr universa commonalitd fo d an , an n li alss yi ofora univerf mo - sality, though an external one. All other men [Menschen] have it in commosensationss y i commot jus, m i I l s n tal a a o nt e b n , o witt e hm

Phenomenologye th n I . 11 1807f o , Hegel's "thistreatmend an " sometime"I f to s seem implo st y that the coordinate—neithee yar r subordinate othere th o dt , both arising weret i s a , , together. Ther mucs esai e i thir b dfo so h t interpretation I d an , cannot rule it out, but the preponderance of the passages seems to treat "this" as prior doubI . t that Hegeclearla d ha ly though t positioou t whethen d no an " "I r "this" were coordinated or subordinated. 4 9 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

representations, etc., to be mine. The /, however, abstractly as such, is pure relatio itselfo nt whicn i , representatiol hal n [Vorstellen], sensation, every state and every particularity of nature, talent, experience, * etc. abstractes ,i insofas di I from existence e rth Th . whollf eo y abstract universality e abstractlth , s thinkingi I ya e s freea th y . Thawh s i t subject, and in that I am simultaneously in all my sensations, representations, states, etc., though everywhers ti e presen rund tan s through all these determinations as a category. (§20, my tr.)

Th thus i eI whollsa ) claime(a e yb abstraco dt t universality pur) ,(b e relation to itself, (c) abstracted from all its particular states, and (d) thinking as a subject. And we are also given at least a partial specification of the things to which "I" can be correctly applied—to all humans. This passage, when correctly interpretedo t y ke a s i , Hegel's concep wore th f dto "I.importane "Th t clu whas ei t Hegel suchs say"a e ssuch"s th aboua locutio r I ,e fo tth essentiallns i n ya operator restricting what can be correctly said about its argument to things thaspecialle ar t y connecte argumene sense th th f o eo dt t expression. During the time Winston Churchill was the prime ministe Englandf ro trus ewa t tha ,i prim e tth e ministe Englanf ro s dwa a leisure-time bricklayer; but it is certainly false that the prime minister of England, as such, was a leisure-time bricklayer. The prime minister, as such, is a member of the cabinet, advisor to the throne, and resident of No. 10 Downing Street; but the prime minister suchs ,a neithes ,i r mal femaler eno , shor tallr tno , Labour Conservativer no more b o e.T general everythint ,no s ga truA f eo reckonee sucb n hsense ca parts th d "A";a f f eeverythint o o bu g true of A as such must have some special connection with the sense of "A." Wha trus ti suces a o trufcorrectlbecausht s A e i i b f eo n ca et yi referred to by "A." Of course, we must remember that even if it is fals falss i edoet t i I esucfollo that s , . a F sF no h s tt A i w no thas i tA tha presidene tth Unitee th f to d States suchs ,a forme a s ,i r screen nonetheless i actort i t ,bu s true tha presidene tth facn i formea ts t i r screen actor. Hegel asserts that "th , howevereI , abstractl suchs ya purs i , e relation to itself, in which all representation, sensation, every state everd an y particularit naturef yo , talent, experience, etc. abs i , - stracted from." Let me put aside for the moment the idea that the I s puri e self-relation s suca I s abstractehi e Th . s it d f o fro l mal Phenomenology: The 1 Emerges 95

particular states; tha , therparticulao tis n s ei , rI stata qu e , thaI n ta must have. But this apparently leaves the I totally indeterminate. Hegel does not, however, think of the I as indeterminate. For one thing, that would not distinguish "I" from "this."12 It is important abstractes i I tha e tth d fro mspecifia c grou statesf po , namelye w s ,a see from the list he gives, primarily mental states (in a suitably broad sense). But there is another important fact about the list from which the I as such is abstracted: thinking is missing from the list. Few philosophers distinguish mental representation and thought. YeHeger fo t l ther cleaa s ei r difference; representatio sena s ni - suous, imagistic typ mentaf eo l processing, whereas pure thinking is formal and nonsensuous (i.e., its phenomenology is not constitutiv it)f eo . Indeed quits i t ,i e significant that thinkin omittegs i d from the list of thing's from which the I is abstracted; only a few lines later, thinking is asserted to be the I. These considerations give us a preliminary understandin sense th "I,f f geo o " namely, "this thinking subject."13 This is not an entirely happy choice on Hegel's part, for there are problems with thinking that "I" has as its sense "this thinking subject." First, "this thinking subject" could refer to someone besides the utterer. "This thinking subject" could have the peculiarly first-person sense essential to "I" only if there were some special form of demonstration that necessarily indicates its user. But "this" used with that special form of demonstration would already be equivalent to "I," and the sortal would not be necessary. We would neet no specifdo t y what kin thing—namelyf do thinkin,a g thing— the "this" picked out. "I" would be as conceptually indeterminate as "this."

12. I have not tried to specify the sense of "this." A number of things Hegel says about "this" indicate that a "this as such" could only be a bare particular, something individuan a pickes a t d ou propertiess l it shorl al f no . barThero n ee particularsear , however Aquila'e Se . s interesting discussio "Predication ni Hegel'd nan s Meta- "thisphysics.d coordinatan e " ar "I f "I e terms, the n"thia suchs sa " woula e db pure or bare object contrasted with the pure or bare subject of the I. . Thi13 s view obviously tiefirst-persoe witn sth i f ho Kane us n fs pronouo nt express the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel's interpretation of "I" is deeply influenced by Kant's reflections in the transcendental deduction (see WdL, vol. 2, p. 2igff.; SL, p. 583ff.). For an illuminating treatment of the thinking self in Kant, see Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, / ed. Allan Wood, pp. 113-47. 96 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

One might try to give the demonstrative a smaller scope and take havo t sense subjece " eth th "I e thif o t s thought, t this "bu sha difficulties as well. This move seems to assume some form of inner demonstration, which is just as suspect as a form of demonstration that applies onl oneselfo yt alst I . o presuppose indin s ca tha -e w t viduate thoughts before individuating theiry subjectswa a s A . around this latter problem mighe w , t suggest that ther speciaa s ei l access to my own thoughts, so that I need not individuate them by first individuating myself, but in that case again the simple "this" expressing such access woul sufficiente db . Adding tha thoughtta s i the kind of thing demonstrated is otiose. In general, equatin " e senswit"I gth f heo somee forth f mo demonstrativ "thisf o e "eus seem necessitato st e postulating some special form of demonstrative contact that guarantees first-person- ness. This strikeimplausibls I mus a f i e thocd d sm a An .d ean emplo yspeciaa l access availabl thinkinn i ee onlm myselff o ygt o , how can others understand my thoughts or assertions about myself? Ther adequato n captur o s et i y essentiae ewa e th l first-person- " usinnes "I essentialle f sgo th y third-person resource "this.f so " Such considerations make it more plausible that "I" and "this" are coordinate primarever e o , th ns i tha y" indexical."I t 14 Nonetheless, according to the most natural interpretation of the two-para s ha texts " t "I ,sens r Hegelefo : first t designatei , sa thinker, indeed individuan a , l thinker; secondexpressioe th s i t i , n of that thinker's pure self-relation, which itsel partls fi y constitutive of bein gthinkera . This pure self-relatio poorls ni y expressen a y db objective mode indexical like "this." (The nature of the pure self- relation intimated by the use of "I" is explored in the last section of this chapter.)

14. When Hegel calls something a "this," his intent is usually to emphasize the object's individuality. Hegel's concern wit metaphysicae hth l questions surrounding the relation betwee individuae nth universae th d an l l dominates such discussions. He never explicitly discusses the specifically linguistic nature of the uses of "this" (or "I," for that matter) as a demonstrative or anaphorical term, or the conditions of its successful use. It is thus not surprising that Hegel fails to consider explicitly all the technical difficulties in the use of "this" or "I." Nor is it surprising that the natural proposa meanine th r " stemminlfo "I f go g fro texte mth subjec s i shortcomingso t . Hege interesteo s s i l emphasizinn di involvemene gth universalf o t indexican si l reference that he pays only cursory attention to the specific differences between the indexicals and between indexicals and definite descriptions. Phenomenology: The I Emerges 97

The Reference of "I" Taking "this thinking subject" as our understanding of the sense of "I," we can now ask what the normal reference of a use of "I" is. Traditionally, one of four alternative referents for "I" has been defended bodya : Cartesian-styla , e soul concreta , e person n(a animate organism strictly identical with neither bod soul)r yno r o , some different thing suc transcendentaa s ha l ego. grante r takWn fo eca t e i d that Hegel self-style,a d idealist, would takt no e one' normae sth bode b ly o referenct e of "I. f one'o n "e I sus the same vein, however, we might think that a good idealist ought to deny body or matter any essential role in the constitution of the thinking subject to which the "I" refers. This would disqualify the concrete perso referene th s n a "I,f to " leaving onl substantiae yth l Cartesian soul or the abstract transcendental ego as appropriate candidates. Hegel clearly rejects the whole notion of a Cartesian soul. The "soul" of rational psychology, Hegel complains, is a confused notion—an attemp humae thino t tth f ko nmodee spirith a f n o o lt natural, material thing. Rational psychology attempt distino t s - guish the soul from natural things by simply denying certain natural predicate . Butit o st , Hege effecn i l t maintains predicatee th , s that capture the nature of spirit have an entirely different logical gramma cannod an r simple b t y compounded from sense experience. Becaus e vereth y notio a Cartesia f no n sou s confusedi l , Cartesian soul hardlreferentn e sth ca e yb "I."f so 15 balance Isth reasonf eo s then throw" stan"I e -favon ni th f o r dardly referring to a transcendental ego, some relatively abstract entity, neither body nor soul nor concrete person, which lies behind the phenomena of the self? Kant was reluctant to identify the I that thinks with the empirical self and sometimes even with the noumenal self (Critique of Pure Reason, 64233). Given the importance of the Kantian conceptio transcendentae th f no post-Kantiar fo o leg n Ger- man idealism, it would seem plausible that Hegel followed suit and posited some transcendental entity as the referent of "I." But, despite these appearances, Hegel doe takt sno e this path. Nonf eo the motivations that pushed Kant to distinguish the empirical self

15. Recal discussioe th l Hegel'f no s critiqu rationaf eo l psycholog Chapteyn i r i. 98 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

thinkine th d an g subject hav significany ean t hol Hegeln do . Kant has three different motivations for regarding the I that thinks as nonempirical convictions hi : s abou nature th tpossibilit d ean f yo ethics belies ,hi f that thinking thing principln i e sar e unknowable, belies hi d f thaan t phenomenal propertie ultimatele sar y unreal.16 Hegel thoroughly rejects Kant's incompatibilis distinctioe th d man n betwee morae nphenomenath d an l l self; morality musthisa e b -t worldly affair or it is useless, according to Hegel. Because Hegel rejects the phenomenal-noumenal split, he can hardly maintain the irrealit f phenomenayo l properties r thao , t natural propertiee sar somehow fake (although thesense false th y ar e n ei that t theno o yd revea complete lth e trut things)f ho . Finally, rather than believing that the thinking subject must be unknowable in principle, Hegel believe oppositee sth . Only insofa somethins ra g exhibit struce sth - ture of thought is it knowable, and only thought is absolutely knowable. We are forced, it seems, to reconsider the notion that a concrete person is always the referent of "I." There is, however, an objection to this—the fact that Hegel claims that the I as such is abstract. Becaus abstractnese th seem t i f e, o I e s th capabl f so maintaininf eo g its identity across conditions in which the identity of a concrete person would not be maintained. For instance, I can imagine being the Emperor Claudius, and it seems plausible to claim that I might have been Claudius sens.e I deans on i et i r tha Wille, tI Vriesme d ,a twentiete th f o n h ma century, cannot have been Claudius hav;I ea certain objective reality that canno alteree tb radicallo ds y without destructioe th persoe . Neverthelessth f am no nI able ar o e t e w , imagine ourselves to be quite different beings from what we objectively are, and Hegel recognizes the importance of this ability to divorce ourselves from our objective reality and to project ourselves int odifferenta , cal t subjectiveli , reality. abstractnese th t 17Bu f so

16. See Kitcher, "Kanf s Real Self," p. 122. 17. Zeno Vendler, in his article "A Note to the Paralogisms," attempts to exploit abilitr ou abstraco yt t ourselves fro objectivr mou e situatio argun o distinctiot a r efo n between the transcendental I and the concrete person, but his argument assumes that our ability to imagine being something else means that it is really possible to be that thing. Then, assumin necessite gth l identitiesal f yo case t musi ,th e e thab t t t identicaeitheno m a Wille o r I t lrigi a t dmno designator s di e Vrie" "I r bott so hBu . "Willem deVries see" "I functiomo d t "an rigis na d designators. "The answe thas ri t 9 9 Phenomenology: I Emerges e Th

doeI meat e sth no n tha concretmore y tth an e, I e persoth t no ns i than the abstractness of "this" means that it cannot pick out a concrete object. Our earlier distinction between names and demon- stratives shows that this objection is fallacious, for it assumes that "I" is a name, not a demonstrative. Kant ought havo t e endorse Aristoteliae dth n dictue mth thas i t ti same thing that thinks tha t cleas runs,i t i r t tha18bu t Hegel does endorse it. Thinking (at least in its subjective variety) is a human activity. To be sure, it is a very special kind of activity, but no activit occun yca r without being realize somdn i e particular, natural embodiment consideo T . abstraco t humaa rs i I tn nfroa m that particular embodiment of thinking. That the I can be abstracted from its embodiment no more implies their separability than the abstractabilit shapf yo e from colo equilateralitr ro y from equiangu- larity implies their separability.

THINKINE TH G SUBJECT Universality and Self-relation Let me summarize the position we have reached. Hegel takes the sense of "I" to be (roughly) "this thinking subject." The referent of "I," as we see in more detail below, is an individual human [Mensch] in a complex situation. Our apparent ability to wrest the I from its

the T', the subject of such a transference, has no content and no essence; it is a mere fram whicn i e pictury h an bare th e e s fitsi for t i ;f consciousness mo " (Vendler, p. 117). This leaves it difficult to understand just what the transcendental I is, but we can already see that Hegel rejects several of the crucial assumptions in Vendler's Kant-inspired argument. First, Hegel reject assumptioe th s n thaimpossible th t e cannot be imagined. The ability to divorce ourselves in imagination from our empirical reality does not show that the self is something different from its empirical reality. Second, Vendler also seems to be arguing that because the sense of "I" is abstract, its referent must be an abstraction, because it designates rigidly. If the "I" designates rigidly, though, it does so via an abstract description, and the designatum need not be abstract. There is nothing here to force Hegel away from "I" referring to a concrete person Zene Se . o Vendler Paralogisms,e NotA th " , o et Contemporaryn "i Aspects of Philosophy, . Ryle G . 111-21. . pp , ed 18. It has been argued that there is no good reason for Kant to divorce the empirical self and the thinking self, and that the thinking self must indeed be the empirical self; see exampler fo , . StrawsonF . P , Boundse Th , of Sense, . i6affpp r o ; Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self." ioo Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

concrete actuality is due to the fact that the coherence of counterfac- tual suppositions about x is controlled by the sense of the expression used to refer to x. Because the sense of "I" is highly abstract, counterfactuaw therfe e ear l suppositions thaabsolutele ar t - yin coheren somethinr fo t g referre solelo face d- t th re t"I.s t ya "Bu main mana s tham a , tI accordin Hegelgo t Cartesia a t no , n ego. The discussion of the sense of "I" began with a passage in which Hegel characterizes the I as (a) wholly abstract universality, (b) pure relation to itself, (c) abstracted from all its particular states, and (d) thinkin subjecta s ga faro S ., onl thire fourtyd th dan h characteristics have been considered preseno .T roundeta d accoun Hegel'f to s understandin "I,e th " f gsomethino g mus saie tb d abou univers tit - salit self-relationd yan . This also necessitate explication sa - He f no gel's conception of thinking, for a thinking subject is universality and pure relation to itself in virtue of being a thinking subject. There are two aspects to the claim that the I is self-relation— material and formal. The sense in which an I is materially self- related is the most directly understandable, for it concerns our relations to our own internal states. More important, the formal self-relation is made possible by the material self-relation. We therefore begi lookiny nb Hegel't ga s conceptio eacy hwa thinkee th f no r is materially self-related. This really only requires a review of the previous developmen subjectivf to emere e th spiri o -t e t witey n ha gence of a self, for the material self-relation of the thinking subject is the self-relation of the organism. As a preface to this discussion, let remine m readee dth r tha overale th t l structur - intend He ean f o t gel's mature system is decidedly more Aristotelian in style than it is Cartesian. Beginning wit logimetaphysicss hm hi ccu , Hegel traces the overall, fundamental structures of reality. The structures formally specified in the Logic are then applied to the analysis of particular phenomena in ascending orders of complexity, each building on the previous order, from mechanics through biology. The philosophy of spirit picks up this progression, but one should not think tha dividine tth g line between natur spirid e an clearcut s ti ; we have a great deal in common with animals. The Anthropology is transitioe th n point betwee human e animae nth th d describelt an ;i s those structures essentia emergence th . I o lt e th f eo The crucial stages of the emergence, as far as we are concerned, start with sensation sensatioA . a peculia s nha r two-sideness: Phenomenology: The I Emerges 101

viewed naturalistically bode stata th s yf i e o t centerei , d arounda sense organ t fro poine bu ,m th vie f to spirif wo t (from withint i s a , absoluteln a were s i t i ) y simple, given reality, without structure, without connection. The Anthropology describes a set of structures in which the particular sensations involved become increasingly less important as the functional organization of the structures becomes increasingly complex. Sensations are, fro poine m viewon f to , bodily states highere .Th - level organizations into which the sensations are brought, how- bodilye s r pe ; t rathereverno e ar ,, the functionalle yar y specified and explained suchs a d , an ,the onle yar y abstractly specifiede th , particular sensations involved being contingent to them. These structures of sensations exist as habits. "That the soul thus makes itself int abstracn oa t universal bein reduced gan s wha particulas ti r in feeling (and in consciousness) to a determination of it that merely is—this is habit. ... It [the soul] is free of [these determinations] in neithes i t i s a r r interestefa o occupier s no n di themy db than ;i t i t exist thesn si e form possessios samit e s th sa t ea tims i nt i e openo t the further activity and occupation of sensation as well as of the consciousness of spirit in general" (§410, my tr.). In an organism thadevelopes ha t d large-scale habitual pattern behaviorf so , individual sensations are important only insofar as they figure in these patterns. The soul is an abstract universal being insofar as it is best described and explained in terms of these abstractly specified, dynamic structure sensationsf so totalit e soue th s Th . li them f yo t Bu . it is not in virtue of habit alone that man is capable of having an I: "This abstract being-for-sel corporealit s soue it t th n li f ye o f t no s yi I, not yet the existence of the universal which is for the universal" (§409, my tr.). Achieving a self, an I, requires a further recursion. Freed fro particularitiee mth sensatiof so reduciny nb role gf th e o sensation to that of mere contingent occasion for the soul's (abstractly specified) activity, the soul now reduces the role of those patterns of activity to occasions for higher-order structures. With this mov I—the th e e subjec f consciousness—emergeso t : "This being-for-sel f freo f e universalit highee th s yi r awakenine th f go soul to the I, to the abstract universality insofar as it is for the abstract universality, whic thuhs i s thinking subjectd itselan r d fo fan indeed subject of its judgment [Urtheil], in which it excludes from itsel naturae fth l totalit determinations it f yo for e [i.e.s s] a th m of n ,i io2 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

objectn a worla , d external relateo s itself,d o t san itsel that i s i o t t fi immediately in that world reflected into itself—Consciousness" (§412, my tr.). Habit Heges ,a l describe thoughe b n organizatioca e , tsth it o s fa n of sensory experience; the I emerges, not in that organization, but as the possibility of a further unitary organization of the various modes of first-order organization of sensory experience. A habit is an abstract universality in that it is the same across times and places, read manifeso yt t itself wheneve eliciteds i imposin n i t ri s i t I . ga further, higher-order structure on our habitually structured sensory experience that the I and consciousness emerge. The I, then, apparently depends on the existence of a second-order functional organization. If this is the nature of the I, we should be able to use it to illuminate the difference between animals and humans. Animals certainly have habits, but, if Hegel is right, these habits simply coexist within the animal, as it were. They are not subject to any higher organizing principle. Should two (or more) habits come into conflict, say, becaus elicitine eth g stimul mutuallio fortw y exclusive behavioral pattern presente sar conflice th , onls i t y resolvee dd facto, depending on which habit is more firmly entrenched. With humans contrastn i , , ther highea s ei r leve organizationf o l . Con- flicts between habitual patterns are (often) resolved in a principled merelt no factd e yd an o manner humae Th . self-regulatinns i a n gi wa animae yth nots li . The picture obtained from the above discussion might be misleading unable somb r y ,fo resiseo t ma temptatioe tth thinno t f ko man's initial reflective turn as essentially conscious, in which man is aware of the behavioral patterns or mental structures reflected on as either behavioral pattern r mentao s l structures. This, however, woul majoa e db r mistake serioua , s jumpin gune th f . go Whe n Hegel insists that the natural determinations of the soul (the sensations, feelings first-orded an , r habits excludee )ar d fro soue mth n li the form of an external world, in the form of objects, he should wordtakes e b objecthi e t na Th . whico st h consciousness relates throughout the Phenomenology are, strictly speaking, internal construction consciousnesf so manifole th f o t sensationf dso ou . This i why Hegel can insist that "the Kantian philosophy is most accu- rately assesse havins da g grasped spiri consciousnesss a t s a d ;an 3 10 Phenomenology: I Emerges e Th

containing throughou philosophe th t no t spiritf yo t onle bu ,y th determinations of its phenomenology" (§415, my tr.). The first- order pattern mentaf so l activit whicn yo h consciousness directs itself do not appear to it as patterns of mental activity, but as constituting independent objects. We can now see the sense in which the I, the subject of consciousness, stands in a material relation to itself. The objects it takes to be independen relatio n itselff i to d whican , no t defineht i s itselfn i e ar , reality determination compleitselfe f so th ther e fo ,y ar x structures of sensory dat have aw e (subconsciously) prepare further dfo r con- ceptualization.19 higher-ordea s i I e Th r organizing principle. Strictly speakingt ,i relates itself directly only to other organizing principles, and thus only to things of its own basic ontological type. If we grant that organizing principles are always universals in some suitable sense (whether^abstract or concrete universals), then the I, itself a universal, relates directly onl otheo yt r universals, which are, furthermore, contained within it. This is the formal sense in which the I is a pure self-related universal. It is, to use the Aristotelian vocabulary, the form of forms. It is also important to note that this formal self-

19. Because of the essential self-refatedness of the I, it is tempting to attribute to Hegel the belief that all prepositional attitudes are de se, a la David Lewis or Roderick Chisholm. The belief that all reference is directly to one's self and only indirectly, by means of individuating descriptions, to other things does not sit comfortably with other Hegelian doctrines. First, whereas Hegel sometimee s th seem d treaan o st " t"I other indexical coordinates sa nevee h , r seems tempte mako dt primary" e"I . Sec- ond, the idea that we are, in thought, directly related to and directly aware only of ourselves flies in the face of the phenomenology (in the non-Hegelian sense) of thought; deep thought is precisely when we forget ourselves, lose ourselves, as Hegel remarks in several places. Third, insisting that we act as our own intermediary betwee thoughr worle nth ou d stilan t l leave wits s u intermediar n ha thud yan s threaten revivo st problee eth thing-in-itsela mf o f inaccessibl. us o et There are, however, other element Hegel'f so s philosophy that indicate sucn ha interpretation—his comparisons feeline th f !o g soumonada o t l instancer fo , a t A . deeper level, Hegel's confinement to an Aristotelian logic of terms, which underlies convictios hi n that judgment syllogismd san waye sar internae sth l structura f eo concept (universal) unfolds itself, also encourages the view that thought and belief ought to be understood as self-attribution of a universal, whether in the still implicit form of a concept, the dirempted form of a judgment, or the fully unfolded form of a syllogism. havt Hegeno clearlea d ldi y articulated theory prepositiona e ofth l attitudess wa t ;i not a clear issue for the age. I presently believe that Hegel's position is indeterminate with respect to this question, although I hope to return to it in future work. 4 1O Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

relation supervenes upon the material self-relation. Anything with the material self-relation exhibite normaa y db l human being would ipso facto also exhibit the formal self-relation of the I (though not necessarily vice versa).

Thinking as a Subject The major characteristic of the I—thinking as a subject—needs to furthee b r explicated. Though sees i t universaHegee y nb th s a l l ordering activity manifeste mucordes e da th objectivf n hro i e reality as in our subjective mental activity. Pure thinking is the structure or organizing activity necessary to any (metaphysically) possible systee worldth s i m t ;i trace Hegel'n di s Logic. M . InwooJ . d interprets Hegel's clai thinkins mi I tha e a th ts ga subject to mean that Hegel identifies the pure I with the self-determining syste f purmo e thoughts.20 Ther severae ear l startling consequences of such an identification. First, there is no distinction between individual thinkers.21 Inwood suggests that different particular egos migh identifiee b t d with different chunk totae th f lso system of pure thoughts—namely, with that part of the system an ego commands. But this seems already to presuppose the identification of egos in some other way, for there is no way intrinsic to the system of pure thoughts to differentiate egos. Second, identifying the I with the system of pure thoughts would make it impossible to distinguish any particular thinker from that system, from the Abso- lute. A Kojevean vision of a megalomaniacal Hegel, who having understood his own system has become the very intellect of God, woul righe db t after all. Another untoward consequenc sucf eo ha position is that it seems to make it impossible to draw the distinction between occurrent thinkings, attributable to persons at specific times, and the pure thoughts themselves. The system of pure thought always i s present—the pure thought datablet no e t sar .Bu then how can I or my occurrent thoughts, which surely are datable, be identical to (even part of) the system of pure thoughts? I argue

20. Inwood, Hegel, pp. 34-42. 21. This consequence can be softened somewhat by taking the position that there onls i distinctioo yn n between individual ego pura squ e thinkers thinkerf i t Bu . e sar identifietrule b o yt d with pure thoughts distinctioo n ,e therb n eca n among them, for pure though ones ti . 5 10 Phenomenology: Emerges1 e Th

below that Hegel believe shighese thath t a t t leve mentaf o l - ac l tivity—pure thinking—we aractivite eth y that though (ses ti e also Chapte mistaka s i rt i tak11)t o et strica e Bu . e thib t o identitst y between me and the system of pure thoughts; one batter does not a ballgame make. untoware Th d consequence strica f so t identificatio pure th ef I n o with the system of thoughts can be avoided without losing the essential and intimate relation between the two by employing one of Hegel's favorite devices, the distinction between form and content. The pure I and the system of pure thoughts must have, accord- Hegelo t g same in ,th e content significantln i t ,bu y different forms. This distinction, as employed by Hegel, is not a simple juxtaposition of two independent, separable elements in a complex whole. Although one content can appear in different forms, it is sensitive to fore th whicmn i t appearshi mismatcA . h between for cond man - tent does violence to both. Without the appropriate form, the content cannot appear as it really is; an inadequate form distorts, or at least conceals, part of the content. mose Th t familia f thio sre distinctioexamplus e th f eo n within i Hegel's system is his description of the relations among the triad of finae th l stage (Absolute Spiritphilosophe th f o ) f spirityo : Art, Religion Philosophyd an , . Hegel claims that these three sharea common content—the self-knowledge of spirit as Absolute Spirit. Bu alse th o claims that they for e diffeth m n i rthi s conten givens ti . In Art, spirit's self-knowledge is clothed in an externally perceptible form Religionn i ; t takei , imaginativen sa , imagistic form. Onln yi Philosophy does spirit's self-knowledge attain the fully adequate, explicit form best suite. it do t The system of pure thoughts is a network of interrelated pure Hegew ho s l conceptsi wells conceive a s I hi .t e Hegeth Bu .f so l adopt Kantiae sth n idea thacategoriee th t s (pure concepts) constitute the I in their operation. The subject and the object are simultaneously constituted by the activity of thought. But unlike Kant, Hegel sees no reason to confine pure concepts to subjective minds alone. Pure concept alse sar o constitutiv objectivityf eo ; anything supposedly lying "behind" the objects of our thought must be nonobjective, illusory. Thus Hegel' activen a s i sI , self-constituting system of pure thoughts. Th Ideae saiee totath e b f sam th ,do y l realit eworldma e th f yo . 106 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

The important difference between the I and the Idea is that the I is existentn a , self-constituting syste mf puro e concepts (WdL, vol, 2 . p. 220; SL, p. 583). To say that something exists or is existent is to thainvolves y i t sa i t relationn di mutuaf so l dependence witn ha indeterminate number of other things of similar status. "Existence is the immediate unity of self-reflection and reflection in another. It therefors i indeterminate eth e collectio existentf no things sa - sre flected into themselves which are just as much appearances in anothe relativer ro whicd an , h constitut eworlda mutuaf o l depen- infinitdencn a d eean connectio groundf no groundedsd san " (§123, my tr.). Existence is the form, for instance, of spatiotemporal particulars. The world-whole, or the pure Idea, cannot be said to participat relationn ei mutuaf so l dependence—ther , afteeis r all, nothing else it can depend on. The I, however, does participate in such relations, for each perso necessarilI n a ns i y relate othedo t r I's and to nonthinking beings as well. Thus, although the content of samee th e , ar theiI e r th form Idee d significantle th aan ar s y different. Since existence is a matter of entering into dependency relations with other things, there is an inherent tension in the notion of the system of pure thoughts existing. The system is supposed to be absolutely self-determining. How can it adopt a form so antithetic naturets oit ?

