Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Ru...actors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination

Environmental Security Threat Report Released by the U.S. Department of State October 2001

Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Russian Marine Reactors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination

Over the last four decades, the Soviet Union and built about 250 nuclear powered submarines – more than any other nation. Russia has decommissioned most of these submarines because it has limited resources to support such a large fleet. This decommissioning has occurred much faster than de-fueling and dismantling facilities can keep up. Operation, decommissioning, and dismantlement of this fleet produce large quantities of both high- and low-level radioactive waste. The high-level waste, principally in the form of spent nuclear fuel, presents significant threats to environment, health, and safety because of the large inventory of spent nuclear fuel present, the high activity level of the fuel, and the lack of final disposition strategies. Safe handling and disposal of these wastes are also very expensive. While the Government of Russia clearly has the responsibility to address this situation, international donors may wish to assist those efforts that are in their interests. In addition to having to cope with environmental problems stemming from marine nuclear reactors and associated radioactive waste, Russia is burdened with numerous non-nuclear environmental threats. While it is beyond the scope of this report to examine these threats, mentioning them illustrates that the nuclear waste issue does not exist in isolation and that Russia is further troubled by many additional environmental concerns. Russia is ill-equipped financially and politically to resolve these problems on its own. The cleanup of waste from naval activities, in particular, will likely continue to be short-changed while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) wrestles with the allocation of its severely limited defense budget. The MOD has indicated that it will be cutting back on the Navy in order to buttress a traditional reliance on the land-forces for defense. A lack of funding for the Navy will inhibit carrying out nuclear submarine decommissioning, de-fueling, and dismantlement in an expeditious manner. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has also played and will increasingly continue to play a major role in the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes. In 1995, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection of the Russian Federation issued the "State Report on the Status of the Environment of the Russian Federation." This report stated, "The greatest danger in recent years is found in the radioactive waste repositories [located on the Kola Peninsula]. The repositories for spent nuclear fuel are … obsolete, are practically completely full, and could lead the Navy to return to the practice of dumping liquid radioactive wastes into the sea." Until 1992, the Soviet Union and Russia had been dumping radioactive waste, including some nuclear submarine reactors containing fuel, at sea, according to open sources. This took place even though the Soviet Union had ratified the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (unofficially known as the London Dumping Convention) in 1975. In particular, the Soviet Union dumped thirteen nuclear submarine reactors, six of which contained spent or damaged nuclear fuel, in the Kara Sea. The Soviet Union also dumped untreated solid and liquid low-level radioactive wastes in the Barents and Kara Seas. It is estimated that the Soviet Union dumped at least twice as much radioactive waste at sea as the combined inventories of the other twelve nations that had carried out disposal activities at sea. Much of the Russian dumping was done in shallow waters near the continental shelf north of the 40th latitude in the Russian Far East in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and north of the 70th latitude in the

