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CHAFTER XXXVII OPERATIONS OF TASK GROUP 6?.5 16 J ANUARY - 2 FEBRUARY 1943.

Task Group e? . 5, NICHOLAS, DEHAVEN, O'BANNON, RADFORD based on Guadalcanal area under the operational control of Cominander Advanced Naval Base Guadalcanal durin~ the period 16 January - 2 February 1943 for the purpose of operating offensively by strikinp enemy infiltration and Aupply ef~orte both eurface and submarine~ end providinr bombard­ ment fire in suooort of our lend forces in the Guadalcanal area. The operations of this ta~K rroup were coordinated with thooe of PT boRts, anti-submarine craft and aircraft. Durinv tl.iA perioe tte e~e~y mair.talned a concentration of sub~arinee in this aree and operated t~e Tokio Express wlth eflective air cover.

Task Group 6? .~ deoarted Espiritu Santo on 16 January ar.d arrive~ at Guadelce~ul P·w . l? Jar.uery. I~ .... eciately u?on arrival C.T.G. 6?.5 conferred with the Com~anding General, Co!ll.'. .ander Naval Base, Senior Naval Aviator, Com­ ~andin~ Officer or the Black Cat ~roup and scoutlnr plane ~ roup and the Flotilla Com~.ander of PT ooet ~. A reneral plan of operations ln the area was diecuesed and an oper­ atir ~plan for nipht action in the vicinity of EAperance and Savo coordinatinr the operations of Black Cata, PT boats and T G. 5r, ,5, was promulg&ted.

C.T.G. 6?.5 ie~ued the follo~in~ doctrine for nipht attacA by destroyers Of the taek yroup: 1. Unlees otnerwise directed toroedoee will be fired prior to opening punfire . ThiP even at the expense of tai<.in;r some ooposinr runf1.re in order to reach a point of vantap·e . 2. Torpedo Roreade of half ealvoe will be a maximum of 4 torpedoec, le~ving one in ~ach mount for emergencies.

3. Retire~ ent after firin~ torpedoeF. will be away from the target, at hi~h speed, to avoid po~Rible counter torpedo fire. Ships fire and turn away individuali y and reeRin position in column a~ 60~n as posrible. 4. Toroedo target for each ehip will be:-

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(a) Ir AKa and APe are present, se will be primary targets . Shipe will r1re at op o .te number from van. Example: If three AKs are present, let three ehipe fire on ships in the order or column, 4th and 5th ehips concentrate on let and 2nd tar~et. (o) If heavy or light CLs present eame procedure applies. (c) If only ODs present, count off from the van. Fire at the nearest column if more than one.

5. If any ene~y cripples are left behind, leave them to o knocked over later. Concentrate on the live ones. During daylight all ships eearch continuously with s.c. Use only S.G . and Flrecontrol Radars at night until close contact le obtained. ?. Normal night gunfire will be by radar control, uslr short ladders to insure getting early hits and start fires for illumination. At 0515 January 19, Task Group 6?.5 got underway from Tula~ i to carry out a bombardment on Guadalcanal. Bombard­ ment objectives, in general the reverse slopes not reached by artillery, were divided among the four ships present, each ship having six objectives plus any targets of oppor­ tunity which mi~ht become available. Fire was well con­ trolled and appeared to be very effective, particularly in view of reports received from ground forces which later passed through some or the areas taken under fire. At 1340 January 19, Task Group 67.5 was released from this duty and returned to TulaFi anchora~e. At 1945 Task Group 67.5 got underway and stood out to take station northwest of Florida Island. The weather cleared after sunset with a brilliant full moon witb very few clouds and it is believed that this change in the weather prob~bly caused the MExpress" to turn back. Stations were patrolled until 0330, at which time the attack forces were ordered to return to base. At 0600 January 20, the NICHOLAS proceeded to Lunga Point and embarked the Collllllanding General, GUADALCANAL, and his etaff. The remainder of the Task Group proceeded to Tulagi anchora~e. NICHOLAS stood up Guadalcanal coast line and enroute, bombarded two enemy positions at Visale at close ranfe, then proceeded to Beaufort Bay, arriving at 1030 and landing the Comrr.anding General at that point. At 1245 January 20, the Comwanding General returned aboard and NICHOLAS proceeded to Lunga Point arriving at 1651 and

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disembarked the General and his staff. At l?O? Taek Group 6?.5 departed for Espiritu Santo, speed 26.5 knots in order to fuel and load ammunition and join Taek Force 6?. From p.m. 20 January to 24 January, T.G . 6?.5 partici­ pated in the bombarci.ment of Kolombangara.

During dayli~ht on January 25 this force made anti­ submarine searches between Lunfa Point, Esperance, Savo and Tula~i with no contacts. At 21ZO January 25, the Task Group took patrol stations on a line southeast of Savo continuing the anti-submarine search and prepared to intercept the HExpress" reported enroute. At 0235 enemy planes were de­ tected in the vicinity of the formation and at 0245, while maneuverin~ at 30 knots, one plRne dropped two bombs off the etarboard bow of the FLETCHER. The bombs fell rou~hly 300 yards clear of the stip. Fire was opened on the planes, the formation ouened out and com. enced high speed zigzags and the planes withdrew. At 0300 enemy planes were picked up ir. tnc searcn lir.hts ea~t of Lunra Point and two hips in tne formation opened fire on tnese planes. Shortly tnereafter ene~y plar.es made an approach on the NICHOLAS and DEHAVEN and dropped at least two bombs in the vicinity Jf the NICHO~S. During the firing by this group, which then took place, one plane vas definitely seen destroyed and one very probably. Both planes were observed to be on fire but only one was definitely seen to crash. All planes aupeared to retire from the area and ttcondition Green" was announced. At about 0400, FLETCHER and RADFORD proceeded to Lunga Point and picked up Artillery Observers and the Commanding General for the morning bombardment. THE BOMBARDMENT OF SHORE OBJECTIVES BY THE DESTROYERS DURING THIS PERIOD IS REPORTED TO HAVE 81!.J!;N MOST EFFICIENT. THE CLOSE COOPERATION BE­ TWEEN THL ARMY AND NAVY WAS COMPLETE AND CONTRIB­ UTED TO A LARGE DEGREE TO THE SUCCESSFUL OCCUPA­ TION OF THE ENTIRE ISLAND OF GUADALCANAL. Bombardment objectives were in the vicinity of Visale and were completed at 1000 January 2?. FLETCHER and RADFORD rejoined Task Group off Tulag1 and at 1630 January 2?, the task Grouo stood out for the desiynated patrol area off Cape Eeperance and Coughlan Harbor. At 0415, while steaming in line of bearinR 135°(T) in the v1cinlty of Esperance, all ehips in the formAtion ~ade a surface contact by Supar Georre in close to the beach off Kamimbo. Ranr,e from the FLETCHER wes ?20v yards on contact and about 4200 yards from

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RADFORD. It appeared that an enemy submarine had just surfaced since all four destroyers reported contact simultaneously at varying ranges. T.G. 6?.5 APPEARS TO BE A WELL TRAINED AND INDOCTRINATED TEAM. In as much as two New Zealand corvettes were operating in this area, care was taken to insure that the investi­ gating snips, the RADFORD and NICHOLAS, did not open fire on friendly vessels. At the time of the contact there was a heavy rain storm over the area and visibility was at a illinimum. RADFORD and NICHOLAS closed the contact which was tracked on a course or 169°, speed 18, later changing course to 189°. RADFORD overhauled the contact, at 20 knots steaming in its wake, and had just gained visual contact dead ahead when the submarine siphted her and crash dived. The RADFORD at this time was close enough that air venting was heard and ran over the spot dropping two 600 pound charees. The failure to drop a full salvo resulted from scrambled communications. The RADFORD's position at this time was fairly close inshore off Coughlan Harbor and all eff orts to re ~ ain contact were ineffective. However, a persistent strong odor of diesel oil remained in the area a ud at daylight the patrol plane which had been requested, reported an entirely new oil slick off this -position. The entire Task Group remained in the area conducting a ca~eful anti-submarine search until 1245 January 28, in an effort to regain contact with negative results. Subsequent photo­ graphs made by the Army indicated a new submarine hulk sub­ merged on the reefs off Kamimbo with much oil still e~uding. It is believed that the submarine was fatally damaged by the RADFORD's attack and ran ashore on the reef in an effort to escape. At 1930 January 28, the Task Group arrived on patrol station north of Russell Island. At 2250 this group was approached by a plane not showing IFF but believed at the time to be a Black Cat. The plane was challenged by light and did not reply but continued to make what appeared to be a bombing approach on the FLETCHER. FLETCHER opened fire when the plane was at close range (500 yards) where­ upon the plane immediately showed IFF and turned on running lights. Voice communication was established and the plane proved to be a Black Cat on patrol. THIS IS AN INDICATION OF INEXPERIENCE. THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY C.T.F. 63 PRESCRIBES IN DETAIL THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR PLANE TO FOLLOW.

~?-4 At about 0300 January 29, New Zealand Corvette KIWI was observed firing off Vieale a nd later reported havinf bombed a submarine with dep h b m s s t it en fire , rammed it three imee and cha ed it in n the b a ~ h . At daylight the submarine was clear y vi t~ le n t he reef with some forty r et of i s b et ki ~ from the water at a n angle of rouphly 45 deP-rer . At 0800 January 29, FLETCHER returned to Tula ~ i t obtai water; the remainder of the Task Group maintaining anti-submarine search northwest of the unload­ ing area at Lunga Point. At 1545, FLETCHER rejoined the Ta8k Group and pr ~ eede ~ o patrol area north of Russell Island t o intercept possible small craft f errying troops or munitions to Guadalcanal. Thie station was maintained unt il 0600 January 30, at which time the Task Group stood in toward Lunga Point for anti-submarine patrol. At 1600 January 29, FLETCHER picked up, off Savo Island, a Japanese survivor from submarine destroyed by KIWI the previous night. The man was determined later to be a seaman from the submarine and hie story was reported to have revealed little of the submarine 1 e activities. At 1?30, the Task Group arrived on station off Point •Willlam" and took up patrol in that area for the night . No contacts were made by this group during the nignt but at 0400 the New Zealand corvettes reported attacking four Japanese landing barges off Visale. The corvettes reported the definite r.inking of two barges, apparently empty. It was further reported that these barges were of high speed and armed with 20 millimeters. Task Group 6?.5 proceeded towards this position but on arrival at dayli~ht could see no indications of a landing . Two barges on the beach ~t Visale, which appeared to be undamaged, were fired upon ~nd destroyed. Visibility waa very poor until well after iaylight precluding earlier bombardment of this area. rask Group 6?.5 at 0?50 stood in towards Lunga Point de­ taching one destroyer at a time to return to Tulafi for fuel At 2030 January 31, patrol stations were taken in the vicinity of Point "UncleM and anti-submarine patrol carried out during t he nifht. No contacts were made but the Black Cat patrol reported siphting two hi~h speed craft southeast of Santa Isabel Island, retirinr to the north­ west.

Prior to dayli£ht, this ~ roup contacted u.s.s. STRINGHAM proceeding to Nugu Point, this point having been sel ected for landing instead of Marovovo as ori~inally planned. The landinE from the STRINGHAM was effected without opposition at 0630 February l. As soon as it be­ came evident that no bombardment would be required at 3?-5 SECRE'T

Point Nugu, Task Group 6?.b patrolled from Esperance to Nugu coverin~ the approach a~d landinf of the LCTs coming from Lunf.a. A total of six LCTs were employed steaming·in pairs some tnirty ~1nutee apart. At 1130 February 1, condition "Red" was eie;nalled from GUADALCANAL Control. At 1135, enemy twin en~i~ed bocbers were seen retiring from tne direction ot Esoerance across the bow of the fornation. The leadln shlps, NICHOLAS and RADFORD, opened fire on the first ~lane with ne~ative results although some bursts were sufficiently close to make the plane take radical evarive tactics. At 1145 a second Qlane attemnted to cron~ ahead of the for~ntion at a ran~e-of aporoxlmately 600C yards. Tne third burst was observed to demolish one engine and apparently wreck the tail controls. The plane spun in, cra~hin~ in flames rourhly two miles ahead of the forms- ~ ion. RADFORD recovered the effects of two of the person­ nel of the plane. Ten Zeros were observed retiring astern of the formation well out of run range. RADFORD and FLETCHER continued screeninf the last two LCTs loaded with troops, and the DEHAVEN and NICHOLAS covered the return of the first four LCTs now unloaded and returnln~ to Lungs. At 1430, all LCTs were unloaded and were returning to Lunp-a, accompanied by STRI.1GHAM, FLETCHER, and RADFORD. At 1430, enemy planes were reported by GUADALCANAL Control, approachinf from the northwest i n two groups. These planes were not visually obs~rved cominf. in out were detected on Surar Cherlie radar well beyond run ran ~ee. At lbOO, carrier type dive bombers were ooserved to the northwest of Savo and at about 1515 , lt was reported on the GUADALCANAL Control circuit that one LCT had been bombed. Thie report was erroneous and at 1530, NICHOLAS reported that the DEHAVEN had been sunk about one mile south of Savo Island. FLETCHER and RADFORD proceeded at hi~h speed to the scene and FLETCHER removea 126 DE HAVEN survivors from two LCTs for transportation to GUADALCANAL. NICHOLAS had already removed 16 wounded survivors and was enroute GUADALCA~AL. At 1?45, completed unloading sur­ vivors and Task r.roup 6?.5 stood out to take station south of the Russell Island. The 11 Express 11 had been reported to be definitely on the way, consisting of sixteen destroyers. At 2000 February 1, while northwest of Cape Esperance on course 225•, enemy aircraft were detected by Sugar Charlie radar, closing from the northwest. They passed astern and broke up into three groups of at least two planes each. One group immediately made an approach from the port quarter. Course was changed to South and speed