This last shape of Spirit—the Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Concept as remaining in its Concept in this realization—this is absolute knowing. . . . Truth is the content, which in religion is still not identical wit certaintys hit thit s Bu .fact a identit than w i e , th tno s yi content has received the shape of the Self. As a result, that which is the very essence, viz. the Concept, has become the element of existence, s becomha r formo e eth of objectivity consciousnessr fo . (PhG, . 556p ; PhS, pp. 485-86)

The system of pure thoughts—the absolute Idea—cannot itself adopt the form of existence, for the system requires a form fully adequate to its content. Its content is the categorial structure governing the constitution of the world. Considered as a pure content, independent of considerations of form, this is the Concept—an Phenomenology: The I Emerges 107 abstract structure (explored in the Logic) realized by the world- whole. The only form fully adequate to this content is the world- whole itself that Bu t. abstract structur alss ei o realized withine th world; there weret i are s a , , partial, microcosmic realizatione th f so structure of the macrocosm. An existent individual who possesses sufficient internal complexity with the appropriate categorial structure partially realizes the Concept in a self-reflective mode. The contenindividuae samee th th t f eac s o ti bu , hI l I'sdistincs a , t existence e naturath n i s l world e themselvear , s thereby distinguished. It is, indeed, part of the very structure of the world that its own structure be internally duplicated in this way, and in this sense the world comes to its own fullest realization in our thought about , ourselve s realizinsa e Conceptgth . All human activit imbues yi d with thought; though momena s ti t in everythin Jus. thoughs do ta e gw involvestructures e ti th l al dn i s of the objective world, it permeates all the structures of subjectivity. In this sense we are always thinking, according to Hegel. But surely ther some ear e episode mentaf so l activity whic pure har e thoughts in a more straightforward sense—for instance, what someone does in readin understandind gan g Hegel's Logik. Though struce th s ti - ture mentar ofou l activity purn .I e thinking that structur alses i e oth object of our thinking. Thus thinking as a subject and thinking as an object coincid puren i e thought self-conscioue ,th s realizatioe th f no Concept. i, We began with a question: According to Hegel, what am I? I am a complex organism whose internal states exhibi self-reflectivea t , multileveled structure enabling me to consciously recreate the structure exhibite worle wholethinkina th a s n di a m a I . g thing and therefore necessarily also an embodied, sensate thing. Strictly speaking, I am neither a merely material nor an immaterial thing. What is important about me is not what I am made of, but what I do—namely, think. And in thought, at least, I participate in the Absolute. 7

Intuition

THE ROLE OF INTUITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY

Intuitio firse th t s ni divisio theoreticaf no l spirit althougd an , h Hegel could have called it "rational sensibility" or even "perception," its placement after the Phenomenology emphasizes the difference between intuitio sensatiod nan feelingr no . The connection between sensation, feeling intuitiod an , thans i t they are all mental states with significant sensory content directed on individuals Kant'n I . s botanizatio genue th f nso representation (Critique of Pure Reason, A^2o/B-}^6-7), intuition a nclasses i n a s da objective perception that "relates immediatel s objece i th d yo an t t single." This is strikingly echoed in the Zusatz to §445, where the first stag theoreticaf eo l spiri describes i t "materias da l knowledge relatin immediateln a o gt y single object,—or intuition." specifyn I - thag in t intuitio fora ns materialf i m o knowledge Hege excludins li g cognitive states that relate to a single object, but that do so formally, as for instance a definite description might. A representation with the content roome "thth e n i "talles n mighma t t well relata o et single individual and yet not be a piece of material knowledge. For, if there were suc individuan ha sensoro n t bu ly contact between representatione th hid man representatioe th , n immecoule b t dno - diately applied to the individual. Not all singular representations intuitionse ar , therefore—only those that represen individuan a t l directly through their sensory content. As in Kant, the objects to which intuition relates are highly struc- Intuition 109 hired. The objectof intuition is a spatiotemporally extended object, possessing causal properties and sometimes intentions, desires, and reason. It is only at this relatively late stage that Hegel finds a place for the rich_perceptual-experience-of-the-world with which we are all so familiar.1 This is important, for the fact that our ordinary perceptual consciousness of the world is dealt with under intuition means that it is not under consideration in the Phenomenology. This reinforces our earlier claim that Hegel's Phenomenology is not the proper place to look for his theory of perception. Sensation providesJhejnaterial for intuition. "The content thas ti raised into intuition [spirit'ss it s si ] sensations ^intuitions jusit s ta s are changed into representation immediateld san representas yit - tions into thoughts, etc" (§440 sensationt tr.)w y m sa ,Bu . e w s a , earlier thoroughls ,i y nonconceptual thero s , rooeo seemn me b o st for the concept of "rational sensation." And indeed, Hegel writes very littl f sensatioeo sectioe th n intuitionn i no . Hegel rather recapitulate e notioth s f feelinno s forminga e firsth g t stagf eo intuition. But the notion has broadened in scope here a bit, for Hegel remarks that "feeling has already occurred earlier (§339ff.) as a mode of the soul's existence. In that case the essential determination of the finding or the immediacy is natural being or corporeity. Here however merels i t i , y abstract, immediac generaln yi " (§446). Notice tha referencs hi t e her , perhapeis s surprisinglye th o t t no , section on feeling in the Anthropology but to the Philosophy of Nature. Feeling is a determination of the animal and therefore properly treate Philosophye th dn i of Nature wells a sayinn .I g that heren ,i intuition, feeling has become merely abstract, Hegel is opening the realm of feeling and sensation to things that are not simply the mental counterparts of externally determined bodily states. Thus he fulfill earlies hi s r statement (§401, Zusatz) that internal sensations are, properly speaking, to be discussed in the Psychology. The important poin thas ti t such feelings hav beet eno n mediatee th y db

i. Sellars has argued for years that a Kantian perceptual judgment has the form "This cube is pink," where the subject phrase "this cube" models the intuitive component of the perceptual judgment and therefore the structure of the intuition itself Hegel'n I . s Logik singulae th r judgment takes precisely this form. If Hegel takes his logic and his statements about the singularity of the object of intuition seriously, he would have to find Sellars's model suggestive and very agreeable. See W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics. 110 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

objective, rule-governed constructive processes that constitute intuitions.2 Intuition is for Hegel, like Kant, the constitution of that form of our cognitive experience in which we relate immediately to the singula singulars a r . Material relatio singulae th o nt singulars a r , however, can be guaranteed only by a sensory connection. Con- cepts never relate to the singular as singular. In intuition the content retains the form of the found or the given (the immediate), but s givennesit t appearsi contene y th merels i s wa r a fo s e ,i t yth determination of spirit itself, and in its relation to it spirit relates itself only to itself; that is, the object of intuition seems to be given to us directly, without intermediary process or medium, but in fact the rich structure that the object of intuition is presented as having is itself the work of the constructive processes of spirit itself. Hegel does not believe that this structure is only a subjective artifact of our mental processes—the objective structure th e worl th d f dan eo subjective, cognitive structures of rational beings are ultimately congruent—but thaobjece th t presentes a t intuitiodn i bees nha n constructed in accordance with the categorial structures of consciousness, although that activity is not present to the intuiting consciousness itself. In the Psychology there is a steady progression in the explicitness activite ofth spiritf yo . "Psycholog thereforys i e concerned wite hth facultie generar so l mode activite th f so spiritf yo suchs a —intuiting, representing, recollecting, etc., desiring, etc." (§440, my tr.). In intuition the activity of spirit, its constructive contribution, is not

2. It is not altogether clear, however, that in his discussion here Hegel respects his own distinction between sensation and feeling. In particular, my interpretation of the distinction seems to be belied by his remark that "cultivated, true sensation is the sensatio cultivatea f no d spirit thaacquires ha t consciousnese dth determinatf so e differences, essential relationships, true determinations whicn ,i etc.this d i ht si ,an rectified matter that enters its feeling, that is, contains this form" (§447, my tr.). This sentenc rathes ei r obscure takimplyI o t t t ethat i , bu ,no t sensation come loades sa d with essential relations t tha theibu ,n i r very entry into feeling resule a th s a f , to immediate synthesis of sensation to create feeling, they already obtain this form, sinc unconscioue eth s synthesi informew no s i sreasony b d . This sentenceo s , interpreted, does not threaten my interpretation of the distinction between sensa- tiofeelingd nan . Ther passagee ear Additione th sn i s where these terms seee b mo t used loosely, but this is not surprising, for in writing the Additions Boumann had a variety of different sets of notes, both from Hegel's hand and from his students', some of which were relatively early, before Hegel had solidified this distinction. 1 11 Intuition

yet eviden experiencee th n i t , howevee th o t e r b presen y ma t i t mind reflectin nature th intuitionn f geo o . Theoretical spiri "ths ti e activit whicy yb seemingle hth y alien stag e objecth f Conf eo [o t - sciousness] receives, instead of the shape of something given, isolated and contingent, the form of something inwardized, subjective, universal, necessary, and rational" (§443, Zusatz, Miller tr.).

thereforIs i t mistakea e when theoretical spiri sometimes i t s distinguished from practical spirit by characterizing the former as passive anlattee d th actives ra . This distinction does, indeed, appeae b o t r correct. Theoretical spirit seems onl accepo yt t wha alreads i t y there, whereas practica lproduc o t spiri s ha t e somethint ye t g no tha s i t externall hando yt truthn I . , however alreade w s a , y indicatee th n di Zusatz to §442, theoretical spirit is not a merely passive acceptance of an other, of a given object, but reveals itself as active by raising the inherently rational content of the object out of the form of externality singlenesd an s int fore o th reasonf mo . (§444, Zusatz, adapted from Miller tr.)

Theoretical spirit begins wit foundha immediacy (its apprehensiof no the object of consciousness). In this seemingly immediate appre- hension of the object of consciousness spirit indeed knows the external object—but it does not yet apprehend its own self and the extent to which the object of consciousness is its own, its self (because constituted by it). The concepts with which subjective spirit understands its own activity are the subject of the Psy- chology Psychologe Th . cruciaa s yi l leve f Hegel'o l s systemr fo , its thoroughgoing self-reflectivity is the defining characteristic of spirit.

ATTENTION, SPACE TIMD EAN ,

Full-fledged intuition is not, of course, present at the lowest level of intuition have w es a ;seen lowese th , t leve s simpli l y feeling recapitulate abstractedd dan levee Th .l above that, called "attention" by Hegel, has (as is common with the second step of a triad) two "moments" within it. The fact that spirit finds itself in intuition implies an internal split, a distinction between that which finds and that which is found. In intuition spirit is self-related, which requires 112 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

tha distinguishablto thertw e eb e (thoug necessarilt hno y separable) moments. Naturally, thes momento etw thoroughle sar y correlative: the moment of spiritual activity is attention; what is found is a spatiotemporal world. importanIs ti noto t e here that attentio apparentlns i y conceived of as the mental activity through which experience receives its spatiotemporal form. thit sBu notion seems implausible attenr fo , - 3 tion (Aufmerksamkeit) is a fairly strong word, implying a high degree of conscious mental activity and willful self-control. The constitutive function of the perceiving spirit is not a conscious function of Additioe th spiritn i t §44o nt ,ye 8 Hegel seemThi. thay is t sa sti o st view would see makmo t constitutioe eth spatiotemporae th f no l experiencworlr ou f do e somethin payiny b o d ge attentiogw n either to our feelings or sensations or to the objects of experience, and this seems patently false. To understand Hegel's concep attentiof o t muse nw t remember that it occupies a place within the dialectic of intuition parallel to that occupied by self-feeling and by the whole level of consciousness insofar as it is in consciousness that the distinction between the subjectiv objective th d ean mads ei e explicitcase th e e b takI .o t t ei that self-feeling, consciousness, and attention are all different levels same th ed generian e oon f c for mentaf mo l activity, with attention bein gmora e highly develope articulated dan d leve thif lo s activity or function of mind. Each of these levels has as a primary feature a subject object spli whicn i t objece hth projectes i t d away froe mth subject or externalized.

Two observations havmade b eo respect en i significanc e th f to thif eo s externality however; firstly, since what is spiritual or rational constitutes the objects' own nature, what is sensed assumes the form of a self-externality in that it becomes an object external to the internality of spirit. Secondly, we have to note that since this transformation of what is sensed proceeds from spirit as such, what is sensed is endowed with a spiritual, that is to say with an abstract externality, and so acquires the same universality as that which can pertain imme-

implicatioe 3Th . clearns i objecte :th s of consciousnes Phenomenologe th sn i o yd not have a spatiotemporal form. This continues the remark in the Phenomenology (§418) that "here "nowd "an determinatione "ar t realls no tha yo d te appl th o yt object of sense certainty but are properly reserved for intuition. This is made even clearer in the Addition to §418. 3 11 ~ Intuition

diately to what is external, a universality which is still entirely formal and devoid of content. (§448, Zusatz)

respecto tw e Thes whicth n s i e ear h intuition differs fro earlies mit r counterparts. First, Hegel says, intuition experiences its objects as sejf-external. This means that in intuition we experience objects as imperfectly manifestin determinatga e essence essencn a , - ein dependent of that singular object and only fully realized by us, through our conceptual grasp of it Insofar as the object of intuition is determined by this essence—without which, of course, it would not be what it is—the object is self-external. Second, the externalization of the sensuous content is performed in intuition by spirit as such thid an s, dictate fore th swhicn m i h that conten exters i t - nalized. The point here is that the external form imposed on something by spirit itself is essentially appropriate—it is the externality the thing itself has. So when spirit imposes an external form on the sensuous content presented to it, it imposes the same form of externality as singular, sensuous things themselves have—space and time. But this leads us to ask a more probing question: Are we to understand that sensation themselvee sar spatiotemporaa n si - lor dering, even though spirit, although perhaps temporal, is certainly t spatialno have ?W e already see nquandara y similar thiou o r t n si discussion of sensation, a problem that we decided was a weak spot Hegeliae inth n theory. Here however situatioe ,th differentns i r fo , whether Hegel realizes it or not, he has room for a sophisticated answer to the present problem. . Yese no t shoulanswei e th , decide a d s a Th , an , dbe s ris dye ordering of sensation is spatiotemporal, but no, this does not en- gender special problems once we realize what Hegel intends by a spatiotemporal ordering. If we turn to the relevant discussion in the Philosophy of Nature (§254-59), we find Hegel discussing the idea that spac mera s ei e for intuitionf mo thio T .s notio repliese nh , eliminate the element of subjective idealism in this statement and it is right—for "space is a mere form, that is, an abstraction" (§254). saye h §448s n i a , , Or spac "thes i e form of indifferent juxtaposition and quiescent subsistence." Time, also a mere form, is the "form of restlessness, of the immanently negative, of successiveness, of arising and disappearing." I suggest that we take Hegel seriously here and think of time and ii4 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

spac purels ea y formal ordering relations indifferen whao t t t they order other than that (sinc forme theth self-externalityf e so y ar t )i be self-external. It might well be the case then that there are two different sort itemf so s exhibiting these sort f relationso s among themselves, the objects that really are "out there" and the sensations that arise in the subjective mind. The idea is that space and time, as formal orderings of items, can apply to different kinds of item internae lons th sa s ga l structure domaine th f so isoe sar - morphic mine . Therth dforman a i s ei l isomorp perceivee th f ho d spatial relation between two objects of intuition, and this is sufficient for the spatiality of the intuition, since space is, by its nature, formal.4 This idea of counterpart dimensions to account for the spatiotem- porality of our experience is not clearly among the arsenal of the eighteenth nineteenth-centurd an - y philosophers. Sellarss hi n i , discussio Kantf no , for instance onln ,ca y claim that Kand ,ha t made a few distinction e ofth s Sellar mades sha woule ,h d have beeo t d nle some such idea. Yet the case that something like this was in the back of Hegel's mind seems stronger, for he also makes it clear that "if we have said that what is sensed derives the form of what is spatial and temporal fro intuitine mth g spirit however, this statement must tno takee b meao nt n that spac timd onlye ean e ar subjective forms. . . . trute Th tha s hthingi e th t themselvesn si spatiae ar temporal d lan , this dual form of extrinsicality not being one-sidedly imparted to intuitionr the ou origin my i b t n,bu already communicate theo dt m implicite byth , infinite eternallspirite th y ,b y creative Idea" (§448, Zusatz). Space and time are both internal to the subjective spirit and real forms of nature. Why are space and time the forms of intuition? Could there be other form intuitionf o s ? Kant t seemsi acknowledg,o t s ha , e eth

obviouslm a 4I . y drawin somsuggestione n go th f eo s that forwart Sellarpu s sha d in his interpretation in Science and Metaphysics of Kant's views on space and time, but ther some ear e significant difference readinsy herem n Sellarsf g.O o sigmae ,th d -an tau-characteristics of impressions woul propertiee db impressione sth s have because of their causal history Heger .Fo l this causal influenc nugatorys ei ; they would rather be characteristics assigned to sensations by the mind because the mind here, as spirit, implicitly cognizes their nature as self-external and takes them as having the appropriate form—gives them this form, in effect. Of course, spirit only gives to them what they already are in their nature, but the spontaneity of mind in the constitution of the spatiotemporal order seems to me heavily emphasized in Hegel. Intuition 115

possibility of other forms of intuition and can offer no reason why space and time happen to be the forms of our intuition. For Hegel, though, such a question does not really arise. Space and time are the determinate forms of self-externality in general (see the arguments in PN §254ff.); this is why they are not merely subjective presene formar t naturn sbu i t e itself. The r intuforme you ar f -so ition simply becaus forme theth whice n si y ar h self-external individual objects are realized. If those objects could adopt a different form intuitior fore ou th ,f m o thef no m would change accordingly. Hegel's derivation of space and time from self-externality is overly aprioristic, but his belief that the forms of our intuition depend on the structure of the world, and not vice versa, represents a healthy realism on his part. Hegel exploits the fact that attention is more determinate and focused than mere consciousness, for the object of attention is more tha nrelativa e otherbecoms ha t i , e totally determined, locaten di determinate th e metri spacf c o timed ean , give independenn na t existence all its own, and thus, since it is not really independent, made self-external. "Intelligence thus determines the content of sensatio somethins na g tha externas ti itselfo lt , project intt si o time spaced an , formwhice th whice n si h ar h intuitiveis ti " (§448, Miller tr.). But finite things are self-external and spatiotemporal, according to Hegel intuitiod an , n thus get theit sa r very heart. It seemed, above, that Hegel might be insisting that we are conscious in intuition of bestowing spatiotemporal form on objects. But t thin no facn i k o t s Id i tha committe e h t suco dt implausibln ha e doctrine. Even though in attention spirit is actively directing itself on certain aspects of the world rather than others, this need not be a conscious effort, nor need a person be aware of doing so. That would indeed be a higher level of self-consciousness than is present in intuition. Muc Hegel'f ho s tal attentiof ko nabilite treatth s focuyo a t t si n so one thing, which involves both the negation of one's self-assertive- abilite th nes givd yo t san e onesel mattee th o handft t r a . Wherean si feelin distinctioe gth n between subjec objecd tan indeterminates ti , "intelligence necessarily goes on to develop this difference however, to distinguish the object from the subject in a determinate manner" (§448, Zusatz). The focusing of attention emphasizes the subject's activity in cognition and determines the object more fully n6 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

for the mind, thus sharpening the split between mind and object while also fosterin deepea g r appropriatio e objecs it th f n i no t fullnes mine thud th dy an s sb overcomin splie gth t between subject objectd an .

INTUITION PROPER

In feeling proper the item found is "found" as a member of an indeterminate connectedness consciousnesn ;i founs i t s i exter s da - independend an l ontologicae na th ego e d th ,f an to l structure th f eo object itself comes under investigation intuition .I itee nth m found is found as an item (or as belonging to an item) in an external, spatiotemporal world. The structure of the connectedness among the found sensations is now completely specified. And it is only in intuition that adequate sophistication is reached to account for the experienc spatiotemporaa f eo l worl spatiotemporals da Hegeln .O - principlesn ia , animals canno attributee tb experience dth a f eo spatiotemporally ordered world.5 The third step in the triad of intuition is the rather bland assertion that intuition prope "concrete th s ri e unity" moment e ofth s already discussed. We may take the time to differentiate intuition proper from some of its other neighbors, as Boumann's Zusatz does. One of the more interesting remarks in the Addition to §449 is the contrast drawn between intuitio sensuoue th d nan s consciousness Phenomenologye oth f stateds A . , though seemt i ,t intuitio se o st n t jusoffno ,t from sensuous consciousness t fro l ,thosbu mal e attitudes summed up under the heading "Consciousness." Such consciousness, he says, "in unmediated and wholly abstract certainty of itself, relate simmediate itselth o t f e singularit objecte th f yo , which falls apart int omultituda f aspectseo . Intuitione th n o , contrary, is a consciousness which is filled with the certainty of reason, its general object having the determination of being something constitutinf rationalo o s d singla t an , gno e being torn apart

5. Hegel takes spatiotempora lt merelrelationno e b y o qualitativt s t alsebu o cannoe metricw d tan , attribut animalo et s knowledg metrica f eo : "Space isn i , general, pure quantity. . Consequently . . , nature begins with t quantitno d yan quality" (PN §254). Intuition 117

into various aspects, but a totality, a connected profusion of determinations." (§449, Zusatz). "True intuition," he goes on to say, "apprehend genuine sth e substanc object.e th f eo " cleaIs ti r here that somehow intuition get essencee holsa th n do s conceptr o thay thing f impossibls to i wa a n si phenomenologir efo - cal consciousness case th e explaie e withoub w thin n w snca ;ca ho t calling on the vague and unhelpful point that intuition is informed with reaso thereford nan e grasps thing thes sa y arehave ?W e seen advancg bi nature objece thath e th th f tn ei eo t constructey db intuition over consciousness is that it is explicitly spatiotemporal, thid san provide wits object e skeyu e th h th r ,sfo constructey db intuition trac epata h through spac timed ean woul t I . d seem from most of Hegel's pronouncements about the abstract nature of space and time, their low level of reality, for instance, that the spatiotem- porality of an object has very little to do with its essence. But such is not quite the case. It is true that in intuition the grasping of the object is still merely immediate and is not yet true cognition, for "it has not yet achieved the immanent development of the substance of the object, but rather limits itself to apprehending the unexplicated substance still surrounded by the concomitants of the external and contingent" (§449; Zusatz, my tr.). But what intuition must have a grasp of is the recipe for constructing a spatiotemporally extended object—an object with a backside, an inside, a past, and a future— on the basis of the sensations that have none of these qualities. This recip firse th t es stei p toward possessin essencee gth concepe ,th f to e thing th r thifo ,s recipimportane th s ei t recombination intoa "living" totality of what consciousness has separated and analyzed. The object is no more the simple conglomeration of its causes and effects futures wholeit e pass d partth it s , it t,an d ,s an than breads i the simple conglomeration of flour, yeast, water, sugar, eggs, heat, and pressure. Because Hegel insists that all content can occur in feeling, and therefore in intuition, he can also use his account of intuition to approximate the more everyday sense of the term (which it has in Germa wels na English) s la . Thu talke historian'sa h f so s intuition, and of course of the artist's intuition. These remarks, however, dilut pure eth e epistemic positio s forchi f ehavo d nan e probabld yle readermans hi f yo s astrayimmediatn a t bu , e - graspines e th f go n8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

sence of the object is what any kind of intuition is about. In intuition conceivee on objece sth t correctly mers i t i e t correcbu , t beliefr fo , one's justificatio t madno s ne i intuition y evidenb r o r tfo . When, on reflection, the subject realizes that strictly speaking its t reallobjecno s yi t external t internabu , determined an l e th y db subject move th , mads ei e into representation mentaf , o tha t se t l activities surrounding memory and imagination. This is the topic for chapter fittins i 8-10t i nott o gt ,bu e here tha representation ti n intuitive th e activit mine th f dyo provide materiae sth furtherr lfo , more complex activities. Intuitio extremelns i y comple Hegel'n xo s firse th tt stag bu serieaccounta s f i e o t successivel f i s o t ye , y more complex, compounded levels of mental activity. 8

Representation and Recollection

ROLE REPRESENTATIOTH F EO N

A division abilitie e ofth s min e ofth d into perceptiv thinkind ean g capacities is old and common; one of Hegel's more noticeable inno- vation tripartita s si e divisio mentae th f no l faculties int intuie oth - tive, the representative, and the thinking. The middle element here, representation (Vorstellung),1 present wits su h particular difficulties. Some of the phenomena Hegel treats under the rubric of "representation" are dearly sensory—such things as delusions, dreams, and hallucinations—yet others are such as we would today unanimously attribut thoughto et , namely e phenomenoth , f o n language. I begin here by distinguishing representation from intu- secone itionth n I .d sectio ture recollectionnw o nt lowese ,th t level

i. Vorstellung also presents related difficulties for the translator. For Kant it is the generic term covering menta usualls li actd san y translate "representation.s da n "I Hegel's usage Vorstellung longeo n genus e mental i rth al f so l doe t actsi t r sno fo , include thought. Petry translates it as "presentation," whereas Wallace and Miller continue to use "representation." I have adopted "representation" partly to prevent confusion with the more general notion of something's being presented to spirit and to mobilize the play on "re-presentation," which captures some of the spirit, although not the exact semantic content, of Hegel's plays on Vor-stellung, and partly because Hegel's criticisms of Vorstellung are criticisms of what is today called the representational theory of mind. "Representation" is a fortuitous choice as well in that representation treatee sar Hegey db re-presentationss la presentationr o , a n si new mode, of intuitions. 0 12 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

of representation retur distinctioe e .th W o nt n between representation and thought in Chapter 11. When Hegel separates representation fro phenomene mth f ao intuition, he claims that in representation the fact that the mental subjectivs i t statac r eo e becomes explicit:

However, that the object has the character of being mine is only implicitly present in intuition and is first posited in representation. In intuitio objectivite nth y [GegenstiindlichkeH] contene th f o t predomi- nates. Onl intuition—onlye wheth s ha nreflec I o wh tI thays i thet ti n steI o pd int standpoine oth representationf o t . (§449, Zusatz, tr.y m )

Accordingly, spirit posits intuitio owns it s n,a penetrate , makesit t si into something inward—recollects becomeitsel, it n fi s presen itselo tt f therebd an t i yn i free. Through this inwardization intelligence raises itself to the stage of representation. Representing spirit has intuition, whic sublatehneithes d i an vanishet s i rdha n somethini s i r dno g only past. (§450, Zusatz, tr.y )m

