| No 5 | September to October 2007

AZERBAIJAN | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation

In the period under review country stability appears to be growing but there are already indicators showing a certain potential for an opposite trend with more conflictive events. This trend is mostly based on the upcoming presidential election in 2008, which will be more difficult for President Ilham Aliyev than assumed, because besides Country Stability and Conflictive Events internal, external factors will become more important. Especially the rivalry between the US, and to get more influence over the energy-rich country and the most important chain link in the East-West and North-South transport corridor has a strong impact on bilateral relations, which have now become gradually more strained. Baku has been trying so far to keep the balance and to remain neutral (highlighting the importance of settling the Karabakh conflict), which is fully in the interest of Moscow and Tehran but it does not satisfy Washington. The US wants to hold off the influence of Russia and Iran over the hydrocarbon resources and the main transport corridors in the Caspian Region. Although NATO Special Envoy for South and Robert Simmons announced on 26 September that the accession of Azerbaijan

Source: FAST event data into NATO is not on the agenda, the US wants to intensify the Integration of Azerbaijan (and Georgia) into NATO. The number of visits by high-ranking officials from the US military and Foreign Ministry is growing; but there are also more and more meetings with representatives of oppositional parties and civil society actors at the US embassy in Baku as well. This could indicate that Washington is trying to put pressure (through democratic means) on Aliyev’s government. Just recently the US called on Ilham Aliyev to stop persecuting independent media in what came as the first harsh words from Washington to Baku. This does not mean that Aliyev is in danger of becoming blacklisted as another authoritarian leader of a post-soviet country. For the US, stability in Azerbaijan is more important and as long as Aliyev is able to ensure this, his position remains relative stable. But also Iran and Russia have strong cards in this game and are willing to play them. For instance, Vladimir Putin’s statement at the Summit in Tehran on 15 October that no country in the region “should offer its territory to third powers for use of force or military aggression” has been widely seen as aimed at deterring US military intervention in Iran. This warning was also directed specifically at Azerbaijan and any plans to establish a permanent US base in Azerbaijan. Such a base could serve as a staging area if Washington decides to strike Iran’s nuclear assets, including the Bushehr reactor. Another reason for tensions is that Azerbaijani authorities are carrying out their strategy of pan-Turkism and transformed it into an official state ideology. This ideology, also caused by the traumatic experience of the Karabakh conflict, is directed against minorities like the Talysh and Lezgins, which are living on both sides of the Iranian, resp. Russian (Daghestan) boarder. Baku prefers to strengthen the position of the “Turkish“ element in such regions by repressing political movements and cultural institutions of minorities. Authorities are also pursuing another aim by putting pressure on ethnic minorities: concerning the aggravated Iran-US conflict, Baku is trying to formally convince the US administration that the Talysh are a potential threat and claim that they are under the growing influent of Iran. As preventive measures so-called “Iranian spies” are arrested from time to time. The Talysh, which are more loyal to Baku than for instance the Lezgins, are not calling for independence but for more cultural rights and an improvement of the social situation in their region, which is also serving as the main corridor for drug trafficking from Iran to Azerbaijan. It is a fact that ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan have been demanding more rights for many years but the government still has not provided sufficient assistance for this purpose. The potential for ethnic separatism may grow significantly if social problems and political and cultural repressions mix with radical radical doctrines. Besides constant pressure on independent media, which caused sharp criticism of the US and international organizations, there are various attempts by the government to establish an even stronger basis for the upcoming elections: On 12 October, Baku finally launched a NGO program (see FAST Update 3), which should help to oversee and fund the NGO sector. While the government insists that it will only help to fund NGOs, some activists claim that the real aim is to impose more control over their work. They fear that the program is designed to counteract the influence of foreign donors and NGOs they fund because many are very critical towards the government’s policy. Officials already warned opposition organizations that “many NGOs are politicized nowadays, doing things that are no concern of theirs.” Critics said that it is a remarkable coincidence that the decree coincides with the pre-election period for the 2008 presidential elections. It is worth remembering that four years ago, state-controlled media alleged that several leaders of high-profile NGOs funded by foreign donors were guilty of high treason after they visited Nagorno-Karabakh to discuss various issues with their Armenian counterparts. It was not the first time that such FAST Update | Azerbaijan | No 5 | September to October 2007

media campaigns were instigated by authorities and carried out with the support of state-controlled NGOs and it is very likely that the risk of such things happening will increase with the new law. Another very illustrative example for the general pressure by authorities was a campaign to force the admission of students to the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party at the Baku State University on 25 October. Deans of faculties entered classrooms and ordered first-year students to join the party.

