A Quietist Jïhadi-Sàlafi the Ideology and Influence of Aim Muhammad Al-Maqdisi

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Please be advised that this information was generated on 2021-10-11 and may be subject to change. A Quietist Jïhadi-Sàlafi The Ideology and Influence of Aim Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Joas Wagemakers

A Quietisi Jihadi-Salafl: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Religiewetenschappen

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann, volgens besluit van het college van decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 16 november 2010 om 10.30 uur precies

door

Johannes Wagemakers geboren op 19 mei 1979 te Kaatsheuvel Promotor: Prof. dr. H.H. Motzki

Copromotor: Dr. R. Meijer

Manuscriptcommissie:

Prof. dr. C.H.M. Versteegh Prof. dr. mr. R. Peters (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Dr. MJ.M. de Koning Table of Contents

Preface vii

Acknowledgements ix

Glossary xiii

Note on Transliteration xxiii

Introduction 1 The Salafi Ideological Basis 3 Defining Salafism 4 The Roots of Salafism 6 Labelling Salafism 8 The Development of Radical Islam 10 The Muslim Brotherhood and its Heirs 11 The Spread of Wahhabism 13 The "Afghan Arab" Phenomenon 14 The Gulf War and Beyond 16 Jihadi-Salafi Ideologues 19 Theoretical framework, methodology and sources 20 Framing 20 Methodology 23 Sources 25 Overview of this Study 25

Part I: Al-Maqdisi's Life and his Place in the Jihadi Ideological Spectrum, 1959-2009 29

Chapter 1: Wavering between Quietism and Jihadism 31 Al-Mac/disi's Childhood Years 31 Growing up in Kuwait 33 Becoming a Quietisi Jihadi-Salafi 34 Sowing the Seeds of Salafism 35 Studying in Saudi Arabia 37 From Kuwait to Peshawar and Back 40 Spreading al-Maqdisi's Writings in Jordan and Beyond 41 Al-Maqdisi's Arrival in Jordan 42 The Prison Years, 1994-1999 43 In and out of Prison 45

Chapter 2: Al-Maqdisi's Quietist Jihadi-Salafì 'Aqîda 51 Classica! Jihad 52 Jihad in the Qur an 52 Jihad in Islamic Law 54 Al-Maqdisi and Classical Jihad 57 Turning Jihad against Muslim Rulers 58 Justifying Jihad against Muslim Rulers 59 The Debate over Takfir of Muslim Rulers 63 Al-Maqdisi's Views on Jihad against Muslim Rulers 67 Globaljihad 72 Fighting the "Far Enemy" 72 Al-Maqdisi on Globaljihad 74

Chapter 3: Al-Maqdisi's Quietist Jihadi-Salafì Manhaj 77 Da'wa or Jihad? 77 Quietists' Manhaj 78 Al-Maqdisi's Two-Pronged Approach 79 Jihad Strategy 80 Jihadi-Salafì Views on Jihad Strategy 82 Al-Maqdisi's Jihad Strategy 84 Targets of Jihad 86 Modern Scholars on Indiscriminate Violence 88 Al-Maqdisi on Indiscriminate Violence 90

u Part Π: Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Saudi Islamic Opposition, 1989-2005 97

Chapter 4: Saudi Arabia's Post-Gulf War Opposition 99 Wahhabism and the Saudi System 99 Wahhabi Resistance to the Saudi Regime 101 The Gulf War 104 AÎ-Mcujdisfs Framing of Saudi Arabia 107 Judging Saudi Arabia on it Religious Credentials 107 Saudi Arabia as a Kufr State 110 Al-Maqdisi's Influence on Saudi Arabia's Post-Gulf War Opposition 112 Spreading al-Maqdisi's Writings 113 The Scope of al-Maqdisi's Influence 114 Explaining al-Maqdisi's Influence 116 Core Framing Tasks 116 Cognitive Liberation 119

Chapter 5: Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula 123 The Rise ofal-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) 123 Bayt Shubrä 124 From the Riyadh Bombing to the QAP Campaign 126 Adopting αί-Macjdisi's Frame 130 Framing QAP's Jihad 131 Reframing QAP's Jihad 133 A Wahhabi to the Wahhabis: Explaining al-Maqdisi's Influence 141 Conditions for Frame Alignment 141 Al-Maqdisi's Frame Resonance 143

Part III: Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Development of al-Walö' wa-I-Bara, 1984-2009 149

Chapter 6: The Revival of al-Jsti ana bi-l-Kuffar 151 From Jahiliyya to Wahhäbiyya- The Development o/al-Walä' wa-1-Barâ' 151 Ai-Wafä' wa-i-Barâ' in Salafi Writings 153

m A/-/sti απα bi-l-Kuffar in 19th-century Arabia 155 Reframing al-Isti'âna bi-l-Kuffar 158 Al-Maqdisi's Réintroduction of ai-Istiana bi-Z-JCu#ar 158 The Wahhabi Rediscovery of ai-/stiana bi-]-Kuffar 159 Explaining al-Maqdisi's Frame Resonance 165 Explaining al-Maqdisi's Influence 166

Chapter 7: "Salafising" Jihad 169 Jihad as Bar!' against "Infidel" Walä' 169 Connecting Walä' with Worship 170 Connecting Bara' with Jihad 173 Adopting a "Salafised"Jihad 178 Adopting a Legislative Form of al-Wala wa-l-Bara 179 Non-Saudi's Adopting a!-Isti ana bi-l-Kuffar 183 The Acceptance of al-Maqdisi's "Salafised "Jihad 187 The Quality of al-Maqdisi's Frames 188 The Resonance of a "Salafised" Jihad 189

Part IV: Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Community, 1992-2009 193

Chapter 8: Guidance to the Seekers 195 The Jordanian Political Context 195 Islam in Jordan 195 The Turbulent Late 1980s and Early 1990s 200 Ai-Macjdisi's Arriva! in Jordan 202 Stability amidst Instability 203 Channelling the Discontent 207 A Visionary in the Land of the Blind 212 Cognitive Liberation 213 "Filling the Gap" 215

Chapter 9: The Leader of the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Community? 217 The Prison Experience and Beyond 217

IV Growing Rifts 218 Quietism Haunts al-Maqdisi 221 Framing Jordanian Opponents 227 The State and its Salafi Supporters 227 "Extremist" Jihadi-Salafls 232 A New Generation ofQuietbtJihadi-Salafis? 236 Successali Counterframing 237 Failed Counterframing 239

Summary and Conclusions 243 Summary 243 Al-Maqdisi's Life and his Place in the Jihadi Ideological Spectrum 244 Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Saudi Islamic Opposition 247 Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Development of al-Wala wa-l-Bara 249 Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafì Community 251 Conclusions 253

Bibliography 257 interviews 257 Websites and forums used 258 Media used 259 Books, articles, reports and fatwas 260 Primary sources (Arabic, English) 260 Secondary sources (Arabic, Dutch, English, French, German) 269

Samenvatting 301

Curriculum Vitae 307

ν vi Preface

Like many good ideas, the one for this PhD-thesis started over dinner. In 2005, my co- supervisor Roel Meijer and I were at a restaurant discussing my intention to write a dissertation about radical Islam in the Middle East but I was not entirely sure what to do yet. Roel, who was quite aware of my fascination for the dynamics of Islamist ideology, suggested I should do something with Jihadi-Salafism. Although I do not recall him mentioning the name "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi", of whom I had never heard at the time, I distinctly remember him saying: "Perhaps you should check out this website." The URL I wrote down was, of course, www.tawhed.ws, al-Maqdisi's website and the biggest online library of Jihadi-Salafi literature. When I got home and found it, I was immediately struck by the huge number of sources available and just knew I had to do something with this site. This dissertation is the product of the idea that was coined that night. My fascination with ideology and its development and flexibility is rooted in an inexplicable interest in beliefs and dogmas I have had for a long time. For years I have been intrigued by the intricate details of theological and ideological debates, whose participants often claim to be the only true followers of a certain tradition, all the while quoting the same books and scholars but coming up with entirely different practical solutions. This interest was, of course, carefully pushed into the direction of Islamic and Islamist thought during my studies of Islam at Radboud University Nijmegen and my choice of courses and subjects partly reflected this. In that sense, this dissertation is something I had long wanted to write, probably even before I realised it myself. Dinners and long-held fascinations aside, however, it should also be mentioned that this PhD-thesis would probably not have been written had it not been for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Not only were thousands in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania murdered in these attacks but they also had a deep impact on the lives of millions of others affected by the attacks' foreign and domestic policy implications and - importantly - on academia. The aftermath of "9/11", as my generation will always remember it, spawned a great number of think tanks, centres and institutes dedicated to the study of terrorism and - in this case - its radical Islamist underpinnings. In a way, this dissertation is also a result of this trend although I feel slightly uneasy putting it like that. While I am certainly very interested in radical Islam and terrorism, I have never considered myself a "terrorism analyst". This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong

vu with terrorism analysts; many of them do an excellent job keeping us safe and write first- class publications. It is just that I have always been more interested in the words and ideas than in the guns and bombs and would have been happy to apply my time to non-radical beliefs and ideologies. I therefore also hope that this dissertation will not be viewed as dealing only with terrorism and radicalisation - although these subjects are certainly mentioned in the pages to come - but really as an effort to dissect the contents, (ideological) context and impact of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's ideas. Combining my fascination for ideas with my realisation that this dissertation would not have seen the light of day without "9/11" turned out to be much easier than I had initially thought. As someone who was profoundly shocked and abhorred by the attacks in 2001,1 assumed it would be difficult to ever talk to al-Maqdisi, who so openly applauded this wanton killing and generally held beliefs that were diametrically opposed to my own. It turned out, however, that this was not the case. Not only was al-Maqdisi a very friendly and hospitable person - his radical beliefs notwithstanding - but meeting the man whose ideas have occupied such a major part of my life over the past four years was quite exciting and ensured that we had a connection that overcame any ideological animosity I had for him. It would be wonderful if this dissertation could in some way contribute to a greater understanding of radical Islam as my reading of al-Maqdisi's work helped me understand him better. While a better grasp of Jihadi-Salafism can be used for various purposes - both good and bad, depending on one's perspective - a bit more understanding is never wasted, especially not in today's world. That would definitely be a nice result of an idea that simply started over dinner.

vin Acknowledgements

One of the many great things about writing a dissertation is that you can do it on your own, free to set your own agenda and work according to your own time table. Still, throughout the course of doing research and writing the chapters, I have had a lot of help from many people who must be mentioned here. First of all, I would like to thank the Institute of Historical, Literary and Cultural Studies (HLCS) at Radboud University Nijmegen for awarding me a grant that allowed me to do this research. I am grateful for this opportunity and, considering how much I enjoyed doing my research, I still have a hard time believing that HLCS have not only enabled me to do this but have even paid me for it into the bargain. I would also like to thank the two supervisors of my PhD-project, Harald Motzki and Roel Meijer. They gave me the freedom to do research without having to report on my findings every two weeks but were always willing to comment on my work - including the articles I continued to bother them with - and their advice was very useful and has improved my writings considerably. The two different kinds of research that Harald and Roel represent - philological research on the beginnings of Islam and historical research on contemporary Islamism and the modern Middle East respectively - have both greatly contributed to my dissertation in their own ways, just as their different approaches to supervision have improved my work. I am especially grateful for the fact that both of them - and particularly Roel, who was also largely responsible for writing my original research proposal - have given me ample opportunity to publish, give lectures and attend conferences, thereby exposing my research to a greater audience than it would have had otherwise. One could argue that supervisors get paid for this and are simply supposed to do these things. Ideally, yes, but I have heard enough cases where this did not happen to be extremely grateful for the excellent advice and help they have given me throughout my research. If, after reading this dissertation, anyone should remark that traces of Motzki & Meijer can clearly be seen in its text, I would consider it a great compliment. I should also mention the Department of Islam & Arabic at Radboud University Nijmegen. Shortly after I started working there, we were told that the department would be dissolved but because of the tireless efforts of several people, particularly Lieke de Jong and Kees Versteegh, we survived. Even throughout this difficult period it was always a joy to work at this department and I would like to thank all of my colleagues there for creating such a pleasant working environment. The same can be said of my colleagues of the

ix research project on Salafism in which I participated, Carmen Becker, Martijn de Koning, Roel Meijer, Zoltan Pall and Din Wahid, whose own research was not only very interesting but also provided me with new perspectives on my own. I should especially mention Martin van Bruinessen, who often took time out of his busy schedule to listen to our stories and whose extensive experience and judicious advice was useful to all of us. Several people, including Joseph Alagha, Egbert Harmsen, Thomas Hegghammer, Stéphane Lacroix, Marie Juul Petersen, Madawi al-Rasheed, Guido Steinberg and Quintan Wiktorowicz, have given me some exceUent advice on how to go about doing field work in the countries that I visited and have often shared contacts that allowed me to get started, for which I thank them all. I am also grateful to Hasan Abu Haniyya, Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, David Commins, Bernard Haykel, Will McCants, Saud al-Sarhan and Paul Schrijver, who have contributed indirectly to this dissertation by commenting on articles I wrote or by providing me with certain documents that I was unable to find myself. In England, I was always welcomed by my friends Dave and Christine Miller and their sons Daniel and Andrew. Although my support for Arsenal sometimes clashed with their preference for Tottenham Hotspur, we had some very good times together and I thank them for their hospitality and great sense of humour. In Jordan, I benefited greatly from the personnel at the Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) in Amman, particularly Leila El Jechi, who always had time for my questions. Similarly, my stay in Saudi Arabia would have been much less effective without the help of the staffai the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS) in Riyadh, especially Yahya b. Junayd and Awadh al-Badi, whose advice and contacts helped me in finding the literature and people I was looking for. I am thankful for all of their help and hope I will be able to benefit from their expertise again in future. During my field work, I talked to lots of people. Many of them are mentioned in this dissertation but some would only be interviewed on the condition of anonymity, which I of course respect. I thank all the people I interviewed for their time and expertise, particularly Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was kind enough to welcome me into his home and gave me the best meal I had in all of my stay in Jordan. Without them, this dissertation would obviously not have been the same. Several people have also been a tremendous help for me in locating others. I would especially like to thank Marwan Shahada, who proved indispensable and has sacrificed a lot of his time to help me, Fu'ad Husayn, whose car will never be the same again after driving me through the hilly Jordanian country-side, and

χ Hasan Abu Haniyya, from whose insights and experiences I benefited a lot. Moreover, he and his wife Huda never failed to welcome me into their home for a chat. I am grateful for all of their help and hospitality. Several researchers and visitors to the countries I went to for my field work, including Romain Caillet, Pascal Debruyne, Christopher Parker, Mohammed Sbitli, Ora Szekely and Erin Walsh, made my time in Jordan and Saudi Arabia much more interesting and a lot more fun. We had some good discussions about our work and all kinds of other things that I have fond memories of and I would like to thank them all. Once back home, I found several experts willing to read parts of my dissertation. These include Egbert Harmsen, Thomas Hegghammer, Stéphane Lacroix, Madawi al-Rasheed and Julian Schwedler, whose comments improved the relevant chapters, even if I did not adopt all of their suggestions. I thank them for all their work and efforts. Suffice to say, all mistakes in this dissertation are mine alone. There are also several people to whom thanks are due for their special help, such as my colleagues Jan Hoogland and Everhard Ditters as well as my friend Steven Boogaard, for their efforts to solve my computer-related problems, and Assad Jaber, for teaching me the basics of Palestinian Arabic. Perhaps somewhat strangely, I would also like thank the people behind AccuRadio.com and Accujazz.com - whoever they are - for ensuring that writing my dissertation was not only an interesting but also a swinging affair. One of the few things I did not like about my research was typing out interviews, not in the least because it kept me from listening to AccuRadio.com's wonderful music. I am not much of a rebel and perhaps my only act of rebellion during my research was playing AccuRadio.com's fantastic selection of bluegrass music at fidi blast from my laptop at the King Faisal Center in Riyadh on a Friday afternoon, which may be well have been the very first time that the sounds of the American South ever echoed through that building. Finally, I cannot finish these acknowledgements without mentioning my wife, who not only had to manage on her own and take care of our son when I was away for what ultimately amounted to several months of field work but also spent many an evening alone while I was in my study working. I thank her for all the patience and the loving way in which she accepted my oft-broken promises to be downstairs "in five minutes' time". My wife and I were blessed with two wonderful children during the course of my research. As anyone who has gone through the same experience will tell you, raising small children on top of a full-time job - particularly with all the sleepless nights, of which we have had our

xi fair share - does not exactly contribute to a good working environment. Still, I would not have missed it for the world, as my wife and children have provided me with a deep sense of happiness throughout the past few years. And that happiness has been the best working environment any researcher could ask for.

Xll Glossary

Note: several of the terms mentioned here have multiple meanings. I have chosen to focus only on those meanings used in this study.

'adäwa - hostility. A word used in Q. 60:4 - a very important verse in al-Maqdisi's writings - and often equated with disavowal (bara', q.v.). See also baghda. Ahi al-Hadîth - an early-Islamic trend and precursor to Salafism (q.v.) that relied heavily on hadfths (q.v.) in establishing its rulings. There are also modern-day movements bearing this name or similar ones. Ahi ai-Sunna wa-1-Jama a - the branch of Islam that claims to follow the example of the Prophet (Sunna) and belong to the group (Jama a) that, according to a hadith (q.v.), will be saved from hellfire. The term is applied by Salafis (q.v.) to themselves but is also used by Sunni Muslims in general. See also al-tä'ifa al-mansüra, al-firqa al-nâjiya. amir (pi. umara) - leader. The term can refer to a prince, the commander of an army unit or the leader of a group. See also imära. ansar aJ-tawäghft - lit. "the helpers of the idols". The term is used by al-Maqdisi to refer to the group of politicians, diplomats and military men and women who support, defend or directly help a regime based on laws other than Islamic ones. The term "ansar" has a positive connotation for Muslims since this is also the word used to refer to the people from Medina who helped the Prophet Muhammad in his time of need. Al-Maqdisi implicitly seems to juxtapose this with the ansar al-tawäghit. See also tawäghit. 'aqïda - creed. This is a highly important term for Salafis (q.v.) since they attach great value to following the right path. as! (pi. usui) - root, core or basis. Salafis (q.v.) use the term to refer to the part of religion (asl al-dîn) that is so important that it forms the basis of Islam. Some Salafis (including al- Maqdisi) believe that a violation of parts of the asl al-dîn (such as a denial of God's existence) immediately turns a Muslim into an unbeliever (kàfìr, q.v.). osnäm (sing, sanam) - idols. Sometimes applied by Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.), including al-Maqdisi, to rulers who do not govern on the basis of Islamic law (sharfa, q.v.). See also tawäghit. baghda - hatred. A word used in Q. 60:4 - a very important verse in al-Maqdisi's writings -

Xlll and often equated with bara' (q.v.). See also 'adâwa. bara' - see aJ-wa!ä' wa-i-barä'. bay'a - an oath of allegiance. The term is used in Bay'at al-Imam, the name wrongly applied to al-Maqdisi's group in Jordan before he went to prison in 1994. bid'a (pi. bida') - innovation. Salafis (q.v.) regard bida' as undesirable and wrong since they are considered illegitimate additions to Islam that compromise the religion's supposed purity. bughât (sing, bäghin) - rebels against the leadership of (parts of) the Muslim world. They are considered a category of people that may be fought by means of jihad but should not be equated with non-Muslims. aain (pi. du at) - a caller to Islam. See also da'wa. dar al-harb/där al-kufr - the abode of war/the abode of unbelief. The terms traditionally referred to the parts of the world that were not under Muslim control and had no peace agreement or truce with the abode of Islam (dâra!-/s/âm, q.v.). Al-Maqdisi distinguishes the dar al-kufr al-asliyya (the original abode of unbelief) from the däral- kufr al-häditha (the new abode of unbelief). The former refers to the parts of world that are traditionally not under Muslim control, such as Western Europe and the Americas, while the latter term denotes the parts of the Muslim world that are controlled by supposed apostates (murtaddün, q.v.). Al-Maqdisi sees the entire world as dor al-kufr, divided only between the original and new ones. See also dar al- Isläm/där al-ïmân. dar al-lslâm/dâr al-îmân - the abode of Islam/the abode of faith. The terms refer to the parts of the world that are under Muslim control. According to al-Maqdisi, these areas do not exist today since no country is ruled entirely in accordance with Islamic law (sharia, q.v.). See also dar al-harb/dar al-kufr. da'wa - the call to Islam. This is part of the preferred method (manhaj, q.v.) of engaging with society for quietist Salafis (q.v.) but is also an important part of al-Maqdisi's. dawia - state, caliphate. fard 'ala l-'ayn - individual duty. Used in this study with regard to jihad, where it refers to the duty that is incumbent upon every Muslim. Scholars disagree on when jihad becomes an individual duty but many claim that this happens in a situation when the dar a/-/släm (q.v.) is attacked. See also fard 'ala l-kifäya. fard 'ala l-kifaya - collective duty. Used in this study with regard to jihad, where it refers to

xiv the duty that is incumbent upon only a limited group of Muslims to be sufficient. Scholars disagree on when jihad becomes a collective duty but many claim that his happens in a situation when Muslims attack the däral-harb (q.v.). See also fard 'alä l- 'ayn. fiqh - Islamic jurisprudence. This term plays a minor role in Salafism (q.v.) and the writings of al-Maqdisi. See also fuqaha. al-firqa al-näjiya - the saved sect, the group that, according to a hadith (q.v.), will be saved from hellfire. Salafis (q.v.) believe that they are part of this group. See also Ahi al- Sunna wa-1-Jamä'a, al-tâ'ifa al-mansüra. fitna (pi. fitan) - chaos, strife. Quietist Salafis (q.v.) often describe Jihadi-Salafis as causing fìtna through their jihad and excommunication (takfir, q.v.) of Muslim rulers. Al- Maqdisi, however, claims that the greatest fitna is caused by abandoning the unity of God (tawhfd, q.v.) through - amongst other reasons - ruling on the basis of laws other than those of Islamic law (sharia, q.v.). fuqahä' (sing, faqih) - scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh, q.v.). ghülät - exaggerators, extremists. The term is often applied to Muslims who go to great lengths to apply excommunication (takfir, q.v.) to other Muslims. See also ghulûw. ghulûw - exaggeration, extremism. The term is often used with regard to excommunication of other Muslims (takfir, q.v.). See also ghulât. JWfth (pi. ahâdrth but given as hadiths in this study) - a story consisting of a chain of transmitters (isnâd) and some content (main) containing information about or from the first generations of Muslims, particularly the Prophet Muhammad. Hadiths have played a major role in the formation of Islamic law (sharfa, q.v.) and in the doctrines and publications of Salafis (q.v.). häkimiyya - sovereignty. According to many Islamists, sovereignty of a country and its laws should be God's alone. The term was popularised by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and adopted by Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.). haläl - allowed, permitted. The opposite of harâm (q.v.). The term is applied to all kinds of issues that are considered admissible according to Islamic law (sharf a, q.v.). See also istihlâl. harâm - forbidden. The opposite of haläl (q.v.). The term is applied to all kinds of issues that are considered forbidden according to Islamic law (sharfa, q.v.). hyra - emigration. Most often used in Islamic history to refer to the emigration of the

xv Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D. but also applied to modern- day religiously-motivated emigration, such as the perceived duty to move from the dâral-harb (q.v.) to the däral-Isläm (q.v.). hizb (pi. ahzâb) - (political) party or group. hukm (pi. ahlcâm) - (Islamic legal) ruling. ianat al-kuffar - the act of helping non-Muslims, particularly against other Muslims in times of war. It is seen by most modern Salafi scholars as part of loyalty and disavowal (ai- waiä' wa-l-bara, q.v.). According to some scholars, including al-Maqdisi, i αηαί αί- kuffär is strictly forbidden. See also al-istiana bi-l-faffar. 'ibäda - worship. On the basis of Q. 9:31, several scholars, including al-Maqdisi, include the following or application of man-made laws (qawänin wad'iyya, q.v.), as opposed to Islamic ones, in their definition of worship too. ijtihäd - independent reasoning on the basis of the scriptural sources of Islam without necessarily remaining within the limits of one Islamic legal school of thought (madhhab, q.v.). The opposite of blind emulation (taqiid, q.v.). 'Urn - (Islamic) knowledge. iman - faith. The opposite of unbelief (kufr, q.v.). imam - the emirate or leadership of a group, army unit or political entity. See also amir. irja - postponement. The term is linked to the Murji'a (q.v.), an early-Islamic trend advocating the postponement ofjudgemen t over a person's sins and leaving it to God. irtidäd - apostasy. This makes one an apostate (murtadd, q.v.) and an unbeliever (käfir, q.v.). a/-isti απα bi-l-kuffar - the act of asking non-Muslims for help, especially against other Muslims in times of war. It is seen by most modern Salafi (q.v.) scholars as part of loyalty and disavowal (αί-waia wa-J-bara, q.v.). According to some scholars, including al-Maqdisi, αί-isn'anat bi-l-kuffar is strictly forbidden. See also i'änat al-kuffar. istihiâl - making or considering something that is forbidden (haräm, q.v.) permissible (haläl, q.v.). With regard to the question of unbelief (kufr, q.v.), having the belief that something wrong is actually right is one of the conditions that turn minor unbelief (kufr asghar) into major unbelief (kufr alcbar), thereby expelling its culprit from Islam. See also i'tiqäd, jahd. i'tiqäd - conviction. With regard to the question of unbelief (fcu/r, q.v.), the conviction that one is committing a sin without refraining from it is one of the conditions that turn

xvi minor unbelief (Jcu/r asghar) into major unbelief (kufrakbar), thereby expelling its culprit from Islam. See also istihiäi.jahd. jahd/juhüd - negation. With regard to the question of unbelief (kufr, q.v.), the negation of the supposed truth of Islam and its rulings is one of the conditions that turn minor unbelief (kufrasghar) into major unbelief (kufrakbar), thereby expelling its culprit from Islam. See also i'tiqäd, istihläl. jähiliyya - the pre-Islamic age that Muslims identify as a period of ignorance. The term was also used by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) to refer to the supposed state of ignorance Muslim countries live in nowadays and has also been adopted by Jihadi-Salafis as such. kabïra (kabd'ir) - a major sin. It can be equated with minor unbelief (kufrasghar, q.v.) and should not be confused with major unbelief {kufr akbar). kafìr (pi. kuffar/kafìmn) - unbeliever, a non-Muslim. An apostate of Islam (murtadd, q.v.) becomes a kàfìr once he/she has abandoned Islam. See also mushrilc. Khawârij (sing. Khârijï) - seceders. The term refers to an early-Islamic group that seceded from the majority of Muslims and advocated the excommunication {takfir, q.v.) of other Muslims for acts of minor unbelief {kufr asghar, q.v.). The label is often used by quietist Salafis (q.v.) to de-legitimise Jihadi-Salafis. In that sense, the term "Khawârij" is the opposite of "Murji'a" (q.v.). See also irja. khurûj - revolt against the ruler. This is strongly rejected by quietist Salafis (q.v.) but often advocated by Jihadi-Salafis. kufr - unbelief. The opposite of faith (iman, q.v.). Salafis divide kufr into major unbelief {kufr akbar), which expels its culprit from Islam, and minor unbelief {kufr asghar), which does not, unless it is accompanied by i'tiqäd (q.v.), istihläl (q.v.) orjahd (q.v.). madhhab (pi. madhâhib) - Islamic legal school. In Sunni Islam, there are four schools of law: the Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi'i and Maliki legal schools. Each are usually treated as legitimate in the eyes of the others but Salafis reject the blind emulation {taqlïd, q.v.) of any one school of law and instead advocate independent reasoning on the basis of the scriptural sources of Islam {ijtihâd, q.v.). mahabba - affection. This term is often equated with walâ' (q.v.). See also muzähara. majlL· al-shürä - consultation council. See also shûrâ. manhaj - method. The term refers to the method of applying the creed (aqïda, q.v.) that Salafis (q.v.) follow in their treatment of the sources, worship and dealing with

xvii society. It is a very important concept since the manhaj is mostly responsible for setting Salafis apart from other Sunni Muslims, who may have the same ideas but do not apply them similarly. ma'siya - disobedience. masiaha (pi. masâiih) - (general) interest. In this study, the term is used in contexts where certain things may be legitimate but not in the interest of Islam and Muslims. mujaddid (pi. mujaddidun) - renewer. According to tradition, every hundred years will see a new and important renewer in Islam. mujâhid (pi. mujähidün) -jihad fighter. muräja'a - revisionism. Al-Maqdisi has been accused of this by some of his critics. Murji'a - an early-Islamic trend advocating the postponement {irja, q.v.) of judgement over a person's sins and leaving it to God. Quietist Salafis (q.v.) unwilling to apply excommunication (takfir, q.v.) to rulers of Muslim countries are often accused of using irja' by Jihadi-Salafis, including al-Maqdisi. See also Khawârij. murtadd (pi. murtaddun) - apostate. Al-Maqdisi and other Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.) accuse the rulers of Muslim countries of being apostates for their adherence to other, non- Islamic laws. See also irtidäd, käfir, kufr, mushrìk, ridda, shirk. mushrìk (pi. mushrikün) - polytheist. Al-Maqdisi and other Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.) accuse the rulers of Muslim countries of being polytheists for their adherence to other, non- Islamic laws. See also irtidäd, käfir, kufr, murtadd, ridda, shirk. mustahabb - commendable. This term is applied to aspects of Islam that are not compulsory (wâjib, q.v.) and that, subsequently, are believed not to be punished by God when abandoned but the performance of which is said to be rewarded. αΖ-mutashäbaha li-l-kuffar - looking like unbelievers. This is frowned upon by Salafis (q.v.) and is - rightly or wrongly - often conflated with loyalty and disavowal (αί-walä' wa- !-bara, q.v.). See also toshabbuh al-kuffar. muwahhid (pi. muwahhidün) - an upholder of the unity of God (tawhfd, q.v.). Salafis (q.v.) sometimes call themselves this way because of their allegedly strong preference for and adherence to tawhfd. muwä/ät - a form of loyalty {wala, q.v.), which, when directed towards non-Muslims, is considered a form of minor unbelief (kufrasghar, q.v.). See also tawa/Zi. muzähara - assistance, often equated with loyalty (wa/a', q.v.) and considered forbidden when given to unbelievers. See also mahabba.

xviii nasïfia (pi. nasâ'ih) - advice. Quietist Salafìs (q.v.) often find this the preferred way of expressing criticism of rulers. See also wa!ial-amr. a!-näsiJch wa-i-mansükh - the abrogating and the abrogated. One of several methods of Qur'ânic exegesis to reconcile seemingly contradictory verses in which the later verses abrogate the earlier ones. qawânïn wad'iyya (sing, qänün wad'i) - positive law but in this context translated as man- made laws. Salafis oppose man-made laws and favour Islamic law (sharia, q.v.), although they do so in highly different ways. qitäl - fighting. Al-Maqdisi distinguishes qitäl al-tamlcfn (fighting to consolidate one's power in a certain territory) from cjitä! ai-niJcâya (fighting to hurt the enemy and his interests). He considers both legitimate in principle but has a strong preference for the former, qiyôs - analogical reasoning. One of the methods used in exegesis to derive new rules from existing ones. Salafis (q.v.) do not reject this outright but have a strong preference to rely on the literal texts themselves. Räfida/Rawäfid - rejecters, deserters. A derogatory term for Shiites, used by many Salafis (q.v.). ray - personal opinion. A means for scholars of Islamic jurisprudence ifuqaha, q.v.) to create new rulings on the basis of existing texts using one's own or others' opinions. Salafis (q.v.) reject this but distinguish this from independent reasoning (ytihäd, q.v.), which they see as a legitimate form of deriving rulings from the text. ridda - apostasy. This makes one an apostate (murtadd, q.v.) and an unbeliever (kâfir, q.v.). See also irtidäd. Sahwa - revival. In this study, the term refers to the Saudi movement that was inspired by Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood-ideas and grew in importance from the 1960s onwards. It played a major role in the opposition to the Saudi regime in the 1990s. salaf- see al-salafal-sälih. al-salafal-sâlih - the pious predecessors. Refers to the first three generations of Muslims who, according to a hadith (q.v.), are the best in Islamic history. Salafis try to emulate these generations as much and in as many spheres of life as possible. Salafis - see Salafism. Salafism - the trend in Islam whose adherents try to emulate the first three generations of Muslims (a!-sa/afai-säiih, q.v.) as much and in as many spheres of life as possible.

XIX shahäda - the Islamic confession of faith. It reads: "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God." It is the most basic creed in Islam and is the first of its five pillars or basic duties. sharia - Islamic law. The term refers to the path Muslims should follow, which is supposedly embodied by the numerous writings on Islamic legal issues. Because Salafis (q.v.) believe that religious innovations (bida, sing, bid'a, q.v.) have crept into this system of laws throughout the centuries, they reject the sharia as it is understood by many other Muslims, i.e. the systems of the different legal schools (madhähib, sing, madhhab, q.v.) developed by the faqaha (q.v.) throughout the course of Islamic history. Their own alternative remains rather vague, however. sharif (pi. shuraß'/ashräf) - a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The Jordanian king claims to be a sharif, a title that is respected by many Muslims but has little other significance. shaykh - patriarch, leader, title for a religious scholar or for someone respected for other reasons. shirk - polytheism. Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.) accuse rulers of polytheism for their reliance on man-made laws (qawânïn wad'iyya, q.v.) at the expense of Islamic law (sharia, q.v.). Because they equate laws with idols (osnäm, q.v.; tawäghft, sing, täghüt, q.v.) and adhering to these laws with worship ('ibäda, q.v.) on the basis of Q. 9:31, Jihadi- Salafis accuse people who consciously follow "un-Islamic" laws out of conviction (i'tiqäd, q.v.) of being polytheists (mushrikün, q.v.). shüró - consultation. Islamists who want to incorporate democracy into their ideas sometimes use this term as a supposedly Islamic form of democracy. Al-Maqdisi rejects this. tabarru' - see bara'. tabdil - exchange. In this study, the term refers to the complete exchange of Islamic law (sharia, q.v.) with another system of laws or a non-Islamic constitution. According to some Salafis (q.v.), including al-Maqdisi, this act of exchange is such a clear example of unbelief (ku/r, q.v.) that no further proof of someone's true intentions is necessary. al-tä'ifa al-mansüra - the victorious group. This term refers to the Muslims who are, on the basis of a hadfth (q.v.), believed to be the only victorious group on Judgement Day. Salafis (q.v.) believe they are part of this group. See also Ahi al-Sunna wa-1-Jamä'a, al-

xx firqa al-nâjiya. tajdîd - renewal. See also mujaddid. täghüt (pi. tawäghit) - idols. Al-Maqdisi and other Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.) see the rulers of Muslim countries and their man-made laws (gawänfn wad'iyya) as idols for the obedience that they enjoy from people, which should only be directed at God. See also asnäm. tahkim - legislation. See also tashiT. tak/ir - excommunication of other Muslims, declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers {kuffar, q.v.). Al-Maqdisi advocates this when dealing with legislative issues and thus favours tak/ir of the rulers of Muslim countries but is careful in his application of the concept beyond the legislative sphere, tälib 'Um - a student of (religious) knowledge, a knowledge seeker. A term that many Salafis (q.v.) apply to themselves, thereby indicating that they see themselves as seekers of the correct knowledge of Islam. See also 'ilm. taqlîd - blind emulation of a particular school of law (madhhab, q.v.). See also ijtihäd. tashabbuh al-kufßr - looking like unbelievers. This is frowned upon by Salafis (q.v.) and is - rightly or wrongly - often conflated with loyalty and disavowal (a!-wa!a wa-l-bara, q.v.). See also aJ-mushäbaha li-l-kuffar. tashn - legislation. See also tahkim. tatarrus - the term is used to refer to a human shield (turs) used by the Muslims' enemies that does not prohibit the jihad fighters (mufähidün, q.v.) from attacking them, even if the innocents used as a human shield are killed. tawa/Zi- a form of loyalty (waiä', q.v.), which, when directed towards non-Muslims, is considered a form of major unbelief (ku/r akbar, q.v.). See also muwäiät. tawhüi - the unity of God. This is a strong focal point in Salafism (q.v.) and in Islam as a whole. Salafis (q.v.) divide tawhid into three different types: tawhfd a/-rubûbixya (the unity of lordship), tawhfd aJ-asma wa-1-sißt (the unity of names and attributes) and tawhid a!-uiühi)ya (the unity of divinity). The first refers to basic ideas of monotheism such as that there is only one God and Creator. The second refers to God's unique nature and incomparability. The third form refers to the idea that only God may be worshipped, ta'wil - interpretation. 'ulama (sing, ah'm) - scholars, particularly religious scholars.

xxi umma - the worldwide community of Muslims. wäjib - compulsory. Acts that are wäjib al-dîn are compulsory. Neglecting them is not a form of major unbelief (lcu/r alcbar, q.v.) but only a form of minor unbelief (kufrasghar). walä' - see αί-waiä' wa-i-barâ'. a!-waiä' wa-1-barä' - loyalty and disavowal. Wala refers to the friendship, loyalty and dedication Muslims should show to their co-religionists while bara denotes the distance, disavowal, hatred and enmity Muslims should show towards non-Muslims. While many scholars interpret this concept solely in a social and a-political way, others treat it also as a concept relevant to situations of military conflict, during which Muslims should always side with their fellow-believers against non-Muslims. See also 'adäwa, baghda, mahabba, αί-mushäbaha H-l-kujfar, muwälät, muzâhara, tashabbuh al-kuffar, tawafli. wairi-amr (pi. wu/ätaZ-amr) - the ruler. Quietist Salafis (q.v.) believe this ruler should be obeyed and, in case of criticism, should be given advice (nosiha, q.v.). Political Salafis, however, believe protests and/or political participation are allowed and Jihadi- Salafis believed the walial-amr may be fought if he is an apostate (murtadd, q.v.). yâsiq/yâsa - the Mongol system of laws. This system was criticised by Taqi al-Din Ahmad b. Taymiyya (1263-1328) for its mixture of Islamic and non-Islamic elements. Modern- day Jihadi-Salafis (q.v.), including al-Maqdisi, sometimes compare the laws of Muslim countries today with theyösic;.

XXII Note on transliteration

Throughout this study, I have transliterated Arabic words using the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). I have, however, also transliterated some more common terms that IJMES does not transliterate (e.g. Quran/Quran). Moreover, I have transliterated names and titles of books in the footnotes but not in the text itself. Some words, such as hadith, have not been given their accurate plural forms (ahädfth) but a slightly simplified English plural (hadfths).

xxiii xxiv Introduction

In 2005, when I submitted the research proposal for this book at my university, the person whose ideas and influence form its subject - Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi - was virtually unknown among the general public in the West. Although this Jordanian radical Islamic ideologue did get more media attention in the years that followed - mostly because of the spectacular acts of terrorism by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a former leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq and once a student of al-Maqdisi's - this has remained more or less the same. In a world that had vivid memories of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and watched daily images of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were launched in the months and years that followed, "Osama bin Laden" became a household name. "Al-Maqdisi", however, rang much less familiar with most people. It therefore came as a surprise to many when in 2006, the year I started my research, the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point, New York, published a study of radical Islam that concluded that, contrary to popular perception, the most influential scholar in the world of militant Islamism today was not al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden or his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri but precisely this little-known man called Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.1 It is clear that al-Maqdisi has indeed been an influential ideologue among like- minded Muslims across the world and that his influence goes far beyond simply having been the teacher of al-Zarqawi. His website (www.tawhed.ws, in Arabic) offers the biggest library of jihadi literature on the internet and his writings have been translated into several languages including English2, French3, Dutch4 and Indonesian5. He is seen as an important ideologue by radical Islamic movements across the world, ranging from the Saudi organisation al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula6 and the Algerian Groupe Salafìste pour la

1 William McCants (ed ), The Militant Ideology Adas, Executive Report, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006, pp. 8-9. 2 See for example the website of Tibyan Publications, http://tibyan.wordpress.com/ (accessed 10 June 2009) but also al-Maqdisîs own website Minbar al-Tawhld wa-1-Jihâd (www.tawhed.ws), which has English translations of several of his writings. 3 See for example the website http://tawhid.over-blog.com (accessed 10 June 2009). I would like to thank Mohamed-Ali Adraoui for providing me with this website. 1 See for example the translation of an interview with al-Maqdisîand his book Hâdhihi 'Aqîdatuna on http://dienoelislaam web-log.nl/bestanden/2007/04/dit_is_onze_aqi.html (accessed 10June 2009). This book is said to have been translated from English into Dutch by Mohammed Bouyen, the murderer of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh. 5 Jakarta Post, 8 July 2008. 6 Al-Maqdisfs writings are frequently mentioned in the organisation's digital magazines Sowt al-Jihäd and Muostoiral-Battâr, available on www.e-pnsm.org (accessed 10 June 2009). Al-Maqdisîs influence on this group is dealt with in detail in chapter 5.

1 Prédication et le Combat7 to the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah". Furthermore, his works are praised and quoted by radical Islamic scholars from Egypt', Syria10, Jordan", Iraq12 and elsewhere13 and he has been an important scholarly adviser to Jihadi-Salafi groups in the Gaza Strip since 2008.14 The scholars and groups influenced by al-Maqdisi can thus be found in many different countries. Despite their geographical diversity, however, they seem to have at least one thing in common, namely that all of them belong to a branch of Sunni Islam called Salafism. Since Salafi ideology is the basis of al-Maqdisi's writings and central to explaining his influence on others, we must first deal with this topic in some detail before turning to a historical overview of the development of radical Islam in the Arab world and an explanation of the theoretical frameworkt o this study, its methodology (including the main research question) and the sources used. This introduction concludes by presenting an overview of the rest of the book.

' See for example Hiwär ma'a RaTs al-Lajm al-I'lämiyya h-l-Jamaa al-Salafiyya li-!-Da'wa wa-1-Qitâl, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), 2004, p. 17; Abu 1-Hasan Rashld, Wiyüb al-Fisâm wa-Hatmiyyat al-Sidäm bayna l-Kufr wa-1- Islâm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), 2005, pp. 16,19,20,97,100; Hiwärma'a l-Qa id KhähdAbll-'Abbäs Amir al-Mmtaqa al-Sa/iräwiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), 2006, p. 2. ' Sidney Jones, "Briefing for the New President; The Terronst Threat in Indonesia and Southeast Asia", Armais of the American Academy of Political and Sonai Science, no. 618, July 2008, p. 74 ' See for example 'Abd al-Qädir b. 'Abd al-'Aziz (a.k.a. Imam Shanf/Dr. Fadl), Al-Jämi' fìTdab al-'llm al-Sharif, vol. II, www.tawhed.ws(accessed 10June2009), 1994, pp.768-769;Hanial-Sibâl, Yazidb Muäwiyawa-Hukkäm 'Afnnä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9June 2009), n.d., p. 6. 10 See for example Abu Mus'ab al-Sürï, Da'wat al-Muqäwama ai-Zslamiyya al-'Alamiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 June 2009), 2004, pp. 1050,1128; Abu Basîr al-Tartûsî, Μα'πα Tawhïd al-Häkimiyya, www.tawhed ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., p. 3; id., Dhabban 'an 'Ird Akhlnä l-Shayìài Abi Muhammad al-Maqdisi, www.abubaseer.bizland.com (accessed 10 June 2009), 2002. " See for example Abu Qatäda al-Filastlnl, Hawla Murjt'at al-'Asr, www tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., pp. 3-4, id., Al-Ru'ya aJ-Shar'iyya Ii-Ahdäth AmriJcä, www.tawhed ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., p. 5. " See for example Abu 1-Fadl al-'Irâqï, Al-Ghulüw wa-Äthäruhu l-Salbiyya 'da l-Jihäd wa-l-Mujähidfn, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., pp. 2,3; id., Mu'ömarat al-Fasl bqyna l-'Ulamä' wa-l-Mujähidin, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., pp. 2,3; 'Abd al-Wahhäb al-HIda, Bahth fiAsrä l-Murtaddm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), 2002, ρ 8 " There are many examples of authors from other countries or of unknown origin quoting or praising al- Maqdisi. See for instance Abu Sa'd al-'Ämill, Al-Dfmüqrâtiyya: Wasila li-htiwä' al-Tayyär ai-islämf, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d, p. 6, footnote 1; Abu Umâma al-Dayyâlî, "Αί-Hizb al-islämral-7räijf ' tahta 1-Myhar a/- Shar'i, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), 2005, pp. 6,22; 'Abd al-Rahmän b. 'Abdallah al-Gharib, Kashfmä Alqähu IbllsβMajallat al-Shana mm Talbü wa-mä Fa'alahu (irshayyidll [sie]) mm TadlL·, www tawhed.ws (accessed 9June 2009), n.d., pp. 14-15, footnote 38, Muhammad Sälim al-Majhsi,Al-Sala/iyyawa-l-'l/lamä. wa-l-Haqfijaal- Murra (2/2), www.tawhed ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., p. 4; 'Izz al-DIn al-Qa'qä', Qänün al-Usra al-Jazä'in fiZill al-'Awlama, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., pp. 3-4; Abu Mänya al-Qurashl, Al-Wäbil al-Sayyib β Nafîhat al-Tahrm al-Tayyib, www.tawhed ws (accessed 9 June 2009), n.d., pp. 7-8. " This is expressed in his increasing criticism of Hamas and his writings supportive of the Jihadi-Salafi groups in the Gaza Strip. See for example Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Hamös Sahhihö l-Asâs wa-lchshü Höh la TaJchshü I- Näs, www tawhed ws (accessed 6 January 2009), 2008, id, Ataqtulûna Rajulan in Yaqûlu Rabbrllâh, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 August 2009), 2009

2 The Salafi Ideological Basis

Just like al-Maqdisi's name, "Salafism" was not a household word before 11 September 2001.15 Although several publications partly dealing with (aspects of) Salafism as it has developed since the 1970s had appeared before "9/11"16, this was not reflected in common knowledge about the subject. This changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks on that day, when a large number of people became interested in the Salafi ideas associated with al- Qa'ida, the organisation behind the attacks.17 Although the number of books and articles dealing with al-Qa'ida and global radical Islam increased greatly after 200118, the rising interest in Salafism was only partly matched in scholarly publications focussing on the ideological tenets of this branch of Islam. Several publications have explored the link between Salafism and al-Qa'ida1', have treated the former as a de-territorialised and a- cultural phenomenon20 or have dealt with contemporary Salafism in individual countries such as Indonesia21, Iraq22, Saudi Arabia23 and Yemen24. It was not until quite recently,

15 Hegghammer shows, for example, that the term "Salafism" was never used by two major American newspapers before 2000. See Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism", in: Roel Meyer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, p. 248, footnote 8. " Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1999; Gilles Kepel Jihad. The Trail of Politica! Islam (transi. Anthony F. Roberts), Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2002 [2000], Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou. Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition, Washington, D.C.· The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan", /nternationol Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 2000, pp 219-240; id., The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power m Jordan, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. 17 To get an idea of the much broader interest in Salafism nowadays, one need only type in the word "Salafi" in Google to get literally hundreds of thousands of hits, ranging from scholarly studies to popular articles and from apologetic websites to anti-Salafi polemics 18 Good examples of this include Abdel Ban Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda, Berkeley & Los Angeles. University of California Press, 2006; Jason Burke, Al-Qaedo: The True Story of Radical Islam, London & New York: LB. Tauns, 2003; Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge etc.. Cambridge University Press, 2005; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaedo: Global Network of Terror, New York: Berkley, 2003, Lawrence Wnght, The Looming Tower AI-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York: Knopf, 2007. " See for example Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad", Middle East Policy, vol. 8, no. 4, December 2001, pp 18-38; Quintan Wiktorowicz &John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11", Middle East Policy, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003, pp. 76-92 20 See for example Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Umma, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 21 See for example Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Ithaca, NY· Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2006, id., "Saudi Expansion, the Salafi Campaign and Arabised Islam in Indonesia", in: Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders. Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London Hurst & Co., 2008, pp. 263-281 22 See for example Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers m Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Washington, D.C United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, pp. 63-87. 21 See for example International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia backgrounder. Who are the Islamists'', ICG Middle East Report no. 31, Amman etc., 21 September 2004; Stéphane Lacroix, "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia", in Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, London: Hurst & Co., 2005, pp 35-56; Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge etc.. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

3 however, that in-depth studies dealing with Salafism as a whole and its ideology in particular started appearing.25 Apart from the importance of Salafi ideas for this study, the relative lack of in-depth treatments of the ideological underpinnings of Salafism is therefore another reason to deal with this subject at some length. Moreover, it also introduces some of the main concepts and terminology used throughout this study.

Defining Salafism

I use the term "Salafism" to refer to those Muslims who try to emulate the "pious predecessors" (ai-sa!afaI-säJih, hence the name Salafism) as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible and construct their beliefs, their behaviour and their reading of the sources of Islam to further that goal. Based on several traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadfths), these predecessors are usually limited to the first three generations of Islam and are considered to be - in the words of the Prophet - "the best of my community" (kfiayr ummati).26 They are believed to embody the purest and most authentic form of Islam. Salafis subsequently see themselves as the group that follows the only "true" form of Islam and therefore believe they are the tä'ifa mansüra (the victorious group) or the firqa näjiya (saved sect), the group of Muslims that - according to several hadïths - will remain steadfast in their pursuit of the truth and will consequently be saved from hellfire." The concept most central to those I (and others) refer to as Salafis is tawhfd (the unity of God). Apart from simply seeing this as monotheism as it is generally understood (the belief in only one god), Salafis distinguish three different kinds of tawhid: taw/ud al- rubübiyya (the unity of Lordship, referring to the belief that there is only one Lord and

" See for example Bernard Haykel, "The Salafis in Yemen at a Crossroads: an obituary of Shaykh Muqbil al- Wadi'i of Dammaj (d. 1422/2001)", Jemen Report, no. 2,2002, pp. 28-37; Laurent Bonnefoy, "Salafism in Yemen: A 'Saudisation'?", in: Al-Rasheed (ed.). Kingdom, pp. 245-262; François Burgat & Muhammad Sbith, "Les Salafis au Yemen ou... la modernisation malgré tout", Chroniquesyémémtes, no. 10,2002 25 See for example Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism. Islam's New Religious Movement, London: Hurst & Co, 2009, Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que le Salafisme?, Pans· Presses Universitaires de France, 2008; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement", Studies m Con/îict and Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3, 2006, pp 207- 240; id., "The Salafi Movement· Violence and Fragmentation of Community", in: Miriam Cooke & Bruce B. Lawrence (eds.), Muslim Networks from Hay to Hiphop, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005, pp. 208-234 26 For these traditions, see Sahifi al-Bukhàrï, book 57 ("Kitâb Fadâ'il Ashâb al-Nabl.."), chapter 1 ("Fadâ'il Ashäb al-Nabî..."), nos. 2 and 3; SahïJi Muslim, book 44 ("Kitâb Fadâ'il al-Sahâba..."), chapter 52 ("Fadl al-Sahäba, thumma lladhîna Yalûnahum, thumma lladhîna Yalünahum"), nos. 2533,2534,2535 and 2536. 27 Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action", in. Meyer (ed.), Global, pp 33-34, Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy", p. 207; id., Management, pp 111-112,120 For hadïths about this point, see for example Sahih al-Bukhârî, book 56 ("Kitâb al-Manäqib"), chapter 27 ("Bâb"), nos. 834 and 835, book 92 ("Kitâb al-I'tisam bi-1-Kitâb wa-1-Sunna"), chapter 10 ("Qawl al-Nabl[...] LaTazäluTä'ifa..."), no 414.

