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of the past, present and future

(Running Title: What is Postnormal When There is no Normal?)

George Cairns

QUT Business School, 2 George Street, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia.

Email: [email protected]

Abstract:

Keywords: Postnormal, postdichotomous, phronēsis, power.

Introduction

In recent years, Ziauddin Sardar (2010, 2013) has called for a breakdown of binary divisions of East and West in what he refers to as ‘postnormal times’. Defining the parameters of these postnormal times, Sardar (2010, p. 435) states that they are “characterised by three c’s: complexity, chaos and contradiction”. In contrast, he argues (Sardar, 2013) that in

‘normal’ times that preceded them, society was defined in terms of clear divisions of geography, power and authority. Within these, the resultant hierarchy – whilst not immune to dispute and challenge – would oversee progress towards a better future. Here, the ‘good’ would prevail and the evil others – of various political, economic and religious inclinations – would be overcome. Sardar posits that breakdown of the normal that led us into the postnormal came at the time when the neoliberal West’s notion of the ‘end of ’

(Fukuyama, 1989, 2002) and universal acceptance of free market democracy was seen to be a chimera. In this paper, I posit that Sardar’s (2013) notion of some inherent stability that underpins the concept of normal times is flawed. I argue that what was presented by those in power in ‘the West’ as a normalcy of progress towards social, economic and political equilibrium and future betterment was, at best, misplaced optimism and, at worst, a deliberate veil of untruths designed to anaesthetize and cocoon the privileged few and to keep them blind to the reality of the wider world in which they lived.

In developing such a line of argument, I first argue that the foundation of neoliberal thinking on social and political stability built on the classical free market of Adam

Smith was flawed from the outset. I posit that Smith’s ideas were misinterpreted in a narrow and exclusive way and that Smith himself was somewhat naïve in considering basic human drives. From this, I call for a realization that there was no ‘normalcy’ in what is described as normal times and, therefore, the term ‘postnormal times’ itself must be rethought in a more nuanced way. However, I consider that questioning the naming of an idea does not in itself negate the ideals and principles that underpin it. Rather, I will argue that what Sardar and others refer to as postnormal times represents an even more extreme set of ‘normal times’ than existed prior to the breakdown of the end of history thesis. More importantly, I propose that individuals’ responses to a present situation that is perceived as one of extreme normalcy will be different from one that is viewed as novel and truly postnormal, and that this difference is a crucial factor underpinning action, or lack thereof.

Whilst critically engaging with characterization of a postnormal world, I concur with the basic rationale of the emergent ‘postnormal theory’, and argue the case for fundamental change to economic and political priorities and for a focus on social needs and values in the very near future if we are to avoid acceleration through inertia towards the apocalyptic collapse of free-market capitalism. However, I posit that proposing responses to a situation of extended normalcy requires a different mindset and starting point than in addressing a new or post-normalcy. Whether we live in postnormal, ‘hyper-normal’, abnormal or ‘new normal’ times, we must accept that, for most of humanity and for the planet on which we live, certainly these are not good times and we must strive to bring about urgent and radical change.

Laying Foundations for a Calmly Radical Change

In positing the possibilities for meaningful change and success in challenging the status quo of a dominant normalcy, I would argue that it is first essential to avoid relying on broad assertions and generalizations. Such statements will be challenged by those who can cite contrary examples, and they also risk disaffecting like-minded individuals who feel themselves implicated in the generalization. We may infer some degree of generality, but we must do so from examples of the specific. More importantly, it is necessary to offer some constructive concepts and reasonable directions on action that can be taken to bring about challenge to the status quo. I have previously argued that academics must take a lead in seeking to bring about change, and called for a new ‘academic activism’ (Cairns, 2014).

This activism, whilst revolutionary in nature, must not be grounded in violence. Rather it must be a ‘revolution of ideas’, as proposed by Polish academic Monika Kostera in her keynote talk at the 2013 Standing Conference on Organizational Symbolism (SCOS) in

Warsaw. The key question to me is how such a revolution is to be informed, such that it becomes a movement of inclusion rather than exclusion, is pluri-vocal rather than strident and mono-vocal, and is truly cultural diverse rather than superficially multicultural.

