Vol. XVII, No. 1 Fall 1984 ISSN 0032-3497

THE JOURNAL OF THE NORTHI POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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I Polity The Journalof the Northeastern PoliticalScience Association VolumeXVII, Number1, Fall 1984

Articles

GeorgeKlosko Thrasymachos'Eristikos: The Agon Logon in RepublicI 5

MaryP. Nichols Glaucon'sAdaptation of the Storyof Gyges& Its Implicationsfor Plato's Political Teaching 30

WilliamW. Lammers& Joseph L. Nyomarkay SocialistElites in TechnologicalSocieties: Cabinet MemberCareer Patterns in Austria,France, Germany & Great Britain 40

JeffreyLeigh Sedgwick The Prospectsof "Restoringthe FederalBalance" 66 Sue Davis JusticeRehnquist's Judicial Philosophy: Democracy v. Equality 88

Controversy

TheodoreS. Arrington& Saul Brenner AnotherLook at ApprovalVoting 118 StevenJ. Brams& Peter C. Fishburn A CarefulLook at "AnotherLook at ApprovalVoting" 135 Arrington& Brennerto Brams& Fishburn 144

HenryS. Kariel Affirminga Politics of Inconsequence 145 Felix Oppenheim Fallacies& Dangersof "Inconsequence" 161 Karielto Oppenheim 164 ResearchNote

WalterC. Opello, Jr. &William Claggett The Dynamicsof West EuropeanParty Systems: The PortugueseCase 165

ReviewArticles

John P. Burke Squaringthe Circle: MakingBureaucracy Accountable 179

SheldonD. Pollack WhitherLiberalism? 192

COVER:Pen and Ink drawing by Elizabeth Pols. WhitherLiberalism?

Michael Walzer,Spheres of Justice:A Defense of Pluralismand Equality(New York:Basic Books, 1983)

MichaelJ. Sandel,Liberalism and the Limitsof Justice(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982)

David Spitz,The Real Worldof Liberalism(Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 1982)

ThomasA. Spragens,Jr. The Irony of LiberalReason (Chicago:The Universityof ChicagoPress, 1981)

SheldonD. Pollack, Universityof Pennsylvania

In contrast to such theoretical traditions as Marxism or the psycho- analyticmovement, liberalism never had its principlescarved into stone by any single prophet.Indeed, the very questionof who meritsinclusion into the family of "liberal"theorists is open to serious debate. For in- stance, Hobbes is often regardedas the founding theorist of English liberalism,yet, Hobbes comes to some basic conclusionswhich conflict with liberal sensibilitiesas they developedover the next three centuries. Despite the forceful presence Hobbes exerted upon the tradition,Hob- besian theory is not the essential core of mainstreamliberalism. Locke would be a better candidatein a search for the fundamentaltheorist (and hence, principles) of liberalism;however, much of nineteenthcen- tury thought radicallydeparted from Lockean theories, both regarding politics and epistemology.And if America is the Lockean culture par excellence, (notwithstandingthe assaultsof Gary Wills), even here the varieties of liberalismare considerable.Indeed, if the differentexpres- sions of liberal thoughtare as diverse as such theoristsas Hobbes, Mill, Tocqueville,Kant, and Rawls, can there be any set of principleswhich ultimatelydefines liberalismitself? Or is the very pretense of viewing liberalismas a unifiedtradition mistaken? Each of the four books under considerationhere sheds light upon what principles might be included under the rubric of liberalism (al- though Michael Walzermay see his study as more closely relatedto an American formulationof "social democracy"). Ironically,these books Review Articles 193 also underlinethe extremelyamorphous nature of liberalismas a tradi- tion of thought. As an exercise in liberal theorizing each suggests a very differentunderstanding of liberalismas well as the natureof theo- rizingas an intellectualenterprise. Walzer and Spitzboth wish to defend their own particularconceptions of liberal/pluralisttheory. Spitzis con- cerned with defending a liberalismsimilar to that advanced by John Stuart Mill; Walzer is eclectic, drawingupon socialist and democratic traditions.In the end, each seeks to persuadehis readersof the relative merits of his position. On the other hand, Sandel and Spragenswrite for a more limited audience of scholars, rather than for the broader liberal audienceitself. Sandel focuses narrowlyupon a particularstrain of liberalism,that rooted in Kantian theory and most recently given expression by John Rawls. Spragensdirects his attention to a much wider range of theory;indeed, he presentsnothing less than a scholarly intellectualhistory of most theorists even vaguely associated with the liberal tradition.Both Sandel and Spragensalso have intellectualaxes to grind, and distinct interpretationsemerge from their works. One of the chief obstacles to liberal theory has been the attemptto delineate separate realms of the private and the public. As Hannah Arendt has thoughtfullypointed out, the modern notion of the public realm is at odds with and alien to the classical traditionof the Greek polis. The notion of a public and political sphere as the Greeksunder- stood it was submergedas liberal theory after Hobbes redefinedthe individualand his labor/propertyas an autonomoussphere of "natural rights"protected by the political sovereign.This newly imagined"pri- vate" realm was conceptualizedin contrastto the artificialconstruct of the political sovereign.The polis ideal was lost as liberal theoristscon- fronted the emergingpolitical realityof the modem state; the polis was relegatedto Rousseauean,communitarian undercurrents of the dominant political mainstream. Yet, in confrontingthe reality of the modern state, liberalismfound itself in an ambiguousposition: political institutionswhich guarantee "naturalrights" are also the most direct and visible threat of political tyranny. Lockean and Madisonianliberalism separates the individual from the state, defines the protectionof (property) rightsas the essen- tial function of the political institutions,and then warns against the potentialtyranny of the uncheckedstate. At its core, liberalismis ambig- uous regardingits stancetoward the fundamentalingredient of politics- political power. Furthermore,the crucialquestion left unresolvedis: when do broader social/public interestsjustly outweighindividual rights. In practice,the neat distinctionbetween the public and the private melts away as the 194 Review Articles