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2001/5883pf.htm (1 of 10) [10/4/2002 14:23:59] Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Ru...actors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination Russian Northwest in the Barents and Kara Seas[3]. The Russian Northern and Pacific fleets contain about 250 surface and subsurface nuclear powered vessels, with about two-thirds berthed in the northern region. Today, the Russian Navy’s nuclear powered fleet includes more than 476 marine reactors in service or storage and has generated large quantities of spent nuclear fuel, high and low-level solid and liquid radioactive wastes that have not been processed or safely stored. These marine reactors are mostly from nuclear submarines. The vast majority of the submarines contain two reactors each, and the remaining small fraction of the total submarines has one reactor each. Figures vary, but approximately 160 nuclear submarines have been taken out of service in the Russian Navy; about 90 of these are from the [4,5]. These decommissioned submarines have overwhelmed the existing dismantlement and de-fueling infrastructure, and as a result, many of the decommissioned vessels are moored for long periods of time awaiting final disposition. Of the 90 Northern Fleet submarines, about 60 remain to be de-fueled[6]. In the Pacific Fleet, about 40 submarines await de-fueling. The following brief description of the high number of de-commissioned submarines and large amount of radioactive waste at the numerous facilities in the Kola Peninsula illustrates the environmental security challenges facing Russia. The Northern Fleet, operating out of the Kola Peninsula, includes five naval bases: Zapadnaya Litsa, , Gadzhievo, , and Gremikha. Of these bases, Zapadnaya Litsa is the most important for two reasons. First, it is only forty-five kilometers from the Norwegian border and has, therefore, attracted serious attention from Norway. Second, it is the largest submarine base in Russia with four naval facilities associated with it. These facilities are Andreeva Bay, Bolshaya Lopatka, Malaya Lopatka, and Nerpicha. Andreeva Bay is the primary spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste storage facility for the Northern Fleet. This facility contains about 21,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and about 12,000 cubic meters of solid and liquid radioactive wastes. There are three wet storage tanks in the Andreeva Bay facility, containing large volumes of spent nuclear fuel. These tanks are deteriorating due to poor maintenance and the harsh Arctic climate. Much of the legacy fuel at this facility has been stored in unlicensed transportation casks out in the open with no protection from the elements. Many of these casks are also deteriorating. Similar storage facilities exist in the Russian Pacific Fleet on the Shukotovo Peninsula near Vladivostok. Bolshaya Lopatka has eight piers and a servicing dock for submarine storage and repair. A small amount of solid and liquid radioactive waste is stored there. Excess waste is transported to Andreeva Bay. The Nerpicha solid and liquid radioactive waste storage facilities are also small, so this waste is transported to Andreeva Bay as well. At Malaya Lopatka, there are five piers and a floating dock for submarine maintenance. Vidyayevo naval base consists of the Ara Bay and Ura Bay facilities. At Ara Bay, about a dozen nuclear-powered submarines are waiting for de-fueling and dismantlement. This facility also has small storage capacity for solid and liquid radioactive waste. Gadzhievo has two naval facilities: Sayda Bay and Olenya Bay. Sayda Bay contains numerous nuclear-powered submarines and reactor compartments, awaiting final disposition. About six decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines are awaiting dismantlement at Olenya Bay. This base stores about 200 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and more than 2,000 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste. The administration center for the Northern Fleet is in Severomorsk, near , which bases several naval surface warships, including two nuclear-powered vessels. Gremikha, the Northern Fleet base furthest east of Murmansk, has more than a dozen nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement. This base also contains three large radioactive waste storage facilities, which suffer from many of the same problems as those at Andreeva Bay. The Kola Peninsula houses six naval yards: Nerpa, Safonovo, Sevmorput, and Shkval in the Murmansk region, and Sevmash and Zvezdochka in the Arkangelsk region. Shkval, located on the western side of the Murmansk fjord, has about a half-dozen decommissioned nuclear submarines. One of them, a first-generation Echo II, contains a damaged reactor with high radiation levels in the reactor compartment. The radioactive waste storage facilities at this site are full. Consequently, two hundred containers of radioactive waste and other contaminants reside in open storage, exposed to the

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2001/5883pf.htm (2 of 10) [10/4/2002 14:23:59] Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Ru...actors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination elements. Safonovo, which is between Murmansk and Severomorsk, is a naval yard for nuclear ballistic missile submarines and nuclear surface warship repair. Sevmorput, in the eastern side of the Murmansk fjord, serviced nuclear submarines from the 1960s to 1991, when nuclear fueling was stopped due to radiation safety concerns for the nearby city of Murmansk. Nerpa, located near Polyarny on the Kola fjord, is one of three naval yards where nuclear submarines are dismantled. It has an open-air solid radioactive waste storage facility about 100 meters away from the sea as well as a storage tank of liquid radioactive waste. The Arkangelsk region has the two largest naval shipyards in the Northern Fleet. Initially designed for submarine construction and repair, both Sevmash and Zvezdochka now also serve as major facilities for nuclear submarine dismantlement. Several submarines are awaiting dismantlement along with some floating reactor compartments awaiting long-term storage. The city of Severodvinsk on the White Sea supplies the work force for these two naval yards. In and around Severodvinsk, there are four solid waste storage facilities. More than 12,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste is stored in Severodvinsk. Much of this waste is stored haphazardly. The Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning and dismantlement process involves the following steps[7]: ● Removal of the submarine from active status; ● Removal of missiles (for ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs)) and other weapons, such as torpedoes; ● Cutting out ballistic missile launch tubes (for SSBNs); ● Extraction of the spent nuclear fuel and disconnection of the reactor circuits; ● Transport of spent fuel for reprocessing or long-term storage; ● Storage and disposal of low- and high-level radioactive wastes; ● Removal, recovery, and recycling of reusable equipment and metals; ● Separation of the reactor compartment (usually with a compartment attached on either side of the reactor compartment); ● Sealing of the reactor compartment for long term storage (presently, these compartments are floating at pierside as three-compartment units); and ● Scrapping remaining uncontaminated parts that are not salvageable.

