Disorganization and the New Mexico Prison Riot of 1980 Author(s): Bert Useem Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 5 (Oct., 1985), pp. 677-688 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095381 Accessed: 07/06/2009 17:45

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http://www.jstor.org DISORGANIZATION AND THE NEW MEXICO PRISON RIOT OF 1980*

BERT USEEM Universityof Illinois at Chicago

"Breakdown" theorists postulate that collective action results from social disorganization and increased levels of discontent. Data on the 1980 New Mexico prison riot provide support for certain aspects of this model. From 1970 to 1975, the State Penitentiary provided inmates with employment opportunities and recreational programs. These integrating activities were sharply curtailed after 1975. As a consequence, inmates experienced strong feelings of deprivation, and inter-inmate violence increased. The 1980 riot reflected the disintegration of the previous five years. No one element was in control of the riot, and the level of brutality surpassed that of any other U.S. prison riot.

Few researchers now defend a "breakdown" mechanismsthat inhere in social organization. or "disorganization"model of collective ac- Urbanizationand migration,for example, up- tion, even though it dominated the field just root individuals from their social, political, two decades ago (Kornhauser,1959; Smelser, and recreationalactivities, producinga mass of 1962; Davies, 1962). According to the model, isolated, anomic individuals. These marginal collective action arises from a breakdown in individuals are then readily "available" for the structures of solidarity-church, family, mobilization (Kornhauser, 1959; Smelser, work, and voluntary organizations-that nor- 1962). mally channel people into conventional be- Second, disorganizationincreases "discon- havior. tent" withina population.The isolated, anomic The fact that the "breakdown" model is individual develops new, unpredictable, and called what it is-rather than the "crisis" or potentiallyunfulfillable desires; he develops ir- "shock" model, say-reflects an underlying rationalbeliefs about how they can be fulfilled; presumption that in normal times social he seeks to escape and overcome his isolation structures exist which keep people from and discontent through collective action mobilizing for conflict. Two complementary (Smelser, 1962; Davies, 1962, 1969). facets of the breakdownmodel emphasize dif- The second, more economically-oriented ferent sets of these controlling structures. facet of the breakdownmodel emphasizes so- A Durkheimian(and Parsonian) facet em- ciety's ability in normaltimes to meet people's phasizes control over the individual's emo- needs, needs that are considered as given and tions, thoughts,and appetites. In normaltimes, somewhat stable. Thus, the effect of unem- the individual is integrated into the social ployment on the individual is traded through whole; he feels a sense of commonality with his empty pockets ratherthan throughhis iso- other sectors of the society; his appetites are lated condition. Withoutthe rewardsof work, restrainedto a manageablelevel. Accordingto discontent results, followed by protest (Piven this view, then, disorganizationproduces col- and Cloward, 1977). lective action for two reasons. First, disorgani- Of course, discontent need not be concep- zation frees individuals from the regulatory tualized as the result of "breakdown." Theorists of "pure" deprivation and relative De- deprivationemphasize the effect of discontent *Direct all correspondenceto: Bert Useem, it to partmentof Sociology, University of Illinois, Box on protest without necessarily attributing 4348, Chicago, IL 60680. the failureof pre-existingcontrol mechanisms. This materialis based upon work supportedby the Increasedperceived deprivation, however, can National Science Foundation under Grant SES- be treatedas the expression of "breakdown"if 8240024.Earlier phases of the work were funded by one adopts the assumption that a stable order the National Instituteof Justiceand the Universityof normallyhas the mechanisms, culturalor eco- Illinois at Chicago's Office of Social Science Re- nomic, to ensure stable levels of contentment search, Research Board, and Departmentof Sociol- for all its constituents. ogy. I would like to thank Hellen Gaussoin, of the with the New Mexico Departmentof Corrections,for her as- The breakdownmodel is consistent sistance in arrangingthe inmate interviews, and idea that protest occurs in periods of high rates Peter Kimballfor his help in conductingthem. This of personal pathology and antisocial behavior, paper benefitted from comments by Peter Kimball, such as suicide, dissolution of families, alco- Jack Bloom, PatriciaDavies, and Dennis Roncek. holism, vagrancy, and crime. Protest and high

American Sociological Review, 1985, Vol. 50 (October:677-688) 677 678 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW rates of pathologycovary, accordingto break- cial conditions in the cities, such as percent of down theory, because both are productseither dilapidatedhousing as a measureof social dis- of the dissolving of social controls or of in- organization,did not have an impact on riot creased deprivation. propensity (once controls are introducedfor The most ardent critics of breakdown ap- region and percent of nonwhite population) proach are researchers working within the (Spilerman, 1970; 1976). The Tillys sum up ,,resource-mobilization" tradition: "Break- their interpretationof the evidence: down of collective action and collec- theories As the dust settled and evidence accumu- tive violence," the Tillys (1975:290) state, to see the discrepancies and lated, people began "suffer from irreparablelogic empirical between what happenedin Watts, Detroit,or major arguments difficulties." There are four elsewhere and theories which emphasized against the breakdown model. First, the explosion of accumulateddiscontent.... resource-mobilization theorists claim that [The evidence] dispels] the idea that the grievancesare sufficientlywidespread through participants came disproportionatelyfrom all times as a constant,they all societies at that, the ghetto's marginal, depressed, disorga- explain little of the variationin collective ac- nized populations(Tilly et al., 1975:293). tion. Althoughresource-mobilization theorists would