two spheresare seen to be often overlapping,and not autonomous.Short of a strict libertarian,nonstatist political community (probably a logical and practicalimpossibility), the state must pursuesome public interests which will conflict with individualinterests. Since political institutions even oriented around a genuine public interest will inevitablyintrude into the sphereof individualrights, liberalism possesses a built-intension and conflictover wherejustly to drawthat line of intrusion. This tension between natural rights (in effect, those rights held in claim againstthe state) and the legitimateinterests of the communityis addressedin variousways by differentliberal theorists. Hobbes seems to sanction an all-powerfulsovereign which (at least, theoretically)dom- inates the individualin the very act of protectinghis rights. Even re- ligion, or as much of it as Hobbes can bring under the category of "things indifferent"to salvation, is directly under the authorityof the sovereign.Even if Leviathancan be defended againstthe facile charge of authoritarianism,it does violate the spiritof liberalismwhich emerged with Locke's more familiarbourgeois reformulation of the relationship between citizen and king. There is a greater emphasis in later liberal thought upon restrictingthe sovereign to a role as protector of con- tracts. In addition,the importanceof the notion of tolerancein liberal thought after Locke led to a secularformulation in which the individual is protected from social and political pressures.John StuartMill's On Libertyis certainlythe fullestexpression of nineteenth-centuryliberalism and its unresolved comprehensionof the public/private dichotomy. Strippedof Mill's earlier intoxicationwith utilitarianism,On Liberty is the pre-eminentstatement of the case for liberty, tolerance, and in- dividual achievement.Mill's liberalism is central to twentieth-century practice; however, Mill's interest in liberty for its effect in cultivating higher values via the few great men of society has been abandonedto a "value free" liberalism (the subjectof Spragens'study). What is left is individual"rights" (really little more than demandsupon the state), individualliberty (for no particularpurpose), and toleranceof all "value judgments"(except perhapsthe quest for salvation). This is very much the modem liberalismdefended by David Spitz in The Real World of Liberalism.Spitz traces liberalism'sdebt to Mill, and he spends consid- erable and productiveeffort in defendingMill from his detractors.On Liberty,along with Tocqueville'sDemocracy in America,is perhapsthe first serious defense of the individual from the intrudingsocial and political realms. Spitz's assessment of Mill is particularlyconvincing in conjunctionwith his criticismof the illiberalattacks upon toleranceby Messrs. Wolfe, Moore, and Marcuse. Spitz also has scorn for the au- thoritarianimplications of B. F. Skinner'sthought. In fact, despite the Review Articles 195