Presently, Russia is attempting to create the necessary infrastructure to carry out this program. Recently, Russia has expressed the view that it must conduct this program in a deliberate, careful manner in order to minimize expenditures and to preclude building unnecessary or unused capacity. Only up to 20 percent of the costs might be recouped from the sale of non-nuclear materials recovered from the de-commissioned submarines. This is representative of the costs that can be recovered from the submarine disposal process in the U.S. Table 1 summarizes the major steps in the lifecycle management of Russian naval spent nuclear fuel from submarine dismantlement activities. Throughout the facilities noted above and the rest of the Russian nuclear navy, disposing of spent nuclear fuel represents the key disposal and cleanup challenge. While spent nuclear fuel is only about 5% of the radioactive waste volume from Russian submarines, it comprises more than 99% of the radioactivity from these vessels. This inventory resides in more than 100 decommissioned submarines (the majority are in Northwest Russia), shore storage facilities, icebreakers (under civilian control), military and civilian (for example, the Lepse and Lotta) surface vessels, and barges. According to open sources, the total amount of spent fuel assemblies exceeds 112,000, including about 34,000 in the Pacific Fleet and about 79,000 in the Northern Fleet[8]. To meet the challenge of spent fuel disposal, Russia is contemplating new spent fuel handling, movement, and storage initiatives, in addition to increasing spent fuel reprocessing in the immediate future. While some of these initiatives involve cooperative technical development efforts with western countries that address specific radioactive waste management problems, others are unilateral Russian initiatives at the present time. Some of these actions, given current Russian environmental conditions and the status of relevant http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2001/5883pf.htm (3 of 10) [10/4/2002 14:23:59] Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Ru...actors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination infrastructure, cause international concern and may pose significant threats to environmental security by either exacerbating the existing problems in the affected regions or by contributing to potential new problems in the future. Problems could arise from: ● Limited Russian capabilities in the proper off-loading of fuel assemblies and low level liquid waste from ballistic (SSBN) and general purpose (attack -- SSN and guided-missile -- SSGN) submarines; ● Lack of capabilities for the proper handling, transport, and storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies; ● Uncertainties over the disposal of nuclear reactor compartments from the decommissioned submarines, including a small number of liquid metal reactors which cannot be de-fueled; ● Unsatisfactory storage of spent and damaged nuclear fuel assemblies onboard ships (such as the Lepse, the Lotta, and other similar storage ships) and barges; ● Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and management of the resulting waste streams; ● Inadequate plans, procedures, technologies, and resources supporting Russian spent fuel and waste management; ● Lack of Russian Federation inter-ministerial cooperation to effectively carry out programs; and ● Lack of a permanent waste repository.

The Northern Fleet operates six service ships for submarine de-fueling operations. Four of these vessels are the 30-year old Project 326 Class ships, and two are the more modern Malina Class vessels. Reportedly, all of these vessels are in poor mechanical condition; several are severely contaminated with radioactivity, and all are close to full storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel. Pacific Fleet support vessels are also poorly maintained. Another component of the radioactive waste management system is storage and processing of liquid radioactive waste. The Russian Navy suffers from a lack of both storage capacity and facilities for waste processing. The United States, Norway, and Japan have expanded waste processing facilities; for example, a significant effort is the upgrade and expansion of the RTP Atomflot site to treat primary coolant waters and high salinity radioactive liquid waste from dismantled submarines. These facilities will help Russia meet and adhere to all requirements of the London Dumping Convention.