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momentarily increae£d to 0U ~nots durinr the attRck, using continuous individual zivza·e. At 2u~c, fire was opened by tne for~ation on the planee at a range of 8500 yards. Thia plane group retired eharDly toward the northward. Snortly thereafter at intervals of ten or f1fte~n minutes succesA1ve approaches were made from the stern and quarter~ of tne formation. On the third attack one plane waa shot down after the ran~e closed to 2400 yards; both 5-1nch and auto­ matic wea,ons were used on this run. Thereafter the attacks turned oft at a greater ranre wnen fire was opened. No bomos were ooserved to be dropped in any of these attacks. At 2230, when Task Group 6?.5 was some 15 miles eouth of the Russell Island, the planes retired to these islands ana circled over that position. The 11 E:xprass" had then Just arrived ofr Esperance and an effort was made to return to an attacKing position, first try1n~ an apnroach in as close to tne Guadalcanal shore as outly1nf reefs would permit. Alwost immediately this move was detected and the Jap planes moved in to attack. The first approach being on the star­ board bow from the direction of Guadalcanal, causing a change of course to westward. Several salvos were s1..if­ f1c1ent to turn this attack off, out any attempt to approach an attacking position undetected was definitely now out of the question. Several other atte~pts to approach the Russell-Esperance line were tried, usin~ low speed from iifferent directions, but in each case these moves were ~pparently observed by the planes and the formation was forced to turn away in order to unmask batteries to bear on the planes. It was apparent to me th!'t these planes mi~ht have had radar since tnPir cistances from the forma­ tion was between lb and 20 miles and believed too great for visual si~htin~s under the overcast conditions then prevailine . rhe above tactics continued until 0300, when the "ExpregP 11 was reported retiring. At this time tbe plane fl Wf're observed, by Suuar Charlie, retirinE' to the northwest. Task Group 6?.5 arrived off Esperance at day­ li~ht and assisted in picking up survivors of the PT boats, searching in the area until 1t appeared that all had been rescued. This Task Group then colIWlenced fuelin~ at Tulari, in succession, bein: interrupted at frequent intervals by "Conditions Red". Based on the two weeks operationA in the GUADhLCANAL area, the following com:nents and recomffiendations were eub­ mi tted by the Task Group Commander: (a) GENERAL OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS. In order to simplify the operations or the Task Group

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~nd to reduce voice and other transmisAiona to a minimu:n, the nifht attacK doctrine was promul~ated to all ships. Thene instructions were l&ter amplified by si~nal and in :onference to take care of chanrinp conditione. It was particularly streAsed, after enemy air activity incrensed in the area, that ships should elways operate in close company for mutual protection and for better all round offense. THE NICHOLAS AND DEHAVEN WERE NOT IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF EACH OTHF.R ~ffiEN THE DEHAVEN WAS SUNK. THEY WERE SEPARATED BY SO?-~E FIVE MILES. The Task Grouo was divided normally into two sections, the FLETCHER and RADFORD being Section One, and DEHAVEN - NICHOLAS Section Two.

'Then investi~atin~ sound contacts the Ahip nearest the contactin~ ship was ordered to asqist in developing the contact and to add protection arainAt air attack. Full Supar Charlie search by all ships, both day and nipht was directed, w1 th Su;ta:- Geore;e in uAe during dark­ ness and low v1s1oility. All contacts, both air and surface were uroadcaRt over TBS, the Task Groupe primary communi­ cation circuit. THIS APPEARS TO BE A VERY SOUND RADAR DOCTRH\E. It was repeatedly directed that all planes not showing IFF were to be assumed as enemy planes until definitely identified otherwise. In this connection it was noted that many GUADALCANAL planes returning from patrolA or other missions failed to show reco~nition until they were either directed by the aircraft control tower, or until challenged by li~ht. Tnia was a continuous source of unnecessary alert1nr the ships ?ersonnel especially when operatine at night or outsiae tne Savo-Esperance line durinf daylirht, out gave valuaole opportunity for frequPnt fire control drill under oressure.

1•lORE THOROUGH I~:nocTRI1'ATION OF PILOTS IS INDICATED AS NECESSARY. The Black Cats were particularly annoying in the above resoect, displaying an amazin~ curiosity in this Task Group's movements; this in spite of definite information, promulgated

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dailv. of the Task Group' s nightly operation a reas. On pra cti cally every ni~ht a t least one of these planes ap­ proa ched dangerously close to the formation and unnecessarilv risked losing the plane. The fact that several enemy planes penetrated the defPr.sPs to Henaerson Field by following frlendly plane~ landing, was further reason to view with suspicion nny planee apprcaching the formation at night. On seve~al occasions enemy planes turned on their running lights when in the vicinity of the Task Group. (b) INFCRMATION RECEIVED:

Com~unications ver~ generally excellent and the rapidity of transmission of pertinent early inforffiation was excellent. Black Cat information was of the greatest assistance at night, with the exception of the night of February 1-2. At n~ ti~e during this night's operations could I obtain a defintte picture of the enemy disposition or acourate lo­ cation of hie component units once he was reported 20 miles n0rthwest of Savo, clcse aboard the Russells. I was par­ ticularly intPrested to know if any units were south of tt.e Russell - New Georgia line and only after a strenuous half nour'P visit by "Black Cat Two" did I get him away from the formation and on a search to the northwest for this infor­ mation. Thia was tt.e same pilot, I believe, upon whom we fired on on the night of !anu~ry 28. An anditional bit of ~issing information on the night of Febru~ry 1-2 was the preeence of own tauntless planes in the Savo-Esper~nce area after 2230. Not until I read the Senior Aviator Gundalcansl'e despatch report the following morning wan I cognitant of t~eir b?ing in the are~. RESPONSIBLE COM¥.ANDERS MUST BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED.

(c) NIGHT A~TI-SUBMA.~!NE SEARCHES: In ntght anti-submarine searches the Task Group was formed on line of bearing, distance 1500 yards and sweeps tr.rough the area to be searched made at 15 knot3, using both sound and Sugar George. Sweeps of roughly twenty miles were norm~lly made covP.ring the approaches to the suspP.cted ares from different directions on each sweep. The eubmarine believed to have been destroyed by the RADFORD on the morning of January 28 n?parently came "down the slot" between Ne~ Georgia and Santa Isabel and was probably enroute south a~c west of Guadalcanal. His plotted c~ur~e. after

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surfac1ng, d1d not 1ndicate any intent toward enter 1ng the V1aale - :oug!.:an Harbor area . The aubmarir.e dP.stroyed by XIWI, however, was def1nitPly engaged in operRtions on t he beach at V1aale or Kamimbo, be1ng detPcted close inshore, and observed to have landing craft secured on deck.

(d) ANTJ-AIRCRAFT TACTICS USE~: When enemy aircraft were rPported in the vicinity and especially at night, the Task Group was r0r~ed in a loose column and maneuvered by TBS at speeds up to 30 knots us1ng continuous 1nd1vidual zigzags. THIS APPEARS TC BE A SOUND PROCEDURE. HIGH SPEED WITH RADICAL MANEUVERS HAS BEEN PP.CV~D TO BE A SPLENDID AND AN EFFECTIVE A/A DEFENSE. Contacts and solutions were also put out by TBS wren t1me permitted. All night f1r1ngs were with full radar control us1ng Mark ~2 fuses 1n part of the battery ~nd time fusee in the remainder. Automatic weapons were used when the ran~es percitted. Continual drill was necessary in order to be able to shift the target from Sugar Charlie to Fox Charlie and director, 1n sufficient time to open fire with a good solution at ranges of 6000 to 8000 yards. The problem wa~ coneiderRbly complicated when C?erating in close proximity to land, which was the general situation. However, after a few days and nights of actual ahooting, all ships appeared to be able to get on in time to put up an effective fire. The plane shot down on February 1 was definitely a v1ctim of thie ammunition.

(e) AIRCP.AFT REPORTS:

The reconnaisennce reports of aircraft were generally excellent and ~ere invaluable in estimating the gP.noral situation. The ~ollowing discrepanc1ee 1n aircraft contact repo~te were noted:

(l) Times of cont~cte as reported were usually omitted

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and if the reoort was relayed, the enemy's position be­ came only approximate due to unknown time delays in transmission. MORE TRAINING OF PILOTS IS INDICATED. (2) Shipe speeds, as reported by aircraft, usually are in error if the speed is high. The error is always on the high aide. This seems to be a universal error among pilots, particularly at ni~ht. All night bomb­ ings observed to date have been misses ahead of the ship, indicatt~~ too high an estimated target speed. The same is reported to be true by the PTs at GUADAL­ CANAL. On the night of February 1-2, Jap destroyers were reported retiring at 45 knots althourh their sub­ sequent positions reported showed a speed of roughly 32 ~nots. (f) AIR COVERAGE: The general coverage for all operations observed, was four fifhters. Commander Task Group 6?.5 is not in a position to say tf this is sufficient, but with the "strun~ out" type of operatione such as the landing at Point Nup.u, ­ which operated ar. planned, this ~overage seemed to be in­ adequate and proved to be insufficient to protect the entire operation. (g) ENEMY OPERATIONS AND TACTICS: (1) Ground forces: The ground forces of the enemy were conspicuous by their ability to camouflage their beach positions and to take advantage of jungle covered terrain. On only two occasions were any troops actually sighted, although ships operated within 2000 yards of the beach during several cf the bomoardment oper~tions. On the other nand, our forces were clearly visible, particularly the bivouac areas in the hi~h unwooded areas. Tente, motor vehicles and personnel could be clearly observed in all rear areas. Thie point was pointed out to and observed by the Commandin~ General, GUADALCANAL on both trips made with this Task Group. (2) Surface Craft: No large surface craft were con­ tacted. The tactics used, however, were obviously those employing a greatly superior fast force, depend­ ing upon air protection and submarines used defensively.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII LOSS OF U.S.S. DE HAVEN ON FEBRUARY 1, 1943. The U.S.S. DE HAVEN was lost due to enemy action on Feb­ ruary 1, 1943, about two miles southeast of Savo Island in approximate Lat. 9° 9' J., Long. 159c 52' E. During the day of February 1, 1943, the DE HAVEN was operating with Task Group 67.5 (four destroyers) supporting the movement of six LCT's and one AVD incident to the estab­ lishment of a beach head at hlarovovo on Guadalcanal Island. In the afternoon of that day the DE HAVEN was engaged in the anti-submarine patrol covering the return to their base of two LCT ' s.

At 1445 Nhen in position about due south of Savo Island, distant 3 miles, circling the LCT's at 15 knots, her com­ manding officer was notified by Guada lcanal Control that condition was Red. The ship went to General Quarters im­ mediately and steered a course ap ~ roximately northeast, speed 15 knots. Two more boile rs were lighted off, but were not cut in. At about 1~50 speed was increased to 20 knots. At about 1455, speed was decreased to 15 knots . At about 1457 a flight of nine unidentified planes was sighted broad on the starboard beam, distant 25,000 yards, position angle about 25°. The planes were on approximately 270° T., flying at medium speed. lmmAdiately the main bat­ tery and shortly afterward, the machine guns that would bear were ordered to train on them. The planes were identified by the fire control party about one minute later, as enemy dive bomber type. The fire control party reported ready to open fire at that time and requested permission to do so. The bridge talker acknowledged, but permission to open fire "NBS not granted. 'Nhen the planes reached a position about on the starboard quarter six of them changed course sharply and came directly at the DE HAV!:N. Both main battery and machine guns opened fire at this time, but all six planes are believed to have dropped their bombs. The ship was hit by three bombs in quick succession and was, in addition, damaged by one near miss. All way was lost after the first hit and shortly there­ after the DE HAVEN began to settle by the bow . No serious fires were seen. About two minutes after the last hit, the

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DE HAVEN was seen to sink. It is believed that her water­ tight integrity aft of the after fireroom was not breeched. The word to abandon ship was not passed. COMMENT. The DE HAVEN was equipped with SG, SC-1, and FD radar. It appears that the ship was not prepared for maxi­ ~um speed. There is no indication of any radical maneuvers by the ship to avoid the dive bombing attack. The Fire Control Officer requested permission from the brid3e to open fire. The bridge talker acknowledged the messar.e but it is not clear whether no word was sent to the Fire Control Officer, or whether "not granted" was given. Gunnery Doctrine issued by Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet covers the following directive on Opening Fire:

~For aircraft targets the responsibility for opening fire rests with the commanding offi- cer. With action already joined or in case of fast moving targets the responsibility for se­ lection {and openin~ fire) must be given to the contr~l officer and in certain cases to the gun captain. The foregoing action should be a matter of indoctrination rather than procedure. "With high speed targets, - - - -, the re­ sponsibility must be delegated to the control officer and gun captains, particularly captains of machine guns." All ships when under air attack or threat of air attack must steam at high speed using radical maneuvers. This should be basic doctrine. Full use must be made of all equipment and guns promptly. Commander Task Grouo 67.5 commented as follows: DE HAVEN and NICHOLAS were separated some five miles escorting two LCT's each toward Lunga, the DE HAVEN being about one mile south of Savo Island when she was attacked by dive bombers. The planes had been sighted but apparently not identified and the commandin~ officer'a permission to open fire was withheld until attack had developed. The

0e-2 first bomb, estimated as either 500 or 1000 lbs., struck the bridge structure demolishing it. Shortly afterwards two bombs struck the fireroom and engine room. The ship was reported to have broken amidships and sank within a few minutes. Commander Task Group 6?.5 stressed particularly that ships should always operate in close company for mutual protection and for better all round offense.

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CHAPTER XXXIX NIGHT TORPEDO ATTACK BY JAPANESE PLANES ON TRANSPORT CONVOY FEBRUARY l?, 1943.

On February l?, 1943 Task Unit 62.?.2, composed of the PRESIDENT JACKSON, CRESCENT CITY, PRESIDENT ADAMS{ PRESIDENT HAYES and TALLULAH, with six destroyers; DRAYTON Escort Commander), MAURY, GRAYSON, CONYNGHA14, LARDNER, and CRAVEN was enroute Noumea, New Caledonia to Guadalcanal Area with the 33rd Naval Construction Battalion, 118th Engineer Bat­ talion, U.S.A., ?43rd Ordnance, U.S A., and an air servicing unit embarked. At 1911 the task unit was in Lat. 10° 30 1 S., Long. 162° 30 1 E., 19 miles bearing 005° from Santa Anna Island, Solomon Group, when a white flare was dropped over the formation. The escort destroyers had picked up unidentified planes earlier in the day. Just before dark radar contact was reported by escort on two planes which remained out of sight. At the time the flare was dropped over the formation shi ps were in cruieing disposition as follows: TALLULAH in right colu;nn (section 1); PRESIDENT JACKSON (OTC and guide); CRESCENT CITY in center column (section 2); PRESIDENT ADAMS; PRESIDENT HAYES in left column (section 3); distance 600 yards, interval 1000 yards. Escort destroyers in submarine screening positions ahead and on both flanks, distance 2500 yards. Course and axis of for~ation was 318°, speed 15.5 knots. The relative positions of the ships in the formation remained the same but on orders from the Task Unit Commander, the transports increased their distance to 800 yards and the escort destroyers rotated their screenin~ positions to a circular formation surroundinr the transport group at 2500 yards distance. The taRk.unit ceased zi~zagg in~ and immedi­ ately began maneuvering in accordance with 45° turns as ordered over the TBS radio by Commander Task Unit 62.?.2 in the PRESIDENT JACKSON. THE BEST PRIMARY DEFENSE AGAINST AI..J... PLANE ATTACKS IS RADICAL TURN MOVEMENTS. ALL COMMANDERS DO NOT APPRECIATE THIS FACT.