agree with the propositionthat individu- These argumentshave convinced most re- als who engage in collective action are dis- searchers in the discipline. Even those re- satisfied with the existing order, they assert searchers otherwise critical of the resource- that this propositionhas no predictive power mobilization approach have sided with its (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Oberschall, stand against the breakdown model (Pinard, 1978:298;McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1214-15; 1983). Social movement/collective behavior Snyderand Tilly, 1972).Second, they maintain textbooks now routinely report that break- that the barrierto insurgencyis the access to down model has, as Miller recently put it, resources, and that disorganized groups are "yieldedfew explanationsof social movements least likely to have the requisite resources. that have withstood the probings of critics" Disorganizedpopulations will tend to be pow- (Miller, 1985:319; see also, Wood and Jackson, erless and unable to launch an insurgency. 1982:63-77;Washburn, 1982:201-203). Third, the resource-mobilization theorists Despite the general oppositionto the break- argue that collective action flows out of strug- down model, there is still research claiming gles among well-definedgroups. They find im- supportfor it. One example is Piven and Clo- plausiblethe idea that collective action occurs ward's (1977)work on the conditions that give when groups becomes less organized, rather rise to "poor" people's movements. They than more organized. argue that "profound dislocations," such as Finally, resource-mobilizationtheorists rest massive unemploymentor large scale migra- much of their charge against the breakdown tion, are needed "to virtually destroy the model on the purportedlynegative evidence structures and routines of daily life" before they and others have collected. Collective ac- protest can occur (1977:10).A second excep- tion does not covary with indicators of per- tion has been Gurrand his collaborators,who sonal pathology (e.g., crime, suicide, alco- found that "crime waves"-sharp increases in holism) (Lodhi and Tilly, 1973:296;Tilly et al, crimes of violence and theft-coincided with 1975:76-81), non-membership in secondary episodes of civil strife in London, Stockholm, and primarygroups, (Gerlachand Hime, 1970; New South Wales, and Calcuttaduring various Useem, 1980), and changes in the level of de- periods in the 19th and 20th centuries (Gurr, privation (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Snyder 1976:82-90;Gurr et al., 1977:666-76). and Tilly, 1972; Skocpol, 1979:115). Third, a numberof researchershave found One focus of this research has been the flaws in the standard research on the 1960s urban riots of the 1960s. The evidence indi- urban riots, and reported that properly as- cates that the rioters compared to their non- sessed, the data support a breakdownmodel. rioting counterparts, were more likely to be Millerand associates (1976)show that many of politically sophisticated, racially conscious, the key tables supporting the resource- socialized in the North, victims of racial dis- mobilizationinterpretation of the riots are per- crimination,and similar to their counterparts centaged in the wrong directionand conflate a on such variables as income, education and critical distinctionbetween nonviolent protes- occupation (Bryan, 1979; Caplan and Paige, ters and rioters. Once these errors are cor- 1968; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Sears and rected, Millerand associates (1976:361)argue, McConahay,1973; Tomlinson, 1970).Further, the data reveal that the rioters were the "least rioting tended to occur in cities that had socially integratedand lower elements of the blocked political opportunities for blacks community." Lieske (1978) found that cities (Eisenger, 1973), whereas variationin the so- with higher levels of social disorganization DISORGANIZATIONAND THE NEW MEXICO PRISON RIOT 679 were more likely to experience a riot than cities resource-mobilizationand breakdown propo- with lower levels. Family disorganization(as nents. measuredby divorce and separationrates and While these considerations serve as an im- illegitimacy rates), demographic dislocations portant caveat-cautioning researchers not to (as measured by nonwhite population change overgeneralizethe results from prisons to col- and percent nonwhite change in residence), lective action elsewhere-it would be unwar- and high levels of criminal activity (as mea- rantedto draw the strongerconclusion that the sured by police density) each contributed to evidence on prison riots does not bear on the the outbreak of the riots. central controversies. Althoughall inmates ex- Finally,a greaternumber of researchershave perience a profound deprivationby virtue of been persuaded that deprivation and protest their imprisonment,inmates do develop stan- are causally associated (Unseem, 1980;Walsh, dards of just deprivation.It is the violation of 1981, 1983; Pinard, 1983). These research- these standards which, as in the non-prison ers, however, still tend to reject the picture of world, is hypothesized to motivate protest. collective action as the behavior of uprooted, The breakdown and resource-mobilization disorganizedpeople, and argue instead that or- models, furthermore,have been applied to a ganization and solidarity generate protest. heterogeneous assemblage of phenomena, in- They see the "breakdown"element as the fail- cluding peasant involvement in revolutionary ure of social mechanismsthat were previously movements, strikes by workers in the early supposed to satisfy the needs of the discon- stages of industrialization, unionization of tented group, and not as the disruptionof ties farmworkersin the United States, and partici- within that group. pation in the U.S. civil rights and new Chris- This paper takes a new look at the break- tian right movements, to name a few recent down model. We show that the breakdown examples. These diverse foci make less model can more adequatelyaccount for a par- troublesome the argumentthat prison popula- ticular instance of collective action, the New tions are atypical of those usually studied. Ad- Mexico prison riot of February 2, 1980, than ditionally,both resource-mobilizationtheorists the rival resource-mobilizationmodel.' (e.g., Zald and Berger, 1978:843,846, 