TABLE 1. MAJOR STEPS IN THE LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIAN NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY TYPE OF UNIT ACTIVITY/ TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL SUBMARINE ACTIVITY - ACTIVITY - NW FE FLEET[9] FLEET[10]

Number of fueled Decommissioned 65 40 105 submarines Fueled submarine

Preparation of fueled Fueled Reactors 2 130 80 210 submarine for decommissioning

Off-loading of spent Fuel 500 32,500 20,000 52,500 nuclear fuel to Assemblies[11] floating service vessels

Placement in casks 40 Tonne Metal 15 975 600 1,575 Concrete Casks[12]

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Interim storage in Interim storage 0.3 20 12 32 Kola and sites[13] Vladivostok Regions

Placement on rail car Special Rail 5 325 200 525 at reloading facilities Cars[14]

Train transport to Special Train[16] 1 65 40 105 Mayak[15]

Transfer to Mayak Fuel Assemblies 500 7,500[17] + TBD TBD for TBD storage/reprocessing

Russian nuclear materials management is seriously hampered by the lack of resources, infrastructure, and the necessary technology to safeguard, handle, transport and store naval nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel. Russia appears willing to address these problems. However, it lacks the resources to effectively address the range of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel management issues, as well as to safely dismantle its ballistic (SSBN) and general-purpose (SSN and SSGN) nuclear submarine fleet. This combination of factors poses several potential risks, including that of possible proliferation of certain highly enriched nuclear materials and a definite threat to the local and regional environment and marine food chain.

Potential Environmental Consequences from Dismantling Submarines A major concern within Russia and with neighboring countries is that the spent nuclear fuel and associated radioactive wastes could leak and contaminate the environment, presenting a health hazard to the populace. Although contamination from leaking spent nuclear fuel storage facilities may pose a serious problem, especially considering the hazardous state of much of this storage, a greater environmental contamination risk could emanate from a criticality or other accident while de-commissioned Russian nuclear submarines are laid-up or during de-fueling. The Russian Navy has applied many temporary safety measures to prevent decommissioned nuclear submarines from sinking. However, managing these submarines moored at piers presents difficulties not normally associated with operational submarines. These impediments to safe maintenance could be contributing factors leading to possible accidents. For instance, the main control panel of the reactor plant is usually removed during de-commissioning. Moreover, the partial crew that monitors de-commissioned nuclear submarines is generally not well trained. Tending de-commissioned submarines is not a glamorous, career-enhancing duty assignment, and crewmembers often come from the least competent segment of the submarine force[18]. Several studies have assessed the potential for radioactive material release from these submarines and their associated consequences. The events studied include criticality accidents, primary heat transport system failure (including loss-of-coolant events, loss-of-coolant flow events, and fuel channel blockage), secondary heat transport system failure, cooling water system failure, electric system failure, instrument system failures, hydraulic oil system failure, flooding, fires, explosions, and sinking. Research results, summarized below in Tables 2 and 3, are taken from a Canadian study that was verified by a NATO Study Group[19] in a report published in March 1998. These studies note that the two most serious accidents resulting in the substantial spread of radioactive contamination from a moored decommissioned nuclear submarine are (1) a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and (2) a nuclear criticality accident during de-fueling. A LOCA means that the reactor core, which contains the nuclear fuel along with highly radioactive fission products, would be deprived of coolant -- necessary to carry away heat and prevent the core from melting down. A meltdown might result in a massive release of radioactivity to the environment if the pressure vessel of the submarine were ruptured. A LOCA could result from either loss of electricity to the feed water pumps or a small loss of coolant. Ship collision, a potential external cause of a LOCA, is possible, but is considered