It might appear tharepresentatioy tan n wear subjectivits sit n yo its sleeve, yet such things as hallucinations do not obviously present themselves as any more subjective than any other perceptual states, although Hegel calls them representations. Of coursr ou l eal mental states, perceptual state wells sa subjectivee ar , t whabu , t qualifies these mental states to be particularly well suited to be called representations? At the level of representation, the subjectivity of the content of mentae th l state, whic onls hwa y implici intuitionn i t s madi , e explicit. Hegel doe t thinksno , however, tha must ti explicie b t o t subjece th t havin representatioe gth n thasubjective—others i t i t - wise hallucinations and delusions could not be considered representations. It must rather be made explicit to an objective point of view. But an objective point of view also realizes that even in intuition the content is subjective, although it agrees with the objective reality thio T .s extent, intuition representationd san t no e sar exclusive intuitionr fo , s for mspeciaa l subse representationsf to . We still nee distinguisdo t sense hth whicen i subjectivite hth f yo the content of a mental event becomes explicit in a representation. We can understand this by asking what would count as the correct 1 12 Representation Recollectiond an

explanation of the presence to mind of that content. If we reflect for a moment on what we have already seen of Hegel's theory, it is apparent that wha manifole tth sensatiof do presentens i t dno as si occurrentn a , simple propert certaia f yo n comple sensationsf xo ; rather, what a complex of sensations is presented as is a matter both of the internal structure the activity of spirit has endowed that comple sensationf xo relatione th f so wit d s hthaan t that complex, again through the activity of spirit, has with other sensate complexes. Thus a mental state that seems to fit in with the course of intuitio us—ann i therefors di e presente intuition—mayn a s da , on later reflection, be discovered to have been a mental state that doe t cohersno e wit ordee hth f intuitio o rs thu i d mersa nan e representation theoretican I . l spiri adope w t objectivn a t e standpoint eve than no t whic subjectivehs i . Thus representationt no e sar self-presentin sense th egn i that, when had, they revea necessitf lo y all their essential qualities, including whether they are mere representation representationr so s that also qualif intuitions ya virtun si e of correct connection with extra-mental objects. This last remark should also mak cleaet i r that therabsoluto n s ei e demarcation in internal ("felt") qualities between intuitions and mere representations, at least not at the lowest levels of representation, for indeed, in intuition itself we have a representation. One is tempte tha y difference sa tth o dt e between intuitio represend nan - tatioattitude th s nmini e eth d takes statetowarn thit ow bu ,s s dit way of talking nourishes the misleading picture of a spectator in a theater watching images on a screen and reacting to them. We must rather tell a more complex story and give up the attempt to simplify so radically. The mental life of an individual forms a whole, and even this whole is not a totally isolated atom but interacts in various ways wit subject'e hth s environment. Each menta statr n o a t s ei lac item in the course of the world that is open to explanation, and the distinction between som thef eo intuitionms a somd s an the f eo ms a mere representations lies kinmore explanatorth f do n e i y considerations that must be advanced to explain them than in any properties intrinsic to the states themselves. Thus mental states are dassed as mere representations both when they fall short of intuition and when they are at a higher level. Let me explain this. firse Th t constrain muse w t t recogniz thas ei t accountina r gfo mental state or act is not just a matter of explaining its origin in strict 2 12 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

causal terms; one must also show how the act fits in with the subject's other menta environment e statle stateth th f eo d san . Thus it is important to give, not only a causal chain leading from the object to sensations forming the material of the mental state, but also an account of the principles according to which these sensations are unified with all others to form a coherent whole. This is a large parsayine whaf ar t o e gtw whe describe nw ementaa l staten i terms of its content. The full explanation of the genesis of a mental state includes as a crucial factor its fit with other mental states— even though this is a matter of interpretation. We must remember 2 thacoherence th t sensatioy an f eo n witothey han re b nee t dno evident to the subject itself; nonetheless, that there is such a co- herenc presupposes ei assigninr ou y d b sensatio e gth same th eno t subject. There are three important factors to be taken into account in the explanation of a sensuous mental state: the environment, the perceptual apparatus, and the internal spiritual apparatus responsible constructive forth e activity norman .I l intuition activite e ,th th f yo subjective spirit and the operation of the sensory apparatus are standard and therefore not important in explaining that particular state. Whe nsubjeca alerts i t standarn ,i d conditions, with perceptual organs operating properly referenco n e , state th th f eo o et subject other than its orientation in the environment and perhaps perceptua necessars i t lse expe subjece e explaiyo th t th s -y tha n wh rienc t hassubject'e i Th . stat n activitiesd ow sean , since quite normal, form backgroune parth f o t d condition perceptuae th f so l experience, and the burden of explaining why that particular expe- carries i riencd facty ha db s esi abou physicae th t l environmenf o t the subject. In cases of mere representation, the explanatory burden is shifted for whatever reason to facts about the subject itself, whether about the perceptual apparatus or the spiritual apparatus. The subject's own activities are now important in explaining why this experience was had at that time. There is still a causal story to be told about the generation of the sensate material, but now the form that that materia give s normali a spirit y nb no s tli reconstructio cause th f neo

2. These considerations of coherence and the process of interpretation are holistic, Ideological normatived ,an coursef ,o Chaptee ;se r i. Representation and Recollection 123

of the sensations. The standard relations between the causal and semantic characteristic mentae th f so lt hold statethis i no t sI o . sd difference that means that the experience is not an intuition, but this differenc eevidene neeexperiencb e t th dno n ti e itself. Sucha situatio ways o occun some therntw ) b ca n :(a n ri e e ca disturbanc e normae th n i l operatio sensore th f no y organs possibls i t i ) ;(b e that ther somes i e breakdow activite th n i construction f yo . This second alternative can occur for two different reasons: (i) the causal input, materiae th sensationf o l , doe t fullsno y determin objece eth t con- faultr laco o t f structedko ye contextuadu d an , l informatioe nth wrong objec constructes i t objece th r constructeds o ti d with some wrong properties; (ii) the mind itself "processes" the material incorrectly and constructs something that corresponds to nothing in the environment. These possibilities allo illusionr wfo , hallucination, and even madness, and in such cases it is clear that the state of the subjec crucia s i texplanatioe th n i l experiencee th f no casen I . f so such a breakdown in the otherwise normal course of intuition we are forced to be more aware of the subject's own role in intuition, face th tf tha o subjec e d tth an t possesse subjectivesa representationf o the extra-mental world. In this way some representations are best understood as falling short of intuition. There are, however, other way contributioe sth spirif s no it o t own experience can come• to the fore. Spirit is free—it determines itself and is not totally dependent on the external world for its content. Insofa spiris a r t determine experiencen ow s sit evis i t -i , dent that spirit itself bear explanatore sth y burde explaininn ni g this sha t experienci y wh e now. The most intuitive exampl sucf eo h 3 self-determination by spirit is a case of imagination, where, for instance, I let my fancy wander amid images of flowered fields and

woult I mistak a . 3 e db thino et k that spirit's self-determinatio undere b o t -s ni stood here as spirif s willing a certain state into existence, for a volition itself is something to which spirit determines itself. At this level, spirit's freedom is the freedom of organic self-determination, of the independence of the complex from the environment force sayinf .Th e o g that spirit determinet s no itsel certaia s i n i fy nwa the imputation of a volition or some such mental state but rather a sign that we are at an explanatory dead end. Since spiri frees i t action t externalls it ,no e sar y caused, and saying that spiri freels ha t y determined itselcertaia n i f n manner let knos su w tha explanatioe tth n stops with spirit itself explanatioe Th . spirif o n fre i a t f s nti eac o terms of spirit's ends, which it has determined for itself and which are ultimately implici essences it n ti . 124 Hegel's Theory of Mental Actimty

beautiful skies, thus escaping the drear of a winter's day. This need intentionan a e b s i t t i no t l actionbu , do , o somethint t ou t se gI somethin Alternatively. do g I coul,I dowt d si wor d ndesignan n ko - ing a house or solving a problem. We can give reasons for why I am thinking what I am thinking, but these are again internal to me and thoughtsy refem o rt , desires, goals, character, perhap physicay sm l condition. This notion of a spirit freely determining its own mental content seems to raise some problems. Do we, by this formulation, commit thesie Hegeth o st l tha spiria t creatn ca t e sensations basie th , c material of mind, freely? Since sensations are, as we have already seen, states of sensory organs having immediate being for mind, this interpretation would involve mind's abilit influenco yt e th e body directly. Hegel would objec puttino t questioe gth n this way, for it suggests a real separation of mind and body, but the point does confron witm hreahi ta l difficulty therf I . sensatione ear s that standare arist th no y eb o d d causal patterns, Hegel must account for such processes—but to my knowledge he does not do so. Nee suppose dw e tha mine simpln tth dca y create sensationx se imaginationn i e nihilus r ofo ? Hegel migh thay sa tt ther cona s ei - tinual though changing fund of sensation, that in creating representations spirit construct sensatione sth noven si l ways, makinf o e gus the material at hand. In talking about a certain case of visions that someon recognized an d mere eb ha o det visions, Hegel remarks, "Internally we have before us a representation, and this presence is a moment of corporeity, and through illness this presence can be so augmented tha t assumei t fore sth seeingf m o " (quoted froe mth Kehler ms. in PSS, vol. 2, p. 271, my tr.). But to suppose that the eidetic imag flowea f eo r arrangement whic eidetin ha c imagey rma have while, say, skiinmountaine th n gi merels si ynovea l reconstructio sensatione th f no s cause standardn i d environ e wayth y sb - ment seem stretco st h plausibility eidetin A . c imagcloso to o es t ei the original. Hegel's rather bland explanation that something was brought abou spiriy tb dredger to frop du m within spirit's "night- like abyss" (§453) is simply insufficient. If this is the nature of the self-determination of spirit in imagination, how exactly does it differ from an illusion or hallucination, spirit's merely incorrect constructio materiae th f no f sensationo l ? Again, internally there need be no difference, except insofar as in Representation and Recollection 125

spirit's free self-determinatio constructe nth presentee sar mindo t d as bearing the stamp of self-creation. This difference, however, can onl cashee y b relationterme n i th n df i s o construc e sth t bearo st other mental states or acts. For instance, suppose someone to be havin gpina k elephant experience, althoug hsuco thern he ear elephants around. Whethe tha persoy e sa tth e hallucinatinrns w i g merelr o y imagining vividly depend greaa o st t extenfurthee th n to r behavio reportd persone ran th f so describe.e Ifsh elephante sth n si detail, matches their color to a printer's sample, and yet does not expec responr t o other elephantse e th se do o st t , doe cowet sno n ri wely lma marve e imaginativr w he , t a lon fron o themf s o t d e an , capabilitie shale assert w t lno shallucinatinbu s t i thae tsh under go r an illusion. To be hallucinating she must think that there are elephants out there, and we tell this by, for example, her running to escape being trampled. Whethe representatiora imagininn a ns i r go an incorrect intuition depend connectioe th n so gives i nt i othe no t r representations.4

RECOLLECTION

Hegel's treatmen Representatiof to dividens i d triadically, under e headingth s Recollection (Erinnerung), Imagination (Einbildungs- kraft), and Memory (Gedachtnis). These headings are a bit misleading; ther perhape ear betteo sn r words for labeling whatalkins i e th g about, but if one takes these in their ordinary meaning certain confusions are bound to arise. In each case Hegel isolates particular mental abilities althougd an , h each retains some relatioe th o nt normal sense of the word, it is stripped bare of most of the connota- tion normallt si y carries. Furthermore finee ,th r point absolutelo sg y untouched necessars i s a ,encyclopedin a n yi c treatment. Hegel warn alss su o against treating eac thesf ho e thre differens ea d an t separate faculties constituting the mind. The three are understood by Hege hierarchicalle b o lt y ordere increasindn i g complexity, each one presupposin involvind gan predecessors git : "The precis- ena turtrula f eo y philosophical comprehension consists howevee th n ri

4. Sommateriae th f eo l dealing with derangement quote Chaptedn i reinforcer5 s this interpretation. 126 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

grasping of the rational connection present between these forms, in recognizing the sequence of the organic development of intelligence within them" (§451, Zusatz). Recollection, the first of the three main stages of representation, is itself divided triadically. This creates some technical difficulties , foforus Hegel use importane sth t term "recollection" within each of these three stages without acknowledging explicitly that the meanin shiftes gha d slightly becaus appliew tere no a e th m s o i dt simpler, now to a more complex, ability. To avoid merely verbal confusion smale th t la s expens somf eo e stylistic awkwardnessI , simply subscrip terme tth mako st cleaet i eacn ri h case which levelI am dealing with. Recollection s describei i s followsda s initiall"A : y recollecting intuition, intelligence posit contene sth feelinf tinwardnesso s it gn i , in its own space and its own time. It is thus (i) image freed from its initial immediacy and abstract singularity against others and taken int p universalite u o generalth n i I image e th .Th longef yo o e n s rha complete th e determinateness tha arbitrarts i intuitio d an r s yo nha contingent generan i s i t i ; l isolated fro externae mth l place, time, immediatd an e contex whicn ti h intuition stood" (§452 tr.)y n m ,.I recollectionj the sensate material present to mind (the content of intuition longeo n s )i r presente objecn a s da t externa mine th dn o i lt spac timed sensate ean .Th e materia stils li l give internan na l structure sufficient to make it a representation of an object, but the particular sensate clump is no longer united with all the others by those strict categorial principles that impose spatiotemporal structure on the field of intuition. Thus the image is no longer presented as in objective space and time, but as an object in no particular space particulao atn r time objece .Th t image thus dha s been remover do abstracted fro spatiotemporas mit l context consideI f I . objecte rth s in my visual field not as physical objects independent of me but as visual images, even though I may be correctly intuiting a typewriter and desk, I have moved up to the recollectioni of these objects, for the objects are no longer located for me in objective space. This abstractio image th f no e (whether visual, aural, gustatory, etc.) from its immediate spatiotemporal context is the first important step presuppose highel al y db r activitie thesespiritl f so al r ,fo especially thought itself, involve the ability to go beyond the immediate situation into the actual past in memory, into nonactual possibilities in the imaginative construction of possible pasts, presents, Representation and Recollection 127

and futures, and beyond the sensible altogether in the contempla- firselementare d universae an tTh tioth . f se no r ype l step toward these more sophisticated intellectual achievement this si s simple abstractio presene th f no t material fro complets mit e context. Although the content of feeling is no longer completely subjected to those rules or categories that impose complete spatiotemporal determinatenes certainls i t i , t lefit yno tn so devoi sucf do h structure, and the entire categorial arsenal developed in the Encyclopedia Phenomenology presupposes i d here. Without these categoriese th , subject-object split would remain meaningless to the subject, who would be unable to perform the act of recollection, unable to contrast his states with extra-mental objects at all. In recollection!, "wha representeds ti , however, gains this permanencee onlth t ya cost of the clarity and freshness of the immediate, fully determinate singularity of wha intuiteds ti . Intuition pall dimd s becominan sn i g imagen a " (§452, Zusatz, tr.)y m . This passage bring mino t s d Hume's distinction betwee impression na idean a d . Humnan e distinguishes the two solely on the basis of their force and vivacity, which seems to be similar to Hegel's distinction between the relative freshnes claritd san intuitiof yo recollection!d nan Hume't .Bu s differentiation between impressio ided nmerelas an i y phenomenological; he has no other way to explain why an idea is less vivid than an impression other than that ideas derive from impressionsr fo , which conclusion a major argument is that the impressions are more vivid sinct .Bu e Hume draws several other distinctione th n so basis of force and vivacity, it is not clear just what the distinction between impression and idea, which is supposed to be an important distinctio kindn i , really amounts to. Hegel, on the other hand, can give a theoretical explanation of the phenomenological difference between intuitio representad nan - tion. Vivid and strong presence to mind is not merely a matter of the original strengt sensationf ho , accordin Hegelo gt e t alsth f bu ,o o weight in the constructive process it is given.5 But if we are to

muse 5W . t remember thacategoriae th t l scheme develope Encyclopediae th n di Phenomenology doe t givconstructioe rules no th e u r sfo f particulano r objectn si general constructioe .Th n of particular objects always demands special knowledget ;i is, moreover, imbued with thought and is something that we unconsciously and sometimes consciously learn to do. To a trained taster certain flavors, in a complex disquite b drinr ho y e stronkma vividd gan , untrainewhile th o et d palate thee yar multitude losth n ti othef eo r flavors. 8 12 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

construct an object abstracted from its spatiotemporal, causal environment, certai properties it f no certai d sensatione san th f no t si cause ariso st e withi s musnu givee b t n shor tcone shrifth -n i t struction givo T . e them their woul e fuldu l d involve constructing their environmentimpace th n o t thid an s, would slowly extend itself thoughou spatiotemporae tth l worldextene th o t.T that these properties of the object (ultimately all of them to varying degrees) t giveno ne ar their full weighconstructione th n i t objece th , s i t presente less da s clear, less vivid, less fresh mighe On . t consides ra an analogy the phenomenological difference between the sound a familiar voice makee variouth n i s s environment whicn i s e hw normally hear it and the radical change it undergoes in an anechoic chamber, where it is deprived of its normal richness through interaction wit environmente hth .

Recollection fairla s ji y straightforward concept. Recollection2"isa little more problematic, for it is the unconscious preservation of the image isolate recollectionjdn i . Each representatio have nw pre s ei - served in the "night-like abyss" of intelligence. We encountered a claim tike this about the feeling soul earlier, but I said little about it mort bi a e y nowsa e . m Firs t then allf le to ,o s , ther cleao n s eri rule for individuating representations or feelings. Is the representation o typewritefa differenra t representation fro representatioe mth f no a blue typewrite representatioe th r ro battereda f no typewrited ,ol r with thirteen keys and the ribbon missing? All our intuitions can be treated as representations, so we must take Hegel to mean that our complete intuitive experienc worlde inneth y f Wels an eo a ,r s a l intuition able develoar o e t e sw highet pa r stages preserves i , n di

recoUection2. In a stretch of intuitive experience we are able to focus on any of its aspects and turn it into an image, and as potential

image whole sth e panopl preserveys i d within recollection2- Second, the mode of preservation in recollection2 is not correctly conceived as an anatomization and pigeonholing operation within inabilite mindth e s i th t grasyo :t "I universale pth , whic concreths i e in itself while yet remaining simple, that occasioned [the notion that] particular representation preservee sar particulan di r fibers and locations; different things are supposed also to need singular- ized spatial existence" (§453 tr.)y m ,. Hegel insist"neee th n do st o grasp the Concept in its concreteness, to grasp it, as it were, as the seed which contains affirmatively and as a virtual possibility, all the 9 12 Representation Recollectiond an

determinatenesses which first come into existence in the develop- treee menth f "o t (§453) cleas i t I .r that thinkin imagee th f go s sa preserved in pigeonholes or as stored in Locke's mental closet promote thorougsa h misconceptio mindf no ther imagee fo , nth s would remain independent actualities that are merely rearranged imagee minde bth yth t longeo sn Bu . r exist, t discret no the e yar e individuals discoverable within the mind but potentialities capable of being actualized by the mind. Locke's image of a progressively better stocked close exactls ti y wrong. Hegel heavily emphasizes the unity and simplicity of spirit exhibited by the fact that all these images are retained, but not individually and discretely. But an even more important lesson perhaps is the generative power of spirit. Hegel uses the metaphor of a seed: "the germ which contains affirmativel virtuaa s a d l possibilityyan , determinatenessee alth l s which first come into existence th n ei developmen treee th f "o t (§453) infinite Th . e generative powef ro our minds has been a central fact in contemporary reflections on the natur mind—buf eo t contemporary theorists have been generally concerned to show how such infinitary capabilities can rest on finite resources attempy An infinitar.e sketcth o genere t b w n hho y- ca ated by the finite is noticeably absent from Hegel's works, however, for he is convinced that the finite really presupposes the infinite. The finite believese h , , migh reachee b t"analysis n a y db e th f "o infinite (as a point, perhaps, is an analytic part of a line), but the (true) infinite cannot be generated by synthesizing finite pieces (as a line canno buile tb stringin y tb g points together). Hegel's talk of an "abyss" also constitutes a denial that there is any privileged set of simple ideas or images into which perceptions ca decomposee nb frod dman which memor other yo r images cae nb recomposed. We preserve the whole of our experience and recall . partHegel'it f o s s approac e minth s antitheticadi o ht e th o t l contemporary cognitive scientist's analytic approach. Unfortunate- ly, Hegel concreto given s su e suggestion ssecuro t abou w eho t infinitary generative capacities without a set of elementary parts and combinatory operations. It is intriguing to speculate about how Hegel would have considere analogn da y drawn betwee preservatioe nth n imagon fa thien i s preservatio"abysse minth e d th f dan "o parpictura a f f no to a n ei hologram. Therone-to-ono n s ei e correspondence betweee nth 130 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

partimagn a f so e generated from holograa e parte th th f sd o man hologram itself; fro parhologray a mf an o t m completea , though less detailed, imag generables ei . Another mode f "distributeo l d representation fascinatind an w offere"s i ne a g y brancdb cognif ho - tive science—connectionism. Connectionist machine perforn sca m apparently difficult and sophisticated tasks in real time by manipu- lating highly interconnected network verf so y simple processors. Unlike standard algorithm-crunching von Neumann machines, separablo thern e ear e memory addresse differenr sfo t piecef so information, either program or data. Whatever representations are attributed to the machine cannot be localized; they are distributed acros machinee sth possibls i t .I e that Hegel would have found even these analogie materialistio to s thein ci r treatmen f mindo t t bu , perhaps such a treatment is still fitting at this low level of representation. These potential images hidden withi intellece nth t wouln a e db empty fiction unless they could be actualized, but they can be actualized only in an intuition: "To have determinate being such an abstractly preserved image needs an intuition with determinate being. Recollection properl callerelatioo ye s imagth e ds th i f no eo t an intuition particulan i , subsumptioe th s a r immediate th f no e singular intuition under what is universal in form, under the representatio same nth thaes contenttha " (§454 tr.)y recollection m ,.I n proper (recollection3) spirit gains control ove imagee rth s withi, nit for they are no longer present as either isolated intuitions or mere

potentialitie imagesf so recollectionn I . relatioe 3th n between these two aspects is brought to the fore, and this somehow gives spirit this control paragrape Th . rathes hi r murky t whabu , t Heges i l getting at is that in recollectioni there has to be an actual intuition present to the mind, and the potentialities discussed under the

headin recollectionf go onln 2ca y find their actualit thosn yi e intuitions. Spirit can, however, produce this product on its own, rather than waiting for it to be elicited by the environment: "In recollection therefore, intelligence is within itself in the determinate sensation intuitions it d recognized an an , s the alreadms a owns yit , whilt ea the same time it now knows its image, which in the first instance is merely internal, to be also confirmed in the immediacy of the intuition" (§454). This phrasing is a little misleading, for recognition knowind an e sophisticategar d cognitive acts, well beyone dth Representation and Recollection 131

power thif so s level of spiritual activity shalI . l returintere th o n-t pretatio thif no s sens recognitiof eo n below. "The image, whicn hi the abyss of intelligence was its property, is now, with the determination of externality, also in its [intelligence's] possession. It is thereb same th t eya time posite distinguishabls da e fro intue mth - itiod separablnan e fro simple mth e nigh t firswhica n i t s ti t hi immersed. Intelligenc therefors ei powee eth beinf ro g- ablex o et press what it possesses, and no longer to require external intuition in order to have this possession existing within itself" (§454, my tr.). Two question raisee sar wha§454n n di i ) t(a : sens these ear e images general (bd ) an , nature wha recognitioe th th s f i te o e nw

gai recollectionn i "abstractle 3?Th y preserved image abilite th "s i y generato t imagee eth insofat bu , this ra s abilit itsels yi f something general, it is a general representation. But why is it that this descen- dant from a completely determinate intuition can be something general? There are two ways to understand this new generality, neithe whicf ro h exclude thesf othere o se th e involve.On generasa l point about the nature of abilities; the other involves the specific natur imagef eo Heges sa l conceives them. First, there is something inherently general about abilities. Each actual action is fully determinate; it is an individual. But I do not thin makn k ca tha ee senstw havinf eo abilitn ga y thalogicalln tca y onl d fulle realizee an y on yb e determinaton dn i e way migh.I t have theabilit commiyo t t suicid 10:5t ea 3 P.M Marcn .o h 23,1989 this .I s an ability that has only one possible realization? True, it is necessary that it can have only one actual realization, but there are still any numbe fullf ro y determinate possible actions that would realize this ability coulI . d commit suicide wit hknifea guna , , with sleeping pills homet car,a y m , sorrowfullyn ,i gleefullyr o , l coulal e d W . dad such conditions ont specificatior oou abilitye th t therf no bu ,e ear always others left unspecified. If we attempt to avoid these considerations by picking some fully determinate possible action, naming it "Harry," and then saying that I have an ability to Harry, there are several replies to be made. First, the context "an ability to ____" take verbal-actiosa n description nama t r singulaeo no , r term. Second, if we understand this ability as "the ability to perform Harry," there is an epistemological problem about assigning such an ability without assigning the more general ability to perform other Harry-like actions; our evidence could never be that complete. 132 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Can we think of conditions under which "He has the ability to perform Harry" is justifiably assertable but "He has the ability to perform other Harry-like actions" is not? It seems to me that this makes sense only in a world so thoroughly determined that Harry is onle th y possibility give whole nth e e th world e statf i th t f eo Bu . events of this world are so thoroughly determined, it seems that the notio abilitn a f no y becomes trivialized thingr ,fo s would only have "abilities exactlo d o "t y those thing abilitiee s Th the . cono syt do - struct image standine sar g abilitie spirif so t of whic realizatioe hon n does not exclude other earlier or later realizations (unlike the realization of an ability to commit suicide). Even though the image generated may be quite determinate, the same image can be generated again, and the generation of one particular image can also be a realizatio severaf no l different abilities eacn .I h cas realizatioe eth n particulas i abilite th t yr bu realize generals di . Second image n have a , w es a ,seenabstractio n a s i , n froe mth objective spatiotemporal order; but once we have abstracted from spatiotemporae th longeo n n l individuat ordero ca t refet d i ro an rt e cases e imag th ,presenn ca e numbey an t f differeno r t objects. Locke, for instance, also saw this property of abstractions. As we shal whee considelse e nw imaginatione rth more abstrac,th e ew t t onlno y fro object'e mth s spatiotemporal contex t alstbu o fros mit spatiotemporan ow l features more th , e suitabl t becomeei a s sa representation of a wide range of objects and properties. A recollec-

tion3 of a triangle is general in being an ability to generate other perspectival views of the triangle, given the intuition of the triangle as stimulus image Th . e generate generas di sens e th en li that only its internal properties are still fairly determinate, its spatiotemporal position and perhaps other individuating relational properties being abstracted from.

In recollection3 we "subsume" an intuition under the abstract representation, and this constitutes a sort of low-grade recognition of the object. This is not full recognition, for no concepts are applied to the thing in this recognitive process. I have talked as if the one-time occurrenc intuition a f eo enougns i preservho t imags eit e indelibly minde i nalthougth d ,an h thi theoreticalls i y true, fro practie mth - cal standpoint it is too simple, as Hegel recognizes quite well. The strength with whic hcontena preserves i t proportionas di s it o t l repetitions within experience. "If I am to preserve something by 3 13 Representation Recollectiond an

recollectin t gthereforei musI , t hav intuitioe eth t repeated.i f no n I firse th t instanc coursef eo image ,th revives e i muce o s m t y hdb no as by the immediate intuition corresponding to it. By means of being thus frequently elicited, however, it acquires within me such a liveliness and presence, that I no longer need the external intuition in order to recollect it" (§454, Zusatz). When this ability to call up an image on one's own has been developed, a new and higher stag f spirito e e reproductiv, th tha f o t e imagination s beeha , n reached. We can give another sense to the way a "general" representation—this abilit construco yt image—subsumen a t intuitionn sa , recognize w y have intuitioe wa w eth e e alreadanth on o ds t n a y had. It must be clear that we do not hold one intuition up against an image and compare the two, deciding that they are the same or that one is a specification of the other. Generally speaking, one thing is subsumed unde seconra d whe instance n firse a sece nth s i th t -f o ondthid san , approac extendee b n hca d fairly straightforwardlo yt case th t handea actualization :a abilitn a instancn f a n o s y, i it f eo specifia d an c intuitio instancn a s ni spirit'f eo s abilit construco yt t such an image. This still leaves unanalyzed the manner in which spirit can recognize the content of an intuition as one it has encountered before. That which is recognized as previously encountered, as our own, is what is familiar. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that recognizing something involves assignin linguistia gt i concepr co - tual recognitiotage .Th speae nw herf ko definiteles i y prelinguistic, of a sort we might also be able to assign to animals, for instance. Seeing something as familiar does not involve comparing it to any other representatio mentallyt i stickinr n o o g ta g,a but, phenome- nologically speaking presumins i t i , knoo gt thing w who s stand, having certain definite expectations about what would happen . if.. Thi. s for f knowinmo r recognitiogo s foundeni e th n o d immediate knowledge of ease in the performance of an ability. All explicit knowing epistemif thato foundes t i se a cn do skills , knowing hows. If I am exercising a certain skill, I do not need to look at my actions to know what I am doing or what the result of my actions ought to be. Development of a skill brings along with it immediate, nonin- ferential knowledge that the skill is being performed during the 134 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

performance. This does not mean that in the performance of the necessarile ar skil e w l y reflectively awarperformancee th f eo t bu , that hav wheo d e n sucw h reflective awarenes noninferentials i st i . Such awareness of ease in construction is immediate and nonin- r abilit t infalliblebases i ou no t i o ferentialn y s t di o d t i an ,t bu , habituate ourselve ordinare th o st y cours eventsf eo . Through this proces familiarizatiof so habituationd nan , spirit gains control over representationss it . Ther suggestioo n es i n here that thi will-fua s i l learning process; at this stage we are confronted with a brute ability of spirit spirie learn on , ca tcontro o nt l consciously thae on t t bu , does not depend on such conscious control. After repeated hear- ings, for instance simpln ca e y ,sinon gsonga , without ever having made an effort to learn it. And there are different degrees to which masterede sonb e n th gca . Some people might requir egooa d deaf lo prompting, that is, the repetition of part of the appropriate intuition, to be able to keep going with the song. Others eventually find no prompting at all necessary—they now know the song. Knowing a son knowina gs i kinge howknowledgth skillf a d o d s i ,an t , i f eo objects we possess in our recollective activities is a similar kind of knowing how. It is a kind of technical knowledge always limited by immediate th e situatio applicabilits it n i usefulnessd yan t no s i t i ; yet theoretical knowledge, which escapes the limitations of particular situations, transcendin dependence gth particulan eo r sensate material that still characterizes recollection. Imagination: Universality Significationand

In Petry's edition of the Encyclopedia, it appears from the table of contents that Imagination is subdivided into (a) Reproductive Imag- ination, (b) Associative Imagination Phantasy) (c d an , , whics hi then itself subdivided into (i) Symbol, (ii) Sign, and (iii) Language. But this division seems to be Boumann's, not Hegel's, for if attention is paid to the architectonic mentioned in the main paragraphs, cleas ii t r that Reproductive Imaginatio Associativd nan e Imagina- samee tha th d thre e d an ,tth an e e divisionon tioe n ar Imaginaf so - tion are (a) Associative or Reproductive Imagination, (b) Symbolic Imagination Sign-makin) (c d an , g Imagination treaI . t the mthin i s order.