847) and breakdown theorists (e.g., Smelser, 1962:236-37,251-52, 254) have drawn on data DATA RIOT AND on prison riots to support their respective Before describing the data, we consider models. whether evidence on prison riots, in general, Finally, the resource-mobilizationtheorists can be used to help adjudicatethe debate be- emphasize protest by integrated, skilled, in- tween the breakdown and resource- telligent, organizedsectors of a group, and op- mobilization approaches. Two considerations pose the image of rebellion as the work of the suggest it cannot. A mandatedpurpose of pris- canaille. It is somewhat problematicfor them, ons is the deprivationof its clientele. Sykes therefore, if the canaille do rebel. Because (1958:63-83) describes five deprivations- prison inmates often lack social skills and in- liberty, goods and services, heterosexual re- variably lack organizationaland material re- lationships, autonomy, and security-that to- sources, pure resource-mobilization theory gether lead all inmates to feel that "life in the would predict their being a passive and easily- maximumsecurity prison is deprivingor frus- controlledgroup. Their high levels of depriva- tratingin the extreme"(1958:63). As a possible tion ought not to alter this, because everyone consequence, the effect of deprivationon pro- has grievances. If they do rebel, a resource- test may be different in prisons than it is mobilizationtheorist would be forced to posit elsewhere. some causative increase in resources or inter- Further,inmates in maximumsecurity pris- nal organization. It is therefore particularly ons are (of course) convicted felons. The fac- problematicif prisoners rebel precisely when tors that cause this atypical subpopulationto their deprivationis greatest, resources fewest, rebel may differ from those that generate re- and social structure most atomized-as was bellion in the populations considered by the case in New Mexico. The data on the New Mexico riot are drawn from two principalsources. As part of the offi- I Because the resource-mobilizationmodel has cial investigationof the riot, the New Mexico been discussed extensively in the recent social Attorney General'soffice interviewed, shortly movementliterature, we do not furtherelaborate it here. See the useful overviews by Jenkins (1983), after the riot, a random sample of 49 inmates Wood and Jackson (1982:141-47), and Marx and and 28 guards. Of those selected to be inter- Wood (1975), as well as the originalformulations by viewed, only three inmates and six guards re- Gamson (1975), McCarthy and Zald (1977), fused to grant interviews (OAGSNM, Oberschall(1973), and Tilly (1978). 1980:A-2). The interviews lasted from two to 680 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW four hours, and involved questioning the in- there were many such group . .. ferociously mates and guardsabout prison conditionsover slashing open stomaches, cutting of a ten-year period. Verbatim transcripts of genitalia, beating on corpses that were these interviews were obtained. The author strewn over the catwalks. The floors were and co-worker, in addition, interviewed36 in- covered with clotted pools of blood, the cells mates in February,1985. The sampleconsisted with bloody drag marks,the air with cries of of all inmates in the penitentiarywho had been men being tortured(Stone, 1982:126) there during the riot.2 The assaults and killing were selective. The The 1980New Mexico prison riot is perhaps primary targets were inmate informants the most brutal(33 inmates killed, 400 injured ("snitches") and objects of personal grudges. [Lapham et al., 1984:218])and costly ($200 An inmate stated, million [Morris, 1983:225])U.S. prison riot. It began when several inmates overpowered, [M]ost of the people [attacked]were rats or stripped, and severely beat four guards who they had jackets . . . Some of them were were conductinga routineinspection of a dor- killed over little petty beefs . . . There was a mitory in the prison's south wing. Guards reason behind every one of them. There stationedat other south wing dormitorieswere wasn't, you know, helter skelter killing. quickly subdued. A numberof security lapses (A.G. Interview) allowed the inmates to take control over the Autopsy reportslisted thirtyof the thirty-three the entire institution:a securitygate separating as inmate-inflicted homicides was deaths (the south wing from the rest of the institution cause of death could not be determinedfor the left unlocked;a recently-installed,purportedly remainingthree bodies, which were inciner- impenetrable window fronting the control ated). (Laphamet al., 1984:222). center gave way when bashed by inmates;and Twelve guardswere taken as hostages, some renovationcrews left behindacetylene torches of whom were repeatedlybeaten, sodomized, that were used to bum open locked gates and threatenedwith death. A hostage reported (OAGSNM, 1980;Serrill and Katel, 1980;Col- that an inmateapproached a groupof hostages vin, 1982). with the severed head of a black inmate, say- lead- No group of inmates attained clear ing, "This is what can happen to you . .. We'll ership status. Control over hostages, walkie- cut you in pieces and throw you out the win- talkies, and negotiationswas fragmented,per- dow" (Quotedin Hillman, 1981:1194).Another sonalistic, and ephemeral. Some inmates, hostage reported that an inmate said to him: alone and in groups, took advantage of the " 'First we're going to stab you fifteen times, situation to beat, rape, torture, and mutilate then we're going to cut your hands off, then other inmates. One inmatehad his head cut off we're going to cut your head off.' " (Quotedin with a shovel; anotherdied froma screw-driver New Mexican, February3, 1985,Sec. E, p. 3.) driven through his head; several others were Inmates killed no hostages for two reasons. immolatedin their cells when inmates sprayed First, they believed that a hostage killingwould lighterfluid on them; and still others were tor- an armedassault. Second, as one in- swiftly bring tured to death with acetylene torches. No inmate put it, mate group made a serious attemptto prevent this. One inmate wrote: a dead man does not suffer and they [the inmates]wanted to fuck them [the guards]up ... They succeeded in every case. Fucked 2 Interviewsconducted by the AttorneyGeneral's them up bad. They didn't want to kill them office and by