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Even though the chance of such an accident occurring on a particular submarine is extremely small, it is important to recall that more than 100 Russian nuclear submarines with most containing two reactors currently wait for de-fueling. A severe de-fueling accident could cause a steam explosion. This explosion would cause a radioactive plume to rise. The severity of the resulting contamination would depend upon the height of the plume, wind patterns, and other weather conditions. This type of accident would spread radioactive elements similar to those released by the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Because of the operating conditions of a typical Russian submarine reactor compared to the Chernobyl reactor, the accumulation of radioactive products from the submarine fuel would be many times less than the buildup of these materials in a Chernobyl-type reactor. Therefore, the severity of a submarine criticality accident would be much less than the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. According to open source reports, five Russian Navy criticality accidents have occurred, twice during refueling operations. The three remaining accidents occurred during maintenance and reportedly did not result in a radioactive release to the environment. The most significant accident occurred in 1985 during refueling of an Echo II submarine in Chazhma Bay near Vladivostok. The control rods were not properly detached and were removed with the lid of the reactor vessel. This action led to an uncontrolled chain reaction and fire, killing ten people with many others receiving high doses of radiation. The accident contaminated the marine environment and dispersed radioactive contamination to the local area via atmospheric transport. Given the history of criticality accidents, this scenario was rigorously investigated in the NATO Study group. They modeled a criticality accident during de-fueling of a decommissioned submarine occurring in Ara Bay in Northwest Russia. (Ara Bay is located approximated 100 km east of Kirkenes, Norway.) This modeling included source term size and composition, reactor characteristics, and atmospheric transport. A complicating factor for any regional transport analysis for the Arctic area is the potential for relatively high concentrations of contaminants being rafted long distances by floating ice. This effect depends on the time of year that an accidental air release at a coastal location occurs. Two main categories of results came out of this modeling. First, the most probable events would result in most of the radioactive contaminants staying within Russian territory. In particular, about 80% of the released radioactivity, on average, would contaminate the and/or Russian territory. The other 20% of the contamination landed primarily on the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The near term doses to a population in Kirkenes, Norway or rural northern Finland would be less than 1 milliSieverts (mSv), with long term doses to the same regions due to ingestion of contaminated foods and other external sources still totaling less than 1 mSv per year. Both doses would be well below the recommended levels for the protective actions of sheltering (5-50 mSv) and evacuation (50-500 mSv). This study did not calculate dose to the Russian population or shipyard workers, which would obviously be much higher. Therefore, for most accidents, trans-boundary contamination would be small in comparison to Russian Federation contamination. In particular, such contamination could harm the food chain, especially fisheries, which are major food and livelihood sources in this region. Addressing the consequences of this type of accident could impose a large-scale health and financial burden on Russia. Under these cases, stability of the Northern European allies would not be the main concern. However, instability of Northwest Russia would be of paramount concern. Second, the study examined a plausible worst-case accident. In this hypothetical accident, the majority of the released radioactivity landed in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The amount of rainfall was a key factor in determining the severity of the contamination. In particular, "rainfall during [radioactive] cloud passage may lead to contamination rates comparable to the situation in the middle of Sweden following the Chernobyl accident, but the affected area will be much smaller," according to the NATO study. Up to 30 percent of the local food products could be contaminated. This could lead to a major disruption in fishing and other food industries in the Nordic countries. Under a plausible worst-case de-fueling accident, trans-boundary effects would be the primary concern, resulting in possible regional instability. In addition, there would be

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In addition, all the above effects could harm the financial health of the regional economies in Northern Europe and Northeast Asia for accidents occurring in Northwest Russia or the Russian Far East, respectively.

Table 2. Nuclear Submarine Accident Scenarios Resulting in Potential Radioactive Material Release: Internal Events

Problem for moored/ Comments regarding moored Event Cause decommissioned submarines submarines?

Submarine in guaranteed shutdown. Control rods Control Rod Ejection No electrically disconnected and mechanically stopped.

Coolant pumps shutdown and Idle Loop Restart No disconnected electrically.

Emergency core cooling system Cold Water Injection No would be drained; control rods Criticality Accidents fully inserted.

Sub is shut down and does not Steam Line Break No produce steam.

Excessive Steam Sub is shut down and does not No Demand produce steam.

Reactor vessel and submarine Reactor De-fueling Yes hull open to environment.