However, in arguing for inclusion, I do not then accept that debate becomes one of moral relativism, in which all viewpoints and values are held to be equal. There must be frameworks for building the necessary inclusive conversation but, also, methods for making moral judgments between competing discourses.

Accepting that there is nothing particularly unique about the critiques I offer, my aim in this text is to focus on two key questions. Whilst critique may be readily accepted by those that agree with it, it can more often be read as mere criticism by those that disagree, or are the subjects of it. So, I question first how we might seek to transfer, or translate, critical discourse effectively across belief and value systems. However, critique itself is helpful only in as much as it leads to action to alleviate the circumstances being constructively critiqued. This leads me to consider, second, how we might approach engagement to inform action. As such, the later sections of this paper are devoted to presenting some ideas for frameworks and methods that I posit offer possibilities for consideration of radical change – for a revolution of ideas.

Challenging the Equilibrium Fallacy

As outlined above, in positing postnormal times, Sardar (2013) precedes these with times of perceived normality and equilibrium, in terms of economic growth, social stability, cohesive communities and a general understanding of a future trajectory along similar lines. This trajectory was to be confirmed and embedded as the future of humanity with the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989, 2002) and the collapse of the Soviet Union’s opposition to capitalist society. However, I challenge the notion that there was such equilibrium, other than in the chimeric, sanitized worldview of the few living within a bubble of blindness to the situation of the many. Also, I challenge one of the key foundation stones of this flawed worldview, in the classical economic theory of Adam Smith (1776/1999). The justification that underpinned arguments for the end of history and that still dominates notions of free market capitalism as the ideal societal form is largely economic in nature, drawn from the classical economic logic fathered by Adam Smith, extended by

Milton Freidman (1962), embraced by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US

President Ronald Reagan, and perpetuated by the neo-conservative right. However, whilst

Smith is celebrated for his legacy, I would argue that those who so admire him fail to acknowledge two factors that are key to interpreting his writing. The first I read as what might now be considered a somewhat naïve assumption of Smith (1790/2009) on basic human nature, which may be attributed to the nature of the society in which he lived and worked. The second, more importantly, concerns the issue of governmental responsibility – a responsibility set out by Smith that was ignored by Thatcher/Reagan, their advisors and acolytes, yet challenges aspects of the free market that they put in place and vehemently protected.

Adam Smith was born into a Scottish society in which the religious doctrine of

Presbyterianism was dominant, and his mother was a devout follower of the Protestant faith. This was a society in which there was little in the way of luxuries to be coveted and in which population numbers were in balance with the capability of the land to support them.

Writing in these times, Smith (1790/2009) asserted that, despite their personal desires and inclinations to accumulate, the rich, whilst picking the best of what was available,

“consume(d) little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity…they (would) divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements”. For

Smith, the rich were, “led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants” (1790/2009, p. 215). I would argue that such a notion of equilibrium in distribution is clearly a fallacy in contemporary society. Today, the global charity Oxfam argues that a mere 62 individuals own as much wealth as the poorest half of the human population – around 3.7 billion people (Elliott, 2016). Over the last few decades, socio-economic fragmentation has been increasing in all countries, from the richest Western democracies to the poorest in Sub-

Saharan Africa (cf. Cingano, 2014). The 21st Century global elite and their wealth are mobile and transient, more likely to share time and interests with others of their group in whatever luxurious, exclusive and secure setting they find themselves, in whatever country, than with those who share their nation of birth. So, we should not for one second think that there is, or will be any natural redistribution of wealth, as implied by Smith. However, I would also argue that historical legacies of industrial slums, eviction from the land, enslavement and child labour indicate that Smith’s view of humanity was from the outset seen through rose- tinted spectacles.