ASSOCIATIV REPRODUCTIVR EO E IMAGINATION

Spirit, in the exercise of the ability to set images before itself longewhico n e hrar occasione immediate th y db e intuitione th s i , reproductive imagination. As a result of spirit's having gained unconscious control over what is presented to it (which means that referenc presene th o et t intuitio stimulus na longeo n s si r necessary in the explanation of the occurrence of the mental act), the process of abstraction, analysis generalizatiod an , n whic alreads hwa n yi evidence in recollection has become more thorough, more advanced. For now, "it is however only within the subject, in which it is preserved, individualite thaimage th th ts eha whicn yi e hth 136 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

determination contens it f s o linke e tar d together immediates it r ,fo , i.e., its initially merely spatial and temporal concretion, its being a unit within intuition, is dissolved" (§455). In recollection, the con- imagee tentth f so s were still complete spatiotemporal objects a s met with in intuition, although abstracted from their spatiotemporal context whet skille Bu . nth constructio f so n have reachee dth sophistication involve imaginativn di e reproduction distince th , t determination t wit united experience sme han th n di spaa f eo - tiotemporal object become dissociable from each other longeo n , r hanging altogether in natural clumps. The connection between determination longeo n s si rgenera e giveth y nb l rule f conso - struction or the particular knowledge of spirit; in forging the connection, spiri longeo tn r follow rulee sth s constitutiv objectivitf eo y but unite determinatione sth accordancn si e with some subjective general representation. "The reproduced content belongins ,a o gt e self-identicath l unit f intelligencyo d produceean d from intelligence's universal mine shaft, has a general representation for the associative relation of images, of the representations which, in accordance with other circumstances, are more abstract or more concrete" (§455 tr.)y ,m . The picture of mind operating in reproductive imagination which emerges from these remark followingse seemth e b o srecollect n I . - tion, mind achieves the ability to generate images of each particular determinatenes objecn possesssa y ma t intuitiot ,bu stilns i conla - trolling reproductivfactore th n I . e imagination, these abilitiee sar freely exercised t informe no t the e bu ,y ar d wit hrationaa l order either; the governee yar arbitrary db y associations morn ,I e intuitive language, having only encountered red fire trucks and green lanterns, with the power of imagination I can separate and recombine these into images of green fire trucks and red lanterns. Images of particular determination producede sar t individuallno , y without any connection, but as realizations of a more general representation, which, however, can be quite abstract, a mere association. Wha wane w tkno nature o t th w s thii f e o s general representation. We have already noted that images have a certain generality; we must now see that imaginative representations have a higher leve f generalityo l : "Image alreade ar s y more general tha- nin tuitions; however, they still hav esensuousla y concrete content whose relation to other such contents I am. In that I now direct my Imagination: Universality and Signification 137

attentio thio nt s relatio nobtaiI n general representations—representation propee th n si r wordsense thath r f eo .Fo t through which the individual images relate to each other is precisely what is common to them" (§456, Zusatz, my tr.). Hegel goes on immediately to explain this common element: "Wha commos ti eithes ni certaira n particular aspect of the object raised to the form of universality, rose colod th ere f rfoe o suc rth instances ha concrete th r ,o e univer- salrosgenuse e instancecasr e th ,th e fo f th e o n ;i plante th , " (§456, Zusatz). understanw no Wn eca d more exactly wha s beeha t n accomplished in the earlier stage of recollection and here in reproductive imagination abstrace .Th t general representation withi mine nth dn i recollectio stils representatioe nth lwa particulaa f no r individual object, arid its generality was that of subsuming beneath it the multiplicit intuitionf yo spacn si timd ewhican o e t t hcouli d give rise. Strictly speaking onls i t i , y associativ e levenowe th th f t lo ,a e imagination, that we have achieved a truly general representation, namely firse th ,t representatio sucf no h thing rednes- s sa hu d san manity. s importanIi t noto t t e that Hegel distinguishe differeno tw s t forms of universality, although they are not distinct for subjective spirit at this level: there are particular abstract properties and there are concrete universals. What is the difference, and why is it so intportant? Hegel himself identifie concrete sth e universal wite hth genus othed ,an r texts mak cleat ei r that Hegel think genue th f so s othina f givins ga essences git s conceptit , ideas it , l typee th , peculiar unity amon e otherwisgth e contingent determinations which make thine sth associativgn I wha. is t i t e imagination both kinds of universal become indifferently available to spirit, but the associative imagination draws no distinctions between them. It is stage onlth f thought eyo a t that this distinctio made b y n eb n ca spirit, for only at that point has spirit so systematized its own product isolatsn thaca cruciae t i eth t l nodal points withie nth system. herIs ti e withi treatmene nth associative th f to e imagination that Hegel discusses briefly what he1 takes to be the shortcomings in the previous treatment thif so s subject, specifically notioe th , lawf no s of association of ideas and of abstraction. His first attack on the laws of the association of ideas is merely terminological, for he points out 8 13 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity ideast no s thai tha associated,t e t"i tar " whic systems truhs hi i n ei , since his definition of "idea" is quite different from any given by anyone workin empiricae th n gi l traditio attackings i e nh thit sBu . hardly strike deatsa h blow s otheHi . r criticism, however, cuts deeper. He claims that the "modes of relation" commonly considered under this headin t laws,no e "thgar e precise reaso thir nfo s being thasame th t e matte subjecs i rmany o s o t t laws, that what occurs tends to be quite the opposite of a law in that it is capricious and contingent,—it being matter of chance whether the linking factor is an image or a category of the understanding such as equivalence and disparity, ground and consequence, etc." (§455). Asso- ciationists of the time often multiplied their "laws" beyond all plausibility (although Hume certainly did not), and when care was taken to keep the number small, they were stated vaguely enough quitte ob e unscientifi casey an .n ci There is also a deeper criticism lurking here, which we can restate as follows. In physics the fundamental laws are relatively few, and they apply universally. There can be great complexity in their application, thus rendering the actual calculation and prediction of specific events practically impossible, but this is not a difficulty with the theory; it creates no problem in employing the theory to explain events, for they are all explained in parallel fashion. The so-called laws of psychological association, however, are in a very different situation. There are even greater difficulties with prediction—but this migh t firs ta thoughe b t merele b o t y practical. Wha mors i t e importan thas ti t thes treatet e lawno e universalls dsa ar y applicable; in constructing a post hoc explanation, we do not mobilize the full set of laws but choose one that will give the proper result, and accordingl othee yth r laws mus cas e holdinvokt e eon t no w n .e I eth law of associating resembling representations, in another case we invoke contiguity, and in a third, causation. There is, or at least seems to be on the Humean account, nothing to decide which laws get invoked until after the fact; the laws are to that extent merely ad thihocd s .An point nonpracticaa p su l difficult usinn yi g these laws to construct predictions about what a person will think: even having specified the antecedent conditions, we cannot decide which obeyede laon we th wil. e Unleslb have sw ehigher-ordea o t w rla give us some method of deciding this, we are in principle barred from predicting. Thus believet ,I merel no multiplicits e i yt th i , f yo Imagination: Universality and Signification 139

purported associative laws which is the focal point of Hegel's criticism—Hume avowed only thre Hartled econf an o -yw onlla e yth tiguity—but their nonsystematic multiplicity that bears the brunt of the objection. The "laws" of association simply do not share the characteristic law-likenesf so s with other laws. Is thi faisa r objectio othee Humo th nt rd associationistsean ? There are things the associationist can do to hold this objection off, such as insist that the laws of association are measures of the probabilit certaia f yo n kin idef do a following anothe musd ran e tb given various weights relativ backgroune th o et d conditions. Thus, in any particular case, prediction is not possible, since the laws are only probabilistic, but all the laws apply, just with different strengths havl al ed universalitan , necessityd ya an t thit no s si Bu . very t happawarno f anyonym eo a moveI d e makinan , a r o t gi similar timemove th t .eothea e Humth rd associationistean s took themselves to be developing a system of laws for the operation of mind in the same way that Newton gave laws for the operation of natural systems. Hege seizes lha significansome n do th f eo t differences in the formal nature of the two kinds of laws to demonstrate the inadequacy of the associationist program to its own ideal. The idea predictiva f lo e psychology modele physicn do s never attracted Hegel in any case, of course. t finisheye Heget no d s i witl associationistse hth , howevere h ; take furthesa rconcep e looth t ka abstractionf to doee dent .H sno y legitimace th concepte doeth e f h y o t s finbu , d fault wit assoe hth - ciationists' attempts to analyze it. He claims that associationists e abstractiothinth f ko generaa f no l representatio kina s f nda o superimposition of similar images. This has been a common post- Lockean attempt to explain Locke's rather unfortunate pronouncement that the idea of a triangle "must be neither oblique nor rec- tangular, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, , sect7 . ,emphasis) pt y ix, m , IV . bk . Hegel doe t attacsno k this rather confused notio abstracn a f no t idea t Locke' (whicno s hswa reflective position) straightforwardly, however; rather, he points out that with this in mind one still needs to explain how just these images get combined: "In order that this superposing may not be entirely accidental and conceptless, an attractive force or something assumee b o t kin e od th fd dha betwee similae nth r images" (§455, 140 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

my tr.). This remark of Hegel's immediately brings to mind one of Hume's: after discussing the principles of association that govern the mental world, Hume notes that "here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown" (A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. i, sect. iv). But, says Hegel, it is silly to treat the bond between different image soms sa e sor attractivf to e force bone th ; spiris di t itself. Hegel's poin s thai t t representations hav e powerth e s they have—the representatione th e yar s they are—becaus theif eo r role in a complex system. The associationists cling here to the idea that our representations are thoroughly natural and that their interaction alse naturas ar ocausae a th s a l relations among physical particles. But the holism of representations defeats the conception, for their interactions are not atomistically determined. The system primary s particulai y an t no , r propert representationse th f yo e .Th "attractive force" between representations is not an empirically demonstrable entit empiricisn yo t principles; therperceptioo n es i n f theri d e an were , oit f , that perception woul juse db t another impression. t Imageuniteno somy e db sar e intrinisic attractive force postulatioe th ; naturaa f no l attractive force between subjective entities constitutes a pseudo-solution to understanding their orde connectiond ran attempn .A construco tt mechanicata l model of the mind and of the nature of an idea or concept must fail, for it fundamentally misconstrue nature sth spirituaf eo l activity, which t mechanicaisno t holistibu l teleologicald can oncd eAn . spiris i t recognized as this force, and the images are understood to be determine totalite th y dwhicyb n i h they participatee roae th ,th o dt proper understandin whaf go spirituas ti bees lha n opened. Yet to talk of a free act of spirit is not to say that the ordering of image chaotis i indeterminater co , for "intelligence onlt itselno y s fi general form; rather inwardness it , itseln i s si f determinate, concrete subjectivity with its own content or worth [Gehalt] which stems from some interest, implicit concept, or idea" (§456, my tr.). understano t e w e ar d w Busuc ho tinternan ha l determination? Whamechanise th s i t determinatiof mo thay e nsa w t here e w f ?I hav efora agenf mo t causation t mechanicano , l causation—under- Imagination: Universality and Signification 141

standin activite gth termspirie f yo th n sti that see sprinmo t g most quickl mino yt d given Hegel' idiom—wn sow e hava ep theu t nse picture that presupposes an agent, a mind within the mind itself, "little th e man" theor mindf yo . Clearl yt somethin thino s si e gw want to attribute to Hegel. But agent causation is not the only alternative to mechanical causation. Another model of determinatio thans i t element'on fa s being determine placs wholeit a y den b i . Hegel's point is that the order of particular images and representations can often be legitimately and usefully explained by reference whole toth e trai whicn i h they occur, whic itselhs i f accounted for by reference to some higher-level mental entity, such as an abiding interes attempn a r o t solvo t t eproblema , which involves even further holistic reference to the mental life of the subject. / On the basis of this functional determination of mental acts, we can then reintroduc notioea agenf no t causatio mentae th n ni l sphere, as is clearly necessary at a later stage, since we can cause thought to occur by trying to think of something, setting oneself to conside. problemra on o s d ,an This possibility of the holistic explanation of series of mental acts shows up another fault in naive associationism: if the associationist principles are adopted as the sole explanatory principles of mental activity, rational, goal directed though unintelligible—ors ti , rather, is unintelligibl rationas ea l thought associationbasie e th th f sn o .O - ist laws alone we cannot distinguish flights of fancy from well- controlled problem-solving pattern f thoughtso recognitioe Th . n that series of thoughts come as intelligible units or wholes is the first step toward separating "the plathoughtlesa f yo s representing" (§455) fr°m rationally informed thought itself.

SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION

Insofa s individuaa r l images acquir eplaca e withi ntraia f no thought, they begi poino nt t beyond themselve thud san s begino t acquire meaning .nex e Thith ts i level symbolie th , c imagination, which together with sign-making imagination Hegel often calls fantasy. We must not presume that because Hegel talks here of meaning moves ha e sdh into quasi-linguistic mental activitys i r ,no the abstract rational content that unifies the subjective representa- 142 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

tions a "hovering presence" or a ghost. It exists in the representation needd san s the ordemn i havo t r e actual existence: 'Thus, while informing [this fund of representations] with its own content, [intelligence] is in itself determinately recollected in it—fantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing poeticar o , l imagination" (§456 tr.)y m ,. Thu sparticulaa r imag particulaa f eo r rose become symbosa l fol ral roses, and it is called to mind at times in order to be the particular embodimen r vehiclo f o t e forr instancefo , a representatio, f no beauty. Which particular rose-image is present to mind when one is thinking about flowers or roses or beauty is entirely unimportant, explanatioe th d occurrencan e th f n o imag e th f eeo doe account sno t for it in all its particularity, but only in its general formal features. Thercoursf o e ear e certain condition image sth e must meee b o t eligible as a symbol for a certain general representation, namely, it imagmusn a e somethinf tb eo g that share appropriate sth e property: "This [fantasy] chooses expreso ,t generas sit l representations, no other sensuous stuff than that whose independent meaning correspond determinate th o st e conten - universae th im f e o tb o t l aged. So, for example, the strength of Jupiter is presented through eaglee th , sinc eagle eth stronghele es i b do t " (§457, Zusatz, tr.)y m . But fantasy can operate with complex sets of symbols, and "it is rather by a coherence of details that allegory expresses what is subjective" (§457, Zusatz). This level of mental activity underlies the possibility of art, but the discussion of the particular modes of symbolization belongst properlno s philosophi e th d yo an t t ar f yo discusse dnoten herca e ,allt e a however W . poetryf o t , ar tha ,e tth explicitls a y linguistic stranga s ,i e hybrid betwee symbolie nth d can the signific. It would be interesting to see how consistent with this account of symbols and signs Hegel's treatment of poetry and art is. Symbolic fantas importann a s yi t turning poin mind'n ti s growth to free self-determination, for "insofar as the content it derives from imagen a itsel s ha fd existence, intelligenc perfectes ei d into intuition of itself within phantasy" (§457>. Previously what was present mino t bess dwa t accounte referency b r dfo e eitheexternae th o rt l influences on mind (intuition) or to what prior experience the mind had already accumulated together with the present intuition (representatio lowee th n ri stages) symbon .I l fantasy, however, this i longeo n r true particulae ;th r images, wha presens ti mindo t e ar , accountee b o t w dno fo referency rb particulao et r goal interestr so s Imagination:3 14 Universality Significationd an

larger-scaloo rt e chunk spirit'f so s life, suc charactes ha projectsr ro . Wit abilite hth symbolizeo yt , spirit becomes capabl f dealineo g effectively, although still rudimentarily, with universals beyone dth universals of sense. We can symbolize such universals as justice thud adequatn an sa begit ge no et gras whan po t must otherwis- ere main beyon powee dth sensf ro recollectionr eo . Spiri thoughd tan t are themselves nonsensible universals, and the symbolizing imagination marks a significant step toward the self-comprehension of spirit. Let me summarize metaphorically the route we have watched spirit take. At the level of intuition spirit is, as it were, a mirror of its objective environment. It obeys set laws in reflecting the environment t thes constanbu ,e ear t enoug ignoree b o h t mosr dfo t purposes—the explanation of what plays across the face of the mirror is carried by the facts about the environment* But this will not do totally for two reasons, and our attention is directed to the mirror flawe itselfb n smirro e .ca i nTherth r o e r ethaar t takeneee b o dt n into account (illusion, madness), and, more important, the mirror itself is not a merely passive reflector—it is active within its reflection, reorganizin inpute gth first reorganizatioe .A th t inpue th f nto seems merel ymattea addinf ro g dept reflectiobode r ho th yo t y nb including in the now increasingly multidimensional reflection after- images and other perspectives of the objects reflected, but we then notice that some "shadowed imagee ar w sno " with relate nont dbu - coobjectual images, and that these shadows group the images into new suborganizations. We also find some images unrelated to any- immediate thinth n gi e environment explanationr ou n I .y wh f so mirror'e th s overall imag fine w dwha es , i thesis t ti e shadowe b o st of increasing importance groupiny b d an , g them into similarity classes we can develop theories of the character of various mirrors, what their interest on—ano ss ared ,an d these theories simplifr you otherwisw no e incredibly complex tas f explaininko they gywh reflec imagee th t s the. ydo

SIGN-MAKING IMAGINATION

In that spirit only begin levee symbolith f t lso a c fantas detero yt - mine itself determino t , contentn ow onls s i e it t i y, relatively free, 4 14 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

fo embodo rt generae yth l representatio musnt i t fin imagn da e that exemplifies that property. Spirit advance sign-makino st g fantasy, arbitrarsign foe a rth ns i y vehicle founiversae rth l conten spiritf to , sige th n n spirii d tan achieve highesa r measur freedomf eo e th t Bu . transition from symboli sign-makino ct g fantas e t cleath no n ri ys i Encyclopedia; seemt i propee sth effectedt ri moves i t jusw bu ,?t ho Hegel points out several times that the symbol is subjective, and he maintains that this failin overcoms gi signe th .n e i "Subjectivea s "i protean word in Hegel's philosophy, and each of its occurrences demands our attention. In using "subjective" here Hegel is clearly not pointing out the mentalit image th f yeo that serve symbols sa e .ar Insofae w s a r dealing with mental images here this needs no pointing out; but if extene w r discussiodou includo nt e artistic images, which Hegel seem allowo st longe o n e , therar limitee nw mentao dt l imaget sa allwhan I . t other l thessensal e ee ar thing s subjective- on e th f ?I tological status of the symbols is not relevant, then I suggest that the link between symbo symbolized lan . Therdis purela s ei y natural connection between the two in that they share common properties. But this doe t accoun choice sno th particula a r f eo tfo r imaga s ea symbol, for there are presumably many other images that share the natura symbolizede l th lin o kt . Therrulo n decido et s ei e what symbolizes what, and no common agreement is necessary for some- symboa thine b someoneo go t lt thio T .s exten line th tk between symbo symbolized an l e whie th th f msubjectivs do i o t p u d ean agentsigne th ,n .I thi s subjectivit supposeys i overcomee b do t t ,bu as the sign is also an arbitrarily chosen entity that stands for another, is the sign-signified link not just as subjective? It is subjective t thibu ,s cas differens ei importann a n i t t aspect. Thero n s ei longer a natural link between sign and signified. Whereas symbols ca variee nb d relatively arbitraril assumptioe th n yo n tha natue tth - ral link between symbo symbolized lan d will carr brune e yth th f to symbolic labor, suc assumption ha longeo n madn e nrb ca e about signs. Precisely becaus line eth k between sigsignified nan - to s di tally arbitrary must ,i hele t b consistently do t arbitrare ;th y linkage has becom essentiae eth l tie.1

i. Eve privata n i e language, if suc possiblehs i sign-signifiee ,th d relations must hele b consistentlo dt exis o thet yf i allt e ta y ar . Imagination:5 14 Universality Significationd an

Any semantic relation must depen certain do n uniformitiesn I . symbol-symbolizee case th th f eo d relation cruciae ,th l uniformities are intrinsic to the respective contents, but the existence of a particular symbol-symbolized relation is dependent on fully arbitrary choice. In the sign-signified relation the crucial uniformity is none other than the continued observance of a once-arbitrary correlation. The original correlation was fully arbitrary, but the existence of a particular sign-signified relation depends on its having become a rule objectivn a , correlatede factar o , tw tha e .tth I fsense thith whics en i i hsig a mor a ns i e objective embodiment of spirit's representation advancn seee a b this i s no a st y ewh , beyon more dth e subjective symbol? Because makinn i , gsigna , spiri brokes ha t n still further from being - determinebe s ha d dan come to an even greater extent the determining factor in its own existence. "In its use of intuition therefore, intelligence displays more willfulness and sovereignty in designating than it does in symbolizin gsig e particula(§458).e th n th n i r "Fo r- contenin e th f to tuition employed has become fully unimportant; it must, of course, hav econtenta whict ,bu h conten fulls ti y arbitrary creatinn .I g signs selfn "fro,ow [intelligences mit ] then give independens sit t representation a definite determinate being, using the filled space and time intuitioe th , own,s it s na effacin s immediatgit proped ean r content givind an , t anothegi r conten significancs a t sould ean " (§458, my tr.). The sign-signified relation is higher than the symbol- symbolized relation because the activity of spirit is now fully responsible for the link. Further, because there need not be a direct sharin propertief go s between sigsignifiedd nan , more complex, more abstract, more universal content easile b n ys ca signifie d than can be symbolized, and thus spirit is able to possess these more abstract contents determinatel signe th .yn i The sign-making fantasy seem maro st kwatershea spirir dfo n ti markedle th o t thate y du ,increase d abilit deao yt l with universals that such signs afford significana , t advanc made b spirit'n n ei e ca s self-comprehension, and in particular in spirit's ability to give itself concrete embodiment and expression. "Intelligence qua reason starts by appropriating to itself the immediacy it finds within it- determininy , b tha . , sel. is t . f universal;s a t gi froms herit n eo activity as reason (§438) is to determine as being what is perfected (completed) to the concrete intuition of itself within it/ that is, to 146 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

make itself into being, int subjecte oth matter [Sache]" (§457 tr.)y m , . In earlier stage emphasie s th unfoldin n o s swa universa e gth l con- "founde tenth f to " material emphasie .Th shiftsw sno , howevero ,t individualizin expressind gan universale gth propee ,th r contenf to spirit, spirit's inner nature. "It is to be emphasized that insofar as fantasy brings the inner content [Gehalt] to image and intuition and thi expresses si [fantasy'sy db ] determinin havins a gt i g beinge th , expression that intelligence makes r makeitselo e b f s itself intoa thing shoul t seedno m peculiar s contenit r fo , t [Gehalt] s inteli - ligence itself, as is the determination intelligence gives the content" (§457 tr.)y m ,. Spirit's self-comprehension make firss sit t recognizable appearance here, but it is still severely limited by the mode of universality available to sign-making fantasy, for it is confined to the abstract universal and is therefore merely formal. "The formations of phan- tasrecognizee yar d everywher s sucea h unification f whao s s i t proper and internal to spirit [the universal] with what is intuitable [the singular]; ... As the activity of this unification, phantasy is reason, but insofar as the capacity [content, Gehalt] of phantasy as suc mattea hs i indifferencef ro merels i t i , y formal reason, whereas reason as such determines the truth of the content" (§457). brine th language f kn o o mus e w w awar e t tno b W,e bu ear that signl al linguisti e t sar no c signs. Hegel's first example signf so e sar cockades, flags, and gravestones. These are signs, for their link with what they signify is fully arbitrary and conventional. Indeed, to the extent that they lack the semantic structure we find in language, the more yar e adequate example signf so s than words are, for linguistic structure looks beyon imaginative dth e activitiee sw have been discussing, anticipatin standpoine gth thoughtf to e th f ,o understandin particulargn i abilite Th .creat o yt e signs Hegel calls the productive memory; he reserves the term "memory" (Gedacht- ni$Y sign-usinr fo g mental activity, "for althoug generahn i l usage memory is often taken to be interchangeable and synonymous with recollection, and even with representation and imagination, it is never concerned with anything but signs" (§458).

2. Unlike Erinnerung (etymologically, "inwardizing"), whic translate hw e "recollection," Gedachtnis seeme deriveb o t s d fro pase mth t participl o think."t f eo " Perhaps it is for this reason that Hegel uses it for the higher activity of signification. Imagination:7 14 Universality Significationd an

Although language produc e itsel th latee s th i f rf to stage , memory, Hegel devotes a good deal of time in §459 to a discussion of the nature of the linguistic sign per se, for the linguistic sign, in particular not the written sign but the spoken, exhibits the nature of being a sign most fully. As a sign, "intuition . . . acquires the essential determination of having being only as a sublatedness. ... In its truer shape, the intuition of a sign is therefore a determinate being within time—determinate being which disappears in that it has being, while in accordance with its further external, psychical determinatenes e positednesth s i e tone,t i sth f o swhic h intelligence furnishes from the anthropological resources of its own naturalness, the fulfillment of the expressiveness by which inwardness makes itself known" (§459). Spirit's bein spatiags i temporald lan sinct ,bu e spac statis ei d can time active and moving, spirit expresses itself more adequately in time tha spacen i tone "physicalizeTh s .ei d time" (§401, Zusatz), and, in the tone, space and time find a relation that parallels the abstract nature of their relation in spirit itself to a surprising degree. "For in the tone, corporeality becomes posited temporally as motion, as an internal oscillation of the body, a vibration, as a mechanical shock through whic bod e whola h th s ya e moves onl parts yit s without having to alter its relative place, sublates its indifferent juxtaposition by positing its inner spatiality temporally, and by this sublation allows its pure inwardness to emerge from the superficial alteration brough t mechanicae abouth y b t l shock, before immediately restoring itself" (§401, Zusatz). tonee th activite n th ,I f yo spiri evidens ti activitys ta , rather tha frozespatias e na th n ni l self- externality of the written word. Hegel is attempting here to give a proof that spoken language is metaphysicall r ontologicallo y y prio writteo t r n language- at n a , tempt that depend sanalysis bot hi natur e n hth o f spirif so eo d tan on certain these philosophs hi f so naturef yo attempe .Th t doet sno succeed, for we can no longer take all his premises seriously. But from this priority Hegel derive superiorite sth alphabetif yo c over hieroglyphic writing systems, since in an alphabetic system the signs do not directly signify representations but rather signify the tones that are naturally used to signify representations. Insofar as, the alphabetic system is an encoding of the phonemic system, whic bots hi h temporall metaphysicalld yan bots i yt i h a prio, it o rt 8 14 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

more adequat proper emoro a d eran efficient expressio spirif no t tha hieroglyphina c system. Hieroglyphic systems instancer fo , , tend to be tainted with symbolism rather than being pure signs. Ther , howevereis suddeo n , n break between symboli sigd can n systems, for our spoken language has its roots in the onomatopoeic replication of natural sounds. But, as elsewhere in Hegel's thought, the fact that onomatopoeia is only the beginning of language shows that it is the lowest level, unessential (§459). 10

Memory: Languageas Materialthe of Thought

SIGNIFICATION AND LANGUAGE

At the level of sign-making imagination we have sign making genesiss onlit immediatn ye i Th . welliny ecr frop gu m withine th , grunt that only later comes to be attached to an object or situation— thes bettee ear r illustration sign-makinf o s g imagination thae nth more complex activitie f highlso y trained language users. "The nam initialles i ysinglea transient production connectioe th d an , f no the representatio somethins na g inner wit intuitioe hth somes na - thing external, is itself external" (§460, my tr.). In the section on memory we watch this attempt of spirit to indicat embodd ean y itself gain objectivit independenced yan - ,be come stable and meaningful, and then get left behind by spirit as something still too external, atomistic, and passive to properly express spirit's nature as spirit then transcends symbols and signs to realize itself as pure thought. The word is itself something intu- ited, something perceived; consequentl subjecs i e o th to o t tt i y generalizing activit representatiof yo n which gives ris signo et n si the first place. But the recollection of a word is not the same as the recollection of the sound constituting the word, for sounds can at best be tokens of words—and even so one can hear a sound as a sound yet not hear it as a word, if, for instance, one does not know the language. So the recollection of a word is no longer the recollec- tiomera f no e intuitio recollectioe th t nbu significana f no t intuition, thae on t already embeds withi prioa nt i r recollecting clarifo .T y this 0 15 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

difference, let us look more closely at Hegel's conception of the signification relation before we turn to the paragraphs on memory. The theory of meaning plays a central role in contemporary epis- temolog metaphysicsd yan fine w d o ourselves , s naturally putting great weight on the theory of meaning when we turn to the exam- inatio pasa f no t philosophy somo t t e. Bu exten emphasie tth e th n so theor f meaniny o e misleading b n gca s cruciaa ; a roll s preea - twentieth-century philosophy may have accorded language, language was not thought to be the key to resolving most epistemologi- metaphysicad calan l problems.1 Hege stils ll wa unde influence rth e f ideaso they y ,(b wa n accordin e oldow th f ne ) whico gt e hth primary explanandum was our understanding of the world, not our ability to speak correctly about it. It was taken for granted that language's connection with the world is quite indirect; words are sign markr so idear gaisd fo san n meanin referencr go objecto et s only because their immediate significations are ideas, mental acts, that have antecedent connection with the objects. Locke insists on this understandin significatiof go claimd nmakan o t sy ethatr o t words signify something other tha ideae nth s speake e ofth r "would mako t e eb them sign nothingf so , sounds without significance" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk III, pt. 2, sect. 2) It is within this tradition that Hegel is working. When Hegel says, for instance, that a word signifies a representation, he clearly does not mean that all we can talk about is our representations. Hegel is concerned here to understand the role language plays in the econ- omy of the individual spirit as a being that comprehends his world. For Locke language plays no essential role in the constitution of experience or knowledge; language opens up experience in that through languag have ew e accesexperience th o st othersf eo t bu , our basic experience of the world is not affected by language or the Accordin. lacit f ko Lockego t , language' scommunicatioe rolth es i n of thoughts to another, which is only a supplement to the ideational process, not an essential part of it. In Hegel's theory, on the contrary, language is essentially involved in the process of thinking.