inconsistencies of Mill's thought (which are too easily absolved by Spitz) a strong case is made here for his understandingof liberalism. Mill himselfhad rejectedutilitarianism, which relegatedthe individual to a secondaryrole vis-a-vis the greater social good. In utilitarianism, the good of society wins out over individualrights. In the value-free utilitarianismof B. F. Skinner,the goal of the "survival"of society itself substitutesfor the happinessprinciple. Mill's concernfor the individual and his belief in the objectivepossibility of freedomof thoughtare lost in the world of Skinner'stechnocracy. Unfortunately, Mill failed to de- fine the precise limits placed upon the individualby social interests.His faulty distinctionbetween self-regarding and other-regardingacts points to the difficultyin any such attempt.Struggling to find the dividingline betweenactions which affectonly the individualhimself and those which spill over into the public arena, Mill's examples are particularlyun- convincing.The case of individualdrunkenness versus drunkenness while on public duty fails to addressthe fact that even the most individualof acts can be construedas having a public effect. The point is that once liberal theory abandonsa conceptionof an absolute, inviolablesphere of rights,then the door is open to hagglingover how far the individual must give way to the "publicinterest." If individualrights are absolute and inviolable,then even the minimalstate of Robert Nozick is tyran- nical. If rightsare mere fictions,then B. F. Skinneris absolved. An alternativephilosophical approach to this problemis the subject of Michael J. Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Sandel ex- aminesa traditionof politicalphilosophy rooted in Kantianthought which has recently been expressedby John Rawls. Sandel labels this philoso- phy as "deontologicalliberalism"-a philosophy of justice which sets rightover the good. Terselydescribed, the principlesof deontologicallib- eralismdefine a set of rules, not outcomes: "society,being comprisedof a pluralityof persons, each with his own aims, interests,and concep- tions of the good, is best arrangedwhen it is governedby principlesthat do not themselves presupposeany particularconception of the good; what justifiesthese regulativeprinciples above all is not that they maxi- mize the social welfare or otherwisepromote the good, but ratherthat they conform to the concept of right, a moral categorygiven prior to the good and independentof it" (Sandel, p. 1). Standingin directcon- trast to deontologicalliberalism is utilitarianism,which ultimatelysacri- fices the individualto the greatergeneral "utility." Sandel carefullyexplores the thoughtof Kant and Rawls, and shows their similarities(both are deontologicalliberals) as well as their dif- ferences. In the end, Sandel makes some strong criticismsof Rawlsian theory, challenginghis understandingof communityand the kind of 196 Review Articles