One aspect of Smith’s free market economy that was later shared in the work of

Freidman (Friedman & Friedman, 1980) concerned the role of government in protecting the individual. Whilst both argued that private enterprise should be allowed to trade without constraint within ‘the rules of the game’, both also argued for the role of government in looking after the interests of the people – their security, health, education and general social wellbeing. This key aspect of both writers’ work was ignored in the neoliberal marketization of Thatcher/Reagan, and railed against by the right wing neo-conservatives of the United States. Across the globe, governments that have both followed the neoliberal agenda freely and that have had the agenda thrust upon them through terms of membership of its institutions – the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – have abrogated responsibility for many aspects of security, health and education. Private firms have been handed contracts for internal and external security in many places, health services have been privatised and preference those that pay market rates, whilst education, particularly at university level, has become a global business driven by market share, income maximisation and government agendas for the supply of ‘talent’ to the market economy (cf.

Group of Eight Australia, 2014) rather than by intellectual curiosity within a regime of .

In contrast to the notion that policy grounded in classical and neoclassical economic theory will lead to socio-political equilibrium, I would assert that the foundational thinking on human values as being egalitarian is naïve and that contemporary evidence shows the opposite to be the case now and across history. I would also argue that governments’ abrogation of responsibility for key social welfare issues under this normalcy further promotes social fragmentation and disparity. In summary, I argue that what is argued as

‘normal’ times can be characterized by the very issues that define postnormal times – and that the latter differs only in a matter of degree. I see the inertial forces of ‘normal’ inequity, exploitation, degradation and fragmentation currently accelerating human society towards apocalyptic extremes and inevitable collapse. Such are the forces of momentum unless radical change is driven both from the top down and the bottom up, with commitment by both ill-defined East and West, as well as within the forgotten South and other remote regions.

Behind the Rhetoric – a Fairly Normal Present

No matter how we label these times – normal, postnormal or otherwise – what is urgently required are new forms of political and social engagement that transcend the binary distinctions that characterize the current situation, and we must question why it is that such distinctions continue to dominate political discourse. Why is it that national distinctions of rich and poor not only persist, but are transformed and reinforced under the breakdown of

East/West divisions that Sardar and others point to, to be recreated at a global level as new divides between rich and poor, between included and excluded. Here, the nouveau riche of so-called developing economies has more in common with the establishment wealth of the

‘developed’ world than with those who are excluded from wealth generation in their own countries. Similarly, governments form alliances and allegiances to fight whatever common threat they jointly externalize to protect the neoliberal values that they internally valorise.

The emergent rich of countries of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations provide new markets for luxury goods, from exotic cars to cosmetics, with a passion for

‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen, 1899/1995) that reaches to new extremes. At the same time, the governments of countries that in the past followed distinctly divergent and conflicting political ideologies – seemingly cast in stone until the ‘end of history’ – work together to counter common external threats to their neoliberal economic hegemony, whilst remaining culturally and ideologically discrete in other areas.

These combinations of shared and diverse interests between and across nations are not a new phenomenon. Whilst the generally accepted view of European colonization is one of dominance over and repression of indigenous societies, often through brutality, the reality is, “that imperialism works effectively only if it is accepted by much of the colonial society, and if it actually operates through a network of indigenous collaborators” (Breilly,

1993, p. 158). Such alliances of convenience to bring conflicting local interests together in the face of a common external threat are seen throughout history across the world. The

British Empire relied heavily on members of the local bourgeoisie in colonized states who, recognizing the technological superiority of the colonizers, resorted to the most pragmatic means of seeking to maintain their superior status within their own society.

It is regularly stated that conflict and terrorism in non-Western nations have reached new levels of depravity and barbarism in recent times, as insurgents seek to affect a population that is acculturated to ‘normal’ violence through 24x7 news coverage, hyper-real

3D film violence and computer gaming. However, as a teenager in the UK in the 1960s, I recall reports of British soldiers being beheaded by ‘terrorists’ in what was then Aden (cf.

Craig, 2006), and of football being played with the heads. Similarly, the Mau Mau uprising in

British colonial Kenya in the 1950s evoked tales of genocide on both sides, with reports of

British military personnel perpetrating massacres of civilians (cf. Osborne, 2016) similar to those alleged against US and UK forces in Iraq in the 2000s. Further, the Indian Uprising against British Imperialism of the 1850s – seen by many in the indigenous population as the

First War of Independence – saw atrocities committed by both sides against civilian populations, including massacres of women, children and infants (cf. Blunt, 2000).

