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Translation of Sworn Statement by Karl Hermann Frank, Who Was Interrogated by Dr

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-A Translation of sworn statement by Karl Hermann Frank, who was interrogated by Dr. Bohuslav Ecer, Chief, Czechoslovak War Crimes Investigating Team, attached to 12th Army Group, on 29 May 1945, at Wiesbaden, Germany. WPWWW »f LUM'U • 1 My rank as Minister of the Reich In August L943 I was appointed Minister of State in the rank of a minister of the Reich. As such I have, however, never participated in the activities of the Government of the Reich. In my capacity of Minister of State for Bohemia and Moravia, I received several times drafts of laws for review concerning the Protectorate. My opinion was in some cases taken under conside­ ration, in some cases not. Party .and Stated There existed a continous fight especially in the Protecto­ rate between State and Party. The position of -he Party was legally stronger in the Reich proper than in the Protectorate, as compared to the State. I remember the la./ of 1933 for securing the unity of State and Party. This worked out in such a manner that, for instance, the "Gauleiter" /provincial leaders/, who were arty officials had at the-« same time certain state functions as for example "Reichsstatthaiter" national governor/, respecti- I vely "O'berpraesident" /provincial prefect/. In the Protectorate the situation was different, at least on paper; there was a decree signed by Rudolf Hess, in late 1^39, forbi .din,; the interference of the Party in the State administration of the Protectorate and assigning to the Party only the task of leading the German population. Territorially,four "Reichsgaue" /provinces of the Reich/ reached out into the area of the • Protectorate. They were the Sudetengau, headed by Konrad Henlein, SS Obergruppenfuehrer /translator's note : higher SS group leader equal to the rank of lietenant general/, the Bavarian Eastern province, heade . by Waechtler, S3-0bergruppenfuehrer, and Lower Danube, headed by SS-Obergruepenfuehrer Jury, all Gauleiter. I do not know whether Waechtler held a rank in the S3. As far- as these Gaue readied out into the Protectorate, they were supposed to be only party "gaue" /provinces/. But the following situation developed: The head of the party chancellery, Martin Bornian, established a party liaison office in Prague /Castle/, which served also the purpose to control the Reich Protector and later the Minister of State. This liaison office was established, to my knowledge, in early 1540. The chief was province leader Jury. The party interfered with all branches of the administration,of the Pro­ tectorate, respectively tried to interfere. This lead to a continuous right between myself and the party, which ended for me in a personal trage iy. For many weeks I tried in vain to obtain an audience with the Fuehrer in order to inform him of the harmful effects of the party infringements. Finally, in late 1942 or early 1943» 03 got a hearing, not with Adolf hitler, but with Martin Borman in the presence of about three gentlemen from the party chanc ;llery and of provincial leader Jury. In opposition - J - to the Party, I advocated the sten point ex resoed Lr Hess d c e. I consider it my _.. ..r..onul tra • .,/ :""' I now sit in the -.oel: before the Czech nation, although I ii : everything to rotect ana maintain its auto :omy. The int .i'view was stormy - Loi'::an pouded the table with his fist, called :.;e an en .-. y of he party ana ordei'ed i..c out oi' the room. Question : How do you explain that in spite o v being "- led a a party enemy, eve. heless you were appointed Minister oi' Stai : of the Protectorate in Au ust 1.,-j.J ?. Answer : I cannot explain this. I only rei.ark tl at the • quarrel between Harman an.; myself ended in the evening with a compromise. I I remember that Adolf Hitler defined the relation between party and state approximately as follows : it ia not the state which issues orders to the party, but on the contrary it is the party who -jives orders to the state. The primacy of the party was the axiom in tee ..eich and was to be :atablished also in the Protectorate, although it was contrary to the autonomy of the Protectorate. This primacy ..as then introduced loo de facto in the Protectorate in several instances. Apart trom Hitler a fun­ damental standpoint, there were constant fights between party and state, and besides that between the individual in power within the party; also a fight betv/een the Wehrmacht and the 33. The conflict between the Wehrruooht and S3 became more acute after the attempt on Adolf Hitler's life in July 1944. 