the authorand Peter Kimballare desig- . . . [T]hey've been hurt for years by those nated"A.G. Interview"and "U. and K. Interview," wanted to back respectively. Whereverpossible, we have relied on fuckingguards, and they get the Attorney General's interviews rather than our at them, wanted to hurt them.3 (A.G. Inter- own. First, the Attorney General'sresearchers ob- view) taineda samplerepresentative of the inmatepopula- tion at the time of the riot, whereas our sample 3 A psychiatrist who treated 9 of the 12 guard overrepresentedinmates with long sentences and re- hostages reports that the inmates did, indeed, "suc- cidivists. Second, the AttorneyGeneral's interviews ceed" in terrorizing the hostages (Hillman, 1981). In were conducted soon after the riots, whereas ours addition to the physical brutality, most experienced occurred almost five years later. At this point, in- extreme feelings of fear and helplessness. Many of mates' memoriesmay have faded. This is especially them said "goodby" in their minds to their loved salientin regardto inmates'assessment of changesin ones; they imagined the grisly ways that inmates the prison from 1975 to 1980, for which we rely would kill them; and they visualized their dead almost exclusively on the 1980 interviews. Still, we bodies being discovered after the riot. Most experi- noticed no major discrepancy between the two enced acute and disabling aftereffects for at least one rounds of interviews. year following the riot. DISORGANIZATIONAND THE NEW MEXICOPRISON RIOT 681 However, some guards received better treat- brutalityhad been a permanentfeature of the ment than others, and some were helped to prison. escape by sympathetic inmates. We found, however, that inmates perceived Not all inmates participatedin the violence. a dramaticworsening of conditions. The turn- This includedthe prison's 120blacks (nine per- ing point, accordingto most inmates, occurred cent of the inmatepopulation). They organized in 1975when the deputy wardenwas fired and themselves for self-protection and eventually the warden (Felix Rodriguez)was transferred fled from the riot (OAGSNM, 1980:49). (under allegationsof personal corruption)to a Other inmates not participatingin the bru- make-workjob in the central administration. tality included a small group who had been One inmate stated: active in prison reform and class-action suits. When we had Rodriguez everything was Led by respected jail-house lawyer Lonnie Duran, the group running good . . . Ever since he left we got tried to transform the riot the rest of them wardens, they all change into a protest for prison reform (Colvin, everything, from better to worse. (A.G. 1982:459).Duran's group formulateda set of Interview) demandsand establishednegotiations with the administration.Many inmates, however, sim- Anotherinmate invidiously compared the Rod- ply paid no attention to or were unaware of riguez period with the one that followed: these activities, and they had little on impact When Mr. was here had the course and outcome of the riot (Serrilland Rodriguez you pro- grams here . . . They had people going to Katel, 1980; Colvin, 1982). college and everything. They had good pro- grams ... They give them something to do FINDINGS and it improves their minds and their spirits and We had a when Both the inmateand guardinterviews everything. good year supporta they had those programshere. (A.G. Inter- deprivation explanation of the riot. Most in- view) mates reported that the conditions in the penitentiarybefore the riot were insufferably One inmate, himself, perceived a link between bad. One inmate, for example, stated: changes in the level of deprivationand an in- creased likelihood of a riot: It was unlivable before the riot . . . It's been too crowded, the food is bad, the god- Inmate: [Before 1975] there was only about damnedguards talk to you like you're a dog. eight officers in the corridor at night, . . . We're not dogs. (A.G. Interview). and they'd call chow just about everybody at 700 Anotherinmate described the prison as a place the same time, so there'd be people out of chronic violence: in the corridor. Question: So it was easier to pull off a riot in There was one dormitory designed for 45 those days? men, and they had 120 in there. It was a Inmate: Oh, yeah, much easier... jungle after lights out. You couldn'tgo to the Question: But nobody wanted to? restroomat night without steppingon some- Inmate: Yeah. Nobody cared about that one, and that was all it took for a fight to thing because the conditions weren't that break out. The guards stayed down in the bad. I mean, the conditions were bad ... mess hall, drinking coffee. (Albuquerque we've always had rats and the water has Journal, 2/3/85, Sec. B, p. 4.) always been cold in the showers and stuff A U.S. Justice Department study concluded like that. [B]ut people can live with that if that the Penitentiarywas, before the riot, "one they're treated like human beings.. . It's of the harshest, most punitive prison envi- really hard to live here. You just got that hatredin mind all ronments in the nation." (AlbuquerqueJour- your the time. (A.G. Inter- view) nal, 9/24/80, quoted in Morris, 1983:111). This evidence, though, does not persuade Another inmate described the transition: resource-mobilization theorists. Deprivation may have been a "constant" feature of the Inmate: It's just been getting worse ever penitentiary,and thus cannot explain why the since I got here. In '74 it was pretty mellow. riot happened when it did. Indeed, Colvin It was alright. Shoot, by '79 it was smokin' (1982) rejects a deprivationexplanation of the hot. Just making you do things you didn't riot for just those reasons. He argues that in- want to do . .. just to give you a hard time. mate food and "services" had always been Locking people up left and right. (A.G. bad, and that while some services had deteri- Interview) orated, others had improved. Further, guard Another inmate stated: 682 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW Question: You've been here for the last five participatedin a wide range of programsand wardens ... Give me an idea as to how activities (OAGSNM, 1980:14). Programsin- programs change when the wardens cluded a college associate of arts program(213 changed? inmates);a school release programfor inmates Inmate: They've all gone worse. Straight nearing parole (20); an IBM