I could go on to talk of Spanish colonial practices in South America, further back in history to Roman imperialism and, no doubt, across the world to similar types of violence exhibited by one social group against the differentiated and devalued ‘other’. My key point here is that the notion espoused by some of a 21st century of turmoil and violence following on from a relatively peaceful 20th century, punctuated by two World Wars and a few other conflicts, is shown to be a fallacy. Records (Polynational War Memorial, 2014) show that there has not been a day since the start of the last century in which there was not armed conflict between nations. In addition to drawing on examples of conflict and terror, environmental degradation on a vast scale is also cited as characterizing postnormal times. While I would certainly agree that humanity faces extreme conditions on a global scale resulting from resource extraction, depletion and destruction, I would again argue that this is not a new and postnormal feature. In the 16th century, Henry VIII started a process of mass deforestation across England to build his navy (cf. Vogt, 2007). This process continued into the second half of the 19th century, by which time bare hills and barren landscapes had

replaced deep forests across most of the nation. As we face mass extinctions of species in

this century, man (by and large a male project) has been adept at wiping out entire species

over centuries. Also, whilst current extreme conditions are global in their reach, earlier

destruction would likely have impacted the entire life-world or known world of whole

populations.

I have highlighted here that conditions of negativity and extremes of ‘non-normal’ behaviour that are invoked as a recent phenomenon have been common throughout history. However, I would point to the opposing examples of good and philanthropy across history. Adam Smith’s compatriot Robert Owen (1821/1970) is a prime example in the century following publication of Smith’s ideas, with his work at the community of New

Lanark whilst, in the following century, Joseph Cadbury committed to similar social philanthropy at Bourneville. Again, we see such philanthropy today alongside capitalist greed. Whilst some may decry the notion that Bill Gates or Richard Branson should decide what is to be valued and supported in our world, it might also be argued that if governments abrogate the responsibility to tax and spend on social welfare, it is better to be valued by someone than no one. Similar arguments might also have been directed at Owen and Cadbury, as selective philanthropists driven by their own values and beliefs on what an ideal society might look like. In presenting examples of binary extremes from across history, I do not propose that such oppositional thinking should be valued or pursued as the way of meaningful inquiry.

Rather, I merely assert that human activity and engagement with others has always been characterized by difference and set out along continua that range from one extreme to the other. It is on this basis that I posit that any notion of some normal situation that exists in a state of static equilibrium is and always has been a fallacy. Human societies throughout history have been characterized by dynamic ebbs and flows of power, interest, alliance and conflict. As such, it is also a fallacy to consider that such dynamics are the defining characteristics of some postnormal present that differentiate it from a non-existent normal past. However, it is of crucial importance to acknowledge that the normalcy of such dynamic relationships is generally ignored if not denied by the dominant powers. In line with Orwell’s

(1949) vision of a 1984-to-come, the histories of the past are rewritten in the present to align them with current orthodoxy, promoting illusions of stability and continuity over time.

What is to be Done?

If we are to bring about meaningful change towards a postnormal future that is indeed a post-‘crazy-normal present’, we may first ask why it is that academics and others who support intellectually rigorous debate on complex and ambiguous issues are by and large absent from the discourse. Why, when there is a need for inclusive and engaging dialogue between opposing views based upon mutual respect and willingness to listen, is there a seemingly accelerating trend toward stridency and violent opposition in the spoken word, too often translated into violence, suppression and genocide in the resultant actions by others? Why can climate sceptics say whatever they please about how global warming is a natural phenomenon when science indicates otherwise (cf. NASA, 2016). In recent years, an Australian Prime Minister has been briefed to question whether the country is prepared to cope with ‘global cooling’ (Milman, 2014) while US President-elect, Donald Trump, has previously called global warming a Chinese instrument of economic warfare (Trump, 2012).