39-l Commander Task Unit 62.?.2 made the followin~ comments: From about 1030 in the morning until middle of the afternoon of l? February escortin~ destroyers reported radar contacts with unidentified aircraft intermittently. These aircraft contacts did not develop into sightings and the Task Unit Commander was convinced that the unit was being shadowed by the enemy. In anticipation of air attack after dark, trnnsports and tanker were directed to set Condition II watch in the A.A. batteries at 1800. Embarked troops since departure manned additional 50 and 30 caliber guns mounted in landing boats and on deck. Prior to dark escort commander reported radar contact with two unidentified aircraft which remained in ~eneral to southward of task unit, distant about 15 miles, and out of sight. Shortly after dark these aircraft were reported as having closed to about ? miles and at 1911 a high intensity aircraft illuminatin~ flare appeared on port quarter at elevation of about 60°, bearing l?0°T. Position of unit at this time was Lat. 10° 301 s., Long. 162° 30 1 E. Thereafter radar contacts continued to be made and ships were directed by TBS radio to open fire on any aircraft which came within range. The first flare was followed by others over the formation and also white float lights began to appear on the southeastern horizon followed before and throughout the action by other float lights dropped, evidently, by more than one plane, entirely surrounding the disposition. At appearance of flares and float lights, it was con­ sidered that illumination was being provided for torpedo or bombinr plane attack. Escort commander was directed to change destroyers from an anti-submarine screen to an anti­ aircraft screen entirely surrounding the transports and tanker. Commencing at 1923 the disposition was maneuvered using 45° turn signals over the Tas/TBY net paralleled by one or two short blast turn signals by the PRESIDENT JACKSON. At 1930 Task Unit Commander b.roadcast over the TBS/TaY circuit that he considered a torpedo olane attack was de­ veloping. This conclusion was reached in view of the suc­ cessful torpedo attack which a short time previously had been ~ade on another force in the same approximate locality and at about the same time of day. Despatch report was made to Task Force Commander,

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ComSoPac and Guadalcanal at time of appearance of the first flare. This despatch was followed by two others sent during the engagement reporting approach of seven torpedo planes and continuation of attack. At 1943 a green flare appeared overhead which burst into a cluster of eight green flares. This distinctive flare was assumed at the time to be a signal for commencement of the attack. At 1943 one destroyer commenced firing with main battery followed by firing by automatic weapons from several other ships. Some of this fire was directed towards the antiair­ craft bursts of the destroyer batteries and shortly there­ after firing was ceased. At 2000 a radar contact report was made of seven planes bearing 180°, distant 12 miles. Flares continued to be dropped from overhead. Firing was again opened by destroyers and additional radar contacts with planes were reported. First attacking planes came in from the south, from general direction of San Cristobal Island. Their approach was preceded by radar bearings and distances so that when planes came within range they were met with a great volume of fire from destroyers and transports. These radar bearings also made it possible to maneuver the disposition in a general direction away from the contact that appeared to be most threatening at the time. First plane that came in was shot down at 2005. Attack was not well coordinated. Disposition was maneuvered by 45° ship turn movements directed by TBS and paralleled by whistle signals. Attacks continued, planes generally coming in singly or in pairs from various directions but a majority from bearings away from the moon which, at the time, was high in the sky. The action lasted until escorting destroyers reported at 2048 that screens were clear. Weather: Full moonlight but with layer of high cirro­ stratus clouds which completely covered the sky diffusing the moonlight and resulting in halo around the moon. Wind force 1-2 from NNE. Sea condition 1 from NNE. Visibility good but with slight haze. Reports from different sources indicate conclusively that five or six planes were shot down, all but one result­ ing in great flames from burning gasoline which spread out

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over the surface of the water, illuminating the area and silhouetting the ships. These areas were avoided as far as possible. It has been reported that launchings of torpedoes were seen, torpedo tracks sighted and torpedoes heard running by destroyer sound equipment. Several heavy underwater deto­ nations which resembled depth charge explosions or ship bein~ torpedoed are now believed to have been torpedo war­ heade detonatin~ upon completion of run. Planes used in this attack were very probably two­ motored, long-range torpedo bombers. The evidence of personnel si~hting planes is not entirely conclusive. Two PBY planes were sent out by Guadalcanal and arrived after the attack on this unit was over. These Planes had orders to drop flares about 5 miles distant from enemy flares. Thia procedure, had the attack been in progress, would probably have been effective and confusing to the enemy. The successful frustration ot the attack without any damage to any of the ships of this unit is attributed prima­ rily to excellent radar performance and prompt reports which permitted Task Unit Commander to maneuver ships away from attacking aircraft, which could not be seen coming in until close aboard; these radar reports also permitted ships to brin~ all guns to bear on the target bearinR so that when the attackin~ plane came within sight and range a murderous fire met and generally destroyed it. The TBS, which Per­ mitted rapid transmission of information and maneuverin~ si~nals, was invaluable; with the e~ception of two trans­ ports, which used TBY, all ships had this equipment. No visual signals were necessary at any time. Ship handlinR on the part of transport and tanker commandin~ officers which kept ships of the disposition maneuvering together was excellent. The work of the de­ stroyers in the screen taking stations promptly, furnishing re.dar information and gun protection for the heavy ships as the attacking planes came in was hi~hly satisfactory. Firing Lrom the automatic antiaircraft batteries of all ships ob­ served was spectacular and hi~hly effective although there was some wild firing done such as firing on five-inch anti­ aircraft bursts, but this was considered justifiable under the circumstances. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS BY ESCORT COM?~DER. During the forenoon of 17 February 1943, in Lat.12° 10 1 S., Long. 162° 45 1 E., the SC-1 rat~r ~ade contact on an unidentified plane at 1135. At 1145 the plane waR sighted and signnl made that strange aircraft was in sight bearing 0~5° T. This plane was at a distance of about 10 miles an~ was not pos~tively identified by type, though believed to hRve been a twin-ensine boober of the type Mitsubishi 97. No friendly indications were received by radar. Earlier, o.t 0735 17 Fet>ruary, the TJRAYTCf! had a radar contact in approximate Lat. !3o 10 1 s., Long. 162° 43' E., beRring 270°, distance 27 miles. Thie plRne came in sight at 0751 and was identified as a Flying Fortress. Later in the day at about 1320 a PBY was sighted approach­ ing from the north ~nd it passed within about four miles in Lat. 11° 40 1 s., Long. 162° 52 1 E., and at about the saJLe time the DRAYTON had an unidentified plA~e c~ntact bParing 270°, diAtant 26 miles. At 1430 in Lat. 11° 26 1 9., Long. 162° 52' E., a group of friendly planes passed over one transport plane apparently escorted by a group of 12 dive bombers snd torpedo planes. Thie group was heading toward Guadalcanal. From 11~5 until 1452 radar contacts on friendly and unidentified air~raft were frequent though there n,peared to be one who was not above suspicion that was circling the formation at ranges from 12 to 17 miles. At 1438 radar contact was made on a plane bearing 050°, distant 18 miles and it was tracked out to a bearing of 098° T., distant 28 miles where contact was lost at 1452. No further radar contacts were made on aircraft until 1825 when contact was again made on unidentified plane bearing 114°, distant 31 miles. An outstanding feature of the SC-1 radar search during the day was the relatively large number of contacts that were made that were unidentified until planes came in si~ht. The display of IFF was the exception rather than the rule. The plane that was sus­ pected of being enemy remained in the vicln1ty for an estimated three and one-half hourc snooping around un­ molestt:d. FAILURE OF IFF IN THI<3 ARE.A DURING RECENT MONTHS HAS CAUS~D CONSIDERABLE EMB1\R,t!.ASSMENT APPROACHING DISASTER.

The SC-1 radar functioned above average and search ~as meintained in assigned sector with occasional 360° sweeps.

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During the approach the enemy plenes were first picked u~ bearing 1?0° - 1?5°, distant 21 miles indicating that they might have rounded the southeastern tip of San Cri~to­ bal as a navigational marker, and stc0d up the straits wh~rP. they could not miss. From the radar contacts it appears that there were two planes in the search group and seven or eight in the attack group. The attack group apyarently shirted. to line their approach with flares that had been dropped and to make the initial approach directly from the rear and then split right and left to come in for the attack on both bow~. Attacking planes were not clearly observed by perAonnel though the general 1mpreaeion was that they were largeJ two-engine planes. The dietnnce at which t.he Japanese planes dropped thf'1r torpedoee is not definitely known, however, at 2018 the sound gear of the DRAYTON picked up a torpedo by sound passing down the port side nt 350 yards and inasmuch as the DRAYTON was at the time tvo or three thousand yards from the transports it can be assumed that he made hie drop at least 2000 yards beyond or at a distance or 3000 or 4000 yards. The wake or the torpedo was not obeerved nor ~es the plane that made the drop. Powerful underwater detonations wer~ bear~ and felt ~t intervals, assumed to be self-destruction of torpedoes at the end or their runs. The planes did not strafe our ships.

The DRAYTON opened fire nt two separate times on planes. At 2006 at a plane coming 1n on her starboard beam, until plane waa in line with transports. No hits were observed on thie plane, but it was obcervP1 to go down 1n flames when transports opened fire on 1t. At 2008 fire was opened on a plane coming in on the port bow. A destroyer, the CRAVEN or MAURY, was firing at the sall!e plane which vas forced down and vas on the water smoking heavily. The DRAYTON opened fire again at about 2032 at what turned out to be smoke from AA burst near the water. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DRAYTON made the follow­ ing observations:

That any movement ve make toward the Guadalcanal Area is generally known by the Japanese by information gained either from coast watchers, submarines or search planes, and to operate on env other assumption ts merely wishful thinking.

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That the Japanese has enjoye~ success on his dive bombing and torpedo attacks in thi~ area in all attempts except th1s last one on l? February.

That he will willingly exchange l? or 25 torpedo planes for a heavy cruiaer and a destroyer, and that he will continue to attack eurface craft night or day when­ ever the opportunity presents itself.

That there is an urgent necessity or occupying San Cristobal and ~alaita to establish atr bases fer the protection or shipping in this area aa well as to pro­ vide intermediate staging points and emer2ency landi~ fields for aircraft enroute to Guadalcanal, and to pro­ vide mutual eupportin~ bases in closer proximity to a principal theater of operations.

It is recommended:

That radar equipped ships keep far enou~h away from land so as to eliminate land interference which makes it difficult to detect aircraft approachin~ from land sectors.

That patrol planes and search planes approach con­ voys and task unite, to exchange communications as to possible enemy craft in the vicinity. The PBY and Fortress that came within eight of our task unit on l? February might have been of ~ome help. We could have told him there was a suspected snooper about, which they evidently didn't know, and the search plane could have informed hie base without the surface craft breakirlP'. radio silence. I feel that it is quite justifiable to break radio silence on occasions where trailing planes persist. The Japanese know where you are and where you are ~oin2 so the mere transmission of a warning message could do no harm, and might give somebody the news that could be of some help. When the shootin~ starts they open up and yell for help and it is generally too late for help when it gets there. It is noted that recent instructions permit the all time use of SC radars when in waters where attacki~ enemy air­ craft m1~ht be encountered. ~ain if the Japanese can be

39-? there, he knows when you are there and radar silence will only throw away the advanta~e of knowing when he ie coming.

WHEN ENEMY HAS LOCATED THE TASK FORCE, IF AIR COVERAGE CAN BE PROVIDED, IT IS BETfER TO BREAK RADIO SILENCE TO ASK FOR IT, THAN TO MAINTAIN SILENCE AND NOT GET THE COVERAGE.

The Executive Officer, U.S.S. DRAYTON remarked as follows:

On Februarv 17, 1943, Task Unit 62.7.2 was attacked by Japanese torpedo planes in Lat. 10° 20' S., Lon~. 162° 25 1 E., while the task unit was enroute from Noumea, New r.aledonia to Kol1 Point, Guadalcanal Island. The attack was proceded bj a shadowi~ phase bv t~o Japanese air­ craft which were picked up on the aircraft search radar at 1825. At 1915 a plane believed to be one of the shadowin~ planes dropped a parachute flare over the for­ mation followed at intervals by other flares. At 1945 a rocket was fired from a shadowing plane overhead which burst into eight green stars. Thie is believed to have been the ei~nal from the shadowin~ plane to the torpedo planes to begin the attack.

Durin~ the attack it appeared that the planes were approaching in general from the direction away from the moon, probably to ~ain the eilhouettiruz effect of the moon which was about 40° hi~h. A total of five burnin~ planes were counted on the surface of the water after havin~ been shot down by the tssk unit.