i. lan Hacking argues that Locke, Arnauld otherd an , s working w withine e nth watheoro n ideaf yo d meaninf yo sha presentle w s ga y understan terme dd th an , that to expect them to deal with our problems leads to misunderstanding and disappointment; see Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?. Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 151

Hegel doe believt sno e thacoule ton d hav efulla , rich cognitive life without language; indeed, language is a necessary presupposition and concomitant of thought, according to Hegel, and is therefore mera t eno adjunct that conveniently allow communicato t s su e with others. Language play necessarsa ydevelopmene rolth en i f to richnese th complexitd san r mentaou f yo l essentias lifei t i ; r fo l Spirit's ability to instantiate reason. Whereas Locke tends to think of the ideas words signify as images, Hegel by no means thinks of the representations signified by Word particulas sa r images. Locke coursef o , , founders when confronted with words like "or," "every, r "when,"o t seemi r "fo s impossibl como et witp e u imag n ha e they could signify. Hegeln ,o othee th r hand tols thas signifiede ha ,u th t d representatione sar abilities to generate images either on the occasion of external causal affection or freely, that is, determined from within. Locke talks as if ideae th image e sar f objectsso Heger fo ; representatione th l e sar 1 generals that find their subsumd beinan gn i e mental individuals, namely, intuitions. He acknowledges that "the formal factor in languag , howevereis understandinge wore th th ,f ko , whic- hin forms it with its categories, and it is this logical instinct that gives rise to what is grammatical" (§459). The understanding, we shall see concernes i , d wit universae hth l articulatio experiencef no d ,an the logical operators or grammatical words in a language signify, not image objectsf abilite so th t structuryo t bu , e image repred san - sentations in general in a certain way and to recognize that structure experiencer inou . Bluntly put, "and" signifie abilite sth conjoiyo t n images and representations and the (same) ability to experience a conjunctio itemf n o conjunctiona s sa grammaticale th .y Thiwh s i , structural principle understandine th f so reasod gan n must already be at work in intuition, even though they only "come to conscious- nesshighere th n "i , still more reflective stagePsychologye th f so . 'By having words that signify our mental activities or abilities, we can invoke those abilities without having to use them. Language performs the immensely useful (indeed, necessary) task of distilling the complex abilitie minf so d into simple form genera;a l representation, "however rich a content it may include, is still for the mind simple in, the riame. havey ma ",I for instance generae ,th l representation of a democracy, which means having the ability to recognize a democrac e abilitth generatd o yt f yan o n eow imagey m n o s 152 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

situations that count as democratic. Democracy is a general notion, 2 havo t actuan e ea m r l fo though d an f democraco t t musyi e b t embodied in something singular, such as images. But if our images were alway comples sa phenomenoe th s xa questionn i woult i , d be very difficult for our finite, limited minds to do much thinking at all. Rather than thinking about democracy by the complex use of my ability to intuit and imagine one, I think about a democracy through the mention of this ability in the simple use of a word. The connection betwee generae worth e nd th dlan representatio immediatens i ; the word, as it were, goes proxy for the representation: "With the name lio neee nw d neithe intuitioe rth sucf no animaln ha ever ,no n the image; rather, the name, in that we understand it, is the image- less, simple representation thine W .names n ki " (§462 tr.)y m ,. face tTh that words allow t totalloneno f i dispenso ,yt e with intuition and the sensible, at least to minimize the direct involve- ment of complex sensate constructions in the higher mental activitie manf so alss i , o importan Hegelo t t anothe thir ye fo s ,si r progressivstage th en i e sublatio sensationf no particularitiee .Th f so sensation become leslesd ssan important certainls i t I . y impossible for a congenitally blind man to possess a direct image of red, but he can acquire the use of the word "red" and thus an indirect ability to recognize cases of red, not on the basis of direct perception, but on the basis of descriptions, meter readings, and so forth. Thus Hegel, unlik esevera e empiricist, nee dent dno yrepresentatioa o t d re f no a well-educated blind man. The empiricist tends to think that the ability to recognize red directly is essential to the representation of redness, but for Hegel the former ability is not essential to representing redness beino t , g abl reasoo et n correctly about redness. The sensation of red is something subjective, itself noncognitive, and it gives us only the nonconceptual occasion for forming the representation of red. This analysis leaves some problems. Clearly the abilities that, on my account, constitut representatioe quite eth b n e ca dif d - re f no ferent for a blind man and a sighted man; by what right do we call them representations of the same thing, and how is intersubjective communication between the two possible, given that the representations invoke wore th dy d b "red " coul disparatee db have ?W e

2. There is no reason to think that the images generated must be static, or of individual objects; an image of a democracy might be a montage of images of actions—people voting, an assembly convening, etc. Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 153

been treating havin grepresentatioa basicalls a d re f yno havine gth abilit recognizyo t thingd e re wid a n si e rang actuaf eo possibld lan e circumstances abilite th t recognizo yt Bu . e something cannoe b t simply the ability to attach a label, for that is what we are trying to explain. It rather comes down to an ability to generate in image an appropriate similarity class of situations and an ability to respond appropriately in other ways. The blind and the sighted man can larged agree an whicn o y , b , h situations coun similas a t thin i r s respect even if their criteria, their ways of telling, are different. some Therb y e minoema r divergenc vaguenese th o t e e th f esdu o term "red," but we do not need exact correspondence. Large-scale intersubjective agreemen sufficiens ti presenr ou t a t t level. The most important aspec f languageo t , however s thai e , th t complex abilities of spirit to generate images and recognize things can now be replaced by the relatively simpler ability to use words. Words are simpler elements standing for complexes, and to that extent they are something like abbreviations. They are of course intuitione moreth r fo , s tha worde tar s themselve througo sg e hth proces recollectionf so representative th d an , e power spirif so - re t flec themselvesn o t , creating still higher levels. This first reflection 3 occurs at the lowest level of memory, to the examination of which we now turn.

STAGEE TH MEMORF SO Y

The sectio memorn no subdivideys i d into three subsections: they are, roughly speaking recollectiv) (a , name-retaininr eo g memory, (b) reproductive or imaginative memory, and (c) mechanical memory, which is, so to speak, memory memorized.

Recollective Memory Recollective memory is the analysis of the activity of understand-

ing wordlevee th recollectionf t o ls a 3. "Making that connection,

3. There may be interesting analogies between the way words function in Hegel's theory and the way function names operate in a computer language such as LISP. If a large numbe complef o r x function definee computee ar s th n di r language- ex n a , tremely complex program can be expressed very simply and elegantly, because each function is itself very complex. Furthermore, in LISP there is no distinction between progra datad man ; everythin functiona s gi . 154 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

which the sign is, its own, intelligence raises the single connection to a universal, that is enduring connection, through this recollection, in which name and meaning are objectively combined for it, and makes the intuition, which the name initially is, to a representation, so that the content, the meaning, and the sign are identified, representatione on e ar " (§461 tr.)y m ,. The soun originalls di ysingla e spontaneous productio spirif no t which expresses or signifies spirit's representation. But, by recollectin soune gth d wit connectios hit representatione th no t , spirit constructs a standing connection; the word as significant is now present within spirit as an abstractly preserved image that is called appropriatele fortth y hb y related intuitions. Once again "abe th , - stractly preserved image" is nothing more than the ability to recognize and appropriately respond to a word given the appropriate intuition alreadt .Bu thit ya s leve connectioe lth n betwee sige nth n and what it signifies has become objective: "The primary thing here is that we retain the meaning of names—that we become able, with the linguistic sign, to recollect the representations objectively linked to them" (§461, Zusatz, tr.)y m . Note that Heget sayinno s li g here that hearinn ,o gworda imagn ,a somethinf eo whicgo t wore hth d applies comes into our heads, but rather that at this stage knowing the meaning of a word does mean that one has the ability to gener- suce at h images wore ;th d signifie imagesabilitye e th sth t ,no . This is wha moss i t t importan Hegelr fo t insofar wore fo ,th s da r goes representatione proxth r yfo havo t actua n s eordea n u i , r lfo r mental presentatio contene th generaf a n o f o t l representatioe nw nee longeo dn r invok imagistie eth c abilitien sca involvee W . it n di dispense with all actual images, for, if necessary, we can construct or generate the necessary images given the words. Things are now presente througs u do t h words connectioe .Th n between sigd nan signifie fullw yno s objectivdi e [Objektiv] because, having been generalized through the activity of recollection, it no longer depends on whie th immediatmr o e individuaurgn a f eo l subjective spirit.

Reproductive Memory Insofar as the process of full appropriation of verbal signs has been accomplished, the stage of reproductive memory has been reached: "The name is the subject matter [Sache], as it is present in Memory:5 Language15 Materiale th s a of Thought

reale th representatiomf o validitys ha reproductived e nan .Th memory, with neither intuition nor image, possesses and recognizes the subject matter in the name, and with the subject matter the name" (§462, my tr.). A content of representation can be either an individual spatiotemporal thing or an abstractum such as justice; in either case actuar ,fo l representation there mus determinata e tb e individual presented to mind that acts as the vehicle or embodiment of the content.4 In the lower stages of representation we must re-present ,the thing itself, which make representatioe sth abstractf no a (contents peculia spirio rt t itself) impossible highea t A . n r leveca e w l substitut esymbo a thin e th r g lfo itself finalld an , arbitrarn ya y sign serves as the representation of the thing and the content of the menta embodies i t lac foreiga n di n matter. Insofa recollece w s a r t this matte signa creats e ra ,w abilitn ea y that embeds anotherr fo , recollectioe th abilitsign e a th ns i represenf nyo t o connectioe tth n between sign and signified, which last is itself an ability. parallelise th t ou t mse Wbetween eca n stage representatiof so n arid stage memorf so followss ya have W .e analyze recollectioe dth n of a lion as the ability to re-present the lion, as knowing how to construc lioe tnth from sensat respono et materiaw sucho do t d hlan intuitions. The recollection of "lion" is the ability to re-present "lion" asign—sa construco t that , is t "lion relatios it e n th "i o nt abilit represeno yt t lions reproductivn I . e imaginatio achieve nw ea general representation of lion, the ability to re-present not just a lionclasa r similar-lookinf ,o s o g lions liont ,bu general—thasn i , tis to construct lions from sensate material reproductive .Th e memory of "lion" is the ability to represent "lion"s,—that is, to construct "lion"s from our sensate material. In recoUective memory we are still re-presenting word tokens, and in reproductive memory, I believe, we move up to the re-presentation of word types. Again ther embeddee ear d abilitie reproductivn si e- memoryre e th r fo , presentation of "lion"s as signs involves the implicit reference to what they signify, itsel embeddee abilityn fa th t Bu . d ability need exist only implicitly—to represent "lion meaningfua s "a l signI , nee actuallt dno y exercis abilite eth signifiesyt i unexercisen a d ;an d

4. Spatiotemporal "individuals almose "ar mucs ta h general thing Heger sfo l as, for instance, properties suc rednesss ha ; individuals have propertie commonn si , and properties have individual commonn si mattea s i e slicere ;pi whice on sy th hwa of indifference. 6 15 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

ability, having nothing actually embodying it, remains a mere po- tency and thus is not realized in any mental act at the time. Thus throug oe f us word r hhave ou sw e eliminate neee dr th dfo intuition image d thinge san th represente f so sw thinge Th .e sw represent exist for us in the names themselves: "As the existence of the content within intelligence name th , intelligence's ei s internal self-externality intuitioe th s a d n broughan , t forth from intelligence, the recollection of the name is at the same time the externalization in which intelligence posits itself within its own self" (§462). This passage, so confusing in its statement, is explicated in the following passage fro Zusatz:e mth

Although the spoken word vanishes in time, and time therefore displays itself in the words as an abstract or merely destructive negativity trule ,th y concrete negativit linguistie th f yo c sig intelligencens i , sinc througs i t ei h intelligence thachanges i t i t d fro externalitn ma y into an internality, and preserved in this altered form. It is thus that words become a determinate being animated by thought. This determinate bein absolutelgs i y necessar thoughtsr ou yo t onl e yW . know of our thoughts, only have thoughts which are determinate and actual, when we give them the general form of objectivity, of being different fror inwardnessmou , i.e.e shapth , f externality—aneo d moreover of an externality which at the same time bears the stamp of supreme inwardness. (§462, Zusatz)

Though generals i t contens it for s d it ;s general e i m an t ar t i d an , mere appearance that we can think the individual. But the general cannot exist without the individual; if something general is to be one of an "indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time are correlative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnection between grounds and consequents" (§123), it must individualize itself and become a determinate one among many. The general contents of theoretical spirit are most adequately individualized and given a determinate being through words, for, since free wordth e e sar productio f spiritno , unlike intuitio eved nan n images, thee yar immediately presente mino dt imbues da informed dan d with spirituality. Words hav ethoroughla y mundane existenc soundss ea , t whabu t they are—words—is essentiall expressioe yth e th f no spiritual. Without suc expression ha n spirit would remain unarticu- Memory:7 Language15 Materiale th s a of Thought

lated generality. Implici thin ti s thesiviee th ws i s tha individuae tth - tioidentitd nan y criteri wordr afo individuatiose givth s eu d nan identity criteria for thoughts, and thus, although they are not the same as words (words are in a language, for instance, whereas representations and thoughts are not), our only access to the thoughts we have is through and in words. Further discussion of this difficult topic must awai examinatior ou t thoughf no t itsel Chaptern i f s n and 12. Though reasod an tessentiall e nar y systematic; insofa s lana r - guage considere t attainelevee ye th memorf t t o ld a e no d th s yha leve t thoughtsystematizedf o l ye t thud no an ,s s i individuae th , l systematicallt signno e sar y joine simplt dbu y follo anothee won n ri our heads as we experience the world and respond to it verbally. In intuition or representation we "run through series of" (§462) words internally wit particulao hn r connection between them move .Th e to names within grammatical structures rather than lists depends on language use being informed with thought. In the grammatical structures availabl mor o languagn d ei n e thaca e new simply name r representationsou have abilite w ; eth thino yt k about themo t , reflec thein o t r relation internad san l structure representatione .Th s this reflection give themselvese risar o et s capabl beinf eo g named.

Mechanical Memory The reproductive memory itself does no more than set the foun- dationcomplee th r sfo x activit languagf yo e usenexe Th .t stage, what Hegel calls mechanical memory, present s witsu hrathea r surprising mov whicen i h spirit, whic previoue th hn i stage w sfe f so its activit beed yha n tryin expreso gt s itself ever more fullyw no , divorces itself fro products mit wordse th , , rendering them senseless .las e Thith t s stagsi representativf eo transitioe spirith d tan n to thought itself. Hegel's concep mechanicaf to l memory poses many problemr sfo us, for on Hegel's own admission, "to grasp the placing and significanc memorf eo comprehen o t d yan organis dit c connection with though systematizatioe th n ti intelligencehithertf ne o th f o e o on s ,i wholly unconsideremose th f t o difficul face n i on td dtan pointn si the doctrine of spirit" (§464). Mechanical memory is crucial in Hegel's account, for it constitutes the point of transition from repre- 158 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

sentation to thought—even though it seems itself to be the antith- esi thinkingf so . Briefly and bluntly put, in mechanical memory, spirit is once again divided into a multiplicity of simple elements that "appear as something purelfounda s hana e yd "on dabstrac an (§463e th n )o t container holding them togethe othere havth e n .rW o e seen similar stages earlier in spirit's progress, for instance at the stages of feeling and habit. But as we shall see, there are significant differences, for the elements at this point are of a radically different nature. Hegel's manner of speaking about this stage is fairly confusing. He talk subjectivitf so y here bein "universae gth l space "sensef "o - less words spendd "an sdisproportionata e amoun timf to e unfold- analoge th g rotin o yt e memorization, which analog yfinI t dno particularly illuminating unless one already understands his interpretation of memory sufficiently well to see why it serves as the example. The interpretation Hegel has in mind may be briefly put as follows. In reproductive memory an important new wrinkle enters picture th minf eo d Hege bees lha n sketching: mind explicitly presents itself to itself insofar as in the general representation of a word the link between the sign and the signified is represented, for in ordethis o signifiede d th ,o r t , whic itselhs i generafa l representation, something subjective that need objectivitn sa orden yi o t r achieve actuality, must leasitselt a e tfb implicitly represented. Thus the general representation lion is included implicitly in the general representation 'lion' thit s.Bu latter general representatio itseln nca f be named, signified—as indeed we have done with the word "lion." Any representative ability of mind can be named. We have already seen that names come to replace images and intuitions. If tak e procese w eth naminf so extrems it go t abstracd ean t froe mth necessarily ongoing intuitions and representations in the mind, samwhae th leftt s eti tim?"A e however, thi heare s th takin f t [o p gu mattee oworde th f th furthen e ri ]th als s orha significanc intelf eo - ligence makin gmattea r [Sache] itselff o thao s , t subjectivity than i , t it is different from the matter, becomes something that is quite empty.—The spiritless reservoi wordf ro s that constitutes mechanical memory" (§462, Zusatz). We certainly have a mess of names left—but what else? Any actual ability of mind to represent either intuitions, images, or names is itself named and replaced by the name. Yet we cannot say Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 159 have thaw l e largtal a lef s i t e collectio namesf no undoubtedlr fo , y spiri tidenticat itselno s fi l with these names, these externalizations of itself, its products; yet it is nothing in particular over against them, for otherwise it would have been particularized in a name and replaced. Still, something must be left to account for the coexis- tence and occurrence of series of names. "The I, which is the abstract being, is, as subjectivity, at the same time the power of the different names empte th , y bond that fixes serie thef so mitseln i f and keeps them in stable order" (§463, my tr.). Another way to put this is to point out that none of the particular representative abilities of spirit exhaust spirit. The particular abilities of spirit can be named insofar as they are particular—"intelligence is however the univer- salsimple ,th e trutparticulas it f ho r externalizations" (§463). There reao n da le nnamb spirir efo t because naming particularizesd an , spiri neven tca reduce e rb particulara o dt . This account of the nominalization of subjectivity explains He- gel's tal subjectivitf ko spac a abstrac r s o y a f eo t power over words, but we still need to see how it is that words have become "meaningless" at this stage. This is particularly important, for, just as words have become meaningles mechanican i s l memory, Hegel claims that thought itself "no longer has a meaning" (§464). It seems at best incongruou attributo st e meaninglessnes thoughto st e w o s , must understand just what is involved in the denial of mearjing to thought. Having a meaning is, according to Hegel, a relational characteristic of intuitions; an intuition has meaning when it stands in the 1 signifying relatio generaa o nt l representation, whic thes hi s nit meaning givet .Bu n thi severask statas affairsn f eo l ca revealine w , g questions .relation e Whath e tar s between these various productf so intelligence, the words? And second, if we carry through the "nominalization" of spirit discussed above, what is left of this notion of meaning? The answe firsr ou t questioo rt than s onli e tth y relations that exist between words at this stage are accidental juxtapositions as spirit runs through the mserien i reaction si internas it o nexternat d lan l environment. That there are only accidental relations between any words here can be demonstrated as follows. Each general representatio differens ni t from every other, even cleat thougno rs i jus ht i t wha criterie tth individuatiof ao n are. Still, each general representa- 0 16 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

tion receives a name, which is its simple presentation to mind. That must mean that namea qu , namo n , e admit analysisf se o th s i t i ; simple presentatio generaa f no l representation generae .Th l representatio mala f no e sibling receives instancer fo , name th , e "brother." But as this is its simple presentation to mind, it is not itself capable of analysis, and neither does subjective spirit have the conceptual tools at this stage to perform any acts of analysis. Thus minimar inou l verbal reaction environmenr ou o st wely e b lma t ti the case that "brother" always occurs together with "maled "an "sibling" as we survey our world, but there is at this level insufficient structur spirir e fo construc o t assertioe tth n that brothere sar male siblings. Our words at this stage are linked in parallel with the representations they expressrepresentatione th d an , s still retain priority. In the second edition of the Encyclopedia (1827) this point is made adequately clear in a paragraph Hegel later replaced with the present §463: "There is a general multiplicity of words, and insofar sucs a thes a e h yar mutuall y contingent, ther nothins eo i eg t gbu thid san multiplicity" (PSS, extene . 207)volth p , o 3 .o t.T d tha e tw not yet have a language system, the words are meaningless (in our sense), sinc kiny definitionf ean do , either explici implicitr o t s i , impossible. In answer to our second question, if the nominalization of spirit is carried through, then the general representations have lost distinct actuality ther abilitiee fo ,y ar generato st e images, abilities that, wit dominance hth wordsf eo , have become otiose. These image- generating abilities remain actual, then, only insofar as they are themselves represente generae th n di l representatio wore th f dno that signifies them insofa t wore .Bu th ds ra replace imagee sth s that actualizatioe th e ar generae th f no l representatio t signifiesni e th , word replaces the general representation itself and makes it unnecessary. The word thus becomes meaningless, since it has now lost that toward whic bort h i meanin e eth g relation. Clearly this never occur baldlhumano e ss th n yi , for, even verbalizing e whilar e ew , we are also intuiting, recollecting, imagining, and thus invoking the abilities to image. But the point is that these activities are separable fro verbae mth l activitie have w s e been investigating. Thee yar surely the presuppositions for verbal abilities in that without them verbal abilities would be impossible to acquire, but once those Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 161

abilities have been acquire"dispensen ca e dw " wit lowee hth r abilities on which they are built, except insofar as the lower abilities actually constitut highere parea th f to . Onc have e w appropri n ea - ate stock of words, we no longer need images. But then to the extent that our imagistic abilities have been rendered otiose and superfluous worde th , s that name those abilities have become meaningless. Becoming meaningless thus means becoming independenf to the original imagistic base sucd an ,h meaninglessness becomes more and more prominent, particularly as linguistic sophistication increases andactivitn a s , a f thoughtyo wordw ne gainee , sar d through definitio termn ni alreadf so y familiar words philoson I . - phy in particular it is important to divorce the words one uses from the shallow imagistic bases that may still cling to some of them, for in those abstract reaches images only confus mattere eth , introduc- ing contingent elements int onecessara y discipline. finallw positioa no n Wyi e ear understano nt Hegey dwh l calls this stage mechanical memor compared yan e ofteo th s t o i st n phenomenon of rote memorization. Insofar as the imagistic abilities have been replaced by words, which, however, are not yet systematized by thought, the words are mere counters, series of which are produced by subjectivity with no necessary order or connection between them. This situatio similans i thao rt t of rote memorization, the perfect example of which for Hegel's purposes is, not the actor recreatin gcharactea scenea schoolboa n t i r bu , y tickine th f gof word poea f so m expressionlessly, neither understanding whas i t sair evedno n imagecalline th poee p gu sth t trie evokeo st e Th . poem has been reduced to a mere series of words, and nothing at all is "going throug child'e hth s head."

The abilit retaiyo t roty nb e serie wordf so connectednese sth s of which is devoid of understanding whicr ,o themselvey hb senseless a e sar s sa a serie namef so s migh therefors i , tbe trulo es y remarkabl accounn eo t beins ofit essence gth spirif wite o b ho tt itself [bei sich], whereas here it is as it were inwardly externalized, its activity seeming to be a mechanism. Spirit is with itself only as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity however; and here in memory, after being initially external an findino ds g determination intuitionn si recollectind an , - ap d gan propriating wha founs ti presentation di n [Vorstellung] maket i , s itself 162 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

inwardly int externalitn oa memorys ya thao s , t appropriwhas ha t ti - ated appears as something found. Objectivity, which is one of the moment f thoughtso hers i , e posited within intelligence itsela s a f quality pertaining to it. (§463)

Wha have w tlevee spirin e i th f mechanica o t l a t l memora s yi reliable verbal responder, someone whose "language" skills are purely Skinnerian, untouched by the formal syntactic and semantic structures indigenous to real thought, someone whose references have roots but not fruits. Hegel's account of mechanical memory is far from unproblem- atic wordf I . s I suggesteare s a , d earlier r accesou , "generao st l representations," then each person has a limited number of such general representations, and different people can have sets of general representations that diverg significana o et t degree mort Bu .e important t thia f si , stag structure eth languagf eo t presentno s ei , wha makte sensw talkinf n eo eca g about e wordcasey ar e an ?W n s i confronted wit modere hth n dictum that words have meanings only in the context of a sentence, which seems to be precisely what Hegel is denying. There is of course ambiguity in Hegel's use of the word "meaning" and its meaning in the Fregean dictum. But even so, the problem still remain differentiatinf so g betwee nwora d properlo ys called and other verbal signs such as the ejaculation "Owl" With the machinery available to him here, it is unlikely that Hegel can make distinctione th thiss .I , however proble,a himr mfo ? Shoule b e dh able to make that distinction here? I see nothing in his task indicat- thag shoulde in th explai.n Wit ca machiner e e e hth nh th s ha e yh fact that "Ow! significanca s "ha e tha conventionas ti objectivet lbu ; the fact that it is a rather peculiar part of speech, one that does not enter normally into syntactic combination with other verbal signs to forpurviews hi m n i sentences t .ye Heget no s settins i ,li whap gu t he takes to be the foundation of highly sophisticated, thought- imbued, linguistic activity. The social practices necessary for such a sophisticated activity find their discussion elsewhere.5 In the process of replacing representations by words it is clear that, whatever level we are at, we can always go higher. But could

5. The best survey of the role of language in Hegel's phOosophy that I know of is T. Bodammer, Hegel's Deutung der Sprache. Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 163

this process come to an end; could we reach a point at which there onle ar y abilitieswordso n d an , ? Clearly not impossibls i t ;i a r efo mechanicaa mine b o dt l memor nothind yan a stil go t e elslb d ean mind agait problea Bu . nt thino Hegelr s takeme si - fo h r sme fo , chanical memory to be, not a separable faculty of mind, nor a distinct growte stagth thinkera n e i f hforo a t activitf mo bu , y that can be isolated within, but not separated from, the complex activities of a thinking being. One must pay careful attention to the task Hegel concerns himself with at each level of analysis; it is easy thino t k tryin s morthai o d e h teact o g et a h stage tha actualle nh y intends. There is one major problem left: how does mechanical memory constitute the transition to thought? The full answer to this question require complete sth e accoun thoughtf o t , whicsubjece th s hi f o t nowy poin thoughn wa n .I e ca te th w t spiribu , Chaptert12 d an 1 s1 almost begins again fro beginninge mth feelingn i s ;a , subjectivitys i the merely abstract and indeterminate unifying power that stands over agains materials tsignificanit a w thert no Bu .s e i t differencn ei the material. No longer mere sensations, the material of thought is loaded with implicit internal structure materiaworde r th ,fo e sar f lo thought. The paradigmatic activity of thought will be rational discourse systematizatioe th , wordsf no , although thought infects, informs affectd an , s every leve spirituaf lo l life. Because its material is words, thought has broken away from any immediate dependenc intuition eo sensuoud nan s experience. Fur- thermore systematizatios it n ,i n of words ,vie n whicwca e metahw - phoricall constructioe th s ya idean a f nlo language, particular contingent truths are not what is sought, qua thought. Any particular unificatio wordsf no mat,e th , n suc"o whics "Ths i ha t s ehca i contingent, is a representative use of thought's structures; thought itsel concernes fi d with necessary, systematic connections between words, and, insofa treatt i s worde ra sth s only with respec theio t r necessary connections worde th , raisee sar signo dt conceptsf so , not mere general representations. Mechanical memory is the transition to thought because it represents the point at which thought can begin to realize itself as the pure activity of organizing and uniting words: "Reason now exists in the subject as its activity, and as such is thought" (§464). 11

Representing versus Thinking

In Hegel's account of the increasing generality of spirit's produc- tions, the theory of the structure of representations may seem an attemp solvo t t problee eth f generalitmo sophisticatiny yb e gth perception-base ideasdf o "ney "w wa foun Lockn di Humed ean . But in the long run, Hegel believes, all such approaches fall short of a full explanation of the nature of thought, for real thinking is something that differ kindn si just degreeno ,n t i , fro imagistie mth c abilities of representing tasy thikn M .i s chapte explaio t s ri n Hegel's distinction between representing and thinking in preparation for r examinatioou s theore structurhi th f nf o y o f thougheo e th n i t following chapter.

