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The Threat from Independent Jihadists Chris Jasparro

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The Threat from Independent Jihadists Chris Jasparro Date Posted: 09-Dec-2010 Jane's Intelligence Review Lone wolf - The threat from independent jihadists Chris Jasparro Key Points The threat that individuals could carry out independently motivated terrorist attacks was highlighted by the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings in the US. 'Lone wolf' attacks pose a risk because the absence of a cell or major external links may make it difficult for the authorities to detect and deter potential attackers. However, an analysis of this type of attack over several decades suggests it is rarely effective and so poses a lower level of risk than might be supposed. Over the past decade, attacks by independent operatives and weakly connected cells have increasingly contributed to the jihadist threat against the West. Chris Jasparro assesses the potency of such actions and their potential to pose significant problems in the future. The threat of grass-roots terrorism in the West is attracting renewed interest in the wake of the November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood military base, Texas, which left 13 United States military personnel dead. This event seems to have galvanized the attention of security officials, jihadist leaders and media alike, with Al-Qaeda and its Yemen-based affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), calling on their supporters to carry out similar attacks. Contrary to some recent reporting, there is nothing new about these calls for independent jihad or the phenomenon of grass-roots, home-grown terrorism. Although such cases appear to be on the rise, much media and analytical coverage tends to focus on specific incidences, such as the Fort Hood shootings in 2009. However, when the cumulative record of this type of terrorism over several decades is analyzed, it seems that independent terrorists have a poor record of success and that the most serious threats are still posed by established jihadist groups or cells that are closely connected to such groups or wider jihadist networks. Categorization One of the difficulties in assessing 'lone wolf' jihadism is determining the actual extent of an individual or cell's independence from wider terrorist networks or formal organizations and external direction. Furthermore, as cases are investigated, links previously not suspected may emerge, while in others suspected links may be dismissed. Although the state of knowledge is constantly shifting, loose categories of cell type can be distinguished that exhibit persistent characteristics. From an examination of 48 plots and actual and attempted jihadist attacks in the US since 1977, as well as the 16 attempted and successful attacks that have occurred in western Europe since 2003, three common types of actor emerge: individual lone wolves, weakly connected cells and connected cells. Individual lone wolves and weakly connected cells are single people or small groups that have independently prepared and plotted attacks without external direction, assistance or training. They may have been influenced by ideologues or propaganda external to their social network and in some cases may have weak or past ties to wider terrorist networks or organizations. Connected cells are those that include at least some individuals who have received training, assistance or direction related to an operation from a formal organization or individual acting on behalf of such an organization. For example, Faisal Shahzad, who was sentenced to life imprisonment on 5 October 2010 for charges relating to his attempted vehicle bombing in New York's Times Square five months earlier, carried out his failed operation at the behest of the Pakistani Taliban. This category also covers self-starters who are deeply embedded in and connected to wider jihadist networks from which they may have obtained information, skills, training, resources, ideas or inspiration beyond that which members could have generated on their own accord. For example, while the March 2004 Madrid train bombers appear to have formed a self-starter cell that was not under the control of Al-Qaeda or another formal terrorist organization, many of its key members were deeply connected to wider jihadist networks in Europe and North Africa. Case studies An examination of published US government and legal documents, media reporting and academic sources reveals that, since 1977, Sunni jihadist groups or individuals acting in line with a Sunni jihadist ideology have formulated a total of 48 specific plots (defined as active planning, training and targeting), including attempts (instances where attackers commenced their operation but failed to reach or engage their targets) in the US. This total does not include instances of financing, espionage, proselytizing or actions committed by US nationals outside the US. Of these, 40 had an operational home-grown element, where key operational cell members were US citizens or legal residents, the cell involved was formed in the US or one or more cell members were radicalized in the US. At least 12 of the European attacks examined have a home-grown element (see Table 2: European lone wolves). Only 22 of the 48 US incidences actually proceeded to the point of execution, with 13 being successfully executed. Lone wolves account for 14 of these attempts and eight of the 13 successfully executed (see Table 1: US lone wolves). Therefore, these statistics reveal that nearly half of all successful Islamist extremist attacks in the US over the past 30 years have been home-grown, lone wolf attacks. However, these attacks produced 19 deaths, excluding suspects. Connected jihadist cells killed around 3,000 people in the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and six in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, while numerous disrupted plots had the potential to kill many more. Conventional wisdom suggests that contemporary jihadists are often sophisticated and well-adjusted members of society, who are unknown to the authorities (so-called 'clean skins') and turn against their home countries under the influence of extreme religious ideology. Grass-roots jihadists are particularly feared by security officials and sought after by militant leaders because their lack of ties to extremist organizations makes them difficult to detect and, in theory, allows them to appear anywhere to carry out surprise attacks. However, so far individual attackers have proven to be singularly maladapted. In all 14 US lone wolf cases, political and personal grievances against the US government were the main motivations or justifications given by the operatives for the attacks. The primary justification in all 14 cases was anger at US actions in the Middle East and towards Muslims, especially the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and US policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Michael Finton, a convert to Islam charged with attempted murder and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, told an FBI informer that as a young man he wanted to join the army to get training so he could establish a militia to fight the government, according to his indictment. These long-held anti-government feelings appear to have heightened after he converted to Islam. The indictment said he tried to detonate a vehicle bomb outside the federal building in Springfield, Illinois, on 24 September 2009 in the hope it would result in the US withdrawing its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. He denies the charges. Few fit the stereotype of well-adjusted, religiously devout but fanatical individuals that currently pervades much of the public debate over home-grown terrorism. Analyses reveal considerable diversity of character between jihadists that defies simple profiling and categorization. However, individual actors in the US have displayed a remarkable set of similarities. At least nine of the suspected lone wolves have been described by investigators or friends and family as loners. Ten had experienced significant life crises, including marital problems, deaths of parents, unemployment or job issues, financial troubles and drug abuse. Seven, including Finton, had criminal records. At least six appear to have suffered from mental illnesses, ranging from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia to depression. Of the cases that have come to trial, no courts or juries accepted mental illness as an excuse or explanation for the suspects' specific actions and decision to launch their attacks. Many of the suspects became increasingly angry and radical as their personal and psychological problems deepened, whereupon they began to externalize their grievances, blaming them on outside causes. These grievances were ultimately shaped and sharpened by extremist ideologies. The actual point at which they were religiously radicalized varied widely; in some cases radicalization developed over an extended period, while in others it occurred rapidly. Table 1: US lone wolves Attack Date Suspect Target/location Result mode CIA Headquarters, Two CIA employees were killed. Kasi was 25-Jan-93 Mir Aimal Kasi Shooting Langley, Virginia executed in 2002. Member of a Jewish sect, One person killed. Baz was sentenced to 1-Mar-94 Rashid Baz Shooting Brooklyn Bridge, New 141 years in prison. York Light aircraft Bank of America Tower, 5-Jan-02 Charles Bishop suicide Only the suspect was killed. Tampa, Florida attack El Al counter at Los Hedayat killed an El Al ticketing agent and Hesham Mohamed 4-Jul-02 Shooting Angeles International a bystander before being shot dead by a Ali Hedayat Airport, California security officer. Disrupted by informant. Reynolds was convicted of plotting to blow up energy Michael Curtis Dec-05 Bombing Unspecified oil pipeline installations, attempting to enlist help on Reynolds the internet and possessing a hand grenade. University of North Mohammed Reza Vehicle No fatalities. Taheri-Azar was convicted on 3-Mar-06 Carolina campus, North Taheri-Azar ramming two counts of attempted murder. Carolina Jewish center, Seattle, One person killed, five wounded. Haq was 28-Jul-06 Naveed Afzal Haq Shooting Washington sentenced to life plus 120 years. Derrick Shareef Shooting, Shopping mall in Disrupted by informant. Shareef was Dec-06 (Talib Abu Salam grenades Rockford, Illinois sentenced to 35 years in prison.
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