The Radar Officer, U.S.S. DRAYTON reported as follows:

At 1135 on the mornin~ of February 17th, our SC-1 contacted one unidentified plane bearing 020°, distant 15 miles. At 1137, two minutes later, control reported a

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strange plane on this bearing. This plane circled our for­ ma tion clockwise at a range of 8 to 15 miles, visible f or short periods of time, and always on the 3C-l scope. It was a twin-engine single tail plane, and ~es identified at the time as probably beine a Mitsubishi 97. At 1155 t3e SC-1 lost contact, and regained it shortly thereafter. From this ti~e until 1452 we had contact intermittently on whet was be ieved to be this same plane, finally losing him at 1452, bearing 098°, distant 28 miles. Our next r adar contact with the enemy came at 1825 when we had contact on an unidentified plane bearing 114°, dis­ tant 31 miles. ~e had contact on this plane until about 1830, at which time we lost him. His range rem9.ined the same, about 31 miles, while his bearing increased fro~ 114e to 155". This plane was probably a sh"ldower who had not yet spotted us ; the sky being sli3htly overcast; I think it hardly possible that the r ange of visibility could have been so far . About 1845 we nade contact on another unidentified plane, oearini:; 050° , distant 17 miles. Im:nediately after making t his contact, >-.e made a complete sweep of 360° and found un­ identifie l plene bear ing 140c , distant 19 miles . These were the only two plan~s we had, aPd "e trac~ed both of the~ for alnost an hour as they circled the formation clockwise, com­ lnr as close as 5 miles at one time, but normally at o range of from 7 to 12 ~iles. At 1944 we lost contact on one of tte planes at a r ange of 5 miles, and just o min1te or so later we received the report over the phones tnat a flHre was burning directly overhead . At about this time several ships opened fire Nith their macnine guns, apparentlJ shoot­ ind at this flare and several more which were dropped a minute or so later. ile still had contact ~vi th the two un­ identified planes as they flew around us, and at tiffies came in, passing overheaa. At 2000 we made contact on a group of uniaentified nlanes , bearing 180° , distant 21 mi les, as they came out of the ~and echoes from San Cristobal Island . There was no doubt whether these were the "real ones" or not, because they ca"lle stre i::;ht in, their bearin~ never changing ~ore than 5c either ~ice of 175°. I counted seven indi vidual echoes on the SC-1 scope, and from my experience, I would estimate that there were as many as ten planes in the group. About this time we lost our two shadowing planes who had been wi th us now for over an hour . lie were intent on tracki"lg the raid as it came in , and

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made no further effort to watch for the shadowers. At 2004 the raid was in as close as 6 miles, and a curious thing was noticed. All echoes were approximately on the same bearing, but while the leading plane was closing at a fast speed, the others seened to be thinning out, so that they were no lonser in a group. At 2005, the leading plane was in to 3 miles, while the remaining ones were spaced so that the last one, of 7 or 8 echoes, was at a r nge of 12 miles.

About this time, the ships of t~e formation had opened fire on the leading plane , and from then on things were happening too fast to keep an accurate log of times and re­ ports. During the next half-hour we were searching all around, reporting contacts as we found them (and they were not difficult to find now), re~aining on them long enough so that the FD radar would have a chance to picK them up, and then shifting to the next contact. Practically all of the contacts we made were coming on the astern or quarter of the formation, usually at a range of from 5 to 10 miles • .. e had so many targets to choose from that we thought it best to concentrate on those which were closest to the formation, and from whom we could expect the next attack. DurinB the height of the attack, the sound gear picked up a torpedo passing close aboard, and since our sound and radar eruipment are in the same room, this extre~ely loud noise added to the din of orders and reports which had 9lready been filling the air. At about 2026 the height of the attack seemed to have passed, and at this time we had but two echoes remaining, both bearing 170°, one at a range of 8 miles, and the other 12 miles. They circled us to the right for about ten min­ utes, and then headed away. Contact was lost on them at 2041, as they went into land echoes, bearing 280°, distant 24 miles. These were the last contacts we had, and at 2048 we reported that our scope was clear of echoes. t:e were operating both SC -1 and SG sets during this 9Ction. As ordered by the Escort Commander our SC-1 was searching a sector 000° - 070° relative to the fleet axis, and since the axis was 004, the relative bearines here were aL~ost identical with the true bearings of the sector. About every five minutes we made a complete sweep of 360°, and as it turned out, we ~ade all of our contacts during these sweeps. The SG set was a greet aid in station-keeping during the action, and we reported the bearing and range of the ~uide whenever the phone circuit was not crowded with more important infor:nstion. We were unable to pick up any of

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the low-flying planes on the SG. However, since we were on station in the lead of the formation, about 2,000 to 3,000 yards fro~ the guide, and since most of the attacking planes Car!!e in from the rear, or on the ~uerters of the formation, it would have been necessary for the SG to detect them at a range in excess of 5,000 yards to be of any value to the formation; and this range is about the ~aximum we have ob­ tained upon planes with our SG. The Gunnery vfficer, U.S.3. DRAYTON reported as follows: Luring the past few weeks considerable time has been spent in instruction and discussion of night torpedo plane attacks. h'hen the initial flare was dropped all hands man­ ned their battle stations promptly and there seemed to be no doubt in anyone's mind as to what was about to occur and the action desired to combat it. Control was kept well informed at all times by the SC radar of bearings and distances of all planes approaching the foriation. Attempt was made to pick up as many of these planes as possible on the FD radar. This radar was in fine operating condition and most of these attempts were success­ ful but unfortunately nearly all remained outside of gun range and could not be fired on. On one occasion just be­ fore the torpedo planes came in the FD radar picked up a plane Ythich had been dropping flares . The plane was at a position angle of around 35° - 40° and range about 4,500 yards. The battery was matching with the director but just as I was about to open fire radar contact was lost due to inability of the director pointer and trainer to follow their pips. This case of a plane at close range and fairly high position angle presents a very difficult problem for the director pointer and trainer to handle by radar due to the rapidly changing bearing and elevation. A total of 14 rounds were fired from the 5"/38 battery. Of t11ese 8 were fired by gun ff4 in local control at a plane on our starboard ouarter passing astern. The Qirector was unable to pick up this plane before it went into the "blinds". The gun captain of gun ff4 picked it up and continued firing until the plane approached the bearing of the transports at which time he ceased fire. Several machine guns also fired on this plane but it is not believed any hits were made on it by this vessel. The plane was, however, observed to crash into the water as the transports commenced firing at it and it is possible that we might have inflicted some damage. The remaining rounds were fired in director control at a plane approaching on the port bow and which was only seen for a

39-11 SZCRET very short time by the director crew. Our machine guns also fired on this plane during which time another destroyer was also observed to be firing at it. It was observed to crash into the water and smoke but dirl not burn . Of the 14 rounds fired by the 5" battery, 5 of them were projectiles with .~ark 32 fuzes. Due to the darkness it was not possible to observe their performance. One projectile wi tn the ~.'.ari<: 32 fuze was unloaded through the muzzle the followln~ mornin~ and gave a premature burst at an estim9ted range of 1,500 yards.

u. s. s. corrr.~GHN.1.

The initial contact on shadowin~ !)lanes was nade by the DRAYTOr: by SC radar. The escort formed in circular dis­ position !!round the convoy 9.t a distance of from three to four thousand yards in order to afford protection from all directions . .and 10 to 15 knots fro:n southeast. Sea light swells and wave$ . Visibility, hazy. Bright moon shining through cloud overcast. ::.tips visible at five thousand yards. Planes visible not over 2,500 yards.

CHRO.l~OLOGICAL LOG OF BATTLE.

TII.iE E'IENT

1856 DRAY~ON report two unidentified planes bearing 150c T., distant 15 miles. 1857 :1.anned battle stations. Cut in all boilers, two of which had been in standby condition.

1900 ?icked up shadowing plane on bearing 205° T . , distance 8 , 400 yards. This plane was tracked by SC radar as it circled astern and approached to drop flares .

1904 ~ighted flashing lights at intervals on hor izon between bearings 200° T. , and 135° T. (Appar ently float lights). 1910 ,/hite flare dropped on starboard quarter. Shadow- ing plane bearing 210! T. , distant 8 , 100 yar ds .

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TIME EVENT 1922 CONYNGHA.\: taking station south of convoy at 3, 000- 4, 000 yards to ecualize spacing. 1924 Shadowing plane bearing 245< T., distant 8,950 yards. Fro~ this point on this vessel remained in a direction generally south of the convoy at 3,000- 4,000 yards. The convoy was maneuvered ''ith 45° changes of course at short intervals. The courses anJ speeds of this ship did not corres9ond to move­ ~ents of the convoy at all times d~e to flaneuvers to eoualize spacin~ and keep a maximum number of guns bearing on approachin · aircraft, as the bear­ ings of the latter reached tne connin~ officer from C.I.C.

1925 ~hadowing plane 185< T., distant 7,950 yards. 1926 vhadowing plane bearin5 175° T., distant 5,950 yards. 1927 3hadowing plane bearing 125° T., distant 6,300 yards.

1928 ~hadowing plane bearing 075° T., distant 5,400 yards. 1929 Shadowing plane bearing 000° T., distent 9,000 yards. 1930 Jhadowing plane bei:irin12; 000° T., distant 9,350 yards.

1932 ~h~dowing plane dropped white flere. 1935 Continuous tracking and plottine showed that there were three shAdowing plane ~ , one in an area 9-10,000 yards in a northerly direction from this vessel drop­ ping flares to mark the convoy, the second in an area 10-13,000 yards between bearin3s 180° and 225° T., the third in an area 8-13,000 yards between bearings 220° T., and 280° T. Conti~ued search for attack group.

1943 ~hadowing plane dropped a green shower flare over the convoy. Concentrated ~c search in exposed arc between adjacent screening vessels on each side of CONYNGHA.\J.

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TIME EVENT

1956 GRAYSO~ and LARDNER opened fire on target in their sector to northward.

1957 Sin~le plane bearing 190° T., distant 11,500 yards. 1958 ~Rme plane bearing 180° T., distant 10,500 yards. 1959 ~a~e plane bearing 140° T., distant 9,550 yards. 2000 Ficked up about ten planes between bearings of 160° and 200° T., at ranges between 12,000 and 25,000 v~rds. These planes appeared to be comine in singly at range intervals of three thousand yards . Ranges and bear­ ings of the nearest plane were furnished direct to the bridve and control from radar until planes were ;.i. tb.in firing ran~e at which time the next plane was "talked in". 'fhe attacking planes appeared to maneuver radi­ cally coming in.

2004 Jeveral unidentified snips of the convoy commenced firing.

2u05 One plane crashed in flames bearing 190° T., distant 5,000 yards.

2008 Opened fire with 40mm . and 20mm. on plane on starboard ouarter. Plane caugnt fire and crashed in about 10 sec­ onus.

2010 Ordered 5" battery to open fire on plane on port bow but checked fire before firing because plane crashed in flames, oresumably from fire by MAURY and CRAVEN. 2012 Plane crashed in flames 5,000 yards on starboard ('1Uarter.

Opened fire with 20mrn. and 40mm. on plane on port bow in conjunction with two other vessels, probably CRAVEN and MAURY. Plane crashed in flames. (Ship turning rapidly to starboard at this time). Observed splash 3,000 yards on port ouarter and vague shape of a plane not previously seen rapidly turning away to the rear. It is believed the splash was from a jettisoned torpedo of which no evidence was there­ after seen. No report was made at this time since the torpedo was headed away from the disposition and no

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TIME EVENT purpose would have been served by using the TBS circuit. Two planes '"ere observed withdrawing to the westward with incipient fires starting. No further observation of these planes was made. Two columns of smoke ~ithout flames were observed later rising from the water surface indicating crashed planes. No other planes appeared to be coming in. All firing ceased. Planes were tracked as they circled away from the formation in an east­ erly direction changing to south and southwest. The last radar contacts on the planes were at 20,000 yards on bearing 207° T. COMMENTS ON' EITT:.IT FORCES. Use of float lights and flares. Float lights were observed over a considerable arc of the horizon in the general direction from which the torpedo attacks developed. Shortly thereafter a white flare was dropped over the convoy. White flares were iropped at intervals apparently to mark the location of the con­ voy. A green shower light was dropr,ed shortly before the initial attack, apparently as a starting signal. Any element of surprise which might have been attained by the enemy was lost due to the long interval between the initial use of flares and the actual attack. Planes arriving at the formation singly afforded opportunity to fire on all planes within range and to shift to new targets being tracked in. It is especially notable that the enemy planes were well muffled. They could not be heard nor could any sign of exhaust flame be seen when they were close aboard. The only information on the attack on the CHICAGO available to the commanding officer, that appearing in the Radio Press, indicated exhaust flames were visible in that attack. COMMENTS ON O;IN FORCES. The illuminated reticule of the Mark 14 sights and the Mark 51 director can not be used at night on an unilluminated target. The illumination blinds the pointer so that he can not see the target when using the lowest illumination. Ring sights on the Mark 51 director and tracer control on the 20mm. guns were used. On this vessel the SC and SG radars are on the bridge level while the combat operations center is located below the bridge level in the chart house. The moat satisfactory 39-15 SECRET

results have been obtained by placing the executive officer in the radar room to direct the search and tracking, in­ cluding sound, and to have another experienced officer in combat operations center to determine general movements of enemy planes. During the actual attack the situation de­ velops too rapidly to rely on plotting. The information on nearest targets was furnished direct to the bridge and control.

Great difficulty was experienced in keepin~ the FD radar Jn tar~ets due probably to limited experience of pointers and trainers, and because of the rapidly changing ranges and bearings. It must be recognized that without visual per­ :eption of the target as in visual pointing the poi~ter and trainer react more slowly.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOM?-~ENDATIONS. It is believed that durinp, a night aircraft attack of this type five-inch gunfire is undesirable, unless a good solution is obtained, for the following reasons: (a) The flash discloses the ships position and outlines the general formation for following planes, and in the case of fire from vessels of the screen, directs approachin~ planes away from danger points. FLASHLESS POWDER IS NOW BECOMING AVAILABLE AND WILL ELIMINATE THIS BLINDING FLASH. HOWEVER, NO FLASHLESS POWDER IS USED IN AMMUNITION OF SHORT RANGE WEAPONS. (b) The flash blinds the control parties and personnel on the automatic weapons. (c) Bursts cannot be spotted. (d) Bursts close aboard are easily mistaken for planes. There was widespread comment on this uoint following the action. Communication bv TBS was very satisfactory mainly be­ cause most ships refrained from using it except on initial contacts. The convoy commander used this system for emer­ ~encv maneuvers. The radar contacts observed by this ship were announced by the escort commander over the TBS practi­ cally simultaneously and no purpose would have been served in duplicating the information. Very apparently other commanding officers followed the same reasoninp:, and throughout the action approach.1-ng planes were announced only by the escort command.er. .Although TBS communications

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proved highly satisfactory in this engagement due probably to appreciation of the importance of keeping the circuit clear, experience during ordinary operations have shown that this means of communications can become hopelessly congested through over-use. It is recommended that a doctrine for the use of TBS in action be promulgated to provide for its use as: {a) A means for reporting initial contacts when other means would be too slow. (b) Emergency maneuvers. (c) An information circuit by a controlling ship. The controlling ship would be the one making the initial contact until the OTC or other designated controlling ship or officer has obtained the reouired information and has the situation in hand. At any time another ship, but only one, could be designatec to take over control. It is recommended that communication plans provide simple code words for radical course and speed changes. The voice card is too slow for use on a darkened bridge in an emergency and the direct reading signals of the general signal book can be easily guessed, if, as we are told is true, the enemy knows our TBS fre uency and listens on it.