key-punch work down hill. shop (184 inmates); counseling programs for Question: No bouncing around? drug, alcohol and sex-relatedoffenders; and a Inmate:No, no bouncingaround, just boom, numberof clubs and communitycontact pro- right from ten to zero. (A.G. Interview) grams, such as the Outside Friends, Bible On The guards also stated that the prison condi- Study, Jay Cees Club, and Toastmasters. their own initiative, inmates formed Toys for tions for inmateshad worsened, althoughsome for Children, and regardedthis changeas appropriate.One guard Tots, Concerned Convicts charitable activities stated: "During [Rodriguez's] tenure, there other (OAGSNM, Accordingto the Attorney General's was no escapes. There was no majorstabbing, 1980:14). and activities duringthe pe- there was no killings, and that's because they report, "programs [the inmates] had everything they wanted. It riod (1970-1975)involved a majorityof the in- was ridiculous, but they did." (A.G. Inter- mates in some meaningful activity" view) (OAGSNM, 1980:24).The administrationthat The evaluations made of different adminis- replaced Rodriguez's sharply reduced the trationsin the 1980inmate interviews also sup- numberof programsin the prison and stopped port the deprivationargument. Inmates com- community-contactprograms entirely (Colvin, of pared the conditions under the various war- 1982:454).The inmates were aware these dens 181 times. One-hundred-sixtyof these changes. One inmate commented: comparisons indicated that conditions were Inmate: I joined one of those clubs. better underRodriguez. Table 1 classifies these Question: This was when Rodriguez was comparisons by the area of prison life com- warden? mented upon. In every area, inmates reported Inmate: Yes, and when the other wardens that the conditions under Rodriguezwere bet- came in, they just stopped it. ter than under any of the other wardens. Question:They closed down the other clubs According to breakdown theory, unem- too? ployment and absence of voluntary organi- Inmate:Everything, everything. (A.G. Inter- zations make individualsmore "available"for view) mobilization.When applied to the prison set- inmate stated: ting, the argument implies that inmate pro- Another grams and jobs make riot participationless I'll give Mr. Rodriguez credit for he knew likely. The data supportthis hypothesis. Under how to run this goddampenitentiary for the the Rodriguezregime, the majorityof inmates things that were importantto the inmates in

Table 1. Comparisonsof Prison ConditionsUnder Various Wardensa Prison Better Under: Baker Rodriquez Aaron Malley Romero Griffin Same Condition (1968- (1970- (1975- (1976- (1978- (1979- Under Mentioned 1969) 1975) 1976) 1978) 1979) 1980) All Officials/wardenfair, competent, or "cares" 21 - 2 General Conditions 1 20 Food, Mail, TV, Case Workers,Rec- reation, Psych. Services, Canteen, Visitation 17 2 5 Inmate Programs 1 45 Inmate Informants 15 1 Treatment by guards - 18 - - 2 Discipline, restrictionon movement, disciplinary segregation 24 - 7 a This table is based on the 1980interviews only. The distributionof responsesamong the categoriesin part reflectsthe questionsasked. For example,the inmateswere askedto evaluatethe programsunder each of the wardenssince 1970but were not asked about changes in the qualityof the food. Thus, we cannot inferfrom the table that inmateswere more concernedabout the inmateprograms than, say, the food (althoughthis is probablytrue). The tabledoes demonstratethat inmatesbelieved that the qualityof prisonlife haddeclined in virtuallyevery area. DISORGANIZATIONAND THE NEW MEXICO PRISON RIOT 683 here. He was a strong believer in programs. anotherguy who got killed in cellblock 2. . . He knew when you have 'em in, you got to Then it startedincreasing two or three (stab- give 'em something to occupy their dead bings) every month. (U. and K. Interview) time. He was damngood at that, but it hasn't Another inmate, in the same round of inter- happened since then. (A.G. Interview) views, stated: The terminationof the programsappears to [Malley] came in like a real maniac. People have had many of the effects that breakdown can say what they want about Rodriguez, theory would suggest. One decreased inmate and maybe he did have his finger in the pie, incentives to comply with institutionalrules. but all I know man, all I know empirically, Question: How has [the Penitentiary] when he was warden here, you didn't have changed over the years? guys stabbing each other in wholesale Inmate: I think it changed when Warden numbers, you didn't have guys breakingout Rodriguez resigned . .. That's when the big and runningup the fence 15 or 20 at a time change came. because it was too heavy for them to do time Question: What did they do? here.... It was a mellow, laid-back place Answer: They stopped all the programs. under Rodriguez. (U. and K. Interview) They just took everythingaway and nobody The trend toward greater inmate crime and had anythingto look forwardto or no more violence after 1975 is also reflected in the incentive to try for. [Rodriquez] had pro- numberof inmates housed in solitary confine- grams . . . that a convict could shoot for. ment (punishment) and protective custody. Now in this institutionthere's nothingto try During the early 1970s, one cellblock housed for. (A.G. Interview) both the prison's disciplinary cases and its The inmate added: protection cases. It averaged around 50 in- mates, representingless than 5 percent of the We had outside entertainmentat least once population,and held as few as 13 in 1971. By a month. It was something to look forward 1976, over 20 percent of the inmates were to, something to stay out of lock up. There either in protective custody or in segregation wasn't near as much tension . . . When units, forcing the administrationto designate Aaron came in [in 1975]he stopped all out- one block for segregation and another for side programs,everything. (A.G. Interview) protective custody. Each block had a rated Another inmate offered this reflection: capacity of 90 inmates, but held as many as 200 inmates. Two and sometimes three in- Every one of these wardens, I have begged mates lived in a cell designed for one 'em until I was blue in the face to get pro- (OAGSNM, 1980:18,27). grams back in this institution. I've gotten Further, a "breakdown"in the prison com- other inmates together to get the lifers