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Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy 1988 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Willem A. deVries University of New Hampshire, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/phil_facpub Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HEGEL'S THEORY OF MENTAL ACTIVITY An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit WlLLEM A. DEVRIES CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON Copyright © 1988 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Excep brier tfo f quotation reviewa n si , this book, or parts thereof ,reproduce e musb t fortno y man dn withoui t permissio writinn i g fro publishere mth informationr Fo . , address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 198 Cornely 8b l University Press. International Standard Book Number 0-8014-2133-0 Libraiy of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-47723 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. The paper in this book is acid-free and meets the guidelines for permanence durabilityand Committee ofthe Productionon Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. To Dianne Contents Preface xi A Texte Notth n se o xvii Structure Th Subjectivf eo e Spirit xxi 1 Science, Teleology, and Interpretation i Physicalism and Causalism i Our Relationship to Nature 4 Approacheo Tw Naturo st 4 e Objective Purpose 7 Universal Purpose 10 The Need for Philosophy 13 2 Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 18 Philosophical Psychology: Hegel's Predecessor8 1 s Against Rational Psychology 19 Against Empiricist Psychology 22 Philosophical Psychology: Hegel's Methodology 24 From Soul to Spirit 25 Subjective Spirit 26 Philosophy and Psychology 28 The Philosoph Spirif yo 1 3 t 3 Nature and Spirit 33 Metaphysic Structure th Sciencee d th san f eo 3 3 s The Languages of Nature and Spirit 35 Hegel as a Weak Monist 41 viii Contents Distinguishing Nature and Spirit 46 Externality and Self-determination 46 The Nature of Spirit 49 3 5 4 Sensation: Mind's Material Sentien e Nonsentiene th Th d tan 4 5 t The Nature of the Animal Organism 55 The Sentient Organis6 5 m Objece Th Sensatiof o t 0 6 n Inne Outed ran r Sens1 6 e Mediat Immediatd ean e Object Sensf so 3 6 e Sensation as Noncognitive 67 1 7 5 Feeling The Role of Feeling 72 Feeling and the Self 74 The Soul's Relatio Realito nt 8 7 y The Liberation of the Soul 84 6 Phenomenology: The I Emerges 87 Consciousnes9 8 I e th d san Does "I" Refer? 90 Th2 9 e Sens" "I f eo The Reference of "I" 97 Thinkine Th g Subjec9 9 t Universality and Self-relation 99 Thinking as a Subject 104 7 Intuition 108 The Role of Intuition in the Psychology 108 Attention, Space, and Time 111 Intuition Proper 116 8 Representation and Recollection 119 Role Representatiof Th eo 9 11 n Recollection 125 9 Imagination: Universality and Signification 135 Associative or Reproductive Imagination 135 Symbolic Imagination 141 Sign-making Imagination 143 x i Contents 10 Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 149 Significatio Languagd nan e 149 The Stages of Memory 153 Recollective Memory 153 Reproductive Memor4 15 y Mechanical Memory 157 11 Representing versus Thinking 164 Traditional Accounts of Thought 164 The Classical and Symbolist Theories of Mind 164 Problems with Symbolism 167 Problems with the Classical Theory 169 Problems with Representationalis0 17 m Hegel's Respons Traditione th o et 1 17 s Active Th e Concrete Universa1 17 l Rejectioe Th Inspectivisf no 4 17 m 12 Thought 176 Immediace Th Thoughf yo 6 17 t Nature Th Thoughf eo 8 17 t The Formal Structure of Thought 179 Concepts 179 Judgment0 18 s Inferences 190 Nature Th Thinkinf eo g Activit5 19 y Transitioe Th Practicao nt l Spiri8 19 t Conclusion 200 3 20 References 7 20 Index Preface I have high hopes for this book. First, it should fill a conspicuous Hegee th n i l literaturep ga Philosophye th r fo , of Subjective Spirit is— unjustly—second e Philosophyonlth o yt of Naturee lacth f k o n i attentio receivest ni . The book should also helmort bi pa e sti p interesru Hegen ti n li Anglo-American philosophical circles, wher e philosopheth f yo mind is currently one of the most active and exciting fields. It is in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit that Hegel