Such views receive headline billing in the media where it apparently takes a ‘celebrity physicist’ (Prof. Brian Cox) to be given space for public challenge to an elected politician who claims that NASA ‘manipulated’ the data referred to above (BBC, 2016). Generally, scientific discourse is restricted to what can be proven beyond reasonable doubt and is frequently confined to the margins of reporting.

In relation to the silence of academics, I would argue that a key factor that emasculates the academic voice is the structures of reward within academia that reinforce the very disciplinary boundaries that Sardar argues are breaking down. Sardar (2015) argues that postnormal science has established a strong basis as a new ‘normal’. However, I would argue that postnormal scientists now are no more prevalent or powerful than in the past.

Research councils grant funding and universities promotion based on demonstrated

‘excellence’ in conformance with the disciplinary status quo – for extending ‘knowledge’ within extant boundaries rather than breaking through them into new domains of inquiry.

Looking back into history, Galileo and Newton were ‘postnormal’ scientists of their time, whilst Paul Feyerabend’s anarchist scientific challenged notions of ‘method’

(Feyerabend, 1993) and ‘reason’ (Feyerabend, 1987) during the period of late 20th century

US ‘normalcy’. Whilst the first two are generally accepted as dealing with what now passes as , Feyerabend remains a figure whose work is not widely recognized, and one who was denigrated by the philosopher of US normalcy, Ayn Rand (1984).

If we are to seriously ponder Lenin’s question, ‘What is to be done?’ in the context of our contemporary society with the intention of bringing about meaningful change to slow – eventually hopefully reverse – the accelerating decline into apocalyptic chaos, we must find voice in the mainstream discourse. This voice must be a positive and productive contributor to human ‘development’, not one from the wilderness, crying wolf to a populace led like sheep by the vested interests of greed and domination. In responding to the dominant voices of the status quo and their strengths in controlling finance and resources, from mainstream media and political lobbying to the agendas of academics in the

‘system’, we do well to consider the sage words that the best way to beat a boxer is to challenge him to a game of chess. We must face up to brute force and ignorance with the types of strategic analysis and planning, contemplation, option appraisal, subtlety and wisdom that must characterize the ‘grand master’ of social change. Here, however, I acknowledge that I run up against a problem.

The approach I advocate, to employ another metaphor, is akin to the process of changing the course of a supertanker. This takes careful advanced planning, anticipatory action and patience to await the desired outcome. However, in accepting the key precept of postnormal theory, that the world is in a period of accelerating change with potentially catastrophic outcomes, I also accept that we have no time to wait. This, I see as the key issue of our times and our ideas – moving from being non-mainstream commentators on negative change to being key players in and informants of urgent positive change. Therein lies the problem – rather, two key questions. First, how do we build effective communication across belief and value systems for meaningful critical discourse? Second, how do we translate such discourse to action, to alleviate problems in need of urgent mediation?

A Framework for Engagement Through Postdichotomous Ontologies

In outlining arguments that challenge notions of normality and equilibrium as characterizing the present and recent past, I do not imagine for one second that I will convince those who hold to these concepts to change their views by some full-frontal attack. So, I must consider what frameworks and methods might exist for promoting and supporting effective communication or dialogue across and between different world-views, each of which represents some group or individual conceptualization of ‘reality’. In previous work (Cairns,

2014), I have advocated an ambivalent view of these different realities. However, I must acknowledge that the term ambivalence is itself indeterminate and contested. Common usage often confuses it with apathy, while diverse fields ranging from psychology to postmodern and postcolonial studies adopt it in different ways. Here, I return to earlier work in the field of organization studies (Beech & Cairns, 2001) in which, with Nic

Beech, I proposed a framework of ‘postdichotmous ontologies’ within which managers might engage with the multiple realities of organizational life and of the diverse professional and social cultures within it. I see that the principles of this model might be expanded to enable meaningful engagement across and between broader social, political, religious cultural contexts and diverse belief and value systems. The framework for postdichtomous ontologies is constructed around three levels of engagement with and across the ‘reality(- ies)’ of different worldviews. At the surface level, there are the appearances of reality – the recognizable and communicable elements of language, behaviour, artefacts and symbols through which reality is demonstrated. Beyond and behind such appearances lie the assumptions about these appearances – the beliefs and values that underpin them and that define how past, present and future interpretations of them will be constructed. Finally, there is the degree of (in)commensurability between different sets of assumptions – the ways in which different groups may talk with or talk past each other from their separate stand-points.