pro- munityappears to have heightenedthe level of gram here in this institution.The men that's deprivation experienced by inmates. Inmates here doing life and more you'd have to give experienced deprivationin the late 1970s, not them somethingfor an incentive or you can't only because of the direct effect of the institu- hold em. You're going to have to kill 'em or tional conditions, but because inmates preyed let 'em hit the fence. (A.G. Interview) upon each other. One inmate stated: there is an Breakdown theorists posit that Most trustwas back in '69 and '70. It seemed vio- association between crime, interpersonal like trusted each other more. the everybody lence, and protest, since they stem from There wasn't too much ripping off the can- same cause. Evidence on the ten-year period teen and . . . a person didn't have to go to leading up to the riot supportsthat contention. sleep with a shank in his pillow. (A.G. Both inmatesand guardsreport a dramaticrise Interview) in the level of inter-inmateassaults and as- saults against guards. In an interview con- Another inmate stated: ducted in 1985, an inmate stated: Inmate: Inmates get up with there's nothing Question: Did it make any difference when to do . . . They're mad. They ask the case Malley and Aaron came in? worker, "Why don't you get me a job, or Inmate:They introduceddeath here. In 1970 work somewhere, or something." [They an- there was maybe one stabbing a year. I swer,] "Nah, you don't need no job." wasn't here in '71 and '72. I came back again Question: Inmates sitting in a dormitoryall in '73. There was maybe a few gang fights huddled together, does that cause problems but no stabbings,not any real bad things. It between [sic] the inmates? didn'treally startuntil '76 or'77. There was a Inmate: Yeah, it's just like a snake pit. In- guy killed in five, next month after that was mates that don't do nothing, they build up 684 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW and build up and they get tired of it. Maybe Question: Really? the inmatehas borrowedsomething and they Inmate: You can't hardly trust anybody. just going to jump him. But if they had Question: Are there more [snitches] now something to do, this place [would] be bet- than there used to be or are there less? ter. (A.G. Interview) Inmate:Seems like there are alot more now Another inmate observed: than there was before . . . Hell, you can't even trust your best friend anymore . . . Aaroncame in, securitytightened up, people They'll snitch on you. started escaping, people started stabbing Question:When did it startgetting to be that each other, people startedkilling each other. bad? Sure, they got rid of the drugs, but the vio- Inmate: In about seventy-six. lence got worse. Your opportunityto go to school lessened, the educational services, Finally, in a 1985 interview, an inmate re- the psychological services, everything was ported that he believed that the increased use shrinking.(A.G. Interview) of snitches after 1975 contributedto the vio- lence in the 1980 Another factor causing inmates to distrust riot. one anotherwas the institution,by the admin- It's [the snitch system] a real trashed out istration, of a system of inmate informants. system. If that riot would have come down Prior to 1975, prison officials gathered infor- when Rodriguez was warden, I don't think mation throughseveral channels, includingan 33 people would have died because I don't inmate council consisting of inmates elected think there were 33 snitches in this whole from each living unit. Inmates also passed in- penitentiary.When the riot [did]come down formationto the directorsof the variousinmate there was about a hundred and some odd programs who, in turn, forwarded it to the down in Cell Block 4 (the protectivecustody warden. These avenues of communication unit), all of them stoned rats. (U. and K. were closed after 1975with the abolishmentof Interview) the inmate council and the curtailmentof the inmate programs(OAGSNM, 1980:12, In 23). OUTCOMEOF COLLECTIVEACTION place of these programs,officials began a coer- cive "snitch" (informant) system. Officials Breakdown theorists and resource-mobil- threatened inmates with punishment un- ization theorists also disagree over the ef- less they provided informationon other in- fectiveness of protest in solving the problems mates' misbehavior.The punishmentsincluded of an aggrieved constituency. Resource- both direct disciplinaryactions and the disclo- mobilizationtheorists argue that protest can be sure to other inmates that a noncooperative an effective lever for change, but this depends inmate was a "snitch" (OAGSNM, 1980:24). upon the presence of a protest organization The snitch system increasedthe enmity among that can mobilize and channel unrest (e.g., inmates. Gamsonand Schmeidler,1984). In its absence, Question: Duringthe six months before the the resources and skills necessary for effective riot, did inmates trust each other? protest cannot be aggregated and used effi- Inmate: No. Hardly anybody trusted any- ciently. Breakdowntheorists are internallydi- body else. vided. Traditionally,they have tended to dis- Question: Why do you think that was? miss protest as an agent for change. Protest Inmate:It was because all that snitchingwas was presumed to be an irrationalresponse to going on. (A.G. Interview) the breakdown of the social order, and one incapableof forcing constructivechange (e.g., There were fewer informants under Rod- Smelser, 1963; Kornhauser, 1959). riguez's administration. Writingmore recently, breakdowntheorists Question:Is the snitch system pretty preva- Piven and Cloward (1977; see also, Cloward lent? and Piven, 1984) share the resource- Answer: Sure mobilizationtheorists' suppositionthat protest Question: Under Rodriguez?Is that some- can effect change, but challenge the strategic thing that's changed? value of buildinga protest organization.Piven Answer: WhenRodriguez was Wardenthere and Clowardposit that "poor" constituencies was no such thing as a protection unit [for do not have the skills, money and other re- snitches] and I think it was a whole lot bet- sources needed to build and sustain an effec- ter. (A.G. Interview) tive protest organization.The most effective Another inmate stated: option is to create pressurefor reformthrough a strategy of mass defiance and disruption. Inmate: Just about three fourths of the in- From our 1985 