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THOUGHT Classicae Th Symbolisd lan t Theorie Minf so d According to H. H. Price, there have been two major approaches to explaining what it is to have a concept, the classical and the symbolist theories.1 In the classical theory, whose heritage extends at least to Plato, having a concept is a relation to a special sort of object, usually called a concept or a universal. The kind of relation the thinking mind has to this object is most often conceived as analogou sighto st versio,a classicae th f no l theory which Price calls

i. This distinction is taken from H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience. 5 16 Representing versus Thinking

inspectivism. Oppose thio dt s rich tradition stand more sth e radical approac symbolistse th f ho thin O .s approach, havin gconcepa t consists of possessing a certain ability, in particular, the ability to engag symbolin ei c activity. "The symbolist philosophers, when they talk of concepts or abstract ideas, treat them not as inspectable entities ('object thought'f so dispositions a t )bu capacitiesr so o T . possess a concept, they tell us, is just to have the acquired capacity for anothe r usino e gon r sor generaf o t l symbol." symboliste 2Th s tak basie eth c sens havinf eo gconcepa dispositional—the b o t e disposition being acquired (at least in the case of simple concepts) by abstraction fro encounten ma r wit instancn ha concepe th f eo t through sense experience. Usin concepe gth latea s ti r actualization of suc hdispositiona . Thos tako ewh image primars sa wordd yan s s secondara y symbols that mus understooe b t e termn di th f o s primary symbols (Price cites Berkeley) are called imagists; those who take words to be the primary signs or symbols with which we think Price calls nominalists.3 Neither classical nor symbolist accounts of the nature of thought are necessarily representational, that is, committed to the view that though understooe b o t s ti termthinker'e n di th f so s possessiof no innen a r representational system that bears some semantic relation to the world. Nonrepresentational symbolism has been given a spirited defens Gilbery eb t Ryle onct saye Bu .e on s that thinkings i overt symbolic activity, the move to admitting that there is also covert symbolic activity within an internal representational system seems irresistible, give variete nth richnesd yan intelligenf so - hu t man activity pressuree Th .classicae th n so l vie posiwo t intern ta - nal representational system seem not nearly so strong, since the

2. Ibid. . 309p , . Hege Pricd an l e bot "symbole hus "sign,d "an whereat "bu s symbols for Hegel have some natural connection with what they symbolize and sign not juss o reversi e s d t tth i , Pricer efo . This terminological matter shoult dno bother us. . Althoug3 h lately there have bee advocatew nfe classicae th f so l view—Kurt Gode Alonzd an l o Church, perhaps—the symbolist traditio dearls ni y dominant, especiall cognitive th n yi e sciences. Withi contemporare nth y debate ther none ear e who would adop purta e imagist position thert ,bu considerables i e controversy over the forms mental representation might take and the possible role of images and natural language words in thinking. See Ned Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2, or Ned Block, ed., Imagery, for a representative sample of positions. i66 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

relation to the universal which defines this approach can be vari- ously interpreted and need not be thought of as a relation to an internal representation of the universal. The following table roughly sketche possible sth e position gived san s some putative examples in each category.4

Theory Representational position Nonrepresentational position

Classical Possessing a concept of A = Possessing a concept of A = standing in some relation R to standing in some relation R' to an inner representation of A itselA f (Russel Moord an l n ei (Plato, Descartes) their realist period) Symbolist Imagist: Possessing a concept of Possessing a concept of A = beinA= g abl imago et eA being able to behave (Berkeley) appropriately toward A's and Nominalist: Possessing a concept absence th s (RyleA' f eo , of A = being able to use Skinner) mental word "A" (Hume, Geach, Sellars)

The classical inspectivist and symbolist theories are too narrow to account straightforwardl fule th l r rangyfo thoughtf eo ; a eac s hha different area of strength. The classical theory is more suited to an account of our thought about abstracta, whereas the symbolist theory seems especially r thoughsuiteou o dt t about concretat I . seems implausible to claim that, when I think about what I had for dinner, I am inspecting a universal or concept; it seems much closer tha y trute tsa ot th o variouht s images, visua gustatoryd an l r o , various words, such as "omelet," "potato," or "sauerkraut," are flashing through my mind, and that my thinking consists in the rehearsal and interaction of these symbols. On the other hand, the idea that mathematical thinking consist inspectioe th f so r o f no insight into the nature of pure intelligible entities has long had a (perhaps surprising) power to it. Hegel makes a studious attempt to reconcile and do justice to the trut eachn i thesf ho e theorie incorporatiny sb strone gth g pointf so

examplee 4Th . meane sar t suggestivee onlb o yt ; eac thesf ho e thinkero to s si comple adequatele b o xt y characterize thin di s simple chart. 7 16 Representing versus Thinking

each int ohighla y structured theor mentaf yo l activity.5 Contraryo t what one might expect, Hegel rejects the classical representational theory of Plato and Descartes and unites symbolic representationalism with classical nonrepresentationalism.

Problems with Symbolism In symbolist theor maintaines i yt i d that thinkin nothinggs e i th t bu rule-governed manipulatio symbolf no signsr so evet Bu t firs.n a t blush only the knowledgeable or intelligent (though not necessarily conscious) manipulation of symbols can be plausibly identified with thought, and that seems either circular or regress-generating.6 Hegel's symbolist predecessor t fulls no oftey d exploidi n e th t possibilitie f theio s r position ofteo to l n Al the. y treated simple possession of a symbol, its mere presence before the mind, as sufficien constituto t t e havin appropriate gth e concept lure f eTh .o the classical, relational picture of concept possession is evident in this tendency. This view is made plausible by the idea that there is a set of natural symbols, namely, the symbols for simple concepts, that wear their meanings on their sleeves. Simple concepts are suppose intelligible b o dt e independen othey an rf to concept , even in isolation from all others, and are represented in the mind by nonconventional symbols—either innate or generated by perception. If the symbolist then forgets to take the dispositional sense of concept possessio basics na occurrence th , thoughe e th th f ed o tan occurrenc symboe th f eo l seem identical, makin easgt i infeyo t r that

5. I use "mental activity" here to signal that my concern is with Hegel's theory of wha calle h t s subjective thought. Hegel distinguishes subjective thought—what goes on in the minds of individual thinkers—from objective thought—the working of reason in the world at large (see §§24-25). 6. This is a relative of what Daniel Dennett calls "Hume's Problem"; see Brain- storms pp. 102, 12. Symbolists give two answers to this problem. The answer given by Dennett or Jerry Fodor avoids the regress by analyzing intelligent capacities into complexe lesf so s intelligent capacities othe.e Ryleth rn o ,hand , replie giviny sb n ga adjectival analysi f intelligenceso : doin intelligentlgX r knowledgeablyo t no s yi doing two things concurrently, namely, doing X and thinking about X, but is instead doee Bot. aon s X matte w h strategieho f ro s defea regresse th t mose ;th t satisfactory theory might combine them r evidencFo . e that Hegel noticed this probleme se , Encyclopedia §455 finI . evidenco dn eithew e sa tha f these o re h t th e f wayo t sou problem. 168 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity the thought and the symbol are identical. Such a view leads toward the possibility of having a concept by having a symbol present to the mind whict connectabl wit othey y no hs hwa an i ry symbolan n ei . Conflating concept possession with the simple presence to mind of a symbol result vera n syi poor theor thinkinf pare yo on - d gan ticularly inep t dealina t g with self-reflection t abandoni r fo , e sth essential symbolist insight into the active nature of thought. Hegel strongly attacks this weak but popular form of symbolism. Since symbo concepd lan identifiede tar , mental activity seeme b o st decomposable into various distinct operation symbols—thinkn so - ing, remembering, imagining,—an e unitdth f conceptuayo - ac l tivit sucs ya losths i . Rather than engagin complee on gn i x activity with many essential components seee w ,m onl engago yt - as n ei sorted simple activities. Thus, Hegel complains, thinking becomes just another facult f minyo d alongside other §20)L s(E . Further- more, the content of thought then appears to be without intrinsic connection— individualf o t ase , discrete universals (§20). Froe mth weak symbolist point of view, any connection between two concepts must appear totally contingent; necessary, intrinsic connection between concepts must be impossible, for there are no necessary connections between symbols. Such a conception of thinking condemn thoughl sal beino tt g incapabl containinf eo g truth.7 Furthermore, symbolism, especiall instantiates ya classie th dn i - cal empiricist theorie Humef so , David Hartley Jamed an , s Mill, tends towar mechanistice dth Heged an , absolutels i l y convinced that no mechanistic theory can be adequate to the phenomenon of thought. Mechanism leaves no room for ends and purposes and thus cannot account foteleologicae rth l proces rationaf so l thought. Eve nmentaa l chemism Johs ,a n Stuart Mill like caltheoro ds t lhi y to contras witt ti father'ss hhi , falls shor thin ti s respect. Heges li committed to a mental organicism, which he takes to mean a teleological holism. The fact that symbolist theories of mind are particularly attractive to materialists and mechanists, however, is not muc argumenn a f ho t against them, even for Hegel cleat no ,r s foi t ri that a mental organicism must eschew symbolism. And in his theory, symbolic representations do play a central role.

§25examine e 7Se W .. e Hegel's reason thir sfo s below critique th n i ,repre f eo - sentationalism. Representing versus Thinking 169

Hege facn li t maintains tha subjectivl tal e though ties ti symo dt - d sigboan ln manipulation thine W .wordsn ki e sayh , s (§462); whenever we think, the thought is embodied in a sign or symbol (§462, Zusatz). sige though e symbolr th n o t Th no s ti ; rathet a s i t ri work through the sign or symbol (§462, Zusatz). Thinking expresses signa f o .e Wheus e thine itselnth w n ki f about thought thine w , k about wha symbole wort a th s ti n k i signr so s tha presentee tar o dt us.

Problems wit Classicae hth l Theory In classical theorie s claimei t si d that thinking consiste th f so mind's standing in some relation to a universal. But how, then, can thine w k about individuals answee ?Th r mus tha e have tb w to en such contact with individuals qua individuals. Attempts by classical theorists to explicate the nature of the relation between mind and universal have not been very successful. metaphoe Th seeinf ro dominates gha d such attempts.8 Inspectiv- chilisa m s substahtialisi f do t theorie mindf so , theorie whicn si h the mind itself is reified as an entity related to its objects in the way a person perceiving physical object relates si themo dt . Inspectivism, like symbolism threatenes i , d with either circularit regressa r yo , for Kans a , t saw, perception itself involves though thereford an t e relatio universale th o nt . Hegel puzzle individuan sa ovew ho r l mental entit represenn yca universal.ta representationa9A l version of classical inspectivism seem boio st l dowobviousle th no t y inadequate theory that ther signe ear mere sth e presenc whicf eo o ht mind constitutes possessio exercisd nan concepta f eo theora , y Hegel rejects. Hegel doe completelt sno y rejec classicae th t l theory, however. How and why he thinks it has to be salvaged is revealed by his understanding of the problems of representationalism. The idea of a nonrepresentational symbolist theory of mind is entirely foreig himo n t existenc e ;th internaf eo l symbol imagination si d nan memor obviouys i himo s t symbolis o .S mconsideres i Hegey db o lt

8. For a sustained critique of visual metaphors in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 9. The section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit entitled Vorstellung traces the stages in which our mental representations become increasingly universal in content. 0 17 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity be committe representationalismdo t believee h t .Ye s that representationalism entails certain consequences that condemn it as a final answer about the nature of thought.

Problems with Representationalism Hege wels li l awarpressuree th f eo s withi representationay nan l theory, pressures that tend to cut the mind off from external reality, keepin trappegt i d behin dveia ideasf o l . Whatever semantic relatio supposes ni exiso dt t betwee r representationnou theid san r objects, its veridicality must remain forever beyond our ken. If this worr takeys i n seriously, eve self-knowledgr nou threateneds ei . Epistemological skepticis problee th thing-in-itsel e d th m mf an o f vitalle ar y linke Hegelr dfo . Bot oftee har n motivate entirely db y separating the subjective from the objective world to be cognized, by adopting a picture of the mind as an inner space populated with merely subjective representations. thent 10Bu , sinc have ew e access only to our representations, we cannot independently ascertain whether the indeee yar d veridical representation whether so r there relatioy l betweean al s i t n a r representation nou othey an rd san reality. We cannot even ascertain whether they are correctly characterize representationss da Kantiae Th . n answe suco rt h empiricist skepticism divisioe th , knowledgf no e into possible phenomenal and impossible noumenal knowledge, Hegel regards as a sham. Knowledg eknowledgt thano s ti knowlthingt f eo no s thei s sa -e yar edge at all; Kant's theory is just another form of skepticism, accord- Hegelo t g in . Purely representational theorie mindf so , Hegel believes, condemn one to subjective idealism, an intolerable position. Hegel does not reject representationalism wholesale, however; he believes thattheora s a , perceptiof yo lowee th d r ncognitivan e functions that involve sensory elements (intuition and Vorstellung), representationalism correc e musth e tb t answer. There a need e b o st nonrepresentational anchor for our mental activity, however, one that ensures thaknowledgr ou t thingf o thems e n i i thes sa e yar - selves. Hegel's rejection of representationalism in order to escape from

. Rorty10 , Philosophy an Mirrore dth of Nature, also criticizes this metapho innef ro r space at length 1 17 Representing versus Thinking

subjective idealism depends on his other metaphysical positions. In particular, his claim that the universal, and not the individual, is the substanc e worlth f s crucialdi eo cannoe W . t have other actual individual mindsr dealingr ou ou n sy i ; thiswh wits si h such individual perceptionn si , imagination forto s representae har d an , - idetionale havinf th at o .Bu g universals themselve thn si e mins dha t seemeno impossibles da . Often enoug bees ha nt hi claimed that this is the only place they exist. It is our knowledge of the universal—the object of pure thought—that is nonrepresentational and fully objective, according to Hegel; because the universal is the in- itself of the world, we know things as they are in themselves. Hegel does admit tha cae ntw represent universal ourselveo st s o (ans o dd in art and religion), but when we do so we have not yet achieved true thought. In true thought we stand in a nonrepresentational relatio r thoughte objecou th f o o nt t , which must alwaya e sb universal. Thus we turn next to explicating the nature of the universal, the object of thought, and the nature of its relation to the thinking mind.

HEGEL'S RESPONSE TO THE TRADITIONS

Hegel's attempt to reconcile representational symbolism and nonrepresentational classicism revolves around his notion of a concrete universal. He believes that his predecessors erred in assuming an absolute distinction between individuals and universals and attempt overcomo st e this rigid distinctio arguiny nb g that bote hth individua universae reconceivee th b o d t lan e lar momentss da a f o more complex, articulated unity concrete ,th e universal conceptr ,o . r purposesFoou r s technicahi , l terms "concrete universald "an "concept treatee b n one s "basidca s a Hi . c argumen reconceivr tfo - ing the world in these terms is that we are otherwise incapable of reaching a fully coherent conception of the world. That argument, however, is beyond our bounds here.

The Active Concrete Universal Hegel believes tha t s predecessormoshi f o t s have chosee nth wrong paradig f predicationmo . These philosophers—philosophers trapped in the "attitude of the understanding"—have taken 172 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

such accidental predication "Ths sa e bal reds li paradigmatics "a n .I suc hcasa e therintrinsio n s ei c connection betwee universae nth l individuae th d predicatean s i t li d of—bot universae e hth th d an l individual seem quite indifferent to each other. Taking this to be the paradigmatic predication relation leads, Hegel believes metaa o t , - physics in which the world is seen as composed of nexus of bare particulars (in his terminology "abstract individuals") and ontologically independent universals (he would call these "abstract universals"). Hegel thinks such a metaphysics impossible; to escape being muse trappeon t i rejec n di t bot abstrace hth t individuae th d lan abstract universal.11 place Inth accidentaf eo l predication Hegel consider versiosa f no essential predicatio strivee idean b a o s t lna n n a toward n i r fo , essential predicatio universae individuae nth th d an intrinle ar l - sically tiedessence .Th somethinf eo alsgs i o see Hegey nb havo lt e some explanatory power; saying of what kind a thing is can be a legitimate explanatory move Heget Bu . l goes further than thisr fo , an essence, something's concept, is held to be, not a descriptive essence prescriptivea t ,bu ideal. Something's concept offer idean sa l pattern that the thing strives to realize in the course of its existence, although individual thing nevee sar r perfect exemplar f theiso r essence. In this respect we can begin to see a rather strange melding of Aristotle's concept of essence with the Kantian notion of concept. Kant insisted that "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serve rulea s sa " (Critique of Pure Reason, Aio7). Hegel seizes on three aspects of Kant's a priori concepts— their unrestricted universality, their prescriptive force, and their conceptual priority over their instances—and transfers these properties to the basically Aristotelian conception of an essence or thing- kind. Hegel also learned from Kant that concepts are not discrete en- titie sknowe thab n t ca nexis d eactan h independen othersy an f to ; neither thinkenotioe th simple a s f n o tharha y sa conceptt n ca e .W Hegel took over from Kan coherenca t e theor conceptsf yo : even bottom-level basic ideas are to be understood through their interaction with other idea basin si c principles contrastivn i , e relations, and so forth. Perhaps most important, the crucial relations between concepts need not all be construed as analytic "inclusions"; Kant

it. See R. Aquila, "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics." 3 17 Representing versus Thinking

inaugurate searce dth nonanalytir hfo t alscbu o nonpsychological, rational connections between concepts, and Hegel willingly followed. Thus what Hegel calls a concept is a prescriptive ideal that is parsystea f o t msucf o h ideals tha worle tth strivinds i realizgo t e and in terms of which we can make sense of what happens in the world. Hegel, however, takes the rule-like character and implicit systematicity of concepts so seriously that he makes a move Kant would never dream of; he insists that the being of the I is the being unificatioe rule th r th e experiencefo s l o concepti fa al I f e no th r ,fo . The unit apperceptiof yo ideae th s nli governin l synthetigal - cac tivity in the mind. Indeed, since the I provides the ultimate rule— all concepts mus unifiee tb d unde includin, rit pure gth e concepts— e selfth ,, I become e th ssuper-concepta concepa , f concepto t s (WdL, . 220-21 vol . pp 583) p , , 2 . .;SL Every universa whatevef lo r kind unifies something, but conn ,i - trast to abstract universals like red, concrete universals not only unite various different individuals under some headin t alsgbu o accoun their tfo r internal unity modee .Th thir lfo s internal unification is the synthesis of the manifold into the unity of apperception. The manifold is unified, according to the Kantian vision, because I mak t mineei , constituting mysel than i f t very process. Hege- at l tributes this kin self-constitutinf do g activit evero yt y concrete universal l conceptsal o t , unity manifola An .f y o d whic t thuno shs i actively involve vere th yn d i natur elementse th f eo , while also constituting its own self in the activity, is to that degree a merely abstract universal concret.A e universa therefors li e different from the abstract universals that previous thinkers in the classical tradition took to be the object of thought: "The universal of the concept featuref mero a t m eno su ss i commo severano t l things, confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence on its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particularizing or self-specifying, and with un- dimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis" (EL §163, my tr.)abstracn A . thune b universa thathingg n n go ta ca t a ss i l otherwise quite indifferen orden i t i sor o rt o t tt them out concret;a e universal, on the other hand, must reach to their very hearts and afford an explanation of their being. An abstract universal is static and unchanging because it is dead, a mere sum of otherwise unrelated features. A concrete universal, however, is alive, dynamic, dialecticald an essentialls i t ;i yparself-developina a f to g system. In sum, the foremost characteristic of a concrete universal is that 174 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

active.s ii t whole Th e univers e realizatioth s ei universaa f no l activity—and this activity is the concrete universal. Its mode of actio teleologicals ni self-realizations i , t thai , tis concrete th ; e universal is both cause and effect, it is self-developing. Second, a concrete universa truthe th thosf s o i l e object t characterizesi d san animates. It is their essence, that which explains what they are and why they behave the way they do. Third, a concrete universal is not separable from its instances; it actively manifests itself in and through them. Fourth, concrete universals, concepts,- haves n ea senc theif eo r own concrete ,th e universal, which realizes itseln i f active th e self-realizatio s contributorit f no y moments. Concrete universals are essentially parts of a self-realizing system. What ultimately is, according to Hegel, is a universal self-constitutive activity that becomes self-consciou man'n si s knowledg it—thf eo e Absolute.

Rejectioe Th Inspectivisf no m Hegel'Is ti s ontology that allowbreao t m ks hi awa y from representationalis classicae th d man l tendency toward inspectivismr fo , at the highest level of pure thought, he believes, the concept is not inern a t entit inspece yw t rathet bu activit e rth are.e yw Insteaf do standing apart from a universal or a representation that we somehow "look purn i , e"at though become tw especiaa l realizatiof no the concrete universal realizind ,an gconcreta e universae th t no s li sam representins ea g it.12 Hegel ultimately transcends representationalism, abandoning a common assumption shared by most philosophers since Descartes. Hegel takes thought to be a certain distinctive and dynamic, structured activity. He is a symbolist to the degree that he holds that this activity mus realizee tb symbolis da c activit subjectivitya yn i , but he refuses to identify thinking with any specific set of symbolic activities; he also refuses to say that the action on the symbols is itself symbolic. Hegel insists rather that, when Wthinkinge ear e ,th symbols themselves representatione th , s befor - minde in eth e ar ,

pointe s discussioth hi f f o so 12 e . f thoughThinon o s si §§20-2n i t e th f 5o Encyclopedia. Only in this way can we make good sense of his distinguishing between objective and subjective thought while maintaining their identity. This also explains why philosoph r thoughyo self-movemene th s i t concepte th f o t , whicht i we s a , were, simply observe; §238, Zusatz. alse oSe WdL, vol 824-7. . 485-8. 2,pp pp , .;SL 5 17 Representing versus Thinking

consequential. What really counts is what we do with the symbols. The activity actually operatin symbols—foe th n go r whic syme hth - bols are but "pieces in a game"—is thinking. This activity is not, of course, a kind of action performed by some homunculus on inner symbols. The activity is implicit in the symbols themselves; they are symbols for concepts by virtue of participating in a system of demands and permissions, and in this sense they are codes that directly invoke activity.13 Although Hegel would admit that sym- thinge th t s no bol thee sar y symbolize onlt ,bu y representationf so them tha y systee woule sa h ,th t t demandf mdno o permisd san - sions that gover e interactionnth e symbolth f o sveridican (i s l thought onls )i yrepresentatioa demande th f n o permission d san s that govern the interactions of the things symbolized. Real think- 14 ing, which, according to Hegel, is always veridical, is achieved whe r internanou l symbol syste ms governei samee th y db rul e system as the world. Thinking is to be identified with the instantia- tion of this rule system; our ability to think true thoughts about the worl face bases di th t than dinstantiato e tw same eth e rule system that govern world.e sth philosoph1n 5I y this rule system als- obe comes the object of our thought, not by our symbolizing it to ourselves, but by our self-consciously participating in the system, self-consciously playing the game. Thus Hegel rejects a representa- tionalistic reading of thought, rejects inspectivism, and synthesizes the symbolist and classical theories through the claim that in thinking the active universal is present in our symbolic activity.

Douglan I . 13 Hofstadter'. sR s popular book Godel, Escher, Bach: Eternaln A Golden Bfaid, distinctioa draws ni n between iner activd an t e symbols. Hofstadter, along With other contemporary symbolists, insists that active symbol spatiotemporae sar l entities and that, in the final analysis, their interaction is to be explained causally. Hegel, in effect, would deny that such symbols are physical entities (according to him, the like year mental utterances would )an d probably even more strongly deny that their interactio explainee b lawo e t th physics f n i so y db chemistryd san e Th . interactio sucf no h symbols mus explainee tb d entelechially beins ,a fulfillmene gth t of a telos. 14. Otherwise, he would have to deny the identity of subjective and objective thought. 15. Hegel sees the world as the interplay of concrete universals. But thinking is precisely that, an interplay of concrete universals. He distinguishes objective thought and subjective thought onle th ,y difference between them being their venud ean mod realizationf eo . Objective though realizes ti d everywhere, subjective thoughs ti realized within individual subjectivities (through their symbolic activity) Heget Bu . l insists on the identity of the two forms of thought. 12

Thought

As centra Hegel'o t l s philosoph concepe th s ya though f to t i , tis seems strange that there are only four relatively short paragraphs (§§465-68) devoted to it as the culmination of theoretical spirit. Hegel takes ultimate thinkinth e b eo gt activity lying behinl dal worldly processes, responsible for the grand structure the world exhibits t thesBu .e paragraph e philosophth n i s f subjectivo y e outlinn a t thaf eno o spiri te topicar t whico t , h Hegel devotesa gread deal of space, for instance, in the Wissenschaft der Logik. How- ever, in the philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel is concerned, not with Thought active th , e substanc worlde th merel t f eo bu , y with thought, an ability possessed and exercised by individual human beings relatioe th , f whicno Thougho ht s opei t discussiono nt . Hegel claims that subjective thought and objective Thought are in reality one and the same, though admittedly in different forms. In the first section below I restate the situation at the lowest level of thought. The second section is devoted to spelling out in greater detail what Hegel thinks thirgoee th when ds o n think i e nd w an , sectio briefle nw y discus transitioe sth practicao nt l spirit, which does not concern the nature of thought itself so much as the relation between thought and will.

THE IMMEDIACY OF THOUGHT

"In the first instance, however, thinking cognition is formal; universality and its being is the simple subjectivity of intelligence. Thus 7 17 Thought

the thoughts are not determined as being in and for themselves, and the representations recollected as [or into] thought are still the given content" (§466 tr.)y m ,: thu generae sth l d situatioen e th t na e sectiooth f representation no s statedni . Spiri s taken i ta s na abstract power standing over agains collectiota wordsf no , which are the embodiment of or represent certain spiritual capacities. These words, the representations, are raised to the level of thought throug hrecollectiona t insofaBu . s thia r s recollectio kina s ni d of « generalization in which we move behind the words to what is expressed in them—not subjectively (that would be a regression to an earlier stage of representation) but objectively (that is, for a hypothetical anyone understooo wh words)—there dth severae ear l thing saie b do st abou t words recollecte thoughtss da . First, such thoughts are merely abstract universals, not concrete universals. The takee yar sunderes na d entities, each apart frol mal the others, and the individuals in which they are taken to be expresse thinge wordse th dar t s no ,themselves t ye t . no The e yar inner principle activityf so , structural nodes organizing their local relative intt fi olargea o st r pattern concep A understoo.e b n ca t d itself to be a set of permissions, demands, and prohibitions on that power of unification which is thought in abstract generality. No concept can be an atomistic counter indifferent to the power of thought that manipulates it. Thought, therefore, must go beyond this initial abstract universal to develop the true concrete universal. Second, thought importann a s n heri e ear t sense presen mino tt d as merely given; that is, we find language already there and already cuttin worle certaiga th invent p du no word ne o waytd th e e sw .W use leare w , n them slowle W . y lear abstrace nth t connection- sbe tween word phrased leare san w thinko ns t sa creatioe Th . a f no new word for something previously unexpressible, when done consciously, is itself an act of highly sophisticated thought. The world generally seems to come to us prearticulated by our lan- thesn i continu e guaget i w e e termd se an ,o et s unthinkingly most of our lives until we start theorizing, thinking in the strongest sense articulatioe .Th worle th mera f takens do i e b e o nmattet f ro mose th facr t partfo t , something given t Hegebu , l insists thal al t such articulation is ultimately generated out of the self-revealing natur thoughtf eo . Thought is.activ subjectiviten i naturen i d yan t ;i t consciouactivitn isno ow s naturen yit i f so ; this activit fos yi r itself 8 17 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

onl subjectivityyn i firse th t instancen "I . , thought know unite sth y of the subjective and objective as wholly abstract and indeterminate merels a , ycertaia n unity, whic neithes hi r fille r condno - firmed thio T .s unity therefore determinatenese th , rationae th f so l content is still external and therefore given,—and cognition is therefore formal. Yet since this determinateness is implicitly contained in thinking cognition, this formalism contradicts it and is the therefore sublated by thought" (§466, Zusatz). The thinking spirit is convince adequace th f dthoughs o it worlde first f ya o th t to t Bu . this is an unreflective assumption; spirit merely finds its words fittin experiences git . That thoughprecisels i e beind on tan e y gar "determinatenese th rationae th f so l content" that Hegel talkf so "rationae hereactuarationale e th actuar e th th th fo ,s d li s li an l " (prefac Philosophye th o et of Right). althougt Bu openin e th t ha g level of spirit, spirit has this conviction, it is nothing but a conviction; spirit cannot Spirit'. bacup kt i s original conviction tha thoughts tit s capture the world successfully does not result from its own thinking about though worldthie o t th s d extend ,an tan clais tit knowlmo t - edge of the world is merely formal, awaiting fuller justification. The conviction that thought and being are one and that thought is adequate to the world is, according to Hegel, both the necessary assumptio attitude th f no thought—itf eo s working hypothesiss ,a it were—and its ultimate result.