individualsrequired to sustainthat collective.An implict and unjustified utilitarianismis uncoveredin Rawls's theory; what is denied the indi- vidual due to the randomnessof the distributionof naturaland social inequalitiesis too readily assumed to belong to the social whole. This same kind of argumentis directedagainst Ronald Dworkin's justification for affirmativeaction (social goals for groups are claimed to outweigh the individual'sright to equal treatmentbased upon merit alone). A truly Kantianposition would forbid such a use of individualsfor social goals. Sandel furthercriticizes Rawls's assumptionsregarding the kind of individualswho would be necessaryto supportthe "originalposition," showing the limitations of a theory of justice and communitybased upon such "disembodied"subjects or agents.All studentsof Rawls will be forced to consider Sandel's penetratingdiscussion of this strain of liberalism. The way in which Rawls has come to embody a modem "liberal" position is itself a curious affair. Surely, this is not the liberalismof Hobbes, Locke, or Nozick. The fusion of modem liberalismwith dem- ocraticand equalitarianimpulses is manifestedin Rawlsiantheory. While equality (of rights) was implicit in traditionalliberalism, equality as a social goal beyond the individual'sproperty rights is characteristicof social-democraticthought. Michael Walzer has been associatedwith this social-democraticperspective in the past; ironically,in Spheresof Jus- tice he succeeds in outlining a promisingintellectual reconciliation of the democraticand liberal perspectives. Traditionalliberalism always emphasizedequality of rights.As Spitz puts it: "In the political sphere, the unity or traditionof liberalismis unambiguous.Its pre-eminentprinciple is political equality" (Spitz, p. 31). Yet, the equality of rights and opportunitiesin a liberal order in- evitablylead to inequalitiesof distribution.In Locke's theoretical"state of nature"property is abundantand seeminglyavailable to all who would put their labor into productiveuses: this startingcondition is used to justify and legitimize the unequal distributionsof developed society. Rawls's formulationof an "originalposition" serves to limit the range of later inequalitiesof distribution,without taking a simple egalitarian stance. Walzerpursues a differentapproach, one which requiresneither an imaginary"original position" and its rules for accumulation,nor a periodic return to equal starting conditions (a sort of jubilee year). Instead, Walzer defends a pluralisticview of equality (and inequality) which is far closer to traditionalliberalism than to radicalegalitarianism. Walzer'stheory of justice focuses upon the distributionof goods in a social community. Rather than search for any single principle for Review Articles 197 distribution(equality), Walzer outlines a notion of complex distribu- tive justice. While equalityis an importantgoal, Walzerwishes to retain an emphasisupon the liberty and dignityof the individualwithin a free society. Equality is desired insofar as certain kinds of inequalitylead to dominationof one citizen by another: "The aim of political egali- tarianismis a society free from domination... no more masters, no more slaves. It is not a hope for the eliminationof differences"(Walzer, p. xiii). However, equality of rights, legal status, and opportunityare not adequateto insure equality in terms of citizenship.Radical egali- tarianismis no solution since it violates individualityand introduces political repression.Walzer advances a notion of "complex equality" which builds upon Mill's understandingin On Liberty. By separatingautonomous spheres of social, economic, and political activity,Walzer shows that there is no need to degenerateinto a crude, leveling notion of equality nor to simply stop at equality of rights. Within the "membership"of a social communitydifferent goods can be distributedaccording to differentprinciples of distributivejustice which apply within the separate spheres. For instance, social welfare and defense (both providingand receiving) may very well be distributed accordingto strict egalitarianprinciples (equal benefits and duties for all citizens). Similarly,voting rights will be equal and nontransferable among citizens. However, within a relatively free marketplaceand a complex division of labor, money and commoditieswill be unequally enjoyed. There may be a Rousseaueanlimit upon absolute levels of wealth and poverty, but within that range citizens will simply work and excel in differentways. The marketplacemay be a restrictedsphere limited to goods and services, but within that sphere unequaloutcomes and distributionsare acceptable and just. Education must be equally provided in response to an equal need among citizens; however, once inside the schools, students will rise to differentlevels of achievement and success. Even in the political realm, where all citizens have an ab- solutely equal right to vote and seek office, not all citizens will choose to participateor be chosen to hold office. Walzer'sperspective follows Mill's in that individualsshould be free to pursuetheir own self-defined interestswithin these separatespheres. Justice requiresrecognition and reward for superiortalents and effort, and only the "grim creed" of repressive equalitarianismwould seek to impose leveling uniformity. However, Walzer does insist upon a separationand autonomyfor the differentspheres. Hence, economicsuccess (the accumulationof wealth) should not spill over into influencewithin the political realm. The suc- cessful achieversshould be respectedand rewardedfor their efforts,but 198 Review Articles they must not constitute an aristocraticclass which dominatesthe less successful.Walzer's liberalism is democraticin its spirit. This conception of justice does fit into the liberal fold for several reasons. Walzer's theory relies mostly upon a notion of equality of rights,rather than equalityof outcome.Liberty is stressedas a desirable goal in itself, and for the excellence and creativityit cultivates. In a deeper sense, it is Walzer'sview of the state and its role in distributing goods within the other spheresthat most closely links him to traditional liberal thought.The primaryimportance of the political realm is recog- nized by Walzer: "Statepower... is the means by which all the differ- ent pursuits,including that of power itself, are regulated.It is the crucial agency of distributivejustice; it guards the boundarieswithin which every social good is distributedand displayed.Hence, the simultaneous requirementsthat powerbe sustainedand that it be inhibited:mobilized, divided,checked and balanced.Political power protects us from tyranny ... and itself becomes tyrannical"(Walzer, p. 281). So after describing the differentspheres of activity,Walzer returns to the traditionalliberal ambiguityregarding political power and liberty. The state capable of enforcing distributivejustice as Walzer defines it, is also capable of destroyingthe libertyof the individual.Hence, Walzerrevealingly turns to a concern with restrainingthe political institutionswhich support even democraticpolitics-hence, we are back to Madisonand Tocque- ville after all. This is to Walzer'scredit, and it makesSpheres of Justice all the more important.But it does not solve the problemof the liberal polity: how can state power be restrainedand also serve democratic ends? Walzer's suggestive contributionshows that pronouncementsof the death of liberal political philosophyare premature.However, there is a clear indicationhere that liberaltheory has lost its way. Walzer'stheory of justice supports a liberal political philosophy;however, that theory will not appeal to all within the liberal tradition,nor is it clear that it could be implementedas a practical public philosophy even if such consensus emerges. Spitz and Sandel also fail to offer any comprehen- sive liberal philosophyin responseto their able critiques.In The Irony of LiberalReason, ThomasSpragens helps to explainhow liberaltheory came to such a dead-endposition. If Walzeroffers hope that new direc- tions can be found. Spragensdemonstrates how liberalismgot off course. Spragenslocates the difficultyin modern liberalismin its initial as- sumptions-specifically, its epistemological and philosophical under- pinnings. The liberal faith in reason underminedliberalism as "heir to and protectorof Westernhumanism" (Spragens, p. viii). Liberalismwas the driving force of the Enlightenmentrebellion against classicism, Review Articles 199