The Azerbaijani government claimed to have prevented ”terrorist attacks” on Western embassies in Baku at the end of October 2007. The whole operation was probably meant to serve as evidence that radical Islamists are now organized enough to launch attacks in the oil-rich state and are becoming a threat to Western representatives in the country as well. The situation in Baku remained tense for several days and the opposition newspaper described it as an “undeclared state of emergency.” Roads were full of traffic police and security forces’ check points. The situation has remained very unclear and rather vague since government officials have so far given contradictory statements. Critics say that this “plot” was only one of many attempts by the government to use the threat of extremism to clamp down on dissent. No matter how much the official figures of Baku insist that “Azerbaijan is developing very quickly,” the country is buried in corruption and poverty, which according to experts is the right environment for the development of radical religious groups and criminals as well. There is a growing gap between rich and poor and popular anger at the ruling elite for perceived corruption. On the other hand, Western countries are more than ever confronted with energy interests (even Switzerland has recently intensified its cooperation on this issue and will soon open an embassy in Baku) and democratic rhetoric. Therefore, it is quite understandable that more and more Azeris are becoming disillusioned with democracy and the West, especially because they realize how the West is curry flavoring Aliyev’s highly corrupt government. This has also a negative impact on impotent and discredited opposition parties with pro-Western orientation and is an additional reason for their sinking insignificance. Despite the fact that the Azerbaijani Islamic Party is still not registered and can not be elected, is well placed to become a political force in the future, which will manifest itself on the streets. A very significant event took place earlier this year on 23 May when mosques in Azerbaijan were banned from using amplifiers to broadcast the Azan (call to prayer) like in many Muslim countries around the world. Officials said that the ban was necessary because the loud calls to prayer were disturbing residents especially in the capital Baku. It was the Caucasus Muslim Administration, which manages Muslim affairs in Azerbaijan on behalf of the government, which imposed the ban with the argument that there are so many new mosques in Baku that there is no longer any need to use loudspeakers and hinted that the decision was instead rooted in Azerbaijan’s firm commitment to democracy. But when the Chairman of the Azerbaijan Islam Party, Hajiagha Nuri, announced on 29 May that they do not agree with the ban and that they were ready to hold protest actions across the whole country (after they had already held an aggressive illegal rally in Baku, which could not be called off by security forces), in the evening of the same day, President Ilham Aliyev reversed the controversial ban. Officials explained that the decision to ban the loudspeakers was made without the president’s knowledge. This could also be a diplomatic hint that the government finally realized the difference between smashing a rally of journalists and human rights activists and controlling an angry religious (or social) motivated rally. The recent growth in Turkish-Kurdish tensions has also had a strong impact on the security in Azerbaijan. It is no surprise that politicians and public opinion unambiguously support Ankara’s position on dealing with the militant threat of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Officials noted, however, that Azerbaijan does not have a policy to officially label organizations as terrorists groups. Despite all moral support and rhetoric, it remains open how Baku will and can assist Ankara. However, it is not likely that the PKK is acting directly against Baku’s interests because this would be more damaging to their cause in the region and their image in the West.

It is more the deep-seated socio-economic problems and less the constant repression of religious and ethnic minorities and civil society in general that cause tension within the Azerbaijan society. At the present stage, radical Shiite and Sunni groups do not pose a serious threat to Azerbaijan. The secularism in the country is still strong but as the patience of the population runs out, radicalism could grow faster. In addition, police are using brutal force in dealing with religious groups and the government is to a large extent disregarding social causes, which makes especially young men join radical groups. Thus, despite the surface appearance of order, there is an underlying instability. This could trigger the type of extremism as seen in Russian North Caucasus and lead to sectarian violence and an outbreak of (smaller) terrorist attacks, especially if the government pursues its authoritarian repressive policy against society. Contact FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, FAST International covering 25 countries/regions in Africa, Asia and Europe. Based in Country Team: Azerbaijan Bern, Switzerland, the program is funded and utilized by an Sonnenbergstrasse 17 international consortium of development agencies, including the 3000 Bern 7 Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Canadian International Switzerland Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development [email protected] Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Swiss Agency for Development and www.swisspeace.org Cooperation (SDC).