Loss-of-coolant Yes Could lead to core melt accident (LOCA)

Reactor(s) and pumps shut down Loss-of-coolant-flow No and only natural circulation Primary Heat Transport Event required. System Failures Power level is much less than Fuel Channel one percent of full power, and No Blockage low core temperature would not lead to fuel damage.

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Sub is shut down and does not produce steam; feed water Steam Line Breaks No inventory is large relative to decay heat generated. Secondary Heat Transport System Feed water Line Failures Yes Similar to small LOCA Breaks

Loss of Feed water Yes Similar to small LOCA Flow

Decay heat small and could be Sea Water System dissipated through conduction in No Failure the condenser; active seawater cooling is not necessary. Cooling Water System Failure Even with the secondary side of the shutdown cooling heat Component Cooling No exchangers empty, it is possible System Failure to dissipate decay heat through conduction and convection

Temperature and pressure would rise and ultimately pressure Electric System Failure Yes relief valves would lift; results similar to small LOCA

Mechanical valves would open; Instrument Air System Yes natural circulation would fail; Failure similar to LOCA

Hydraulic Oil System Unlikely to be used in areas No Failure essential to reactor safety

Flooding Yes Could affect decay heat removal

Could affect decay heat removal Fires/Explosions Yes with results similar to flooding.

Leakage would be slow and Sinking No contained; the hull could be easily raised.

Table 3. Nuclear Submarine Accident Scenarios Resulting in Potential

Radioactive Material Release: External Events

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Problem for moored/ Event Cause decommissioned Comments submarines?

Possible, but low probability of significant damage due to strength of submarine double Ship Collisions Yes hull. Small LOCA accident possible, but this might be offset by cooling effects of flooding.

Unlikely to cause significant Falling Objects e.g., from overhead cranes No damage, particularly to the reactor area.

Grounding/ Vessels are already grounded or No Beaching moored.

______[3] See for example, Don J. Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the former Soviet Union, edited by David R. Payson, Battelle Press, 1997. [4] "Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement Plans and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program Assistance," Fact Sheet, 23 September 1998. [5] Povl Ølgaard, "Worldwide Decommissioning of Nuclear Submarines," In Decommissioned Submarines in the Russian Northwest, ed. Elizabeth Kirk, NATO ASI Series Vol. 32, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 17. [6] Thomas Nilsen, "Naval Nuclear Waste Management in Northwest Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Conference: The Toxic Legacy of the Cold War in the Former Soviet Union, 1998. [7] Adapted from Jill Tako and Tamara Robinson, "Decommissioning and Dismantlement Overview," Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1998. [8] See for example, Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Aleksandr Nikitin, The Russian Northern Fleet, Bellona Report, August 1996. [9] 91 submarines await dismantling; 26 of these have been de-fueled; and 65 await de-fueling. [10] 56 submarines await dismantling; 16 of these have been de-fueled; and 40 await de-fueling. [11] 250 fuel assemblies/reactor. [12] One 40 tonne metal concrete cask/35 fuel assemblies. [13] Cask "farm" will store 50 casks each. [14] Rail cars/3 40-tonne metal concrete casks.

[15] Current capacity = 10 train trips per year to Mayak. Thus, complete transfer of all fuel from Northwestern or Far Eastern sites to Mayak will require about 10 years assuming there is no change in capacity or scheduling. In fact, new wagons will be constructed with support from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and U.S. DOD/CTR. This will increase the infrastructure capacity and reduce the number of years required to transfer this fuel. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2001/5883pf.htm (9 of 10) [10/4/2002 14:23:59] Section II: Environmental Security Threats From Decommissioned Ru...actors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Waste, and Contamination

[16] 1 special train/5 rail cars. [17] DOD CTR Program includes provisions for reprocessing of spent fuel from 15 SSBNs. [18] Benjamin A. Snell, "Dismantling Russia’s Northern Fleet Nuclear Submarines: Environmental and Proliferation Risks," Master’s Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2000. [19] "Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence Related Problems," NATO CCMS Study, Cross Border Environmental Problems emanating from Defence Related Installations and Activities, Phase II: 1995-1998, NATO Report No. 227, March 1998, pages 1-9

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