4 Creator), tawhid al-asmâ' wa-1-sißt (the unity of names and attributes, indicating that God is one and utterly unique in all his characteristics) and tawhid al-ulühiyya (the unity of divinity, referring to the idea that only God is divine and therefore the only being worthy of worship). Because Salafis have such a strict understanding of what constitutes tawhrd and because this concept can be seen as the basis of Islam28, practices such as the veneration of so-called saints among Muslims are denounced as examples of violating the unity of God and are thus seen as expressions of polytheism (shirk) and unbelief (lcu/r). According to Salafis, the person guilty of such a sin is a polytheist (mushrik) and an unbeliever {kafìr) who becomes the subject of excommunication (takfir) since he or she can no longer be called a Muslim. Salafis also object to any popular or cultural traditions added to the doctrines or practices of Islam, which - in their view - tarnish the purity of the religion as embodied by the lives of the pious predecessors. Such practices are referred to as "religious innovations" (bid'a, pi. bida") by Salafis, who try to shun them as much as possible.29 Salafis as I describe them also express their strict emulation of the salaf in their rejection of following the different schools of Islamic law (sharia). In Sunni Islam, there are four such legal schools (madhdhib, sing, madhhab): the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali schools, each named after the person on the basis of whose ideas these schools developed. It has traditionally been common practice for Sunni Muslims to follow the rulings of one of these madhâhib (taqlfd), often depending on the geographical region one is from, with each of the four schools recognising each other as orthodox and legitimate. Salafis reject taqlid, however, since they believe one should only follow the original two sources of Islam, the Qur an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna) as embodied by the various hadrths. Salafis therefore advocate independent interpretation of these two sources (ijtihâd), freed from the boundaries that the various schools impose.30

28 The confession of Islamic faith "there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God" explicitly refers to this dimension. 29 Haykel, "Nature", p. 39; Wiktorowicz, Management, pp. 113-117. 30 Haykel, "Nature", p. 42; Wiktorowicz, Management, pp. 119-120. The exact definition of both taqiid and ytihâd is contested, however. For more on this issue, see Mohammed Fadel, "The Social Logic of Taqlid and the Rise of the Mukhtosar", Islamic Law and Society, vol. 3, no. 2,1996, pp. 193-233; Wael B. Hallaq, "On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihâd", Studia Islamica, no. 63,1986, pp. 129-141; id., "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?", international Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1,1984, pp. 3-41; Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform m Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 76-108; Sherman Jackson, "Taqlid, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory", islamic Law and Society, vol. 3, no. 2,1996, pp. 165-192; Rudolph Peters, "Idjtihäd and Taqlid in 18th and 19Lh Century Islam", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 20, nos. 3-4,1980, pp. 131-145.

5 The Roots ofSalafìsm

Although Salafism in its present form came into existence in the latter half of the 20th century, its roots go back hundreds of years. The desire to emulate the pious predecessors - particularly the Prophet himself and the first four "rightly guided caliphs" (the so-called röshidün) - can be said to have always been part of Sunni Islam in general, not just its Salafi current It is the strictness and methodology with which Salafis try to live up to the standard set by the salaf and their willingness to gear their teachings and beliefs towards that goal, however, that distinguishes them from other Sunni Muslims Because of their emphasis on precisely emulating the first generations of Islam, Salafis attach great importance to finding, studying and following hadiths about the predecessors This search for as many details about the salafas possible in order to apply them in one's own life so as to live in a strictly Islamic way is rooted in the eighth-century movement known as the Ahi al-Hadîth. Although this group of scholars from Medina did not totally reject and even practised the analogical reasoning (qiyäs) and personal opinions (ray) of Islamic legal experts that had become an increasingly important element of Islamic law, they favoured relying only on the Qur an and the Surma.31 This trend to rely on hadiths to complement the Qur an at the expense of non-scriptural sources of law such as analogical reasoning eventually became important to all schools of Islamic law, especially the Hanbali one, which followed the principles espoused by the scholar Ibn Hanbal (780-855).32 Through Hanbali scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the principles behind the Ahi al-Hadîth - emulating the pious predecessors as closely as possible - strongly influenced the modern-day movement we now call Salafism.

Despite the fact that the tenets of Hanbalism and the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al- Wahhab (often referred to as "Wahhabism") have been major sources of influence on Salafism, they should not be equated with it There is a tendency among some to lump

11 Haykel, "Nature", ρ 38 For more on the Ahi al Hadith, see Joseph Schacht, An /ntroduction to Islamic Law, Oxford etc Oxford University Press, 1982 [1964], 34 36,46 48, Ν J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 1964, pp 40 52, Wael Β Hallaq, Sharia. Theory, Practice, Transformations, Cambridge etc Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp 47 48,55 60 12 Schacht, /ntroduction, ρ 63 For a critical treatment of Schacht's description of the role of hodfths in early Islamic jurisprudence, see Harald Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence Meccan Fiqh before the Classical SchooL· (transi Marion H Katz), Leiden etc Bnll, 2002, pp 18 49, esp pp 18 22 Motzki himself argues that the use of Wfths, at least for Meccanjunsprudents, played a larger role than has been assumed See ibid, pp 287 297

6 especially the terms "Wahhabism" and "Salafism" together.33 Although there is indeed reason to do so - many of the beliefs, doctrines and sources used are the same - there are differences. The term "Salafism" refers to the broad movement of Muslims who meticulously try to live according to the example of the safaf as they see fit, whereas "Wahhabism" - a term rejected by its adherents - refers to the specific type of Salafism propagated by the 18th-century reformer Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab from the central Arabian region of Najd. One could thus say that Wahhabism is the Najdi branch of Salafism. There are, in fact, many Muslims whom one might call Salafis but not Wahhabis. Adherents to the belief that the salaf should be emulated as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible have been found in areas outside Najd for centuries34 and they, notwithstanding their ties with Wahhabi Muslims35, have sometimes differed ideologically with the latter, for instance on Wahhabis' overly strict enforcement of their beliefs, their lack of tolerance towards others and their less than total reliance on ijtihäd as opposed to taqifd.36 Just as contemporary Salafism should not be equated entirely with Wahhabism, it should also not be confused with the late 19th- and early 20th-century movement called Salafism. This trend, propagated by scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839- 1897), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) did indeed try to move Islam back into the direction of the salafbut with a completely different objective. Whereas contemporary Salafis try to emulate the predecessors to purify Islam and revert to its supposedly original and true form, Al-Afghani, 'Abduh, Rida and others did so in order to rid Islam of the centuries of legal and historical baggage that had, in their view, turned it into a rigid religion unfit for modern times. By going back to the earliest period of their religion, they wanted to strip Islam of this "burden" so it could be rebuilt again from the bottom up

33 While writing this introduction, for instance, I received an e-mail directing my attention to a website denouncing the "wahabi/salafi/neo-khawanj cult" (see http.//answersyahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090613160929AALpPub, accessed 17 June 2009) This is a typical - albeit somewhat extreme - example of how these different terms are sometimes lumped together. " There have long been Salafl-onented Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, for example. See for instance Barbara Daly Metcalf, islamic Revival in British India. Deoband, 1860-1900, Oxford etc · Oxford University Press, 2002 [1982], pp. 268-296. For a highly accessible account of this community and its ties with Wahhabi scholars, see Charles Allen, God's Terrorists. The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modem Jihad, Cambridge, Mass. Da Capo Press, 2006. 15 See for instance Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien; Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902-1953, Wurzburg: Ergon, 2002, p. 207. 16 See for example Allen, God's, ρ 50; Hala Fattah, "'Wahhabi' Influences, Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745 1930",;oumal o/Jslamic Studies, vol. 14, no. 2,2003, pp 127-148, Haykel, "Nature", pp 42-43; id.. Revival, pp 14,127-130; Stéphane Lacroix, "L'apport de Muhammad Nasir al- Din al-Albani au salafisme contemporain", in Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que, pp 46-47; id., "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir ai-Din al Albani and his impact on the shaping of contemporary Salafism", in. Meyer (ed.), Global, pp. 65-66

7 in a way that was assertively Islamic but compatible with the challenges of their time. Although these Salafìs shared a preference for certain concepts with their present-day name-sakes, such as an emphasis on tawhfd and a rejection of taqlid, in the end theirs was a thoroughly modernist discourse, as opposed to the purifying tone of contemporary Salafìs.37

Labelling Salafism

The above suggests that labelling Salafism is somewhat problematic and that the name "Salafism" is not universally applied to the same group of people. This is indeed the case and not just among scholars of Salafism. The people referred to in this study as Salafìs also sometimes reject this label. Believing that labelling believers in different ways only leads to unwelcome divisions within Islam, some Muslims I call Salafìs have argued that they should really be seen as followers of al-salafal-sälih, the Ahi ai-Sunna wa-1-Jama a (the people of the Sunna and the community) or simply as Muslims. The first of these three options more or less boils down to the same as the term "Salafìs", the second is too subjective to be useful for an academic study and the third is far too broad to be of any specific use. It is therefore important to note that my use of the term "Salafism" and its derivatives is not based on what the people I refer to as "Salafìs" call themselves. Instead, it is partly based on common practice among Western scholars of the subject but also on my own observation that some Muslims share the strict attempt to emulate the salaf in various ways, legitimising the use of a label derived from that word. My use of the term "Salafism" should therefore be seen as a label that / use, not as one that is necessarily endorsed by the people it refers to.38 The people I label "Salafìs" all share the basic ideas I have outlined above. There are, however, significant differences between Salafis. Two different terms are particularly relevant in this respect: 'aqida (creed) and manhaj (method). The term 'aqïda refers to the beliefs and doctrines that Salafìs subscribe to and has been described in its most basic form above. Because of Salafis' desire to purify Islam of religious innovations and other "un- Islamic" influences, defining exactly what their creed entails is very important to them, hence the many documents outlining the exact beliefs of Salafis.3' Manhaj, on the other

17 For a good overview of Al-Afghanìs, 'Abduh's and Ridâ's ideas, see Albert Houram, Arabic Thought in the Liberai Age, 1798-1939, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983 [1962], pp 103-160,222-244. M For an example of such a discussion by Salafis themselves, see for instance The Doctrine of Ah! ai-Sunna versus the "Salafi" Movement, www.ummah net/Al_adaab/fajr.html (accessed 21 September 2007) 39 See for example Muhammad b. Sâhh b. al-'Uthaymln, The Muslims [sic] Belie/, www.allaahuakbar.in (accessed May 2007), n.d., Abu Basir al-Tartûsi, Hôdhihi 'Aqîdatimâ wa-Hâdhâ UadhïNad'û ilayhi, www.abubaseer- bizland.com (accessed 10 June 2009), 2002, Abu Muhammad al-MaqdisI, Hädhihi 'Aqrdatunä, www tawhed ws

8 hand, refers to the method of applying this creed. The Saudi Salafi scholar Salih b. Fawzan al-Fawzan has distinguished three different form of this concept. The first of these is Salafis' method of dealing with the sources of Islam. The second is the method of worship ('ibâda) and the third is the manhaj of dealing with society.40 The first form of manhaj is probably universally agreed upon by Salafis since they all believe in a strictly literal reading of the sources, even if that means texts cannot be reconciled with one another, and eagerly search for textual - as opposed to rationally argued - proof for their beliefs.'11 The second and third forms, however, are controversial. Although Salafis agree that the worshipping of saints is a form of shirk, they do not have the same ideas on what constitutes worship. As we will see later on, several scholars - including al-Maqdisi - believe following laws can also be seen as a form of worship, a point that is contested by others. The third form of manhaj mentioned by al-Fawzan is probably the most controversial one, however, as it deals with contentious social and political issues such as parliamentary participation and the use of violence. Based on the division between 'aqïda and manhaj, Wiktorowicz, in a seminal and highly influential article, has distinguished three types of Salafis: quietists, politicos and jihadis. According to Wiktorowicz, they all agree on issues relating to 'aqïda but differ when it comes to manhaj, which he more or less equates with the third form of manhaj distinguished above, namely the method of dealing with society. Quietists focus on the propagation of their message (da'wa) through lessons, sermons and other missionary activities and stay away from politics and violence, which they leave to the ruler (wa!f al- amr).42 Politicos, on the other hand, do engage in political debate or even participate in

(accessed 11 June 2009), 1997; Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna, 'Aqïdatuna wa-Manhq;unä, www.tawhed ws (accessed May 2007), η d.; al-Qâ'ida m the Land of the Two Rivers, Hödhihi 'Aqîdatanâ wa-Manhajunä, www.tawhed ws (accessed May 2007). 10 Sälih b Fawzän al-Fawzân, Why Manhaj?, www.allaahuakbar.in (accessed May 2007), n.d. 41 Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy", pp 210-212, lA, Management, pp. 114-115. 42 Haykel, "Nature", ρ 49. Wiktorowicz actually calls the first group "punsts". Although I have also used this term, it was brought to my attention that all Salafis consider themselves punsts. To associate this term with only one type of Salafi would therefore show bias. Personal conversation with Stéphane Lacroix I would like to thank my colleague Carmen Becker for suggesting "quietists" as an alternative. This term has also been used by others. See for example Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, London & New York. Routledge, 2007, p. 248. This group includes major Salafi scholars such as the Synan scholar Muhammad Näsir al-DIn al-Albânï (d 1999), the former Saudi mufti 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Bâz (d. 1999) and his successor Muhammad b. Sâlih b. al- 'Uthaymln (d. 2001). One could argue that the latter two were not entirely a-pohtical as they were sometimes called upon to justify the Saudi government's policies. One could also argue that even an entirely a-pohtical stance is inherently political since this is not neutral but implicitly supports the political status quo. Furthermore, some have argued that the "political" should not be confined to elections and parliaments but extends beyond that. For an example of the latter, see for instance Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagmmg the Umma, London & New York: Routledge, 2004 [2001], pp. 8-14

9 elections and parliaments.43 Jihadi-Salafìs, finally, are those people who believe that jihad in the form of religiously legitimated violence, besides its role vis-à-vis non-Muslim countries, may be used to solve social and political problems within Muslim societies.44 Although Wiktorowicz's article has done much to clarify the differences among Salafis, his division of them is somewhat too schematic. His assertion, for example, that all Salafis agree on the creed is true when it comes to its basic tenets as described above but not when dealing with its details. Questions about issues such as what constitutes faith and, especially, when a Muslim can be said to have lost his or her faith and can be declared an "infidel" are controversial among Salafis and are answered in different ways, as we will see later on. Furthermore, Wiktorowicz's treatment of the term manhaj suggests that Salafis are either quietists, politicos or jihadis. In this study, however, I argue that this need not be the case since Salafis may well transcend the borders of one particular type of manhaj and emphasise, for instance, both da'wa and jihad in their writings as useful ways of expressing contention and dealing with society and politics. One such an example of a Salafi whose ideology challenges the division made by Wiktorowicz is al-Maqdisi. I contend that al-Maqdisi, even though he is clearly a Jihadi- Salafi, uses arguments, concepts and terms that show he is very close to the quietist creed. Moreover, his emphasis on the use of da'wa shows that he also partly adopts the method of quietist Salafis. Therefore, one might say that al-Maqdisi is, in fact, a "quietist Jihadi-Salafi". In this study, I argue that al-Maqdisi's closeness to quietist Salafis in both 'aqida and manhaj is a major factor in explaining his influence among certain Salafis and his lack thereof among others.

The Development of Radical Islam

The outline of Salafism given above has described in some detail what Salafism entails and has pointed out that al-Maqdisi belongs to the jihadi branch of Salafism. Jihadi-Salafism, however, did not come into existence in an ideological vacuum, as the information given above might suggest. Before it became what it is nowadays, it went through many stages of

" Important figures of this group are Saudi scholars such as Salman al-'Awda and Safar al-Hawâlï. See Fandy, Saudi, pp. 61-113 for an in-depth treatment of these men. Whereas these two scholars only engage in political debate, other actually participate in politics, such as the Salafis in Kuwait. An important ideologue supporting this is the originally Egyptian scholar Abu 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Rahmân b. 'Abd al-Khâliq. " Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy", pp. 225-228. The different views on jihad will be dealt with in greater detail in chapters 2 and 3.

10 development and was often influenced by events and groups not directly linked to Salafi beliefs. The following paragraphs deal with the development of radical forms of Islam in the Arab world and how this culminated into Jihadi-Salafism as we know it today. Just like the description of Salafìsm, this must be dealt with in some detail since it introduces many of the events relevant for the rest of this study and provides a historical basis from which subsequent chapters continue.

The Muslim Brotherhood and its Heirs

The roots of today's radical Islamic movements in the Arab world can be traced to the founding of a movement that is still widespread and very active in several countries: the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded by an Egyptian called Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in 1928, the movement quickly spread from its humble beginnings in Isma'iliyya to the rest of Egypt and, later, to other countries. Al-Banna, a student of the aforementioned Rashid Rida, wanted the Brotherhood to be an activist and assertive movement focussed on instilling a strong Muslim identity in his fellow countrymen and -women. The founding and development of the movement should be seen in the context of colonialism in general and the British occupation of Egypt in particular. In fact, the strong British presence in Isma'iliyya - a city close to the strategically and economically important Suez Canal - made a deep impression on al-Banna.45 The Brotherhood was engaged in different activities, including education and political activism but also, sometimes, violence against the Egyptian government. The precise direction that the movement should take was contested under al-Banna's rule46 but conflicts over this issue could mostly be contained. When al-Banna was assassinated in 1949, however, the disputes over what policies to pursue became apparent. Partly fuelled by tensions and disagreements over the new leadership of the Brotherhood, the movement disintegrated steadily as its members first co-operated with the so-called "Free Officers" led by Muhammad Najib (Neguib) and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser), who staged a revolution in 1952, but were later put in prison by Nasser after they were accused of trying to assassinate him.47 The splits within the Brotherhood, exacerbated by the Egyptian regime's crack-down

,5 The two best studies in English on the early history of the Brotherhood are Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942, Reading, UK: Ithaca/Gamet, 1998; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1969. " See for example Mitchell, Society, pp. 52-55. " Ibid., pp. 116-162.

11 on the movement, produced two distinct branches. The first was a politically moderate and non-violent branch that considered the state legitimate and eventually started participating in parliamentary elections. This trend dominated the Brotherhood and eventually came to encompass the entire movement.48 Since the 1990s, this moderate trend has developed even further into a movement referred to as the Wasatiyya (centrism), which no longer strives explicitly for the implementation of Islamic law, as the Brotherhood does, but uses religion more as a moral framework through which one can engage in politics.'" The second and - for this study - most important branch produced by the Brotherhood was a radical one that did not accept the legitimacy of the state and advocated the violent overthrow of its regime. This way of thinking was expressed most explicitly within the movement by one of its leading ideologues called Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Imprisoned by the Nasser regime and executed in 1966, Qutb contended that Egyptian society lived in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jähiliyya) that should be countered by an effort to re-establish the sovereignty of God (häkimiyya) through the use of jihad.50 Qutb's ideas failed to have much long-term impact on the Brotherhood itself but influenced other, more radical Egyptian groups all the more. Organisations that developed in the 1970s and 1980s such as the Islamic Jihad (responsible for the assassination of the Egyptian President

" See for example Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodatiomsts Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt", international Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, no 3, pp. 321-339; Gehad Auda, 'The 'Normalization' of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the early 1990s", in: Martin E Marty & R Scott Appleby (eds ), Accounting for Fundamentalisms. The Dynamic Character of Movements, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 375-377,379-381,385-395; Olaf Farschid, "Hizbîya: Die Neuorientierung der Muslimbruderschaft Ägyptens in den Jahren 1984 bis 1989", Orient deutsche Zeitschrift fur den modernen Orient, vol. 30, no. 1,1989, pp 53-74; Martin Forstner, "Auf dem legalen Weg zur Macht? Zur Politischen Entwicklung der Muslimbruderschaft Ägyptens", Orient: deutsche Zeitschrift fur den modernen Orient, vol. 29, no. 3,1988, pp. 386-422; Chris Harnisch & Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 2, March 2009, pp. 189-205; Denis Sullivan & Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt Cml Society vs. the State, Boulder, Col. & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 41-70 " See for example Raymond William Baker, "Invidious Compansons Realism, Postmodern Globalism, and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt", in: John L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?, Boulder, Col. & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 115-133, id., Islam without Fear Egypt and the New islamists, Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard Umversity Press, 2003; Joshua Stacher, "Post Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party", Middle East Journal, vol. 56, no. 3,2002, pp. 415-432. A similar trend can be seen within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. See for example Mohammad Suliman Abu Rumman [Muhammad Sulaymân Abu Rummân], The Muslim Brotherhood m the 2007Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing "Political Setback" or Diminished Popularity?, Amman: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2007. ^ Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, 2002, pp 145-170; William E Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jôhilixya", Jntemational Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4,2003, pp. 521-545 These ideas were expressed by Qutb in his book Ma alim/îl-rarii/, available in the original Arabic on www tawhed.ws but also in Enghsh. See for example Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2005 [2001],

12 Anwar al-Sadat in 1981)51, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya52 and Jama'at al-Muslimin (better known as al-Takfir wa-1-Hijra)53 were all in varying degrees influenced by radical ideas such as Qutb's.

The Spread ofWahhabism

At the same time as when the developments described above took place, another important trend could be discerned too. Under pressure from the crack-down by Nasser's regime in Egypt and similarly repressive policies in other Arab states, many Muslim Brothers fled their home countries and settled in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and 1970s. Saudi Arabia, a country governed on the basis of the strict and highly conservative Wahhabi ideology, welcomed the Muslim Brothers. The latter, through the influential positions they attained and their international networks, gave a much-needed boost to the efforts by Saudi Arabia to spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world. Through Saudi organisations such as the Muslim World League, founded in the early 1960s to counter the revolutionary socialist rhetoric of Nasser's regime54, Muslim Brothers helped Saudi Arabia spread its Wahhabi message while rebuilding their own careers at the same time.55 Just like the revolutionary rhetoric coming from Egypt spurred Saudi Arabia to propagate Wahhabism as a counter message, the rhetoric emanating from the Islamic

51 For more on the Islamic Jihad, see Hamied N. Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16,1984, pp. 123-144; Johannes J.G Jansen, "The Creed of Sadat's Assassins: The Contents of The Forgotten Duty' Analysed", Die Wekdes Islams, vol 25,1985, pp 1-30; id., The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York & London: MacMillan, 1986; Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt The Prophet and the Pharaoh (transi. John Rothschild), Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003 [1985]. 52 For more on this group, see Omar Ashour, "bons Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle Eastjoumal, vol. 61, no 4,2007, pp 596-625; Mamoun Fandy, "Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?", Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no 4, pp. 607-625; Mohammed M. Haifez, Why Muslims Rebel Repression and Resistance m the Islamic World, Boulder, Col. & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; Mohammed M. Hafez & Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement", in: Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed ), Islamic Activism· A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind.. Indiana University Press, 2004; Roel Meyer, "Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya", in: Meyer (ed ), Global, pp. 189-220, James Toth, "Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 2003, pp. 547-572. 53 See for example Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", Intemationaljoumal of Middle East Studies, vol. 12,1980, pp. 423-453, id., "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2, April 1988, pp. 632-657, id., "Egypt's Islamic Militants", MERiP Reports, no. 103, February 1982, pp 5-14; David Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt A Companson of Two Groups", Middle East Review o/Intemational A/fairs, vol. 3, no. 3, September 1999, pp. 1-10. " For more on the Muslim World League, see Reinhard Schulze, /slamischer internationalism us im 20 Jahrhundert Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga, Leiden: Bnll, 1990, especially pp. 181-313. " Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds- Islam and the West (transi. Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambodge, Mass. & London. Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2004, pp 170-177. See also Al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp 73-74, where the author criticises Kepel for portraying Saudis as "passive recipients of a foreign, politicised Islam".

13 Revolution in Iran in 1979 further emphasised the need for Saudi Arabia to increase its efforts in providing Muslims with a conservative alternative to these radical ideas. Helped by the enormous wealth generated through soaring oil prices as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, Saudi Arabia therefore became increasingly active in spreading Wahhabism across the Muslim world * Moreover, the booming oil-industry in the Gulf attracted many workers from across the Arab world. These men often became more conservative through their intensive contacts with particularly Saudi Arabia and took their new-found ideas with them when returning to their home countries. Thus, both through intense efforts to spread a Wahhabi message as well as through migrant-workers' experiences in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular, a more conservative Salafi form of Islam spread across the Arab (and Muslim) world. This abetted an ongoing trend of increased religiosity in the Arab world as a result of the lost Arab-Israeli war in 1967, which severely discredited Nasser's socialist message, and thereby helped create a favourable climate for Islamic movements."

The "Afghan Arab"Phenomenon

The Arab world in the 1960s and particularly the 1970s and 1980s thus saw two broad trends relevant for this study: a spread of radical ideas such as those of Qutb, especially in Egypt but also in other countries58 and an increasing Salafi conservatism as a result of Saudi Wahhabi propaganda and Arabs working in the Gulf countries. In the midst of all this, the Soviet Union, in order to aid the fledgling Afghan communist regime as part of its Cold War efforts to expand its sphere of influence, invaded Afghanistan in 1979. At that point, the interests of several different actors dovetailed in such a way that a new phenomenon came about: the "Afghan Arabs". When Afghanistan was invaded, many newly-committed Muslims in the Arab world saw it as their religious duty to help liberate Muslim Afghanistan from the communist Soviets. Since many Arab regimes had looked upon the greater religiosity of their populations - particularly when expressed through radicalism - with suspicion, they were keen to get rid of these men by sending them off to wage jihad against

56 Saeed Shehabi, "The Role of Religious Ideology in the Expansionist Policies of Saudi Arabia", in Al Rasheed (ed ), Kingdom, pp 183 197 " Kepel Jihad, pp 61 75 Fandy describes, for instance, how poor workers from the south of Egypt went to the Gulf and particularly Saudi Arabia and came back more conservative and a lot richer, using their money to set up mosques and invest in an alternative socio economic infrastructure independent of the government's influence See Fandy, "Egypt's", pp 617 619 58 Kepel Jihad, pp 66 67 For the example of Algeria, see for instance Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism", Third World Quarterly, vol 10, no 2, April 1988, ρ 566, Kate Zebin, ' Islamic Revival in Algeria An Overview", The Muslim World, vol 83, nos 3 4, July October 1993, pp 205-206

14 the Soviets in Afghanistan. As these efforts proved a good opportunity for Saudi Arabia to show its piety by propagating jihad and for the United States to fight its Cold War Soviet enemy by proxy, both countries financially supported the Afghan Arabs.59 Instrumental in the Arab efforts to liberate Afghanistan was a Palestinian Muslim Brother called 'Abdallah 'Azzam (1941-1989). Having worked in Saudi Arabia as a lecturer at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Jeddah, where he taught the young Osama bin Laden, he became impressed by stories of Arab jihad fighters (mufähidün) from Afghanistan and decided to move to Peshawar in Pakistan. There, he set up the so-called Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidmât, MAK) to facilitate and organise the Arabs coming to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Through MAK, an international network of Arab fighters was built that included Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and would later serve as the basis of what would become known as al-Qa'ida.M It should be pointed out that the Arab Afghans were not a homogeneous group of fighters. Some, like Bin Laden, had a Wahhabi (and thus Salafi) background while others, including 'Azzam himself, were part of the non-Salafi Muslim Brotherhood. As will become clear in chapters 2 and 3, there are significant differences in how Islamic ideologues view jihad and these differences were also present among mufähidün in Afghanistan. They concentrated on questions such as whether the mufähidün should focus on Afghanistan or also direct their efforts towards fighting their own regimes back home. Within these disputes, Osama bin Laden, whose great wealth quickly propelled him to an important position among Afghan Arabs, increasingly tended to side with the latter position, propounded by Ayman al-Zawahiri amongst others, at the expense of his support for 'Azzam, who held the former view. Bin Laden's and al-Zawahiri's trend was further strengthened when 'Azzam was assassinated in 1989, shortly after the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan.61 After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the conflict in Afghanistan did not stop but continued for some years between various Afghan factions, sometimes with the help of Arabs. Around this time and in the next few years, many Afghan Arabs decided to go home

59 Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan", in: William Malley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, New York: New York University Press, pp. 117-119; Kepel, Jihad, pp. 136-144; Barnett Rubin, "Arab Islamists in Afghanistan", in: Esposito (ed.), Politicai, pp. 184-189. 60 Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 72-75; Kepel Jihad, pp. 144-148; Bernard Rougier, "Le Jihad en Afghanistan et l'émergence du salafisme-jihadisme", in: Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que, pp. 67-68. 61 Gunaratna, Inside, pp. 29-36; Rougier, "Jihad", pp. 77-80. For more on the conflicts among the Arab Afghans, see Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians m Lebanon (transi. Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 76-84.

15 again Despite (or probably because of) the fact that their countries had often not only allowed but even encouraged them to go to Afghanistan, they were not welcomed back Although the experiences of the Afghan Arabs returning to their home countries cannot be generalised, it is clear that many of them failed to reintegrate into society and joined militant Jihadi-Salafi groups62 As we will see later on, this experience proved to be of great importance in determining al-Maqdisi's influence.

The Gulf War and Beyond

Apart from the important phenomenon of the returning Afghan Arabs, the late 1980s and early 1990s were an eventful time across the globe The Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, effectively ending the Cold War. In the Arab world, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation - the intifada - started in 1987 while the Iran-Iraq war that had been waged throughout the 1980s came to a halt in 1988. Although most Arab countries had supported Iraq in this war, the country had been dealt some heavy blows, including financially Since neighbouring Kuwait was flooding the market with cheap oil, thereby rendering Iraq unable to get back on its feet financially through its own oil profits, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn decided to invade the country This started another military conflict in the Persian Gulf, with an international coalition made up of Arab and Western armies succeeding in liberating Kuwait again Before that, however, Saudi Arabia decided to invite 500,000 U S soldiers to protect itself against any possible attempt by Iraq to invade that country too.

Both the relatively easy way in which the international coalition led by the United States, which only a few years before had supported Iraq in its war with Iran, pushed back Saddam Husayn's army as well as the Saudi decision to allow half a million U.S soldiers on its soil led to a profound shock in the Arab world. International military intervention in a region that witnessed colonialism not so long ago as well as the important role the United States - widely seen as complicit in Israel's treatment of the Palestinians - played in all of

62 Mohammed M Hafez, " Jihad After Iraq Lessons from the Arab Afghans Phenomenon", CTC Sentinel, vol 1, no 4, March 2008, pp 1 4 For individual examples of groups where Arab Afghans played a large role, see for instance id, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria", Middle East Journal, vol 54, no 4, 2000, pp 572 591, especially ρ 574, Beverley Milton Edwards, "Climate of Change in Jordan's Islamist Movement", in Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds ), Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder, Col Westview Press, 1996, pp 123 142, especially pp 127 130

16 this caused anger and resentment among many Arabs, including Islamists.63 The reactions of Islamist movements in the Arab world to the Gulf War and the events surrounding it were diverse and often had to take into account that support for Saddam Husayn - widespread among the people in general - could lead to a decline in funding from countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.64 In the latter country itself, however, the Gulf War and particularly the presence of U.S. soldiers on Saudi soil, sparked protests and the beginning of a strong opposition movement that - in its more radical forms - went so far as to deny the legitimacy of the Saudi regime.65 Although the impact of the Gulf War was probably less strong in other Arab countries than in Saudi Arabia, it stimulated further resentment against the West and certain Arab regimes. The extent to which this has influenced the development of radical Islam in the Arab world is unclear. It may well, however, have abetted the greater religiosity and Salafi conservatism as a result of the decline of Nasser's Arab socialism after 1967 and the spread of Wahhabism as well as the increased radicalisation through the publications of Qutb and the return of the Afghan Arabs mentioned above. The latter factors certainly played a role in creating or developing Jihadi-Salafi movements (i.e. groups that combined Salafi ideas with jihad against their own regimes) in countries such as Jordan66, Morocco67, Egypt and Algeria. Through a combination of radical ideology and government repression, movements such as the Egyptian Jama'a Islamiyya and the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat got involved in a military conflict with their governments, leading to widespread arrests and thousands of casualties.68 The heavy fighting between the Arab states and the Jihadi-Salafi movements thus resulted in many members of the latter either ending up in prison or being killed. There was a third group of militants, however, who left their home countries - some for the

63 James Piscatori, "Religion and Realpolitik' Islamic Responses to the Gulf War", in James Piscatori (ed.), islamic Fundamentalisms and the GulfCnsis, Chicago: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991, pp. 3-18. M For a good overview of Islamist reactions to the Gulf War, see Piscatori (ed.), Islamic. 65 For an in-depth treatment of the Saudi opposition after the Gulf War, see chapters 4 and 5. 66 The radicalisation of movements in Jordan will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 8 and 9 67 See for example Abdessamad Dialmy, "Le Terrorisme Islamiste au Maroc", Sona/ Compass, vol 52, no. 1,2005, pp 67-82. 68 For the Egyptian Jama'a Islamiyya's fight with the government, see Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt", Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 1,1995, pp. 19-24; Meyer, "Commanding", pp. 207-208; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, "Violence", pp 77-80. On the various movements in Algeria and their bloody battle with the state, see Hafez, "Armed", pp. 584-591, li, "From Marginahzation to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria", in: Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic, pp. 37-60; International Crisis Group, /slamism. Violence and Reform m Algeria. Turning the Page, ICG Middle East Report no 29, Cairo & Brussels, 30 July 2004, pp 10-17; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Centrifugal Tendencies in the Algerian Civil War", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol 23, no. 3, 2001, pp. 65-82.

17 second time - for Afghanistan. This country had become an attractive alternative to the repression at home since the strict regime of the Taliban began its rule there in 1996.m One of the militants who moved to Afghanistan again was Osama bin Laden. He had gone back to his home country Saudi Arabia after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan but left again in 1992 to participate in the Islamic revolution in Sudan. When U.S. and Saudi pressure on Sudan mounted to expel Bin Laden, who had in the meantime become a terrorism suspect and had his Saudi passport revoked in 1994 for his criticism of his home country, the Sudanese regime asked him to leave. He then left for Afghanistan again with his entourage and eventually set up the global jihad organisation we now know as al-Qa'ida on the basis of the MAK he had abandoned earlier.70 After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, for which al-Qa'ida was responsible, the United States launched a war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which refused to hand over Bin Laden. This conflict kicked off what would become known as the American-led "war on terror" and was followed by a military attack against Iraq in 2003 on the basis of that country's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and its supposed ties to al-Qa'ida. These wars and the widespread and increased resentment against the U.S. they brought about again led many Arabs to move to Afghanistan and this time also Iraq to fight the invading American and other Western armies, just like others had done in the 1980s. Several of the groups these men set up, as well as certain existing organisations, eventually "joined" al-Qa'ida by presenting themselves as local affiliates of the mother organisation in Afghanistan/Pakistan, taking on names such as "al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers"71, "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula"72 and "al-Qa'ida in the Islamic

69 For more on the Taliban, see for instance M J Gohari, The Taliban; Ascent to Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; William Malley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, New York: New York University Press, 2001 [1998]; Peter Marsden, The Taliban. War and Religion m Afghanistan, London & New York: Zed Books, 2002, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism m Central Asia, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000. '0 Manam Abou Zahab & Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pahstan Connection (transi. John King), New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 13-18,48-53; Rashid, Taliban, pp. 133-140. For a description of the history, travels and ideology of al-Qâ'ida from the point of view of one of its leaders, see Ayman al-Zawâhirî, Fursôn tafitaRôyatal-Nabr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 May 2010), η d. 71 See for example Atwan, Secret, pp. 179-218. 72 See for example ibid., pp. 150-178. Al-Qa ida on the Arabian Peninsula is dealt with in more detail in chapter 5.

18 Maghrib"73. These organisations seem to represent the latest stage in the development of Jihadi-Salafism in the Arab world.74

Jihadi-Salafi Ideologues

Jihadi-Salafism, as it developed in the Arab world over the past decades, was thus directly or indirectly influenced by events such as the revolutions in Egypt and Iran, the wars in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, as well as by ideological trends such as the spreading of Wahhabism and the ideas of Qutb. Apart from the latter, it is not clear what role individual ideologues have played in the development of Jihadi-Salafism. Since this highly ideological movement constantly seeks guidance and justification in the writings of its scholars, it is interesting to see what influence some of these people have had. Apart from the enormous media attention that some militant leaders have been given, several more serious publications have appeared about them too, such as about Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi75 and, of course, Osama bin Laden76. Among Jihadi-Salafi ideologues, however, only the al-Qa"ida strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri77 and the first leader of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula, Yusuf al-'Uyayri78, have been dealt with in detail. Writings dealing with al-Maqdisi, in spite of his influence, usually only focus on his relationship with al- Zarqawi7', specific aspects of his ideology*0 or his alleged revisionism in later years."

73 See for example Amel Boubekeur, Sola/ism and Radical Politics in Postcon/ïict Algeria, Carnegie Papers no. 11, Washington, D.C. etc.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2008, pp 9-13. 74 There are, of course, also organisations that are clearly Jihadi-Salafi in nature but do not necessarily claim the name of al-Qâ'ida, such as the Jihadi-Salafis in Lebanon. See for example Rougier, Everyday; id., "Fatah al- Islam: Un Réseau Jihadiste au Cœur des Contradictions Libanaises", in: Rougier (ed ), Qu'est-ce que, pp. 179-210 75 Jean-Charles Bnsard, Zarqawi: The New Face ofAl-Qaeda, New York: Other Press, 2005; Fu ad Husayn, Al- Zarqäm: Al-yil al-TJiänfli-l-Qä'ida, Beirut: Dar al-Khayyäl, 2005; Loretta Napoleoni, insurgent Iraq. Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stones Press, 2005. 76 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.- Inside The Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York Free Press, 2002, id., The Osama bin Leden ί Know: An Oral History ofAl-Qaeda's Leader, New York: Free Press, 2006 77 See the publications by Brynjar Lia on al-Sürl, including Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life ofal- Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Sun, London: Hurst & Co., 2007; id., '"Destructive Doctrmairians': Abu Mus'ab al Sun's Cntique of the Salafis in thejihadi Current", in: Meyer (ed.), Global, pp. 281-300. 71 Roel Meijer, "Che Guevara van de Jihad: Yusuf al-Ayin", ZemZem. Tijdschrift over het Midden-Oosten, Noord- AfriL· en Islam, vol 3, no l,2007,pp 126-131; id., "Re-Reading al-Qaeda: Wntings of Yusuf al-Ayin",/S/M Review, no. 18,2006, pp. 16-17; id., "Yûsuf al-'Uyairî and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 47,2007, nos. 3-4, pp. 422-459; id., "Yusuf al-Uyain and the Transnationahsation of Saudi Jihadism", in. Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom, pp 221-243. 79 Anouar Boukhars, "The Challenge of Terronsm and Religious Extremism in Jordan", Strategic Insights, vol. 5, no 4, Apnl 2006; Bnsard, Zarqawi, pp. 17-21,33-51; Steven Brooke, "The Preacher and the Jihadi," in: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqam & Eric Brown (eds.), Current Trends in islamist Ideology, vol 3, Washington D.C : Hudson Institute, 2006, pp 52-66; Gerges, Far, pp. 261-263; Hafez, Suicide, pp. 172-173; Husayn, Al-ZarqawF, pp 11-15, 101-114; Nibras Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation· Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi," in. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqam & Eric Brown (eds.), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol 2, Washington D.C. Hudson Institute 2005, pp. 59-73; Napoleoni, insurgent, pp. 50-77.

19 Publications dealing with his ideology as a whole are rare and do not focus on his influence and how this should be explained.82 Several authors have dealt with al-Maqdisi's influence on the Islamist opposition in Saudi Arabia but only in a very narrow way and, since it was not the focus of their research, just very superficially." In short, despite his widely acknowledged importance, there is a huge gap in the current academic literature on al-Maqdisi's influence on Jihadi-Salafis and how this can be explained. This study tries to fill this gap by focussing precisely on these issues. In doing so, I make use of the theoretical literature on "framing", a concept derived from Social Movement Theory, to which we must now turn.

Theoretical framework, methodology and sources

Framing

The past few years have seen an increasing number of publications devoted to social movements in the Muslim world analysed with the use of Social Movement Theory (SMT). More a collection of theoretical concepts than a clear-cut theory per se, SMT has existed for decades and has, in various forms, been used to analyse numerous American and European social movements84, including transnational ones85, as well as those in the Arab world86. One wJoas Wagemakers, "Defining the Enemy: Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisfs Radical Reading of Sûrat al- Mumtahana", Die Welt des /slams, vol. 48, nos. 3-4,2008, pp. 348-371; id., "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wda' νια-1-Βατα' in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi", in: Meyer (ed.), Global, pp. 81-106. 81 James Brandon, "Jordan's Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison", Terrorism Monitor, vol. 6, no 7,3 April 2008, pp. 3-6; Murad al-Shisham, "The Neo-Zarqawists: Divisions Emerge between Jordan's Salafist Militants", Terrorism Focus, vol. 5, no. 39,19 November 2008; Joas Wagemakers, "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism Asset?", CTC Sentinel, vol. 1, no. 6, May 2005, pp. 7-9; id., "Invoking Zarqawi: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihad Deficit", CTC Sentinel, vol. 2, no. 6, June 2006, pp. 14-17; id., "Protectingjihad m the 21sl Century: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices", in: Amsseh van Engeland & Ahmed Dawoody (eds.) Jihad in the Zl* Century (forthcoming 82 Dirk Baehr, Kontinuität und Wandei m der ideologie desJihadi-Salafìsmus. Eine ideentheoretische Analyse der Schriften von Abu Mus'ab al-Sun, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi und Abu Bakr ΛΓα;ι, Bonn: Bouvier, 2009, pp. 117-136; Ahmad Husnï, "Qira a fi Kitäb Imtä' al-Nazarf!KashfShubhät Murji'at al-'Asr", Al-Misbär, no. 5, May 2007, pp. 167- 173; Tähir al-Sharqâwî, "Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisî... Thunä'iyyat al-Muqaddas wa-l-'Unf', Al-Misbär, no. 5, May 2007, pp 131-143; Nelly Lahoud, "In Search of Philosopher-Jihadis. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihadi Philosophy", Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 10, no. 2, 2009, pp. 205-220; Joas Wagemakers, '"De Godfather van de Jihad': Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi", ZemZem: Tijdschrift over het Midden-Oosten, Noord- Afhka en Islam, vol. 3, no. 3,2007, pp. 79-85; id., "A 'Punst Jihadi-Salafi': The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, August 2009, pp. 283-299. 83 Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia. The Story of Juhayman al- 'Utaybi Revisited", /ntemational Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1,2007, pp. 115-116; Al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp. 121-125. " Major works on SMT dealing with Western movements include Donatella della Porta & Mano Diani, Sonai Movements: An Introduction, Malden, Mass. etc • Blackwell Publishing, 2006 [1999]; William A. Gamson, Talking Politics, Cambridge etc • Cambridge University Press, 1992; Bert Klandermans & Suzanne Staggenborg (eds.).

20 aspect of SMT that is particularly useful and relevant for this study, since it deals with ideas and how people are influenced by them, is "framing". The term is derived from "frames", a concept that refers to the "schemata of interpretation" that allow "its users to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms".87 In other words, frames are prisms through which people view, explain and interpret themselves and the rest of the world and that colour and influence their perceptions. The concept of "framing" was incorporated into SMT by scholars such as Gamson88 and Snow & Benford. The latter in particular pointed out in great detail that social movements and other contentious actors often portray events and people - particularly their adversaries89 - in a certain way so as to draw people's attention, arouse their interest and - ideally - get them involved in action for a certain cause. Successful efforts by movements or other contentious actors to make their own frames resonate with any particular audience are referred to as "frame resonance" or "frame alignment".'0 It is

Methods of Social Movement Research, Minneapolis & London· University of Minnesota Press, 2002; Ennque Larafta, Hank Johnston & Joseph R. Gusfield (eds ), New Sona/ Movements. From Ideology to Identity, Philadelphia- Temple University Press, 1994; Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1999 [1982]; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer Ν Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Socio/ Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1994] 85 See for instance Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi & Dieter Rucht (eds.), Social Movements m a Globa/izmg World, London etc. MacMillan, 1999; Donatella della Porta & Sidney Tarrow (eds.), Transnational Protest & Global Activism, Lanham, Maryland etc.: Rowman & Uttlefield, 2005; Kevin McDonald, Global Movements: Action and Culture, Maiden, Mass. etc.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006; Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge etc.. Cambridge University, 2005. " See for example Asef Bayat, "Islanusm and Social Movement Theory", Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 6, 2005, pp 891 908; Jeroen Gunning, Hamas m Politics· Democracy, Religion, Violence, London: Hurst & Co., 2007; Hafez, Why, Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization. Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 4,2001, pp. 487-510; Came Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing /slam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, New York etc.: Columbia University Press, 2002; Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic. " Erving Goffrnan, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience, New York etc • Harper & Row, 1974, p. 21. M See for example William A. Gamson, Bruce Fireman & Steven Rytina, Encounters with Unjust Authority, Homewood, 111.· The Dorsey Press, 1982; Gamson, Talking. " The literature even speaks of "adversarial framing" or "boundary framing", meant to draw a clear distinction between the framers and their adversanes but also to underline their own views and identities. See for example Gamson, Toltang, pp. 85-107; William A. Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest", in: Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans (eds.). Social Movements and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, pp. 99-102, Bert Klandermans, Marga de Weerd, Jose-Manuel Sabucedo & Maria Costa, "Injustice and Adversarial Frames in a Supranational Political Context: Farmers' Protest in the Netherlands and Spain", in: Delia Porta, Knesi & Rucht (eds.), Social, pp. 134-147; Ira Silver, "Constructing 'Social Change' Through Philanthropy Boundary Framing and the Articulation of Vocabularies of Motives for Social Movement Participation", Sociological Inquiry, vol. 67, no. 4,1997, pp 488-503. K See for example David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation", American Sociological Review, vol 51, August 1986, pp. 464-481; David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization", in: Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Knesi &

21 obvious that this is an important factor for people to join a movement or follow a certain person. Frames should preferably be broad so as to appeal to as large a group as possible but also incorporate concepts that resonate with people's beliefs. Framers therefore often make use of aspects of people's culture to achieve frame resonance. One author, in an oft-cited article, even refers to culture as a '"tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals, and world views" from which framers can take various aspects to make their ideas resonate." Consequently, aspects of culture, religion or other values that people hold dear are often used in framing by movements and actors as diverse as pro- and anti-abortion groups'2, white supremacists", environmentalists94 and pro-democracy protesters95, among many others. In the case of Islamist groups and ideologues, framers obviously make use of Islam a lot. Such frames have included the Palestinian Hamas' view that the conflict with Israel can only be dealt with through Islam ("Islam is the solution")96 or that the Palestinians were actually fighting not just a state but a world-wide Jewish conspiracy.97 Other examples include military conflicts in Muslim countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan, which are framed by some Islamic ideologues as not just political issues but actually attacks on Islam itself.98 Despite the fact that framing is all about ideas, it should not be equated or confused with ideology. Whereas the term "ideology" - whose definition is certainly not agreed upon99 - refers to a more or less complex system of ideas and concepts that are at least to a

Sidney Tarrow (eds.), Internationa! Social Movement Research, VoL 1. From Structure to Action - Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, Greenwich, Conn. & London: JAI Press, 1988, pp. 197-217. " Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies", American Sociological Review, vol 51, April 1986, p. 273. For an in-depth treatment of the role of culture in social movements, see Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 92 See for example John H Evans, "Multi-Organizational Fields and Social Movement Organization Frame Content: The Religious Pro-choice Movement", Sociological Inquiry, vol. 67, no. 4, November 1997, pp. 451-469; Deana A. Rohhnger, "Framing the Abortion Debate: Organizational Resources, Media Strategies, and Movement-Countermovement Dynamics", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 43, no 4, pp 479-507 93 See for example Mitch Berbner, '"Half the Battle': Cultural Resonance, Framing Processes, and Ethnic Affectations in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric", Sonai Problems, vol. 45, no. 4, November 1998, pp 431-450. 91 See for example Stella M. Capek, "The 'Environmental Justice' Frame· A Conceptual Discussion and an Application", Social Problems, vol. 40, no. 1, February 1993, pp 5-24. 95 See for example Jiping Zuo & Robert D. Benford, "Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1,1995, pp. 131-156. 96 This slogan was originally coined by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Hamas is part of. 97 Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement", in Wiktorowicz (ed.), islamic, pp 130-132. 98 joas Wagemakers, "Framing the Threat to Islam': Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara' in Salafi Discourse", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no 4,2008, pp 1-22 99 See for example Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; John Gemng, "Ideology A Definitional Analysis", Political Research Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 4, December 1997, pp. 957-994. See also Teun A van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisaplmary Approach, London etc.: SAGE Publications, 1998, particularly pp. 8-9,49,56-57,81-82,126-130, where Van Dijk's definition of ideology seems to have more in common with what scholars of framing refer to as "frames".

22 certain extent interconnected, frames are much simpler, as the examples given above show. Moreover, frames are flexible and adaptable and can be highly successful in some situations but utterly fail in others. The example of Islam being framed as "under attack" mentioned above, for example, undoubtedly draws part of its popularity from the fact that several Muslim countries are involved in military conflicts with non-Muslim states. One can imagine that the same frame would be far less resonant in the absence of such conflicts and the daily media attention for them.100 It is this reciprocal relationship between ideas on the one hand and the political and socio-economic context in which they are spread on the other that makes the framing perspective so usefial for this study and preferable to treating ideas as relatively static ideologies devoid of any contextual influence. Although scholars of framing are divided amongst themselves about where to draw the line between a frame and an ideology101, it seems clear that the latter refers to a deeper and more detailed set of ideas than the shallow frames used by contentious actors trying to market their cause. Frames, as one author has put it, "represent the popular, bumper-sticker version of the broader ideology" of which "snippets" can become known by followers102, who often only adopt (or reject) an ideology at a later stage. Since this study deals with the influence of al-Maqdisi - an ideologue - and only to a far lesser extent with movements as a whole, the concept of framing, which focuses precisely on how and why ideas resonate or fail to do so, is very suitable.