U.S.S. PRESIDENT JACKSON. At 1800 Condition II was set on AA battery by order of OTC. This was ordered due to radar contacts received by screen. The first positive visual indication of an impending attack was at 1911. A high intensity aircraft illumination flare appeared on port quarter at a high angle of elevation. Ship went to general quarters and order was given to pre­ pare to repel air attack. OTC gave orders to open fire at discretion - all aircraft considered enemy. Between 1911 until the end of the attack the disposi­ tion was outlined by similar flares. OTC immediately began to maneuver formation by TBS in radical ships turn movements. Ships were informed that a torpedo plane attack was pre­ sumably developing. At 1954 a screening destroyer opened fire. This was the incentive for other ships, including this ship to open fire. It is believed that most of firing was at 5" AA 39-17 SZCRET

bursts . Guns were directed to cease firing until planes were visible as the tracer illumination disclosed position of ship ana handicapped lookouts in sighting actual targets . The first attack came from the south. Radar informa­ tion was excellent so that when planes came within range they were met by a large volume of fire . First plane was shot down at 2005 and fell in a burning mass on the water. The attacks continued at varying intervals and from various directions until 2048 when the radar screen was reported clear . This ship did not fire after 2021.

The firing of this ship was b~ local control and was guided primarily by ~unfirc from escorting destroyers. The attacks were mainly from the port side , outsiue of the left column. Insofar as I could obser ve very few if any ?lanes got within the screen on the starboar d side. The general consensus of opinion in this ship is that five planes were definitely shot down, as indicated by enor1ous fires on the water. One plAne was definitely observed to make a forced landing s everal miles on the starboard auarter. This plane did not burn at this time .

U.S.S. CRESCENT CITY .

The attack developed as follows: At 1911 the first flare was dropped over the formation . Soon after, three flashins liohts were observed on the port and starboard ruarters and astern, distance about four miles. These may have been float flares dropped by the enemy planes around the disposition. At 2000 we were advised via TBS radio that seven toroedo planes were coming in from the south . Flight aoparently flew over formation out of range and then separated to attack singly from different directions. At 2004 first plane made torpedo run on for­ ~ation; this ship and other ships in task unit commenced firing. Kt 2005 one plane went down in flames on the port bow at a considerable distance from this ship. At 2006 two more planes were seen to go down in flames , one to port and one to starboar d , distance not definite . At 2021 observed another plane go down in flames on star boar d quarter, distance about three miles. At 2022 plane crash­ ed in flames on starboar d q uarter , distance about 400 yar ds .

39-18 ::>SC~ET

This plane passed close astern fro~ port to starboard under fire from this and other suips of the formation. As plane passed astern, our 5tt/51 caliber gun fire~ at point blank range, usin• a 5"/38 caliber projectile, fuze set at 0.8 second. Projectile exploded directly at plane, blowing it into two pieces. It crashed in fl&:1es. Fldne showed no atoarent damege fro~ other gunfire until it was hit by our 5" gun. At 2031 PRESILEl~T J."'"C.1<:SON fired burst; however, no plane was sighted. At 2040 advised via TB.:> radio that two enemy planes Nere circling tne formation in a clockwise dirAction, distance about 9 miles. At 2045 same two planes still circling formation. At 2048 advised via TBS radio ttAll Cleartt. All guns fired during the action, a total of 37 rounds. It is not definitely known hov1 'Oany planes came within range of the ~uns of t .is ship. Bowever, we fired on three planes which passed within vision, shooting down one of them with our 5tt/51 caliber gun. ~o torpedoes were seen by this ship to be released. One plane which passed astern of this ship was observed to make an apparently excellent run on the TALLULAH then turn away. Visibility was too poor to observe whether or not he released bis torpedo. The planes which caI'le wi :.hin our vision appeared to be of the :.:i subishi 97 type. From records kept by an officer recorder on the bridge, the ruartermaster's notebook, and from individual reports of the various battery officers, the ships of Task Unit 62.7.2 definitely shot down five of the attackine; _planes.

During the attack a very heavy shock was experienced by this ship, cause was not determined. This ship suffered no damage. It is thou~ht the shock may have been caused by a torpe~o exploding as it crossed a wake, or as it reached the end of its run.

At 2158 the ene~y planes hRving been repelled, all ships of the Task Unit resumed their previous stations and steadied on base course. The Executive Officer of the CRESCENT CITY remarked as follows:

The fir~t warning of an impending attack was a flare evidently released by a plane above the for~ation. There­ after nllI:lerous flares and rockets were released in the vicinity. Astern of t~e formation were noted two flashing lillhts on the surface . The regularity of the flashes was such that I could only account for them by an opinion that two submarines had surfaced and were serving as beacons used

39-19 SECRET

as a reference point by enemy aircraft and/or submarines. One of our destroyers was seen proceeding toward these liuhts, apparently to investi3ate their source.

U.S . S . PRESID~NT ADAMS. Action began at 1912 when enemy plane began dropping flares, also float lights, which occulted regularly, in various positions (bow, beam and quarter} . The float li5hts, w~en first seen, were mistaken for submarines exchanging si 7 nals. After droppin~ of flsres on opposite sides of formetion of the blinkin:i; float lie;hts, enemy plane dropped special meanino- pyrotechnics almost directly over trar1sports; the flares were dropped well off on the flanks as a general rule, but some, however were almost overhead. Kot over two torpedo planes were noted to make simultaneous approaches. Transports were maneuvered by voice radio backed up by whistle sign ls from the Officer in Tactic~! Com..~and using 45° simul­ taneous turns. One enemy sub!l1arine showed a searchli~ht in apparent effort to draw our screen away from tr9.nsports. Only one torpedo was seen by this ship; this tor.edo was dropped on the starboard bow about 400 yards away and was "porpoising" continuously as it ap;iroached our bow, where it eitcer sank or took its depth about 25 yards directly ahead of the bow. Flane which dropped this torpedo banked sharply to the right and passed over the forecastle of the ADA.\~. ~its on this plane were observed before it passed overhead when the plane's engines were seen to oe trailing smoke and the plane gr9dually lost altitude; fire of the entire port battery broue;ht this plane down to the water on the port bean; plane apparently making a fair landin~ and did not catch fire im:nediately. Two other planes were fired upon by the port battery on the port quarter and one was definitely seen to plum>;e and burn fiercely about 15 seconds after we opened fire. Starboard gunners claim hits on a fourth plane which flew parallel to and close to adjacent transport column (aft to forward). This plane landed in flames near a destroyer. Starboard quarter gunners also insist they hi~ a fifth plane which appeared to be attacking the CRESCEi\T CITY. A total of seven raeing fires were seen on the water, all resulting from planes shot down. Three heavy underwater explosions were felt in the ship, which were considered to be ene~y torpedoes (from planes) explodino- at the end of their run. Radar reports, after action ceased, indicated there was still one enemy plane (possibly two} in the air. There was no air coverage by own planes during the action. 39-20 s::::c~ET

Bright, almost full moon, help~d our cause immensely, enabling the screenine; shin::; to ope11 fire anu point out the attacking plenes in most cases 1011 befo.e ti ey got inside the screen. The radical maneuver11~ oy tne ~Tc is believed to have frustrated well coorain~ted attac~s, taus ~llowiru• us to deal with ene~r planes in singles or pairs. The flash of own 3"/50 gunfire blinded adjacent 20:nr:i. ·unners and for a si:nil"l.r action, 3"/50 battery .. 111 not te used in the future. j;ei ther the transports nor the screen use l illt.::ni­ nation of any ki1.d. The Executive Officer of the FRE.::iIIJENT ADA;,;S re:narked as follows: The chief noteworthy incident w&s the systenatic 1lethod used by the enemy to thoroughly illQ~inate their target with flares and marking li~hts. In spite 01 a fairly good moon, at least six flares were cropoed over the general area of our task force, the last flare crop~ed bei1g overhead and slightly ahead and containing a del~yed reen-star cluster. This is surmised to hAve been the "go-a~e 's1·r~. tor the actual torpedo plane attack. Bet~een th t ~e of t~e first flare and this last green-star cl~ ter, oa li~hts were system­ atically dropped (which li ~~du· n f ~ •• n· in the water) in a lar·e circle (diameter est~- to b~ ibout 3 ~iles . These were orange colored ~i "Lts se~~ed to have an intermittent, sip;nal-like actio1. "''l~ t1 ..i~ .~ occurs to me that, in addition to servin· '3.S a ~~rker over wn1ch the attacking planes were to loose altituae, these float li,hts could well have been desirneu as a decoy t our destroyers, ~endina to draw our escort A~ay in order to conduct an ex­ amination, and thus leAve the tr3nsports unprotected.

It is believe( that Lne parachute type fl~res were dropped by a float-plane. 1cfter the first flare, a pLwe ~otor was he~rd inter~itte~tly by ~any persons. I, per­ sonally, saw this flare-lPying plane as it passed close to the ~oon And short~y after the first one or two flares had li~hted . Its motors made the typical "one-lung" sound and it was flying slowly in an easterly direction (fron which sector a subseouent flare lighted) and it s altitude was about five thousand feet. A further observation which bears out this theory of a separate flare-laying plane is the fact that the motors of the attacking planes were practi­ cally noiseless . The fire control discipline of the battery was out­ standing. 1li th local control the order, it was incumbent on each pointer to bear in mind our own adj~cent ships and those

39-21 SECRET

of the screen, which were , throughout the attack, on each beam and quarter. This was successfully done , and in one instance, at least, fire from 3" gun Dog was correctly with­ held until the horizontal ran~e was clear . The fact that the 3" gun flashes temporarily blinded the 3" gun ' s crews and also the nearby 20mm . gunners,makes the conduct of the gun pointers especially noteworthy. U.S .S. PRESIDENT HAYES. At or about 2004 destroyer ahead opened action by firing on one plane . Thereafter the action developed into a melee with all surface ships firing as enemy torpedo planes drove home their attack. The enemy plan was appareutly a divided attack with planes coming in from the northeast sector and another group from the southwest sector. These planes drove in, one sli~htly behind the other, which was gre9tly to our advantage . Had they driven in simultaneously , it is doubtful if we would have been ~ble to cover more than one, or two . As it was, the coverage was good and t he results highly satisfactory . Three torpedoes were observed from this ship , one which crossed astern with the bubble track about 300 yards clear of ship's stern, one which ran parallel to port side about 50 yards clear of ship, and one which had expended itself and was seen in an upright position floating along the port side about 25 yards off. The explosion which was felt at 2007 caused circuit breakers to trip out in enginer oom, electric lights jarred out and gauge glasses were broken in several instances in engineering spaces. No disturbance of the water was seen near the ship and exact cause is unknown. These ~ffects were immediately corrected so that no reduction of ship's eruipment was experienced.

co~.XENTS .

The blindine effect from gun blasts and tracers was most noticeable on the bridge and at the fire control station . The addition of any more guns in this immediate vicinity is not recommended .

The exhaust fla~es of attacking planes made an excellent point of aim and were of great assistance to accurate shoot­ ing . The absolute necessity for local control during an air attack was magnified by the multiplicity of targets and the inability of one control party to cover the entire picture, with the added drawback of blinding effect of flashes as mentioned above. This accentuated the necessity of having 39-22 SSCRET

trained battery officers and gun captains who must be practi­ cally on their own after Mcommence firingM is given. The advantages of radar installations and the necessity for such equipment on all ships cannot be emphasized enoup;h. Thie ship, though aware that enemy craft were in the immedi­ ate vicinity of the formation, could not locate them, or determine their number or type until they actually started to drive home the torpedo plane attack.

The radical chan~es of course employed by the Task Unit Commander completely baffled the attackin~ Planes and re­ sulted in this ship twice turning clear of the run of tor­ pedoes thoup;h no torpedo wakes could be seen from this ship until they were too close to be avoided by maneuvering. It is recommended that radar be installed on this type of ship as soon as possible. The slowness of operation of the 3N/50 caliber guns and the antiquated fuse-setting equipment on this ship makes these weapons practically useless for repelling a surprise attack, or a dive bombing attack. It is most urgently recommended that these guns be replaced as soon as possible with twin 40mm. machine $(\lllS, or some suitable gun capable of quick operation for use a~alnst surprise, or dive bomb­ i~ attacks.

The advanta~e of the TBS equipment was emphasized in this en~agement to fac111tate quick maneuver!~.

U.S.S. MAURY.

In all, this vessel fired on twelve dlffere~t targets estimated to have been made up of at least ten different planes. These were in a comparatively small sector. From this and observed firings of other ships, it ls believed the Japanese force consisted of about eighteen planes. In other words two squadrons of torpedo planes. Thie vessel definitely shot down two planes which were each witnessed by at least three officers and many reliable enlisted men. Neither of these planes were fired on by any other vessel. One crashed in flames and the other did not burn. Five burning enemy planes were observed - one each close aboard the CRAVEN and CONYNGHAM and also one close aboard the transports. The fifth cannot be definitely located.

39-23 SZCRET

Six planes were definitely observed destroyed fr~m this vessel. There can be no doubt that others were shot down that did not burn. Plane shot down by five i c~ often crash without burnin~. In other air attacke :xperi­ enced, far lees than half the plan~s shot down burned Cf five torpedo planes observed shot down close to ttie veeeel on October 26, only one wae observed to burr. It therefore seems reasonable to place the enemy losses con­ siderably higher than the six observed. The comma ~ding officer's estimate, taking all factors in consideration, is that possibly twelve enemy planes were destroyed and at least eix escaped. The Task Unit Commander maneuvered the formation bv 45 degree ships turns at a speed of about 16 knots Thie vessel maneuvered more radically at times increasing speed to 20 and 25 knots, maintaining equal screen spacing and keeping battery uncovered when targets were available. At the time the torpedo drops were made, the ship wae swinging towards the attacking planes. The first ·orpedo was not seen by the commandin~ officer at time of droppinp; nor later. This he thinks wae due to gun flashes ~rom tte forward gune. However, from the action of the Plane in pulling up and away, he is convinced the torpedo ~as launched. The second drop was clearly seen, even thou~h the plane was not immediately visible. The track ~f this torpedo was followed down the port side. During night torpedo plane attack, the splash of a torpedo will be more quickly seen than the plane. There­ fore, connin~ officers should watch the surface for the splashes and it might be advantageous to place a responsi­ ble lookout forward away from the gun flashes to watch for and report torpedo splashes.