confronts the questions abou nature tth humaf eo n understandin thoughd gan centrao ts o lt the British tradition after Locke. I think I show here that Hegel's appreciation of the complexity of our minds and the peculiarities of our discourse about them is quite sophisticated—more so than that of his major contemporary rivals. My own philosophical language is that of the Anglo-American tradition, but few of my comrades have devoted enough time to Hegel's works to appreciate him. There is surely no excuse for Hegel's writing style; it is simply abominable. But the stylistic diffi- cultie Aristotle'f so s Metaphysics Wittgenstein'r o s Tractatus havt eno prevented them from being read carefully and often. Hegel's tech- nical language cannot be the only way to express his insights, so I have trie mako dt e Hegel speak Anglo-American "An y hersa I -e( glo-American" rather than "English" because I am not just translat- ing intnativy om e language) doubo N .effort y m t s will distress many readers, both becaus ehavI e made Hege Anglo-Amerio lto - i xi Preface becausd an n thoroughlehavI b ca t donjo eno e eth y enoughf I . opinion on this matter is roughly split, I will be content. Third, I hope that the book is controversial. A fight has been brewing among Hegel scholars, one that has been kept relatively quiet because the field is small. It is not quite.the old battle between left and right Hegelians, which centered on religious and social (thougw ne issues a ht relatedbu , ) battle centere correce th n do t Hegelian treatment of the empirical sciences. Everyone has to admit that Hegel paid close attentio empiricae th o nt l sciences dise -Th . agreement is over whether philosophy itself emerges out of them and depend then so msomn i e real sense (this woulpositioe th e db n of the Hegelian left, I suppose) or comes to the empirical sciences from outside, with a fund of knowledge both independent of and superio empiricae thao th r t f to l sciences (the positio right)e th f no . Neither extreme position is correct (of course), but on the whole readers will find this book constantly straining towar lefte dth , despit mane eth y right-wing pronouncement f Hegeso l himself. The Hegelian systeequalle b n mca y consistently developed toward the left—and it is so much more vital and interesting when it is. Thus sreaa I n d Hegema greaa w s sa la to naturalistwh e on s a , continuoud an arisinf o t gou s with natur capabld ean f beineo g understood only in this natural context. He was certainly not a total naturalist, but no ultimate break is to be found between nature and spiri Hegel'n i t s system s dislikhi f n absolutI o e. e dichotomies Hegel share importann sa tmos e traim to t (t congenialwit s hhi ) successors, the pragmatists. I must point out right away that this is not a book about the Phenomenology of Spirit. There are plenty of those (new ones, too) already havI . e focused almost exclusivel Hegel'n yo s mature sys- founs s Encyclopediai t hi i s n di a m te Philosophicale oth f Sciences. This work, supplemente lecturs hi y db e notes, constitute consideres shi d finad an l opinion philosophe th n si mindf yo earl e .Th y Phenomenol- ogy, as fascinating as it is, is by Hegel's own admission a "peculiar early work." In particular, as even a cursory glance shows, it lacks precisely those systeparte th f smo whic mose har t important foe rth philosophy of mind, the Anthropology and the Psychology. The attention lavished on the early Phenomenology has probably been the major reaso Philosophye nth of Subjective Spirit bees ha n slightedt I . woul ease db thin yo t k tha earle tth y Phenomenology, likgreatee eth r Preface xiii Logic, contain fule sth l versio f somethinno g tha Encyclopediae th t has only in outline. I think such a view is simply wrong; Hegel did a great deal of rethinking while he was in Nurnberg, but I cannot argue that point here. I hope that this book will spur a greater interest in the relation between the early Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia. more On e wor cautionf do havI . e often used material froe mth Zusatze Encyclopedia,e th n i additione th s base Hegel'n s do hi d san students' lecture notes inserte clarificators da y materia Hegel'y lb s posthumous editors.
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