scholasticism,and traditionalism.Liberal rationalismwas expressedas a desire to rid philosophyof superstitionand mysticism,and as political rationalismit sought to overturnentrenched feudal institutionsof domi- nation. The focus of Spragens'analysis is in showing how this liberal commitmentto rationalismdeveloped into a positivistic epistemology and a technocraticvision of politics. The faith in reason expressed by Locke and Descartesultimately led to the Comteandream of a techno- cratic polity governedby an elite of enlightenedadministrators. In some respects, Spragenswas overly ambitiousin this impressive intellectualhistory. He dilutes somewhathis central thesis as the dis- cussion ranges over so much of liberal/Enlightenmentthought. Indeed, at times he seems to equate liberalismitself with the Enlightenment. The argumentis sound in claiming a similarityin the rationalismof Locke and Descartes(p. 20) but less so in implicitlyequating liberalism with the broaderEnlightenment. It was sufficientto uncoverthe rational- istic premises of the epistemology that became dominant in liberal thought. Illuminatingdiscussions of such philosophersas Locke and Hume (among others) accomplishthis goal. If Spragensis perhapstoo broad in his categorizingof liberalism,he is also too narrowin tracing seeminglyall of modern liberalismto a positivisttechnocratic politics. Surely,B. F. Skinneris an extremecase. Yet, Spragensdoes show con- vincinglythat the same arrogantrationalist's faith is lurkingjust below the surfacein much of modernbehavioralism and politicalscience. And the moral relativismdescendent (perhaps falsely) from Hume is ex- pressed in pluralisttheory and the new public philosophyof liberalism. In a most concise and devastatingassessment of that new public philos- ophy, Spragenswrites:

It is Burkewithout reverence, Locke withoutreason, Hobbes with- out war, and Madison without right, the threat of tyranny,or the need for republicanvirtue. It is an interpretationof politics that is secular, utilitarian,and relativisticin its moral orientation:and it is skepticalabout unrealizedideals while relativelysanguine about currentlyestablished political institutions and practices.(Spragens, p. 301)

Spragensoffers little more than a vague suggestionof how to "pick up the pieces" of the liberal tradition-a sketch of a politics merging consensus, authority,and freedom. It is doubtful that the new "quiet revolution"in modern philosophy will provide the secure foundation for such a politics, as Spragensargues. But his optimisticbelief that a new direction can be found for liberalismis justified.While no new 200 Review Articles

Locke has yet emerged,Spragens, Sandel, Spitz, and Walzerhave con- tributed to "clearingthe ground a little, and removing some of the rubbishthat lies in the way to knowledge,"as Locke put it. Obviously, that is the first step in rescuingliberal politicalphilosophy.