Methodology

The concept of framing will further be explained in the relevant chapters dealing with different aspects of this theory. The concept as a whole, however, will be used to answer the

'°0 See for example Brynjar Lia, "Al-Qaida's Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points", Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 8, pp. 3-10, especially pp. 2-3. The idea that Islam itself is indeed under attack is widespread among people in the Muslim world See for example the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Views of a Changing World. How Global Publics View War m Iraq, Democracy, Islam and Governance, Globa/ization, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/l85.pdf (accessed 12 March 2010),June2003,p.46. 101 For a good discussion on this by some of the main contributors to the theoretical development on framing, see Pamela E Oliver & Hank Johnston, "What a Good idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research", Mobilization, vol. 5, no. 1,2000, pp. 37-54; David A. Snow & Robert D Benford, "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology m the Study of Social Movements: A Comment on Ob ver and Johnston", Mobilization, vol. 5, no. 1, 2000, pp. 55-60; Hank Johnston & Pamela E. Oliver, "Reply to Snow and Benford", Mobilization, vol. 5, no. 1,2000, pp 61 63. See also David L. Westby, "Strategic Imperative, Ideology, and Frames", in. Hank Johnston &JohnA Noakes (eds.), Frames of Protest Sonai Movements and the Framing Perspective, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, pp 217-235. 102 Robinson, "Hamas", p. 129.

23 main question this study poses, namely: Why has al-Maqdisi been so influential on the Jihadi-Salafi movement? To answer this question, we must first find out what al-Maqdisi's influence has been. To learn the extent of al-Maqdisi's influence on others, I first made use of search engines on Jihadi-Salafi websites such as www.tawhed.ws to find out what authors cite al- Maqdisi's works or name him as an important scholar. I subsequently analysed the content and origin of these citations. Presuming that not all people who have been influenced by al- Maqdisi have actually mentioned him or his works by name, I also employed another method that entailed finding out what (if anything) makes al-Maqdisi's writings unique. I subsequently tried to find the concepts, ideas or arguments first or only formulated in al- Maqdisi's works in the writings of other scholars. Although this method is not 100% secure, I have found scholars whose books do not mention al-Maqdisi or his writings by name but have nevertheless most probably been influenced by him. It is very well possible that al-Maqdisi's influence is greater than the research based on the methodology described above shows. This partly has to do with the obvious impossibility of talking to each and every person who might possible have read al-Maqdisi's books but it also has to do with the fact that people may be influenced by aspects of his writings that are not uniquely his. If, in such a case, they do not mention him or his writings by name, it is impossible for a researcher to conclude on the basis of these texts alone whether any influence of al-Maqdisi has taken place. Although suspicions in this direction may be confirmed by further research in the form of interviews, the subject of this study - a branch of Islam whose most important adherents are often dead, imprisoned or in highly inaccessible places - makes that unlikely too. After having established what al-Maqdisi's influence has been, we can try to answer the question as to why al-Maqdisi has been influential. The method employed here was to start with an extensive reading of the literature on framing so as to establish what constitutes a good and successful frame, when frame alignment can be expected and what techniques framers use to achieve this. I then moved on to al-Maqdisi's writings to try and find these characteristics and features there. After I identified the factors in his writings that, according to framing theory, would be decisive in determining the frame's and the framer's influence, I checked the validity of these claims with - where and when possible - (former) followers of al-Maqdisi, his direct students, former fellow inmates, his friends,

24 acquaintances and opponents as well as al-Maqdisi himself to find out whether these factors were indeed the causal factors of his influence, as framing theory suggests.

Sources

Apart from the extensive secondary literature, magazine- and newspaper articles on radical Islam in the Arab world, the sources used in this study consist firstly of the writings of al- Maqdisi himself, as found on his website, as well as the writings of many other (Jihadi-) Salafis that have either been influenced by him or are important for other reasons. Most of these sources are in Arabic but some are also in English and include books, articles, communiqués, letters, sermons and fatwas. A second source used for this study consists of some forty semi-structured personal interviews with Arab journalists covering radical Islam, opponents as well as (former) followers of al-Maqdisi, his direct students, his former cellmates, friends, acquaintances and al-Maqdisi himself. These interviews were conducted in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, England and Lebanon as well as by phone or e-mail in the period 2008-2009. Some of these interviewees have been interviewed many times before by researchers - although not with regard to al- Maqdisi specifically - while others have (as far as I know) never been interviewed for this purpose before. Considering the fact that the ideological backgrounds of the interviewees differ from radical Islamist to anti-Islamist, from deeply religious to highly secular and from academic to uneducated, it is interesting to see that each of them have, from their own perspective, contributed to a coherent and consistent image of al-Maqdisi and his influence, as we will see.

Overview of this Study

In trying to answer the question why al-Maqdisi has been so influential in Part I, I will first give an overview of his life and the development of his identity as a scholar in chapter 1. This shows that the notion of a "quietist Jihadi-Salafi" - central to this study's explanation for al-Maqdisi's influence - can clearly be discerned from the people and writings that influenced him. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with al-Maqdisi's ideology and its application in today's Muslim world respectively, both viewed in the context of the larger spectrum of radical Islamic ideologues. This shows that al-Maqdisi, although he is certainly not the only

25 Jihadi-Salafì ideologue, can fully be seen as a radical thinker in many respects but differs from others in his closeness to the quietist Salafi 'aqîda and manhaj, thereby justifying the label "quietist Jihadi-Salafì". As mentioned, it would be impossible for any researcher to try to find each and every person who has been influenced by al-Maqdisi, analyse what this influence has been and why it has taken place. The barriers of language (Urdu, Pashto, Dari, Indonesian, Persian etc.), time and, of course, money are simply too great for any one researcher to overcome. This study therefore concentrates on those areas where al-Maqdisi's influence has been most pronounced, namely the Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia, the development of the concept of al-walä' wa-l-bara (loyalty and disavowal) and the Jihadi-Salafì movement in Jordan. As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, al-Maqdisi's influence has been greater than only in these areas, stretching in fact from the West to Indonesia. There is little reason, however, to assume that in all those other places, al-Maqdisi has been much more than simply one of a number of scholars considered very important. In the areas treated in the more or less chronologically arranged chapters 4 to 9, on the other hand, al- Maqdisi has had a significant impact. Part II deals with al-Maqdisi's influence on the Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia in the period 1989 to 2005. This period, beginning with his book Al-Kawashìfal-Jaliyya fì Kiifr al- Dawla al-Sa'udiyya in 1989 and ending with the fall of the Saudi branch of al-Qa'ida in 2005, saw a rising influence of al-Maqdisi's writings after the Gulf War in 1990. In chapter 4,1 show that al-Maqdisi's writings had a limited impact on the ideological underpinnings of the protests caused by this war but, as we will see in chapter 5, were highly influential on al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula in 2003-2005.1 argue that this can be explained by al- Maqdisi's timely contribution to the shocks caused by the Gulf War but mostly by his excellent framing that - though clearly jihadi in nature - seemed tailor-made for a Saudi audience raised on the quietist writings of the Wahhabi tradition. Part III of this study traces al-Maqdisi's influence on the concept of al-wdä' wa-!-barä' from 1984 onwards, the year when his important book Miüat Ibrahim was written. Chapter 6 shows what al-Maqdisi's exact contribution has been to the idea that it is inadmissible to ask non-Muslims for help, particularly at a time of war (ai-istiana bi-Mcu^ur), an important aspect of αί-walä' wa-l-bara. Chapter 7 makes clear how al-Maqdisi has made an original contribution to the concept of al-walä' wa-l-bara by interpreting it in a legislative way. I argue that his influence in this respect can be explained by pointing respectively to al-

26 Maqdisi's cleverly framed arguments, which are often very close to those of quietist Salafis, and his easy framing efforts as a result of having an audience that shares virtually all of his views. Part IV, finally, deals with al-Maqdisi's influence on the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi community from the time he moved to that country in 1992 until 2009. His impact on this community can be found in his personal role as an important shaykh (chapter 8) and his specific writings against the Jordanian regime, quietist Salafis and those al-Maqdisi claims go to extremes in applying takfir (chapter 9). This can be explained, I argue, by respectively looking at his ability to provide an ideological foundation for a budding Jihadi-Salafi community in disarray in the early 1990s and his strong position in so-called framing disputes with the state and quietist Salafis. At the same time, however, his inability to frame his criticism of extremists in such a way as to achieve widespread frame resonance caused some to abandon and discard his ideas. The notion of al-Maqdisi being a "quietist Jihadi-Salafi" is the thread running through all these chapters as the main explanation for al-Maqdisi's influence and his lack thereof. This is dealt with throughout the quarter century between 1984 and 2009. Since this study focuses on al-Maqdisi's influence as an ideologue rather than his life, the former year was chosen because that is when al-Maqdisi wrote his first important book, Mil/at Ibrahim. The latter year was chosen as I wanted to include events taking place in 2009.

27 28 Part I: Al-Maqdm's Life and his Place in thejihadi Ideological Spectrum, 1959-2009

29 30 Chapter Τ : Wavering between Quietism and Jihadism

"He is Abu Muhammad 'Asim b. Muhammad b. Tahir al-Barqawi, known as al-Maqdisi, of 'Utaybi descent, from the village of Barqa in the district of Nablus."1

As straightforward as these words may sound, they bring up a lot of questions. If al-Maqdisi was born in Barqa (also pronounced as Burqa), a small village on the West Bank, why does he call himself "al-Maqdisi" (the Jerusalemite)? Moreover, if he is Palestinian - whether from Barqa or from Jerusalem - how can he claim to be 'Utaybi (i.e. of the central Arabian 'Utayba tribe? In fact, why does he mention this at all? Such questions show that the quote mentioned above is not as simple as it seems. In fact, Al-Maqdisi's name is exemplary of his life in general in the sense that much of it is unknown in the existing information about him. As we will see in chapter 5, however, seemingly trivial things such as al-Maqdisi's name and descent proved to be quite important to certain people.2 This chapter starts with al-Maqdisi's childhood years in the West Bank and Kuwait, before moving on to the important period of his life spent studying in Saudi Arabia and writing and teaching in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Finally, we will focus on the period since 1992, when al-Maqdisi moved to Jordan, where he still lives, and started becoming the major radical ideologue he is today. This chapter concentrates on the first fifty years of al- Maqdisi's life (1959-2009) and shows that his quietisi Jihadi-Salafism is a position that he slowly but surely acquired through multiple and rather diverse Islamic sources.

Al-Maqdisi's childhood years

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was born in 1959 as 'Isam al-Barqawi. He later took on the name 'Asim instead of 'Isam because he preferred it.3 His nisba", however, has proved most

1 These were the first words of al-Maqdisîs biography on his website www.tawhed.ws until January or February 2009. Quickly after that, his biography was drastically expanded - quite possibly as a response to the many questions I asked al-Maqdisi about his life - to include more details about his childhood and life in general. 2 It is perhaps interesting to note that when the Amencan human rights organisation Human Rights Watch was appealing to the Jordanian regime to release al-Maqdisî because he had not been formally accused of anything, they repeatedly referred to him as "al-'Utaibi" m a manner that suggests they believed this to be his real name. See for example Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Letter to Jordanian Prune Minister Dahabi on Detention of'Isam aî-'t/taibi (Abu Muhammad ai-Maqdtsi), www.hrw.org, 4 December 2007; id., Arbitrary Arrest and Detention of'Isam αί-'Utaibi (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi) www.hrw.org, n.d (both were accessed 11 January 2008) 3 See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Liqa mm KhalafQadbân al-Murtaddïn "Sana 1418", www tawhed ws (accessed 3 March 2007), 1997, p. 2. The reasons he prefers 'Äsim to 'Isam are that the former was also the name of several

31 puzzling to many, particularly in combination with his claim that he is also 'Utaybi.5 The answer lies in the fact that the 'Utayba tribe has two main branches, Barqa and Ruqa. The latter has a sub-branch called Hafi, to which al-Maqdisi belongs. He therefore is a descendent of the Ruqa branch of the 'Utayba tribe, not its Barqa branch. Al-Maqdisi's surname "al-Barqawi" is not of tribal but of geographical origin; it was derived from the village where he was born. The name "al-Maqdisi", finally, has nothing to do with his own origins but is simply a reference to the most important city nearest to where al-Maqdisi was born. Therefore, if one were to include all parts of al-Maqdisi's name, it would be Abu Muhammad 'Isam/'Asim b. Tahir b. Muhammad al-Barqawi al-Maqdisi al-Hafi al-Ruqi al- "Utaybi.6 Several families, including some of al-Maqdisi's ancestors, moved from Najd in Saudi Arabia to Barqa, just like the Sayf tribe from Yemen did. Because of the Arabian origin of these tribes, it has been suggested that Barqa is actually a Hanbali village in the midst of the overwhelmingly Shafi'i Palestinian region.7 Even if this is true, it did not affect al-Maqdisi, who remembers very little about his early childhood in Barqa. Growing up as the eldest child of a farmer with only one sister, his small family was initially quite poor and lived in a house with al-Maqdisi's grandfather. Their situation improved, however, because al- Maqdisi's father worked his way up financially to be a nurse in a hospital and the family were able to afford their own house.8 Only a few years after al-Maqdisi was born, the family moved to Kuwait to find work there.9

of the Prophet Muhammad's companions and that the latter used to be applied to both men and women Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisi, e-mail message to the author, 3 October 2009. 1 The term nisba in Arabic names refers to the connection between a person and his or her region, city or tnbe of origin, his or her school of law or school of thought. In al-Maqdisîs case, his name refers to Jerusalem. s Al-Maqdisi himself says that he has often been asked about this issue. Interview with Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009 6 ibid. This explanation by al-Maqdisî himself is confirmed by other people. Interviews with Mishârî al-Dhayidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008 See also Al-Sfiarq al-Awsat, 7 July 2005. 7 Interview with Fahad al-Shâfï, Riyadh, 11 November 2009. ' Interview with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009. 9 It is not entirely clear when exactly al-Maqdisî moved to Kuwait. In an interview conducted in 1996, he said he moved there when he was one-and-a-half. See Jamal Khâshuqjî & Yâsir Abü Hilâla, "Al-Manzar al-Fikrï li- Munaffidhînfijâr al-Riyäd: Al 'Unf Farïda, al-DImüqrätiyya Shirk!", Al-Wasat, no. 235, 29 July - 4 August 1996, p. 14 He told me, however, that he went there when he was three or four years old, which is also what the updated biography on his website says. Interview with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009

32 Growing up in Kuwait

Al-Maqdisi's family was part of a large group of Palestinians moving to Kuwait As a result of the 1948 war in Palestine, many Palestinians fled, were driven out or emigrated from their homeland and went into exile. Several hundreds of them, mostly highly educated professionals, ended up in Kuwait. Because their arrival coincided with the discovery of oil in Kuwait, they came to play a significant role in the Kuwaiti bureaucracy needed to cope with the country's newly-founded industry. A second wave of Palestinians came in the 1950s and early 1960s, which consisted mostly of uneducated labourers and farmers Palestinian immigration further increased when the country waived any visa requirements for Jordanians (including people from the West Bank, which was part of Jordan from 1948- 1967) in the late 1950s.10 The swelling numbers of Palestinian immigrants in Kuwait and the social change that took place as a result of their arrival eventually led to greater restrictions on immigration in the late 1960s, however Still, in 1970 there were more than 140,000 Palestinians in Kuwait.11 Twenty years later, when the decision by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to support Saddam Husayn during the Gulf War led to the mass expulsion of the Palestinians from Kuwait, their number had grown to 400,000, of whom 350,000 were Jordanians (including West Bankers) "

The arrival of the Barqawi family in Kuwait was part of the second wave of Palestinian immigrants. Al-Maqdisi's father eventually got a job at the Ministry of Health and the family were relatively well-off.13 Significantly, al-Maqdisi's parents were not very religious people. His mother, according to al-Maqdisi himself, only prayed very rarely and his father never prayed at all. It was therefore not his parents who inspired him to become more religious but his friends from the neighbourhood and school, with whom he went to the mosque to pray and listen to the Friday sermon. Al-Maqdisi himself states that this period, when he was a young teenager, was the start of his becoming religious14 Because of his growing religiosity, al-Maqdisi wanted to study Islam at the Islamic University of Medina, a renowned institute of Islamic learning. His parents, however,

10 Shafeeq Ghabra, "Palestinians in Kuwait The Family and the Politics of Survival", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol 17, no 2,1988, ρ 63, Ann M Lesch, "Palestinians in Kuwait" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol 20, no 4,1991, pp 42-43, Yann Le Troquer & Rozenn Hommery al-Oudat, "From Kuwait to Jordan The Palestinians' Third Exodus",Journalo/Palestme Studies, vol 28, no 3,1999, pp 37 38 11 Troquer & Hommery al Oudat, "Kuwait", ρ 38 12 Lamia Radi, "Les Palestiniens du Koweït en Jordanie", Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrelc, no 144, Apnl June 1994, ρ 55 13 Khashuqjï & Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar", ρ 14 14 Interview with al Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009

33 wanted him to study engineering or medicine. In the end, al-Maqdisi decided to leave Kuwait and go to former Yugoslavia. An originally Syrian scholar who was a great source of influence on al-Maqdisi in his teenage years in Kuwait, Muhammad Surur, had some Muslim friends at the University of Sarajevo and al-Maqdisi, together with two friends who graduated with him from secondary school, decided they would continue their studies there. They soon found out, however, that the classes would not be in English but in Serbian. Although the three boys did study that language for several months, they quickly realised that it was too difficult for them. Moreover, al-Maqdisi claims that the fact that women and girls were present and mingled with the men and boys at the university in Sarajevo was not to his liking at the time. He subsequently decided to go to the University of Mosul in Iraq to study biology.15 Although the language obviously proved to be no problem in Mosul, certain things had not changed. Al-Maqdisi was still not studying religion and he was again at a university where men and women sat together in classrooms. Moreover, the political climate in Iraq in the early 1980s was not very welcoming. In 1980, the war between Iraq and Iran started and when al-Maqdisi tried to get more acquainted with Islamist movements and ideology, he was once arrested for two days for "having Islamic books"'6. When he returned to Kuwait for a holiday and like-minded friends confronted him with their belief that it was forbidden to attend a university where men and women mingled freely, he therefore decided to quit his study and finally pursue his long-cherished dream: studying religion in Saudi Arabia.17

Becoming a Quietist Jihadi-Salafî

The Palestinian community of Kuwait in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, in which al-Maqdisi grew up and to which he returned after abandoning his studies in Iraq, was a highly politicised one, as may be expected of people who partly arrived as a result of the conflict with Israel and were heavily influenced by the Kuwaiti branch of the PLO." The fact that most of them were not allowed to integrate into society and become Kuwaiti citizens

15 Ibid. " Khâshuqjî & Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar", p. 14. 17 Interview with al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009. 18 The large numbers of Palestinian refugees could not be absorbed by the regular Kuwaiti schools and therefore new, PLO-run schools had to be set up. Although they followed the Kuwaiti cumculum, they were almost exclusively run by Palestinians, resulting in a situation where Palestinian children were surrounded almost exclusively by other Palestinians See Mouin Rabbani, "The Making of a Palestinian Islamist Leader: An Interview with Khahd Mishal: Part I" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 37, no 3,2008, pp 62-63

34 probably also played a role in maintaining their strong Palestinian identity. Research among Palestinian children in Kuwait in the 1970s has shown that most of them saw themselves first and foremost as Palestinians - even if they had never actually been in Palestine - as well as that many had strong anti-Jewish feelings and a very pronounced love of their homeland." This patriotism and sense of being Palestinian could be found among the dominant Palestinian factions such as Fatah, but also among members of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait.20 This section deals with how al-Maqdisi developed from a Palestinian boy in this Kuwaiti context into a quietist Jihadi Salafi via his experiences in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Sowing the Seeds ofSalafism

Amidst the Kuwaiti Palestinians who had a strong love of their homeland, al-Maqdisi appears to have been somewhat of an exception. He never seems to have had a strong Palestinian identity - anathema to the strictly religious (as opposed to nationalist) ideas of Salafism - and openly admits that the Palestinian question plays only a marginal role in his writings at best.21 The mosque he attended when he was 16 or 17 years old was run by a group of people that included an Egyptian preacher called Hasan Ayyub and a man named Gharib Tawba, who were both in their 40s and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, the sermons of Ayyub were often about the alleged faults of Muslim rulers and politics in the Arab world. Al-Maqdisi liked this political message of an Islam critical of the rulers and slowly but surely came to believe that the regimes in the Muslim world were illegitimate and even "infidel" on the basis of what he saw as their less than perfectly Islamic rule and conduct.22 He was never really satisfied with Ayyub's Brotherhood- flavoured message, however, and slowly gravitated towards the more purist message of

" Tawfic E. Farah, "Political Socialization of Palestinian Children in Kuwait", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, July 1977, pp. 90-102. 20 Rabbani, "Making", pp. 63-66. 21 Interview with al-Maqdisi, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. As mentioned in the introduction, al-Maqdisi has spent more time writing about Palestinian issues since 2008 than he did before. This, however, can be attributed to the rise of Jihadi-Salafi groups in the Gaza Strip and Hamas' crackdown on them, not to a sudden revival of his Palestinian identity, which does not play a role in these writings. 22 A detailed treatment of why al-Maqdisï believes the regimes in the Muslim world to be un-Islamic is given in chapter 2.

35 Salafìsm.23 He found some of the answers he was looking for in the teachings of the aforementioned Muhammad Surur.21 Surur, whose full name is Muhammad Surur Zayn al-'Abidin, was one of the Muslim Brothers from Syria who fled the regime there in 1965 and went to Saudi Arabia, where he adopted a more Salafi approach and was instrumental in promoting a politicised version of Wahhabism in the kingdom.25 He left the country for Kuwait in 1973 and stayed there for ten years, when he moved to London and later to Jordan. While maintaining the politicised discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, Surur was influenced by Salafi scholars such as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and used some of their writings to criticise political rulers. He subsequently rejected the unquestioning loyalty of some Wahhabi scholars to the Saudi state but, significantly, also condemned attempts to overthrow regimes as he believed this would lead to civil strife (fitna).26 It was precisely Surur's combination of criticism of the political rulers, which would later feature so prominently in al-Maqdisi's own writings, and his use of some important Salafi sources that attracted al-Maqdisi. He was, however, looking for more than just a Salafi-inspired ideologue. Although al-Maqdisi now admits that Surur was the best he could find at that time, he later rejected the man's teachings.27 Instead, al-Maqdisi was hugely impressed by the purist message of Salafìsm but regretted the fact that it was so quietisi and refused excommunication (takfir) of the rulers. He was thus not completely satisfied and kept on studying and reading, looking for more Salafi answers than Surur's to the questions he had. In his search, he became acquainted with the radical but essentially non- Salafi writings of Sayyid Qutb. Al-Maqdisi admired Qutb's tak/Tr of the rulers and his call to fight jihad against them but at the same time acknowledged that Qutb made mistakes.28 He believed (and still believes), however, that many Salafis discarded Qutb's ideas simply because he was not a Salafi but failed to understand how valuable they are. While al-Maqdisi

23 For more on Salafìsm in Kuwait, see Carme Lahoud, "Koweït salafìsmes et rapports au pouvoir", in: Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que le scdafìsme?, Paris. Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, pp 123-135 M Interview with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009. 25 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (transi Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, Mass & London. Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 176-177. 26 Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge etc Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 73-77. 27 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009. 28 See for example al-Maqdisrs undated fatwa on Qutb, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Mq/mü' Fatâwâ 1-ShayWi Abu [sic] Muhammad al-Mcu/disf, η ρ : Mu'assasat Ard al-Ribât al-I'lâmiyya, 2007, pp. 105-106 The fatwa is also available on www tawhed.ws. See also Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisî, MTzân ai-i'tidâl/i'raqyrm Kitâb "Al-Mawnd al- Zulâl", www.tawhed.ws (accessed 22 January 2008), 2001 [1987] In this booklet, al-Maqdisi comments on Ai- Mawrid al-Zuläl fïl-Tanbîh 'alâ Akhta αί-Zilâl, a book by shaykh 'Abdallah b Muhammad al-Dawish that is critical of Qutb. Al Maqdisî agrees with some of al-Dawîsh's criticism of Qutb and disagrees with other points

36 shares some of the Salafi criticism of Qutb, such as that his arguments and reasoning as well as his clothes and appearance are not strictly Salafi, his own writings have come to the same conclusion as Qutb's - the rulers are infidels and their laws are un-Islamic - but they have been re-reasoned in a Salafi way." Al-Maqdisi was also influenced by the ideas of Juhayman al-'Utaybi's followers. Juhayman (d. 1980), the Saudi leader of the group of rebels that occupied the Grand Mosque of Mecca for two weeks in 1979, had developed a radical Salafi discourse that was, however, quite disorganised and, importantly, explicitly did not apply tak/ir to the rulers of Saudi Arabia30, with which al-Maqdisi disagreed.31 Other scholars with whom al-Maqdisi was acquainted in the late 1970s and early 1980s included Yusuf 'Id, Sami Dallai and the originally Egyptian political Salafi scholar Abu 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Abd al-Khaliq32. He had also become acquainted with the teachings of major Salafi scholars such as Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Baz (d. 1999) and found their books enlightening and extremely useful. Because of their politically quietist approach to religion, however, al-Maqdisi states that they did not succeed in providing him with the combination between full-blown Salafism and takfir of the rulers that he was looking for. It thus seems that all these names show that al-Maqdisi was trying to obtain knowledge from various Islamist and Salafi-oriented sources but failed to find exactly what he was looking for. His search would end when he finally made it to Saudi Arabia and stayed there for a year, a period he describes as "the most important period in my intellectual life" (ahamm fatraphayatìal-'ilmi), when he became - in his own words - "a real Salafi".33

25 Interviews with al-Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009 and al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 10 For more on Juhaymân al-'Utaybï and his group of rebels, see Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited", international Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1,2007, pp. 103-122; Joseph A. Kechichian, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia. Juhayman al-'Utaybi's 'Letters' to the Saudi People", The Muslim World, vol. 80, no. 1,1990, pp. 1- 16; Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca. The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shnne, New York: Anchor Books, 2007; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York: Knopf, 2007, pp. 88-94. For explicit rejections of tallir of the rulers by Juhayman, see Juhaymân b. Sayf al-'Utaybï, Risôlat al-lmâra wa-l- Bay'a wa-1-Tâ'a wa-Hukm TalbDs al-HuWdm aid Talabat al-'Hm wa-l-'Âmma, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 June 2009), n.d., pp. 9,12, 26. 31 Interview with al-Maqdisi, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawäshifal-Jahyyafi Kufral-Dawlaal-Sa'üdiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2000/2001 [1989], p. 188 32 For more on Abu 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Rahmân b. 'Abd al-Khâliq, see Lahoud, "Koweït", pp. 127-129 33 Interviews with al-Maqdisî, Amman 13 January 2009, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009.

37 Studying in Saudi Arabia

When al-Maqdisi quit his studies in Iraq, he decided to write letters to the major shaykhs in Saudi Arabia, asking them if he might be allowed to study at the Islamic University of Medina instead of war-torn Mosul where, al-Maqdisi wrote, he had to study with women." Although he was never officially accepted as a student, al-Maqdisi did eventually travel to Saudi Arabia for the 'Umra and the Hajj, the annual minor and major pilgrimage to Mecca, where he overstayed his visa to be able to study. After being told by Ibn Baz, probably the most important scholar in the country at the time and the later mufti of the kingdom, that he could make use of the university's facilities without actually being an official student, al- Maqdisi started studying as much as he could. One particular and - in hindsight - life- changing moment came when he went to the library of the Prophet's mosque in Medina where he first learned about the long tradition of Wahhabi writings. He passionately told me about how this was an eye-opener to him:

In the small library, there was an old book. [...]. It was called A/-Durar al-Saniyya fì l- Ajwibat al-Najdiyya'5. And I saw this old book for the very first time then. I was still a youngster. I took the book and I opened it... I read and I read and I read! It was my first time and I read a very large part of the book! It offered tools! It connected the fatwas of the Najdi imams with the period that we live in!36

This experience, and the other Wahhabi writings he encountered during this visit to the library and on other occasions, finally gave al-Maqdisi what he was looking for. It provided him with the fully Salafi arguments, concepts (such as αΐ-wdä' wa-!-barä') and ideas that he wanted but, unlike the writings of al-Albani and Ibn Baz, these sometimes incorporated takfir of Muslim states and armies. It was this combination of unadulterated Salafism on the one hand and the tools for excommunication of the rulers on the other that he had sought from others but had never found. Since both quietisi Salafis as well as al-Maqdisi drew heavily from the writings of these "imams of the Najdi da'wa" (a'immat al-da'wa al-Najdiyya),

11 Years later, when a mixed-gender university opened in Saudi Arabia, al-Maqdisi put copies of the documents that he had sent to Saudi scholars on his website. In these documents, the scholars made clear that boys and girls should indeed not mix at university. This way, al-Maqdisîused the writings of some of Saudi Arabia's scholars against the Saudi state itself, something that he had often done before, as we will see in chapters 4 and 5. See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Sayfän wa-Nakhla, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 22 October 2009), 2009. 35 This is a 16-volume collection of many of the major Wahhabi writings. 34 Interview with al-Maqdisï, Amman 13 January 2009.

38 as the major 18th- and 19th-century Wahhabi scholars are referred to, al-Maqdisi's arguments and reasoning - though ultimately leading to a Jihadi-Salafi conclusion - came very close to those of quietist Salafis.37 Al-Maqdisi used his year in Saudi Arabia to collect all kinds of writings that interested him and the concepts and ideas found therein almost immediately made their way into al-Maqdisi's own writings. One of his first books38, written in 1983 when he had already returned from Saudi Arabia, was still mostly a collection of sayings of various non- Wahhabi scholars. Although he used the book to write about concepts that would later become central to his ideology such as polytheism (shirk), unbelief (ku/r), takftr, idols (tawäghft) and man-made laws (cjawämn wad'iyyaf9, he quoted Hamd b. 'Atiq (d. 1883), who would be a tremendous source of influence on him (see chapter 6), only once.40 The writings that followed, however, clearly reflected his year in Saudi Arabia. Books such as Miilat Ibrahim (1984), I'dad al-Qada al-Fawans bi-HajrFasad al-Madaris (1986/1987), Kashf al-Niqab 'an Shari'at aJ-Ghab (1988) and Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya β Kufr al-Dawla al-Sa'udiyya (1989) were heavily influenced by Wahhabi writings and particularly the concept oial-wala wa-i-barä'.'" It is not entirely clear how al-Maqdisi spent his time in Saudi Arabia when he was not studying. He himself says he visited many different places42 and he is said to have returned to the country several times and made contacts with and paid visits to the former sympathisers of Juhayman al-'Utaybi, even as late as the late 1980s", sometimes to discuss his work or study with them.4'1 As we will see in chapter 4, al-Maqdisi's highly critical writings on Saudi Arabia were probably not known to the authorities until the early 1990s or, in any case, were not considered dangerous enough to bar al-Maqdisi from entering the country. The statements of several people that they witnessed al-Maqdisi during the Hajj in the late 1980s are therefore entirely plausible. The fact that these people recognised him as

"/bid. M Al-MaqdisThad at least one treatise before, dating back to 1982, but this was written when he was staying in Saudi Arabia, as such, did not yet reflect the large number of Saudi-Wahhabi sources that he would use after he had studied them thoroughly. See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Risälatön pBida' al-Masäjid, www.tawhed.ws (accessed August 2009), 2009 [1986/1987], pp. 52-64 w Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, irshâd αί-Mubtadi ilâ Qawâ'id al-Sa'df, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 June 2009), 2009 [1983], p. 45. 40 ibid., p. 51. " Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Miilat Ibrâhïm wa-Da wat al-Anbryâ' wa-l-Mursalih wa-Asälib al-Tug/iat/ïTamynlia wa-Sarf al-Du at 'anhä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 1984, id., i'dâd αί-Qâda αί-Fawâni bi-Hq;r Fasâd al- Madäns, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2001 [1986/1987]; id., Kashf al-Niqâb 'an Shanatal-Ghäb, www.tawhed ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 1988; id., Al-Kawäshf. " Al-Maqdisî, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009. " Hegghammer & Lacroix, "Rejectionist", pp 115 116 " Mansûr al-Nuqaydân, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008; interview with Mishârï al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2009

39 a scholar or even sat down to listen to him in the Grand Mosque in Mecca suggests that he had already acquired some stature as an ideologue, underlining the possibility that al- Maqdisi did indeed visit Saudi Arabia until the late WSOs.45 from Kuwait to Peshawar and Back

In the early 1980s, al-Maqdisi finished his year in Saudi Arabia, and moved back to Kuwait. There, equipped with radical but entirely Salafi writings that he had collected in Saudi Arabia, he wrote what is perhaps his most important book: Mil/at Ibrahim. In it, he re- reasoned arguments such as Qutb's from a Salafi perspective and with heavy use of the concept of αί-walâ' wa-!-barä'. This way, the book became a Salafi indictment of Muslim states that fail to rule by Islamic law, as we will see later on. Having already written an important book, he subsequently went to Peshawar in Pakistan, like other men from all over the Arab world did in the 1980s, to help fight the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979." Although he is said to have participated in military training near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, he did not actually engage in any combat47, contrary to what some have claimed.48 Al-Maqdisi himself says about this period that he found out in Afghanistan that he was "illiterate" in the use of weapons and that he decided to focus on what he had always done, namely cJa'wa.49 He thus spent his time in Peshawar as a shaykh, not a fighter, and as such tried to spread his writings. His book Mi/lat Ibrahim was printed in Peshawar and there he also wrote a book that accused Saudi Arabia of being an infidel state, Al-Kawashifal-JaliyyafìKufral-Dawla al-Sa'udiyya, which was also printed there.50 He is said to have been quite influential in Peshawar since his books were widespread there and well- known among the Arab mujähidün. His ideas were not uncontroversial among jihad fighters in Peshawar, however. Saudi and other mujähidün had come there to fight the Soviets, not to hear that their own state was un-Islamic and al-Maqdisi's takfir of the kingdom was therefore not universally accepted.51 Al-Maqdisi also claims he differed with 'Abdallah

,5 Interviews with Fahad al-Shâfî, Riyadh, 11 November 2008; Yûsuf al-Dayni, Jeddah, 13 November 2008. See also Mishârî al-Dhâyidrs article in Ai-Sharq al-Awsat, 14 January 2004. " Interview with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009. " Al-Watan, 5 July 2005; interview with Hasan Abu Hamyya, Amman, 9 August 2008. " Khashuqjï & Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar", p. 11. " Interview with al-Maqdisi, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009 " Interview with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009. 51 Interview with Jamâl Khashuqjï by telephone, 27 November 2008.

40 'Azzam, the leader of the Afghan Arabs, on what strategy to pursue in Afghanistan. Although they did not have any conflicts, al-Maqdisi says, "[l] was not among his followers".52 After spending time in Peshawar spreading his books, al-Maqdisi eventually returned to Kuwait, where he continued his writing. During this period, he supported himself by working in a book printing shop, where he would eventually become manager." Interestingly, at that time he was on good terms with a Jordanian quietist Salafi scholar named 'Ali b. Hasan al-Halabi. During one of my interviews with him, al-Maqdisi even showed me a book that he had been given by al-Halabi and in which the latter had written: "This is a gift for my brother 'Isam al-Barqawi, may God protect him."54 This is significant since, as we will see in chapter 9, al-Maqdisi would later heavily criticise al-Halabi for the latter's unwillingness to apply takfir to the rulers. Al-Halabi acknowledges that he used to be on good terms with al-Maqdisi but that "when the truth of the man was revealed I never met him again".55 The fact that al-Maqdisi could be on such good terms with a quietist Salafi possibly shows that he did not just resemble quietists in his writings but also in his personal relations. Al-Maqdisi later changed jobs and went into the trade business because it allowed him to work flexible hours.56 Combining his work with his growing influence as a scholar, he could have gone on living like this for quite some time, were it not for the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi army in 1990. As a result of Yasir 'Arafat's decision to back Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn against the international coalition amassing against him, virtually all Palestinians would ultimately be expelled from the country. This meant that they had to go back to their home countries which for al-Maqdisi, as for most other Palestinians in Kuwait, was Jordan.57

Spreading al-Maqdisi's Writings in Jordan and Beyond

Jordan is a country that, having been created by Britain less than a century ago and receiving most of the Palestinian refugees from the Arab-Israeli wars, has always struggled

52 Khâshuqjï & Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar", p. 13. " Al-Maqdisî, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009. M Interview with al-Maqdisi, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 55 Interview 'Alîb. Hasan al-Halabî, Amman, 19 January 2009. r'6 Al-Maqdisî, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009. 57 For an account of the situation in Kuwait directly after the Palestinians left, see Michael Dumper, "End of an Era", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 21, no. 1,1991, pp. 120-123.

41 with its identity. Since a sizeable portion of its population (perhaps even the majority) is of Palestinian descent, the question of "who is a Jordanian?" is not easily answered.58 On top of this, the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians that arrived in Jordan from Kuwait over a period of a few years from 1990 onwards proved to be a heavy burden on Jordanian society. Many of them had never been to Jordan in their lives but because they had been born in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank between 1948 and 1967, they were officially Jordanian citizens. As we will see in more detail in chapter 8, the Palestinians also came at a moment when the country was going through an eventful time, with the Gulf War, an economic crisis and the peace process with Israel all taking place at the same time. While many Palestinians ended up in poor refugee camps at the outskirts of cities such as al-Zarqa'5' and proved to be an economic burden on top of the crisis the country was going through at that time, many also greatly contributed to the struggling economy by setting up shops and firms.60 How al-Maqdisi fitted into this group of Kuwaiti Palestinians moving to Jordan and how he subsequently became an important radical scholar there is the subject of this section.

Al-Maqdisi's Arrival in Jordan

The Palestinians arriving from Kuwait could basically be divided into two groups. The first was the group of relatively well-off, middle class Palestinians who were not only responsible for setting up the new businesses mentioned above but also spread more liberal values. Their lifestyles sometimes caused a shock among some, traditionally more conservative Jordanians and in certain cases exacerbated the already tense relations between Palestinians and Jordanians in the kingdom. The second group consisted of the more Salafi-onented Palestinians, some of whom had spent time in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Maqdisi and his family were obviously part of the latter group and as such they came to Jordan in 1992.61

58 For an in-depth treatment of this issue, see Laurie A Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians A Crisis of Identity" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol 14, no 4,1995, pp 46 61 See also chapter 8 55 For an analysis of the economic situation of these Palestinian camps in Jordan, see Ibrahim Hejoj, "A Profile of Poverty for Palestinian Refugees in Jordan the Case of Zarqa and Sukhneh Camps" Journal of Refugee Studies, vol 20, no 1,2007, pp 120 145 See also 'Palestinian Women in the Camps of Jordan Interviews" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol 24, no 4,1995, pp 62 72 60 Radi, "Palestinienes", pp 59 61, Le Troquer & Hommery al Oudat, "Kuwait", pp 40 44 " International Crisis Group Jordan's 9/li Dealing with Jihadi Islamism, ICG Middle East Report no 47, Amman & Brussels, 23 November 2005, ρ 4

42 From the beginning of al-Maqdisi's stay in Jordan, he seems to have been involved in attempts to spread his writings and was assisted in his efforts by the man who would later become notorious for his dispatch of suicide bombers against Shiites in Iraq: Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. The latter was of Jordanian descent and, like al-Maqdisi, had also been to Afghanistan but, unlike al-Maqdisi, had actually fought there. Al-Zarqawi had returned from Afghanistan in the same period as al-Maqdisi and the two gathered a group of young men around them with whom they tried to spread al-Maqdisi's writings. This group, later known in the media as Bay at al-Imam (Fealty to the Imam), eventually got involved in armed activity against Israel. The attack was foiled by the Jordanian security service, however, landing al-Maqdisi, al-Zarqawi and about a dozen other men in prison with a fifteen years' sentence.62

The Prison Years, 1994-1999

The group, once in prison, tried to continue its activities as much as possible by proclaiming their message and recruiting new followers among fellow-prisoners and even targeting guards with their ideas, as we will see in chapter 9. Although the efforts by al-Maqdisi and the other members of his group to spread their views certainly did not pay off with everyone, they did lead to an increase in their followers.63 There were differences between the approaches the various "members" of al-Maqdisi's group took, however, which became exemplified in the ways al-Maqdisi and the young al-Zarqawi dealt with others: while the former, despite his explicit message, spread his ideas in a friendly and kind manner, al- Zarqawi was much harsher, blunter and more direct to those he considered his enemies. His behaviour, unlike al-Maqdisi's, sometimes expressed itself in verbal or even physical abuse towards the prison guards.64 Confrontational behaviour, especially if it took on the forms that al-Zarqawi used, was not tolerated by the authorities in prison and it would therefore often result in the prisoners' suffering physical abuse, torture and long periods in solitary confinement.65 Al- Maqdisi himself is also said to have been tortured during this period.66 In spite of this,

62 For a more detailed account of this period, see chapter 8. 63 International Crisis Group, Jordan's, p. 9. 61 Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqam and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stones Press, 2005, pp. 68-70. 65 Fuad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi Al-Jilal-Tlianrli-l-Qaida, Beirut: Dar al-Khayyâl, 2005, pp. 14-17; Napoleoni, Insurgent, pp. 75-76; al-Maqdisi, Uqa mm KhalafQadbân al-Murtaddîn "Sana 1418", pp. 5,9. 66 Interviews with Hasan Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008; Fu'âd Husayn, Amman, 5 August 2008.

43 however, he did consider his time in prison as very profitable and it was probably the most important intellectual period of his life after his stay in Saudi Arabia, since he got the opportunity to write some of his most important books67 and studies68. He also devoted special attention to specific questions that fellow inmates had about politics, the rulers and coping with life as prisoners69 and even had the time to write about issues outside his normal range of interests, such as Christianity.70 Al-Maqdisi had been the leader of the group known as Bay'at al-Imam before their prison sentence and early on during their stay in gaol but after a while, al-Zarqawi took over the leadership. It is not entirely certain why this happened. It might have been because al-Maqdisi wanted the time to write and took the decision himself to withdraw from the leadership to let al-Zarqawi take over, as al-Maqdisi himself maintains.71 While this may be true, another important factor - though not the only one, as we will see in chapter 9 - was that many prisoners preferred al-Zarqawi's stronger and more confrontational approach to al-Maqdisi's more gentle nature, which put the latter in the position of spiritual leader. Al-Zarqawi's toughness in the face of torture and other maltreatment, his discipline towards others but also himself as well as his stronger leadership qualities were more attractive to the fellow prisoners than al-Maqdisi's indirect and friendly approach.72 In spite of al-Zarqawi's growing power inside the various prisons that he and the rest of the group were in, outside the prison waUs al-Maqdisi became increasingly influential.

67 Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Tabsfral-'Uqalâ' bi-TalbEsät Ah! al-rajahhum wa-i-Jrjä', www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1996, id., Al-Risâia al-Thaläthmiyyafil-Tahdh\r mm al-Ghuiüwfil-Takfir, www.tawhed ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1998/1999. M Many of al-Maqdisîs studies are undated so it is often unclear whether they were written during this penod or not Of the dated ones that were written during his stay in prison, see for example, Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi, Hädhihi 'Aqidatunä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1997; id., Hidöyat al-Halim ilâ Ahamm al- Mu/nmmat/fMillat Ibrahim, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1995; id, MuWitasar "Kashfd-Niqâb 'an Shan at al-Ghäb"- Al-Dustür al-l/rdunnr, www tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1996; id, Al-Shihâb al-Thäqib fil- Radd 'ala man Iftarä 'ala l-SahäbiHätib wa-ma'ahu l-lsabafiBaraatal-SahâbîAbîLubâba, www tawhed.ws (accessed ljuly 2009), 1996. " See for instance Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Husn al-Rifaqa fîAjwibat Su'âlât Suwäqa, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1996; id, Al-lshräqafiSu'älät Suwäqa, www tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), n.d ; id, La Tahzan ima lläh maona, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1994. 70 Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Tuhfa al-Maqd\siyyafÎMulditasar TâriWi al-Nairânryya. Bidâyatahâ wa- Muntahâhâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1997 During a later stay in prison, Al-Maqdisï later wrote another, much more detailed book about the Old Testament in which he unfavourably juxtaposed the Bible with the Quran See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Man Käna Baytuhu mm Zujäj fa-lä Yarmf ghayrahu bi-Hajar Qira'a wa-Ta'ammui/îAj/3raÎ-'A/id al-Qadim wa-Muqâranat bayna Akhbänhä wa-bayna l-Qofas al-Qur am al-'Azfm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2008. 71 Al-Maqdisï, Liqa mm KhalafQadbân al-Murtaddih "Sana 1418", pp. 1-2 Al-Maqdisi also downplays the importance of this whole issue by pointing out that it was only the leadership of a group of prisoners, not the leadership of a state. 72 Husayn, Al-Zarqäm, p. 14; Napoleoni, Insurgent, pp. 66-76, Mary Anne Weaver, "Inventing al-Zarqawi", The Atlantic MontMyJuly/August 2006, p. 94; interviews with 'Abdallah Abu Rummän, Amman, 15 January 20O9; Yûsuf Rabâba, Amman, 12 January 2009.

44 His writings were smuggled out of prison, allowing them to be spread around the country.73 This way, al-Maqdisi became well-known among like-minded Jordanians because of his writings even during the time he spent in gaol. When al-Maqdisi was moved to the prison in al-Salt, for instance, radical youngsters from that city flocked to visit the famous shaykh that had come to their town.74 The situation of al-Maqdisi's fame growing outside prison while al-Zarqawi's star rose on the inside continued until 1999 when the new Jordanian king 'Abdallah II, who had just succeeded his recently-deceased father, decided to pardon a number of political prisoners, including al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi as well as most of the rest of their group The various differences that had been brewing between the different members of al- Maqdisi's group were expressed most clearly by the actions many of them took when released: while al-Zarqawi (as well as others) would quickly move to Afghanistan and later Iraq, becoming perhaps the most wanted terrorist in the world second only to Osama bin Laden, al-Maqdisi stayed in Jordan, where he tried to pick up his normal life again.75

In and out of prison

Although al-Maqdisi tried to return to the life he had led before he went to prison, he was quickly arrested again. In late 1999, a planned terrorist attack on four different sites (a hotel in Amman, a Jordanian-Israeli border crossing and two Christian holy sites, all frequented by American and Israeli tourists) was foiled by the Jordanian authorities. In this so-called "Millennium Plot", which was supposed to take place on 1 January 2000 (hence the name), 28 men were charged with planning these attacks. Al-Maqdisi was also arrested since he was believed to have been involved in the attacks as well.76 In an interview during his stay in prison as a result of his arrest, al-Maqdisi stated that he knew some of the men charged with involvement in the plot but that he was only arrested because some of his books had been found in the homes of the culprits. He claimed, however, that the real reasons behind the arrests were to "satisfy America, which controls the global system, and to make enemies out of the Muslim mujähtdün who they describe [by using the label of] terrorism

" Weaver, "Inventing", ρ 94, interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008, al Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009, Marwân Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009 71 Interview with Abdallah Abu Rummän, Amman, 15 January 2009 75 For an in depth treatment of the methodological and other differences between al Maqdisï and his followers, see chapter 9 76 International Crisis Group Jordan's, ρ 10

45 everywhere" and also "to defame the da'wa and the jihad and to defame the reputation (sum'a) of the mujähidün." Al-Maqdisi was eventually found innocent of the charges and kept a rather low profile for the next few years. The years around the turn of the millennium, however, coincided with some very important events related to radical Islam. Al-Qa'ida arose in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, some of its spectacular attacks in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam (1998), Yemen (2000) and the United States (2001) took place and the United States subsequently launched its "war on terrorism", leading to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In this period, with fighters travelling to different countries to wage war against the US, al-Maqdisi turned to a different genre in his writings, namely that of giving advice to young radicals who he believed had gone too far in their quest for jihad. Although this criticism of extreme forms of jihad (and particularly takßr) was not new, it did become much more pronounced after 2001 and particularly after al-Zarqawi became infamous for his massive suicide bombings in Iraq.78 The period between al-Maqdisi's critical writings on jihadis and his release from prison was actually quite short because he was quickly arrested again. This time, al-Maqdisi was said to have been involved in a conspiracy to attack U.S. soldiers in the northern Jordanian city of Mafraq and was arrested and interrogated in November 2002." Al-Maqdisi himself claims that he was only engaged in da'wa activities in Mafraq and that when he learned about the plans to stage this attack he actually advised against it because he believed the men planning it were too inexperienced.80 This does indeed seem to have been the case since al-Maqdisi was acquitted of the charges after being held in pre-trial detention till December 2004, although he was not released until June 2005.81 All of this did not mean, however, that al-Maqdisi was or had turned against jihad. In fact, about a month before his arrest in the Mafraq case, he praised two men who had attacked Americans in Kuwait and

77 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Liqa mm KhalafQadbân Sijn Suwâqa "Sanat 1420", www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1999, pp. 1-2. 78 As far back as 1992/1993, for instance, he warned youngsters not to go too far in their application of tallir on societies and advised them on how to adhere to the correct ideas on this issue. See Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisî, R\sâlat Mmäsaha wa-Tadhlâr ûâ Ba'd αΙ-iUiwa, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1992/1993. In another tract, he states his frustration that people ascribe ideas to him that he has never espoused. See al- MaqdisI, Hädhihi, p. 1. His main work of this kind until then (and still) was his massive work on "extremism in takfìr", written in 1998/1999. See al-Maqdisî, Αί-Risâla. ^ Al-Shar

46 used the tract he wrote about them to denounce the Kuwaiti parliament, government and laws.82 Despite al-Maqdisi's continued support for various forms of jihad in principle, he did become increasingly worried about events in Iraq and other countries during this period, He wrote several tracts about it, which were much more widely read than before since al- Maqdisi had begun a website, probably around the year 2002, on which he put not only other people's work but also all of his own writings. Therefore, when he wrote several tracts critical of jihadi practices in general and his former pupil al-Zarqawi's actions in Iraq in particular, the differences between the two men that were rooted in their prison period spilled into the open and became the focus of intense media attention. This started when al- Maqdisi wrote a book called Waqfat ma'a Thamarat al-Jihad in 2004, in which he scolded many mujähidün for their lack of knowledge about Islam and their surroundings, their extreme paranoia or dangerous negligence and their sometimes reckless use of violence.83 He further criticised his former student al-Zarqawi in particular in a tract written specifically about him. In this document, al-Maqdisi advises al-Zarqawi to stop the widespread use of suicide bombings, indiscriminate violence and takfir of entire groups of people because it is wrong to do so and hurts the image of Islam.84 Shortly after he wrote these documents critical of certain jihadi practices, al-Maqdisi was released on 28 June 2005 on the apparently explicit condition that he would not make any statements to the media.85 He did give several interviews to Jordanian newspapers, however, in which he reiterated his criticism of al-Zarqawi.86 Al-Maqdisi later claimed that one of these interviews had misrepresented his words and ideas and that another had never even taken place.87 Although the interviews did perhaps indeed misrepresent his ideas somewhat and the interview which al-Maqdisi claims never took place in particular had headlines that did not do justice to his quite nuanced criticism88, it was hard to deny the general content, which corresponded with what he had said earlier. This was further

82 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Bardaial-Muwahhidfn mm 'C/hüdai-Tawäghit wa-Amänahum Ii-I-Muhänbfn, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2002. " Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Waqfat ma'a Thamarat al-Jihäd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2004. " Id., Al-Zarqäwü Amol wa-Aläm (Munâsara wa-Munäsaha), www.tawhed.ws (accessed 24 August 2006), 2004. This document was also published in full in Husayn, Al-Zarqâwî, pp. 101-114. '5 Al-Sharq al-Awsaf, 4 July 2005. 86 Ai-Ghad, 5 July 2005; Al-'Arab a!-Yawm, 5 July 2005. " Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Boyân Sädir 'an al-Shaykh al-Maqdisîfimâ NushiTafil-Suhufal-ürdunmyya, www.almaqreze.com/bayanat/artcl007.html (accessed June 2007), 2005. 98 The headlines used for the interview with Al-'Arab al-Yawm were "Al-Maqdisï: The actions of al-Zarqâwï in Iraq are not acceptable and killing civilians and Shutes is not allowed" and "The previous spiritual guide of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqâwï criticises his actions in Iraq - Al-Maqdisï: I reject killing civilians or Shiites in Iraq".