interviews, it was apparent mates are snitching. that the 1980 riot was directly responsiblefor DISORGANIZATIONAND THE NEW MEXICO PRISON RIOT 685 significant improvements in the living condi- ing the snitch system "disgusting and im- tions, includingthe eliminationof overcrowd- moral," he stated that it had been banned. He ing, suppression of guard brutality, increased felt that these changes would decrease the programming,less reliance on snitches for in- likelihood of another riot. (AlbuquerqueJour- formation, and fewer restrictions on personal nal, 2/3/85, Sec. E, p. 4). property. One inmate stated: At that time [before the riot], they wasn't giving up anything. I mean it was a real DISCUSSION tucked up place to be. You know it's still a During the 1970s, the State Penitentiary real fucked up place to be. But at least a guy changed from a relatively benign and well-run can live here with relatively safety, and you institution, to one that was harsh, abusive, get fairly decent food and clean linen, show- painfully boring, and without the "regulatory ers and exercise . . . I have been in better mechanisms" that had been in place in the joints than this, but the improvementnow early 1970s. With few programs or work as- compared to before 1980 was-man-it's available, inmates remained con- Now have signments one-thousandpercent better. they fined to their living units with little to do or pay jobs, and there is industrialjobs where look forwardto. Inmates became increasingly off your can work a day and get a day cut hostile not only toward prison officials and your sentence. There's different pay jobs, guards, but also toward one another. but before the riot none of that. Shit, you The of disorganizationwithin the of the processes know, probably seventy-five percent prison not only increased the likelihood of a populationwas on idle. No one worked. (U. riot, but also determined its form. The frag- and K. Interview) menting of bonds among inmates appears to Speaking in 1985, a 1980 riot participantob- have contributed to the weak and chaotic served that he probablywould not participate structures of leadership among the inmates in another riot, because of the improved con- duringthe riot, as well as to the brutalattacks ditions. of some inmates against other inmates. This case study has a numberof implications Myself I wouldn't feel near as good about for the study of collective action. It demon- participatingin another one because there strates that researchershave been too quick to have been some things that have gotten bet- reject the breakdownmodel. The New Mexico ter. They've gotten off my case and they've riot appearsto have been (in part)a response to gotten off a lot of people's cases, for the the prison disorganizationthat began dramat- most part . . . It's never going to be enjoy- ically around 1975. The riot was a product of able but it's livable.. . . Now, that that [har- the terminationof inmateprograms, crowding, rasment] is not happening, well you feel a idleness, and a generally poorly-administered little better about yourself. You do your prison system. Furthermore, the alternative time. You know you got "x" number of resource-mobilizationmodel cannot account years to do. You gonna do it the best way for the riot. There is no evidence whatsoever you can and hopefully get out in one piece. that the prison riot occurredin 1980because of And I think you stand a better chance of that an increase in inmate resources or solidarity, now then you did before. (U. and K. Inter- which resource-mobilizationtheorists say must view) precede collective action. Another inmate reported that the riot had At the heart of controversy between break- caused groups outside of the prison to take an down and resource-mobilizationtheorists is interest in the welfare of the inmates, which he the issue of the relationship between crime/ and other inmates "appreciatea lot." Priorto deviance and collective action. Resource- the riot, he stated, "we had nothing coming mobilizationtheorists hold that crime/deviance from the public;nothing at all from the public." and collective action arise from different,if not (U. and K. Interview). opposite, processes. They argue that crime/ As furtherevidence that riot contributedto deviance and collective action should not co- the improvementsin the penitentiary,the De- vary or, if they do, the links shouldbe weak and partment of Corrections Secretary, inter- negative. Breakdown theorists argue that viewed on the fifth anniversary of the riot, crime/deviance and collective action covary stated that the 1980 riot had motivated him to because they arise from the same underlying try to improve the prison (AlbuquerqueJour- condition. On this point, the New Mexico data nal, 2/3/85, Sec. E, p. 4). He said that, in his supportthe breakdownposition. The 1980riot opinion, the riot was the product of inmate followed a period of dramatic increase in the idleness, crowding,and understaffing,and that level of personal violence in the prison, as de- he was seeking to remedythese problems.Call- scribedby the inmateinterviews and as seen in 686 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW the large increase in the numberof inmates in much support to the Durkheimianstrand of protective custody and segregation. breakdowntheory which emphasizes anomie, Black (1984) has recently argued that much egoism, and the breakdownof a group's inter- crime is an effort to seek justice by those who nal structureas causes of collective action. A have a grievancebut to whom law is relatively similarmodel was appliedto prisons by Sykes unavailable. Youths may vandalize property, (1958), who argued that riots occurred when for example, because they have grievances authorities suppressed the pre-existing social against adults but no legal recourse. Seen in order and allowed unruly, violence-prone in- this light, crime has much in common with mates to gain pre-eminence. protest (even as resource-mobilization In examining both sets of interviews, we theorists conceive the latter), in that both ex- found no evidence that there was much of an press a grievance by one person or group inmate social order even under the Rodriguez against another person or group. Resource- administration,that any group of inmates lost mobilizationtheorists have failed to see this or gained relative power after 1975, or that link