Drawing on these three notions, four idealized forms of ‘reality’ were presented and explained by reference to organizational settings and interactions drawn from our own experiences (Beech & Cairns, 2001). In summary, these idealized forms are:

1. Single reality – Where there is commonality of both appearances and of the

assumptions that underpin them, where all involved actors share language, meaning,

values and beliefs

2. Multi-layered reality – Where the appearances are shared, but where there are

minor differences in assumptions underpinning them. These, however, can be

resolved through dialogue, as where people speak the same language but with

varying dialects and slight variations in word usage

3. Multiple realities – Here, there are differences in both the appearances that

demonstrate the world-view and of the assumptions that underpin them in terms of

beliefs and values. Communication across and between realities becomes more

difficult and requires effort by all parties in seeking to understand both the

appearances and the assumptions of the ‘other’, since these may be

incommensurable

4. No-such-thing-as-reality – Finally, there is a complex and ambiguous set of situations

in which appearances may have multiple, conflicting and indeterminate

assumptions, even for the same individual or group. Understanding requires deep

contextual engagement and, even then, may be transient and ephemeral.

The first two types are dichotomous in nature, in that consideration of any concept takes place in relation to its binary or polar opposite – good/bad, valued/worthless, etc. In a single reality, these are clear and unambiguous to all, whilst in a multi-layered reality, they may be subject to debate and discussion of values, but differences can be understood with relative ease and resolved if desired. In the last two types, however, such notions break down under conditions where one individuals’ ‘good’ or ‘valued’ notion is neither accepted or rejected by others along some binary scale, but may be subject to interpretation under a completely different set of assumptions that are incommensurable. In the case of no-such- thing-as-reality, this may see an individual or group holding to multiple assumptions at one and the same time, where these themselves appear incommensurable.

In the context or organizations, we argued (2001) that managers most often seek to engage on the basis of a ‘single reality’ and the search for the ‘right answer’. However, this is presented as a false notion that, through the examples discussed, may lead to unintended consequences, often directly opposite to what was sought – further fragmentation where unity was the goal, and break down of communication where improved interchange was desired. We posited that an apparent single reality will generally be understood as at least multi-layered, with minor variations in understandings and interpretations. In relation to

‘multiple realities’, we drew upon an example in which two groups, with ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘engineering’ values respectively, but both speaking English, interpreted top management statements in very different and conflicting ways, both to the detriment of their understanding and valuing of the other group and of the firm.

In the typology of no-such-thing-as-reality, individual members of a hospital organization interpreted and represented specific symbols – dress and the notion of ‘hands- on care’ – in different and seemingly conflicting ways both in referring to others and in talking of themselves in different situations. Here, the possibilities for individuals ‘talking past each other’ were very high. In seeking to provide some form of direction towards resolution of the differences inherent in multiple realities, we argued for a mindset that does not seek to be ‘right’ in resolving the un-resolvable, but that seeks to make things ‘all right’ for all members of the community.

Here, I posit that the same characteristics that underpin these idealized realities in the organizational context can also be identified in the contexts of societies, nation states, economies and in members’ attempts to interact with each other both within and across them. Political rhetoric is framed in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and if you are not ‘with us’ then you must certainly stand against us. Where political arguments are framed and presented on the basis of underlying assumptions of the ‘good’ of economic development and growth, these will likely not be commensurable with those underpinned by assumptions of a non-extraction, ecological ‘good’. Where those arguing for different cases are placed in the public arena and expected to perform in line with a single reality model, the result is predetermined to be a failure to communicate across different realities or world-views.

When we consider the position of governments and businesses, including those of the most supposedly democratic and free, over time in relation to subjects such as; apartheid in South Africa, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and nuclear energy as a source of power; we may well argue that these exist in a state of no-such-thing- as-reality.