The sound operators reported both torpedoes. ~owever, they were too close aboard for any action to be taken on their report or for them to obtain any but general bearings. However, it ie believed the sound gear would give accurate bearin~e on a more distant torpedo in sufficient time for avoiding action to be taken. The eoundmen also reported five underwater explosions, believed to have been torpedoes at the end of their run. The machine gunners reported less trouble from gun flashes than was anticipated. The exhaust flames offer an excellent and an easily seen point of aim. The ~unners express surprising little difficulty. One gunner continued

39-24 SZC~ET

t o serve hie gun in spite of very severe gun blasts from the adJa cent five- inch gun. The blast was of sufficient severity to tear loose the gun shield and to blow off the cartridge bag . He was largely responsible for shooting down the plane on our port side. The radars both performed perfectly. The SC-1 plot was of ~reat value and contributed much to the engagement. The tracking party kept control and conn continually in­ formed of the plot and kept the FD coached on the closest and most likely target. The coordination of the two radars under these conditions was very ~ratifying. Fla shles s powder was used until all was expended. While it l asted there was no difficulty from gun flashes. But after it had been expended, gun flashes made it all but impossible to see on certain bearings from the bridge. It i s strongl y recommended that destroyers carry sufficient flashless powder for one night engagement. The commanding officer feels thi s is very necessary and impor tant. It is disappointing that r esults of the Mark 32 fuse could not be observed. The a ttack offered a n excellent opportunity t o prove their worth. Our bur st a ppea red near t he t a r get s and one Mark 32 might have b urst close t o t he plane t hat passed down our port side. Ther e is some que s tion as to the ruggedness of t he fuse . Trouble i n removing from shell racks and in handling in fuse sett ers resulted in cracked and loose fuses. In spite of the fact that no torpedo hits were made and plane losses were heavy, the commanding officer be­ lieves this form of attack has a very high chance of success . Thie particular attack was not too skillfully executed. I t ie believed that the accuracy of the five-inch fire under radar control was a surprise to the enemy and as a result some turned away and others made drops on screen ve ssels. For some reason t he att ackers gave the impression of being conf used . I t ie believed t hat t he best d efense agains t night tor pedo plane a tta ck as against da y torpedo a ttack i s a full c i rcular destr oyer scr een . As a general rule, those planes not shot down by the sc r een wi ll l aunch torpedoes even thow;r;h shot down by the screened vessels. In other words, the vessel that.shoots down the plane is most likely to have to dodge its torpedo. It appears that at present torpedo planes are shot down too close aboard to defea t their

39-25 SECRET

attack. As a rule the screening vessel has planes coming from only one ~eneral direction, and adequate room to ma­ neuver, therefore, is enabled to parallel most attacks . In the October attack on the ENTERPRISE, the torpedo ulanes i~nored the screen and passed very close aboard and those shot down by the screen carried their torpedo with them. It is believed this will usually be the case. The fact that torpedo drops were made on a screen vessel in this attack is contributed to their confusion.

39-26 s::::cRET

CHAPTER XL BOMBARDMENT OF HOLTZ BAY AND CHICHAGOF HARBOR 18 FEBRUARY 1943 AND THE SINKING OF A JAPANESE MARU NIGHT OF 19-20 FEBRUARY 1943.

Task Group 8.6 composed of RICHMOND, INDIANAPOLIS, BANCROFT, GILLESPIE, COGHLAN and CALDWELL, was operating in AlaeAan waters west of Attu Island covering convoy move­ ments and prepared to intercept and destroy enemy Maru•e. On 18 February, Task Group 8.6 proceeded to carry out a bombardment of Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor on Attu Island upon completion or which the Task Group resumed operations for intercepting and destroying enemy Maru•s. During the evening or 19 February, taPk unit consist­ ing of INDIANAPOLIS, COGHLAN and GILLESPIE made sight con­ tact with a Japanese Maru. The task unit concentrated, cloaed and attacked. The Maru aank at 0125/20 after the ships of the task unit had expended 6 torpedoe~, 10? rounda of 8 11 , ?? rounds 5 11 common, and 20 rounds of 5" illuminating projectiles. As a result of the bombardment, the Task Group Command­ er and the Commanding Officers reported as follows; COMMANDER TASK GROUP 8.6 On the afternoon of 18 February, two cruisers and four destroyers of Task Group 8.6 bombarded enemy installations at Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor. Few installations and no enemy personnel were sighted either fro~ shipe or cruiser planes. No opposition was encountered except ineffective AA fire at spotting planes from Holtz Bay by a battery of three or four guns estimated as three-inch. Large number of shells landed in target areas but fires started were in­ consequential in the few and scattered installations. Some damaP.:i:i was apparently donP but the bombardment was of prin­ cipal value as a target practice. A bombardment for 20 February had been planned in accordance with despatch directive from Commander Task

40-1 SECRET

Force EIGHT and the bombardment plan had been issued to all ships. A report from a submarine or possible enemy shipping in the area, however, had reAulted in bringing the Task Group orf Holtz Bay in the afternoon of the 18th. No shipping was present but conditions were ravorable for bom­ bardment. As the harbors in question are frequently closed in, as composition cf our force and its preRence was defi­ nitely disclosed, and as a bombardment was scheduled for two days later, it was determined to take advantage of the favorable circumstances to attack. Thia decision ~as further fortified by the idea of withdrawing eastwards on completion; and, under cover of darkness, to resume oper­ ations westward against enemy shipping. That action paid dividends because an enemy AK or AE was intercepted and sunk the night of the 19th. About 1230 while enroute from the westward the Task Group was picked up and tracked by two enemy float planes. Thoee planes remained well out of ~un range and made no interfsrence with the attack or wi~h our spotting planes. They retired to the westward durinf the attack and resumed tracking after we recoverP.n the spotting planes. They did, however, drive under a friendly subms.rine that surfaced a few miles westward of Holtz. A vafue re­ port from this submarine made before dawn had drawn the Task Group to the area. After firing its recognition si~nal the suomarine surfaced and endeavored to signal that the report was erroneous. The enemy planes, however, promptly drove it under. During the initial approach the Army four motored weather plane made a bombinv run out of the sun at an alti­ tude of about 8000 feet. Fire on it was promptly opened by RICHMOND, but immediately checked by order of Task Force Commander, although the bomb doors were seen open. A few rounds were also fired by other ships before T.B.S. orders stopped t hem. As soon as slfhted this plane was definitely ldentif~~d ae a friendly type althou~h its movements were distinctly hostile.

THIS IS ANOTHER IN~TANCE OF FRIENDLY PLANES ATT.ACKrnG OUR FORCES. GREATER EFFORTS MUST BE MADE BY BOTH SURFACE AND AIR FORCES TO PERFECT IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION IF WE ARE TO AVOID UNNECESSARY LOSSES AND CASUALTIES. It hs.e been later learned that the plane knew the compo­ sl tion of our force and that it was in the vicinity of Attu 40-2 SZCRET

and that the Task Force Commander had ornered it to attack shipping, if any, at Holtz Bay prior to sunset. Non~theless, 1t reported the force as two cruisPrs, two AK, and two ships unidentified. Moreover it made a run to bomb, and only frozen rele~ees prevented the bombs from being dropped. Visibility was extremely high, sea smooth with oome swellA from ncrth, wind about 210 force three. On close approach to Holtz Bay a loose column was formed with two destroyers in van, ten degrees on each bow, then two cruisers and two destroyers in rear, ten degrees on each quarter. About 1400 launched cruiser aircraft, one for O.T.C., one for A.S. patrol, one for RICHMOND spot, one for l1WIANAPOLIS spot, one for destroyer spot. (INDIANAPOUS was unable to launch her fourth plane). During approach arrangement£1 were completed for de­ struction of any shipping present and for counter-battery fire. Ships were informed that if no shipping wae present the bombardment planned for 20th would be carried out. Planes reported no shipping present. Configuration of land makee it iffipossible for surface craft to see the inner ports of Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor except for a brief space directly opposite the entrances. Lack of well definea landmarks made very accu­ rate navigation impossible. Some apparent inconsistencies in cherta added to this difficulty. Lack of soundings on charts made it inadvisable to skirt headlanda too closely. Possible presence of submarines made variations in course and speed advisable. In these circumstances it was deemed advisable to ~ake a rehearsal run before firing. This was done and as a consequence Phase B (Chichagof bomb~rdment) preceded Phase A (Holt?. Bay bombardment). Chichagor Harbor was bombarded from 1504 to 1516 (W) range to innermost portion of harbor about 13,0CO yards. Holtz Bay was bombarded from 1625 to 163? range to inner­ most part of harbor about 15,000 yards. The damage done to the enemy was small, but the gunnery training to the participating shipe was very valu­ able. The opportunity to fire the guns at all against the

40-3 SECRET

enemy was a great boost to morale. Plane spot us1ng voice operated, with some degree of success. Coneider1n.g lack of training in this regard, and the few opportunit'1 s for using the radio in aircraft or even for flying at all too much was not to be expected. N 1etheless discipline c~ the circuits was poor, and the ~erformance in that regard was on the amateurish e1de. Lvery effort will be continued to bring about improvement. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PLANE AND SHIP AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE CANNOT BE EMPHASIZED TOO MUCH. DBILLS MUST BE IMPROVISED AND TECHNIQUE PERFECTED. The performance as a whole was not one to raise high t e hopes of ~reat damage against shore installations even ~ h en little opposition is encountered. OBSERVATIONS (a) At Holtz Bay there was fairly accurate antiair­ craft fire at our aircraft from a battery about 100 yards from shore in eastern arm, and possibly some antiaircraft fire from western arm. Total number of antiaircraft guns was estimated from four to six, and not larger than 3-inch. (b) AtChichagofthere was uo opposing fire of any sort, nor was any one obeP.rved. (c) Our planes operated freely over the area without enemy plane opposition. (d) Along the stream which empties into western arm of Holtz Bay, there appeared signs of storage dumps. There were indications of excavations around Holtz Bay but no signs of any motorized equipment. (e) Six small boats were drawn up on beach at Chichagof and four were moored in harbor. These were straffed by our planes. (f) It is believed that huts and observation poets were seen by planes at Massacre and Ne1rd1skov Bays.

(g) No si~ns of radio or radar stations were observed.

40-4 S.SCRET

OPINIONS (a) That some material damage was done to shore instal­ lations, but no fires were started of any conse­ quence. (b) That total perMnnel on Attu is probably not over two to three hundred, with nearly all of them at Holtz Bay. (c) That these harbors were being used to base float planes while scouting western approaches to Kiska, and also as a retreat whenever KiskR le heavily attacked by our own air planes. (d) That these harbors could be and probably are used as a stopping place for float planes being flown from Horomushlro to Kiska.

(e) That a relatively small landin ~ f orce could seize G ~ ic hagof with limited opposition. Thie landing could be coordinated with air bombardment of Holtz Bay, and supported by surface forces.

U. S.S. BANCROFT

1352 Cruisers began launching planes - two ( 2) OS2U 1 e from RICHMOND, three l3) SOC 1 a from INDIANAPOLIS. Began callin~ INDIANAPOLIS Plane 3 on assigned frequency (3815 KGS) tut was unable to establish communication. INDIANAPOLIS in­ f or med us by visual that No. 4 would cpot for us using 3815 KCS primary and 3985 secondary. An INDIANAPOLIS plane called us by visual and asked if we were calling on 3815 KOS. During the next two and one-half hours the GILLESPIE and BANCROFT were in good communication with each other on the spotting frequency, but neither sh1p was abl.e to raise the plane. The plane was not heard oo the secondary fre4uency either. Aside from the v1sual message al.ready mentioned, the plane was not observed attempting to communt.cate by visual with W!I. SECRET

THIS CONDITION OCCURS TOO FREQUENTLY. IT APPEARS THAT SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS AND ATTENTION IS NOT BEING GIVEN TO PLANE VS SHIP COMMUNICA­ TIONS. 1405 Observed red smoke bomb recognition siEnal from what was probably S-28, close inAhcre off entrance of Holtz Bay. 1410 Changed speed to 25 knots forming special modi­ fied column in order BANCROFT, GILLESPIE, RICHMOND, INDIANAPOLIS, COGHLAN, CALDWELL. 1245 Observed our planes to be under fire from enemy anti-aircraft batteries in the vicinity of Holtz Bay. 142? Formation executed turn move­ ment to course 155°T. An Army B-24, which had been picked up by Radar and identified visually, crossed the formation on a northerly course at an altitude of about 20,000 feet. 1430 Observed some ships of the formation open fire on B- 24 but cPeee firing was executed immediately on orders of Commander Task Group 8.6. THE BANCROFT APPEARS TO BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY PLANES. 1435 Formation changed course by turn movement to 130°T. At this time Holtz Bay andChichagofHarbor had been passed on a line about four (4) miles off the entrance. Close observation in prevailing excellent visibility indi­ cated that there were no ships at either anchorage. Com­ mander Task Group 8.6 announced that hie Operation Order 2-43, Phase Baker, would be effective on the next run pass­ ing Chichagof. 1452 Formation reversed course by turn move­ ment to 310°T. 1454 Changed speed to 18 knots. During the approach BANCROFT checked position by navigational bearinfs and set up dead reckoning tracer and tracker in exact re­ lation with the target area. Once the turn had been made to a firing course, ranges and bearings to the target are& were sent to the fire control party from the Chart House continuously until firing com~enced. The fire control party easily identified the target area but were unable to discern important features upon which fire should be con­ cP.ntrated. The area appeared to be a . sector or a high bluff completely snow-covered and devoid of man made installations. 1505 Firing was commenced on flaghoist signal from Flagship. 1515 Ceased firing on signal. 151? Formation turned to 3~4°T. 1518 Changed speed to 22 knots. 1525 Formation changed course by turn to 305°T. 1530 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1543 Changed speed to 18 knots. 1545 Formation chan~ed course by turn to 130oT. 1550 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1556 Formation changed course to 280°T. by turn. 1605 Formation turned to course 130°T. Gunnery Officer