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

Hegel compresse theors essentiae shi th f yo l structur thinkinf eo g activity into one paragraph, §467. In this culmination of the entire discussion of theoretical spirit, we find two lists of three levels within thought. relatioe Whath s i t n between these lists? They duplicate each other; there is one set of levels described with two different aspects highlighted. In the first list the distinction between form and content is retained; taking for granted thoughts as the "content" of thought as discussed in his previous paragraph, Hegel describe increasingle sth y adequate form into which these contents caste b n . Thuca firse sth t list give descriptioa s su formae th f no l structur thoughtf eo secone Th . d list is believeI , slightla , y more adequate statement leavet i r rathee fo , sth r stati artificiad can l dis- 9 17 Thought

tinction of form and content behind, even as heuristic, and brings t morou e full activite yth y that thought is.

The Formal Structure of Thought Concepts respecn I f thio t s conten diesemn [A t Inhalte] though s (ii t ) formally identical understanding, which transform recollectee sth d representations into genera, kinds, laws, forces, etc. generan ,i l int Categoe oth - ries, in the sense that the material first has its truth in these forms of thought. As negativity infinite in itself, thought is (2) essentially di- remption—judgment [Urtheil], which howeve longeo rn r dissolvee sth concept into the previous opposition of universality and being but rather distinguishes it [or divides it] according to the connections peculia concept e though) th (3 o rt d an ,t sublate form-determinae sth - same th t ea tion timd sean posit identite differences;se th th f yo — formal reason, syllogizing understanding. (§467 tr.y ),m

We start with "recollected representations," whic hhavI e main- tainee abstracb o dt t universals, each isolated fro l othersmal . Through thought these representations are "processed" or "transformed" [verarbeitet] into genera, kinds, laws forcesd an , . What does this mean exactly? Three question thee ar y w s ariseHo ) (a : transformed, what happen theo t s mthin i s transformation) (b ? what exactl thet i transformee ys i y ar worker do intop d Whau ) ?(c t is the common element of genera, laws, and so forth which makes this transformation one process rather than many? We have seen tha recollectee tth d representation generalizae sar - tion ranga f so sophisticatef eo d capacitie spiritf so capacitiee ,th o st call up certain images and words. They are generalized in the sense that the particular idiosyncrasies of individuals have been dis- counted. In other terms, the representations are unities within certain activities and potentialities of individual subjective spirits. The recollected representations thathoughtse ar t , howevere ar , unities of such activities and potentialities within subjective spirit in general, that is, intersubjectively and objectively. The capacities of spirit embodie l entirelal thoughn dt i no y e separatear t d from one another. They exhibit certain interconnections, although spirit t becomye t no e s awarha f theseo e interconnections. There ear 0 18 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

pattern cooccurrencef so r permissiblo , e association instancer fo , , antransformatioe dth n undergon understandinn ei cominr ou gs i g to awareness of these patterns in consciousness. As we then seek to explain and, more important justifo t , y these patterns associae th , - tions are no longer mere instances of a pattern but become example explicif so t rule following. This appear impositiose firsth n i t f no structured connections on the formerly discrete units in thought. One such structure is the partial ordering of genus and species. Thought now sees all its objects as essentially participating in such ordering structures .firs e Thith tovercomin e s si ste th pn i e th f go atomis standpoine th mf o abstractf to , formal thought onls i t i y t ,bu firse relatione th t stepth d ,an s focuse highl tene n db o do t y abstract thoughe ar affectins d a f an to relate gth a only minimally. We have already before us most of the material for answering our second question, namely, what kind of thing the representations are transformed into. Today we think of genera and kinds as very different from laws and forces, categorically different. But Hegel did not think this, for he focused on their common character as modally laden relationovee on manyr a a onef e genusse o .Th th , , kind, law, necessitates certain characteristics in the manifold that falls under it. The application of one of these concepts necessitates applying certain other concepts, and thus these concepts can be see structurins na conceptuae gth l realm, unifyin conceptr gou s into a coherent scheme. Concept longeo n e srar merely contingently associated with each other seew ;modalls ntheno a e yar y related. This systematizatio unificatiod nan conceptr activitou e f th no e sar y of the concept of a concept in one of its manifestations, the essential activity of spirit.

Judgments Fro systematie mth c classificatio conceptf no understande th y sb - progreso t r fa t theio st no s inri explicitlgt i y asserted interconnection in a judgment, although Hegel would complain that many philosophers before him misunderstood the nature of such assertion. Judgment in Hegel's eyes is not merely the assertion of a relation between two independent and indifferent things; this is precisely the view of the nature of judgment which must be overcome, which is mired too deeply in the theory of the abstract universal. Thought 181

Hegel emphasizes that judgment is a kind of distinguishing by playing on the etymological structure of the German Urteil—"original or primordial division or partition." Hegel does not believe that 1 judgmental structure applies only to certain subjective acts of mind:

The judgmen usualls i t y take subjectiva n i e sensoperation a s ea n and a form occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This distinction, however t presenno s i ,Logic n i t judgmend an , takee s i t th n i quite universal signification that all things are a judgment. That is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves—a universal tha individualizeds ti . Their universalitd yan individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical wit othere hth . (El §167 tr.y )m ,

The self-individualization of the concrete universal is a judgment. vere Sincth ys i natur t econcrete i th f eo e universa havo lt beins eit g in individual existents, it is of the essence of the concrete universal to develop itself in judgments. Individuals possess judgmental structur than ei t they realiz universalea . bareThero n e particuear - lars in the world. Indeed, individuals always realize a multitude of universals, so there is no such thing as a purely simple thing in the world. Not only are individuals complex, but even their complexity is complex, with different aspects contributin complee th o gt n xi different ways. Thus a plant may be of a particular kind, say a rose, beins it d g an both kine plan roscomplexityd f on d o s an tei e Th . planalsy oma t have certain parts, suc s rootsha , flowersd an , leaves, and this is another sort of complexity. The flowers may be of a certain color, say red, and this is still another sort of complexity. The individual realizes different universals, but not all of the universal realizet si equale sar . Som essentialle ear y abstract, othere sar concrete judgmente th ; s through whic individuae hth e th d an l universal are distinguished in each case are different. Hegel's the- judgmenf o y or theor a differen e s ti th f yo t way individuae sth d lan the universal are distinguished and unified. It is easy to forget that according to Hegel judgment is as much a featur structurr eo objectivf eo esubjectivee realitth f o s ya . Individ-

i. This approach seem havo st e come from Ficht Holderlind ean . FichteG . J . , SSmtliche Werke, vol. i, pp. 102-3, an(* F. Holderlin, "Urtheil und Seyn," in Mnte- rialien zu Schellings Philosophischen Anfangen,. Kurz . FranG . 108-9M d . pp , kun ed . 182 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

ualuniversald san essentialle sar y relate botn di h realms forgeo .T t that everything objectiv judgmena s ei falo t l s tinti metaphyse oth - ical error of believin bargn i e particulars, platonic universalso s d ,an forth separato T . subjective eth e concept fro judgmentae mth l context whicoccun s n i fal o t ca l s t hri inti theore abstrace oth th f yo t universal, which render judgmental sal l structure arbitrary.2 There is no room here for a treatment of Hegel's full theory of judgmen appeart i Logics,s outlines s a tit hi t n si bu s emerge relatively easily from wha have w t e said already have W .e already noted that judgment can be viewed as the unfolding of the necessary complexity o concretfa e universal thad ,an t even this complexity is complex. Hegel's theory of judgment is an attempt to regiment kinde th complexitf so individualizatioe th n yi concreta f no e universal, ranking the accordancmn i e with their abilit expreso yt e sth original structural unity of the concept. There are two different contrasts involved in Hegel's ranking of judgments. First t everythinno , g prepositional qualifie judga s sa - ment, for Hegel distinguishes between judgments and propositions:

A judgment [Urteil] s howevei r distinguished fro ma propositio n [Safe] lattee Th ,r contain statemensa t abou subjecte tth , which does universay an n stant i t i no l o drelationshit expresset pbu s some single action somr o , e like e stateth .r Thuo , s "Caesa bors Romt rwa na n ei such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, etc." are propositions but not judgments. Again it is absurd thay tosa t such statement I slep" s sta well last night r "Presen"o t turnee arms!b y d"ma int forme judgmentoa th f o s carriagA " . s ei passin woul" gjudgmentby a e db subjectiva d bestt ,an a e , eonlon yf i it were doubtful whethe passine rth g objeccarriaga s twa whether eo r t rathe no poin e d rth observatio f ian to t motion:—in i s nwa n short, only iwert fi e desire specifdo t representatioya n whic stils hlwa short of appropriate specification. (EL §167)

Hegel says something similar abou distinctioe th t Wissen-e th n i schaft der Logik, adding tha judgmenta t "requires tha predicate tth e

empiriciste 2Th . particularle sar y subjec thio t s danger. Although they all leave some roo triviar mfo l knowledg r relationeo ideasf so nonanalytiy an , c judgment tend conceivee b o st the y merda b ms a e associatio ideasf no , which Kans a , t saw, dooms their attempt to understand human knowledge or human mental activity. 3 18 Thought

relate e subjecconcepe e b th on o ds t a t t determinatio anothero nt , and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual" (SL, p. 626; WdL, vol. 2, p. 267). He adds that there is "something of a judgment in a proposition" when the fact expressed by the proposition is place doubdn i t (repeating her eremara Encyclopedia)e th kn e i th d an propositio "assertes ni strengte th n d o som f ho e reaso other.r no " It seems that this distinction is one of degree, not kind [see also SL . 683p , ; WdL, . 330]volp , 2 ., although perhaps Hegel thought that ther soms ewa e break dividin sentencee gth s into genuinely different kinds. Whether a sentence is a judgment or a proposition solelt no s yi dependen grammaticas it n to t i b jo l e for alst th mn obu o perform contexts it n si mer.A e statemen contingenf to t fac onls i t ya proposition; an attempt to theorize or explain is a judgment. Some sentences appear more naturall theorizinn yi g context carrd san y with them, as it were, a lot of theoretical machinery because of their content; these are most clearly judgments, better realizations of judgment per se. And statements that might easily be immediate statement factf so , mad contexa n ei whicn i t h the resulte yar f so inferences, approximate judgments becaus theif eo r theoretical content. The raising of a representation to thought and the raising of a propositio judgmena o nt quite ar t e simila naturen i r believeI , . Although informed wit grammaticae hth l structure f thinkingso , propositions are at the level of representation and share with that level the concern with individuality per se; yet, because they use the grammatical structure of judgment (by using the copula), they give evidence of the presence even in representation of the power of the Concept. Insofa representee th s ra gons rha e beyon occurrence dth e of mere lists of names within its mind—and without seeing through innee toth r connectio particulae th f no r thing representt si itselo st f still want assero st existence tth particularla f eo y bonclosr o e deti between them—it use grammaticae sth l structur judgmente th f eo . The awareness that ther associatione ear representationf so d san then that some are of a different sort from others is already the first step toward thought, and widely different strata all find some accommodation, mor lesr eo s adequat levee th lcontenteo e t o fth n ,i the grammatical forms of judgment. Hegel also draws a distinction between truth, or adequacy to the Idea correctnessd an , judgmen.A correcs ti tidealiza n whea s i nt i - tion of what is exemplified in a particular individual thing or state of affairs. 4 18 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

Truth, on the contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, with its concept. That a person is sick, or that someone has committe dtheftcertainla y ma , correctcontene ye b th t untrues .Bu t i . A sic harmonn ki t bodno ys i y wit concepe hth bodyf to therd a ,an s ei want of congruity between theft and the concept of human conduct. These instance shoy wsma tha immediatn ta e judgment whicn i , n ha abstract quality is predicated of an immediately individual thing, however correct it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate of it do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and concept. (§ELi/2, Zusatz)

A judgment is true according to Hegel, we may say, when it is an idealization of the concept. He would find our use of "true" in the phrase "a true friend" a perfect illustration of his intent. At the lowest end of the judgmental spectrum we find qualitative judgments, by which Hegel means judgments in which some abstract universal is predicated of an individual:

"Thiy Tosa s ros reds ei " involve virtucopule n s(i th f eo a "is"e )th coincidence of subject and predicate. The rose however is a concrete odourn a s onlyd specifiha a re , t t i ; no cs i formo things d d an , an , many other features not implied in the predicate red. The predicate on its abstrac n para s ti t universal doed rosapplt e an ,s th no e o yalonet . There are other flowers and other objects which are red too. The subjec predicatd an timmediate th n ei e judgment touc t werei s ha , onl singla covet yn i eno pointo r d eac t h,bu other. (§172, Zusatz)

Hegel admits that such simple judgment correct;e b y doee h sma s t consideno r them judgmentae true.insofath t n i Bu s a r l fore mth universal and the individual are, though sundered, still connected, we hav simplt eno y "dissolve concepe th . . dt. intprevioue oth s oppositio universalitf no beingd yan " (§467) articulatioe .Th e th f no concept in accordance with its own natural internal structure increase progrese w s sa s throug rankee hth d form judgmentf so . According to Hegel, the judgmental relation, through its development, start approaco st hconsequencea relation, unfolfoe rw da concep seeiny tb g what follow frod man se wha frous s mtit other concept followst si . Concept determinee sar theiy db r logical relations with other concepts, so the self-determining of a concept in judgment must take place through the specification of such logical relations althougt Bu . h some logical relatio judgstates ne i th n -di Thought 185 supportedt mentno s i t ,i withi judgmene nth simplt tbu y giver o y nb in the judgment. To this extent the relation given in a judgment is externa appeard lan merela s sa y given necessity. These modef so relation are what is expressed in the copula. Hegel says that the copula expresses the identity of the subject and the predicate, but thimeane misleadins h si r t numericafo sno , us go t l identitt ybu identity within the concept; the subject and the predicate are themselves but moments of one (self-identical) concept. The develop- judgmene menth f to t onl no ys t i from correctness-incorrectnesso t trut t alshbu o fro copule merele mth th s aa y implicit identitf yo subject and predicate to the explicit identity of the two in a unifying third. Identity statement Hegel't no e sar s ideal judgments; correct, justified attributions of essences are. Unit thira necessara yn i d s i y conditio judgment'e th r nfo s being an "objective connectedness. s attemphi n "I answeo t t r Hume withi limit e atomistin nth a f so c psychology, Kant developee dth analytic-synthetic distinction to isolate the problem of combination, for this is where Hume's focus also lay. Analytic judgments were uninterestin Kango t generan ti l becaus eneo thern w s combinaewa - tion predicate ;th supposedls ewa y already containe subjecte th dn i . But Hegel consider separatioe sth importans na combinae th s ta - tion, perhaps even more so. Kant focused on the need for a third thing X to ground the combination of representations in a true, objective synthetic judgment. Hegel seizes this insigh generalized tan maintainin, sit g that the copula is the representative for an implicit third that grounds both the combination and the separation in any judgment. Accord- ing to Kant, in any a priori synthetic judgment the third that grounds the combination is the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel reinterpret transcendentae sth l unity of apperceptios na s Concepthi thereford an , judgmena e , accordintis Hegelo gt , somethin whicn gi concepte hth combinee sar separated dan n d"i virtue of the necessary unity" of the Concept (to paraphrase Kant; Critique of Pure Reason, 6142). A judgment combines concepts according to the structure of the Concept, the concrete universal, and, extene toth whico tt judgmene hth t adequately reflects that struc- turetrues i t i , . Hegel goes further than Kan insistiny b t g thal al t judgments be combinations grounded in a third thing. Those that are not reallt lio,lion,a sucA no " s n i ye s h "a judgmentar s (§173). Take exampler fo , , what Hegel calls judgment necessitf so y (§177), 6 18 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

suc "Mas hanimal,a n a ns i " which might wel thoughe lb t analytic. Hegel would point out that man and animal are not immediately emptild an y identical rathet mammabu ,a s i r than mamd tma lan - mal animalse sar thad ,an t neithe thesf r linko immedi o n a e tw s i - line at k itself concepe iny .somTh ma n te o sensfma e contain thaf to animal onlt bu ,y mediately, mammalsbecause ar n cone me Th .- cep mammaf to onlt lno y tieothee togetheso th rtw alst robu separates them, for not all animals are mammals. Every judgment leaves itself open to question, as do all things that appear merely given, and this question is answered by showing that the judgment is grounded. This ground is a third thing that mediate relatio e predicate e subjecse th th th d f no an t . e Onlth n yi ultimate stage of judgment is this third thing made explicit, but it is implicitly present throughout. Abstractly taken, this third is the Concept hav itselfe w es a ,seen accordint naturn ,bu ow s e it thi go t s must particularize itsel appead determinatan fa s ra e unifying concept: "Wha bees tha n really made explici onenese th s ti subjecf so t and predicate, is the concept itself, filling up the empty 'is' of the copula. Whil constituens eit t samelemente th t ea time sar e distinguished as subject and predicate, the concept is put as their unity, connectioe th s a n which serve intermediato st e them shortn :i s a , the syllogism" (§180, Wallace tr., adapted). Ideally concepto tw , s are objectively linked in a judgment, according to Hegel, not when on containees i anotherdn i whet ,bu n bot momente har thirda f so ; this is the structure we should expect to find in philosophical propositions concepto Tw . objectivele sar y linke judgmena n di t when they are brought to unity in a third concept. Accordin Hegel'go t s notion of judgmental connection judgy ,an - ment implies a whole systematic network of concepts behind it and supporting it; full knowledge of a concept is a knowledge of all its conceptual relations. The final leve judgmenf lo t Hegel call judgmene sth cone th -f to cept judgmen,a whicn ti individuae hth assesses li d relativs it o et kind highese Th . t form within this level Hegel call apodictie sth c judgment, although it is certainly not what was normally so called. In it the ground or reason for the assessment is also made explicit.3

3. Perhaps he calls it apodictic because "apodictic" literally means "shown" or "demonstrated." Thought 187

Thus "This rose fulfillins a , beautifuls i , g Z) criteri, Y , " woula(X d coun sucs ta hjudgmenta . "All thingsgenusa e ar (their determination and end) in an individual actuality of a particular constitution. And the finitee yar , becaus particulae eth alsd oan then ri y mma ma confort yuniversalno e th mo t " (§179). This apodictic judgment highese th s i t for judgmentfullesf me o th s i tt i realizatio r ,fo e th f no judgmental structure implicit in the concept. The three moments of the concept, individuality, particularity, and universality, are all explicitly state thein di r relation anothere on apodictie o st Th . c judgmen bote b hn correctca ver e truegett d i th yr tan o s heart ,fo f to the matter, articulating the very essence of the thing. Hegel believes it fully possible, indeed necessary, that in general things do not ideally embody their essences or concepts. Thus, when confronted wit boominge hth , buzzing confusio comd nan - plexity of nature, he does not infer that the order characterized by our theorizing activity is merely imposed from without, or that the recalcitrant examples that do not fit our theoretical categories are always indications of a failure in our theory. At some point he is willin assigo gt faule nth naturo t t "impotencee itselfth s i t i ; f "o nature that it cannot adequately embody the Concept and is prey to contingency. Thus each individual thing, although a realization of some concep otherr to thud ,an s determined throug activite hth f yo the concept, is also subject to an indeterminate range of other external influences and thus is not determined solely by its concept. Onl puryn i e thought doe concepsa t determine itself alonen i d ,an pure though concepta idealn a s ti . This seem versa y peculiar doctrine immediatele w r fo , y wano t say thalase th tt thin toss i f inquiren g a so of righa d s o t tha r troublesom untrur o e d caseeba simpls sa y becaus fit e tthea no o yd theory. But there is more to Hegel's move than blunder. It is precisely this doctrine of the imperfection of nature that allows Hegel maintaio t ideae rationaa n th f o l l systeworle th f mdo without falling into the trap of thinking that therefore every aspect of the world (including Krug's pen) should be a priori deducible on the basi purelf so ypriora i rational considerations. When confronted with the extreme and recalcitrant confusion in nature, there seeseverae b mo t l possible attitude taken ) ca (a ,e sw There is no order in nature; all is chaos. This seems unacceptable, for then nothin understandables gi , especiall face yth o t d tha e tw i88 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

understand much about nature, (b) There is no order in nature; an order is imputed to nature by us. But then, Hegel would argue, our "knowledge" of natur onles i y appearance knowledget no d ,an ; this Kantiao to s i nsolutioa Heger n fo smack d thing-in-itselfe lan th f so . (c) Ther completa es i e orde deeplnatures n i ri t i t y,bu hidden . This still does not account for our present knowledge of nature, and it allow deductioe sth Krug'f no eve e in fw srpe gain knowledge th f eo orde naturef ro . Finally ther) orden a (d , s natureen i ri t ordebu , r only imperfectly realized. Thus we can have real knowledge of nature t certainlye , cannoe yw t deduce Krug's pen. "Perfection" here has teleological underpinnings, and if we rid our concept of nature of all vestiges of teleology, this alternative becomes senseless to us (as it probably has). From anothe rvera poin s notn y ha vief ca e o te e thatww on f i , good theory about some range of phenomena, one often throws away or otherwise dismisses some conflicting or recalcitrant data as spurious. Hegeeffectn i , is l, elevating suc pragmatiha c methodological maxim int oconstitutiva e principlereads i e h o y t r fo , accept the possibility that in the long run the ideal theory could be developed and yet not account for everything natural, that a classification scheme could be ideal, for instance, even though there were anomalies. Hegel wants us to take the fact that there will always be a discrepancy between theory and nature as a necessary truth, and he attributes the shortcoming to nature, not to theory. It is the mark of nature and the natural to be less than ideal. Is therdangea t eno thin ri s Hegelian view seemeast ?o I to y o l t sal relax one's scientific vigilance what .A t investigatior poinou n ti f no nature are we justified in claiming that further attempts at a new theor neithee yar r necessar sensible—nor yno t merely for economic or pragmatic reasons but for intrinsic theoretical reasons? Perhaps Hegel would reply that the natural (and social?) sciences could not reach such a point, and that this is itself an example of a bad infinite, a going on endlessly. This response would make sense within his system, for one of the imperfections of nature is that the true infinit concepte th f yo infinite th , e return into self neves i , r fully realized in nature. There we find only bad infinites. It would, then, be fully appropriate that the sciences of nature be subject themselves to infinite progression toward adequacy. It is crucial to remember that the sciences of nature are not the Thought 189

highest form knowledgf so Hegelr efo highese .Th t form knowlf so - edge, religion and philosophy, are in principle and in fact perfect- fros i poin e t mablei th d t ,an o f vie philosophywf o sciencet ,no , that we evaluate natur imperfects ea . This position still diverges widely from philosophical beliefs held today, and again it is Hegel's accep- tanc teleologicaa f eo l worldview foundatio e thath s ti differe th f no - ence. Empirical science is not, however, dispensable according to Hegel. Empirical science trie builo st dtheor a worl e th f ydo froe mth bottom up and is doomed to be caught in the infinite detail and complexit naturef yo . Philosophy construct theors a whol e th f yo e from the top down, but it can never reach the individual per se. The complete enquirer must follow both paths. Whatever we think of the doctrine of the necessarily imperfect realization of concepts in nature, its counterpoint is played by the doctrine of the possibility of perfect "realization" of concepts in mind—the doctrine of the self-determination of the concept in thought. Natural things are imperfect because what they are does not depend on or is not explainable solely on the basis of their concept. Men are different because they have different heritages, live in different environments; these differences are all indifferent to the concept of man and account for the contingent variation in men and the impossibility of a perfect exemplar of the species. But a concept in a subjectivity is in a slightly different position from the concept as realized in nature. A concept is realized in nature by an individual that simultaneously realizes an infinite number of other concepts, eve f ultimatelni y subordinate e mosth to dt essentia l concept. Some of the concepts may not be compatible with the others, thus forcing chang ultimateld ean y finitenes destrucd san - tion on the thing. In mind each concep individualizes ti d abstractly greae th s ti t I . contributio abstractive th f no e power representatiof so underd nan - standing to thus isolate the individuality of concepts. Working with these "given" concepts as material, intelligence as pure thought is the activity of reconstituting the purely conceptual links and relations between them. Since the purele yar y conceptua deterd an l - concepte mineth y db s themselves relatione th , s discoverer d(o reconstructed) in thought are modalized. Since in pure thought concepts appear in their abstract individuality rather than their concrete and complex individuality, they 190 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

need no longer be involved in contingent, arbitrary relations, as they are often in nature or in Vorstellung. Pure thought perceives only those relations between concepts which are intrinsically involved in the concepts.4 Thus removed from the imperfection and recalcitranc naturf eo representationd ean concepte ,th realizee sar d idealss a have .W e realize true dth e concep when knoe ma nf w to w . whais ideae n tth lma

Inferences The mediated relation of one concept to another is a syllogism according to Hegel, and just as a concept has its "truth" in judgment, so does judgment have its "truth" in the syllogism, which makes explicit impliciwhae th s ti t natur judgmente th f eo ture n.W syllogisme role th f th e o o t formaf ,o l inference Hegel'n i , s theorf yo mental activity. As muc Heges hhava y elma dislike traditionae dth l Aristotelian stils logiclwa mightile ,h y unde consideratioswas s rit hi yn i e th f no formal aspect of thought, and this is particularly evident in his discussion of the syllogism. It seems that what Hegel really has in mind is a general theory of our forms of inference; the German s wela schlufl n l meaca n "inference" pur simpld ean s "sylloea - gism," and under this rubric Hegel discusses inductive and analogi- cal reasoning as well as the deductive, three-termed syllogism. Working withi confinee n th rathe e th f so r narrow understandinf go formal logic availabl timee th t e,a Hegel construct interpretation sa n e significancoth f f inferenco e rana d k an eorderin f kindgo f so syllogisms which we must find quite strained. Yet it is masterfully woven into his philosophical system and reflects the structures and themes dominan systee th rathea n mti n i r natural way. What Hegel woul reaction i drichnese y th hav sa o nt o et f so contemporary logic—not just the logic of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica t alsbu o modal logics, many-valued logics, logics of relevance and entailment, intuitionistic logic, paraconsis- tent logics—we shall never know. Hegel's min certainls dwa y keen

4. When we talk here of an intrinsic relation between concepts we do not have in min Leibniziae dth n idea analysif lo s into simple natures picture .Th e that seemo st me best to capture Hegel's vision here is rather that of a set of nodes in a net, each of whic identifiehs i d solelrelations it othey e yb th o rst nodes. Thought 191

havo t enougem realizehi r hfo d that these developments would motivate a fundamental rethinking of much of his system. Perhaps mose th t significant difference betwee logie nth c that Hegel knew d contemporaran y logi s thati c , whereas Aristotelian logis i c through and through a logic of terms, the fundamental level of virtually every branch of contemporary logic is propositional. Today terms are always introduced in a more complex logic on a propositional base. What Hegel would have thought of this change we can only guess. Woul take r systemdh eou expressins sa g more ade- quatel relatione yth s between concept, judgment inferenced ,an r o , less? But such speculation is not to the point here; rather, by pointing out this difference we can bring to the fore a feature of Hegel's interpretation of the syllogism that might otherwise confuse us. We thin inferentiaf ko l relation obtainins sa g between propositionr s(o sentences r statementso , whar o , t hav confines hi e o you)t e - .Du ment to a logic of terms, Hegel thinks of the inferential relation as obtaining at the basic level between terms, as being a more complex connection between terms tha judgmentae nth l relation tere m.s Th i importanl al e th t logicae piecth n ei l puzzle, findind an righe gth t term, the right concept, is like finding the passkey that will unlock natur e worle th th permittinf y edo b g inferential access from every whole th o termt en pari t i f sto o understoode f b whic n ca ht i . The syllogis , thenmis , see Hege y ninterrelation b a s la conf no - cepts judgmenn I . generan ti alse lw o fin interrelation da conf no - cepts, but this is, Hegel claims, quite a rigid relation, each term of the judgment seemingly independent in its own right of the other and possessed of certain formal characteristics that distinguished it unfailingly fro othee mth r term. subjectThue terme th y son s sa ,i , formally determined as a universal or a particular, and therefore as formall distinca f yo t kind frosyllogism e firste mth th n I . , however, "thought sublates the determination of form and at the same time posits the identity of differences" (§467). This is best exemplified by the middle term of a syllogism, which occupies (standardly) both the predicat e subjecth d an t e position differenn si t premisese Th . form determination concepte th f so sublatee sar d still furthe than ri t the premise whicn si middle hth e term occur alsn premisee soca b s or conclusion furthen si r syllogisms, wher formee eth r middle term has become an extreme, that is, a major or minor term. e syllogismInth e fulth ,l systematicit r conceptuaou f yo t ne l 192 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

comefore th e o explicitlyst lessoe th d n an Hege, l draws fros mhi understandin syllogistif go abous ci nature th t conceptsf eo . Con- cepts are individual, differentiated among themselves, excluding one another; they are particulars, that is, specifications of a higher universal thed universalse an ;yar , having specie ultimateld san y individuals under them. These are the moments of the Concept, and in the syllogism they are all brought to a unity, the unity of the Concept. A concept starts its unfolding in judgment but completes it and shows its true structure in syllogisms.