If you accept at all that the state of our ‘normal’ world might be best described according to the last two, postdichtomous realities, then the focus must be on considering how we design, promote and initiate dialogue across the ‘reality divide’ in which there is an open recognition first of the incommensurability, divergence and conflict between values and assumptions about the world and that, thereby, the appearances of events and actions cannot be described and interpreted according to one, general code of morality. Which brings me back to the question, ‘What is to be done?’

Beyond Rhetoric – a Call to Action

If we are to bring about meaningful change, this can only be achieved through concerted action in which some accepted notion of the ‘common good’ supersedes the quotidian of personal greed, nationalistic protectionism and rejection of the beliefs and values of the

‘other’ where these are in conflict our own. The foundations for such an approach can be found in the philosophy of Aristotle (350BC/2004) and his intellectual virtue of phronēsis, or

‘practical wisdom’ – contemplation on moral/ethical decisions to inform action for the ‘good of man’ (sic). The key point here is the direction towards action through contextual thinking on what will be ‘good’ in terms of outcomes for the involved and affected parties, rather than towards deontological contemplation of some generalized conceptual ‘good’.

Aristotle’s virtue of phronēsis informs the contemporary writing of Danish academic

Bent Flyvbjerg (2001, 2003) and his interest in the notion of ‘Making social science matter’

(2001). Grounding his arguments in phronetic inquiry, Flyvbjerg offers a set of four seemingly simple value-rational questions, namely:

‘Where are we going?

Is this development desirable?

What’, if anything, should we do about it?’ where ‘we’ refers to all involved parties, and finally:

‘Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?’

(Flyvbjerg, 2003, p.364)

Flyvbjerg is clear that the resolution of these questions should not be based on some moral relativism, whereby all value sets hold equal weighting. Rather, they must be resolved through active engagement with the other, seeking understanding of their values, beliefs and what drives them to act the way they do, and realizing that difficult decisions require to be made in which some values must be relinquished in the resolution process. Looking at the world in which we live, we can clearly see that there is little or no commitment to such an approach.

The conflicts that exist now and that have persisted every day since at least the start of the last century are grounded in blind adherence to the belief that ‘our’ values are desirable and that what we should do is to overpower those of the ‘other’. In the case of

Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, this may be accepted as a clear moral decision for the common good. However, in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan and, in the last century, Vietnam,

Korea, Angola, and a multitude of other examples, the driving forces for intervention may be viewed as political, economic, or ideological rather than moral, even if the latter was the espoused value of those leading the intervention. In the contemporary situation of what is accepted by so many, including the key ‘normal’ climate scientists, as an urgent need for action on climate change, the momentum forces of the status quo in many parts of the world are those of vested interests in short-term profit from resource extraction and use – all in the name of ‘development’. However, we must question whether this is a majority view, or simply the dominant position of the loudest voices with deepest pockets. If social media could bring about an ‘Arab Spring’, albeit the aftermath has been more bleak winter than a new summer in many places, can it not then enable a ‘Green Tide’ across other parts? If we seriously address Flyvbjerg’s questions, we should surely see that where we are going is towards the edge of a climate cliff, over which we will drag our other socio-political, cultural and ideological conflicts unresolved. I would hope that the answer to whether this is desirable is a resounding, ‘No!’ The more difficult question is what we should do about it in the face of dominant actors of denial. One key obstacle to action that I have observed in research workshops is the feeling amongst the young that the problem is ‘all too big’, and a lack of recognition that individual lifestyles and purchasing choices have impact on it. So, I posit that a key factor in seeking bottom-up change is to create an understanding of empowerment to action to bring about change.