40-6 SSCRET

reported that range appeared to be extreme on this run, and that guns might not be able to reach target. 1615 Formation turned to course 170°T. 1616 Formation turned to course 130°T. 1625 Executed Phase Affirm of Commander Task Group 8.6 Operation Order 2-43 - commenced firing on target. 1626 BANCROFT made a temporary course change to the right to close range, then turned back to base courAe on starboard bow of RICHMOND and resumed firing. 1633 BANCROFT ceased firin~. 1637 Task Group ceased firing on sifnal. 1639 For~ation turned to 0400T. 1640 Chan~ed speed to 22 knots. 1706 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1716 Formation turned to ll5°T. 1721 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1723 Changed speed to 20 knote. Destroyers formed anti-submarine screen 1n loose formation ahead of cruisers who were about to recover air­ craft, 1725 Cnan~ed speed to 15 knots. 1730 Cruisers commenced recovering aircraft at speed 10 knots, destroyers patrolling at 12 knots on station ahead. 1745 Changed sp~ed to 15 knots, cruis~rs having completed recovery of aircraft, DOG method. 1752 Group formed on RICHMOND on course 090°T., speed 15 knots in normal order. The extent of damage caused by BANCROFT'S fire could not be determined b~cause no communication was established with assigned scouting plane, and the ranges were too long for ~ood visual observation from the ship. Target areas were effectively covered and any enemy works within the areas must have received dama~e. Thie firing wa~ highly valuable to the traininr and organ11ation of the BANCROFT ae it was the first extensive test of ordnance material since commissioning. PHASE "B" Fire was opened in full director control, guns in automatic, director trained on the beach-heed and range­ finder ranging on it. An up 500 yard spot was applied at the rangefinder spot knob and ladders and soreads were applied with the computer's present ranr:e crank. Salvo fire, with a five (5) second salvo interval, fired from the stable element, using continuous aim was employed. At 1505 commenced firinr, range 12,500. Fired a down spread of three 500 yard steps then started an up ladder from the third salvo which should have hit the water's edge. Salvos 1 and 2 hit target area with salvo 3 Just in the water. The range pattern was small (about 100 yards) and deflection pattern less than 2 mile. Up and down ladders, 200 yard steps, were used with deflection spotting to cover the area. No specific targets were visible. Arter salvo

40-7 SECRET

12. Gun No. 4 reported shell hoiat out, hoisting shells by hand. After 30 salvos, fire was checked. This was the first sustained firing for this crew and several buzzers were missed. Fire was resumed at 1509-40 11 and ceased 11t 1511-20". Fifty (50) salvos were fired, 18? rounds expended; Gun No. 1 having fired only 0? salvos due to shell hoist casualty. PHASE "A" This area is deep in the harbor at Holtz Bay, and was shielded from the Bhip during the approach by a rocky pe­ ninsula on the northwest bay arm. Fire was controlled as before. Navigational range was set on the computer and allowed to generate. Generated ranfe checked with navi­ gational ranges and at 1625 fire was opened, range about 161 000 yardA. Ten salvos were !ired and then fire checked to observe the results. As the high percentage of these were short in the water, the ship was turned right 20° and ran~e closr.d about 800 yards when fire was resumed. Spotted up 1000 yards and fired 10 salvoa. There were still some short of the target area so the present range was cranked to 18 000 yards ahd the remainder of the run fired with gune matching in train and elevation in low power. The area was covered as in Phase "BM by means of an up and down ladder with deflection spot. The battery performance on the second phase was much i mpr oved. Guns No. 1 and No. 2 made all buzzers, Gun No. 3 ~ iPs ed only on~. Gun No. 4 had a recurrence of hoist trouble. Aml:lunition replacement from the magazines greatly l mproved and the upper rooms had few empty tanks at cease firing The greatest bottleneck was the removal of fuse cov ers from the projectiles coming from the magazines. When going out on future extended operationa1 it is the plan of this ship to remove ruse covers on abou~ fifty shells in each ma~azine, clean up the screw threads and tighten the covers on hand tight. Repair parties were instructed to·watch the guns for severe heating and to wet them down with hoses if necessary. On both phaaes they sprayed the guns but this was believed to be unnecessary ae the guns never became excessively hot. On each check fire. guns were instructed to cease loading and one additional salvo was fired to olear the guns.

NO PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE IS GAINED BY SPRAYING HOT GUNS. NO PARTICULAR HARM IS DONE EITHER BUT ALL SIDES SHOULD BE SPRAYED. SSCRET

U.S.S. RICHMOND Weather conditions during the day or the bombardment or Holtz Bay and Chichagor Harbor. Attu Island, were excellent . Accurate tracking during the approach run proved difficult since the present charts are apparently not accurate and many prominent landmarks either cannot be locat~d on the chart or are incorrectly located. Any indirect fire from navigational data alone would probably be very inaccurate. Communications except ror the voice communication be­ tween RICHMOND and her plane number one were very satis­ factory on the whole. It is believed that communications between plane and ship will be satisfactory as opportunity permits working the plane on the various frequencies . EVERY OPPORTUNITY MUST BE TAKEN TO PERFECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIP AND PLANE. Although subjected to some antiaircraft fire rrom enemy inetallations. the planes got their observations through to the ship thro~hout the rune. No enemy aircraft interfered although one enemy float plane wae shadowing the force the entire day from a distance or about 15 miles. PREPARATION The preparations for firing followed the routine war­ time checkoff list. The ready service ammunition which is normally carried in the two guns and on the citadel deck wae distributed evenly for the entire battery so that the two twine had powder or a temperature comparaQle to that or the single mounts. The ready eerYice powder temperature averages 35or. while the average magazine temperature is 60°F. The initial ballistic le or utmost importance in thle area. The 300 high capacity projectiles were fused with point detonation fusee and carried in the ready racks. Normally 150 H.C. projectiles are evenly distributed in the ready racks fused with the 45-eecond mechanical time fusee. A table was prepared tor the conversion or deflection spots 1n yards to deflection in mile. Detailed sketches or the area to be bombarded were made and provided at the con­ trol stations. Arrangements were made to receive TBK voice transmission in forward control from the spotting plane.

40-9 s.:::cRET

The forward cor.trol rad1oman transm1tted all sh1p data to the plane v1a key.

TRAINING

The training followed the r~gular sunrise battle station procedure. Control runs for various typa;of firing .,,,ere conducted daily after which the guns conducted loading drill. The twin mounts hold a daily loading drill while the single mounts alternate each day at the loading machine. Coordinated procedure between the fire control party and the spotting plane was conducted by having the regular spotting personnel communicate by telegraph key between after and forward control. The navigator and the rsngefinders were decided to be the source of an accurate opening range, the latter to be t.:.Red or.ly if good weather were encountered. CONDUCT OF THE BOMBARDMENT The tactical situation required direct fire on indis­ tinct targets in Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay. The ship's planes were catapulted about 1400, one plane observed for the O.T.C. and tr.e other for the ship'~ fall of shot. Antiaircraft fire was encour.tered by these planes with negligible reqult8. Rangefinder ranges were available and utilized in con­ junction with the navigation ran£es furnished by the navi­ gator. At the entrance to each harbor are small islands or jagfed protrusions which are not snow covered and can be utilized for rangefinder and radar ranges. Tt.e FC radar was not utilized as the antenna was frozen in trair. due to failure of the heater in the pedestal. Tt.ie was discovered at th~ morning general quarters drill during the routine test of the FC radar. Ae the Operation Plan was placed into effect immediately after general quarters, the radar could not be repaired in time for tlie bombardment. A di­ rector check in elevation was attained enroute to the firing point. The approach was made on navigational fixes and the rangekeeper set-up made on the estimate of the range at the initial or firin~ point. The RICHMOND opened fire to port for the first run at a navigational range or 11,000 yards with an initial "up" ballistic of l40C yard~. The visibility was excellent but 40-10 SSC:-l.ET

due to the lack of definite targets in the assigned areA, the point or aim was the waterline. Fall of shot was accu­ rate and aircraft spots were obtained and used in conjunction with the foretop spotter's own observations. The second run was to starboard and started at an esti­ ~eted navigational range of 14,500 yards; an initial "up" ballistic of 2000 yards was applied. The fall of shot was short for the first three salvos, after which the spotter's correction took effect and the assigned area was effectively covered . During the firing the long shadows of high peaks in the background were making the features of the beach in­ distinct, although the Control Party had little difficulty in locating a point of aim. If firing had been 30 minutes later, much difficulty probably would have resulted.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~ENDATIONS The light cruisers or this class when used in shore bombardJllent are definitely suite~ only for direct shore bom­ bardment. They must have a well established point of aim for the director. The terrain at Attu does not allow pre­ liminary track, since the harbor openings do not open until r.ear the firing point. Com:.!:unications by voice from the plane direct to Con­ trol Party is highly desirable and give excellP.nt results. All trRnAmissions to the ,lanes were by key. The INDIANAPCLIS red dye was moBt prominent. Some in tne RICHMOND'S salvo would increase aircraft identification of sRlvos especially in cross fire on a small area.

:om~un1cation procedure was very helpful to aircraft. The notice given "Coming on range" 'gave aircraft e chance to obtain the moat favorable position. Would sugBest that after communication ii; established the Ul9 from the calls be dropped, using Ou and 22 only. The long calls ~ere superfluous and when aircraft personnel were occupied became confusing.

U.S. S. INDIM:APOUS

The firing tOOA place ao scheduled without enemy counter­ f1re on bombardment group. Light antiaircraft fire was di­ rected at our plan°c flying over enemy areas. Due to several ships having targets in a relatively small area, it was difficult to distinguish individual sh1ps 1

40-11 SECRET

bursts . The red dye in several 8 11 shells fired by the main battery of the INDIANAPOLIS definitely identified her batterie~' firing by coloring the snow clouds made by the bursts, red. As fkr as could be determined, no apparent dru;)age was done to enemy installationA. Except for a light antiaircraft barrage from guns judged to be about 40 mm. no enemy activity was observed at either Holtz Bay or Chlchagof Harbor. PRELIMINARY OPERATIOHS On 18 February, an enemy reconnaissance plane, Nakajima 9?, twin-float type, was ~ighte~, bearing 348 T., distance 38 miles. Thie plane shadowed thP Task Group throughout the day and, evidently, attacked the S-28 during the approach for the bombardment. On 10 FPbruary, a plane of thifl type made two oombing attacks on thie Task Group near Amchitka, and shadowed it at intervals during the rollo~ingweek. Vifibility was 35 miles, condition of sea - 1, swells frofu north, win~ direction 210 T., force ~. The bombardment was conducted in accordance with Com­ mander Task Group 8.6 Operation Pl~n No. 2-43, except that PhaAe BaKer preceded Phase Able. Phasee were conducted with ships in a modified column, va.n to rear: BANCROFT, GILLESPIE, RICHMOND, INDIA~APOLIS, CALDWELL, COGHLAN, for Phaee Able. Order reversed for Phase Baker. GUNNERY CHRONOLOGICAL DATA 1504 Commenced firing ma.in and AA bRtteries; opening range 13,500 yards. 151? Ceased firing Phase Baker, having expended 48 rounds 8 11 high ca.pa.city, 16 rounds 8" armor piercing and 174 rounds of 5 11 common. 1628 Commenced firing ma.in battery; opening range 15,200 yards, true bearing 200. 163? Cea.Red firing Phase Afirm having expended 36 rounds 8 11 high capacity and 13 rounds 8 11 armor piercing.

40-12 S.3C:lET

GEi.;ER.AL D:::~CRIPTION A nav1gat1onal track was ma1nta1ned contlnuously 1n the plotting roo~ during the approach and bombardment by taking bearings on previo~Ely selected points with the topside directorR. The position was checked ~itn navigator at from 10 to 15 minute intervals. TLe weather was e)C~ellent and no aifficulty was experienced in obtainlne fixes, v1sib111ty and ce1ling were unliruited with about 10 to 20 per~ent clouds, the sun was over the island throughout the oper­ ation. During the approach a ehadowing Nakajima 9? scout ob­ Rervation seaplane waA tracked by after AA director, ranf.e always in excess of 20,000 yards. On the first run past the haroors careful eearch revealed the s~ttle:uent in Chicht1cuf Haroor. This, plus AA burstR over Holtz Bay were the only 8ignF. of life visible to control personnel. After reverPing course to 310 T, the spotting planes ~ere notif1ed to stand by to epot phase Baker. Flre was commenced by main and AA batteries at 1504 with a rang~ of 13,500 yarde and bear1ng 242 T. Between salvos ? and 8 the target was shifted to tne settlement in southwest corner of tne target and ~potting planes notified. Ceased fire at 1514, main battery hRving f1red 13 partial salvos in slow fire an

40-13 SECRET

grid, expected en~my installations and prominent topograph­ ical features, and were distributed to control stations and air spotters. Combined main and AA battery drills were held by having topside main battery directors read selected bearings at the proper time and plotting these bearings on the large chart in plot. Values of ranges and bearing taken from the track were introduced into the rangekeeper and sent by telephone to the AA directors which continuously gener­ ated the solution. Because of three day advancement of "D" day only two drills were held. IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO DRILL EXTENSIVELY FOR EACH OPERATION. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION MUST BE SUCH TO PERMIT A SHIP TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OPERATION AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE. USE OF FIRE CONTROL RADARS Since vieibility was good and no prominent targets were available no fire control radars were used nuring the bnmbardnent. All "Fox" radars worked satisfactorily before and after the operation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Several shells landing on beach threw up·red snow clouds which were as distinct as splashP-s in water; this greatly facilitated identification of INDIANAPOLIS salvos by planes and top spot. Direct train is better than generated, even if target is obscured, provided a good point of aim is visible near the target. During bombardment many AA shells from this force's oatterieA were observed bursttne harmlessly high above the target area. Fire from INDIANAPOLIS 5" batteries was checked to ensure shells time fusee being set on "safe". GUNNERY DATA Service velocity powder was used in main battery instead of soecial issue bombardment powder because of possibility or encountering surface targets. Time did not permit the shift of powder and range drums after the run was started.