47 confirmed when al-Maqdisi gave an interview to the well-known Arabic satellite channel Al-Jazeera, in which he was allowed to go into more detail about this issue and could explain more thoroughly that it was not his intention to slander al-Zarqawi and that he did not reject jihad as such but that he simply disagreed with some of its extremist expressions." Al-Maqdisi later told me that these writings were written out of a genuine worry that jihad, a concept embedded in Islamic law and supported by al-Maqdisi under certain conditions, was being tarnished by reckless activities by young fighters.90 This was not, however, how al-Zarqawi interpreted his former mentor's critique. In a rebuttal of al- Maqdisi's "advice", al-Zarqawi states that he was surprised to read these comments and gives a detailed refutation of al-Maqdisi's criticism. This includes the claim that he consults with scholars in Iraq about the legitimacy of his attacks and is therefore not reckless. He also defends his use of suicide bombings and attacks against Shiites. Moreover, al-Zarqawi wonders why al-Maqdisi chose to make these comments in the media when he had already expressed them in his writings and wants to know why he made them now." Al-Zarqawi writes that the war in Iraq is heavily testing the resolve of the mujähidün and this is probably why he wondered about al-Maqdisi's motives to express his criticism at that moment. One might, however, also wonder whether al-Maqdisi's release from prison had anything to do with this. It could be argued that al-Maqdisi was acquitted because of these critical writings so that he might use his freedom to act as a moderating force against people like al-Zarqawi.92 This is, however, unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, although al- Maqdisi was critical of certain practices among some mufähidün, his writings also clearly showed that he did support jihad and the use of violence against the Americans and the

89 Abu Muhammad ai-Maqciisf. Al-Salafiyya al-Jihädiyya, www.aljazeera net (accessed June 2007), 6 July 2005. 90 Interview with al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009 91 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqâwï, Boyän wa-Tawdîh lima Athärahu 1-ShayWi ai-Maqdisr/fuqa idi ma'a Qanât aì-Jazìra, n.p., η d I would like to thank Paul Schrijver for providing me with this document. An English translation of this letter is available on http://prostrate4allah.wordpress.com/20O9/03/30/az-zarqawis-rahimahullah-response- to-shaykh-maqdisi-2005in-the-memory-of-sheikh/ (accessed 2 April 2009) The debate between al-Zarqâwî and al-Maqdisi is the subject of several articles. See for example Steven Brooke, "The Preacher and thejihadi", in. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqam & Eric Brown (eds.), Current Trends in islamist Ideology, vol. 3, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2006, pp. 60-63; International Crisis Group Jordan's, pp 10-12; Nibras Kazirm, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation· Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi", in. Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqam & Eric Brown (eds.), Current Trends in islamist Ideology, vol 2, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005, pp. 65-69; Joas Wagemakers, "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisr A Counter-Terronsm Asset?", CTC Sentinel, vol. 1, no. 6, May 2005, pp. 8-9; id., "Invoking Zarqawr Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihad Deficit", CTC Sentinel, vol. 2, no. 6, June 2006, pp. 14-17, Y. Yehoshua, Dispute in /slamisi Circles aver the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shiites and Non- Combatant Non-Muslims m Jihad (derations in Iraq: Al-Maqdisi vs. his Disopie al-Zarqam, www.memn.org (accessed 2006), no. 239,11 September 2005. 92 Interestingly, there were also somejihadis on the internet who believed that this was the reason al-Maqdisî was released. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 July 2005

48 rulers of the Muslim world in general. The Jordanian authorities were unlikely to release a man who held these views, only to let him express them, unless there was another, more compelling reason. Secondly, in spite of al-Maqdisi's criticism of reckless jihadis and some of al-Zarqawi's actions, his media statements eventually landed him in prison again on 6 July, a week after he had been released, since he had not been allowed to contact the media and had clearly violated that prohibition. One could argue, of course, that al-Maqdisi may have made a deal with the Jordanian authorities to denounce terrorism and was released for that reason but that he simply did not (entirely) keep his promises. Since neither party is very likely to admit that this was the case, it will probably remain unclear. The same applies to the claims of the Jordanian security services that al-Maqdisi had contacted terrorists outside Jordan93, or the rumours that he was planning terrorist attacks94 or had been re arrested at the request of other Arab countries.95 Whatever the true reason behind al-Maqdisi's re-arrest, he remained in prison without officially being charged of anything until March 2008. The reason he was released then was again unclear but most probably had to do with his deteriorating health and the pressure that was being applied on the Jordanian authorities to release him since he had not been charged with anything.96 His health problems had come about as a result of his hunger strike, which he had started because he had not been allowed to attend his father's funeral earlier.97 That was about the only thing that was heard of him in the almost three years that he spent in prison again. Virtually no writings of his were released in this period and when he was eventually released, only Middle Eastern media seemed to pay attention to it.98 Al-Maqdisi may have wanted to return to a quiet life, concentrating on his writings and staying out of the spotlights. For about six months, no new writings of his appeared on his website and to support himself, he nowadays runs a shop in which his sons work selling things like fragrant herbs and honey.99 Immediately after his release, however, some journalists wondered if al-Maqdisi would use his freedom to continue his "revisions", a

91 Al-'Arabtyya, 7 July 2005; Al-Ghad, 7 July 2005; Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7 July 2005. ,4 Al-Jazîra, 6 July 2005, www.aljazeera.net (accessed June 2007); Al-Riyâd, 20 July 2005. 95 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 8 July 2005. 96 Human Rights Watch, Human; id., "Arbitrary". See also id., Jordan: Rampant Beatings in Prisons Go Unpunished, www.hrw.org (accessed 11 January 2008), 30 August 2007; id., Jordan: Clarifications on World Report Chapter 2008, www.hrw.org (accessed 18 March 2008), 19 February 2008; Amnesty International, "Your Confessions are Ready for You to Sign": Detention and Torture of Political Suspects, www.amnesty.org (accessed 28 March 2008), 24 July 2006. "Reuters, 17 June 2007. 98 Al-'Arab al-Yowm, 13 March 2008; Al-Haydt, 13 March 2008; Middle East Times, 18 March 2008; Tâmir al-Samadï, "Itlâq Sarah al-Maqdisi ba'da Idräbihi 'an al-Ta am wa-Tardî Awdâ'ahu al-Sihhiyya", Al-Sabil, no. 737,18-24 March 2008, p. 2; Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 March 2008. 99 Al-Maqdisï, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009.

49 reference to al-Maqdisi's earlier writings that were critical towards certain jihadi practices and were seen by some as a moderation of views he had held before.100 Although this claim is not correct, as I have shown above, since al-Maqdisi has been critical of certain forms of jihad and especially takfir since the early 1990s101, his own protestations against this "accusation"102 did not silence his critics. In fact, 2008 and 2009 saw unprecedented criticism of al-Maqdisi by certain Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan but also on the internet. This criticism did not just focus on his alleged revisionism but also on al-Maqdisi's supposedly faulty ideology and - especially - his lack of any credentials as a jihad fighter.103 I contend, as will be shown in chapter 9, that al-Maqdisi's strong preference for da'wa over jihad - even though he considers the latter to be legitimate - can, like other aspects of his ideology, be explained by pointing to al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi background. His closeness to quietist Salafism, rooted in the experiences during his youth, his studies and his religious preferences, means that the quietist manhaj of dealing with society through da'wa is not downplayed by him but valued as a useful tool to bring about change, even though he believes jihad can also be used for this. A somewhat similar argument has been used before by Brooke to explain the differences between al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi but he makes the mistake of linking this to a difference of opinion about tak/ir and fails to take al-Maqdisi's ideological background into account.101 In what follows, I argue that al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafism is a major factor in explaining both his influence and the criticism levelled against him. Before dealing with this, however, we must first turn to al-Maqdisi's ideological place in the jihadi spectrum.

100 A joumaUst who wrote at some length about this is Muhammad Abu Rummän. See for example Al-Hayât, 13 March 2008. 101 See Wagemakers, "Abu", pp. 7-9; id., "Protectingjihad in the 21st Century· Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices", in. Anisseh van Engeland & Ahmed Dawoody (eds.), Jihad in the 21" Century (forthcoming). 102 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-Thabät al-Thabât ftZaman al-Tarâja'ât, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 October 2008), 2008; id, As'lla hawlafhrä at Mansûba li-1-ShayWi Abf Muhammad al-Maqdisf, www.tawhed ws (accessed 18 December 2008), 2008. 103 See Wagemakers, "Invoking", pp. 14-17; id., "Protecting". 101 Brooke, "Preacher", pp. 57-60.

50 This study tries to show what Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's influence has been and how it can be explained. To assess al-Maqdisi's influence and why he has been so influential, it is obviously necessary to determine what al-Maqdisi's ideology is. Although this study focuses on one Jihadi-Salafi ideologue in particular, it is important not to deal with al-Maqdisi's ideas in isolation but in the context of Islamic thought on the issue that distinguishes Jihadi-Salafìs from others: their specific views on jihad. This chapter therefore concentrates on al-Maqdisi's radical views on jihad and how he differs from more traditional beliefs and the ideas of other ideologues on this issue. This is not to suggest that the following is an exhaustive account of the ideas on jihad as expressed throughout history. That would go beyond the scope of this study. My objective here is rather to explain and contextualise al- Maqdisi's views on jihad by looking at its origins in early Islam and how it was subsequently (re)formulated by certain prominent ideologues and scholars. Therefore, although there are more sides to jihad than those mentioned here, such as the spoils of war1 or martyrdom2, only those aspects relevant for a discussion of al-Maqdisi's views will be dealt with. It is important to point out that, in spite of being a Jihadi-Salafi, al-Maqdisi has not actually written a great deal about jihad per se. Although it is clear what his views are on this subject, most of his writings related to jihad focus on the specific question of who should be fought and why, not on what jihad is or how to wage it. This chapter and the next do focus on these issues, however, since they are important to fully understand al-Maqdisi's views and influence. In what follows, I concentrate on issues related to creed ('acjFda, in this chapter) and on questions having to do with the methodology of applying these ideas (manhaj, in chapter 3). This distinction is a relevant one in this respect since ideologues agreeing on a certain problem from the perspective of creed may not agree on the method used to solve it, as we will see. Through the use of the term 'aqida, this chapter concentrates on the Islamic origins of jihad, how some important Muslim scholars have reinterpreted jihad and what al-Maqdisi's position is in this debate. It first deals with classical jihad, the

1 For an extensive treatment of this issue according to Islamic law, see for example Majid Khaddun, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008 [1955], pp 118-132, id, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybânï's Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp 106-129, Isam Kamel Salem, Iskm und Volkerrecht Das Volkerrecht m der islamischen Weltanschauung, Berlin. Express Edition, 1984, pp 129- 136. 2 For more on this issue as dealt with in the Prophetic tradition and Islamic history, see for instance (respectively) Rudolph Peters Jihad m Classical and Modem Islam. A Reader, Princeton Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996, pp 21-24; David Cook, Martyrdom m islam, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge Umversity Press, 2007.

51 least controversial form of fighting most often found in the sources, largely based on secondary literature. This chapter then concentrates on the question of how and why jihad has been turned against Muslim rulers, as argued by various scholars including al-Maqdisi, also mostly based on secondary sources. Finally, this chapter focuses on how the global jihad advocated by al-Qa'ida came about and what al-Maqdisi's views are on this. By placing al-Maqdisi in these wider debates on jihad, it will become clear that his gradual development towards quietist Jihadi-Salafism as described in chapter 1 can also be discerned in his ideology.

Classical Jihad

The word "jihad" often conjures up images of violence, terrorism and suicide bombings, at least among Western audiences. This is hardly surprising, since Islamic movements engaged in those practices often refer to their struggle as a jihad. The concept of jihad is much more nuanced than the rhetoric and actions of terrorists would have us believe, however. Derived from the verb jähada (to strive, to exert oneself), the verbal noun "jihad" can have various meanings, depending on the context, including military ones. This section focuses on how this military form of "striving" is found in the Qur an and Islamic law (sharia) and what al- Maqdisi's views are on this type of fighting, referred to here as classical jihad.

Jihad in the Qur an

According to Islamic tradition, the strictly monotheistic message of the Prophet Muhammad (570-632), which he preached in Mecca from about 610 onwards, caused some to follow him while many others viewed it as a threat to their religious customs and even their business interests, which were sometimes tied to their polytheistic cult.3 As a result, the Meccans treated the increasing number of Muslims harshly, eventually causing Muhammad and his followers to move to Yathrib (later known as Medina) to escape the persecution of the Meccans in 622. After this hijra (emigration), Muhammad became the leader of the community of Muslims in Medina and was frequently engaged in raids and

1 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History m a World Civilization, vol. 1, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 154-172; Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century, London & New York: Longman, 1986, pp. 25-28,31-33.

52 battles with the Meccans, eventually leading to his conquest of Mecca and his increasing power and authority on the Arabian Peninsula until his death in 632.'1 The changing fortunes in Muhammad's life - from persecuted preacher to victorious leader - can be seen in the Qur'ânic text as the Prophet is said to have proclaimed it. In the Meccan verses of the Quran, fighting (qitâl) is not mentioned, nor would the Muslims have been able to fight, given their weakness vis-à-vis their opponents. Q. 25: 52, for example, encourages believers to "obey not the unbelievers, but struggle [or strive] with them thereby [the Qur an] mightily (jähidhum bihi jihâdan Jcaiuran)".5 Passages like this one indicate that jihad only refers to non-violent "striving" in the Meccan verses. Similarly, another Meccan verse (16:125) states "call thou to the way of thy lord (ucfu ilä sabil rabbiica) with wisdom and good admonition, and dispute with them (jädilhum) in the better way". These words seem to confirm the message conveyed in the former verse, namely that contentious relations with Meccan non-Muslims should be solved by calling people to Islam (da'wa, from which the word ud'u cited above is derived), not weapons.6 In the verses said to have been revealed in Medina, however, there are many references to military struggle with non-Muslims, such as Q. 22: 39, which states that "leave is given to those who fight (li- lladhîna yuqätilüna) because they were wronged [...]", or "fight in the way of God (qätilü β sabiî Allah) with those who fight with you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors" (Q. 2: 190). Some verses seem to have an offensive approach and command the Muslims to attack. These include Q. 8: 39 ("fight them (qätilüham) till there is no persecution (fitna) and the religion (din) is God's entirely [...]")7 and the verse stating: "fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden [...]" (9: 29)." Viewed within the broader context of the Mecca-Medina relations and the insecure

" Reuven Firestone Jihacb The Origin of Holy War in Islam, New York & Oxford' Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 106-125; Hans Kruse, Islamische Volkerrechtslehre, Bochum: Studienverlag Brockmeyer, 1979, pp. 46 48, Alfred Morabia, Le Gihad dans l'Islam médiéval. Pans· Albin Michel, 1993, pp 52-68. s This verse and subsequent others are taken from AJ. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, New York: Touchstone, 1955. 6 Michael Bonner Jihad m islamic History. Doctrines and Practice, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 21-22; David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2005, pp. 32-33, Firestone, Jihad, pp. 51-53; Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, 'The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History", in: James Turner Johnson &John Kelsay (eds.), Cross, Crescent, and Sword The Justification of War m Western and Islamic Tradition, New York etc.: Greenwood Press, 1990, pp 38-39. See also Q 15.94; 29:46. Ella Landau-Tasseron describes the different references tojihad and its derivatives in the Qur'ân as having several meanings and states that the wordjihad may originally not have been "connected with antagonism between the believers and other people" at all. See Ella Landau-Tasseron, "Jihad", in: J. Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qur an, vol III, Leiden: Bnll, 2003, pp 36-38. The quote is on p. 37b. 7 See also Q. 2 193, which is almost literally the same. 8 Firestone,Jihad, pp 53-64

53 position in which the Muslim community still found itself vis-à-vis the polytheistic Meccans, however, even these verses could be interpreted as defensive ' The above shows that the Qur an interpreted in light of Muhammad's life gives different meanings of jihad and is not conclusive about how believers should deal with non- Muslims. To solve this problem and other issues related to seemingly contradictory verses, Muslim scholars developed several tools to reconcile them, including the (not universally accepted) theory of αί-nâsikh wa-!-/nansükh (the abrogating and the abrogated), which states that when verses contradict each other, the later ones abrogate the earlier verses10 This led them to reach the conclusion that the so-caUed "sword verse" (Q. 9: 5) constituted the culmination of jihad: "[...] slay the idolaters wherever you find them and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. [...]"" The development of a/-nâsiich wa-i-mansüWi was preceded by the Muslim conquests of lands beyond the Arabian Peninsula. This expanded territory was later referred to as the dar al-Isläm (the abode of Islam), the area where Muslims were in control. Its opposite, the dar al-harb (the abode of war), was the territory that Muslims were - at least in theory - at war with.12 Although it is not clear how the early Muslims viewed the different verses of the Quran dealing with fighting, it seems that later Muslim scholars may have used some (seemingly most offensive) Medinan verses to legitimise these conquests in retrospect."

Jihad m Islamic Law

The military and sometimes offensive forms of jihad described above came to dominate the books of Islamic law but was not always applied and practised as such throughout Islamic history. Military expansion slowed down and, perhaps more importantly, Sufism and moralist forms of Islam were on the ascent, leading to an increasing trend to interpret jihad as a spiritual struggle against one's own sins, based on non-violent Qur'âme verses such at

' Harald Motzki, "Ist die Gewaltanwendung von Muslimen gegen Nichtmushme religiös bedingt' Eine Studie der klassischen gihäd Konzeptionen", in Benjamin Jokisch, Ulrich Rebstock & Lawrence I Conrad (eds ), Fremde, Feinde und Kunoses Innen und Außenansichten unseres muslimisdien Nachbarn, Berlina New York Walter de Gruyter, 2009, pp 417-452, esp 424 435 10 Landau Tasseron, "Jihäd", ρ 39 11 Firestonejihad, pp 47 125, especially 47 91 See also BonnerJihad, pp 23 27 12 For an interesting discussion on the different views on exactly what constitutes the darai harb, see Kruse, Islamische, pp 57 62 " Sachedina, 'Development", ρ 37

54 those mentioned above and similar traditions (hadiths) of Muhammad.14 Although this notion of a spiritual jihad has survived to this day, Muslim scholars were once again confronted with the need to wage a military jihad when the dâr al-Islâm was invaded by the Crusaders in the Middle East and the Reconquista in Spain, both from the 11th century onwards. These non-Muslim invasions led to an increase of writings on military forms of jihad and a further development of the concept.15 Unlike in earlier military encounters between Islamic and Christian armies, the Crusades and the Reconquista made Muslims the defending side. This situation recurred several times in the centuries to come, possibly most significantly through colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Perhaps as a reaction to the new reality of non-Muslims invading Muslim territory and Muslims living under Christian rule, scholars of Islamic law emphasised the idea of jihad as fard 'ala l-'ayn (an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims) over fard 'alä l-kißya (a collective duty that can be performed by a limited number of fighters). The latter of these two terms, which both existed even before the Crusades, applied when Muslims had to expand the dâr al-Islâm, which occurred less and less, indicating that if a sufficient number of Muslims were engaged in it, others were exempt from fighting. If Muslims were attacked, however, the situation was more threatening and fighting became an individual duty for all Muslims.16 This latter dimension of jihad - defensive war against a non-Muslim invader - was used by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the First World War to legitimise its defence against the allied forces17 and it was also employed by Muslims in the 19th and 20th-century struggles for national liberation of colonial occupation.18 These anti-colonial struggles and the need for peaceful relations with non-Muslim countries caused modem Muslim scholars such as the Indian Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) and the Egyptians Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) to reframe jihad as pertaining only to defensive struggles directed at aggressors.19 This way, the classical doctrine of jihad was reformulated in a way similar to Western concepts of "just war" as developed by Christian thinkers such as Augustine and

14 For amore extensive treatment of this spiritual dimension ofjihad, see Richard Bonney Jihad from Quran to bin laden. New York etc.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, pp. 91-107; Morabia, Gihad, pp 324-330 15 Cook, Understanding, pp. 51-52,57-63 16 Kruse, /slamischer, pp. 49-51; Peters Jihad, pp. 3-4 For more on the issue of jihad duty and how the division of fard 'ala l-hßya and fard 'aia l-'ayn spread across the Muslim world, see Bonner, Jihad, pp. 106-116. " R. Tschudi, "Die Fetwa's des Schejch-ul-Islâm über die Erklärung des heiligen Krieges, nach dem Tanîn, Nummer 2119 vom 15. November 1914", Der Islam, vol. 5,1914, pp. 391-393. " For an extensive treatment of jihad as used in the struggle against colonialism, see Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism, The Hague: Mouton, 1979, pp 39-104 " Ibid., pp. 125-130. See also Bonney Jihad, pp. 29-33.

55 Thomas Aquinas.20 Indeed, several studies have compared jihad with Western "just war"21 or international law, both from a Muslim22 and a non-Muslim point of view23. The defensive military struggle as formulated in Islamic law and by modern scholars is also the context in which the efforts of the Palestinian Muslim Brother 'Abdallah 'Azzam to lead the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union should be seen. Though sometimes referred to as the mentor of Bin Laden, 'Azzam's ideas on jihad were quite different from Bin Laden's global jihad24, as we will see. In one of his books, 'Azzam makes the case for jihad against the Soviets by pointing out that all four Sunni schools of Islamic law agree that a defensive jihad is a personal duty and thus compulsory for every able-bodied Muslim.25 He points out that the classical scholars of all stripes agree with this view26 and how the rules drawn up by these scholars are applied in the Afghan war.27 'Azzam's reliance on so many classical scholars, the support his views receive from Saudi, Yemeni and Syrian scholars28 and his treatment of relevant Islamic legal issues, such as whether mujähidün need to ask their parents, spouses or creditors for permission during a defensive war2' underlines the fact that his views on jihad are clearly congruent with the prescriptions of the sharf a.30 'Azzam's importance with regard to jihad therefore lies not in any new ideas but in his ability to use his writings and personal charisma to mobilise Arabs for the Afghan cause, based on a version of jihad that had existed long before.31

20 Peters, Isiàm, pp. 121-130 21 See for example John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson, Just War andjihai Historica! and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace m Western and Islamic Traditions, New York etc.. Greenwood Press, 1991; John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War m Islam, Cambodge, Mass & London: Harvard University Press, 2007 For a critical treatment of this comparison, see Ella Landau-Tasseron, "Is Jihad Comparable to Just War? A Review Article", Jerusalem Studies m Arabic and Islam, vol. 34,2008, pp. 535-550. a See for example Muhammad Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1996 [1935]. " See for example Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law", in: Kelsay & Johnson, Just, pp. 195-226; Peters, Islam, pp. 135-150. " Thomas Hegghammer, "Abdallah Azzam, the Imam of Jihad", in: Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds.), Al Qaeda in its own Words (transi. Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2008 [2005], p. 101. 24 'Abdallah 'Azzâm, Al-Di/a 'an Arädf l-Muslimih Ahamm Furüd d-A'yän, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 19 August 2009), n.d., pp. 9-12 26 Ibid., pp. 12-16 27 ibid., pp. 27-42. 2' Ibid, p. 2. 29 ibid, pp. 21-22. 30 This does not mean that there was no disagreement among scholars about 'Azzam's ideas. See Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambodge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 41-42. " One of the most important books in which 'Azzam calls on Muslims to join the Afghan jihad is his Ilhaq bi-l- Qâfila, www tawhed.ws (accessed 21 August 2009), 1987. In this short booklet, 'Azzam does not so much deal with the justification of jihad in Afghanistan as with the question of why Mushms should "join the caravan" (the meaning of the title) of Arabs moving to that country to fight there.

56 Al-Maqdisi and Classical Jihad

In applying the above to al-Maqdisi's ideas, it should be pointed out that the notion of jihad as a defensive military struggle is rather uncontroversial among Salafi scholars in general, including quietists. The fact that the latter are referred to in this study as "quietists" and not as "Jihadi-Salafis" does not mean that they reject jihad in principle. The war in Afghanistan in the 1980s is a case in point. A quietist scholar such as al-Albani is said to have been instrumental in encouraging Muslims to join the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.32 The same was true for major Saudi quietist scholars such as Ibn Baz and Muhammad b. Salih al-'Uthaymin (d. 2001), who also agreed that the Afghan war constituted a genuine jihad." Al-Maqdisi - despite being aJihadi-Salafi - agrees with them. His stay in Afghanistan during the war in the 1980s clearly showed his support for the efforts of the miyahidun there and in one of his books, he explicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of the Afghan jihad.34 Similarly, after the U.S. government launched its "war on terrorism" in response to "9/11", he called on Muslims to help their brethren in Afghanistan against the invading American army and its allies.35 Al-Maqdisi's agreement with classical jihad as described in Islamic law and expressed in defensive warfare does not mean that he often propagates this type of jihad. This may be related to his - and other Salafis' - different conception of the sharTa, on which classical jihad is based. In his view, the sharTa accumulated all kinds of rulings, regulations and laws throughout the centuries that cannot be traced back directly to the Qur'än and the Sunna but have been added to the body of Islamic law by fuqaha?6 Al-Maqdisi believes the extreme versions of these concepts are, in fact, religious innovations (bida') that cause deviance and should therefore be rejected.37 He believes that all additional rules should be within the

52 Interview with Usâma Shahäda, Amman, 12 January 2009. This does not mean that everyone agreed with the idea of sending young men to Afghanistan to fight there. The legitimacy of the jihad in Afghanistan per se, however, does not seem to have been in doubt " Bernard Rougier, "Le Jihad en Afghanistan et l'émergence du salafisme jihadisme", in. Bernard Rougier (ed ), Qu'est-ce que le Salafisme7, Pans: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, p. 71. M Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Millat Ibrahim wa-Da'wat al-Anbiya wa-Î-Mursa/Γη wa-Asälib al-TughâtfîTamyTihâ wa-Sarfal-Du'ät 'anhä, www tawhed.ws (accessed 26June 2009), 1984, p. 68. 15 Id., Hädhä mä Adinu lläh hihi, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 17 March 2009), 2001, pp. 22-23. 16 These scholarly additions were employed to solve situations for which there was no immediate answer in the sources or to accommodate existing or desirable practices. The use of scholars' own opinions and insights (ray) includes their approval of practices beyond the immediate confines of the law (istihsdn) and their willingness to take the public interest into account (istislöA) See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to islamic Law, Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1982 [1964], pp. 60 62 " Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-Qowl al-Nafisfîl-Tahdhïr mm KhadTat Iblls, www tawhed.ws, η d., pp. 1-2.

57 confines of what the sources say about any given subject and should always have scriptural evidence in order for Muslims not to be led astray.38 This means that al-Maqdisi's concept of the sharia is at odds with the centuries-old Islamic legal tradition we have looked at so far, causing him to reject the latter in favour of his own unclear version. A more likely reason for al-Maqdisi's lack of focus on classical jihad, however, is that he considers jihad against the Muslim world's own rulers more important, as we will see below. He mostly treats jihad as a tool to oppose kufr and shirk to advance the cause of Islam embodied in the unity of God (tawhrd) and therefore does not limit jihad to just fighting but also sees da'wa as a form of struggle ("jihad of the tongue") through which this goal can be achieved39, a position for which he is also criticised, as we will see in chapter 9. From the above, it becomes clear that al-Maqdisi's idea of jihad is a multi-faceted one, encompassing both violent (fighting) and non-violent (da'wa) forms. Al-Maqdisi's way of confronting the dar αί-harb, or dar al-kufr (the abode of unbelief) as he calls it, is complicated by his idea that the entire world is actually part of the abode of unbelief. He only separates the world into the original abode of unbelief {dar al-kufr al-asiiyya), where most people are non-Muslims, and the recent abode of unbelief (dar ai-fcu/r αί-hâditha), where most inhabitants follow Islam.40 This effectively makes the entire world the object of al-Maqdisi's jihad. How he arrived at this position is rooted in another branch of the history ofjihad , which we will deal with now.

Tumingjihad against Muslim Rulers

The outwardly-directed military struggle in relation to non-Muslims41 as seen above is historically probably the dominant form of jihad but Islamic law recognises that apart from conflicts between the dar al-Isläm and the dar al-harb, there may also be problems within the abode of Islam that require the use of armed force against other Muslims. This type of jihad, as described by Islamic law, can be seen as an effort to consolidate, rather than expand, the

J, Ibid., pp. 7-9,13-27. 19 Interview with al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Waqfat ma'a Thamarât al- Jihäd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2004, p. 114. In spite of al-Maqdisi's views on this, the concept of jihad in this study will be treated as one that involves actual fighting, separate from da'wa. 10Id.,RisälatMunäfaha wa-Todhlar ila badal-lkhwa, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 April 2007), 1992/1993, p. 1; id, Waqfit, p. 124; id., Al-ZarqäwL Âmâl wa-Alâm (Munâçara wa-Munösoha), www.tawhed.ws (accessed 24 August 2006), 2004, p. 9. "Jihad may also be waged against non-Muslims living within the borders of the dâr al-Islâm. See for example Khaddun, War, pp. 75-76,80. This version ofjihad, though important, is irrelevant to this study and will therefore not be dealt with.

58 dar al-lslâm and may be applied by the leader of the Muslims (the imam) against apostates (murtaddûn), deserters, highway robbers and, importantly, dissenters or rebels (bughät). The fuqaha did not entirely agree on the correct punishment of rebels but jihad was seen as an option that could be used against them.42 According to Islamic law, rebellion against the imam is never justified except if he does not "fulfil the basic obligations of a member of the Muslim community", such as performing prayers." The following section can be said to deal with this exception and focuses on how jihad against Muslim rulers was justified by certain Muslim scholars, what the Salafi debate is on excommunication (takfir) of these rulers and what al-Maqdisi's position is on this issue.

Justifying Jihad against Musfim Rulers

Although the threat represented by bughât was clearly different from attacks emanating from the dar al-harb, all the types of military jihad described in this chapter so far have at least one thing in common: they are all based on the idea that the imam, as the leader of the worldwide Muslim community (umma), is the one who ultimately calls for and commands the jihad. Even the rebellion caused by bughät was to be met with a jihad launched by the imam. Islamic law, in other words, does not seem to recognise the legitimacy (or perhaps even the possibility) of ordinary Muslims taking matters into their own hands and calling for a jihad themselves, independent of the imam. A person who did see this possibility and was instrumental and highly influential in changing jihad into a concept that could also be turned against the ruler was the medieval Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya.44

42 Ibid., 76-80; li, Islamic, pp. 230-253; Joel L. Kraemer, "Apostates, Rebels and Brigands", Israel Oriental Studies, vol 10,1983, pp 58-59 " John Kelsay, Islam and War. A Study m Comparative Ethics, Louisville, Kent.: Westmmster/john Knox Press, 1993, p. 88. For more on the bughat and how they should be treated according to Islamic law, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Ahkom Al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam", in. Johnson & Kelsay (eds.), Cross, pp. 149-176; Kraemer, "Apostates", pp. 48-59; Werner Schwartz, "öihäd unter Muslimen", Studien zum Mmderheitenprob/em im islam, vol 27, no 6,1980, pp 29-36. An example of such rebels often mentioned in the literature are the Khawânj, the group of early-Islamic dissenters who rebelled against the decision of the fourth caliph 'Alï b. AbîTâlib to accept arbitration in the conflict with his challenger Mu'äwiya b. Abi Sufyän in the year 657 For more on the Khawânj, see for example K.-H. Pampus, "Über die Rolle der Hängiya im frühen Islam", Studien zum Mmderheitenproblem im Islam, vol. 27, no. 6,1980, pp 1-103; Elie Adib Salem, Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawânj, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956; Hussam S. Timani, Modem Intellectual Readings of the Kharyites, New York etc.: Peter Lang, 2008. " This does not mean that there had not been any scholars before Ibn Taymiyya who advocated revolt against the rulers for vanous reasons. See for example Bonney, Jihad, pp. 77-78 It also does not mean that revolts and rebellions against Muslim rulers by other Muslims did not occur. The rise and fall of different dynasties in the history of Muslim empires shows that this did happen. Modern ideologues, however, do seem to view Ibn Taymiyya as the most authoritative and certainly the most influential major scholar who took this position

59 Taqi al-Din Ahmad b. Taymiyya (1263-1328), a Syrian Hanbali scholar who lived at the time of the destructive Mongol invasions of the Middle East, was known as a polemical, fiercely independent and strict scholar who did not mince words, even when speaking to those in power. He was, therefore, a controversial figure in his day and age45 and found himself imprisoned because of his beliefs several times.46 Although Ibn Taymiyya was influential in several areas, only one of them concerns us here, namely his justification of jihad against Muslim rulers. As mentioned, the fuqaha traditionally believed that bughät were not allowed to revolt against Muslim rulers, except when the latter were not proper Muslims. It was this exception to the rule that was used by Ibn Taymiyya to declare the governing Mongols, who converted to Islam after coming to power in parts of the Muslim world, a legitimate object of jihad. Ibn Taymiyya stated that despite their conversion, the Mongols did not rule on the basis of Islam but according to their own system of laws, known as yäsiq or yâsa. Because he believed ruling on the basis of the sharia to be a fundamental part of being a Muslim, the Mongols' unwillingness to do so meant that they were, in effect, non-Muslims and Ibn Taymiyya therefore called for jihad against them.47 Ibn Taymiyya's reasoning against the Mongol rulers of his time and in favour of jihad against them makes clear that talc/ir of Muslim rulers is an important if not essential part in legitimising rebellion. Muslim scholars have generally been highly reluctant, however, to apply talcßr to other Muslims because this would place the latter outside the bounds of Islam and make them subject to the death penalty.48 Although, as we will see, the question of what exactly constitutes ku/r" and when one may be called an apostate or an

,5 Ibn Taymiyya's sanity has even been called into question, although these doubts seem to have been more polemical than factual in nature. See Donald Ρ Little, "Did Ibn Taymiyya have a Screw Loose7", Studia Islamica, no. 41, 1975, pp. 93-111. 46 For more on Ibn Taymiyya's life, see Henri Laoust, La Biographe d'lbn Taimiya d'après Ibn Kathîr, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1943. 47 Bonner, Jihad, pp. 143-144, Bonney Jihad, pp. 115-116,121,424-425; Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modem Politics, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 96-100. For more on Ibn Taymiyya's actions and travels during the time of the Mongols, see Laoust, Biographie, pp. 121-132 Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya also accused the Mongols of being bughät because he believed that they, like the Khawânj in earlier times, had challenged and overthrown the existing Islamic order. See ibid., pp. 130-131. Although this accusation also made its way into the treatise Al-Fanda al-Ghä'iba by Muhammad 'Abd al Salâm Faraj (see below), it does not seem to have been adopted by many modern radical Islamic ideologues, unlike Ibn Taymiyya's accusation of tak/fr of the Mongols 48 Bernard Lewis, "Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islam", Studia Islamica, no. 1,1953, pp 52-62. " For an extensive scholarly discussion of the term kufr, which originally is said to have meant "ingratitude" but quickly came to take on the meaning of ingratitude in the face of God's offer of belief in Islam (in other words "unbelief), see Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts m the Quran, Montreal etc.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 [1959], pp 119-249, especially pp. 119-177

60 unbeliever is not agreed upon50, it is clear that, under the influence of especially Ibn Taymiyya, modern radical scholars have made extensive use of the concept of takfir to condemn the rulers of their countries on religious grounds. First and foremost among these is the Egyptian literary scholar Sayyid Qutb. As is the case with Salafis, tawhrd played a major role in Qutb's thinking. He believed that, since God is the only deity, his oneness should be found in every sphere of life, including in legislation and the rule of a country. Qutb therefore stated that laws and government of a state should reflect the sovereignty of God (häkimiyya)51, a term he had adopted from the works of the Pakistani ideologue Abu 1- A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979)52, who had developed a theory of what an Islamic state should look like.53 Qutb believed that no country in the world was ruled entirely according to the sharia and they therefore failed to give God sole sovereignty in the legislative sphere. As such, even Muslim countries could not be called Islamic states but should be referred to as jähilr states, entities existing in a situation of ignorance similar to that of pre-Islamic times.54 The issue of legislation was so important to Qutb because of the link he drew between laws and worship. Based on Q. 9: 31, which states that "[jews and Christians] have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords (arbäban) apart from God [...]", Qutb concluded that following (religious) leaders in legislation amounts to taking them as lords (and, implicitly, gods) and thus equals worshipping them as if they were divine. Following non-Islamic laws therefore constitutes the worshipping of other gods, which is contrary to the fundamental principle of Islamic monotheism as expressed in tawhrd.55 According to this reasoning, the

w Rudolph Peters & Gert J.J. de Vnes, "Apostacy in Islam", Die Welt des Islams, vol 17, no. 1,1977, pp 1-25 For a discussion of the broader, related concepts of "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy", see Alexander Knysh, "'Orthodoxy' and 'Heresy' in Medieval Islam: An Essay in Reassessment", The Muslim World, vol. 83, no 1,1993, pp. 48-67; Robert Langer & Udo Simon, "The Dynamics of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. Dealing with Divergence in Muslim Discourses and Islamic Studies", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 48, nos. 3-4,2008, pp. 273-288; John Taylor, "An Approach to the Emergence of Heterodoxy in Mediaeval Islam", Religious Studies, vol 2, no. 2,1967, pp 197-210. 51 Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival", in: John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 89. For a recent overview of Qutb's life, see Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism, Westport, Conn. & London· Praeger, 2005. 52 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical islamic Fundamentalism. The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, Beirut. American University of Beirut, 1992, p. 151. For an in-depth treatment of the concept of häkimiyya in Qutb's thought, see Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah andyahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", Middle Eastern Studies, vol 38, no 3, 2002, pp. 145-170 " For a good overview of what an Islamic state should look like in Mawdudîs view, see Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in: Esposito (ed ), Voices, pp 99-133. M Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2005 [2001], pp. 82-83. The original Arabic version of this book, first published in 1964 as Μα ahm fil-Tanq, can be found on www.tawhed.ws Qutb had also adopted the termjdhiliyya in this respect from scholars from the Indian subcontinent, including Mawdudi. See Wilham E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine ofJâhiliyya", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 35, no. 4, 2003, p. 523. 55 Shepard, "Sayyid", pp. 524-525

61 leaders of Muslim countries, all of whom supposedly follow un-Islamic laws, are infidels56 who should be fought through the use of jihad.57 In spite of the similarity between the arguments of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya, it is not entirely clear to what extent the former was influenced by the latter.58 Qutb, notwithstanding the influence of intellectuals such as Mawdudi, seems to have been a rather original thinker. This was perhaps less so with the main ideologue behind the murder of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), who was heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyya. In a booklet in which he portrays jihad as "the absent duty" (al-farida αί-ghä'iba) that is incumbent on Muslims but has been neglected so far, Faraj draws an explicit parallel between Ibn Taymiyya's situation under Mongol rule and Egypt in the 1970s. He concludes that the rulers of Egypt are the same or even worse than the Mongols in Ibn Taymiyya's time and therefore should be condemned as apostates and infidels59 and fought by means of jihad.60 Although the Egyptian regime tried to refute the ideas of both Qutb and Faraj61, this did not stop their and Ibn Taymiyya's ideas from gaining adherents. In fact, the report referred to at the very beginning of this study, which states that al-Maqdisi is the most influential jihadi thinker alive, also mentions that Ibn Taymiyya is the most influential mediaeval scholar and Qutb the most-cited modern thinker among radical Muslims.62 Through their writings, an influential theory came into existence that stated that Muslim rulers whose conduct - particularly with regard to legislation - was not in accordance with

56 Qutb, Milestones, ρ 86. 57 ibid., pp. 53-76; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anicjustification for an Islamic Revolution· The View of Sayyid Qutb", Middle £ast;oumal, vol. 37, no. 1,1983, pp. 27-28. 58 See Sivan, Radical, pp. 92-94,102, who probably correctly sums up the relation between Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya on p. 102 as Qutb "trying to work Maudoodi's [sic] ideas into the Ibn Taymiyya framework". On Mawdudîs ideas onjihad, which share the emphasis on revolution with Qutb - though perhaps interpreted in a different way, see the Arabic translation of the original booklet in Urdu, Al-Jihàd fi Sabil Allah, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2 September 2009), n.d. For more on Mawdûdîs views onjihad, see Jamal Malik, "Maudûdrs al-Jihâd/i7-/slâm: A Neglected Document", Zeitschrift far Religionswissenschaft, vol. 17, 2009, pp. 61-69. 59 Muhammad 'Abd al Salâm Faraj, Al-Farîda al-Ghâ'iba, www tawhed.ws (accessed 26 August 2009), n.d., pp 4- 10 This document has been translated into English in Johannes J.G.Jansen, The Neglected Duty The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and islamic Resurgence m the Middle East, New York & London. MacMillan, 1986 The relevant pages m this translation are pp. 166-179. See also id., "The Creed of Sadat's Assassins: The Contents of The Forgotten Duty' Analysed", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 25,1985, pp 1-30 M Faraj, Al-Fonda, pp 14-32. See also Jansen, Neglected, pp. 190-230 " Rachel Scott, "An 'Official' Islamic Response to the Egyptian al-Jihäd Movement"Journal ofPolitical Ideologies, vol. 8, no. 1,2003, pp. 50-58; Sivan, Radical, pp. 103-104. See also Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94)", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 31, no. 3,1999, pp. 371 399. 62 William McCants (ed ), The Militant Ideology Atlas, Executive Report, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006, pp 7 8,13,15

62 the sharTa ceased to be Muslims and were therefore legitimate targets of jihad.63 This theory became part of the ideas espoused by ideologues I refer to as Jihadi-Salafìs - including al- Maqdisi - and as such has become what I believe is the defining difference over jihad between them and quietist Salafis: the latter support jihad in the classical sense in at least one of its meanings, namely as fighting to defend the dar al-lsläm from invasions by countries of the dar αί-harb, while Jihadi-Salafis are those Salafis who believe jihad may indeed be waged for that reason but also against Muslim rulers within the dar al-lsläm.

The Debate over Takfir of Muslim Rulers

Although jihad against Muslim rulers sets Jihadi-Salafis apart from their quietist counterparts, the differences among both Salafi and non-Salafi scholars about the underlying justification of this jihad - takfir of the rulers - are less clear-cut. As mentioned, the issue of what acts by Muslim rulers can be classified as kufr and thus justify takfir is not agreed upon and, moreover, is more complicated than the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, Qutb and Faraj mentioned so far suggest. In the debate on this issue, the key question is obviously: what constitutes kufrl Salafi scholars throughout Islamic history have given some detailed answers to this question, distinguishing different sinful acts. Some of these, such as worshipping idols or making blasphemous remarks about the Prophet, are considered to be so obviously in violation of what Islam stands for that they immediately turn a Muslim guilty of such acts into a kafìr. Such sins are referred to as greater or major unbelief (kufr

a This trend was abetted by the development of an additional reason forjihad against Muslim rulers, whose supporters saw the liberation of Palestine as their main goal but believed that this could not be done without first turning their own countries into properly Islamic ones so as to fightIsrae l under an Islamic flag. They deemed the inability of Arab nationalist or socialist regimes to defeat Israel as proof of their theory and therefore considered the overthrow of their own regimes as a necessary prerequisite to the ultimate liberation of Palestine. See Sivan, Radical, p. 47. Glimpses of this idea can also be seen in Faraj, Al-Fanda, p. 15, where he acknowledges the importance of "liberating Jerusalem" but argues that "fighting needs to be done under an Islamic banner and Islamic leadership". He further states that the present rulers are obstacles to the liberation of Palestine since "the basis of imperialism's presence in the land of Islam is these rulers" and that trying to bring "imperialism" to an end (presumably without first overthrowing these rulers) is "useless". This idea is argued more clearly and forcefully by Ayman al-Zawähin, Osama bin Laden's deputy, in a treatise entitled Al-Tariij ila !-Quds Yamurm 'abra I-Qähira ("the road to Jerusalem runs through Cairo"), www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 August 2009), n.d. In this short article, al-Zawähin argues on p. 2 that "[.. ] you will not conquer Palestine unless you decide the conflict in Egypt and Algeria... and unless you conquer Cairo". It is difficult, however, to disentangle whether jihad against rulers in the Muslim world is done because of the letter's unwillingness to apply the sharîa in full or because of Palestine, particularly since the Palestinian question is a cause about which both trends presumably have strong feelings. Since the Palestinian question is, in any case, not a prominent issue in al-Maqdisi's writings, the idea of fighting the regimes in the Muslim world as a first step to liberating Palestine will not be dealt with any further in this study.

63 akbar) or simply as kufr.M A person guilty of this need not even be tested on his or her beliefs, whether or not he or she was misinformed about such grave sins or perhaps made a mistake in interpreting scripture. Kufr akbar is considered to be so clearly sinful that no further proof of a person's unbelief is necessary to apply takfir.65 This is different, however, with lesser or minor unbelief (kufr asghar), which refers to major sins (icaba ir, sing, kabfra), such as drinking wine or eating pork, that are not sinful enough to expel a person guilty of them from Islam and justify tallir. This changes, however, if a person not only commits a major sin but also makes clear that he or she - despite knowing it is forbidden in Islam - considers it permissible (istihiâl), believes it to be right (i'tiqäd) or uses such a sin to negate (part of) Islam (Jahd or juhüd). In such a case, major sins that would normally be lesser unbelief then become greater unbelief, allowing takfir against the person guilty of this.66 The division of sins described above is a very Salafi one and is not universally accepted but it does provide a good starting point for an overview of the debate on this issue, in which - historically - roughly four different positions can be distinguished. The first position was held by an early Islamic trend called the Murji'a, whose adherents believed that judgement over people's sins should be subject to postponement (irja, from which the name Murji'a is derived) and left to God alone. They believed that actions by Muslims, no matter how grave they were, should not be condemned as kufr since only belief in the heart is what really matters and God alone can judge that. In relation to the distinction between kufr akbar and kufr asghar the Murji'a therefore believed that even sins that could be put in first category were no reason for tafcßr since even then ordinary human beings would not be able to establish the true beliefs of the culprit.67

M It should be pointed out that when the term kafr is used in this study, it refers to kufr akbar, unless explicitly stated otherwise 65 There are many articles by quietisi Salafls dealing with this topic. See for example Abu lyâd, Kufr Can Occur without Istihlaal orjuhood, www.salafipublications com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d ; id., Kufr Can Occur without Believing m KufrorDesinng it, www.salaflpubLcations.com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d.; Imaam Ihn Baazon Imaan, Kufr, Ιηαα and the Murji'ah, www.salafipublications.com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d., p. 2, Nine Rules Concerning Kufr and Takfir, www.salafipublications.com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d, p. 2 66 Sayings of the Ulamaa' Regarding Ruling by Other than what Allaah has Revealed and the Two Types of Kufr, www.salafipublications.com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d.; Muhammad b. Sâhh al-'Uthaymïn, Shaikh Ibn Uthaymeen on al-Hukmu bi-ghayn maa Anzallallaah, www.salafipublications.com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d.; 'Abd al-Salâm al-Burjis, A Treatise on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed, www salafipublications com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d. See also Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-Wala' wa-l-Bara' in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi", in: Roel Meyer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, London Hurst & Co., 2009, pp 97-99 67 A good overview of the beliefs of the Murji'a, the histoncal roots of the trend and related groups may be found in Wilferd Madelung, "Murdji'a", in· Clifford Edmund Bosworth et al (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition, vol VII, Leiden: Bnll, 1993, pp 605-607. Quietisi Salafls are sometimes accused of being Murji'a, including by al-Maqdisî, whose accusation is dealt with in chapter 9

64 The second and third positions in this debate are held by quietist Salafi scholars who, when deciding whether takßr may be used against Muslim rulers applying "man-made laws" (qawânïn wad'iyya), often quote Q. 5. 44-47 These verses refer to "Whoso judges68 not according to what God has sent down (man iam yahkum bi-mä amala llâh)" as "unbelievers" (al-kâfimn), "evildoers" (αί-ζά/imün) and "the ungodly" (al-fasiqm) In deciding whether rulers, because of their alleged application of "man-made laws", fall into the category of laiffar/kafìrun, zähmün or fasiqün - only the first of which legitimates takßr - quietisi Salafi 'ulama hold the second and third positions in this debate Those scholars holding the second position disagree with any "un-Islamic" laws that Muslim rulers may occasionally apply but they consider them to be "only" manifestations of lesser unbelief since no clear indication of istiWä!, i'tiqäd orjahd on the part of the rulers can be seen.69 This also applies when rulers do not just use "man-made laws" occasionally or even frequently but exchange the whole body of Islamic laws for a secular one (tabdfl). Even in such a case, quietisi scholars holding the second position believe that clear proof of a ruler's unbelief (in the form of istihiâi, i'tiqäd orjahd) is necessary to justify takßr against them™ Since Muslim rulers are unlikely to give them this proof by, for example, explicitly and verbally negating Islamic law, this group of quietisi Salafi scholars, which includes the aforementioned al- Albani and Ibn Baz, makes it virtually impossible to apply takfir against them

Quietisi Salafi scholars holding the third position in this debate are very close to the ones mentioned above. They also disagree with any incidentally or even frequently applied man-made laws and also believe them to be acts of kufr asghar as long as they are not accompanied by any proof of unbelief in the rulers' hearts as manifested in istihläl, ι tiqäd or jahd. They differ, however, in their judgement of the systematic application of man-made laws in the form of a secular constitution or another system that replaces the laws of Islam While the Salafi scholars holding the second position believe that even in such a case proof of the rulers' unbelief is necessary to excommunicate them, the ones holding the third position state that this is not needed since the rulers' complete adoption of another system

68 The viordyahhim can refer to judging but can also be translated as ruling or even governing The more political meaning that this verse gets through such a translation was not lost on Islamist movements See Haddad, "Qur amc", ρ 27 69 Muhammad Nâsir al Din al Albani, Concerning Those who do not Rule by what Allaah SWT has Revealed, www salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d, Imaam al Albani and his Argument against Ahi ut Tak/ir, www salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d , Muhammad b Sâhh al Uthaymm, ShaiWi Ibn Uthameen on Ibn Baz and Albani s Position on Ruling by Other than what Allaah has Revealed, www salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d 70 See for example Abdal AzTzb Baz, Imaam Ibn Baaz on Tabdeel and KufrDoonaKufr, www salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d , The Creed of Imaam al Albaanee on Takfir and Apostasy, www salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), 2000, ρ 8, footnote 9

65 of law in itself is proof of the unbelief in their heart underlying their actions. Thus, prominent quietist Salafi scholars such as the aforementioned al-Fawzan, former Saudi mufti Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh (d. 1969) and one of his successors, Ibn al- 'Uthaymin, see the systematic application of man-made laws as kufr akbar.n The fourth position in this debate is held by an early-Islamic trend called the Khawärij, who seceded {kharaja, hence the name) from the Muslim community over a conflict between two caliphs, 'Ali b. Abi Talib and Mu'awiya b. Abi Sufyan, in 657. The Khawärij represent the complete opposite of the Murji'a in that the former not just considered sins described above as kufr akbar as reason for takpr but also those included in the ku/r asghar category, regardless of any further proof of a person's unbelief. Thus, whereas the Murji'a assumed that even Muslims guilty of kufr akbar were still believers in their heart, the Khawärij dismissed even those involved in kufr asghar as "infidels".72 Within this debate on unbelief, al-Maqdisi - despite being a Jihadi-Salafi - holds the third position that several quietists also adhere to. While there are other aspects of quietist Salafism that he disagrees with73 and he also rejects the unwillingness of the other scholars in this category to rebel against the ruler in order to change "man-made laws" into Islamic ones, which is a question of manhaj dealt with in chapter 3, he does share their views on what constitutes kufr. Unlike many other Jihadi-Salafis, who are more extreme on this issue, do not deal with it at all or simply rely on the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb, al-Maqdisi closely resembles quietist Salafism in the conclusions, arguments and terminology used in his writings on this topic. This further underlines his position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi, as a closer look at his own justification of jihad against Muslim rulers shows.