Here, I must consider what I think is a key difference between the notion of the postnormal being a break from an earlier normalcy and that of it being an acceleration of normal processes. In his book The Big Mo: why momentum rules our world, Mark Roeder

(2011) argues that the forces of momentum rather than equilibrium are what dominate natural and social systems. In his analysis of the global financial crisis (GFC) he argues that practices that were viewed as perfectly normal, and thereby unchallenged even in the face of evidence to the contrary, were allowed to build an unstoppable momentum. In the end, no human being was able, even if willing, to bring about change to prevent the collapse into chaos. Considering the examples of myopic adherence to and defence of insane normalcy in the lead up to the GFC, I posit that similar myopic stances exist in relation to critical issues ranging from climate change to pandemic. Importantly, I propose that it is easier to provoke human response to an unpredictable and sudden event than it is to prompt timely action to counter the build-up of momentum.

It is for this reason that I posit that bringing about concerted action in response to current crises is going to be very difficult. In relation to some issues such as climate change, the current situation may be viewed as merely a bigger than normal swing away from the prevailing norms of climate variation. So, we can take minimal action, or even wait for the matter to resolve itself through the ‘natural’ return to equilibrium. For many members of society, notions that a temperature rise of 1 or 2 degrees Celcius or a sea level rise of a few millimeters can have catastrophic results seem beyond belief. So, they continue along their normal path of consuming and depleting, with perhaps minor changes to consumption habits to appease the Green lobby.

In relation to other matters, such as terrorist insurgency, the problem may be considered as a threat to normal equilibrium, to be countered with an equal level of violence to bring the situation back to equilibrium, rather than addressing the fundamental issues underlying the situation to avoid piling violence upon violence, accelerating the momentum of disorder. I can offer no clear direction on how to awake consciousness to momentum, but I would say that academic papers such as this will have little or no direct impact on key powerbrokers and decision makers. However, they can hopefully provide stimulus for academic activism towards Monika Kostera’s revolution of ideas.

As I have outlined above, however, contemporary academics are very much bound up in a system of performative normalcy within disciplinary boundaries, required to meet research assessment exercise targets, publish in ‘top journals’ and win research funding for any fundable project, no matter what the topic and the impact. I would not dare to call on young academics to ignore these targets, on which their careers and futures depend.

However, I urge them to adopt an approach (Cairns, 2014) in which they recognize that in the short term they can only ‘win’ and have voice within this system, but that they can also only have long term impact and meaning in broad society and enable everyone to win – or possibly only to lose less – by simultaneously engaging in activities that address key issues for broad society and environment. Such activity must be inclusive and respectful of all cultures, values and beliefs and must actively involve the ‘broad’ stakeholder constituency

(Freeman, 1994) – all those who both affect and are affected by the issue to hand. However, it must prompt debate and discussion in which resolution of these differences is sought in search, not of the ‘right answers’ to problems in abstract conceptual terms but of the most appropriate outcomes to suit the context in which they will be enacted. While I see

Flyvbjerg’s (2001, 2003) framework for Aristotelian phronetic inquiry as a valuable starting point for such debate, I propose a further set of questions to prompt deeper consideration of his key questions on what if anything should be done, and on questions of power. These are:

1. Who has power to bring about change?

2. How might this power be mobilized?

3. What are they required to do?

4. Why would they respond to our calls?

5. What are we required to do to enable this?

With the final question, I posit that generation of a new postnormal future starts with the individual. Perhaps the key feature of postnormal action for me is that it shifts thinking on change away from the well-established normalcy of asking who will save us from our situation. Rather it breaks down the barriers of ‘learned helplessness’ that constrain so much human action. These barriers have been constructed with the encouragement of political parties and powerful actors of all colours, keen to build and maintain control even whilst espousing the value of individual agency and action. Also, as these powerful actors espouse the cause of being ‘right’, I would advocate focus on making things ‘all right’ for us all and for future generations.

In conclusion, I would say that consideration of our times must be focused not solely on what kind of situation we find society to be in, but on how this situation is perceived and understood by others, both in the populace at large and in positions of power and control.

We must consider the possibility that the postnormal is not a break from normalcy, but merely an accelerating trend from what has been normal over centuries through the natural forces of momentum, as opposed to a breakdown of the forces of equilibrium. Only once we understand clearly how others perceive and make sense of the present can we start to consider what action we as individuals should take to promote meaningful change.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Ziauddin Sardar and John Sweeney for their constructive comments and feedback on an earlier version of this text.

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