40-14 s::::cnET

The senior aviator of the spotting planes remar~ed as follows: The planes rendezvoused over the ship and proceeded on assigned missions - planes 14 and 15 to spotting stations and plane 16 to station as nnt1-suomar1ne patrol. Plane 14 was to spot for the BANCROFT and GILLESPIE out was unable to establish radio contact with them so sh1fte~ to the INDIANAPOLIS circuit and was on that during the remainder of the flight. The pilots were unable to t1fferent1ate between the 5" salvos of the destroyers and the cruioers 1 secondary battery. The red dye loaded projectiles of the INDIANAPOLIS 1 s main battery aided considerably in spotting for it. Some red splasheR ~ere observed from snow covered areas. It is recommended that where circumstances permit ships fire in groups of t•o or three and ~se separuted targets ~here poa~ib!e in order to avoid co~fus1on between salvos and thus permit better control of the batteries. The use of dye-loaded projectiles ls also recommended wnen firing against targets near the water or covered •1th snow . Considering the fact that the olanes 1 radios had been exposed tO severe WeathP~ and t~at Very little OppOrt~nity hae been had to tune tr.e radio equipment tn the past two monthA , the successful operation of the equipment ls believed creditable.

~CRE ATTENTION TO ROUTINE UPKEEP AND TEST OF THIS E~UIPMENT IS INDICATED . Plane 15 1 e generator gave some trouble but the plane was a.ale to maintain communications throu~:'lout the bombardment. Plane 14 was unable to establish communications with the de­ stroyers, but had no ~1f~iculty 1n establishing communications with the INDirl~APOLIS. Some of the Messages sent by the planes were somewhat ~arbled elt~ouBh receipted for . It le recommended that pilots be impressed with the fact that voice tranam1es1ons must be sent slowly Rnd that unusual wcrds be repeated or spelled out. Shipboard operators shoul1 not hesitate to request !KI slowly from the pilots 1n case they are not certain of correct receipt. MORE DRILL AND NEED FOR STANDARD PROCEDURE IS INDICATE..1.

40-15 SSCHET

Trsce~ fro H.O. clcc. No. l'.i,2'i3-l

Tract of ~q~ R!CHMONn 1 f~hruary 1943 +

BOMB ..R!> ::~lT OF . 135?

ATT'.J !SU.ND

--o"

N 0

Retirlr~ to rt!cover aircraft

1r1ng

40-lG s::::c~ET

I ~BANCROFT Io·~1'!"'" •. o GILLESPIE A- -- 0 1-10 I {)rt'.l'I CD \ 0 I c'0 / «0. 01 \11 :'

CO I 'ii:'--j- 'O'. RICHMOND CDI I 8' I ...... 'ii' CD

I 'JJ ,-~:- -- o' LulA.,APCLIS.... T"\ "' o' o; I '< I I p, I I .,, I \--'I I ,p. . I / O 0

I '-~~--1,, I 0 CALDWELL' {)-- - ...... -~ k_o,ol' (Ii O'.COGHUN

40- 1? S2CRE'T

The Radio Officer of the INDIANAPOLIS :nade the follow­ ing comments: Considering that all plane radio equipment had not been used for two months and had been exposed to heavy weather and dampnee3 for that period, the plane-ship communications ~ere very eatiefectory.

BETTER UPKEEP WIT~ FACILITIES AVAILABLE IS I~IDICATED. Communications were established with the planes within five minutes after they were launched and were satisfactory throu6hout, except for one plane which had a bad generator which provided just suf~iclent power to send on. Thie was the spotting plane, but even with this handicap the rest of the spotting w~s conducted satisfactorily.

The ship 1 P communications with tbe planes were slow and cl~~sy because it had to use CW while the planes used voice.

Thie was the first time that the ~hip's transmitters h~d been used since in~tallation and the calibrations were made as well as could be wtthout tuning the antennae and they were tuned when the plan~e were catapulted. Kore practice and opportunity should be given to using the trane­ ~i ttere and calibration of new equipment. It ls recommended that more voice transmitters be given to ships so that they can tal~ to aircraft efficiently and quickly and not be hampered with alow CW when speed of trans­ mission is paramount, as is the case for transmitting radar bearings of aircraft and all contacts when within range. AlGv that more remote control •.ml ts be furnished so that the various spotting stations may use voice. It is found that no '113.tter how much care is taken in setting the planes' radios they will differ in frequency sufficiently to make it impoe~ible for them all to be heard on the eame setting of an RAB receiver. It is thus necessary to have more broad oand receivers available for use with aircraft, such as the RBH. THE PRESENT EQUIPMENT IS CONSIDERED SATIS­ FACTORY. IT IS A QUESTION OF TRAINED PERSONNEL. The Task Group Commander and the Task Unit Commander commented as follows as a result of the sinking or the Japanese Maru at 0125/20:

40-18 SSC'.\ET

On the night of 19-20 February, INDIANAPOLIS assisted by COGHLAN and GILLESPIE intercepted and sank a 5000 ton JapaneAe freighter a~9are~tly loaded witn exp!)sives and otner stores Pnroute to Japanese held positionA in the WeAt£rn Aleutians. In ouedience to despatch ordere from Co:nmander Task Force EIGHT operatlonA by this Task Group agajnst any such enewy Phipping were com:neuced 15 February. On that morning, soon after arrival on station (between Longitudes 170 and 1?2 East and both sides of Latitude 53 North), an enemy float plane establ1Rhed contact and Ahadowed during follow­ inf t.._.o days. In general, INDIANAPOLIS with COGHLAN and GILLESPIE were on qcouting line patrolling northward of latitude 53 1 and RICHMOND (fls[;) with BANCROFT and CALDWELL on sco~ting line were patrolling southward of that latitude.

In view of the contin~ous observations by aircraft the foreloing units were withdrawn to the ea~tward during day­ li.;ht on tne l?tn., but returned to ::>atrol stations that niL.1t.

EVA3ION IS ALWAYS ~-:ORTH WHILE. Before daylight on the 16th an intercepted despatch from S-28 .i.:.dicated possibility of enemy Ahipping in Holtz I3A.y, A.ttu. Tile Task Group wap concentrated and oroceeded there at high speed. Tne report proved to be erroneous, but advantage was ~aA.e n of favorable weather connitions to bombard enemy instal­ lations. Afterwards the Task Group proceeded eantward until d~rk and then returned to patrol stations.

In the unfavorable we~ther con~itions of the 19th no con­ tact waA made by enemy planes. It is posetble that the with­ C.r·awals eastward, particularly after the bombardruer.t, oay have deceived the enemy into believing our forces had retired from tne are11. In any event, the enemy mercnRnt type ship hitherto mentioned did come in after darkr.eaB on the 19th. By that ti~e, the weather had cleared - tem9erature 32, wind force 3 fro~ 340, moderate sea with coneiderab~e swell, almost full moon, scattered strato ri..unuluA clouds, visibility very high. At time of initl!ll contact INDIANAPOLIS (with the Task

40-19 SZCRET

Unlt Commanderi ln about Latitude 53-30, Longitude 1?1-10 was on course 162, speed 17. COGHLAN and GILLESPIE were on scouting line 000-180 distance 6 miles, COGHLAN to south­ ward.

At 2220 (W) COGHLAN made radar contact and promptly reported over T.B.S. Concentration of the two accompanying destroyers on INDIANAPOLIS were ordered. Shortly afterwards visual contact was made. The Task Group Commander in RICHMOND with the Southern Unit, on receipt of INDIANAPOLIS contact report (received by radio not T.B.S.), made preliminary arrangements to joln INDIANAPOLIS. The separation of Northern and Southern Unlts at that time was about slxty miles. In vlew of the subse­ qJent reports, however, he ~id not break radlo silence, nor concentrate , nor take any part in the ensuing action.

In brief, it was acco~pll~hed as follows: The task untt overhauled the enemy maneuvering to bring it down moon. Enemy that haj been on easterly course turned away to south­ ward and e:ideavored to escape. When challenged 1t gave in­ correct reply whereupon at 2316 flre was ooened, using no illu~ination (otner tnan moon) at range of about 6500 yards. Radar rdnge~ and spots were use~. Sitting was soon es­ ta~iishea and the ~hip set on flre.

It did not sinA uro~ptly , however, and the Task Unit Co:n·:.ander dt ri>cted t!-.at a tornedo be used to finlsh the job. Ir. the end, six torpe~oes, all of which were ineffective, Wf're e.xpenjed.

THI:3 n?i'E... RS TO B:: Al\ Ji:XCE3'3IIJE EXPSNDI­ TURE Of TORPl:.!)..t:S (;N n.N EN::MY SHlP THAT SHOUL!) HhVt: B~::N SJNK BY GU~fIR£.

hdditional shells were fired into her at close ra~~e and the shlp sanY. at 0125. Search of the area by destroyers failed to flnd any sur~ivors. TAS!\ UNIT COl-1KANIJER At 2200 februsry 13, Task Group 8.6 proceeded for oper­ atlons wast of Attu for the puroose of intercepting and de­ stroying enemy Maru's. Shlps were for~ed in a sco~tin3 line. Tne souther~ group consisted of RICHMOND, BANCROFT, and CALD'tlt:LL. The northern group consisted of Il"DIANAPOLIS, COGHLAN, AND GILLESPIE. s:c:lET

At 2200 February 19, the northern ecout1ng group was 1n Lat1tude 53-23 North, Long1tude 1?1-09 East, on course 000 T., speed 14 knots. COGHLAN was 1n pos1t1on 6 m1lee south of INDIANA~OLIS wh1le GILLESPIE was screen1ng the INDIANAPOLIS. At 20~7 GILLESPIE took station.on Acout1ng 11r.e 6 miles to the north. At 2145 course was changed to 162 T., speed 15 knotA and at 2221 COGHLA~ made sight con­ tect of an unident1fied ship bearing 215 r., diAtant 9.6 miles. Shipe went to general quarters, destroyers concen­ trated on INDIANAPOLIS, and task group proceeded on various courses at various speeds closirg tte range. Fire was opened at 231? when challenge was 1ncorrectly answered and direct hit obt&ined on the third salvo which caused a fire to breaA out on enP~y ship. Ship sank at 0125 after Task Gro~p 8.6 had expended s1x torpedoes by destroyers and 107 11 11 roi.:nds of 8 , 77 roti.nde of 5 co~on, and 20 rounds of 5" 1 lluL11 na ting. 'Nhile the expenditure of both 8" and 5 11 ammunit1on was h1gh fer the type of sh1p encountered, it was justified to scme extent oy the fact that 1t was the f1rst enemy ship engaged by this ship, its size and armaffient was unknown at the time of opening f1re and therefore a quick destruction wap, des1rable, and that it furnished prRct1cal gunnery train- 1ng under combat conditions when shooting for training is sadly lacking.

As the enemy sh1p, wh1le burnl~g, showed no signs of sinking after several hours and in order to carry on with the patrol and search for any other ship wh1ch may have been accompanying the one destroyed, it was decided to use one torpedo to quickly a1nk the burning hulk. The COGHLAN was accordingly directed to fire one torpedo. As this torpedo either miesed or failed to go off, another tcrpedo was ordered f1red. Th1P exploded precaturely several hundred yards short of tbe target. Of the third and fourth torpedoes fired by the COGHLAN, one failed to explode and the other f1red prematurely short of tte target. The GILLESPit fired two tcrpedoes both of which fa1led to pro­ duce rPsults either beceuse of not exploding or misQing. It was realized at the time that th1s was a coetly expendi­ ture of torpedoes, but the fact that under easy cond1t1ons eix torpedoes were used which failed to sink a ship dead in the water, for whatever cauee, was a lesson which should be very benef1clal. It should ass1st to bring out defects and · allow corrective steps to be taken so that better results may be expected at some ~uch more critical time in the future.

40-~l s:::cRET

THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF TORPEDOES IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS EFFECTIVE WEAPON.

No living or dead human being was seen during the entire episode, hence, no survivorA were picked up. The COGHLAN had been detailed for this purpose. COGHLAN re­ cover~d one life Jacket with Japanese characters imprinted thereon. They read (as translated by a Chinese mess at­ tendant on board COGHLAN) "Mikado seventeenth year, November, Army Transport". OnP bamboo life raft was also picked up, also one crate with Japanese charactersimprinted thereon. Little else waq seen.

Visibility was 6; condition of sea 4; swells from north­ east; wind direction 352; force 5 . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATICNS Fire could have been stopped after the third salvo with probably the same results. However, fire was continued to hasten the destruction of this highly important enemy ship and cargo, so that our force could clear the area. The large expenditure of ammunition seems more than warranted as the brilliantly flaming target and unlimited visibility marked the scene of action for a great distance. Having hoists filled with AP on some main battery guns and HC on others appears sound doctrine when the character of enemy vessels to be encountered is uncertain. Radar contributed much to the success of the action in ranging and spotting.

GUNNERY DATA Time of 9G contact at 25,900 yards - 2225. Range at 11 commence firing" - Nav. 6550 - Gun 6900. Range at Mcease firing" - Nav. 5350 - Gun 5650.

40-22 S'.::C'.1ST

RADARS Time of Qicking u2 Range Bearing After FD G229 24,000 203 T. After FC 2244 l?,850 181 T. Forward FD 2246 l?,000 l ?9 T. Forward FC 2248 16,100 1?2 T.

Forward FC failed after second salvo. SG radar cut out twice during the firing for about ttree minutes each ti~e. Director II stayed on target with lobing while 5" were firing. The first range obtained on After FD was one of the longest ever obtained with this instrua:ent on a ship. Since the horizon from SKY Art ie just a little over 14,000 yards, it is possible they were ranging on the smoke from the ship. A great deal or material trouble has been experienced in previous firings as well as this one, with the TBA transmitter . The shock of firing causes the lower support­ ing sockets of the power amplifier to fall out of place, thus leaving the tube suspended and partially disconnected . Thie has been corrected by taping and tying in place, but it is believed this is the cause of faulty design and should be altered.

40-23 s;;;cRET

2300

-- - --if254 . 2314 :

p 2316 Challenged '62317 Comm'enced. Firi ng

I Fl:ttin~

\ 0126 '~" ,nmE-fi n k ...,3 .... 2 , s efn~ 23400, ,' first ·53 2~~4 l?l 2305 one 0 sa 1 o

2225 Sightec Smoke. Concentrated Force . Commenced Approach. TRACK CHART OF U. S.S. INDIANA.POLIS ~~- INDIANAPOLIS & DD Track. AND DD 1 S ------Enemy Merchant Ship Track. 19 February 1943

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