71 See for instance Sâhh b. Fawzân al-Fawzân, Shaikh Salih al-Fawzan Explains his Words in Kitaab ut-Tawheed on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed, www.salaflpubLcations.com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d.; Muhammad b. Ibrahim Ä1 al-Shaykh, Tahkfrn al-Qawänfn, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d , al- 'Uthaymm, Shaikh, Creed, ρ 8, footnote 9. See also Shaykh Abdul-Azeez ar-Raaphee on Secular Laws, Changing the Whole of the Deen, and the Accusation of Irjaa'against Ahi us Surmah, www.salafipubhcations com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d., p. 1. 72 Salem, Political, pp. 31-37 73 Al-Maqdisi pays less attention than certain Saudi Salafi scholars to "punty " in personal relations with non- Muslims, for instance, and also rejects quietists' unwillingness to declare rulers to be kuffar, as we will see. He views the latter point as only the natural consequence of quietists' ideas on kufr, while quietists themselves often describe this as ghulûw (extremism). For more on this, see Roel Meijer, "Fighting Fitna with Fitna. Quietist Madkhali Salafism and the Mirage of Unity", paper presented at the MESA Annual Meeting, Boston, 23 November 2009

66 Al-Magdisfs Views on Jihad against Muslim Rulers

Al-Maqdisi's starting point injustifyingjihad against Muslim rulers is to explain his ideas on takfir and kufr and relate them to the central concept of tawhid. He stresses the necessity of the oneness of God "in all its types" including "ruling" (aZ-hulcm) and "legislation" (a!-tashrf) and states that Muslims should not just apply the rulings of the Quran and the Surma but should be in total submission (al-taslim al-mutlaq) to them.74 Like Qutb, al-Maqdisi makes the connection between "un-Islamic" legislation on the one hand and the violation of tawhid through the worship of other gods on the other. He similarly quotes Q. 9: 31, in which Jews and Christians are accused of taking their rabbis and monks as "lords" for following their rules, as the basis of his argument:

They did not prostrate before their rabbis or bow down to them... but their obeying them in making the forbidden permissible (fitahlil al-hamm) and making the permissible forbidden (tahrfm al-halä!) and agreeing with them on that is considered by God to be taking lords for them... because obedience in legislation (al-ta'afìl- tashn) is worship ('ibâda), which is not permitted to be directed at anyone but God.75

Al-Maqdisi's condemnation of un-Islamic legislation is practically applied to several countries of which he has intimate knowledge, such as Kuwait.76 The influence that Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb had on al-Maqdisi, already apparent m his focus on legislation and his comparing it with worship of other gods, is even clearer in his treatment of the laws in Kuwait, a country he lived in at the time when he wrote about it Because he considers man- made laws and their legislators to be other gods, al-Maqdisi actually refers to them as idols (tawäghft). He states that "it is demanded of every Muslim - in every time and place - if he is to be a Muslim who upholds the tawhid (Musliman muwahhidan), that he realises the true meaning of'there is no god but God"' This is to be done by "unbelief in every idol (al-ku/r bi- kull täghüt) and faith in God and submission to him alone", referring to this - on the basis of Q 2: 256 - as "the most firm handle" (αί-'urwa ai-wuthqä) that believers can hold on to.77 He

n Abu Muhammad al MaqdisI, Kashfai Niqâb an Shan at al-Ghâb, www tawhed ws (accessed 16 November 2006), 1988, pp 10 11 71 li, Al Dïmuqrâtiyya Din, www tawhed ws (accessed 29 August 2006), η d, ρ 5 76 Al Maqdisï also has severe criticism of legislation in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which will be dealt with in detail in chapter 4 and 9 77 AI MaqdisI, Kashfai Niqäb, ρ 16

67 continues by stating that the "most disgusting idol of the age in this country of ours (ashna' tawaghft af-'asr β baiadinä hädhä) and in many of the countries of the Muslims is this [Kuwaiti] constitution and its man-made laws (hâdhâ i-du5tür wa-cjawânfnuhu J-waçfixya)".79 Al-Maqdisi then proceeds to frame this belief as the ultimate consequence of the Islamic confession of faith, thereby making such ideas of relevance to every Muslim:

Know that your Islam and your tawhid will not be perfected and the meaning of "there is no god but God" will not be realised and that you will not find your way to Paradise until you disbelieve and disavow every idol, the most important of which is this: the modern idol that most people follow, pay and worship with the worship of legislation."

These words show that al-Maqdisi equates man-made laws with idols and thus sees them as challenges to tawhid and, subsequently, Islam itself. Furthermore, this statement entails that simply pronouncing the Islamic confession of faith and fulfilling one's basic duties as a Muslim is apparently not enough to be a good believer; one must also apply the Islamic rejection of idols to legislation.60 Within this context, he draws a comparison between the Kuwaiti constitution and the yäsiq, the Mongol law, echoing the accusations Ibn Taymiyya levelled at the rulers of his time. Al-Maqdisi claims that, just as the yäsiq was a combination of different systems of law, so today's legislative systems in the Muslim world and Kuwait in particular are not purely Islamic but bear the traces of European influence. This "plurality of sources of legislation" (ta'addud masädir al-tashn), according to al-Maqdisi, also means "the plurality of lords and gods served besides God" (ta'addud αί-arbâb wa-I-ilâha a/-ma'bûda min dum' lläh) and thus constitutes shirk and kafr." The difference is, al-Maqdisi claims, that in the Mongols' time, people rose up and rebelled against them, while nowadays most people do not even realise that there is anything wrong with them.82 To counter people's ignorance of Kuwait's "man-made laws", al-Maqdisi proceeds to do what Faraj refrained from doing in his comparison between the yâsiq and Egyptian laws, namely to give a meticulous analysis of what is so bad about them. Al-Maqdisi quotes article

78 ibid., p. 18. 79 Ibid., p. 19. 80 See also id, KashfShubhât al-Mujadilm 'an 'Asäkir al-Shirk wa-Ansâr al-Qawânm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 4 May 2007), 1999 [1995], pp. 17-29. 81 li, Kashfal-Niqâb, p. 28 82 /bid., pp. 20-22.

68 6 of the Kuwaiti constitution, for example, which states that the country has a "democratic system of rule" (nizâm a/-huicm af-dimuqräti). This in itself shows, al-Maqdisi states, that the people are the source of legislation instead of God.83 Similarly, he points to the freedom of religion and equality guaranteed by the Kuwaiti constitution, juxtaposing this with the saying of the Prophet that "he who changes his religion, kill him" (man baddala dihahu fa- tjtuluhu) and verses from the Qur'än (such as 5: 100) that seemingly support inequality by distinguishing between "the corrupt" and "the good".84 The above, though it shows why al-Maqdisi disagrees with man-made laws, does not explain how he justifies calling qawänin wad'iyya manifestations of ku/r (akbar) instead of simply sins of a lesser nature. As mentioned, al-Maqdisi is very close to quietist Salati scholars in his treatment of unbelief. Like them, he deems acts and sayings that blatantly violate the most important underpinnings of Islam - such as insulting the Prophet - to be acts of greater unbelief that expel a person from Islam, regardless of whether istihläi, i'tiqäd or jahd is involved.85 Also similar to quietist Salafis, he does not consider incidentally applied man-made rulings and laws to be manifestations of kufr akbar, unless they are accompanied by istihfä!, i'tiqäd or jahd.86 This even applies when such a sin is frequently repeated, even hundreds of times.87 The situation changes, however, as soon as rulers start applying whole new systems of laws as the basis of their legislation instead of Islamic ones. This, according to al-Maqdisi, clearly shows that they are unbelievers in their hearts and such a sin is therefore kufr akbar, for which no further proof of unbelief is necessary.88 Such a situation, according to al-Maqdisi, is similar to the one the abovementioned verse Q. 5: 44 deals with. This verse, dealing with Jews who followed their own system of laws, also does not mention any explicit istihläi, i'tiqäd or jahd but nevertheless brands them as unbelievers.89 Al-Maqdisi therefore treats rulers who have substituted an Islamic system of

81 Ibid., pp. 35-37. Because democracy is a system in which the people are ultimately in charge and thus the source of legislation, al-Maqdisi goes so far as to label democracy a religion. For his detailed condemnation of democracy, see id., Al-Dïmuqrâtiyya. " Id., Kashfal-Niqäb, pp. 38-41. 85 Id., Imtä' al-NazarfîKashfShubhât Murji'at al-'A^r, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1999/2000 [1991/1992], pp. 17, 23, 83; id., Tabsfral-'L/qalä' bi-Talbisät Ahi al-Tq)ahhum wa-1-Ιηα, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1996, p. 48. " Id., Imtä', pp. 49, 83; li, Tabsîr, pp. 44-46. 87 Id., Imtä', p. 46; id., Tabsîr, p. 129. '"id., Jmta, 46,49,51-52,57-60,88; id.,Mukhtofar'Kashfal-Niqäb 'an Shanatal-Ghâb'-.Al-Dustùral-Urdmnî, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1996, p. 19; id., Tabsîr, 44-46. 9'/d., Tabsir, pp. 109-111.

69 laws with a secular or otherwise non-Islamic one as people of an entirely different religion.90 Al-Maqdisi's views on this issue as described here are in perfect harmony with those of the scholars holding the third position distinguished above. This shows that, in spite of the seemingly enormous ideological gap between Jihadis and quietists because of their differences over jihad, al-Maqdisi's ideas and arguments regarding Icu/r are actually very close to those of quietist Salafis in general and are virtually indistinguishable from some of them in particular. This will become even clearer in chapters 6 and 7, in which we look at al- wala wa-l-bara, a concept used by both quietist Salafis and their Jihadi counterparts. There is, however, a practical matter that does distinguish al-Maqdisi from scholars like al- Fawzan, Ibn Ibrahim and others. Although they all believe that tabdiî of an Islamic system of laws is a form of kufr akbar, the latter are highly reluctant to reach the conclusion that a country has substituted Islam for something else in its legislation. Al-Maqdisi, however, believes that all Muslim countries practise tabdiî in their laws and that the question of lesser unbelief in legislation is, in fact, a purely theoretical one.91 Al-Maqdisi's belief that all Muslim countries are guilty of substituting Islamic law with another system of legislation also explains - to return to the question with which we ended the section of this chapter on classical jihad - why he sees the entire world as dar al- kufr. If one views the world as divided between non-Muslim countries such as France and the United States on the one hand and Muslim countries whose leaders have thrown out Islamic law and replaced it with secular legislation on the other, as al-Maqdisi does, one could indeed make the case that there is no such thing as dar al-imän or dar al-Isläm. It should be pointed out, however, that al-Maqdisi's belief that the entire world is dar al-kufr, does not mean that he applies tak/ir to each and every Muslim. In fact, al-Maqdisi goes into great detail to show that general takßr of entire groups of people or even nations is wrong and sinful. He meticulously points out that tak/ir is subject to certain conditions and must not be used casually92 and singles out dozens of situations in which people apply takfir but must not or should at least be very careful. These include the impermissibility of calling someone a käfir if he or she is unwilling to join a particular group or organisation93 but also

^ For a more extensive treatment of al-MaqdisFs views on Q. 5:44 and how he differs in his interpretation of this verse with al-Albam, see Wagemakers, "Transformation", in: Meyer (ed.), Global, pp. 99-101. 91 Al-Maqdisî,Imta, pp. 49-50; id., Tabjir,pp. 129-131. 92 Id-, Hâdhihi 'Aqîdatunâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 8 February 2006), 1997, pp. 26-30; id., Al-Risâla al- Thalâthïmyyafîl-Tahdhîrmm al-Ghulûwßl-Takfir, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 September 2006), 1998/1999, pp. 12-85; id., Risala li-l-Shqylch AbrBasir, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 April 2007), n.d., pp. 1-6. n Id, Al-Risâla al-7lialathrnr>ya, pp. 154-162, see also pp. 148-153.

70 the warning that, though tak/ir should be applied to the rulers and their legislation since they are infidel in nature, the people who follow and obey them need not be.94 On account of al-Maqdisfs argument that all Muslim states in the world are based on un-Islamic systems and are thus worthy of tallir, he believes that jihad against these regimes is legitimate. In fact, al-Maqdisi prefers jihad to be aimed at the rulers of the Muslim world and not at non-Muslim invaders, although he is certainly not against that. This preference of his was probably also the reason for his difference of opinion with 'Azzam, a staunch defender of classical jihad as we have seen, when they met each other in Afghanistan.95 Two reasons for al-Maqdisi's preference for jihad against Muslim rulers can be discerned in his writings. Firstly, al-Maqdisi believes that the apostacy (ku/r al-ndda) of the rulers is worse than the "original unbelief' (ai-ku/r αί-asli) of, for example, Jews in Israel. Secondly, al-Maqdisi quotes a verse from the Qur an (9: 123) which states that the nearest enemy, here equated with the Muslims' own regimes, should be attacked first.96 The fact that al-Maqdisi deems jihad against Muslim rulers more important than the fight against Israel and America underscores how serious the issue of legislation is to him. In fact, he accuses Muslim regimes of actively attacking tawhfd and Islam. The rulers and their laws, al- Maqdisi maintains, are responsible for "killing the religion {qatl al-dïn), causing the creed to die (imâtat al-'aqîda) and destroying it (hadmihâ)".97 Likewise, the rulers' substitution of Islamic law is not just about "leaving the tawhid and avoiding it" (tark al-tawhfd wa-1-irâd 'anhu) but leads to "destroying it and waging war on it" (hadmahu wa-harbahu).98 Seen within this context, it is perhaps not surprising that, in relation to the aformentioned debate over whether jihad should be offensive or defensive, al-Maqdisi sees his favoured jihad as a purely defensive fight. Since he claims that the entire world is dor al-kufr, occupied either by infidels or apostate rulers, any jihad in his view is defensive." Moreover, al-Maqdisi also claims that, precisely because he considers his preferred jihad to be defensive, it is an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims, not just a limited number.100

'" Ibid , pp 290-356 ,5 Jamal Khashuqjî & Yäsir Abu Hiläla, "Al-Manzar al Fikrlh-Munaffidhlnfijäral Riyäd Al UnfFarida, al- Dîmuqrâtiyya Shirkl", Al-Wasat, no 235, 29 July- 4 August 1996, ρ 13 96 Al-Maqdisî, Höiihihi, ρ 35, id., Uqä mm KhalafQadbän al-Murtaddîn Samt 1418, ρ 11, id., Mil/at, pp 67 68, id., Tafasfr, pp 102, 147-148 97 id., Kashfal-Niqâb, ρ 50 Although al Maqdisî mostly focuses on legislation, his belief that Muslim regimes attack Islam is not limited to that He also states, for example, that Pakistani and Yemeni efforts to close religious schools - supposedly on American orders - are aimed at "corrupting the sons of the Muslims and destroying their religion and their tawhfd" Seeid.Jdäd, ρ 10 "Ίί,Ιτηία,ρ 88 99 li, Waqfât, ρ 83 100Ibid,ρ 98

71 By reasoning as described above, al-Maqdisi thus on the one hand deviates greatly from Islamic tradition by excommunicating Muslim rulers for their legislation and focussing his preferred jihad on their regimes. On the other hand, however, al-Maqdisi clearly adheres very closely to Salafi tradition and - presumably consciously - tries to position his own rather unorthodox views firmly in the centuries' old development of jihad through his use of terms such as dar al-kufr, defensive jihad and fard 'ala l-'ayn. Al-Maqdisi has held on to this view in spite of a growing trend among Jihadi-Salafis since the late 1990s to favour global jihad, the third and final form of militant jihad distinguished in this study, to which we must also briefly pay attention.

Global Jihad

Apart from the classical form of jihad, which eventually culminated in defensive warfare of the dar al-Isläm as espoused by men such as 'Azzam, and the jihad against the ruling regimes preferred by al-Maqdisi, a third form can be distinguished that is ideologically related to the second. This form of jihad, referred to here as global jihad, gained adherents after the fight by various Jihadi-Salafi movements against their own regimes, particularly in Egypt and Algeria, had not been successful. Many of their members had either been killed or locked up, presenting them with the choice of quitting or moving in a different direction. While some chose the first option, others decided to rethink their priorities, as this section shows.

Fighting the "Far Enemy"

While many Jihadi-Salafis who suffered the repression of their states still believed the primary battleground was in their own home countries, it gradually dawned on them that they would not succeed because of the overwhelming military power of the ruling regimes there and, significantly, the support the latter got from the West. This realisation led to the formulation of a new theory, which stated that Muslim regimes would never fall as long as their Western backers kept up their support. This led some Jihadi-Salafis to direct their attention to those backers instead of their own regimes, hoping that by fighting a global

72 jihad against the United States and its allies, they could weaken Western support for their own regimes, in turn making the latter more vulnerable to jihad.101 Instrumental in formulating this new theory of fighting the "far enemy" (the U.S. and its allies) instead of the "near enemy" (Muslim regimes) was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who would later become Osama bin Laden's deputy in al-Qa'ida. Together with Bin Laden and several others, he set up a new trend aimed at fighting the powers allegedly behind the Muslim regimes. This trend manifested itself in 1996, when Bin Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the U.S. for its presence on the Arabian Peninsula. The declaration was special because it showed that Bin Laden's criticism was really directed at Saudi Arabia102 but his message of war was aimed at the US, since that country was seen as the reason why Saudis were unable to change their country for the better. To be sure, Bin Laden was also critical of America and Israel from the start, independent of what these countries had to do with Saudi Arabia.103 His focus, however, seems to have been with the latter, particularly in the mid-1990s.1M The trend eventually led to the so-called "World Islamic Front", which gradually came to be equated with the name al-Qa'ida, announcing its jihad against "Jews and Crusaders" in a declaration signed by four other radical global jihadis, including al- Zawahiri105, and culminated in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The global jihad and "9/11" were not accepted by all Jihadi-Salafis. The attacks themselves and the subsequent U.S.-led "war on terrorism" did not lead to the massive closing of ranks among jihadis that al-Qa'ida had apparently hoped for. Moreover, some believed that the organisation had clearly got itself involved in a situation that it could not handle and was held responsible for bringing about an American reprisal on Afghanistan.106 Particularly critical of al-Qa'ida and its use of terrorism was the Egyptian al-Jama'a al- Islamiyya, a group that had been responsible for violent attacks for years but had, in the 1990s, made a remarkable U-turn in its ideological outlook by revising its views, disavowing

101 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 24-32. The U.S. and their allies are sometimes referred to in this scenario as "the head of the snake" (ra's al- afa), the idea being that if you cut off the head of the snake, the rest of its body (the Muslim regimes they support) will shrivel up. See Fu'äd Husayn, Al-Zarqöwf: Al-Jita/-7hänrli-!-Qä'ida, Beirut: Dar al-Khayyâl, 2005, pp. 202-213. 102 See for example Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, London & New York: Verso, 2005, pp. 28-29. "" See for example ibid., 3-14. 104 See for example ibid., pp. 15-19,31-43. 105 Ibid., pp. 58-62. 106 Gerges, Far, pp. 192-199.

73 violence and integrating itself into the Egyptian political and social system.107 Besides deconstructing al-Qa'ida's arguments for taking their jihad to America, the group also criticised Bin Laden's organisation for such things as widening the gap between the Muslim world and the West and stirring up anti-Islamic feelings 'oe

A!-Ma

In the midst of this debate over global jihad, al-Maqdisi has been rather quiet Since he believes that the primary targets of jihad should be Muslim regimes, it is perhaps not surprising that he has not made any contribution to the idea that jihad should be taken to a global level. The few statements al-Maqdisi has made on this issue, however, do show that he supports the attacks of 11 September 2001 He openly says so in an interview, stating "Yes, I supported [the attacks of '9/ll'] and I was happy with them as every Muslim who knows the crimes of the Americans and their Jewish brothers against his umma was happy with them " Al-Maqdisi also praises Bin Laden, calling him "the imam of the mujâhidûn in this age" He is similarly positive about al-Zawahin, referring to him as "one of the most important [men] of the Salafi-Jihadi trend (mm ru'us al-tayyâr al-jihâdï al-salaft) in our time [who] is doubtlessly greatly beneficial (!â shakk anna lahu fadl 'azim) to this trend with his writings, his jihad, his steadfastness and his standing side by side with shaykh Osama bin Laden [..] "10, Al-Maqdisi further states that "we are in need of men like Muhammad "Ata, Ziyad al-Jarrah, Marwan al-Shahi, Ahmad al-Ghamidi and their brothers" 110 These are, of course, the names of some of the hijackers responsible for the events of "9/11". Apart from these statements, al-Maqdisi has not paid much attention to the idea of a global jihad and instead has continued to propagate his own views onjihad and takfir He did write a book entitled Moshru aI-Shar

107 For more on this issue see Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed' An Inquiry into the Causes of De RadicaLzation of Armed Islamist Movements The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal vol 61, no 4,2007, pp 596 625, Roel Meyer, "Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action The Case of the Egyptian al Jama a al Islanuyya", in Roel Meijer (ed ), Global, pp 189 220 108 Gerges, Far, pp 200 210 109 Abü Muhammad al Maqdisî, Hiwôr ai ShayWi Abi Muhammad al Maqdisrma a Majallat al- Asr , www tawhed ws (accessed 17 March 2009), η d, ρ 6 110Jd., Waqfaup 30

74 democracy than with the "war on terrorism" or the attacks that preceded it.111 Al-Maqdisi also wrote a book shortly after the attacks but this focussed not so much on legitimising the idea of a global jihad as it did on the duties of Muslims during the war in Afghanistan and the broader "war on terrorism".112 Al-Maqdisi did have much to say about the way jihad was being fought prior to but also after "9/11", though, and openly questioned whether waging jihad - though legitimate - was always such a good idea. These are issues of manhaj, however, to which we must now pay specific attention.

1 id., Mashrû' al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Kabfr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 29 August 2006), 2004. 2 li, Hädhä.

75 76 Chapter 3: Al-Maqdisi's Quietist Jihadi-Salafì Manhqf

When comparing al-Maqdisi's ideas on what jihad is and against whom it should be waged with those of quietist Salafis, there is a great deal of resemblance between them. So much so even, that the ideas on al-Maqdisi's underlying justification of jihad against the rulers - unbelief (Jcu/r) and excommunication (taJcßr) - are virtually the same as those of some quietists. That is creed Çaqïda), however. The manhaj or method of applying critical views of rulers in practice is an entirely different matter and one in which al-Maqdisi more clearly distinguishes himself from quietists, although less so than might be expected from a Jihadi- Salafi. This chapter looks at how Salafi scholars, in particular al-Maqdisi, have translated their 'aqïda vis-à-vis Muslim rulers into practice. We will first look at the choice between da'wa and jihad. While the latter is obviously associated with Jihadi-Salafis, this does not necessarily mean that they are always in favour of waging jihad, as al-Maqdisi shows. Then we will move on to jihad strategy or, in other words, how a jihad should be waged, and what al-Maqdisi has to say about this. Finally, this chapter deals with the question of who may be targeted during an actual jihad. In all three sections, it becomes clear that al-Maqdisi is indeed a Jihadi-Salafi who supports jihad against Muslim rulers and in other contexts in principle but who is nevertheless close to quietists in his support for da'wa and his fear for extremism and excesses during actual fighting.

Da'wa or Jihad?

As we saw in the introduction, manhaj is a concept referring to the method of applying the 'aqìda in different contexts. While the term is broader than simply the application of the creed in politics and society, this is the dimension that this section focuses on by describing what manhaj quietist Salafis and al-Maqdisi choose. This can be portrayed as a simple choice between da'wa and jihad but, as the question mark in the subheading of this section indicates, it is slightly more complicated than that.

77 Quietists' Manhaj

The sometimes critical views of quietist Salafis towards Muslim rulers are, as the "quietist" label I use for them indicates, not translated into organised political action. The reasons for this differ. In the case of many Saudi Wahhabi scholars, their quietist attitude can be said to be the result of the increasing realisation that their preservation as the country's ideological backbone can only be sustained if they are subservient to the political rulers, who are the only ones able to guarantee and protect their role in Saudi society. This realisation dates back to at least the 19* century, when the failure of some scholars to side with the ruler helped bring about disunity and strife, eventually leading to the temporary collapse of Saudi rule. Needless to say, the growing subservience of the scholars since the 19th century was stimulated and enforced by the political rulers.1 Others scholars, such as al- Albani, simply believe that political action leads people away from adhering to the tenets of Islam and should therefore be avoided in order to focus on religious study.2 Still others believe that politics must be shunned because it does not always take the interests of the umma into account but is more about power and influence.3 Whatever the reason, these scholars believe that criticism of rulers or any other issue in Muslim society should not be expressed in the form of political action or violence. Their alternative is peacefully calling on people to mend their ways and return to Islam as it should be in their eyes. These efforts to use da'wa for such purposes express themselves specifically with regard to the rulers in the form of advice (nasifia), preferably in private. Apart from ideological objections to political action or jihad against the rulers, these scholars also argue that uprisings against sinful rulers will only bring more evil and lead to strife (fìtna).4 Moreover, these scholars also believe that if punishment for the transgressions of any Muslim is to be used, this is the prerogative of the authorities, not individual Muslims or groups.5

1 Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat in Saudi Arabien. Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902-1953, Wurzburg. Ergon, 2002, pp. 427-469, id., 'The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present", in: Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance.' Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, London Hurst & Co., 2005, pp. 18-30. 2 Stéphane Lacroix, "Between Revolution and Apohticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the shaping of Contemporary Salafism", in· Roel Meyer (ed ), Global Salafism: /slam's New Religious Movement, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, p. 69 3 Interview with 'Allb. Hasan al-Halabî, Amman, 19 January 2009. Al-Halabîis one of the most important quietist Salafi scholars in Jordan today 1 See for example 'Abd al-'Azîz b Bâz, Imaam Ihn Baz on the Manhaj of Correcting the Rulers, www.salafipublications com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d ; Muhammad b Sâlih al-'Uthaymîn, Imaam Ihn Uthaymeen on the Manhq; of Correcting Rulers, www.salafipublications.com (accessed 27 August 2009), n.d s Sâkh b. Fawzân al-Fawzân, Shaikh Salih al-Fawzaan on those who Ought to Pronounce Takfir and Establish the Hadd Punishment, www.salafipublications com (accessed 27 August 2009), η d

78 A somewhat similar position - criticism of rulers combined with non-violent expressions of it - is held by the Syrian Salafi-inspired scholar Muhammad Surur mentioned previously. Surur rejects the extreme loyalty to the rulers of certain scholars in Saudi Arabia, whom he labels "the party of the rulers" (hizb αί-wulät) and which includes some of those mentioned in this discussion. Yet he does not accept the idea of fighting regimes through jihad either, as the "party of the exaggerators" (hizb ai-ghuiät) advocates, since - like the Salafi scholars mentioned above - he believes this will cause chaos and strife. He considers himself as positioned between these two groups: critical of the rulers but not advocating fighting them. An admirer of the late mufti Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh because of his independence of the Saudi state, Surur believes that scholars must be independent but critical of the state to fulfil their true potential.6

A!-Ma

Al-Maqdisi, though in agreement with most of the quietists' theoretical ideas on Icu/r and takfir, has a different view when it comes to manhaj. It has already become clear that al- Maqdisi's strong emphasis on legislation makes any avoidance of political issues unlikely. On top of that, he also rejects the idea that jihad leads to chaos or fitna. In fact, al-Maqdisi completely reframes the situation as portrayed by quietists. He refers to the attack on and occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by Juhayman al-'Utaybi in 1979, for example, as a fìtna because of the rebels' armed action inside the sanctuary and their shedding the blood of innocent Muslims there. He scolds the Saudi state, however, for causing an even worse fìtna by not living up to its Islamic credentials because - among other things - it fails to apply Islamic law properly.7 Since al-Maqdisi believes that applying non-Islamic laws is a violation of the unity of God, he dismisses the calls of those who are unwilling to confront the rulers with their allegedly un-Islamic rule by stating that "perhaps the majority [of those unwilling to resist the rulers] would use the excuse of the general interest (masfaha) of the da'wa and [the avoidance of] fìtna. But what fìtna is greater than concealing the tawhfd and deceiving the people about their religion?"8 Considering this, it is not surprising that al-

6 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 74-77. 7 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Kawäshifal-Jaliyya fiKufr al-Dawla al-Sa'üdryya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2000/2001 [l989], pp. 179-182. For a detailed analysis of why al-Maqdisï believes this, see chapter 4. 8 ld.. Mulat Ibrahim wa-Da'wat αΙ-Anbiyâ' wa-l-Mursalfn wa-Asâlit al-Tughät fiTamyuha v/a-Sarfal-Du'ât 'anhâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 1984, p. 23.

79 Maqdisi not only rejects the idea that people like himself cause fìtna but actually accuses those scholars unwilling to confront the rulers as "the scholars of strife" ('ulama al-^tna).' Al-Maqdisi's reframing of the debate on the correct manhaj results in the quietists being branded as the ones promoting fìtna instead of the other way around. This might suggest that al-Maqdisi also rejects the preferred method of the quietists - da'wa - altogether. A more detailed look at al-Maqdisi's writings, however, reveals that, despite the real and important differences between him and quietists, he is also closer to them in manhaj than one might think. This is expressed most clearly in al-Maqdisi's insistence that, in spite of the legitimacy and desirability of jihad, da'wa is still necessary, as we will see in chapters 8 and 9. Although al-Maqdisi does not share many quietists' pro-regime sentiments that may cause them to focus solely on da'wa, his view that da'wa should not be dismissed in favour of jihad does partly adopt quietisi Salafis' preferred method. To be sure, al-Maqdisi never rejects jihad and actively continues to promote it even when stressing the value of da'wa, but his insistence on preserving and promoting the call to Islam shows that he is not just close to quietists in 'aqfda-related questions on kufr and tak/ir but also shares some of their manhaj. Al-Maqdisi does have something to say about situations in which actual fighting takes place, however.

Jihad Strategy

As became clear in chapter 2, the caliph who, as imam of the umma, would at least in theory be in command of the armies was central in fighting to expand the Muslim empires.10 He also enjoyed great influence in other matters related to jihad, such as the spoils of war, which he could - within the confines of the rules on this issue as stipulated by Islamic law - divide and distribute among the Muslims as he saw fit.11 The fact that the imam was formally in control and that there were actual armies fighting on behalf of an existing territorial unit shows that jihad from the 7th or 8th century until the early 20fh century was - at least in theory - an organised and state-centred effort, even if it was quite different in

' See for example id, Hädhä mä Adîmi Höh bihi, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 17 March 2009), 2001, pp. 28,31,37. 10 Majid Khaddun, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008 [1955], pp. 87-88. 11 ibid., pp. 118-133; id., The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybäm s Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 106-129.

80 practice.12 This section deals with how two major Jihadi-Salafi strategists and al-Maqdisi use or abandon this tradition in their own views onjihad strategy.

Jihadi-Salafì Views on Jihad Strategy

Jihad as led by an imam on behalf of an Islamic empire was, of course, quite different from the jihad waged by modern-day Islamic movements, who are often persecuted by the authorities in their home countries and collectively have no state of their own. Being hampered m one's organisation because of law enforcement and anti-terrorism measures as well as the absence of a territorial base are thus problems that modern jihadi ideologues have to deal with. Present-day jihadi strategists therefore try to find ways of adjusting jihad to current circumstances and look for the most effective strategy to hurt their enemies while taking these constraints into account. Perhaps the most important of these strategists is a Syrian supporter of the global jihad as espoused by Bin Laden, Mustafa b. 'Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasr, better known as Abu Mus "ab ai-Suri (b. 1958), who was arrested by Pakistani police in 2005." In a massive study in which he calls for "global Islamic resistance" (αί-muqâwama al-Islämiyya al-'älamiyya), al-Suri gives an extensive overview of experiences of various jihad organisations in different countries14 and their mixed results15. Considering the differences in strategy and tactics employed byjihad movements and organisations, he presents what he calls "the constitution of the global Islamic resistance call" (dustür da'wat al-muqäwama al-islämiyya al-'älamiyya), meant to provide a basic overview of the situation in which mufähidün find themselves in today's world and how jihad should be seen in it. This constitution contains ideas that are radically different from the legal rulings on an organised and state-based approach that dominated jihad theory in earlier centuries. Article 1 of this constitution, for instance, states that "the call for global Islamic resistance" - a concept that in itself is somewhat different from the more territorial jihad as defined by Islamic law - "is not a party or an organisation, nor a limited group but an open call. [...] It is possible for any organisation, group or individual convinced of its method, its goals and its

12 In practice, the actual troops - not the caliph - were major beneficiaries of the spoils, for instance See Albrecht Noth, "Von der medinensischen 'Umma' zu einer muslimischen Ökumene", in Albrecht Noth & Jürgen Paul (eds ), Der islamische Onent Grundzuge semer Geschichte, Wurzburg Ergon, 1998, ρ 104 13 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad The Life of Al Qaiaa Strategist Abu Mus ab al-Sun, London Hurst & Co , 2007, Ρ 1 " Abu Mus ab al Suri, Da wat al-Muqâwama al Islâmiyya al- Alamiyya, www tawhed ws (accessed 2 September 2009), 2004, pp 683 818 15 Ibid , pp 819 859

81 way (bi-manhajihä wa-ahdäfihä wa-tariqihä) to join it, directly or indirectly."16 Similarly at odds with traditional views of jihad is article 9, in which al-Suri contends that the rulers of the Muslim world are "apostate infidels" Qaiffaran murtaddm) because - among other reasons - "they rule the countries of the Muslims on the basis of something other than what God has revealed". It is therefore not surprising that al-Suri maintains in article 10 that "the global Islamic resistance call renders null and void the legitimacy of any pact, assurance of protection, agreement or covenant of protection ('ahd aw aman aw mu'ähada aw dhimma) presented by the rulers of the Muslim countries to the infidels".'7 Based on such unorthodox ideas, al-Suri distinguishes three different strategies employed by mujähidün since the 1960s: the school of activist organisations (madrosat al- tamïmât al-harakiyya), which he associates with the jihadi groups in Egypt and other countries that tried to topple regimes and establish Islamic states; the school of open fronts and overt confrontations (madrosat al-jabhät al-maftüha wa-l-muwäjahät aJ-makshüfa), a reference to combat experiences that took place on battlefields such as those in Afghanistan; and the school of individual jihad and the terrorism of small cells (madrosat αί- jihäd al-fardî wa-irhäb al-khaläyä al-saghîra), expressed in relatively small attacks by individuals as well as operations executed by cells independent of a central organisation. Judging these three strategies on the different results they have yielded, al-Suri considers the first to have been a complete failure, while he deems the latter two at least partial successes." He therefore advocates a strategy of global jihad that relies on individual and small cell operations and makes use of the jihad of open fronts when possible.19 As such, the jihadi strategy that al-Suri promotes is thus not centrally organised nor led by any state. The idea behind this strategy is to confuse and exhaust the enemy by frequent and recurring attacks, simultaneously agitating other Muslims, causing them to join the jihad and thereby slowly but surely making the mujähidün victorious.20 While this scenario may be highly successful in wreaking havoc in both Muslim countries as well as the West, the relatively unorganised and global nature of this strategy as well as the response of the governments attacked means that this jihad will likely not lead to the consolidation of jihadi gains in the form of an Islamic state.

16 /bid., p. 923. 17 /bid., p. 925. 18 /bid., pp. 1353-1364. " /bid., pp. 1364-1388. 20 /bid., p. 1376.

82 Standing in stark contrast to al-Suri's writings on jihadi strategy is a book on jihad by another prominent radical ideologue, the Egyptian 'Abd al-Qadir b. 'Abd al-'Aziz (b. 1950), also known as Sayyid Imam and dr. Fadl. One of the main ideologues and the first leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Organisation, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz has been in Egyptian custody since 2004 and has recently become a controversial figure among fellow Jihadi-Salafis for his apparent revisions of his earlier points of view.21 Since he was one of the most prominent ideologues advocating jihad against Muslim regimes, his ideas on the correct way to fight jihad are naturally different from those of global jihadis such as al-Suri. This is clearest in Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's description of what he believes to be the correct organisation of fighting. Unlike al-Suri's decentralised jihad, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz places great emphasis on the leadership (a!-imâra) during fighting by mentioning numerous Prophetic traditions stating that leadership during jihad is a necessity.22 He spends more than 250 pages describing the duties of a leader (amir), traditionally appointed by the imam as a commander of the army, which include general tasks such as leading the fighters in prayer or personally inspecting their weapons but also taking the lead role in their training.23 Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's emphasis on leadership, his description of the amir's duties based on extensive use of the scriptural sources and his use of the language of classical jihad give the impression that he is writing about warfare as described by Islamic jurists and as led by an imam. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz believes, however, that jihad may be fought in the absence of an imam or when the ruling imam is guilty of unbelief. Since he considers the rulers of the Muslim world to be infidels and therefore unsuitable to lead a jihad, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz states that - instead of having the imam appoint an amfr - believers must choose one of their own, just like the first generation of Muslims did when their leader was slain.24 It thus seems as if the author tries to use the rulings on leadership during fighting as derived from Islamic legal thought on classical jihad to frame his own unorthodox ideas of fighting "the near enemy" as a modern-day adaptation of a centuries' old tradition. As a consequence, the writings on this issue by Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, like the classical jurists' works, show a preference for a more organised and centrally-led jihad than those by al-Suri. On the issue of

21 See Amel Lamnaouer & Romain Caillet, "De l'usage du jihad: la fin d'une ère en Egypte? Les revisions idéologiques de Sayyid Imam", in: Hadjar Aouardji & Hélène Legeay (eds.), L'Egypte dans l'année 2007, Cairo: CEDE), 2008, pp. 85-115; Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism", The New Yorker (www.newyorker.com, accessed 5 June 2008), 2 June 2008. 22 'Abd al-Qâdir b. 'Abd al-'Azïz, Risâlat al-'Umdaßi'däd al-'Udda U-l-JihädfiSabü Allah, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2 September 2009), n.d., pp. 50-51. " Ibid., pp. 108-382. 24 ibid., pp. 54-58.

83 consolidating the gains of jihad through the establishment of an Islamic state or at least some kind of territorial base, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz remains silent, however." It is precisely this issue that al-Maqdisi, who is not nearly as detailed and thorough on jihadi strategy as either al-Suri or Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, is most concerned with.

Al-Maqdisi's Jihad Strategy

Al-Maqdisi clearly does not seem to agree with the decentralised global jihad strategy that al-Suri advocates. He laments the badly planned and wrongly executed attacks by youngsters he meets and hears about, who seem to be full of enthusiasm but lacking in expertise and experience, sometimes leading to their arrest and imprisonment, from which they are not released until they have told the secret service everything it needs to know.26 Al-Maqdisi further refers to youngsters who, instead of being negligent and careless, become overly paranoid in their lifestyle so as not to get caught by the police. He mentions youngsters he has visited who insisted on turning up the volume of the radio when speaking, even about trivial matters, so as not to be overheard by the secret service. Others wrote down their plans of attack in such great detail, al-Maqdisi states, that a police raid on their house not only led to their immediate arrest but also ended their plans and the entire jihad cell they belonged to, simply because it was impossible to deny their intentions that had been described so meticulously.27 Al-Maqdisi also criticises actions that may be legitimate but are not very wise, such as filming attacks and showing them on the internet. These acts, particularly beheadings and other executions, damage the image of Islam and do not help jihad in any way, al-Maqdisi maintains. Instead, mujähidün should take the circumstances in which they operate into account and base their actions on that.28 As we will see in chapter 9, al-Maqdisi has been heavily criticised for the book in which he scolded young jihad fighters because some believed he was attacking jihad itself

25 One author who seems to position himself somewhere in the middle between al-Sûrî and Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz is Abu Bakr al-Nâjï. He favours a strategy of exhausting Western "enemies" similar to al-SQrFs but also argues in favour of trying to consolidate the gains of jihad by settling down in certain territories, which presumably demands a more organised and co-ordinated effort, making him closer to Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and, importantly, al-Maqdisï, as we will see below. See Abu Bakr al-Nâjï, Idärat aJ-Towahhus/i: Akhtar Marhala Satamumi bi-fid I- l/mma, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 May 2010), n.d., pp. 15-22. For a more detailed comparison between these thinkers, see Brynjar Lia, "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training", Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 4, 2008, pp. 518-542. 26 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Waqfât ma'α Thamarät al-Jihäd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2004, pp. 32-35,105-110,130-131. 27 Ibid., pp. 38-40. 2" ibid., pp. 91-94.

84 or revising some of his earlier views. Such criticism misses the point of the book, however, as al-Maqdisi's tone throughout the entire text is not one of moderation but of concern for a jihad that he holds dear and has helped inspire but now sees tarnished by actions that he sometimes sees as illegitimate, at other times simply as very unwise. This is also the reason he states that "it is not allowed to be silent about these mistakes"29 and that "we suffer (ίππαπα nata'alìamu) nowadays when we witness the dwarfing (tacjzfm), the shrinking (tah/fm) and, in fact, the distortion (moskh) of the jihad [...]"30. For the same reason, he also advises youngsters on how to improve their jihad by pointing to the well-planned attacks of 11 September 200131 and, especially, the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Al-Maqdisi claims that Muhammad was very skilled at deceiving his enemies and planned his attacks well32 and ascribes this to the Prophet's ability and willingness to take the context in which he operated into account, from which today's fighters can learn.33 Al-Maqdisi's complaints about the actions of mujähidän mentioned so far do not necessarily contradict al-Suri's ideas. Although the latter caUs for individual attacks and operations by small, independent cells, that does not mean that they should not be planned and executed properly. One could therefore assume that al-Suri would probably agree with al-Maqdisi's criticism. Still, al-Maqdisi goes further in his insistence that jihad should be organised and planned. He points out that individual operations are unlikely to damage the enemy very much and will probably not lead to any significant change. Though he considers such actions legitimate, he advises youngsters to cooperate in groups.31 Also, he is said to have had the intention of establishing a board of Sunni scholars that could issue fatwas and spread a message ofjiha d among youngsters.35 These statements, emphasising the need for collective and centralised instead of individual efforts, underline al-Maqdisi's belief that jihad, with regard to the results it yields, can take two forms nowadays. The first is qitâl al-nikâya and refers to fighting to hurt the enemy or his interests; the second is called qitâl al-tamkïn and denotes the battle to

2,Jbicf.,p 35. 30 Ibid., ρ 106. 31 Ibid., p. 30. 32 Ibid., pp. 36-38. 33 Ibid., pp. 54,64-66. This is related to al-Maqdisf s stress that mujâhidûn should have knowledge of both the reality in which they fight and the sharia Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz points to something similar when he states that a jihad requires two types of preparation· a military one and a sharïone, the latter of which he describes in great detail. See Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Risolai, pp. 23,220-386. 31 Al-MaqdisT, Waqßt, pp. 31-32 31 Al-'Arab al-Yawm, 5 July 2005. Interestingly, al-Maqdisï actually seems to have established this. From 2009 onwards, he and several other like-minded Jihadi-Salafls have used al-MaqdisFs website to provide others with an international group of scholars that could provide guidance and fatwas. See www.tawhed ws/FAQ/ (accessed 7 May 2010).

85 consolidate one's presence in a certain territory. Al-Maqdisi believes that the first is good and legitimate and obviously needed when fighting an enemy. He also maintains, however, that while this type of fighting happens in abundance, qitäl al-tamkïn is sorely lacking among today's muiähidün. He complains that jihad has proved very good at striking various enemies but that Muslims have sometimes wasted their chances of following through on them by grabbing and consolidating power through the establishment of a sort of safe haven for mujahidun, for example in the form of an Islamic state. This way, al-Maqdisi claims, the fighters just keep fighting without ever achieving anything in the long term. Even highly successful operations such as the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al- Sadat or the one on "9/11", he believes, were in the end still forms of qitö! al-mkôya. Al- Maqdisi therefore urges mujahidun not to abandon efforts at qitäl αί-tamlcFn in favour of legitimate but ultimately useless attacks.36 Al-Maqdisi's preferred strategy for jihad thus makes clear that he agrees with the legitimacy of individual attacks, as al-Suri does, but prefers collective efforts and, moreover and unlike both al-Suri and Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, emphasises the need for a state or area in which Muslims can consolidate the gains of jihad. This means, ironically, that his favoured form of jihad somewhat resembles the traditional organised and state-centred one found in classical writings on jihad, albeit from a very different perspective. A final question remains, however, namely who the concrete targets of al-Maqdisi's jihad should be.

Targets ofJiha d

In dealing with the question of who constitutes a legitimate target ofjihad - equated here only with people, not material objects - the most important Islamic source dealing with this is the Surma. Prophetic traditions treating this issue are scattered throughout the different hadrth-collections. At least two of them, however, mention that Muhammad explicitly forbade killing women and children in general37 during a raid.38 Based on such and other rulings dealing with related issues, Islamic jurists agreed that women and children, but also other people not considered combatants such as monks and the elderly, were not to be

J'Al-Maqdisï, Waqfat, pp 48 56 37 There are also exceptional situations, as we will see 38 See Sahih Muslim, book 32 (book 19 in other collections) ("Kitâb al-Jihâd wa 1 Siyar"), chapter 8 ("Bâb Tahrïm Qatl al Nisâ wa 1 Sibyän fi 1 Harb"), nos 4319 & 4320 (1744 in other collections) See also Rudolph Petersjihad in Classical and Modem Islam A Reader, Princeton Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996, ρ 13

86 attacked.3' The question of whether these persons actually participated in fighting the Muslims or in helping the enemies of the Muslims is very important. Although the fuqahä (Islamic legal scholars) do not agree on certain details such as whether non-combatant males may be killed or the exact status of monks in this respect, they all seem to agree that persons who refrain from or are unable to participate in combat or helping enemy combatants (sometimes apart from non-combatant adult males) may not be killed.40 The question of the legitimate targets ofjihad becomes particularly important with regard to the oft-used tactic of suicide bombings, when violence is almost necessarily indiscriminate and therefore highly likely to hurt some of the people that may not be attacked according to Islamic law. Needless to say, there were no suicide bombings in the days of the Prophet or in the centuries that followed With regard to the important issue here - indiscriminate violence - there are, however, some indications as to how Muslims should behave during warfare. Several traditions exist in which Muhammad allowed women and children to be killed as collateral damage during a night raid, in which the fighters may not have been able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.41 From traditions such as these, most Islamic jurists concluded that in cases when it is difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, imprecise attacks with for instance mangonels42 on enemy targets are allowed, even if it kills the people one may generally not attack. Conditions for allowing this varied among the scholars but they included the necessity of targeting the enemy, not the non-combatants43, and serving the greater interest of the Muslim community44 Interestingly, this ruling is even upheld by some jurists if the enemy uses Muslims as a human shield, thereby causing believers to become collateral damage.45 This section deals with how several modern scholars as well as al-Maqdisï fit into this debate on indiscriminate violence.