'i'he - 4 - fundamental principle of the national socialists state law was : The .J i ti . is an instrument of the party. The pergonal union of party and state was accomplished as follows : 1/ Leading party officials were taken into the government L1 u. t d with functions corresponding to their party functions. For insta ee, Jarre as a party official was "Reichsbautrnfuehrer" /Reich peasant lea .•/ anJ in the overnment he was Reich Minister for Pood and Agricul ture. Coebbels v,ras propaganda leader vor the Reich in the party and in the government Reich Minister of gro- paganua. Ribb< itrop was special commissioner of the Fuehrer for att t's of foreign policy in the "party ana in/ the government ich Minister 'or 'orcign Affair:-. Several persons, an "or instance Jchacht, S'-hworin-krcsigk, Ohnesorge, were, to my knowledge not members of the party. They hoa, h.owevor, to join tl . sarty . a DUO:! as thejf were appointed Reich ministers. On this occasion or late:1 they rece ved the Golden Party Badge; as acknowledgment for expert merits, Every member of the Reich government was thus a member of the National Socialist Party. The program of the party was binding for them. This personal union was systematically established also in lower positions and finally in ]\ jl it was established by the law concerning German civil servants that every official had to have only beliefs Ln accordance -.1 Lh the national socialistic program. 4o - 5 - In practice it load to a point where practically all civil servants were nationel socialists. 2/ According to the law, every appointment or promotion servants had to be approved by the warty chancellery 4tnade such an appointment or promotion impossible. This was practised also in. Lhe Protectorate, of course for German officials only. I remember that in individual cases, I wanted vo promote civil servants who were not national socialists, but whose expert knowledge made them fit for it. The party chancellery refused its approval. Aims of foreign policy of nationel socialism ana the 'Jj&rd Reich. Of these aims I knew only as much as was publicly said or written. I was not informed of the secret intentions of the highest party and state leaders, including Adolf Hitler. I can, for instance, remember that after yielding of the so-called Sudetenland in accordance with treaty of Munich, Adolf Hitler told me once during, a conversation that he h-ad created the greater German Reich and had no furt/er territorial claims. Besides, this cor^JSspondeu with his declaration given to Chamberlain shortly before the conclusion of the Munich treaty. The internal decision of the highest leadership were kept strictly secret. I know exactly that a decree of the Puehrei was issued during the war that those offices of the party, Wehr, acht or state which were ordered with the execution of a secret matter were not allowed to co. municate this to other such offices y 4i - ö — which were not concerned. The punishment for -transgression was to rny knowledge very severe. I was totally unaware that the high­ est party and state leadership had the intention to occupy Czechoslovakia as a whole. I was entirely surprised by the occupation of 15 March. My appointment as Secretary of State to the Reich protector tool: me also entirely by surprise. I was simply summoned to the Hotel Imperial in Vienna to Adolf Hitler on 17 or 18 March 1939* The entire high staff of the party was assembled in the lobby of the hotel. I then knew only a few of L,hem . I was summoned to see Adolf Hitler in his room, where VBaro n Konstantin von Neurath was present. I was told by the Fuehrer that Herr von Hour; th was appointed Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia and I was appointed as his Secretary of StflitC As I have emphasized above I knew of the sir 13 in foreign policy of the party and of the Third Reich only what was publicly said or written. That was to break- away from the tre ty of Versailles and to unify all Germans in a greater German K ich. I knew notpng abode the plan to establish a world rule by the German nation and that for this purpose the Third Reich planned and prepared a war. I know only that at a lea er meeting o_ Sfe-Obergru_/penfuehrer , and p", which 1 attended," the date of which I do not remember, Himmler spoke if the necessity to create a great Germanic Reich. It was, at any rate, after the occupation of Norway and Denmark. I have no knowledge of a speech of Himmler delivered on 26 June 1T44 i-1- Bitch in Alsatia. Idid not know that the German Reich preparing the second V/orld ,<ar **"u. .. m'^ii.. >;• —,.»,.i.—; i, ;. iM.fi Oeuuan. ivieh woo—ppijj'Ui'ing—'0)1.0 «jtnoo»».* nui'Ii« n'mu and I id not know that the occup; ;io 0 Czechoslovakia was the .irst link of a chain of'fui'cherNof ag, ression ag inst neighbouring states.
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