between protest and crime, not so much such processes had anything to do with the because of weaknesses in their model of pro- outbreakof the riot. test, but because they underestimatethe moral Neither did we find the actions of most in- component of crime.4 mates duringthe riot to be irrationalor char- The interviews and increasing punishment acteristic of "magicalbeliefs." Most of the in- suggest, as well, a causal connection between mates we interviewedin 1985described the riot crime and collective action. A secure, low- as a more or less justified and successful at- crime environmentis a valued condition, and tempt to relieve unjustlybad conditionsof life. its absence may produce anger toward au- In fact, the quantity and quality of the vio- thoritiesor towardothers in the community,or lence, in its apparentsavagery and irrational- toward both. In New Mexico, inmates com- ity, may have been the most effective possible plained bitterly about the beatings and the ab- strategy to motivate the state government to sence of security in the prison before the riot. make sweeping improvements (Morris, This dissatisfactionappears to have fueled the 1983:225-26). riot. When authoritiesrespond regressively to The evidence does, though, supportPiven's increasesin crime/deviance,but do not destroy and Cloward'sthesis of the advantagesof mass all forms of resistance, the increased repres- defiance, at least in the prison setting. The sion may add a further impetus to collective New Mexico riot forced substantialprison re- action. This propositionfits well with the evi- forms in the absence of a protest organization. dence for the New Mexico riot. The prison Although work comparing the relative "suc- administrationresponded to the increasedlevel cess" of prison riots is needed before we draw of crime/deviancewith a coercive snitch sys- any firm conclusion, it would appearthat fear tem and a greateruse of solitary confinement. of another high-cost prison riot provides a Both of these policies appearto have angered deeper impetusfor prison reformthan the con- inmates and to have helped motivate them to cessions that inmate negotiators sometimes start the riot. force officials to agree to during a riot. Once These findings, though, do not indicate the order is restored, inmates have no means to utilityof acceptingthe full breakdownmodel as ensure compliancewith these concessions, nor a generalaccount of collective action. The case are state and prison officials likely to feel study provides no supportfor the presumption bound by them since officials agreed to them held by some breakdowntheorists that collec- under duress. tive action inevitably fails. The living condi- Furthermore, collective action may have tions of the State Penitentiarywere substan- distinct subtypes, some promotedby the pro- tially better in 1985than they were before the cesses identified by the breakdowntheorists, riot. The 1980 riot contributed to these im- others by the processes specified by the provements. resource-mobilizationtheorists. One possibil- Furthermore, the evidence does not give ity is that relatively spontaneous, short-lived actions, such as riots, arise primarily from breakdownprocesses, whereas the more en- 4 Based, as it is, on Black's view of crime, this duringforms, such as social movements, flow observation is tentative. Black and his associates from resource-mobilization processes. We (e.g., Baumgartner [1984] and Rieder [1984]) have find, however, no supportfor this proposition opened a new perspective on crime and its relation- in the current theoretical literature. Break- ship to other forms of "social control." The effort is still in its early stages, however, and lacks confir- down theorists apply their model to social matory evidence. It may turn out that Black and his movements (Kornhauser, 1959; Piven and associates are explaining the exceptional case rather Cloward, 1977), and resource-mobilization than the modal one or even a frequent one. theorists see their model as able to account for DISORGANIZATIONAND THE NEW MEXICO PRISON RIOT 687 riots. More important, perhaps, are the pre- 1969 "The J-curve of rising and declining satis- vailinghistorical and culturalconditions within factions as a cause of some great revo- which the collective action is embedded. For lutions and a contained rebellion." Pp. example, it could be argued that resource- 671-709 in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted as increased Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: mobilization processes-such Historical and ComparativePerspectives. solidarity and heightened political strug- New York: Signet Books. gles-were responsible for the urban riots Eisenger, Peter K. of the late 1960sand the Attica riot of 1971. In 1973 "The conditions of protest behavior in contrast,both the black riots which occurredin American cities." American Political Sci- Miamiin 1980(Porter and Dunn, 1984)and the ence Review 67:11-68. New Mexico prison riot of 1980may have been Etzioni, Amitai breakdownriots, in part because of the demise 1961 A ComparativeAnalysis of Complex Orga- of a cultureof oppositionin the United States.5 nizations. New York: Free Press. The breakdownmodel, over the past decade, Feagin, Joe R., and Harlan Hahn into disfavor among social move- 1973 Ghetto Revolts. New York: Macmillan. has fallen Gamson, WilliamA. ment researchers. This case study suggests 1975 Strategyof Social Protest. Homewood, IL: that breakdownprocesses can contributeto at Dorsey. least certain instances of collective action. Gamson, WilliamA. and Emilie Schmeidler Furthermore,as noted at the outset, the evi- 1984 "Organizingthe poor: an argument with dence on the breakdownmodel in other con- FrancisFox Piven and RichardA. Cloward, texts is equivocal, despite the claims of Poor People's Movements:Why They Suc- resource-mobilizationtheorists otherwise. The ceed, How They Fail." Theory and Society brief against the breakdown model rests on 13:567-85. Gerlach, Luther P., and VirginiaH. Hime shaky empiricalgrounds. 1970 People, Power, Change:Movements of So- cial Transformation. Indianapolis: REFERENCES Bobbs-Merrill. AlbuquerqueJournal Gurr, Ted Robert 1985 "Debate: building the road to change." 1976 Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers:A Political History of UrbanCrime and Conflict. 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