35 Khaddun, War, pp 103 104 w David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London University of California Press, 2005, pp 58- 63, John Kelsay, islam and War A Study m Comparative Ethics, Louisville, Kent Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993, pp 59-67, Ella Landau Tasseron, Non Combatants" in Muslim Legal Thought, Research Monographs on the Muslim World, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute, Series 1, no 1,2008, Peters, Jihad, pp 33 36,49 41 See SahiJi Muslim, book 32 (book 19 in other collections) ("Kitäb al Jihâd wa-1 Siyar"), chapter 9 ("Bäb Jawâz Qatl al Nisä wa 1 Sibyân fi 1 Bayât min ghayr Ta ammud"), nos 4321 4323 (1745 in other collections) See also Peters Jihad, ρ 13 12 Mangonels were devices operated by a spring used to hurl great rocks or other heavy material at the enemy According to several Prophetic traditions, they were used by the early Muslims This method was obviously not very precise " Khaddun, Islamic, ρ 102, id, War, ρ 107 "id., War, ρ 107 " Cookjihad, pp 55 56, Khaddun, Islamic, ρ 102, id., War, ρ 107

87 Modem Scholars on Indiscriminate Violence

The idea that killing citizens is allowed either as collateral damage or because they can be seen as combatants for aiding the enemy has also found its way into the writings of modern scholars commenting on present-day conflicts. In relation to the idea of collateral damage, the Egyptian shaykh al-Azhar, for example, has argued with regard to Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians that these are allowed, provided they target soldiers. If civilians die in such operations, they may be seen as unintended victims of legitimate attacks.46 Similarly, Paris al-Zahrani, better known as Abu Jandal al-Azdi (b. 1976 or 1977), a prominent ideologue of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), defends killing civilians by quoting scholars who argue that it is allowed as collateral damage if one does not intend to hit them or if it serves the general war against the unbelievers.'17 The reasoning on collateral damage is taken to perhaps its ultimate consequences by the Saudi scholar Nasir b. Hamd al-Fahd (b. 1968) in his treatise on the permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction. Since these weapons can kill thousands in a single strike and are designed specifically for such massive destruction, attacks using them are the epitome of indiscriminate violence. Al-Fahd argues that Muslims are allowed to employ these during fighting, however, if the jihad necessitates their use. In such a case, if women and children are accidentally hit in an attack on the enemy, it is permitted as collateral damage. To support his case, al-Fahd points to the traditions allowing indiscriminate attacks and the use of mangonels mentioned above.48 Modern scholars have also tried to expand the concept of combatants and the persons who help them by including people in that category that are not usually seen as such. As we saw before, the question of whether someone is a combatant is an important one because it allows such people to be targeted by jihad. If modern scholars therefore want to legitimise violence against civilians, they need to find some way of framing them as combatants even if they are not. A case in point is the Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), who is often considered the most influential Sunni scholar alive today. Al- Qaradawi states that, because both men and women in Israel need to perform military

"John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War m Islam, Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 141. ,7 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, Nufüs al-Fuqahâ' hawla Ahkâm al-lghâra wa-l-Tatarrus, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 September 2009), 2003, pp. 6-25. " Nâsir b. Hamd al-Fahd, RisâlatpHukm Istikhdäm Ashhat al-Damär al-Shämil didda l-Kuffar, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2 September 2009), 2003, pp. 9-11,12-13.

88 service at a certain age, Israeli society is, in fact, a militarised one. This means that every Israeli is at least a potential soldier, making all Israelis combatants and therefore legitimate targets of jihad." In his reasoning, al-Qaradawi stretches the concept of combatant to include people who are not soldiers but may be ones in future. In spite of this extraordinary argument, in other cases al-Qaradawi nevertheless seems to adhere closely to the traditional idea that only combatants may be killed. He declared attacks on civilians in Iraq impermissible50, for example, and roundly condemned the attacks on "9/11" for failing to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.51 Such a reasoning might be considered inconsistent but, as Kelsay points out, if one accepts al-Qaradawi's reasoning that Israelis are all soldiers, he is actually quite consistent in his belief that attacks may not target civilians.52 A person who stretches the definition of a combatant even further than al-Qaradawi is Bin Laden, who argues not only that the Pentagon, attacked on "9/11", was a military target but also that the people inside the other target on that day, the World Trade Center, were financial backers of the United States and therefore compilât in the latter's alleged crimes against Muslims.53 Bin Laden also claims that American civilians in general, because they live in a democratic country, are responsible for choosing their leaders and therefore support their government's policy, making them involved in the combat that the U.S. engages in.54 In an interview, Bin Laden indicated that several scholars had shown that such attacks were legitimate, including the Saudi scholars Humud b. 'Uqala' al-Shu'aybi (1927- 2002), Sulayman b. Nasir al-'Ulwan (date of birth unknown) and the first leader and ideologue of QAP, Yusuf al-'Uyayri (d. 2003).55 These scholars do indeed point to the supposed status of combatant of all Americans56 and Israelis57 due to their democratically elected government and their military service duties respectively.58

" Kelsay, Arguing, ρ 141 50 "Al Qaradâwî Yuharnmu Amahyyât Khatf al-Madaniyyîn", www qaradawi net (accessed 4 September 2009), 2004 51 Kelsay, Arguing, ρ 142 52 Ibid , pp 142 143 53 Bruce Lawrence (ed ), Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden, London & New York Verso, 2005, ρ 119 M Ibid , pp 164 165 "/bld.pp 116-117 56 Humûd b Uqalâ al Shu aybl, Bayern AmmäJaräfiAmfiicä min Ahdâth, www tawhed ws (accessed 2 September 2009), 2001, pp 1, 6 7, Yusuf al Uyayri, Haqîqat al-Harb al Saltbiyya al Jadida, www tawhed ws (accessed 16 January 2008), 2001, pp 31 33 " Sulaymân b Näsiral Ulwän, HukmQatlAt/ulwa Nisä al-Kuffârpl Amaltyyât al Istishhädiyya, www tawhed ws (accessed 2 September 2009), 2001, pp 4 5 58 They also reiterate the conclusions mentioned by al Qaradâwî and al-Fahd that as long as Muslims do not aim at the people usually exempt from fighting - whether they are used as human shields by the kuffar, are

89 Several modern, often radical scholars have thus justified indiscriminate violence against non-Muslim women and children (and even Muslims if they are used as human shields) based on the idea that they should be seen as unintended victims of legitimate attacks. They have also simultaneously tried to stretch the meaning of what a combatant is so as to include people who are sometimes - as in the case of ordinary Americans - only remotely linked to the actual soldiers fighting Muslims. The same two arguments of collateral damage and a reframing of combatants appear in al-Maqdisi's writings, though - because of his preferred jihad against Muslim regimes - with a different twist."

Al-Maqdisi on indiscriminate Violence

As mentioned before, al-Maqdisi has not written much about global jihad and the same is true about its targets and the use of indiscriminate violence. Still, in reaction to "9/11" and some of the expressions of jihad that al-Maqdisi observed from the 1990s onwards, he did write enough to give his readers an idea about his thoughts on the issue of indiscriminate violence. He is more emphatic than most scholars mentioned above, for example, in stating that killing non-combatant women, children and other people generally exempt from the fighting can only be done unintentionally and that the general rule is that they may not be targeted. He points out, for example, that mujähidün should be urged to attack military targets, "even if they are from among the occupying Jews in Palestine".60 He also states with regard to killing Muslims as collateral damage that

You must know my brothers61 that the blood of a Muslim is dear (ghälin) and its sanctity great (hurmatahu 'azfma) and [that] the violation of Muslim blood (istibähat dima aJ-Musiimin) is a great danger (ichatar 'azfm) and that abstaining from killing a thousand infidels (tark qatì alfkafìr) - as our scholars have determined - is of less value than deliberately shedding a cupping-glass of Muslim blood (safli mihjama min indistinguishable from the enemies, are killed out of necessity or through the use of imprecise weapons - they may be killed indiscriminately and will be seen as collateral damage. See al-Shu'aybï, Bayân, pp. 4-6,7-8; al- 'Ulwân, Hukm, pp. 3-4; al-'Uyayrï, Haqïqat, pp. 33-37. M It should be mentioned that both classical and modem scholars mention more reasons to justify indiscriminate violence, such as a breach of contract by non-Muslims or retaliation in kind for an indiscriminate attack by non-Muslims. These, however, are not dealt with in al-Maqdisi's writings and are therefore not discussed in this chapter. 60Al-MaqdisI,Hâdhâ,p.31. " The actual text says "iJchwänunä" (our brothers). Al-MaqdisT, both in his writings and during conversations, has a strong tendency to speak about himself in the plural. This will be translated as singular, however.

90 dam Muslim 'amdan).'

Coming from a man who believes that killing non-Muslims is often a good thing, this is obviously a strong statement. In spite of this, however, al-Maqdisi shows that he does recognise the possibility of legitimately killing women, children and even Muslims. Like other radical scholars, he states that if Muslims try to target their enemies, indiscriminate violence may be used, even if it leads to the killing of women, children and other Muslims. He also confirms that the presence of Muslims among the enemy is no reason to cancel an attack on the latter, as long as the Muslims are not targeted." Even when arguing that non-combatants may sometimes be killed, however, he still apparently feels compelled to emphasise that especially children may not be targeted and that one should try to avoid places where they gather, such as "a kindergarten, their schools and their parties".64 This tendency to call for relative restraint is even clearer in his treatment of suicide bombings. While he believes these are legitimate methods to target the enemy, he maintains they are only to be used in exceptional circumstances and laments the fact that they are sometimes used to kill only one or two non-Muslims, which can also be done with a gun.65 He also scolds mufähidün for their tendency to revert to such spectacular attacks and even says that "many youngsters have fallen in love with explosive operations (qad osbaha kathfr min αί-shabäb mughram bi-'amaliyyät al-taßir) [...] as if jihad is no good without explosives (wa-ka'anna ί-jihâd là yaslahu illä bi-Z-muta/âj/irât)!!"66 With regard to considering the killing of other Muslims as collateral damage in suicide attacks, al-Maqdisi claims that some mufähidün use the statements by the Prophet allowing such victims if there is no other possibility as an excuse to kill fellow believers much more randomly. This, he believes, is not only a misinterpretation of Muhammad's words but also leads to the killing of dozens of innocent Muslims.67

Al-Maqdisi is not only concerned with the general illegitimacy of killing Muslims, however. He also openly wonders why fighters target buses, churches and Shiite mosques since such attacks do not further the cause of Islam in any way, he claims. He further states

62 Al-Maqdisi, Waqfit, p. 5. 63 li, Hädhä, pp. 29-32. M Ibid., p. 31. 65 id, Waqfat, pp. 2,114,123-124; id., Al-Zarqâwï: Amai wa-Aläm (Munäsara wa-MunäsaM, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 24 August 2006), 2004, p. 10; Al-Jaiira, 6 July 2005. 66 Id., Waqßt, p. 2. 67 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

91 that such operations only tarnish the image of Islam and help its enemies.68 Al-Maqdisi's reasoning against targeting Shiites deserves special mention. Apart from some isolated references to Shiites as Rawâfid (refusers or deserters)69, a derogatory term, and an introduction to someone else's book about this branch of Islam70, al-Maqdisi has not written anything about them. It is therefore not surprising that his argument for not targeting Shiites is somewhat shallow. Al-Maqdisi states that

ordinary Shiites are like ordinary Sunnis. I am not saying 100% but you will find among them [people] who know nothing except prayer and fasting and do not know the details of the [Ja'fari Shiite] school of law that our brothers talk about [as expressed] in the distortion (tahrijf) of the Quran and other forms of unbelief (αί- mukaffirât) that some Sunni scholars excommunicate the Râfida Shiites for.71

The fact that Jihadi-Salafis often differ in their interpretations from other Muslims, scholars and Islamic law shows that their views can frequently be challenged, as this chapter and the previous one have shown. Al-Maqdisi's argument against attacking Shiites, however, is unlikely to be accepted even among fellow Jihadi-Salafis. While they may agree not to attack them, the idea that most Shiites are simply like most Sunnis, unaware of the specific beliefs that separate them from their Sunni brethren, simply seems to be wrong. In fact, al- Zarqawi, at whom much of this criticism was directed, specifically mentions this in a rebuttal of al-Maqdisi's critique, stating that ordinary Shiites do know about specifically Shiite beliefs, such as their reverence for Muhammad's grandson Husayn and their imams.72 Apart from al-Maqdisi's arguments for seeing victims of indiscriminate violence in certain circumstances as collateral damage and his reasoning against such thinking in other situations, he also tries to expand the concept of combatant, like other scholars have done. He states, for example, that if women and children help non-Muslims in their fight against Muslims in any way, including with vague notions such as giving one's opinion (αί-ray),

68Ibid.,pp. 7-8; id., Al-Zarqam, pp. 9-12; Wailal-Batîrî, "Abu Muhammadal-Maqdisï Tabarra'tuMiräran wa- Takrâran mimmâ Yartakibuhu 1-ba'd min 'Amahyyât ghayr Mundabita bi-Hudüd al-Shar' Yadhhabu DahiyyatahäÄläf al-Abnya min duna Faida",Λΐ-Sabil, no 896,4June 2009, p. 5. 69 See for example al MaqdisI, Al-Kawâshif, p. 8. 70 Abu Anas al-Shâmî, Aì-Shia, www tawhed.ws (accessed 1 June 2009), 2009, pp. 111. 71 Al-Jazîra, 6 July 2005 See also al-Batîrï, "Abu", p. 5; Al-Maqdisî, Al-Zarqawï, p. 12. 72 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawï, Boyân wa-Tawdïh h-mâ Athârahu l-Shoykh al-Maqdisï fi Uqä'ih ma'a Qanât d-Jazira, n.p., η d. This communiqué circulated on various internet forums around July 2005 but does not seem to be available in Arabic anymore. I would like to thank Paul Schrijver for providing me with this document.

92 they can be included in the category of combatants and may therefore legitimately be fought.73 He even states explicitly that

Everyone who knows the religion of God and [knows] something about the reality of America, its policies, its support for Israel and its assistance to the Jews against the Muslims, its assistance to the idols of the Arabs and others against the mujähidün by seizure, killing and submission, its enmity and war against Islam and the Muslims, its imprisonment of the scholars of the Muslims and the mujähidün [...] knows with certainty ('Urn al-yaqîn) that it is effectively a state at war (dawlat harb) and that its people are a people at war (sha'b muhärib).74

Al-Maqdisi thus tries to stretch the need for women, children and others to be engaged in fighting somehow as a condition for their being called combatants. In this sense, he is not very different from other scholars mentioned above. As has become clear in the preceding sections, however, al-Maqdisi's jihad is not primarily aimed at America or Israel but at the rulers of the Muslim world. In spite of the difference in target, he implicitly tries to apply a method of expanding the definition of combatants similar to the one used for Americans and Israelis. Al-Maqdisi's targets of jihad are the rulers of the Muslim world because of their alleged man-made legislation. As mentioned, al-Maqdisi refers to these people as tawäghit (idols). These rulers (kings, presidents and prime ministers) are not the only ones guilty of unbelief, however, since their regimes rest on the people that work for it. These people are usually referred to in al-Maqdisi's works as ansar αί-tawäjjhft (the helpers of the idols). The question is, of course: who are these helpers? Do they include army generals, civil servants working for ministers and perhaps even postmen working for the state's postal services? Al-Maqdisi has tried to answer this question specifically and in a way that again expands his concept of the enemy and the people who help them by including persons in the category of ansar aJ-tawäghit that would usually never be seen as combatants.

In describing who these ansar are, Al-Maqdisi states that people should choose God and stay away from "every corrupt post (kull wozfjfa fisida) that involves helping the servants of theyösicj (ίαηαί li-'abïd d-yäsiq, the term used for the Mongol law) in favour of

73 Al-Maqdisi, Hadhä, pp. 32-33. 74 ibid., p. 23.

93 their injustice (zuimihtm) or confirmation or help (iqrär aw nusra) of their laws".75 This statement makes legislation a central issue by referring to the yäsiq, the Mongol system of law that al-Maqdisi compares modern Muslim states' laws with. It also seems to suggest that the people included in the category of ansar are at least those who are somehow upholding the regime and their laws and are actively working for the system's survival. This is indeed the way al-Maqdisi intends it to be interpreted as the people he explicitly includes in his definition of the ansar αί-tawäghit fit this description. These include the army, the police and the national and/or royal guards since they protect the regime and uphold the laws that al- Maqdisi refuses to accept. Since these laws are affronts to tawhid and Islam according to al- Maqdisi, he considers the army, the police and the national and/or royal guard to be "in the forefront of those who wage war on God and his religion" (muqaddimat al-muhâribm Ιί-ί/äh wa-li-dmihi).76 For waging war against these "true Muslims", al-Maqdisi also considers people working for the security services to be included since they "spy on the believers (ahi al-imän) and pass on their information to their friends among the servants of the yäsiq".77 While these people may be seen as persons traditionally included in the category of combatants because of their military or security-related jobs, the same cannot be said of the civil servants who levy taxes, enforce fines, work at customs and similar, related offices. Since these people actively help enforce the regime's rules financially, however, al-Maqdisi also deems their jobs acts of kufr.7' The final persons al-Maqdisi identifies as part of the group that helps the tawaghît include servants, ambassadors and messengers working for "the servants of the yäsiq"79, persons working in the justice system as district attorneys or lawyers for their explicit upholding of the man-made laws'0 and members of parliament and ministers81.

Al-Maqdisi considers the people mentioned to be helpers of the regimes and their laws who are complicit in the regimes' supposed fight against Islam and are therefore, in a way, similar to people aiding combatants waging war on Muslims. By including these people in the circle of enemies that may be fought through jihad, al-Maqdisi thus widens the group of enemies in a similar way as Bin Laden's treatment of every American as a combatant does. While al-Maqdisi is quite specific about who is included in this group and who is not,

" Id., Kashfal-Niqäb 'an Sharfat al-Ghäb, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 November 2006), 1988, p. 113 76 Ibid., p. 116. 77 Ibid., pp. 122-123. The quote is on p. 122. 7' Ibid., pp. 125-126. 79 Ibid., p. 127. 10 Ibid., pp. 128-130. 81 ibid., pp. 131-133.

94 the term "helpers of the idols" is easily misinterpreted to include persons who are only vaguely tied to the regime but may nevertheless find themselves the object of tak/ir if radical Muslims believe they are complicit in the regime's alleged crimes. Al-Maqdisi seems to realise this possibility and therefore states that the professions he includes in the group of helpers entail protection of man-made laws and helping the regime against the Muslims who uphold tawhrd (muwahhidün). This is different, al-Maqdisi maintains, from other government jobs such as conductor on a train or bus.82 Posts such as this or mere administrative government jobs should not be the subject of tak/ir, al-Maqdisi believes, although he claims to stay away from them himself." Similarly, while working as a judge or a lawyer shows one supports and tries to uphold a ku/r law, citizens demanding their rights on the basis of and seeking help through that law are not ku^ar. One must take into account that people are weak, al-Maqdisi believes, and have to resort to man-made systems of law since they have no other possibility. He does call on people not to do this, however.84 In the method of application of his creed, al-Maqdisi thus tries to expand the circle of those who may be fought by including people upholding, protecting or legislating on behalf of the regime as ansar αί-tawäghrt. At the same time, al-Maqdisi is careful not to let this group expand too much and points to those that should be excluded from it. This relative moderation, just like his emphasis on not using unbridled violence, abets his ideas on tak/ir dealt with in chapter 2 as well as his emphasis on da'wa, which both show that al- Maqdisi's is often closer to quietisi Salafis than one might think. How al-Maqdisi's beliefs and identity as a "quietisi Jihadi-Salafi" affected his framing efforts of several specific issues is dealt with in the next six chapters.

"2 Ibid., pp. 134-136. "''Id., Al-R\sâlaal-Thalâthmiyyafi}-Tahdhïrmmal-Ghuluwftl-Takftr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 September 2006), 1998/1999, pp. 318-321, 336-342. "Ibid.,pp. 322-335.

95 96 Partii: Al-Maqdïsi's Influence on the Saudi Islamic Opposition, 1989-2005

97 98 Chapter 4: Saudi Arabia's Post-

As we saw in chapter 1, al-Maqdisi was heavily influenced by the time he spent in Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi writings he found there. He has nevertheless been a staunch critic of Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi scholars who are loyal to its regime. This not only shows that Wahhabi writings can be used in both pro- and anti-Saudi ways but it also makes clear how al-Maqdisi uses the Wahhabi tradition, which is mostly adopted by quietist Salafis, for jihadi purposes, thereby further underlining his position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi. In this chapter, we will first look at the history of Wahhabi opposition to the Saudi system from within the country itself, especially the wave of opposition to the regime after the Gulf War of 1990. The chapter then focuses on al-Maqdisi's ideas on Saudi Arabia, what impact they have had on the post-Gulf War opposition until 1995 and how this influence can be explained. The year 1995 was chosen because this is when the phase of post-Gulf War opposition more or less came to an end.

Wahhabism and the Saudi System

Whereas some twenty years ago there were few general historical studies on Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism in Western languages1, the past two decades have seen the publication of a relatively large number of studies on the history of Wahhabism, ranging from the apologetic2 to the highly critical3 and everything in between4, as well as the history of Saudi Arabia in general5. From these and other studies, we learn that the Saudi state began with the territorial ambitions of Muhammad b. Saud (d. 1765), the ruler of Dir'iyya, a settlement

1 Important exceptions include David Holden & Richard Johns, The House of Sand. The R\se ana Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty m the Arab World, New York. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, George S. Rentz, The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad b. 'Abd ai-Wahhäb (1703/4-1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia, London: Arabian Publishing, 2004; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1988 [1985]. Rentz's book, though published only in 2004, had been completed as a PhD-thesis in 1947. 2 Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford etc · Oxford University Press, 2004. 3 Hamid Algar, Wahhabism A Critical Essay, Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002 ' Mohammed Ayoob & Hasan Kosebalaban (eds.), Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, Boulder, Col. & London Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London & New York: IB. Tauris, 2006; Michael Cook, "On the Origins of Wahhabism" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 2, no 2,1992, pp 191-202; Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat m Saudi-Arabien. Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902-1953, Wurzburg: Ergon, 2002. 5 David E. Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, GainsviUe etc.: University Press of Florida, 1997; Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia· Power, Legitimacy and Survival, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Alexei Vassihev, The History of Saudi Arabia, London. Saqi Books, 2000 [1998].

99 in the central Arabian region called Najd. His pact in 1744 with fellow Najdi Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the strict Salafi reformist scholar whose ideas would become known as "Wahhabism" and gave Ibn Saud religious legitimacy, became the basis for three Saudi states. The alliance conquered large parts of the Arabian Peninsula and set up an emirate with Dir'iyya as it capital. The families of the two men - the Al Saud and the Al al- Shaykh - have formed the two pillars of the state ever since, from the first Saudi realm (1744-1818), through its successor (1824-1891) to the current state of Saudi Arabia (1932-).6 Despite sometimes fierce internal opposition to the Saudi-Wahhabi project7, the pact between the Al Saud and the Al al-Shaykh proved to be an enduring alliance. The former became what is now known as the Saudi royal family, which formed the political pillar of all three Saudi states and whose members became the country's kings and most important ministers. The descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, on the other hand, were eventually given key positions at religious and educational facilities and institutions and, as a result, held large sway over societal and doctrinal issues. The religious legitimacy provided by the Al al-Shaykh to the Al Saud was reciprocated by the protection of the religious scholars (ulama) provided by the rulers.6This way, Saudi Arabia's rulers had enough room to apply their preferred policies, while simultaneously keeping up their image as a pious Islamic state on account of its religious foundation and its status as protector of the holy places in Mecca and Medina. This image of piety that the state assumed has become institutionalised throughout the years so that the seemingly separate identities of being a Muslim and a citizen are inextricably mixed in Saudi Arabia.' This fusion between statehood and religion

6 These years should be taken as rough indications of when these states started and ended, not as exact dates. The ones used above have been taken from al-Rasheed, History, pp 14 72. 7 For instance, when the Egyptian army attacked the emirate in the early 19th century on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, quite a few inhabitants of Arabia are said to have switched sides because of their dislike of the Saudi-Wahhabi regime, with some of them even using a truce in 1815 to go to Cairo and call on the Egyptians to resume their attacks. See Commins, Wahhabi, p. 33; al-Rasheed, History, ρ 23. For more on ideological opposition to Wahhabism, see Hamadi Redissi, "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745-1932", in: Madawi al-Rasheed (ed ), Kingdom without Borders. Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London. Hurst & Co., 2008, pp. 157-181, Samer Traboulsi, "An Early Refutation of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb's Reformist Views", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 42, no. 3,2002, pp 373-415. 8 For more on the relations between the rulers and the scholars, see Alexander Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 17,1985, pp. 37-50; Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of and Islamic State The Case of Saudi Arabia", /ntemationa! Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 18,1986, pp 53-71 'Joseph Nevo, "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia", Middle Eastern Studies, vol 34, no. 3, July 1998, pp.34-53

100 as well as the country's self-imposed duty to spread the message of Islam are actively promoted by both the royal family10 and in education11.

Wahhabi Resistance to the Saudi Regime

The strict Wahhabi image that Saudi Arabia uses to present itself often excludes groups of Muslims considered deviant, such as Sufis12 and Shiites13. This exclusive nature of Wahhabism may seem preferable for a country that sees itself as the "state of the unity of God" (dawiat al-tawhFd) but it also acts as a double-edged sword. Although it provides the country with an important religious status, it also sets a very high standard that its rulers must necessarily live up to in their policies. During several episodes in Saudi Arabia's history, certain elements from within the country challenged the rulers on religious grounds in ways that were rooted in Wahhabi tradition itself. The first major challenge to Saudi rule on Wahhabi grounds came from the so-called Ikhwan (brothers). This band of fighters was used by the first king of the current Saudi state, 'Abd al-'Aziz b. 'Abd al-Rahman Al Saud (also known as Ibn Saud, 1880-1953) to conquer parts of the Arabian Peninsula. The king had also established ties with the British, wanted cordial relations with neighbouring countries and took a more or less conciliatory approach towards minorities such as Shiites. This meant that he wanted to limit the conquering zeal of the Ikhwan somewhat. The latter, however, did not agree and challenged the king over this issue, who eventually confronted the Ikhwan militarily and defeated them at the Battle of Sibilla in 1929.14

10 Madawi al-Rasheed, "God, the King and the Nation: Political Rhetoric in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s", Middle £ast;oumal, vol. 50, no. 3,1996, pp. 359-371, esp. 365-371. 11 Eleanor Abdella Doumato, "Manning the Barricades: Islam According to Saudi Arabia's School Texts", Middle East Journal, vol. 57, no. 2, 2003, pp. 230-247. 12 See Mustafa Kabha & Haggai Erlich, "Al-Ahbash and Wahhabiyya: Interpretations of Islam", /ntemational /oumal of Middle East Studies, vol. 38, no. 4,2006, pp 519-538; Alexander Knysh, "Contextuahzmg the Salafi-Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, July 2007, pp 503- 530; Gabriel Warburg, "From Suflsm to Fundamentalism: The Mahdiyya and the Wahhabiyya", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 661-672. 13 See International Crisis Group, The Shnte Question in Saudi Arabia, ICG Middle East Report No 45, Riyadh etc., 19 September 2005, Toby Jones, "The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Report, no. 237,2005, pp 20-25; id., "Saudi Arabia's not so New Anti-Shi'ism", Middle East Report, no. 242,2007, pp. 29-32. See also Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York. Palgrave, 1999, pp. 195-228. 14 Commins, Wahhabi, pp. 75-92; John S Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam· The Ikhwan ofNajd and Their Role m the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930, Leiden· Bnll, 1978, pp 121-155, Joseph Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, July 1985, pp 313-318; Steinberg, Religion, 431-469; id., "Wahhabi 'ulama and the state in Saudi Arabia, 1927", in· Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna & Elizabeth Fnerson (eds.), The Modem Middle East A Sourcebook for History, Oxford etc Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 57-61

101 The second, partly Wahhabi-inspired challenge to Saudi rule came in 1979, when a group of rebels under the direction of Juhayman al-'Utaybi (d. 1980) occupied the Grand Mosque of Mecca on the eve of the new Muslim century.15 They claimed that one of them, Muhammad b. 'Abdallah al-Qahtani, was the promised Mahdi ("the guided one", a Messianic figure). Al-'Utaybi's writings, however, showed that - at least for him personally - Messianic zeal played perhaps only a secondary role.16 He claimed to be a descendant of one of the Ikhwan that King 'Abd al-'Aziz had defeated and used religious arguments to point out that the ruling Saudi regime was illegitimate, though not infidel. Although he makes his case against the Saudi rulers in a rather unorganised way, it is clear that al-'Utaybi partly relies on certain Wahhabi writings and was actually part of a broader pietistic Wahhabi-inspired movement that politicised in the 1970s.17 The group of rebels was defeated after a two-week stand-off and dozens of them were executed." Like-minded activists continued their activities abroad, however, and also influenced al-Maqdisi, as we saw in chapter 1. The third and perhaps most important partly Wahhabi-inspired challenge to the Saudi regime came in the form of a trend that originated in the 1960s. As we saw in the introduction, numerous Muslim Brothers from around the Arab world moved to Saudi Arabia to escape persecution in their home countries from the 1960s to the 1980s. They integrated into the country's educational facilities and as such gained major influence within the new universities of Saudi Arabia." As Madawi al-Rasheed points out, official,

15 For contemporary accounts of this rebellion, see Jim Paul, "Insurrection at Mecca", MER1P Reports, no. 91, October 1980, pp. 3-4. See also James Buchan, "The Return of the ikhwan", in: Holden & Johns, House, pp. 511- 526, li, "Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia", in: Tim Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy m Saudi Arabia, New York- St Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 120-123; William Ochsenwald, "Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 13,1981, pp 271-286. 16 These ideas are expressed most clearly in Juhayman b. Sayf al-'Utaybî, RisöJat al-/mâra wa-1-ßay'a wa-1-Tâ'a wa- HuJcm TalbEs al-Huktóm 'ala Talabat ai-'lim wa-l-'Amma, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 17 November 2009), n.d. Among the things al-'Utaybî holds against the rulers are that they are not descendants of the Quraysh, the Prophet Muhammad's tnbe, and do not uphold Islam but, in fact, try to destroy it and wage war upon its adherents. For other relevant aspects of al-'Utaybrs ideology, such as his views on wagingjihad, see also id., Awthacj 'Uro l-lmän: Al-Hubb filläh wa-l-Bughdfillâh, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 17 November 2009), n.d., id, Raf al-llt\bâs 'an Milla manja'alahu llâh /maman Ιι-1-Nâs, www.tawhed ws (accessed 17 November 2009), n.d. For more on al-'Utaybfs writings, see Joseph A. Kechichian, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia:Juhaymân al-'Utaybrs 'Letters' to the Saudi People", The Muslim World, vol. 80, no I.January 1990, pp. 1-16; Florian Peil, "Die Besetzung der Großen Moschee von Mekka 1979", Orient, deutsche Zeitschrift fur den modernen Orient, vol 47, no 3, 2006, pp. 398-405. 17 Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al- 'Utaybi Revisited", /ntemational Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1,2007, pp. 103 122. See also the highly interesting articles by the Saudi journalist Mishâri al-Dhâyidîon the 25lh anniversary of the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Al-Sharq al-Awsat on 24 and 25 February 2004. " The most comprehensive account of the rebellion and its immediate aftermath in English is Yaroslav Trofìmov, The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shnne, New York· Anchor Books, 2007 See also Lawrence Wnght, The Looming Tower Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/U, New York. Knopf, 2007, pp 88-94 " The best analysis of the Sahwa, including in this period, can be found in Stéphane Lacroix, Les islamistes saoudiens, une insurrection manquée, Pans Presses Universitaires de France, 2010, pp 48-64. For an excellent

102 state-sponsored Wahhabism was (and is) mostly concerned with ritual issues in people's daily lives and generally leaves moral and political issues to the rulers. The immigrated Muslim Brothers and like-minded Saudis, however, combined Wahhabism with the Brotherhood's political activism and thereby helped bring about the Sahwa: a resurgence of a more politically sensitive and critical Wahhabism in the 1970s and 1980s.20 A major difference between the Sahwa and the two previous Wahhabi-inspired rebellions was that the two earlier challenges could be seen as radical outgrowths of the Saudi-Wahhabi system itself, while the Sahwa clearly represented a mixture of Wahhabism with a political activism alien to the Wahhabi tradition.21 The development of the Sahwa was facilitated by the Saudi regime after 1979 since it was eager to portray itself as pious after its status had been challenged by Juhayman al- 'Utaybi's occupation of the Grand Mosque.22 This expressed itself in (amongst other things) more funding for religious institutions, a greater role for the 'ulama, an increase in the number of mosques and the king's adoption of the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Places" (khädim al-haramayn). In this climate of increased official religiosity, the Sahwa could flourish.23 Although "members" of the Sahwa were quite politicised and critical of official Wahhabism24, they did not openly challenge the regime. This stopped, however, shortly after the Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia.

analysis of the Sahwa in English, see Madawi al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, islamic Voices from a New Generaton, Cambridge etc. Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 59 101, esp. 65-72 20 Al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp 59-72. See also Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds Islam and the West (transi. Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, Mass. & London: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 170-180 See also Lacroix, islamistes, pp. 174-177, where the author points out that Sahwa scholars blamed official scholars of ignoring "thejunsprudence of reality" (fiqh al-wdqi") by focussing entirely on doctrinal details at the expense of major moral and political issues 21 Lacroix, islamistes, ρ 65 22 This greater public religiosity contrasted sharply with the period immediately preceding Juhaymän's take over of the Grand Mosque, which was characterised by increased wealth and decadence as a result of the steep rise in oil prices. For a vivid description of this period, see Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom Kings, denes, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia, New York. Viking, 2009, pp 3-5 23 Toby Craigjones, "Religious Revivalism and its Challenge to the Saudi Regime", in: Ayoob & Kosebalaban (eds.), Religion, pp 110-112; Lacroix, islamistes, pp 90 95, Niblock, Saudi, pp 83 85; Gwenn Okruhlik, "Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia", in· Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed ), islamic Activism· A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind : Indiana University Press, 2004, pp 254-255. It may also have been the case that more money was put into conservative publications by the state in this period, although that is not entirely dear. See William Ochsenwald, "Religious Publication in Saudi Arabia, 1979 1989", Die Welt des islams, vol. 41, no 2,July 2001,pp 135-144. " For example, one of the leaders of the Sahwa, Safar al-Hawäll, wrote his PhD-thesis on the phenomenon of irja (postponement) in Islamic thought He believed that religious scholars nowadays tend to postpone judgement over certain sins and leave that task to God instead. Although al Hawaii mostly refrains from accusing people directly, it seems obvious that he was referring to the official state-employed Saudi ulama, who are supposedly unwilling to pass judgement over the alleged sins of the Saudi rulers. It is probably no coincidence that this dissertation was written under the supervision of Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid's brother, and one of the Muslim Brothers who fled to Saudi Arabia See Safar b Abd al-Rahmân al-Hawâlî, Zähirat al-ΐηά'

103 The Gulf War

The Sahwa and the Al Saud collided drastically in 1990 when the Saudi government decided to allow 500,000 American soldiers within its borders to protect it from a possible attack by the Iraqi army. Although the decision is said to have been a controversial one among the ruling Saudi princes25, King Fahd (r. 1982-2005) eventually went ahead with it and also managed to convince the official 'ulama' to approve of inviting these non-Muslim soldiers in such large numbers.26 Despite the support of the official 'ulama', the invitation of the American soldiers caused a shock among the Sahwa scholars, who saw the U.S. as an enemy and staunch supporter of Israel. After it became known, the invitation of the soldiers sparked a protest movement that was broader than just the Sahwa and far from homogeneous. It included liberal Saudis who, sensing that the regime was at a weak point in its popularity and authority, asked for reforms in the sphere of human rights, legislation and démocratisation.27 Another group was the so-called Advice and Reform Committee (ARC), led by Osama bin Laden, which seems to have consisted mostly of people who had fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and who held more radical ideas than the Sahwa. Although such people came to play a more prominent role in the Saudi opposition in later years (see chapter 5), their influence during the period dealt with here seems to have been rather small and I will therefore concentrate on the Sahwa in this chapter.28 The Sahwa (as well as some older sympathisers, who sometimes had personal reasons to support the movement)2', became the backbone of the protests against the state

fil-Fikral-Isiâmî, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 September 2009), 1985/1986 See also Kepel, War, pp. 174-176; Lacroix, islamistes, pp. 177-179. " Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis, London & New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 174. "ibid, pp. 178-179. 27 Richard Dekmejian, "The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Journal, vol. 57, no. 3,2003, p. 403. For more on current developments among liberal Saudis, see Stéphane Lacroix, "Between Islamists and Liberals. Saudi Arabia's New 'Islamo-Liberal' Reformists", Middle Eost/oumal, vol 58, no. 3,2004, pp. 345 365, id., "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia", in: Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, London: Hurst & Co, 2005, pp. 35-56, id, "Post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia?", 1SIM Review, no. 15, 2005, p. 17. 2" Fandy, Saudi, pp 177-194 For good overviews of the Saudi Islamic opposition, see Abdulaziz 0. Sager, "Political Opposition m Saudi Arabia", in Aarts & Nonneman (eds.), Saudi, pp 234 270; International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder Who are the islamists?, ICG Middle East Report No. 31, Amman etc , 21 September 2004 2'> See Lacroix, Islamistes, pp. 201 206

104 after the Gulf War.30 The two men most closely associated with this phenomenon - to the extent that they are referred to as the "Sahwa shaykhs" (shuyükh a/-Sahwa) - are Salman al- 'Awda and Safar al-Hawali. These two men, both educated and politicised in the 1970s and 1980s, led protests, held critical sermons (spread through audio cassettes) and wrote books about international politics from which it became clear that they were not going to accept Saudi foreign policy as easily as the official 'ulama had done.31 Although the protest movement led by al-'Awda and al-Hawali was sparked by the decision to allow the American soldiers into the country and centred around this topic, it was not limited to this particular issue but had a wider agenda demanding political and social reform.32 As such, participants within the movement presented the Saudi king with a "Letter of Demands" (Jchitâb a/-matâlib) in 1991. It contained both secular demands, dealing with démocratisation and equality, as well as religious ones, concerning the interests of the Muslim community (umma) and the application of Islamic law (sharia). Although the letter did refer to the need to avoid alliances that "violate" the sharfa - an obvious reference to Saudi ties with America - the other demands made clear that the movement had roots that went deeper than this incident.33 In 1992, it was followed by a longer document entitled "The Memorandum of Advice" (mudhaWdrat al-nastha), which carried a similar message but was much more detailed about topics such as the judiciary and the proper role of scholars.34

10 For more on who these people were and what their motives were tojoin, see ibid., pp 197-209. 31 Fandy, Saudi, pp. 61-113; Okruhlik, "Making", pp. 255-257; Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier t/ιαπ Thow Saudi Arabia's Zslamic Opposition, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, pp. 25-32. 32 Most scholars deal with the post-Gulf War protest movement as part of a broader Saudi reform movement against the state's authontananism that continues to this day See International Crisis Group, Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, ICG Middle East Report No. 28, Cairo & Brussels, 14 July 2004; Toby Jones, "The Clencs, the Sahwa and the Saudi State", Strategic Insights, vol. 4, no. 3, March 2005; id., "Violence and the Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Report Online, www.merip.org/mero/merolll303.html (accessed 20 October 2008), 13 November 2003; Gwenn Okruhlik, "The Irony of Islah (Reform)", Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4,2005, pp. 153-170; id., "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia", Social Science Research Council, www.ssrc.org/septll/essays/okruhhk_text_only.htm (accessed 20 October 2008), 10 May 2007, id., "Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Report Online, www.menp org/mero/merol02401.html (accessed 20 October 2008), 24 October 2001; Nimrod Raphaeh, "Demands for Reforms in Saudi Arabia", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 41, no. 4, July 2005, pp. 517-532. For a highly interesting account of the post-Gulf War period as part of a reform movement through the eyes of one of its participants, see Anonymous [Sa'd al-Faqïh], The Rise and Evolution of the Modem Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia, n.p , n.d. A digital version of this book was given to me by its author in 2008 33 For English translations of the Letter of Demands, see R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no 4,1994, pp. 630-631; Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom- Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 222-223. * Mudhakhrat al-Nasiha, www.alhramain.com/text/payan/alnseha/l htm (accessed 6 May 2008), 1992. For an English summary of the Memorandum's text, see Dekmejian, "Rise", pp 633-634.

105 The Letter of Demands and the Memorandum of Advice make clear that many of the Sahwa's wishes were, in fact, more political than strictly religious.35 Demands for an independent and empowered consultative council (mo/Zis al-shûrâ), equality, an end to corruption, a more equal distribution of wealth and a stronger army could all just as easily have been made by secular reformers, particularly since most were framed in exclusively political terms.36 The Memorandum of Advice put more stress on religious legitimacy, such as the request to increase the role of the 'ulama' and the wish to see the media employed for the purpose of da'wa, but this document also focussed on issues such as the army, foreign relations and human rights.37 The political nature of the Sahwa was underlined by the speeches and writings of al-'Awda and al-Hawali, who argued much more - but certainly not exclusively - in terms of international politics and American-led conspiracies against Saudi Arabia than by using strictly religious language.38 In 1993, an organisation was founded called the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR, al-Lajna li-Difâ' al-Huqûq al-Shar'iyya)39, which basically strove for organised political reform along the lines of the Letter of Demands and the Memorandum of Advice.40 The Saudi state, meanwhile, was shocked by the reformist initiatives and initially decided to give in to the protests by announcing reforms. As the demands grew louder, bolder and even became organised through the CDLR, however, the Saudi government became increasingly willing to repress dissenters in various ways.41 These included attacking their message with official fatwas and counter documents and some of the petitioners, including al-'Awda and al-Hawali in 1994, were imprisoned while others, among them prominent CDLR member Sa'd al-Faqih and its spokesman Muhammad al-Mas'ari, fled

35 Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the political and the religious in Salafl discourse because the two can be so intertwined. It is therefore important to realise that by "political", I mean arguments and points of view that have to do with interstate relations, laws, regulations and institutions without recourse to Muslim sources such as the Qur'ân and the Sunna but also books, articles and fatwas by Muslim scholars By "religious", I mean views and arguments that do primarily rely on those sources to praise or condemn a certain issue. " Dekmejian, "Rise", pp. 630-631; Lacroix, islamistes, pp. 214-219 " MudhaWarat; Lacroix, islamistes, pp 219-223. " Fandy, Saudi, pp. 63-84,94-112; Teitelbaum, Holier, pp. 29-30. A very clear example of this is Safar b. 'Abd al- Rahmân al-Hawâlî, Kos/i/al-Ghumma 'an 'Ulama al-Umma, http://saaid net (accessed 20 May 2010), 1991. That they did not speak and write in an exclusively political language is made clear by Lacroix. See Lacroix, islamistes, pp. 198-199. 39 The translation of "shar'ixya" as "legitimate" is interesting, since it can also be translated as "according to the sharfa" The ambiguity of this term seems to be a reflection of the group in general, which portrayed itself as Islamic in Saudi Arabia but as simply striving for human rights in the rest of the world See Fandy, Saudi, p. 116. 40 For more on the CDLR, see Lacroix, Islamistes, pp 224-227, Teitelbaum, Holier, pp 49-66 41 For an in-depth analysis of how the Saudi state countered the Sahwa, see Lacroix, islamistes, pp. 238-259

106 the country and settled in London in 1994.''2 There, the movement eventually split and lost much of its influence." Although the use of faxes and the internet allowed the exiled opposition to continue its activities in a sometimes very effective way44, halfway through the 1990s the Saudi regime seemed to have succeeded in thwarting most of the Sahwa's opposition.45

Al-Maqdisi's Framing of Saudi Arabia

The Sahwa's critical ideas expressed after the Gulf War clearly went beyond the decision to invite the American soldiers. They were part of a broader and politicised Wahhabi reformist critique of Saudi Arabia's policies and its system and should be viewed within the context of general discontent about the country. Al-Maqdisi's ideas on Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, though similar to the Sahwa's critique in several ways, were different in three respects, two of which are important for this chapter: though clearly employing a politicised discourse, al-Maqdisi framed the regime and his critique of it in a more religious way than the Sahwa activists and shaykhs did; and al-Maqdisi's discourse drew much more radical conclusions with regard to the supposed sinfulness of the Saudi system.46

Judging Saudi Arabia on its Religious Credentials

The inherent but latent tension between Saudi Arabia's reputation as the supposed "state of tawhrd" and the more complex reality of interests and international relations the country found itself in surfaced when the regime was confronted by the Ikhwan, Juhayman al- 'Utaybi and the Sahwa. Similarly, al-Maqdisi frames Saudi Arabia as a country that does not live up to its own Salafi-Wahhabi ideology. His first major book, Miilat Ibrahim, occasionally mentions Saudi Arabia as an example of a state that claims to be pious but, in reality, is

" Al-Rasheed, History, pp. 172-176. •" For more on the group's activities in London, see Champion, Paradoxical, pp. 227-229; Fandy, Saudi, pp. 127- 145,150-151; Niblock, Saudi, pp 98-100; al-Rasheed, History, pp. 176-186; Teitelbaum, Holier, pp. 51-55. 44 Mamoun Fandy, "CyberResistance· Saudi Opposition between Globalization and Localization", in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 41, no. I.January 1999, pp. 124-147, esp. 134-146; Joshua Teitelbaum, "Duelling for Da'wa: State vs. Society on the Saudi Internet", Middle East Journal, vol. 56, no 2,2002, pp. 222-239, esp. 226-227. 15 Sa'd al Faqlh continues to broadcast his opposition to the Saudi regime through radio programmes as part of his Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), while Muhammad al-Mas'ari founded the Tajdîd (Renewal) organisation. n The third difference, which has to do with the style in which al-MaqdisFs frames his critique of Saudi Arabia, will be dealt with in the next chapter.

107 not." His most comprehensive and sustained effort against the Saudi state can be found in a different book, however, called Al-Kawashifal-JaliyyafiKufr al-Dawla al-Sa'udiyya, which came out in 1989 and in which he criticises Saudi Arabia on religious grounds.'" Roughly speaking, al-Maqdisi criticises Saudi Arabia for three things.'" The first is its legislation. As we saw in chapter 2, Islamic legislation is extremely important to al-Maqdisi and he applies this attitude in great detail to Saudi laws. He claims that the kingdom, despite its reputation for piety, does not actually govern according to the laws of Islam but applies man-made laws (cjawänin wad'iyya).50 He accuses the Saudi government of applying un-Islamic legislation under the guise of different names, so as to give the impression that all its laws are truly Islamic and that other, non-Islamic rules are not actually laws. "[Saudi Arabia] does not apply the word 'laws' to [its laws]. On the contrary", al-Maqdisi writes, "it calls them 'systems' (anzima), 'protocols' (maräsim), 'instructions' (talimcit), Orders' (awämir), 'decrees' (lawaih) or 'policies' (siyâsât)." He proves this by quoting a book on Saudi law which states that '"the words "law" (qänün), "legislation" (toshrf) and "sharfa" are only applied in Saudi Arabia to the rulings that appear in Islamic law (al-sharfa al-Isiämixya). Those man-made rulings that exceed [the sharfa] are considered "systems", "instructions" or "orders".'"51 Al-Maqdisi mentions examples of Saudi laws that supposedly contradict the sharfa. He states that increased trade with other countries, for instance, has resulted in trade laws that are not of Islamic but of Arab or even European origin.52 He also writes that books published in Saudi Arabia need to be approved by the state, which, he sarcastically points out, results in a situation where one is "not allowed" to publish truly Islamic books in the dawlat af-tawhfd.53 He further remarks that one has to look carefully whether these are really Saudi and not Kuwaiti laws, which - as we have seen - al-Maqdisi has also condemned.54 Significant in all of al-Maqdisi's work, as we saw in chapter 1, but especially in Mil/at Ibrahim and Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya is that he makes extensive use of Wahhabi sources.

" Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim wa-Da'wat al-Anbiyä' wa-l-Mursalm wa-Asäiib al-Tughät fiTamynhä wa-Sarfa/-Du at 'anhâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 1984, pp. 16,69. " Id., Al-Kawâshifal-Jahyya ft Kufr al-Dawla al-Sa 'ûdiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2000/2001 [1989]. A brief but generally very good overview of this book and the circumstances under which it appeared as well as al-Maqdisfs life can be found in al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp. 121-123. " The book deals with far more but al-Maqdisîs real criticism of the present Saudi state's system and policies, however, is mostly limited to the three topics mentioned. 50 Al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawâshif, p. 4. 51 Ibid., p. 15. 52 ibid., p. 16. "/bid., p. 21. " Ibid., p. 18.

108 Scholars such as Sulayman b. 'Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, Hamd b. 'Atiq and Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab are quoted extensively. One could therefore say that Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, the sources of which he collected in Saudi Arabia when he stayed there55, is a Wahhabi- flavoured j'accuse against the Wahhabi state itself. One of the ways al-Maqdisi does this is by showing that Saudi Arabia's laws do not conform to the norms of Islam according to the fatwas by a former mufti of the kingdom itself, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh (d. 1969). He lists law after law that Saudi Arabia introduced but that was rejected as contrary to Islamic law by Ibn Ibrahim, who nevertheless remained loyal to the ruler (wa/F aJ-amr). According to al-Maqdisi, Ibn Ibrahim tried to keep the kingdom from deviating from the shana but to no avail since the rulers adopted the laws anyway. He mentions examples, including trade laws56 and regulations related to smoking57, that were condemned by Ibn Ibrahim and as such al-Maqdisi frames the Saudi state as so unwilling to live up to its religious underpinnings that it does not even listen to its own mufti. The second point of criticism al-Maqdisi writes about has to do with Saudi ties to foreign organisations and institutions that govern on the basis of man-made laws. Equating these laws with objects of worship or idols (tawaghft), he states that Saudi Arabia should not have ties with organisations that blatantly violate God's tawhfd by accepting other gods in the form of man-made laws. Examples he mentions are the International Court of Justice and the United Nations (UN). Since these are based on documents such as the UN Charter, which Saudi Arabia necessarily subscribes to because of its membership of the UN, it actively endorses an organisation that is based on man-made laws.58 Although one may get the impression that al-Maqdisi's opposition against the UN has more to do with politics than with his religious conviction - he claims, for instance, that the UN "yields to Jewish influence" and protects the interests of big states5' - he mostly frames his opposition in a religious way. Al-Maqdisi claims, for example, that issues such as equality of religions and the sexes, opposition to offensive warfare and peaceful relations between Muslims and non- Muslims are seen as positive and desirable by the UN but are completely contrary to Islam.60 He also condemns Saudi ties with Arab organisations such as the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Arab League because he believes these are also based on non-shar'f laws.61

55 Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009. 56 Al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawäshi/, pp. 33-36. 57 Ibid., pp. 40-41. ™ Ibid., pp. 59-81. s' Ibid., p. 64. 60 Ibid., pp. 67-69. " Ibid., 105-139.