The syllogis bees mha n taken comformabl distinctione th o yt s whicht i contains; and the general result of the course of their evolution has been to show that these differences work out their own abolition and destro concept'e yth s outwardnes selfn .ow Andseee s it w n ,o s i t , a the first place, i) each of the moments has proved itself the systematic whol thesf eo e elements shorn ,i wholta e syllogism,—the consee yar - quently implicitly identical. In the second place 2) the negation of their distinctions and of the mediation of one through another constitutes independency [Fursichsein]; so that it is one and the same universal which is in these forms, and which is in this way also explicitly put as their identity thin I . s idealit momentss it f yo syllogistie th , c process ma describee yb essentialls da y involvin negatioe g th charac e th f no - ters through which its course runs, as being a mediative process throug suspensioe hth mediation,—af no s couplin subjece gth t no t with another t wit bu ,suspendeh a d worde otheron n ,i , with itself. (EL §192, Wallace tr.)

The syllogism shows that every concep implicitls i t ysystea f mo conceptual relations concepe ;th t come syllogism e truts th it n o hsi t . syllogisme Inth r abilitieou n i ,infero s t idealiz e w , e most ade- quatel complee yth x structures exemplifie worlde th n di : "Every- thin syllogisma gs i . Everythin concepta gs i existence ,th whicf eo h differentiatioe isth members it f no functionsr so tha o univere s , tth - l nature concepsa th f eo t gives itself external realit meany yb s of particularity, and thereby, and as negative reflection-into-self, makes itsel individualn a f , converselyOr . actuae th ; l thinn a s gi individual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and makes itself identical with itself" (EL §181, Wallace tr., adapted). In the syllogism, concepts are brought to an articulated unity. But the unity given in any one syllogism presupposes other such uni- Thought 193

ties. This sequenc pro-syllogismf eo Heget bu , l on d san couln o o dg would call suc infinitn ha e progressio infinitd ba na e (no tvicioua s regress, which it clearly is not). Reason refuses to remain content with the bad infinite and conceives instead the true infinite, the totality of conditions which is itself unconditioned. There must be, accordin reasono gt overarchinn a , g unity reasonr fo , greae th , t unifier, is self-reflective. The ideal lying behind the syllogism, then, iarticulatese thath f o t d totality ultimate th , e unitthingl al f yo n si one system. This, the totality of conditions, is the unconditioned, the absolute. Here, obviously, Hegel joins battle with Kant. Kant saw that reason, the syllogizing faculty, has an innate urge to push onwar unconditionede th o dt totalite th , conditionsf yo . Bute h , claimed, since such a totality can never possibly be given to our sense experience sincd ,an e knowledg possibles i e only througe hth conjoining of sense experience and thought, we can never claim knowledge e totalitth f f o conditionsyo . Kan s willini t o grangt t the idea of the unconditioned totality of conditions (of which he thought there were three subspecies regulative)a f o e us e rolth n ei our reason. statu unconditionede e th Th f so , together wit problee hth e th mf o thing-in-itself, form majoe sth r poin contentiof to n between Hegel issuee Kantth d t thin an si bu ,s debatcompleo s e ear x thae w t cannot hope to do them justice here. Kant, following his empiricist bent, rejects all ontological claims of the Ideas of reason because the Ideas transcend possible experience; Hegel, with his opposing rationalist bent, considers their transcendence of possible subjective experienc strengta e b eo t h ontologically. Perhap mose sth t straight- forwar stato t disagreemen e y eth dwa followss a s ti regulativs A . e principles, the Kantian Ideas are maxims for action, prescriptions, oughts. But they are not constitutive, and they represent ideals that can neve fulfillede rb , maxims that prescrib impossibln ea e task. But Kans a , t himsel strikinglo s f y pointed out, ought implies can. Kant seems stuck wit hdilemmaa internan a , l inconsistencye on , that he escapes by saying that what is commanded is striving for the ideal achievint ,no thit sBu seem. git s hollo Hegelwo t , like tellinga midge striv o professionat ta r efo l basketball career. Accordino gt Hegel such infinite striving is simply empty; an end without end is no end at all. Hegel's proposed solution is clear: ought does imply can, and the Ideas of reason (which Hegel unifies in his own one 194 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

principlen i Ideae th s ) a achievabl e tas objecr ko rationaf o t l thought are not merely regulative, they are what is in and for itself, what is real. For Hegel thin o transcent ,o t ks i d sensation toward universality and necessity. The fact that through reason we pose ourselves an object that transcend possibll sal e sense experience shows that here have w e finally freed ourselves fro immediace mth sensationf yo — finally begu thinno t k purely: "The ris thoughf eo t beyon worle dth d of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the super-sensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of sense thil al , s transitio thoughs ni nothind tan thoughtt gbu y Sa . there must be no such passage, and you say there is to be no thinking" (EL §50, Wallace tr.). This does not mean that Hegel thinks we can achieve the ideal scientific theory of natural phenomena; for reasons we have already discussed, the theory of nature is open to infinite refinement on Hegel's view. But philosophy studies thought itself, the universal and necessary structure of the world, and furthermore comprehends the ideal of thought, whic knowledghs i absolutee th f eo unconditionede ,th , itself none other than thought. Hegel's system, as has been noted before, seem pulso t bootstrapsn l itselow s f it sincut y pb .Bu e thought no s ti itselsensorr iten ou fa m n i y experience necessars i t ,i transcenyo t d sense experience if thought is to comprehend itself, if it is to be though allt ta . t thipu s Therdisputen ca . Broa anothes e D i . w dC .y sugrwa - gests that there are two fundamental principles in Kant's discussion of the proofs for the existence of God, the Ideal of Pure Reason. 5 First, if anything exists, something must exist in its own right; or, everythint no g derive existencs sit e from something else. This principle has found acceptance among philosophers since Parmenides. Secondpossiblt no s i t ,i e tha existence tth anythinf eo g shoula e db necessary consequenc naturs it f e o definition r eo . Kant's resolution of the conflict is to make both principles regulative (although, as Broad points out, he need only have made one regulative). Hegel rejects that solutio instead nan d accept firse th s t principld ean denies the second outright. His reason for doing so is that, whereas the second holds of natures and definitions abstractly conceived,

. BroadD . C ,. Kant:5 Introduction,n A . 298-300pp . 5 19 Thought

that is, conceived as abstract universals, it is simply false of the concrete universal (see SL, pp. 705-8; WdL, vol. 2, pp. 353~57).6

The Nature of Thinking Activity I have discussed the first list given in §467 in some detail, so the discussio secone th f shortere no db havI n lis s ca t eA . saide th , second list focuseactivitye th theoreticaf n o o s l spirit thus i t I .sa more adequate description of the actuality of thinking, yet we have covered groune mosth f to d alread extensivr ou n yi e discussiof no the first list.

Intelligence cognize s thinkinga s . e understandinIndeedth f i ) a , g explains the singular from its own universalities (the categories), it is called self-comprehending understandine th f i ) b ; g explain t [thsi e singular] as a universal (genus, kind) in a judgment, then the content appears in this form as given, c) However, in a syllogism the understanding determines the content from itself in that it sublates the distinction of forms. The last immediacy that remains attached to formal thinking disappears with the insight into necessity. (§467, my tr.)

What first strikes our attention is that Hegel consistently uses wore th d "explain" (erklaren) describo t activite eth y involven di thought. Hegel adopts a rather Aristotelian view of explanation, recognizing different "why" questions in answer to which explanations can be given. But he gives pride of place to ideological explanation, for it is a form of explanation grounded in the concept of the thing explained; it alone relies on intrinsic necessities. The philosophical theor worle teleologicath a f yds o i l theory onld ,an y sucha theory, accordin Hegelgo t , could coun philosophicaa s ta l explana- nature world.e tioth th f nf o e o 7 Some parts of this second list seem confusing. If the understanding tries to get at something's concept, to explain the singular thing

6. Applied to the ontological argument, though, Hegel's position begs the ques- t demonstrateno s ha e h tion correctnese r dth fo , s theorconcrete hi th f f so yo e universal. deVriese 7Se . , "The Dialectic of Teleology," Proceedings, Hegel Societ Amerf yo - ica, 1980. 6 19 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

by means of "its own [the understanding's] universalities (the categories), "doey wha t doingi wh s s thii d t an s, coun "compres a t - hending itself"? First, Hegel seem reservo st tere eth m "categories" concepte foth r objective th f so e logic, Bein Essenced s i g an e h o s , here talkin explaininf go g somethin term gn qualitiesi s it f so , quan- tities, relations fortho s d . an ,Thi s certainly seems straightforward enough; but how does this result in understanding's comprehending itself? We have already seen that Hegel's theory is a version of the macrocosm-microcosm view; intelligence has reconstructed the world within itself understandind an , worlde pary th s f gi an to t i , also in part understanding its own activity in reconstruction. The categories are generic rules by which it operates, and knowing how applo t y the fora m s understandingf mi o , jus knowins ta o t w gho use the tools properly is a form of understanding construction work. And, of course, the categories are themselves the product of intelligence; to understand them, understanding must understand itself in its product. The formulation Hegel gives the last part of this paragrap 182e th 7 hn editioi Encyclopediae th f no bears this outn :"I tha comprehendst ti , intelligenc determinednese th s eha s whicn hi s sensatioit t firsa s tni sigh immediatn a t e material itseln i , s a f simpl insighe owns yit th n I . t int necessite oth contene th f yo t first give thougho nt tactivit n intelr itself fo ow course , -s th y,is it f eo ligence, identical wit implicie hth t determinednesbeine th f go f so the content, intelligence being for itself as determining" (PSS, vol. 3, pp. 221-23). This passage also importan e bringth t sou t fact that Hege- be l lieves that thinkingn i , activite mine th , th "identicals f di yo " with the "implicit being" of the determinateness [an sich seyenden Bestim- mtseyn] of what is thought about. Hegel takes it to be the case that the structure of thought is the structure of the world. All things are judgments; all things are syllogisms, according to Hegel. The structural relations discernible in the activity of thought are the same as ontologicae th l structure worlde th f so . Ther , howevereis arguo ,n - ment her thir efo s position; suc "argumentn ha burdee th "s i n e ofth Logik and of the system as a whole. In §467 Hegel encapsulates a vision of the nature of man's theoretical activity begie W . n wit hconfrontatioa n wit individuae hth l facts and entities of the world, yet this is not a mute acceptance, for they have been raise exemplardo t universale th f so , they belongo t kinds. This point is made explicit in the second stage of thought, Thought 197

judgment e contenTh . f thoughto t still appearsgivene b o t here, stile ar insofal makine w s ra g explici interconnectione tth s between the universals, which universals appear otherwise independent of each other. An example of this kind of approach might be taking "mass" to be an independent concept that can enter into different theories, such as the Newtonian or Einsteinian, without being intrinsically affected in any way. This point of view is superseded at the highest level of thought, wher r awareneseou importance th f so inferentiae th f eo l connections amon conceptr gou explicits si . Eve universale nth s through whic firse hw t graspe individuae dth l factentitited w an sno e sar specificatione seeb universae o nt on e th f ls o activit thinkingf yo . Though thio t ss i t exten closea t d system, adapting itsel itselfo t f , givin structuren g itselow s dealinit fy B . g thus only with itself, building within itsel purfa e syste relationsmf o , though trans tha - scended all particular content and all immediacy, achieving "insight into necessity." This final stage is not, one must realize, a form of a special empirican a science t no s i lt ;i scientifi c theor aspecn a f y natureo f to , nor of nature as a whole. It is the unitary, philosophical theory of how things in the broadest sense hang together. A scientific theory, which must have some particular subject matter, never achieves this exalted status, for it always depends on some form of given, something that spirit merely finds before it. Only in the theory that unifie t onl particulae no sy th r phenomen naturf ao t alsebu o re ligious, ethical, and aesthetic phenomena and, perhaps most important, philosophical theorizing itself into one complete picture of e world-wholth l particulaal s ei r content transcended trany B . - scendin particulal gal r content, philosophical theorizin lefgs i t with only the universal content: thought. Philosophy, like the absolute, thinks thought goae f purTh o .l e though comprehensive th s i t e knowledg conceptuae itselff eo th f o , l articulatio worlde th f nf o o , whic itsel s goali e whicaspecf t hn i th methoo s a f s It .d i ht i tan s di pure inference, taking everything offered to it and following out all its consequences (where deductive inference mose th te triviasar l and least important form of reaching consequences).

The universal is known here as self-particularizing and as collecting itself together fro particularizatioe mth n into singularity—or, whichs i the same—as the particular reduced from its independence to being a 8 19 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

moment of the concept. Accordingly, the universal is no longer exter- contene th na o lt t rathes herei t veritable ,bu rth e form that produces the content out of itself—the self-developing concept of the subject- matter [Sache]. Thinking, therefore, has at this point no other content than itself determinationsn , thaow s nit , which constitut immae eth - nent conten e formth f .o t Thinking seek e objecd findth an sn i ts [Gegenstand] only itself. The object is therefore distinguished from thinking only in that it has the form of being, of subsisting for itself. Thus thinking stands her perfectla n ei y free relationshi objece th po t [Objekt]. (§467, Zusatz, my tr.)

The goal of thought is the construction of a completely self-contained, self-explanatory conceptual system, one identical with the conceptual articulation of the world itself. The explanations that this system will afford, however t deductivno e ar , e argumentn si which a particular event, property, or object is shown to be necessary; they are teleological, interpretive "makings sense of" particular aspect worlde th f so . Philosophy will never allopredico t s wu t the course of the world or its individual events, but it should enable us to understand in retrospect how it all hangs together. Through philosophy we gain a vision of the whole through which the individual parts make sense. But this vision metaphor must be handled gingerly perceivee th r fo , normalls ri y distinct fro perceivede mth . The "vision whole th f "eo gained through philosoph onln ye ca y b achieved by identifying with that whole; our "vision" is better called a re-creation: "In this thinking that is identical to its object [Gegenstand] intelligence achieve completions sit s i t goals i it ,r fo , then in fact what, in its immediacy, it was only supposed to be— self-knowing truth, self-recognizing reason. This mutual self-pen- etration of thinking subjectivity and objective reason is the result of developmene th theoreticaf to l spirit throug stagee hth intuitiof so n and representation that precede pure thinking" (§467, Zusatz, my tr.).

TRANSITIOE TH PRACTICAO NT L SPIRIT

Although the internal re-creation of the structure of the whole is culminatioe th theoreticaf no l fina course f spiritd o th s en lt i t e,i no Thought 199 e story th r theoretica o fo t , l spirit develops into practical spirit, which transitio topie th §468 f ncs o i : "Intelligence, knowing itselo ft determinane th e b contente th f to , whic determinehs i n ow s it s da leso n s tha beings na will."s ,i Concept theoriz e idealse th s ar d ,an - ing activity of spirit produces knowledge of ideals. In particular, spirit's self-knowledg knowledga idea n s ei ow l s natureit f eo - In . trinsic to the notion of an ideal, however, is that it is a goal to be pursued, and the knowledge of its ideal which results from spirit's theoretical activity necessarily culminate practicaln si activity.

Pure thinking is, to begin with, a disinterested (unbefangenes) activity in which it is absorbed in the object. But this action necessarily also becomes objective to itself. Since objective cognition is absolutely at home with itself in the object, it must recognize that its determinations are determinations of the object, and that, conversely, the objectively valid determinations immediately presen determiobjecs e it th e n ti tar - nations thiy .B s recollection, this withdrawal into itsel intelligencef fo , the latter becomes will. (§468, Zusatz, Miller tr.)

naturr knowerspare Is ou t i b therefor e f o to et w d an , e strivo et achieve the ideal theory of the world. But we are not, and could not be, only knowers. The task of the lower levels of theoretical spirit is to idealize that which is realized in the world; as it progresses and develops, spirit develops its content from within itself through its theorizing. Ther certaia s ei n amoun practicaf o t l activity heref o , course—creating words, making judgments and inferences. Hegel doe intent thinso no t s dku that theoretica practicad lan l activitn yca divorcee b d froanothere mon relatioe th ; n between the monls i y that level f practicaso l activity conceptually presuppose levelf so theoretical activity. In fact, however, they cannot be disjoined. When Hege l analysie turnth o t sf practica o s o t ls spiritha e h , backtrack quit bit ea conceptioa ,o t f "practicano l feeling.n I " actuality the theoretical and the practical are simultaneous aspects of the activity of spirit, but as we all know, exposition is always linear, even if the subject matter is not. In emerging int sphere oth practicaf eo l spirit, spirit testifies it o st freedom and its self-certainty. It is now sure of itself as the moving powe worldre oth f , sur productn e thaow s tit s mus realizee tb n di worldextene e th th o t.T that nature doe exemplift sno ideale yth f so aoo Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

spirit, nature falls short, and spirit must undertake to work its will on nature. This process is itself subject to a complex dialectical progression, but that lies beyond the bounds of this essay.

CONCLUSION

Hegel maintains that thinkingn ,i , concept active sar e withi, nme theim ana drI same vehicleth t wereei d s an a , .e Theson e ear concepts that are active in the world, and they constitute the true substance of the world. The problem of a divorce between my concept naturee th d thingf san o themselve n thei s sa e yar s therefore doe t arise althougt sno Bu . problee hth thing-in-itsela f mo f may not arise for Hegel, it would be more than naive to think that otheo n r problems arise. The notion of a creative, self-structuring activity is awesome, fascinating powerful—bud an , t also quit accepto t e s hars u i r t .I d fo har tello d t coursef o , , whethe fulle rw y understand Hegel's concep spirif o trejecd tan becaust i t lingerinf eo g suspicions abous it t coherence whether ,o succeedet havye e t rw eno comprehenddn i - concept—e th g in a concept, supposedly whicn i , h comprehension breeds credence. Neither our suspicions nor our lack of insight can count as a refutation of such a notion, but the notion is so vague that more exacting criticism of it is equally elusive. We do know that self- reflection often generates paradoxe otherwisn si e straightforward matters, especially where all-inclusive self-reflective totalities are concerned set-theoreticae Th . l paradoxe bese th t e examplesar f so this. But how would one even begin to construct an argument that Hegel's notio self-reflectiva f no e totality Absolutee th , barres a s ,i n setsl tende al f ? On o avoi o st t se notio e de th self-reflectiv th s f a no e totalities whenever possible, because of their extreme complexity, yet, in Hegel's defense, it is not clear that we can avoid them altogether certainle .W y cannot rul limitet eou d self-reflection—is i t too obviously a feature of the world we live in and of our own being. Someone of naturalistic bent might easily point out that there particulao seemn e b o st r problem involve worle pare th f don to dn i "mapping" another part, even if it is an element of what is mapped. There need only be restrictions on the detail of the map. I have much sympathy with such an approach, but working out the de- Thought 201

tails alse w ,o know extremeln a s i , y difficult taskt . Hegeno d di l adopt suc approacn ha reasoa r hstrengtfo e nth whicf h o stil m a l hI obviouslo to s wa uncertainyt i teleologicalw sa worl e e h Th . s da . Standard physical theory tell s thaworle su th t d n oughru o t t down, approachin grandoa m distributio energyf no . Organid can mental phenomena see mgainsao t y this result (remember that Hegel wrote well before Darwin). Explaining organic and mental phenomen principlee basie th th f sn o ao s adequat explanae th r efo - inorganice tioth f no , materia lloot worlno k d feasibleddi onle yTh . alternative, if the world was not to be bifurcated into alien realms, wa explaio st materiale nth , inorganic mechanicad ,an l somehown o teleologicabasie e th th f so l principles explanatio e useth dn i e th f no mentalorganie th d c an .rout e Thith s esi Hege- at e l tookth t Bu . tempt to fit the material and mechanical into an organic framework, when it concerns the world-whole, raises its own problems, for ther majoe ear r disanalogies betwee world-whole nth organd ean - ism r mindso s . Organism mindd an s s have environments with which they interact causally, for instance. Even if we accept the idea that organisms and minds,are..to be^explained through teleological principles, an idea Hegel never doubted, deep puzzles arise when applo t y ytr these w e principles vagus ,a moss ea thef to m e areth o ,t world-whole. As we learn more about what kind of thing teleology is, we may well find that Hegel's route looks even less plausible. But even if most of us find it hard today to accept Hegel's notion of the Absolute and much of the attendant metaphysics that accom- panies it, his system is still worth our attention. I have often been asked what profit there is in studying Hegel's philosophy of mind, and the subtext of the question is whether there are insights there that would transform current philosophy of mind, insights unrep- resente currene th n di t debate. Perhaps regrettably answee th , r must be that there is nothing strikingly new in Hegel's philosophy of mind. Fifty years ago, however, the question would have been answered with a resounding yes! Against the atomism and reduc- tionis positivistse th mf o , Hegel would have bee nwelcoma e anti- dote. As it happened, Hegel's own primary inspiration in philosophical psychology, Aristotle, provided much of the inspiration to those who battled positivism within the Anglo-American tradition. But positivism was not simply overthrown in a movement to restore past philosophica l adherentn gloriesow s it ; s rigorously investi- 2 20 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

gated its assumptions and its arguments, and its own internal dialectic gradually led to a repudiation of the atomism and reductionism characteristic of positivist thought. Hegel has little new to offe becauses u r , after much hard work have w , e finally caughp tu with him. The purely historical interes comprehendinn ti ggreaa t philosophy for its own sake is quite sufficient justification for reading Hegel, particularly when there are interesting resonances with current work in the field. Surely we understand our own assumptions better by seeing them employed or rejected by others, particularly those who have been major figures in our own history. An ahistori- cal philosophy is an unreflective philosophy—and that is a contra- dictio termsn i . References

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Absolute, self-realization of, 3, 13-14, Davidson, Donaldn 4o , 45-46 105-, ,50 7 Dennett, Daniel, i6rn Abstraction, 126-28, 132, 137-39 Descartes , 166-689 , ,736 Rene, 32 , 2 , Ameriks, Karl, i8n Dualism, 3, 36 Animals, 47-48, 55-57 distinguished from humans, 1026 11 , I Egoe Se . and feeling, 72—73 / Elder, Crawford, 42n Anscombe M.. E ,. 9iG , n Eliminative materialism, 37 Aquila, Richard, 22n, 95n, i72n Emotions, 62 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 65, 72-73 Empirical sensitivity 27-28, 14 , , 31-35 Aristotle, 44-45, 55n, 64-67, 1721 ,20 Empiricism, 18, 22-24 Artelt, Walter, 28n Eschenmayer . A.C ,. 28-2A , 9 Associationism, i, 137-41 Existence, concept of, 106 Attention, 111-16 Faculty psychology, 23-24, 59-60 Behaviorism, i Feeling, 56-57, 71-85 Bodammer , i62T. , n vs. intuition, 108-10 Broad, C. D., 194 . sensationvs , 71—72 Burge, Tyler, 4in, 8in Fichte, J. G., i8in Fodor, Jerry, 36n, 5gn, i67n Chisholm, Roderick, io3n Form Contene Se . t Church, Alonzo, i&5n Fulda, Hans Friedrichn 87 , Concept: Functionalism, i, 63, 65, 101, 107, 122, Hegel's understanding of, 2, 67, 105- 141, 175, 183, 201 7, 137, 171-75, 179-80, 184-86, 189-92 Gardeil, H. P., 73 representationsd an . See Representa- Garfield, Jay, 4in, 8in tional theor minf yo d Godel, Kurt, i65n and words, 163, 175, 1773 18 , Goethe, Johann von1 1 , Concrete universal, 137, 171-74, i75n, 177, 181-82 Habit, 84-86, 102 Connectionism0 13 , Hacking, lan, i5on Content0 7 , Hamlyn, D. W., 53n, 68n, gon . form vs , 1058 65 ,17 , Hartley, David, 1398 16 , and functional role, 65-66 Hartmann, N., 45n and sensation, 60-63, 65-70 Haugeland, John, 4in Copula, 3in, 183, 185-86 Heintel, E., 56n 208 Index

Hofstadter, Douglas, 17511 Litt, n T.52 , Holderlin, F., i8m Locke, John, 129, 132, 139, 150-51 Hume , 127,89 ,, David 13832 , -19 , , i,2 Logic, 33-34, 190-91 40, 166, 168, 185 Hypnotism3 8 , , 27-2881 , 79 , McTaggart9 1 , E. . M . ,J Meaning Language Se . e I, 85-107 Memory, 146, 149—63 as concept of concepts, 173, 185 mechanical, 157-63 not soul, body transcendentar o , l Mental illness, 77-79 ego, 97-99 Mill, James, 168 as power of names, 159-61 Mill, John Stuart, 168 as self-relation, 100-4 Modularity in psychology, 59—60 as such, 94-96 Monad, soul as, 80-83 systes a purmf o e concepts, 104-7 Muren G.. R 45 , . G , "Ideal," 49, 58 Image: Nagel, Thomas, 7 abstracted from spatiotemporal con- Names , 152-592 , 6 text, 126-272 13 , replacing images, 158-61 associatio , 136-4nof 1 Natural kind, 9, 11-17 generalit 131-33, yof , 136-37 Nature: vs. intuition, 126 imperfection of, 187-89 and language, 151-54, 1561 16 , practical relatio 4-1, nto 0 preservation of, 128-30 and spirit, 33-49 as symbol, 141-43 theoretical relation to, 4-7, 10-13 Imagination, 134-48 Noneliminative materialism. See Token and intuition, 135-36 identity theory Inspectivism, 165—66, 169—70, 174—75 Interpretation, 16-17 Oppenheim, Paul, 36n Intuition, 108—18 vs. feeling, 108-10 Perry, M. J., 27, 76n and imagination, 135-36 Phenomenology of Spirit, , 68n53 , 87-89, vs. representation, 119-25, 127-28 93 and sensation9 10 , Philosophy, 13-17, 197-98 as singular, 108 Physicalism, 2-3 Inwood , gon4 }. . 10 , M , Plumer, Gilbert, 9on, gin Poggeler, Otto, 87n Judgment, 180-90 Predication, 22, 171-72, 180-87 vs. proposition, 182-83 Price, H. H., 164-65 Psychology: Kant, Immanuel , 17-19,9 , 31-32, 34n, faculty, 23-24, 59-60 49, 55n, 67, 89, 95n, 97-99, 102, modularity in, 59-60 105, 108, 114, 169-70, 172-73, 185, pure, 29-31 193-94 Purpose: Kemenyn , Joh36 , nG. objective, 7-10 Kim, Jaegwon, 4in universal, 10—13 Kitcher, Patricia, 95n, g8n, ggn See also Teleology Krug, Wilhelm Traugott, i4n Putnam, Hilary, 3611

Language, 146-637 17 , Qualia, absen invertedr to 6 ,6 and grammar, 151, 162,183 and nominalization of spirit, 158-63 Rationalism, 18-22, 97 spoke written. nvs , 147-48 Recognition, 132-33 and theor meaningf yo , 149-53, *59~ Recollection, 125-34 62 vs. imagination, 135-37 thought and, 149-533 ,16 nonatomistic8 12 , Lewis, David, iO3n of words, 149-50, 153-55, 177-80 Index 209

Reductionism, 36-37, 42 Sentience vs. nonsentience, 54-60 Reference, linguistic, 90-93, 97-99, Signs, 143-48 and things signified, 145, 154 Representation: Simple idea conceptsr so , 129, 172-73, explanations of, 122—23 192 generality of, 131-34, 136-37, 142, Solomon, R. C., 25n, 5in, 53n 151—53, 155, 160—624 16 , Soul, 1 18-2610 , ,97 vs. intuition, 119-25, 127-28 immaterialit 20-2, yof 1 and memory, 155-56 vs. spirit, 25 problem of individuating, 128 Space, 69-70, 79, 112-15 See also Image; Language; Signs; Spinoza, Baruch, 64n Symbols Spirit, Hegel's characterization of, 25- Representational theor mindf yo , 165- 26, 46-52 66, 170-71, 174-75 Strawson, P. F., ggn Rorty, Richard, i6gn, i7on Supervenience, 40-46, 81-84 Royce, Josiah, jin and expression, 83 Russell, Bertrand, gin, 166 Syllogism , io363 , n Ryle, Gilbert, 165-67 theor 190-9, yof 6 Symbols, 141-43 Self: inert and active, i75n bundle theory of, 79-80 and things symbolized, 144 emergenc 85-86, eof 1 10 , See alsoI Self-feeling, 74-78 Taylor, Charles, 5in, 53n Sellars, Wilfrid, 7, logn, 114, 166 Teleology, 4, 7-17, 26, 45, 195, 201 Thought, subjective vs. objective, 104- Sensation, 48, 53-70, 100-1 . feelingvs , 71—72, lion 7, 171-78, 196-97 vs. intuition, 108-9 Time, 111—15 object of, 60-67 Token identity theory, 38-39, 42 organized in feeling, 75 Truth vs. correctness, 183-84 sublatio , througnof h language2 15 , Sense, inner vs. outer, 61-63