109 The third point of criticism of Saudi Arabia and the most political one al-Maqdisi tries to make is the inadmissibility of strong Saudi-US ties. It is with regard to this topic that al-Maqdisi is closest to the writings of al-'Awda and al-Hawali, although they and other Sahwa proponents also mentioned the importance of the sharia, of course. Al-Maqdisi first shows how deep and close the relationship is between the United States and Saudi Arabia and then goes on to give a detailed overview of Saudi defence expenditure, which clearly leads to the conclusion that, although the kingdom has spent billions of dollars on weaponry, it still has a weak and incompetent army.62 The reasons for the Saudi army's incompetence in spite of its huge investments lie, according to al-Maqdisi, in the fact that most of the money is spent on American advisors, soldiers, trainers and planners. He maintains that these men and women, as well as the compounds and cities they live in, are employed to "achieve the goals and policies of the United States of America", not Saudi interests.63 Al-Maqdisi states that it can therefore be said that America is the real power on the Arabian Peninsula and that the 30,000 U.S. soldiers on Saudi soil at the time might perhaps even increase to 100,000 in future. In light of this, as well as the alleged American attempts to keep oil prices low at the expense of Saudi profits and the continued U.S. support for Israel, al-Maqdisi wonders how any Arab country could possibly have such strong ties with the United States.64 He underlines this point by giving many specific examples of weapon systems Saudi Arabia bought from the U.S., supposedly placing itself more and more under American influence.65 This argument, as well as the previous ones used, lead al-Maqdisi to pass a harsher judgement on the kingdom than many of the Sahwa activists did.

Saudi Arabia as a Kufr State

The writings by Sahwa activists presented to the Saudi king as well as the books by al-'Awda and al-Hawali were highly critical of the state and its policies but never openly questioned the legitimacy of its rulers. Al-Maqdisi, by contrast, does so all the time. As we have seen in chapter 2, al-Maqdisi believes that all Muslim countries in the world are systematically governed by un-Islamic laws and are therefore guilty of major unbelief (kufrakbar) and their rulers should accordingly be labelled infidels (kuffar). By extensively quoting the Saudi

62 Ibid, pp 87 91 61 Ibid , ρ 92 64 Ibid , pp 95-96 's Ibid , pp 96-103

110 mufti Muhammad b. Ibrahim, who makes it perfectly dear that some of the country's laws are irreconcilable with the sharia and even explicitly states that this is kufr that expels from Islam66, al-Maqdisi frames Saudi Arabia as a state of unbelief because of its own laws and those of organisations of which the country is a member. In fact, the title of al-Maqdisi's book on the kingdom conveys a similar message, pointing to the "unbelief of the Saudi state". Since Saudi Arabia was founded as an Islamic state and Islam forms the very basis of the country, this is as harsh an attack on the rulers' legitimacy as one can possibly imagine. In framing the rulers of Saudi Arabia as infidels, al-Maqdisi even goes further than a previous Wahhabi-inspired rebel who challenged the Al Sa'ud's legitimacy, Juhayman al- 'Utaybi. As we saw in chapter 1, the latter explicitly did not apply takfir to the rulers because he did not consider them infidels.67 Al-Maqdisi, however, regrets al-'Utaybi did not go that far and states that Juhayman "was ignorant of their unbelief and apostacy".68 He also believes that the Saudi rulers' unbelief can be seen in the fact that "today, the [British] flag of the cross flutters in the streets of Jeddah, Riyadh and other [cities] next to the flag of tawhfd!!!!" He adds, in what may be meant as a slightly conspiratorial tinge to his arguments, that King Fahd openly "wears the cross of the Christians (saiib al-nasärä) and the sign of Freemasonry (shi ar aJ-mäsüniyya)".69 Al-Maqdisi's conclusion based on all of this is that "there is no difference between this state and other Arab täghüt systems (ai-anzima al- täghütiyya al-'Arabiyya aJ-ukhra)".70 Just like al-Maqdisi's analysis of the problems in Saudi Arabia is quite harsh and uncompromising, so is his analysis of what to do about it. He advises "true" believers to move away from the state's sinful behaviour (hi/ra) and, more importantly, to wage jihad against the state. Having established that Saudi Arabia, through its supposed use of other gods in the form of man-made laws, is in clear violation of tawhid, he writes that the state should be fought "until the religion is God's entirely"71. He adds that the 'uiamâ' have stipulated that if a ruler "shows clear unbelief (al-ku/r a!-bawâh), it is necessary to stand up against him (al-qiyäm 'alayhi), remove him ('az/ahu) and substitute him (tabdüahu wa- taghyïrahu) to set up the divine law of God (shar' Allah) and a full realisation of his tawhfd

66 See for example ibid., p. 45. As we have seen in chapter 2, however, this is not necessarily and endorsement of tallir of the person guilty of such a sin. 67 Al-'Utaybï, Risdlat, pp. 9-12. "Al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawäshif, p. 188. "/bid., p. 11. 70 ibid., p. 13. 71 These words are a reference to süra 8:39, which fully reads "Fight them, till there is no persecution and the religion is God's entirely; then if they give over, surely God sees the things they do".

Ill (tahqîq tawhidihi kämilan)." According to al-Maqdisi, this "realisation of God's tawhfd" is the goal of fighting the Saudi state.72

Al-Maqdisi's Influence on Saudi Arabia's Post-Gulf War Opposition

The impact of al-Maqdisi's writings mentioned above on the Sahwa surfaced after the Gulf War but had its roots in the 1980s, when al-Maqdisi spent time in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he wrote his book on Saudi Arabia. Although, as we saw in chapter 1, Al-Kawashif al- Jaliyya was not universally accepted among the fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, his teaching there caused his writings to spread among them and several people who were there at the time have stated that his writings were well-known in the Afghan-Pakistani border area.73 Moreover, the Saudi government preferred to keep its own men in Afghanistan and Pakistan separate from others and a specific guesthouse was set up to achieve this. The man behind this effort was Jamil al-Rahman, the Afghan leader of a faction called Jamä'at al-Da'wa ila 1-Qur'ân wa-l-Hadïth, whose Saudi-sponsored activities attracted the more Salafi-oriented Arabs coming to Afghanistan.74 Although there was also Saudi cooperation with other groups and Saudis did not exclusively join al-Rahman's group75, these efforts to control the direction of those coming from the kingdom must have led to a greater Wahhabi-flavoured cohesion among them. On top of this, the group is also said to have developed a preference for the practice of takfTr, which put it at odds with its Saudi sponsor and eventually even led to efforts to stop the kingdom's money from going there.76 Considering this mixture of Wahhabism and takfir, it is not surprising that al-Maqdisi's books are said to have been especially influential among this group of Afghan-Arabs.77

72 Al-Maqdisï, Al-Kawäshif, pp. 143 144. 73 Interviews with Mishän al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; Fahad al-Shäft, Riyadh, 11 November 2008. Telephone interview with Jamal Khâshuqjï, 27 November 2008. 74 Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia", in: Fansh A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand & Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), The Madrasa m Asia. Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam Amsterdam University Press, 2008, ρ 268; Thomas Hegghammer Jihad in Saudi Arabia· Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 46. 75 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (transi Carol Volk), London: LB. Tauns, 1994 [1992], pp. 117-120. 76 Bamett Rubin, "Arab Islamists in Afghamstan", in: John L Esposito (ed.), Political islam Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform'', Boulder, Col. & London Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 196-197 77 Mansûr al-Nuqaydân, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008.

112 Spreading al-Maqdisi's Writings

Al-Maqdisi's writings (primarily Al-Kawashifal-Jaliyya but also Millat Ibrahim and at least one smaller treatise7*) were smuggled into the kingdom in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Saudis returning from Afghanistan and Pakistan (perhaps primarily those part of al- Rahman's group), as well as from Kuwait." Although this was done with the books of other ideologues too, according to one well-informed Saudi government official, al-Maqdisi's Al- Kawashifal-Jaliyya was the most important of them.80 These books were often taken back to the kingdom because people liked them but others brought al-Maqdisi's writings to show their shaykhs in Saudi Arabia what kind of "deviant" books circulated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Several copies are also said to have been intercepted at the airport in Riyadh, indicating that the Saudi authorities may have had at least some idea of the fact that anti- Saudi writings were circulating in Afghanistan and Pakistan." During my fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, several former followers of al-Maqdisi's ideas indicated that, once these books were inside the country, they spread them by hand by faxing them to others or photocopying them for friends.82 In the days before the internet, this was probably the most effective way to spread clandestine literature and, unsurprisingly, this was also how some of the Sahwa literature was spread in the early 1990s.e3 Although it is not entirely clear what al-Maqdisi's activities were in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s besides studying in Medina, it is certain that his personal presence contributed little if anything to his influence in the country simply because he spent so little time there. Even some of his former followers who actually met him in Saudi Arabia only did so for a very short while during the smaller pilgrimage ('Umra), when al-Maqdisi taught some youngsters.84 Other information about al-Maqdisi's activities in the kingdom gives no indication that his presence in Saudi Arabia has in any way influenced his following there

78 Interview with al-Dhâyidi, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. 79 Interviews with Yüsuf al-Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhäyidl, Riyadh, 8 November 2008, Muhammad al-Dawsarî, Riyadh, 25 November 2008; 'Abd al-Rahmân b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008; al-Shâff, Riyadh, 11 November 2008. Al-Nuqaydän, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008 M Interview with al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008. "' Al Nuqaydän, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008; Sa'ûd al-Sarhân, London, 2 July 2008. See also Abu Qatâda al-Filastînl, Bayna Manhajayn "9", www.tawhed.ws (accessed 27 November 2009), n.d., pp. 2-3. 82 Interviews with al-Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhäyidl, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Faysal al-Rijihl, Riyadh, 18 November 2008; al-Shäft, Riyadh, 11 November 2008. 81 Unya Shavit, "Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins: Islamist Ideology", Middle East Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4, ρ 4 " Interviews with al-Daynl, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008; al-Shâfî, Riyadh, 11 November 2008

113 and it is therefore safe to assume that his impact on the Saudi Wahhabi opposition after the Gulf War - apart from factors beyond his person - is due to his writings.85

The Scope ofal-Maqdisi's Influence

The exact scope of al-Maqdisi's influence on the post-Gulf War Sahwa opposition until 1995 is difficult to gauge. One might assume that a book like Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, which deals extensively with the controversial relations with America and (correctly) predicted that the number of U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia might increase, would be hugely influential among the Sahwa. It appears, however, that this was not the case. The Letter of Demands and the Memorandum of Advice show no clearly discernible traces ofal-Maqdisi's ideas and neither do the writings of the most important leaders of the Sahwa, al-'Awda and al-Hawali. They never cite his writings nor do they name al-Maqdisi as an important scholar whose books people should read. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they were not influenced by al-Maqdisi's work. Al-Hawali, for instance, recommended one ofal-Maqdisi's books about the Murji'a86 to his students, according to one of them.'7 Others have indicated that they believed al-'Awda and particularly al-Hawali had read, agreed with or had even been influenced by al-Maqdisi's works but would not say so in public.88 Beyond anecdotal examples such as the ones mentioned above, it is difficult to prove that al-Maqdisi had any influence on the Wahhabi opposition of the relevant period. My fieldwork, the examples given above notwithstanding, emphasised this. In fact, during interviews with ideologically different people who are very knowledgeable about the post- Gulf War protests, I was repeatedly told that al-Maqdisi had very little impact on the Sahwa.89 One interviewee, a prominent member of the CDLR at the time, even stated that he had never read Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya.'*' There is, however, one exception to this general rule.

85 The only example 1 have found of al-Maqdisrs personal presence having an impact on Saudis was the story of a man who heard al-Maqdisî teach during his pilgrimage and was very impressed by his knowledge. Although knowledge is obviously an important aspect in influencing others, this episode seems to have been too incidental to have had any broader impact. Interview with al-Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008. 86 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Imta al-Namr fiKashf Shubhät Murji'at al-'Asr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1999/2000 [l99l/l992]. 87 Interview with al-Daynî,Jeddah, 13 November 2008 88 Interviews with al-Dawsan, Riyadh, 25 November 2008; al-Shâfï, Riyadh, 11 November 2008; 'Abdallah al- 'Utaybî, London, 1 August 2008 Another example of a Sahwa-scholar said to have been influenced by al- Maqdisî was 'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Ubaykân, a traditional Wahhabi scholar who is said to have been drawn towards the Sahwa after reading al-Maqdisîs book See Lacroix, Islamistes, p. 205 *' Interviews with Sa'd al-Faqîh, London, 11 March 2008; Muhammad al-Mas'ari, London, 10 March 2008, al- Sarhân, London, 2 July 2008 *' Interview with Sa'd al-Faqîh, London, 11 March 2008

114 In 1995, the spokesman of the CDLR, Muhammad al-Mas'ari, published a rewritten and, according to its author, improved version of al-Maqdisi's book.91 Al-Mas'ari's work, though stylistically different and better organised than al-Maqdisi's book, is very close to Al- Kawashf al-Jahyya in content. Like the latter, it describes Saudi history and the kingdom's policies, deals with Saudi Arabia's supposedly man-made laws and its international relations and spends quite some time dealing with Saudi ties with the U.S. and the U.N. Some of the chapter headings are even almost the same. Although al-Mas'ari draws conclusions similar to al-Maqdisi's - he calls the first king of the current Saudi state "the previous täghüt of the [Arabian] Peninsula", for instance92 - his book is nevertheless written from a somewhat different point of view than the one it was based on, as we will see below.93 Considering the few people who explicitly cite al-Maqdisi or his works as well as the consistent image that arose from my interviews indicating that he had not been influential on the Sahwa, we must conclude - simply for lack of evidence showing otherwise - that al- Maqdisi's importance during this period - if any - lay elsewhere. This importance can be found in the spreading of his writings throughout Saudi Arabia, which may not have led to much (discernible) influence among the Sahwa, but will probably have acquainted them and other like-minded or more radical people with his books. This is particularly important in light of Saudi policy against the mostly Sahwa-led opposition after the Gulf War. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Saudi government saw the Sahwa - and not the more radical trends represented, for example, by Bin Laden's Advice and Reform Committee - as its enemy. Several authors have pointed out, however, that more radical ideas were slowly spreading beneath the surface.94 Hegghammer has emphasised that this trend should not be overestimated and did not (yet) constitute a secretive al-Qa'ida-type terrorist organisation.95 The potential for radical anti-Saudi ideas, however, was certainly there. Ironically, these tendencies were facilitated by the Saudi government, which concentrated on cracking down on the Sahwa and tended to ignore the spread of more radical ideas,

"' Muhammad b Abdallah al Mas ari, Al Adula al-Qat lyya ala adam Shar lyyat al Duwayla al-Sa üdiyya, London CDLR, 2002 (é"1 ed ), pp 7 8 ,2 /bid, ρ 24 " It should be mentioned that al Mas ari is a somewhat a typical adherent to the Sahwa since he has long been a follower of Hizb al Tahrlr, which strives to set up an Islamic caliphate but is not known to use violence 94 Abdullah F Ansary, "Combating Extremism A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach", Middle East Policy, vol 15, no 2,2008, ρ 112, Bruce Riedel &Bilal Y Saab, "Al Qaeda's Third Front Saudi Arabia", Washington Quarterly, vol 31, no 2, 2008, ρ 34 ^ Thomas Hegghammer, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia", international Affairs, vol 84, no 4, 2008, ρ 707

115 including those of al-Maqdisi.% This, as one Saudi official admits, was a grave mistake since it allowed a more dangerous ideology to spread without much opposition.97 The familiarity with al-Maqdisi's writings among certain Saudis that resulted from this proved important when the Sahwa had been defeated through imprisonment, forced exile and co-optation but a more radical opposition emerged in the form of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula, dealt with in detail in the next chapter. First, however, we must explain al-Maqdisi's (lack of) influence on the Saudi Wahhabi opposition in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

Explaining al-Maqdisi's Influence

The impact al-Maqdisi had on the post-Gulf War Sahwa was, as far as we can tell, limited. His book Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya was nevertheless important in the period 1990-1995 because it spread among scholars and activists critical of the Saudi state at a time when the latter was mostly focussed on dealing with the Sahwa. How can these two slightly conflicting phenomena be explained? Framing theory offers tools to explain this (lack of) influence in the form of the so-called "core framing tasks" as well as "cognitive liberation".

Core Framing Tasks

Snow & Benford, two pioneering scholars of framing, have shown that for a frame to be adopted by the public, which al-Maqdisi apparently mostly failed to achieve with regard to the Sahwa, it has to resonate with their ideas and beliefs. To be able to do this, a frame has three core tasks'8: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing." The first deals with describing what the problem is and who is to blame for it; the second task has to do with suggesting a solution to the problem; and the third constitutes a call for action.100 The idea

96 Interview with al-Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008, al-Nuqaydân, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008. " Interview with an official working for the Saudi Interior Ministry who asked not to be identified '" A more detailed description of what a resonating frame should look like is given in chapter 5. '" David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization", in: Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi & Sidney Tarrow (eds ), international Social Movement Research, Vol 1. From Structure to Action - Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, Greenwich, Conn. & London: JAI Press, 1988, pp. 199-204 100 Similar ideas were formulated before Snow & Benford published them but only as part of Resource Mobilisation Theory. See particularly Bert Klandermans, "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory", American Sociological Review, October 1984, vol 49, pp. 583-600, id, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus", in: Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow (eds.), Structure, pp. 175 196, where the author refers to consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation as means to align people's ideas with those of a particular actor or movement and encourage collective action respectively.

116 behind this is that if a frame performs these three tasks in a way that resonates with the public, it will likely be successful. If it does not, however, it is unlikely to resonate fully with the target audience and therefore will probably not lead to contentious action 101 If we apply the above to the diagnostic framing of the problem in Saudi Arabia by both the Sahwa and al-Maqdisi, we can see that the two are quite different As described above, the Sahwa had plenty of criticism for the Saudi state but much of this was of a political nature, focussing on the country's ties with America and issues such as equality and increased representation of the people in ruling the country. Although it did have a religious agenda, the Sahwa seemed mostly concerned with political issues and did not openly question the regime's legitimacy. By contrast, al-Maqdisi mostly challenged the regime on its religious credentials and did not accept it at all. He even went so far as to label Saudi Arabia a kufr state. Whereas the problem according to the Sahwa can be said to have lain in some aspects of Saudi policy, for al-Maqdisi the problem was the Saudi regime itself. When looking at the prognostic and motivational aspects of the frames of both the Sahwa and al-Maqdisi, a similar conclusion can be drawn. The Sahwa was essentially part of a movement striving for reform, not revolution, and tried to work within the confines of the Saudi system, not on top of its ruins. It therefore sought its solutions in reforming aspects of Saudi policies, hence the Letter of Demands and the Memorandum of Advice, and called on its supporters to engage in non-violent protest actions. Al-Maqdisi, however, saw jihad against the Saudi regime as the most important solution to the problem he perceived in the kingdom and his writings regularly mention it as the best action people can take 102 It thus seems that al-Maqdisi's framing of the situation was quite different from that of the Sahwa in the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational sense, in spite of their partly shared critique of the Saudi state. It is interesting to note that even the one adherent to the Sahwa who was noticeably influenced by al-Maqdisi during this period - al-Mas'ari - is not very positive about him. Although he praises al-Maqdisi for his willingness to take on the Saudi state and for dealing with the Saudi-U.S. ties, he also criticises him for being far too rooted in the quietisi Wahhabi tradition to be taken completely seriously. He scoffs at al- Maqdisi's writing about "all these issues of smoking and such rubbish", which "shows the

,t" This theory has been used and applied by many other authors in the field of framing theory For an overview, see Robert D Benford & David A Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements An Overview and Assessment", Annual Review of Sociology, 2000, vol 26, pp 615-618 102 See for instance al Maqdisï, Al Kawäshif, ρ 114

117 weak Wahhabi mentality" and concludes that "what al-Maqdisi is offering is deficient to say the least. He really needs a quantum leap in Islamic thought that fits in the 21sl century."103 It could be argued that the fault lines between the ideas of the Sahwa and al-Maqdisi were not as strict as the above suggests. Indeed, the Sahwa itself was not a monolith and there was a time when Osama bin Laden spoke highly of al-'Awda and al-Hawali, suggesting that their different frames of the situation converged at one point.104 Moreover, at least some adherents to the Sahwa are said to have secretly held more radical views than the ones they expressed in public. Several people have told me, for example, that al-Hawali admitted in private that Saudi Arabia was a Jcu/r state but would not say so in public for fear of his position.105 Similarly, al-Faqih admitted that the people behind the CDLR consciously chose "human rights" as one of the overarching themes for their activities because it was acceptable in both Islam and the West and allowed them to - in his words - "ride the waves" of popular sentiment, possibly as a cover for their more radical views.106 In this context, it is also interesting to note that al-Mas'arfs radical views of the Saudi state mentioned above were not published until 1995, when he had reached London and was no longer confined by Saudi pressure on him.107 All of this could indicate that the Sahwa actually agreed much more with al-Maqdisi than its framing of the situation in public suggested. This does not, however, reconcile the Sahwa's politicised Muslim Brotherhood-type Wahhabism with al-Maqdisi's quietisi Jihadi- Salafism and it also does not explain why my fieldwork among some of the people involved at the time consistently showed al-Maqdisi to have been of little influence on the Sahwa. In the early 1990s - before the Saudi government repressed the Sahwa by various means - it seems that al-Maqdisi's descriptions of the kingdom and his call for jihad against it really were a bridge too far for most Sahwa activists. Their ambiguous attitude vis-à-vis al- Maqdisi's ideas, however, explains why people who may not have entirely agreed with him nevertheless showed an interest in his ideas when they were spread in the 1990s.

101 Interview with al-Mas'arî, London, 10 March 2008. 104 See for example Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, London & New York: Verso, 2005, p. 8. 105 Interviews with al-Mas'arî, London, 10 March 2008; al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008. "* Interview with al-Faqih, London, 11 March 2008. 107 The same applied to another document allegedly written by Sa'd al-Faqfli, Abu Qatâda al-Filastïnî and Muhammad al-Mas'ari called Al-Nizâm al-Sa'udîfiMïzân al-lsläm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 December 2009), 1996. This book is also much harsher in its criticism than the previous Sahwa texts.

118 Cognitive Liberation

The term "cognitive liberation" was coined by Doug McAdam in his landmark study on the civil rights movement in the United States. In his book, McAdam states that social movements need good resources to organise and mobilise people and also need the structural openings or political opportunities that allow them to do so. Apart from resources and opportunities, however, McAdam argues that movements also need a situation in which the public realise that the moment to take contentious action has arrived. The term "cognitive liberation" refers to this realisation. The shifting political opportunities provide the public with "cognitive cues" that trigger this process, McAdam states, while existing movements and organisations mobilise their resources to capitalise on this change in attitude in order to take contentious action.108 McAdam has named several political and cultural opportunities that can provide the public with cognitive cues that lead to cognitive liberation. These include ideological or cultural contradictions, which "dramatize a glaring contradiction between a highly resonant cultural value and conventional social practices"; suddenly imposed grievances, a term denoting dramatic events that "increase public awareness of and opposition to previously accepted social conditions"; and dramatisations of system vulnerability, referring to events that expose a regime's weakness.109 The process of cognitive liberation that these events may bring about was not labelled as such before McAdam but was described similarly. Piven & Cloward, for instance, write about this process as involving three aspects: (parts of) the system or regime of a country lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public; people who until then may have seen their situation as inevitable begin to see openings for change; and those who normally remain passive now start believing they have the power to alter their situation.110 Cognitive liberation has also become part of framing theory. Like the latter, it is an attempt to reincorporate beliefs, psychology and "grievance interpretation" into social

108 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1999 [1982], pp. 34-35,48-51,105-106. 109 li, "Culture and Social Movements", in: Enrique Larafia, Hank Johnston & Joseph R. Gusfteld (eds.), New Social Movements- From Ideology to Identity, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994, pp. 39-41. 110 Francis Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements. Why They Succeed, How They Fail, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977, pp. 3-4.

119 movement theory.1" This becomes particularly clear in the work of Sharon Erickson Nepstad, who states that the three core framing tasks distinguished above "can facilitate progression through the three stages of cognitive liberation"."2 In one of her articles she states that this facilitation - in the absence of a social movement - can also be done by an external actor."3 This conclusion has been criticised, however, by Futrell, who claims that people do not necessarily need a social movement or an external actor to help them become "cognitively liberated" but can also reach that stage themselves through interpretive processes of the situation they are in."4 If we apply the above to the subject of this chapter, it is obvious that the Saudi invitation of 500,000 U.S. soldiers was the dramatic change in opportunity or, in other words, the "cognitive cue" that made people realise something was wrong. The subsequent events that took place in the kingdom conform quite accurately with the theoretical framework of McAdam and Piven & Cloward. There were indeed glaring contradictions between the Saudi state's official social policy of encouraging citizens to stay away from non-Muslims as much as possible on the one hand and its invitation of half a million "infidels" from - of all places - the United States on the other.115 This may not have cost the regime its legitimacy altogether but it must have been a blow to its credibility."6 Similarly, the invitation was indeed a "suddenly imposed grievance" that made many Saudis refuse to accept their situation any longer, as was evident in the treatises presented to the king. Although offering petitions to Saudi rulers may not sound controversial, at the time it was and it therefore caused a shock among the rulers, who claimed that advice was welcome but only in private, not in public."7 Finally, the reliance on American soldiers did indeed show the Saudi regime's vulnerability - perceived as such by activists"8 - which encouraged people to challenge the state.119

111 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven Κ Worden & Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation", American Sociological Review, vol. 51, August 1986, pp 465- 466. 112 Sharon Enckson Nepstad, "The Process of Cognitive Liberation· Cultural Synapses, Links, and Frame Contradictions in the U.S.-Central Amenca Peace Movement", Soaologicul Encyuiry, vol. 67, no. 4, November 1997, pp. 471-473. The quote is on p. 472. 113 /bid , pp. 472-485. '" Robert Futrell, "Framing Processes, Cognitive Liberation, and NIMBY Protest in the U.S. Chemical-Weapons Disposal Conflict", Sociological Enquiry, vol. 73, no. 3, August 2003, pp. 362-363 115 See for example al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp 34-37. "' Speaking in (radicalised) hindsight, al-Mas'arï stated that "They [the Âl Sa ud] were finished. They had lost all historical credibility " Interview with al-Mas'arï, London, 10 March 2008. 117 Interview with al-Faqih, London, 11 March 2008. 118 Interviews with al-Faqih, London, 11 March 2008; al-Mas'arï, 10 March 2008 "'Telephone interview with Khâshuqjî, 27 November 2008. Dekmejian, "Liberal", ρ 403.

120 It was in this climate of cognitive liberation that the Sahwa shaykhs preached against the regime's policies, the Letter of Demands and the Memorandum of Advice were published, the CDLR was founded and - most importantly for this study - al-Maqdisi's Al- Kawashif al-Jaliyya was smuggled into the country and spread around. With regard to the question what actor capitalised on the cognitive cue - a social movement, the people themselves or an external actor - one could argue that all three did. It was the social movement that came into existence after the Gulf War that was responsible for various types of contentious action. This social movement was based, however, on pre-existing networks of scholars and academics with a rather coherent socio-political and religious base120, meaning that there were critical trends prior to the formation of a social movement. Moreover, protests such as those accompanying the arrest in 1989 of another Sahwa scholar, 'A'id al-Qarni, showed that there was at least some support from the people for criticism of the regime that might reach cognitive liberation by itself.121 Gwenn Okruhlik has argued that writings such as the Memorandum of Advice helped create cognitive liberation after the Gulf War.122 Similarly, al-Maqdisi's Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya also contributed to this process but as an external actor (i.e. separate from any movement or group) and, as we have seen above, less influentially than the Sahwa writings. Combining this theoretical dimension with the scope of al-Maqdisi's impact on the Saudi opposition from 1990-1995, one could sum up his influence during this period as a (small) external ideological contribution to the more wide-spread attempts to capitalise on the cognitive cue that the invitation of the U.S. soldiers had brought about. Several opposition groups vied for the public's attention after the Gulf War and the Sahwa was clearly the most successful. Although, as we have seen, al-Maqdisi's conclusions went too far for the Sahwa, the decreased legitimacy of the state, its greater vulnerability and its widely despised invitation of the U.S. soldiers created a cognitive liberation conducive to anti-Saudi views, including al-Maqdisi's. Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, in other words, could tap right into the popular mood among certain groups of Saudis, despite the unwillingness of most to take their contention as far as al-Maqdisi wanted.123 His influence during this period should therefore be attributed more to the timing and general anti-Saudi

120 For more on the background of the people who signed the Letter of Demands, see Dekmejian, "Rise", pp. 635-636. 121 Anonymous, Rise. 122 Okruhlik, "Making", in: Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic, p. 261. 121 Apart from activists and former followers of al-Maqdisîs who confirmed this to me, this was also confirmed by a Saudi government official who wished to remain anonymous, as well a staunch Saudi ideological opponent of al-Maqdisîs. Interview with al-Râjihï, Riyadh, 18 November 2008.

121 content of his writings than to his specific conclusions. This changed, however, with the advent of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula, to which we must now turn. Chapter S: Al-Qä'ida on the Arabian Peninsula

After the launch of the U.S.-led "war on terrorism" and particularly the invasion of Afghanistan as a response to "9/11" in 2001, al-Qa'ida's ability to move and strike was severely hampered.1 This loss of territorial and operational freedom was compensated, however, by new groups that were founded or reorganised under the label of al-Qa'ida across the Arab world.2 One of those was al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (al-Qä'ida fi Jazîrat al-'Arab).3 This chapter concentrates on how this particular group, which launched a series of attacks on mostly Western targets in Saudi Arabia from 2003 onwards, came about, what al-Maqdisi's influence on them has been and why he was so influential. The focus is on the years 1995-2005 since in 1995 the Sahwa-led opposition after the Gulf War can be said to have ended and a new and violent phase of contention started, while al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) more or less ceased to exist as a Saudi organisation in 2005.' As we saw in the previous chapter, al-Maqdisi made extensive use of the Wahhabi religious tradition, mostly used by quietist Salafis, to make his case against the Saudi regime, thereby further underlining his position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi. This becomes even clearer with QAP: while al-Maqdisi's framing of the problems in Saudi Arabia failed to attract many followers of the non-violent, political and relatively moderate Sahwa, his radical solutions combined with his close adherence to the (quietist) Salafi-Wahhabi tradition and Saudi historical imagination are precisely what explains his ideological influence on QAP, as we will see.

The Rise of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)

The Sahwa activism described in the previous chapter came as a shock to the Saudi regime and it took until 1995 to effectively suppress this phenomenon, which had never been violent. This changed dramatically when the Wahhabi-inspired activism in Saudi Arabia took a much more militant turn in late 1995, when on 13 November a car bomb exploded at

1 Al-Qaida is not really a single organisational unit but can be divided into a hardcore formed by Osama bin Laden and his direct associates (often referred to as "al-Qä'ida central"), a network of affiliated groups and an ideology that sees Bin Laden as a symbolic leader at most but is not in any way controlled by him. See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda. The True Story of Radical islam, London & New York: LB. Tauns, 2003, pp. 1-21, esp. pp. 8-14 2 Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War", Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 1,2006, pp 14-15. ! Others include Al-Qä'ida ff Bilâd al-Râfidayn (Al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers (i.e Mesopotamia)) and Al-Qâ'ida fî 1-Maghnb al-Islâmî (Al-Qa ida in the Islamic Maghnb (i.e. North Africa)). 4 The organisation later re-emerged as a Yemen-based group This will briefly be dealt with later in this chapter.

123 a U.S. training mission of the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two Indians and injuring dozens. Although several groups claimed responsibility for the bombing, only four men, later identified as 'Abd al-'Aziz al- Mu'aththam, Khalid al-Sa'id, Riyad al-Hajiri and Muslih al-Shamrani, were held responsible for the bombing and were later executed for this act.5 Three of the perpetrators (all in their twenties at the time) told interrogators (and a TV audience) they had fought in Afghanistan and, significantly, had been influenced by Muhammad al-Mas'ari6, Osama bin Laden and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.7 Although these confessions could be the product of coercion, a closer look at these men and their ideological background reveals that this is unlikely.

BaytShubra

One of the culprits of the bombing, al-Mu'aththam, apparently not only claimed to have been influenced by al-Maqdisi but also that he had visited him in Jordan because he was interested in tak/ir (excommunication) of Muslim regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia's.8 It is clear from al-Maqdisi's writings that he was indeed asked about such issues by "the people of the Peninsula (ahi ai-jazfra)".' In a later interview, al-Maqdisi confirmed that he had met several times with al-Mu'aththam, who had come to him for religious rulings and advice.10 Considering al-Maqdisi's views on the Saudi regime, it is not surprising that, whereas the state-supported Council of Senior Scholars (Hay'at Kibär al-'Ulamä') condemned the attack11, al-Maqdisi condemned the execution of its perpetrators and scolded the kingdom's rulers for their supposedly false propaganda12 and spoke highly of al-Mu'aththam13.

s Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 1-2; Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou; Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, pp. 73-76. 6 Considering the fact that they mentioned this in 1995, when al-Mas'arîs had just released his Al-Adi/ία al- Qat'iyya 'aia 'adam Shar'iyyat al-Duwayla al-Sa'üdryya, a rewntten version of al-Maqdisfs Al-Kowöshi/al-yalixya dealt with in the previous chapter, the statement probably refers to this publication. 7 Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 154-155; Tandy, Saudi, pp 2-3; Teitelbaum, Holier, pp 76-77. 8 Teitelbaum, Holier, p. 76. ' Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-MosäbiJi αΙ-Μunira fi l-Radd 'ala As'ilat Ahi al-]cmra, www.tawhed ws (accessed on 17January 2010), n.d This collection of answers deals with questions about working for supposedly un Islamic governments, working for their armies and police forces and working for UN peace-keeping forces. 10Jamâl Khâshuqjî & Yâsir Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar al-Fikrï li Munafifidhî nfijâr al-Riyâd Al-'Unf Farïda, al- Dïmüqrltiyya Shirk!", Αί-Wasat, no. 235, 29 July - 4 August 1996, p. 14. 11 Hay at Kibär al-'Ulamä', Boyân Hay'at JCibär al-'Ulamä' al-Jadrd ba'da l-Taf)îrât al-Akhîra, available on www.e- pnsm org/artidesbyotherscholars.html (accessed on 17 February 2010), n.d. 12 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, IVa-hal Afsada l-Dïn illä I-Mulök wa-Ahbär Sü' wa-Ruhbänahä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed on 17 February 2010), η d. " Id, Tabsir al-'Uqalä' bi-Talbfsat Ahi al-Tajahhum wa-l-Zrjâ', www.tawhed ws (accessed on 28 August 2009), 1996, pp 5-7 Interestingly, al-Maqdisiis said to have praised quietisi Saudi scholars such as Ibn Bäz in the interview

124 The visits paid to al-Maqdisi by al-Mu'aththam were not isolated incidents. In the late 1980s and early 1990s - probably under the influence of the greater religiosity displayed by the Saudi regime to counter challenges like those of Juhayman al-'Utaybi - some Saudis became increasingly pious and, in certain cases, dismayed about what they saw as the sinfulness of society and the state. This was expressed in, among other things, small groups or communities of mostly young people who tried to withdraw from society to study Islam in small circles at people's homes. One of those groups settled in the Shubrä neighbourhood of Riyadh in a house referred to as Bayt Shubrä (the house of Shubrä). Because of their criticism of the state and their pietistic attitudes, the visitors to Bayt Shubrä rejected both state-supported scholars on the one hand and the political Sahwa on the other but were naturally attracted to the writings of Juhayman al-'Utaybi, al-Maqdisi and those of certain 19th-century Wahhabi scholars.14 From interviews I held with former visitors to Bayt Shubrä, it became clear that most activities taking place there concentrated on studying Islamic creed Çaqïda), the Qur an and the Surma, including with a Mauritanian teacher called Muhammad al-Hasan Walad al-Didu al-Shinqiti.15 The visitors - who were all young adults of a middle class background with generally low educational levels16 - considered themselves adherents to the Ahi al-Hadîth tradition.17 Although the group was made up of persons with diverse ideological backgrounds, they seem to have had in common a distinct inclination towards strict Salafism (particularly of a Wahhabi flavour) and - for most - a growing antipathy towards the Saudi state.18 It is obvious that they found plenty of both in the writings of al- Maqdisi available to them (primarily Miilat Ibrahim and Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya) and they zealously photocopied and read these books."

in which he confirmed he knew al-Mu'aththam. Considering al-Maqdisîs admiration for Ibn Bâz, al Albani and ihn al-'Uthaymih, which we saw in chapter 1, this is not surprising According to one of the journalists responsible for the interview, however, this information never made it into the published version of the interview since it was deemed too embarrassing by the Saudi authorities that the man who was apparently a major source of inspiration for the Riyadh bombers had great admiration for Ibn Bâz, who was the Saudi Grand Mufti at the time. Telephone interview with Jamâl Khâshuqjî, 27 November 2008 " Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia The Story of Juhayman al- 'Utaybi Revisited", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 39, no 1,2007, ρ 116 15 Interviews with Mishârî al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008, Saud al-Sarhân, London, 2 July 2008, 'Abdallah al- Utaybî, London, 1 August 2008. " Interview with al Utaybî, London, 1 August 2008 17 Interviews with al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008, Muhammad al-Dawsarl, Riyadh, 25 November 2008. Mansür al-Nuqaydän, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008 18 Interview with al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008 " Interviews with al-Dawsari, Riyadh, 25 November 2008, al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. It is unclear whether al-Maqdisî actually visited Bayt Shubrä when he was in Saudi Arabia. Hegghammer & Lacroix state that he did ("Rejectionist", ρ 116) but none of my interviewees confirmed this Al MaqdisI himself does not

125 The reason Bayt Shubrä is important for this chapter is that al-Mu'aththam and two other Riyadh bombers visited that house in the early 1990s and were influenced ideologically there, including by al-Maqdisi's writings, which presented a sharp critique of politics from a Salafi point of view. This not only shows that the testimonies of the Riyadh bombers indicating their attraction to al-Maqdisi's books were probably authentic but also that they were part of a broader group of people who were extremely critical of the Saudi state and were, in some cases, not afraid to act upon that criticism with violence. This does not mean, however, that all visitors to Bayt Shubrä were violent. Most of them were never involved in armed attacks and some of them have since become prominent liberal journalists20, while others have pursued careers as professionals. As Hegghammer & Lacroix have pointed out, however, the visitors to Bayt Shubrä - though initially a-political - grew increasingly politicised in the early 1990s, when so much criticism of the regime was expressed.21 Moreover, several regular or occasional visitors to Bayt Shubrä, including Ibrahim al-Rayyis, Saud al-'Utaybi and 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Muqrin, later joined QAP.22

From the Riyadh Bombing to the QAP Campaign

The clear link between some visitors to Bayt Shubrä in the early 1990s on the one hand and violent attacks and even QAP on the other raises the question of whether there may be a connection between the contention expressed immediately after the Gulf War and the rise of al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s. Several authors have approached this question through the prism of Social Movement Theory, stating that the post-Gulf War opposition constituted a social movement that protested against government policy in various ways.23 Meijer, based on the theoretical work by Tarrow24, has argued that the post-

remember visiting Bayt Shubrä but does not exclude the possibility. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009 20 For more on these men, see Stéphane Lacroix, "Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia's new Islamo- Uberal Reformists", Middle East Journal, vol 58, no. 3,2004, pp. 352-354; id., "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia", in: Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia m the Balance' Political Economy, Soaety, Foreign Affairs, London: Hurst & Co, 2005, pp 43-44. 21 Hegghammer & Lacroix, "Rejectionist", p. 117 22 Ibid., pp. 117,122, note 87, interviews with al-Dawsari, Riyadh, 25 November 2008, al-Sarhân, London, 2 July 2008; al-'Utaybi, London, 1 August 2008. 23 Roel Meyer, "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terronsm in Saudi Arabia", in: Aarts & Nonneman (eds.), Saudi, pp. 271-311; id., "Yusuf al-Uyain and the Transnationalisation of Saudi Jihadism", in Madawi al- Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London. Hurst & Co.: 2008, pp. 221-243, Gwenn Okruhhk, "Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia", in: Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed ), islamic Activism. A Sonai Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 250-269; id, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi

126 Gulf War protests and the later campaign by QAP from 2003 onwards constituted two phases within one "cycle of contention", i.e. two rounds of protest in a larger conflict led by a single social movement. Both rounds started with mobilisation and, through various means applied by the state, ended with demobilisation.25 Meijer's work states that QAP was originally part of the Sahwa but later parted ways with this movement and attempted to gain the upper hand at its expense.26 Hegghammer, the foremost expert on QAP, has questioned this argument, however, and argues that Meijer's approach does not explain the eight-year gap between the suppression of the Sahwa in 1995 and the QAP-instigated violence that erupted in 2003. Hegghammer therefore contends that Saudi Islamism should be broken down into smaller parts, each to be analysed separately.27 Hegghammer is correct to point out that Saudi Islamism is heterogeneous - which Meijer does not deny - and that Meijer's explanation of why mobilisation only reoccurred in 20032e is rather short. It is undeniable, however, that there were also ideological similarities between the Sahwa and QAP. Apart from the fact that both were critical of the Saudi state, the first leader of QAP, Yusuf al-'Uyayri, scolded the Sahwa shaykh Salman al-'Awda, who had moderated his views when he was released from prison, for having abandoned his more confrontational approach.2' This shows that al-'Uyayri was at least somewhat supportive of the Sahwa's earlier position. Similarly, Bin Laden himself spoke highly of Salman al-'Awda and Safar al-Hawali, as well as other shaykhs associated with the Sahwa.30 In spite of these examples, Hegghammer is nevertheless right in stating that the Sahwa was clearly a

Arabia", Social Science Research Council, www.ssrc.org/septll/essays/okruhlik_text_only.htm (accessed 20 October 2008), 10 May 2007 24 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge etc.. Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1994]. " Meijer, '"Cycle"', pp 271-289. 26 Id., "Yusuf al-Uyain and the Transnationahsation", p. 225. 27 Thomas Hegghammer, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia", /ntemational Affairs, vol. 84, no. 4,2008, pp. 702-703; id, "Violence politique en Arabie Saoudite: Grandeur en décadence d"Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique'", in. Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que le salafisme?, Pans: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, pp 107-108 28 Meyer, "'Cycle'", pp 277-278. 29 Id., "Yusuf al-Uyain and the TransnationaLsation", pp. 232-234 For an extensive treatment of al-'UyayrFs ideology, see Roel Meij er, "Che Guevara van de Jihad: Yusuf al-Ay in", ZemZem Tydschnft over het Midden-Oosten, Noord-Afrika en Islam, vol. 3, no. 1, 2007, pp 126-131; id., "Re-reading al-Qaeda: Writings of Yusuf al-Ayin", /S/M Review, no. 18,2006, pp. 16-17; id., "Yüsuf al-'Uyairï and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis", Die Welt des Islams, vol 47, nos. 3-4, 2007, pp 422-459. 30 See for instance Fandy, Saudi, pp. 186-187; Bruce Lawrence (ed ), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, London & New York: Verso, 2005, pp. 13-14

127 reformist group and therefore different from the violent QAP, which also becomes clear in their different reception of al-Maqdisi's writings, as we will see below.31 Meijer's argument that "the repression and control of the non-violent opposition [in 1991-1995] opened the way for a violent phase of the cycle of contention"32 seems correct. Hegghammer acknowledges that the Riyadh bombing in 1995 was probably, as Meijer states, connected to the crackdown on the Sahwa as well as to the execution of 'Abdallah al- Hudayf, a man who had attacked a Saudi policeman earlier that year and was a friend of the bombers.33 It is not entirely clear, however, whether the QAP campaign of attacks that started in 2003 is also part of the same trend. It appears that, ideological similarities with al- Qa'ida notwithstanding, the Riyadh bombing was an isolated incident and its perpetrators acted on their own, independent of Bin Laden's orders.34 Several attacks followed in the period 1995-2003, the most famous of which is the bombing of the U.S. Air Force compound at Khobar Towers at Dhahran in 1996, killing 19 American soldiers and injuring hundreds. This was probably the work of the Shiite Saudi Hizbulläh35, however, and thus should not be seen as part of the same trend since it came from an entirely different and unrelated group. The other attacks that occurred until 2003 were scattered and relatively small and clearly distinct from the campaign that QAP launched.36 The rise of QAP has been described in several studies, most meticulously by Hegghammer. The latter contends that QAP was much more a pan-Islamic group than a socio-revolutionary organisation, i.e. that it was driven by international causes concerning

31 In this sense, Hegghammer's argument does not fundamentally challenge Meyer's case since ideologically different groups can unite in one social movement. Since movements are often based on informal ties and networks and usually rally around one particular theme, ideological purity and operational homogeneity is often lacking One of many possible examples of this is the Dutch peace movement, which protested together against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s but nevertheless disagreed on the protest methods When some groups felt the time had come for more radical (illegal) action, several church-based and Christian organisations backed away and largely refrained from participating in these activities. See Ben Schennink, "From Peace Week to peace work: Dynamics of the Peace Movement in the Netherlands", in: Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi & Sidney Tarrow (eds ), /ntemational Sona/ Movement Research, Vol 1. from Structure to Action - Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, Greenwich, Conn & London JAI Press, 1988, pp 269-274. 12 Meyer, '"Cycle"', ρ 276 11 Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihad, Yes, but not Revolution Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia", British Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 36, no 3, 2009, p. 401 M Bin Laden did approve of the attack on Khobar Towers (see Lawrence (ed ), Messages, ρ 52, for instance) but so did al-MaqdisT, who was definitely not involved. See Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Zalla Himär al-'llmfil-Tm, www.tawhed ws (accessed 12 January 2010), η d. 35 Thomas Hegghammer, "Deconstructing the Myth about al-Qa'ida and Khobar", CTC Sentinel, vol. 1, no 3, 2008, pp. 20-22. 36 For a good overview of the attacks in this penod, see id, "Jihad", pp 400-402 For more on the general climate of support for anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia in this penod - though not necessarily for armed attacks - see Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform, New York Columbia University Press, 2003, pp 237-244

128 the Muslim world rather than the desire to overthrow the Saudi government.37 He therefore traces the history of QAP to the late 1990s, when several areas of the Muslim world, such as Chechnya and Kosovo (1999) as well as the Palestinian territories (2000), became embroiled in conflict, thereby reinvigorating a pan-Islamic spirit in Saudi Arabia. Combined with the introduction of the internet in the kingdom in 1999, which facilitated the spread of jihadi literature, as well as the emergence of a radical network led by Afghanistan veteran Yusuf al-'Uyayri in 2000 that was willing to work in the service of Bin Laden, the groundwork was laid for the launch of al-Qa"ida operations.38 Several authors have pointed out that Bin Laden's decision to launch a campaign of attacks inside Saudi Arabia was closely connected with certain international developments. The terrorist attacks of "9/11" and the subsequent U.S.-led war in Afghanistan deprived al-Qa'ida of a safe haven from which they could operate, causing the organisation to rethink its strategy and focus on Saudi Arabia, whose ties with the U.S. had been a source of anger to Bin Laden for several years.39 For these and other reasons, QAP was founded in Saudi Arabia in 2002 on the orders of Bin Laden. The direct reasons behind launching attacks in 2003 are somewhat unclear but may have had to do with al-'Uyayri's alleged lack of preparedness at an earlier stage40, an attempt to capitalise on anti-American feelings resulting from the war in Iraq that had just been launched or as a response to several events taking place at that time.'11 Whatever the precise reason, from May 2003 on QAP launched an unprecedented series of attacks on mostly Western targets inside Saudi Arabia that would last until 2004 but petered out until 2005.''2 Although scattered attacks occurred after that, the organisation as a major force was

37 Hegghanuner, "Islanust", pp. 703-706; id, "Violence", pp. 108-112 38 IcL, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Occasional Paper Series, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 25 February 2010, pp. 12-13; id., "Islamist", pp. 707-709; id, "Violence", pp 113-115. 39 Anthony H. Cordesman & Nawaf Obaid, Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymétrie Threats and Islamist Extremists, Washington, D C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, pp 3-4; Hegghammer, "Islamist", ρ 709; id, "Violence", p. 115. 10 Al-Riyöd, 27 September 2005. This article is part of a two-part series on the history of QAP by Fans b. Hazzäm called "Qjssat Ta'sls al-Qä'ida ff 1-Sa'ûdiyya". Part two was published on 6 October 2005. •" Hegghammer, Failure, p. 13; id., "Islamist", p. 710; id, "Violence", p. 116. ,2 For more on the actual campaign, see especially Cordesman & Obaid, Αί-Qaeda, pp. 5-11; Hegghammer, "Jihad", pp. 402-406; Meyer, '"Cycle"', pp. 278-289; but also Jonathan R Bradley, "Al Qaeda and the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows7", Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4,2005, ρ 141, International Cnsis Group, Saudi Arabia backgrounder Who are the Islamists?, ICG Middle East Report no. 31, Amman etc., 21 September 2004, pp. 12-14; Bruce Riedel & Bilal Y. Saab, "Al Qaeda's Third Front: Saudi Arabia", Washington Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2008, pp 35-37

129 effectively thwarted43 until several years later, when Saudis who had fled their country to Yemen, along with native Yemenis, re-launched the group from that country." While the QAP campaign was successful at first, the Saudi authorities eventually gained the upper hand through an increasingly effective counterterrorism strategy.45 QAP further failed because of a lack of support among the Saudi population and the war in Iraq, which proved to be an alternative jihad that absorbed much of the human and financial resources that might otherwise have been invested in the struggle in Saudi Arabia itself.46 This ended - for now, at least - QAP's organised and violent campaign. The group, although made up of a diverse membership47, had effectively rallied around the goal of trying to expel the non-Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula. To what extent a man like al-Maqdisi, whose writings concentrated almost exclusively on the struggle against "apostate" Muslim regimes rather than non-Muslim "occupiers", influenced this group (as well as the visitors to Bayt Shubrâ) is what we will turn to now.48

Adopting al-Maqdisi's Frame

It is clear that the group of youngsters that gathered at Bayt Shubrâ did not dedicate the time they spent together to meticulously reading, studying and analysing Juhayman's or al- Maqdisi's books.49 There was, however, a process of radicalisation taking place. Their inclination towards the Ahi al-Hadïth moved them away from major twentieth-century Saudi scholars such as Ibn Baz and Ibn al-'Uthaymïn since they believed that these 'ulama were not true Salafis who shunned following any particular school of law (madhhab) but rather Hanbalis who had deviated from the tradition of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.50 As such, they

" Michael Knights, "The Current State of al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia", CTC Sentinel, vol 1, no. 10,2008, pp. 7-10. " Although the organisation retained the name QAP, it became a much more Yemeni-directed effort and seemed to have little real connection with its Saudi namesake Hegghammer, Failure, pp. 26-27. For more on this topic, see the special issue of the CTC Sentinel on this subject published in January 2010. 45 Cordesman & Obaid, Al-Qaeda, pp. 11-20; Joshua Teitelbaum, "Terronst Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal Secunty", Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 3,2005, pp. 5-7. n Hegghammer, "Islamist", pp. 712-713. For more on the Saudis who did go to Iraq, see id., "Combattants saoudiens en Irak, modes de radicalisation et de recrutement", Cultures & Conflits, no. 64, 2006, pp. 111-127. 47 For more on the background of QAP's membership, see Thomas Hegghammer, "Terronst Recruitment and Radicahzation in Saudi Arabia", Middle Fast Policy, vol. 13, no. 4,2006, pp 42-48, ICG, Saudi, pp 14-17; Meyer, '"Cycle"', pp. 289-299,301-311 48 For an extensive overview of the background to and the development and demise of QAP, see Thomas Hegghammer Jihad in Arabia. Violence and Pan-fslamism since 1979, Cambridge etc : Cambodge University Press, 2010. 49 Interview with al-Sarhân, London, 2 July 2008. w Interviews with al Dawsarî, Riyadh, 25 November 2008, al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008 It needs to be said here that Wahhâbîs from Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself on have never

130 were more attracted to the methods of al-Albani, who also rejected the various schools of law51, and - in at least some cases - certain Bedouin, who not only refused to follow a particular madhhab but also shunned modern society and the Saudi state.52 It is therefore not surprising that Juhayman, who had held similar beliefs, became something of a role model to them. In fact, Bayt Shubrâ itself was meant as an imitation of a similar house used by Juhayman, Bayt al-Ikhwân (house of the brotherhood).53 Just as Juhayman eventually politicised and radicalised, so did some visitors to Bayt Shubrâ also start combining their pietistic isolation from the Saudi state and its institutions with criticism of the regime that was increasingly framed in terms of Islamic/un-Islamic. Their strict views, linked with the growing sense in the early 1990s that Saudi Arabia was not the pious state it claimed to be, resulted in a willingness to apply takßr to the rulers or even to civil servants working for the government. It was in this context that they came into contact with some of al-Maqdisi's writings (including Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya), which condemned the Saudi state and its laws and policies for being un-Islamic, as we saw in chapter 4. Consequently, al-Maqdisi became the most important radical scholar for the visitors to Bayt Shubrâ, whose books were read by most or all of the youngsters there.54

Framing QAP's Jihad

As we saw above, several visitors to Bayt Shubrâ joined QAP in the early 2000s. The two groups were quite different, however, since they not only came into existence at different times but their "members" also had different backgrounds. Whereas Bayt Shubrâ had some visitors who had been to Afghanistan55, it was mostly made up of radicalised pietistic young men. QAP, on the other hand, consisted mostly of people who had fought in Afghanistan.56 This predominance of "Afghan Arabs" in QAP - whose focus was mostly on fighting either a classical jihad (i.e. against invaders of the dar al-Isläm) or, later, on a global jihad in which

been as interested in Islamic law (sharfa) and its study (fiqh) as they were in issues relating to 'aqîda. See David Commins, The Wahhah Mission and Saudi Arabia, London & New York: I B. Tauns, 2006, p. 12. 51 For more on al-Albânf s role in Salafism in this respect, see Stéphane Lacroix, "Between Revolution and Apohticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism", in: Roel Meyer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, pp. 60-76. 52 Interview with al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008. 55 Hegghammer & Lacroix, "Rejectionist", pp. 104-111,116-117 M Interviews with al-Dawsari, Riyadh, 25 November 2008; al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; Fahad al-Shäff, Riyadh, 11 November 2008; al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008. Although it is difficult to disentangle this process, it seems that their radicahsation partly resulted from and resulted in reading al-Maqdisîs writings. " Interview with al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. 56 Hegghammer, "Terrorist", pp. 45-46.

131 they fought the "far enemy" such as the U.S. - may explain why they focussed their violence on Western targets in Saudi Arabia rather than on the regime itself. Indeed, Hegghammer has convincingly shown that almost all attacks launched by QAP were directed against Western targets, in keeping with the organisation's framing of their jihad as aimed at expelling the "infidels" from the Arabian Peninsula." He states that the preference for violence against non-Muslims at the expense of revolutionary violence directed at the regime in Saudi Arabia can be explained by a relative lack of grievances vis- à-vis the state among Saudi Islamists, structural and cultural obstacles to mobilising against the regime, a certain amount of xenophobia inherent to Wahhabism and attempts by the regime to steer Islamist activism outside in order to divert it from the Al Saud.58 While Hegghammer's reasoning explains why QAP directed most of its attacks at Western targets, he acknowledges that some attacks against Saudi security forces did occur but claims these were mostly out of revenge for violence used against its own members. Later on, however, the QAP literature levelled more verbal attacks against the regime itself, accompanied by actual premeditated attacks against security forces. Hegghammer mentions that QAP may have had a two-stage strategy in which Western targets would be attacked first in order to focus on the Saudi regime later, but that this had few operational and practical consequences. He therefore concludes that QAP's jihad was not openly and explicitly framed and executed as a revolutionary struggle because it would probably not attract enough followers in Saudi Arabia. The attitude of QAP therefore seems to be summed up in the title of one of Hegghammer's articles, namely "Jihad [against Western targets in Saudi Arabia], yes, but not revolution [against the Saudi regime]".59 As mentioned, this makes one wonder why al-Maqdisi became an important source of influence to QAP, since he frames "apostate" Muslim regimes as the main enemy, not the West. Hegghammer's argument is certainly correct in the operational sense: one cannot argue with the fact that most operations launched by QAP in the period 2003-2005 were aimed at Western targets in Saudi Arabia. That does not preclude the possibility, however, that an anti-Saudi ideology did exist among the members of QAP. In fact, QAP's campaign against Western targets, while not directly anti-state, was itself a sign of criticism against the Saudi regime, which had invited and allowed these Westerners within its borders. Moreover, it is unlikely that later attacks against Saudi security forces were only inspired by

" Id., "Islamist", pp. 705-706; id., "Jihad", pp. 402-415; id, "Terronst", p. 41; id, "Violence", pp. 110-112. 58 id, "Jihad", pp. 406-415. 59/bid, pp. 404-405.

132 revenge. It seems obvious that the decision to start attacking Saudi security personnel instead of Westerners later on in the campaign must have been accompanied by some justifying discourse in order to legitimise this change of tactics. I argue that there was indeed an anti-regime ideology underlying QAP's activities and that attempts were made to frame the regime as illegitimate and un-Islamic, even though this was mostly not translated into armed attacks against Saudi targets. Although Hegghammer does not deal with this in any detail, he acknowledges that this may indeed have existed. My argument therefore does not clash with his reasoning but complements his focus on the operational side of QAP by concentrating on the group's anti-Saudi ideological undercurrent, which shows that a strongly anti-regime discourse could indeed be found in QAP's literature during the 2003-2004 campaign. In the following section, I argue that al-Maqdisi's writings were an important direct and indirect source of religious legitimisation for QAP in its attempts to justify this anti-Saudi stance and incorporate his views into its own framing of the situation. This explains how al-Maqdisi's writings, while focussing on "apostate" Muslim regimes, could still be influential among a group that mostly targeted Westerners.

Reframing QAP's Jihad

As we saw in chapters 1 and 4, al-Maqdisi's books Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya and (to a lesser extent) Miiiat Ibrahim, both of which indicted Saudi Arabia for its "un-Islamic" rule, were well-known among jihadis in Peshawar during the 1980s and were smuggled into and spread around the kingdom in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Although this did not result in much direct influence, according to Jamal Khashuqji, a Saudi journalist intimately familiar with Islamism in the 1990s, it did ensure that like-minded Saudis would at least have been aware of these books during that decade.60 This, in turn, means that when preparations were made for the founding of QAP after 2001, these books were probably still available and known to the militants involved in this process. Their knowledge of al- Maqdisi's writings was further facilitated by the introduction of the internet in Saudi Arabia in 1999, which made it easier to spread and share books, and the launch of al-Maqdisi's own website shortly afterwards, making his entire oeuvre available to everyone.61

Telephone interview with Khashuqji, 27 November 2008. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, e-mail message to the author, 11 January 2010.

133 QAP expressed the fact that it was influenced by al-Maqdisi's writings through its publications, in which it frequently printed his articles or referred to him. QAP's publications primarily include its biweekly magazines Sawt al-Jihad and Mu'oskar al-Battar, which was published by QAP's military council (α!-!α;ηα ai-'oskanyya li-l-mujähidmß]azirat al- 'Arab), as well as books and pamphlets by individual members.62 It could be argued, of course, that al-Maqdisi was simply a major Jihadi-Salafi scholar and was published and mentioned in these magazines for that reason only. This would entail that his influence on other radical groups was just as great. A search of other Arabic-language non-Saudi jihadi magazines with a comparable number of issues during the same period (like Sada !-Jihad and MajaUat a!-Ansar63), however, shows that al-Maqdisi was both published and mentioned more often and more extensively in Sawt aJ-Jihad as well as Mu'askar aZ-Battar than in other magazines." Moreover, other authors whose work was published or mentioned in the two Saudi jihad magazines were often Saudis themselves, senior members of al-Qa'ida or scholars who have written extensively on jihad. The fact that al-Maqdisi fitted none of these categories but was nevertheless considered important enough to publish or mention shows that there was probably some other reason for this.

Al-Maqdisi is not a Saudi, does not hold any rank in al-Qa'ida's hierarchy and, although it is part of the solution he offers to the problems he sees in politics and society, few of his writing focus on jihad. This is probably also why his writings that do deal with jihad are only referred to or published occasionally and if they are, they are usually simply pieces praising the mujähidün without offering much strategic, ideological or theoretical insight but seem to be aimed only at boosting morale.65 Al-Maqdisi is often named, however,

62 These magazines can be found on www.tawhed.ws but also on the Pnsm website (www.e- pnsm.org/articlesbyotherscholars.html). Both websites still offered all issues of bothjournals on 19 February 2010. " These two magazines are also available on www.tawhed.ws (accessed 19 February 2010). M Sawt al-Jihäd published al-Maqdisï3 times and mentioned him 14 times in its 30 issues; Mu'askar al-Battâr published al-Maqdisîs writings 7 times and mentioned him twice in its 22 issues. By companson: Sadâ l-Jihâd published his writings twice and mentioned him 6 times (including a reprint of an article that first appeared in Sawt al-Jihäd) in its 35 issues and Majallat al-Ansär did not publish al-MaqdisFs writings or mention him at all in its 23 issues. An exception to this rule seems to be the Algenan Majallat ai-Jamaa, which published al-Maqdisîs writings 6 times in only 8 issues but never mentioned him apart from these. A possible explanation for this may be that this magazine was published from 2004 to 2007, when al-Maqdisï received a lot more attention in the press because of his release in 2005 and his criticism of al-Zarqâwî, making him a more likely candidate to be published. 65 See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, "Al-Qäfila Tasîru wa-1-Kilâb Tanbahu", Mu'osltar al-Battâr, no. 7, Safar 1425/March 2004, pp. 4-9; id., "Qawâm al-Dîn bi-Kitâb Yahdl wa-Sayf Yansuru", Mu oskar al-Battâr, no. 8, Safar 1425/April 2004, pp. 4 6, Abu Jandal al-Azdî, Usâma b. Lâdm· Mujaddid ai-Zamân wa-Qâhiral-Amrikân, www.tawhed.ws(accessed3 April2008),2003,21-23,anonymous,Mu/fFMomlakatÄlSaud-'Abda!-'Azfzb.Bäi, www tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2004, p. 26.

134 by QAP authors or interviewees as an important scholar who has influenced them.66 Moreover, he is sometimes mentioned in QAP literature as an imprisoned but steadfast shaykh67 and his work is also published for this reason6", as well as quoted for other purposes.69 That these were not meaningless references becomes clear if one looks at how some members of QAP refer to al-Maqdisi. One prominent member of QAP, for instance, states that

there are [several] scholars I benefited from, be it through lessons (αί-durüs al- 'ilmiyya) or through discussions (aJ-munäqoshät), but the scholar I benefited a lot from through his books and writings and through contacting him via the internet - he is my model in this age (qudwatïfihâdhâ l-'asr) - is the imam, the divine scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.70

Similarly, 'Abdallah al-Rashid, a scholar affiliated with QAP, writes that

the official [scholars] of Saudi Arabia (bilâd al-haramayn) study the Kitäb αί-Tawhicf', they talk about al-walâ' wa-l-bara, they distinguish the ruler's rule on the basis of something other than what God has revealed [...] and recite (yatlüna bi-alsinatihim) the verses ofjiha d [...]. With regard to these, you will not find a difference between most of the writings of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi - may God strengthen him and break his captivity (thabbatahu ilâh wa-fakka asrahu) - and the writings of many of them on matters of belief (mosä'i! al-i'tiqäd) concerning the fundamental issues, except that he distinguishes himself by his sincerity in what he says [...]."

66 See for instance Abu Jandal al-Azdi, Barami) ma Nurìkum ûlâ mä Yarâ Ai Sa'üd, www.tawhed ws (accessed 3 Apnl 2008), 2003, p. 3, 'Abdallah b. Nâsir al-Rashîd, Hashîm al-Tarâju'ât, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2003, ρ 4; al-Qa'qä' al-Najdï, "Al-Shaykh Ahmad b. Näsir al-Dukhayyil", Sowt al-Jihäd, no. 5, Shawwäl 1424/November-December 2003, p. 36. 67 "Liqä' ma'a 1-Mujähid Sähh b. Muhammad al-'Awfï", Sowt d-Jihäd, no. 8, Dhü 1-Qa'da 1424/December 2003- January 2004, p. 25; Abu Jandal al-Azdi, Wujüb Istmqädh al-Mustad'afin mm Sujün al-Tawäghrt, www.tawhed ws (accessed 3 Apnl 2008), 2003, ρ 1. M Abu Muhammad al Maqdisï, "Al-Sijn Jannât wa-När", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 7, Dhü 1-Qa'da 1424/December 2003- January 2004, pp 12-14; id., [no title], Sowt al-Jihäd, no. 6, Shawwäl 1424/November-December 2003, ρ 10; id., [no title], Sowt al-Jihäd, no. 17, Rabî al-Thânî 1425/May 2004, p. 26; lA, [no title], Mu'oskar ai-Battâr, no. 3; Dhü 1- Hijja 1424/February 2004, p. 23. 69 There are many occasions on which al-Maqdisi is quoted. See for instance Abu Jandal al-Azdï, Al-Âyât wa-1- Ahâdfth al-Chazfra 'ala Kufr Quwwat Dir' al-Jazfra, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 Apnl 2008), n.d., p. 72; id., Hiwâr al- Minbarma'a ί-5/iayWi AbîJandal al-Azdï, www.tawhed ws (accessed 3 April 2008), n.d , p. 38; id., Usama, p. 435. 70 "Liqa ma'a 1-Shaykh 'Abî 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Atharî"', Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 5, Shawwäl 1424/November- December 2003, p. 25. 71 This is one of the most important books written by Muhammad b 'Abd al-Wahhäb and a major text in Wahhabism.

135 The most sustained and consistent indication of al-Maqdisi's influence on QAP does not lie in his morale-boosting articles on jihad, his writings on prison experiences or praise of his work such as that mentioned above, however, but in the frequent references to his book Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya. This book was mentioned73, recommended74, promoted75, quoted76 and part of it was republished in another book77, which in turn was also promoted by QAP79. In fact, an entirely new and condensed version of the book fully in line with the original was published79 (and subsequently promoted by QAP80)· The praise of the book found in various QAP publications also indicates that it was an influential source for the organisation and its members. For instance, 'Abdallah al-Rushüd, a frequent contributor to Sawt al-Jihad, recalls a conversation he had with someone:

I said to him: "Do you know anything about the books of the imprisoned shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi - may God break his captivity?" He said: "I have heard of them but I have not read them." I said to him: "If I could ask you one thing, it would be that you read one of the books of the same shaykh, Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi Kufr al- Dawla al-Saudiyya.'"1

The book is also mentioned as "one of the most famous books circulating on the internet"82 and praised by the author of its "refined version" as a visionary book written "about ten years ago" but which nevertheless stated what was wrong with Saudi Arabia even then.83

72 Al-Rashïd, Hashim, p. 44. " See for instance Abu Jandal al-Azdl, Αί-Bâhith 'an Hulcm Qati Afräd wa-Dubbät al-Mabä/iitfi, www.tawhed ws (accessed 3 Apnl 2008), 2002, pp 8 (footnote 1), 12; "Liqä' ma'a 1-Shaykh AbïJandal al-Azdï", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 10, DhQ 1-Hija 1424/February 2004, pp. 23, 28. 74 "Umm Hamza Mithâl li-1-Mar'a al-Mujähida", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 9, Dhü 1-Hijja 1424/january-February 2004, p. 44. 75 "Kitäb Al-Kawäshif al-Jaliyya fi Kufr al-Dawla al-Sa udiyya", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 6, Shawwâl 1424/November- December 2003, p. 29. 76 Al-Azdï, Hiwär, pp. 29-30. 77 Sälih b. Sa'd al-Hasan, Shahâdat al-Thiqâb Al Sa'ûd fiMïTân Ahi al-Sunna, www.tawhed ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2003, pp. 18-20. 7S "Min Isdârâtinâ", Mu 'oskar aZ-Battâr, no. 17, Rajab 1425/September 2004, p. 6; "Qarïban 'alâ Mawqi' 'Sowtai- Jihâd'", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 9, Dhû l-Hijja 1424/january February 2004, p. 47 79 Mu'jab al-Dawsari, Tahdhîb al-Kawâshfal-JaliyyafiKufral-Oawia al-Saudiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2003. 80 "Isdârâtjadîda", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 7, Dhü 1-Qa'da 1424/December 2003-January 2004, p. 42. " 'Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Râshid b Muhammad al-Rashûd al-Sabn, Al-Tatôr wa-iil Saud, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 Apnl 2008), 2004, p. 23 (footnote 28, continued from previous page). See also id (but name given as 'Abdallah b. Muhammad al-Rashûd), "Al-Tatär wa-Äl Sa'ûd fi Nazrat Shaykh al-Islâm Ibn Taymiyya", Sawt al- Jihâd, no 14, Safar 1425/Apnl 2004, p. 25 (footnote 1, continued from previous page). 82 "Liqâ' ma'a 1-Shaykh Abîjandal al-Azdï", p. 26

136 The information given above shows that Al-Kawoshif al-Jaliyya was indeed an important and influential book in the QAP literature. One could argue, however, that this had nothing to do with al-Maqdisi's role in reframing QAP's jihad as an indirect struggle against the Saudi regime itself but could simply be explained by pointing to Al-Kawashif al- Jaliyya's in-depth treatment of the American influence in Saudi Arabia. It is true that this was an important issue to QAP and al-Maqdisi's writings were indeed used to explain that existing Saudi treaties with the U.S. need not be honoured, thereby opening the way for QAP to fight the Americans.84 The most important topic mentioned by QAP in relation to Af- Kawashif al-Jaliyya, however, was al-Maqdisi's attack on the Saudi regime itself and particularly its so-called "man-made laws" (gawänfn wad'iyya), a ubiquitous issue in his writings. QAP's anti-Saudi stance was expressed in many of its publications, some clearly referring to the allegedly "un-Islamic" system of laws it applied.85 Importantly, the literature of QAP shows that they not only share al-Maqdisi's conclusion with regard to the Saudi state (i.e. that it is a hifr state) but also frequently use his writings to show that this is the case. In fact, one might possibly even say that almost every time the alleged kufr nature of Saudi Arabia needs to be shown in QAP's literature, al- Maqdisi's work is mentioned or quoted. Al-Maqdisi's writings in which he openly describes Muslim regimes as tawäghft (idols) are published or quoted by members of QAP86, for instance, also when he explicitly refers to Saudi Arabia as such87. His work is cited when explaining what kufr really is88 and one author states that

this evil state (ai-daw/α ai-khabitha) - the state of the Al Sa ud - which corrupts the people's religion for them, does not differ from its other sisters and loved ones ('an ghayrihä min shaqiqätihä wa-habibâtihâ wa-akhawätihä) who do not apply the sharf α (ghayr al-shar'iyyât) from among the other Arab and Gulf täghüt regimes (aJ-anzima al-

" Al-Dawsari, Tahdhib, p. 1. 84 See for instance the review of al-Maqdisi's Baraat aJ-Muwahhidin mm 'Uhüd al-Tawaghît wa-l-Murtaddfn in Sawt al-Jihad, no. 2, Shatän 1424/October 2003, p. 11. This treatise is also referred to in - for instance - Abûjandal al-Azdï, Nusûs al-Fu

137 'Arabiyya al-Khalyiyya al-täghüüyya al-ukhrä) that the shaykhs of the Âl Sa ud - sometimes - attack for their rule according to man-made laws Whoever wants to know the truth about this infidel apostate state (hâdhih 1-dawla al-kàfìra al-murtadda) should read the book Al-Kawastufal-Jahyya fi Kufr al-Dawla al-Sa udiyya [ ]."

Another scholar affiliated with QAP agrees and writes, partly with reference to Al-Kawashif al-Jahyya, that

[. ] among the greatest contemporary [scholars] who make a case [against the Saudi regime] is the imprisoned shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi [. ] His books and writings contain abundant knowledge (αί-iÎm al-jamm) and deep-rooted fundamentals (al-ta sii ai-rôsiich) that only an arrogant or ignorant person or an agent of the tawäghit would deny.90

Interestingly, members of QAP do not only mention or quote al-Maqdisi's work when they want to show that Saudi Arabia is a kufr state but they are also careful not to go too far in their takfir and - again - use al-Maqdisi's books to make their case. This desire to wage jihad on a doctrinally sound basis separates QAP from some of the Jordanian jihadis that we will deal with in chapters 8 and 9 This can probably be explained by the strongly religious, Wahhabi background of QAP. Being Saudi, these men grew up and were educated in an environment in which doctrinal purity in every sphere of life was highly important but waging jihad much less so, unlike Jordanian jihadis, who were often more concerned with fighting than with the Salafi creed " It is thus not surprising that some of al-Maqdisi's meticulous writings critical of certain practices among jihadis that caused some Jordanians to accuse him of "moderation" and "revisionism", as we will see in chapter 9, were widely mentioned and quoted by Saudi jihadis as important warnings against extremism in takßr andjihad.92 It is likely that the greater familiarity with doctrinal details made the Saudi QAP more susceptible to and more appreciative of the more nuanced writings by al-Maqdisi than

"Al Azdï, AI Äyät, ρ 5 K Al Rashûd, Tatar, ρ 24 (footnote 29, continued from previous page), id, "Al Tatar", ρ 25 (footnote l) " This was also confirmed by al Maqdisï himself Interview with Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009 92 See for example al Azdï, Al Âyât, pp 46,57 (footnote 101, continued from previous page), id, Hiwdr, ρ 6, id.. Al Aiâqât al Dawhyya fil Islam, voi 1, www tawhed ws (3 Apnl 2008), η d, pp 28 30,38, Abü Muhammad al Maqdisî, "Al Hidhr wa 1 Kitmän bayna 1 Ifrät wa 1 Tafrît", Mu oskar al Battâr, no 16, Jumädä 1 Thânî 1425/August 2004, pp 5 8, "Fa s alû Ahi al Dhikr Fatäwä fî 1 Jihâd wa 1 Siyâsa al Shar lyya", Sowtal-Ji/iâd, no 26, Sha ban 1425/October 2004, ρ 51

138 some Jordanian jihadis, who dismissed them as recantations of his earlier, supposedly more radical work. Several Saudi QAP-affiliated authors stated that the best book one could possibly find against extremism in takfir is al-Maqdisi's Αί-Risa/a al-Thaiathimxya." The combination of using al-Maqdisi's writings for the legitimisation of fighting the Saudi regime as well as for refraining from doing so in an extreme and indiscriminate way becomes very clear with regard to the issue of killing Saudi soldiers. In a Q & A section of QAP's Sawt al-Jihad magazine, the question is asked whether jihad operations against Western targets on the Arabian Peninsula are allowed since one could also hurt Saudi soldiers. The answer refers to al-Maqdisi's writings to make clear that the "crimes" (αί- jarâ'im) of the "helpers (ansar) of the tawäghrt" (here: Saudi soldiers) are actually worse than those of the tawäghrt themselves (here: the Saudi regime) since the latter do not actually carry weapons that they turn against the jihadis and that soldiers may therefore be hurt.94 In other writings by Abujandal al-Azdi, one of the major ideologues of QAP, it is pointed out that while Saudi soldiers may indeed be killed, it should not be done indiscriminately but according to the sharfa and one should take into account that not every soldier is necessarily an infidel, again with reference to al-Maqdisi's books.95 From the above, it is clear that al-Maqdisi was a great source of influence on QAP and has played an important role in reframing the group's position towards the Saudi state. It may very well be, however, that al-Maqdisi's impact on QAP was even greater than the above suggests since some arguments used by certain scholars - particularly Abujandal al- Azdi, who was strongly influenced by him96 - look a lot like al-Maqdisi's and may have originally been taken from him but are not attributed as such.97 Moreover, Al-JCawoshif ai- Jaliyya may have served as a sort of reference work for jihadis in Saudi Arabia in a way that does not always make clear that the book was actually used. One QAP-writer, for instance, cites numerous fatwas by the former Saudi Grand Mufti Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al- Shaykh. What is interesting is that the author only selected fatwas that al-Maqdisi had mentioned earlier in Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya. Considering the fact that Ibn Ibrahim had

n Al-Rashïd, Hoshfm, p. 51; Farhân b. Mashhür al-Ruwaylî, "Isläh al-Ghalat fî Fahm al-Nawâqid (l): Al-Tahdhîr min al-Takfïr Mutlaqan", Sawt al-J\hâd, no. 18, Rabî al-Thânî 1425/june 2004, ρ 14. 91 "Tasâ'ulât hawlajihâd al-Salïbiyyîn fTjazîrat al-'Arab: Al-Halqa al-Sâbi'a", Sawt al-J\hâd, no. 15, Rabr al-Awwal 1425/Apnl 2004, p. 22. 95 Al-Azdî, Al-Ayät, pp. 74-77; id, Al-Bählth, pp 28-32,45-46. 96 See also Al-Watan, 8 August 2004, where al-Maqdisî is mentioned as the most important contemporary scholar who influenced al-Azdï. " See for example al-Azdï, Nusûs, pp. 2-3, where the author distinguishes "the abode of original unbelief' (dar al-ku/r aJ-asli) from "the abode of the unbelief of apostasy" (dar kufr ai-ndda) in a way that is very similar to al- Maqdisfs.

139 literally thousands of fatwas and that al-Maqdisi did not number them consecutively but that they are nevertheless used in exactly the same way by the author, it seems that the latter selected the fatwas on the basis of Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya or may not even have consulted the original work at all." A final indication of al-Maqdisi's influence on QAP lies not in what he or his fellow jihadis have written but in how his ideological enemies have responded to his books. The Saudi government and many Saudi scholars have made huge efforts to counter extremism and terrorism through counter-radicalisation schools" but also by writing ideological tracts criticising the jihadis' ideas.100 While most of these have focussed on the phenomenon in general, several books have been dedicated specifically to al-Maqdisi's book Al-Kawashif al- Jahyya101 or Miüat Ibrahim"2. These books try to refute the ideas expressed in al-Maqdisi's writings - particularly Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya - that Saudi Arabia is a fcu/r state because of its ties with the U.S. and its alleged man-made laws. The quality of these books is not always very high since they sometimes misrepresent al-Maqdisi's point of view (possibly in order to state their own case more forcefully)103 or quote sources that will do little to convince jihadis they are on the wrong track104. They are nevertheless highly relevant because they show that al-Maqdisi's writings were apparently considered dangerous enough by the Saudi regime to allow (or even encourage) government-supported scholars to write refutations of

" Al-'Utaybl, Risala, pp 3-12. *' See for instance the New York Times, 9 November 2008; Roel Meyer, "Saudi Arabia's War on Terronsm. Combating Passions, Ignorance and Deviation", in. Jeevan Deol & Zaheer Kazmi (eds.), Contextualizmg/ihodi ideologies, London: Hurst & Co , forthcoming. 100 These wntings can be found on websites such as www.salaflpubhcations com. For an extensive analysis of the efforts by perhaps the most famous Saudi shaykh involved m these efforts, Rabî b. Hâdï al-Madkhalî, see Roel Meijer, "Fighting Fitna with Fitna: Quietisi Madkhah Salafism and the Mirage of Unity", paper presented at the MESA Annual Meeting, Boston, 23 November 2009. For an overview of Saudi efforts to combat extremism, see Abdullah F. Ansary, "Combating Extremism. A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach", Middle East Policy, vol. 15, no. 2,2008, pp. Ill 142; Roel Meijer, "Saudi Arabia's Religious Counter-Terronst Discourse", in· The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979-2009. Evolution of a Pivotal State, A Special Edition of Viewpoints, Washington, D.C.· Middle East Institute, 2009, pp. 32-34. See also Joshua Teitelbaum, "Duelling for Da'wa: State vs. Society on the Saudi Internet", Middle East Journal, vol. 56, no. 2,2002, pp. 222-239. 101 Muhammad al-Kalîlî, Al-Radd 'aid 1-Kawäshifal-Jaltyya, www.alradnet.com/epaper/article php?id_net=74 (accessed 25 February 2010), 2004, 'Abd al-'Aziz b Rayyis al-Rayyis, Tabdrd Kawâshi/al- Amd/iTakfinfii Ii-Dawlat al-Tawhrd, http://islamancient.com/books,item,39.html (accessed 25 February 2009), 2003 102 Muhammad b. 'Umar Bäzmül, Al-Radd 'ala Kutub Mashbüha, www salafikurd.com/files/pdf/bazmwl/alrdalameltebraheem.pdf (accessed 25 February 2009), n.d. 103 Bäzmül, for example, states that al-Maqdisî not only applies tallir to the rulers of the Muslim world but also to its peoples, which is clearly not true. See Bäzmül, Al-Radd, ρ 5. 104 See for example Abu 'Umar Usäma b. 'Atäyä b. 'Uthmän al-'Utaybî, Al-Hujaj al-Qawiyya alä Wujûb al-Di/a' 'an al-Dawla al-Saudryya, http://otiby net/book/open.php?cat=l&book=18 (accessed 25 February 2010), η d The author cites (pp. 79-92) members of the royal family to support his case the Saudi Arabia is truly an Islamic state. Some of these, for example the late King Fahd (r. 1982-2005), were notonous for their less than pious lifestyles and, in any case, represent the very problem that al-Maqdisî and like-minded thinkers protest against, making it highly unlikely that they will take these sources seriously. The author of this book is not a Saudi, however, but is said to be Jordanian.

140 them.105 Moreover, these books were not written in the 1990s, when - as we saw in the previous chapter - the authorities must at least have been aware of al-Maqdisi's books, but in 2003 and 2004. The reason for this probably lies in the increased violence at that time and the fact that the influence of these books became so apparent that it could no longer be ignored and something had to be done about it, as Madawi al-Rasheed has observed.106 This underlines my thesis that al-Maqdisi's writings were important in stimulating anti-Saudi thought in the 1990s but did not have much concrete influence until the early 2000s. Exactly why they had so much influence is the final question of this chapter.

A Wahhabi to the Wahhabis: Explaining al-Maqdisi's Influence

The description given above may create the impression that al-Maqdisi was the only scholar quoted and mentioned in articles produced by QAP. This was not the case, of course. Other authors, including many Saudi jihadis and scholars as well as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden and 'Abd al-Qadir b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, were cited too. As stated before, however, al- Maqdisi - unlike the other authors mentioned - had not written much about jihad or war against the West, was not a member of al-Qa'ida and was also not a Saudi himself. This begs the question how such a scholar who, moreover, did not have the solid religious education that many Saudi shaykhs did enjoy could possibly be so influential. To answer this, we once again have to look to al-Maqdisi's framing of his criticism of Saudi Arabia.

Conditions for Frame Alignment

In the previous chapter, we saw that scholars of framing distinguished three core framing tasks that any good frame should perform: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. In other words, a frame should indicate the problem, suggest a solution and call for action, preferably, of course, in a way that resonates with the public it targets.107 Al-Maqdisi's

105 A Saudi government-sponsored survey conducted in 2004 that was never published shows that among thousands of Saudi 20-30-year olds who had been to Afghanistan or had sympathised with or even been members of QAP, Millat Ibrahim and Al-Kawäshifal-]aliyya were considered very important books. In fact, in a related question asking what non-Saudi scholar had influenced them most, al-Maqdisî was (a very close) second only to 'Abdallah 'Azzâm. Interview with al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2009 1°' Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 122. 107 For more on how these core framing tasks are applied in practice by various movements and actors, see Robert D Benford, '"You Could be the Hundredth Monkey'· Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 2, pp 201-209;

141 framing of the Saudi regime in terms of unbelief and apostasy to be countered by jihad clearly did not resonate fully with the Sahwa-led opposition in the 1990s. It has become clear throughout this chapter, however, that the visitors to Bayt Shubrâ as well as QAP did draw conclusions similar to al-Maqdisi's with regard to the Saudi regime, the legitimacy of fighting it and - in isolated cases - even concretely attacking its soldiers. Although al-Maqdisi's specific interpretation of the core framing tasks indicates why the visitors to Bayt Shubrâ and QAP were attracted to his writings in the first place - they would obviously not have used the writings of someone they completely disagreed with - there is more to be said about the reason of al-Maqdisi's influence. After all, the incorporation of diagnosis, prognosis and motivation into one's frame may be essential for frame alignment but is no recipe for guaranteed success. Snow & Benford have given a detailed explanation of how - ideally - frames should be constructed that goes beyond these core framing tasks and which has been substantiated by other scholars. They have distinguished five different factors that determine the degree to which a frame aligns with the views of its target audience. The first is centrality, referring to the salience of the movement's or actor's frame in the public's larger belief system. If the frame deals with central issues, its chances of alignment are better than when it only deals with marginal ones.108 The second factor, range and interrelatedness, is connected to the breadth of the frame (i.e. its applicability in more than one situation) and the extent to which it is connected with other important aspects of people's beliefs.109 Thirdly, the frame110 as well as the framer111 have to be credible in the eyes of the target audience. A fourth factor is

Jürgen Gerhards & Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany", American Journal £>ƒ Sociology, vol. 98, no. 3,1992, pp. 579-584; Victoria Johnson, "Operation Rescue, Vocabularies of Motive, and Tactical Action: A Study of Movement Framing in the Practice of Quasi- Nonviolence", in: Michael Dobkowski & Isidor Walliman (eds.), Research m Social Movements, Conflict and Change, vol. 20, Stanford, Conn.: JAI Press, 1997, pp. 113-122; David S. Meyer, "Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War", Political Communication, vol 12,1995, pp. 181-189. ")β Sarah Babb, "'A True American System of Finance': Frame Resonance in the U S Labor Movement, 1866 to 1886", American Sociological Review, vol. 61,1996, pp. 1039-1043. m This does not mean that a frame can be stretched endlessly so as to include more and more issues that people hold dear. This sometimes leads to frame overextension. See David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobihzation, and Movement Participation", Amencon Sociological Review, vol. 51,1986, pp. 477-478; Nicole Youngman, "When Frame Extension Fails. Operation Rescue and the Triple Gates of Hell' in Orlando" Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, vol. 32, no. 5, 2003, pp. 533-542 "° Babb, "True", pp 1038-1039, Jiping Zuo & Robert D. Benford, "Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement", The Sociological Quarterly, vol 36, no. 1,1995, pp 140-143. See also William A. Gamson, 'The Social Psychology of Collective Action", in: Aldon D. Moms & Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven & London Yale University Press, 1992, pp 69-70 111 Marvin E Goldberg & Jon Hartwick, 'The Effects of Advertiser Reputation and Extremity of Advertising Claim on Advertising Effectiveness" Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 17,1990, pp. 172-174; Carl 1 Hovland & Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness", Public Opinion Quarterly,

142 referred to as "experiental commensurability", meaning that a frame needs to suggest answers and solutions that are congruent with the conditions in which the audience finds itself and with how it experiences the situation.112 Finally, frames need to have narrative fidelity.113 This entails that they have to resonate with people's cultural, religious and national or ethnic narrations.114 If a frame adheres closely to the conditions for frame alignment formulated and applied by the various scholars mentioned above, it stands a good chance of resonating once it reaches the target audience. It is important to realise that the theory explained above does not entail that people are influenced solely by ideas without looking at the context in which these are expressed. By incorporating aspects such as empirical credibility and narrative fidelity, framing theory takes the social, political and cultural circumstances in which influencing takes place into account and thereby shows how people are influenced through a dialectical exchange of ideas and context, rather than either of these separately.

A/-Ma

If we compare the conditions for frame alignment given above with al-Maqdisi's portrayal of himself and Saudi Arabia in his book Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, we find that his influence among visitors to Bayt Shubrä and QAP is likely due to the fact that his frame meets these quite accurately. Firstly, in relation to the concept of centrality, we saw in chapter 4 that al- vol 15,1951, pp. 636-647; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Frammgjihad- Intramovement Framing Contests and al- Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority", International Review of Social History, vol. 49, supplement 12,2004, pp 168-176 "'TimothyJ. Kubal, "The Presentation of Political Self: Cultural Resonance and the Construction of Collective Action Frames", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 4,1998, pp. 540,550-551; Tracey Skilhngton, "Politics and the Struggle to Define· A Discourse Analysis of the Framing Strategies of Competing Actors in a 'New' Participatory Forum", British Journal of Sociology, vol. 48, no. 3,1997, pp. 501-502, Zuo & Benford, "Mobilization", pp. 139-143 113 Mitch Berbner, '"Half the Battle'; Cultural Resonance, Framing Processes, and Ethnic Affectations in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric", Social Problems, vol. 45, no. 4,1998, pp 438-444; Gary Allen Fine, "Public Narration and Group Culture: Discerning Discourse in Social Movements", in: Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans (eds.), Sonai Movements and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, pp. 127- 138; William A. Gamson, Talking Politics, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 135-162; Kubal, "Presentation", pp. 540-542; Michael J. McCalhon & David R Maines, "The Liturgical Social Movement in the Vatican II Catholic Church", in: Michael Dobkowski & Isidor Walkman (eds.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 21, Stanford, Conn.:JAI Press, 1999, pp. 131-132; Elena Zdravomyslova, "Opportunities and Framing in the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Russia", in Doug McAdamJohn D McCarthy & Mayer Ν Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political C^portumties, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge etc.- Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp 126-136 '" David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization", in Klandermans, Knesi & Tarrow (eds.), international, pp. 205-211; Robert D. Benford & David A Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment", Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26,2000, pp 619-622.

143 Maqdisi's criticism of Saudi Arabia mostly concentrates on three issues: the country's reliance on "man-made laws", its ties with regional and international organisations that are based on secular systems instead of the sharia and the strong Saudi-U.S. relations. As became clear in the previous chapter, al-Maqdisi frames the first two issues as being related to the worship of tawaghft. Since al-Maqdisi sees the application of and adherence to "man- made laws" as idolatry, he can portray "un-Islamic" legislation as a grave violation of tawhfd, which is not only a central concept in the Wahhabi version of Salafism but the very basis of Islam. This way, al-Maqdisi can portray Saudi legislative policy as contrary to the fundamentals of Islam around which everything else revolves, which also applies to the kingdom's ties with the U.S., dealt with more specifically in chapter 6. Al-Maqdisi's frame also meets the conditions mentioned above with regard to its range and interrelatedness. Since a broad and radical interpretation of tawhfd is the basis of his entire reasoning, his arguments flow naturally from that point to related concepts such as tak/îr and jihad, allowing him to use the concept to comment on religious as well as political affairs. Because of this, al-Maqdisi's criticism of Saudi Arabia is embedded in and strongly related to his critique of other countries' policies and legislation, described in chapter 2. As such, al-Maqdisi uses the concept of tawhfd as a consistent starting point from which to draw a large number of interrelated and broadly applicable conclusions. The two factors mentioned, though very important, are probably present in the writings of most radical Muslim scholars writing about legislative systems. Indeed, early radical scholars like Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj also connected the issue of legislation with tawhfd and used that concept as a starting point for their arguments, as we saw in chapter 2, although not as often and as systematically as al- Maqdisi. Where al-Maqdisi really distinguishes himself from Qutb, Faraj and other radical scholars, however, is in the last three factors that are conducive to strong frame resonance. The credibility of his frame (i.e. the extent to which it can actually be "proven"), for instance, was quite high. It has to be remembered that al-Maqdisi wrote Al-Kawashif al- Jaliyya in 1989, a year before the Gulf War. In that book, as we have seen, he wrote extensively on the close Saudi-U.S. ties, the enormous sales of American weapons to the kingdom and why, despite this, the Saudi army was nevertheless weak and incompetent. He even mentioned the number of American soldiers on Saudi soil and warned that this number might increase in future. The fact that all of this was meticulously documented in his book and that only a year later, the Saudi regime not only turned out to be too weak to

144 take on the Iraqi military threat but invited 500,000 soldiers from its long-time ally America must have supported the book's credibility in the eyes of its readers. The experiental commensurability of al-Maqdisi's frame was also there. Whereas in the early 1990s, people may have felt that a change in the system was possible through petitions and non-violent protests, this notion was quickly dispelled when the Sahwa was repressed, co-opted or exiled, as we saw above. This means that while al-Maqdisi's calls for takpr and jihad may have struck many as unnecessary and extreme in the early 1990s, this was probably much less so once the perceived reality of national stalemate and international "war against Islam" after "9/11" had sunk in and a new and more violent group of fighters returned from Afghanistan. Finally and perhaps most importantly, Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya - though not written by a Saudi - had a distinctly Saudi Wahhabi flavour to it, showing a close adherence to the Saudi and Wahhabi national, historical and religious narratives. The book was first released under the pseudonym "Abu l-Bara' al-Najdi", thereby invoking the heartland of Wahhabism, Najd. As has been stated before, this "reflected a desire to authenticate this revolutionary theology by anchoring it in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, the land of Wahhabiyya"115. Al-Maqdisi must have had similar reasons for stating

so that the reader knows before he reads this book of mine: I am not a communist, nor a Râfidï116 Shiite but - may God be praised - a Sunni Arab adherent to tawhïd (muwahhid) who is originally from Najd (Na/diyyan 'Arabiyyan asflan). [...] I disavow [atabarra'a] to God exalted [communists and Shiites] and their infidel deviant beliefs. I declare my 'aqida to be the creed of the Ahi al-Sunna wa-1-Jamâ'a, on the basis of the Prophet [...] and the pious predecessors from among his companions and their followers from the best generations. I declare this so that I prevent (asuddu l- tarïq) the evil scholars ('ufamä' ai-su'), the scholars of the Äl Sa ud, from slandering me because of this or something else.117

115 Al-Rasheed, Contesting, p. 121. 116 The term Râfidï (rejector) is a derogatory term used by Salafïs for Shntes. For more on this term and the anti-Shnte discourse of many Salaffs, see Guido Steinberg, "Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi'is· Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-Shi'ism", in: Meijer (ed.), Global, pp. 107-125; Joas Wagemakers, "Soennitische Islamisten en de Erfenis van de Islamitische Revolutie", ZemZem· Tijdschnfi over het Midden-Oosten, Noord-Afrika en islam, vol. 4, no. 3,2008, pp. 55-59 117 Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Kawöshifal-JaltyyafiKufr al-Dawla al-Sa 'üdiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2000/2001 [1989], p. 8.

145 Al-Maqdisi goes on to recount the story of the Ikhwan, whom the first king of the present Saudi state, "Abd al-'Aziz, defeated at the Battle of Sibilla in 1929. Al-Maqdisi not only clearly sides with the Ikhwan against the king, thereby placing himself in a longer tradition of Wahhabi-inspired opposition against the Al Saud, but also claims that the latter have betrayed the original pact between Muhammad b. Saud and Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab that was the basis of the first Saudi state. He juxtaposes the strict teachings of Ibn 'Abd al- Wahhab on dealing with non-Muslims with the policies of King Fahd and concludes that "there is no difference between this state and the other Arab tâghût regimes".118 He goes on to make his case against Saudi Arabia using Wahhabi concepts (such as al-wala wa-l-bara, which we will deal with in the next two chapters) and sources and shows that he is clearly knowledgeable about Wahhabi writings. Moreover, his detailed arguments, particularly in books such as Αί-Risaia al-Thalathimyya, show that he follows a Salafi and even Wahhabi way of thinking that clearly goes beyond the relatively shallow reasoning of Qutb and Faraj. In my interviews with former visitors to Bayt Shubrâ and experts on Islamism in Saudi Arabia, it turned out that - apart from the content of al-Maqdisi's frame as expressed in his diagnosis, prognosis and motivation - the five factors distinguished above were indeed very important in explaining al-Maqdisi's influence. Although nobody mentioned the importance of tawhfd and the relation of everything al-Maqdisi writes to this concept, considering the fact that his followers are all Wahhabi-Salafis, it must be assumed that this was indeed important. The range and interrelatedness of his writings was explicitly acknowledged, however, with one Islamist saying that al-Maqdisi's books are very coherent, never contradict themselves and are argued from a single starting point.1" The empirical credibility and the experiental commensurability of his frame were also important factors, with interviewees referring to his argument about the American soldiers and his willingness to openly mention broadly acknowledged problems in the current Saudi state as examples.120 Similarly, al-Maqdisi's own credibility was not in doubt either, not so much because he was seen as a great scholar but because of his clear appearance as a Wahhabi- Salafi "knowledge seeker" {tâlib 'ilm), unlike someone such as Qutb.121

"" Ibid., pp. 9-14. The quote is on p. 13. "' Interview with Sa'd al-Faqîh, London, 11 March 2008. 120 Interviews with al-DaynïJeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008; al-Shâfî, Riyadh, 11 November 2008 121 Interviews with al Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008, Muhammad al-Mas'ari, London, 10 March 2008; al-Shâfï, 11 November 2008, al- 'Utaybl, London, 1 August 2008.

146 The most important of the five factors, however, was al-Maqdisi's close adherence to the Saudi-Wahhabi intellectual tradition. The fact that he used Wahhabi sources, arguments and concepts, placed them in the context of the history of Saudi Arabia122 and openly showed his own Najdi roots123 was acknowledged as an explanation for his influence among both the visitors to Bayt Shubrä and the members of QAP. Some mentioned that al-Maqdisi made the ideas of takfîr of the Saudi state "acceptable" to Saudi jihadis124 and that the latter would simply not have been receptive to Egyptian or Syrian ideas.125 In fact, one interviewee told me that al-Maqdisi, unlike major Saudi scholars such as Ibn Baz, represented the real Wahhabi tradition of the imams of the Najdi da'wa (a'immat al-da'wa al-Najdiyya).12'' Al- Maqdisi's use of major Wahhabi scholars in his case against the Wahhabi state, was therefore mentioned as an embarrassment for the Saudi government.127 In conclusion, we can say that al-Maqdisi proved a major source of influence on the visitors to Bayt Shubrä with regard to their ideas of the takßr of the Saudi regime as well as on QAP in relation to their ideological justification for an anti-Saudi discourse, although this did not translate into a sustained policy of armed attacks against the Saudi state. The reason for people's susceptibility to his specific writings lay in his framing of the situation in a way that concurred with theirs on the one hand and the fact that his frame met all the conditions of a successful frame on the other, in which his being "a Wahhabi to the Wahhabis" played a major role. This latter aspect again shows that al-Maqdisi adhered closely to a form of Salafism that was used mostly as a quietist tradition. His adoption of many of its sources, detailed arguments and concepts makes clear once again that al- Maqdisi can be seen as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi, who despite his calls forjihad does not turn his back on the quietist tradition but embraces it to a large degree. One of the concepts with which he did this is a/-wa!â' wa-J-bara', which we will now look at in greater detail.

122 Interviews with al-Daynî, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; al-Dawsari, Riyadh, 25 November 2008; 'Abd al-'AzIz b Faysal al-Räjihl, Riyadh, 18 November 2008; al-Shâfî, Riyadh, 11 November 2008. Mansür al-Nuqaydân, e-mail message to the author, 6 December 2008. 123 Interviews with al-Daynl, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008, al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 18 November 2008; al-Râjihî, Riyadh, 18 November 2008. This was also acknowledged by members of QAP· See for example "Liqa ma'a 1-Shaykh Abrjandal al-Azdl", p. 23; "Millat Ibrahim li-1-Shaykh al-Asïr Abï Muhammad al-Maqdisî 'Âsim al-'Utaybï", Sawt al-Jihäd, no. 14, Safar 1425/April 2004, p. 32. "'' Interview with al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 18 November 2008. 125 Telephone interview with Khâshuqjl, 27 November 2008 126 Interview with al-Dawsari, Riyadh, 25 November 2008. 127 Interview with al-Faqîh, London, 11 March 2008.

147 148 Partili: Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Development of al-Walä' wa-1-Barä', 1984-2009

149 150 Chapter 6: The Revival of al-Isti'âna hi-l-Kuflnr

In the previous chapters, we have regularly come across the term αΙ-waiâ' wa-l-bara (loyalty and disavowal) as a distinctly Salafi and - particularly - Wahhabi concept, without actually dealing with it in any greater detail. This chapter and the next are meant to do just that. In what follows, I will focus on the notion of ai-istiana bi-i-lcu^ar (asking non-Muslims for help, considered forbidden by Salafis), a dimension of al-wala wa-l-bara that is rooted in Islamic tradition, particularly in its Wahhabi version. The inadmissibility to ask "infidels" for help as reasoned by Wahhabi scholars, particularly against other Muslims during a time of war, was rediscovered by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and it is likely that through his work a revival of the concept was set in motion. This chapter starts by giving an historical overview of the concept of αί-waiä' wa-i- bara from its pre-Islamic beginnings to its reinterpretation in 19th-century Wahhabi discourse, with special attention for the dimension of αί-ΐ5ίιαηα bi-l-kuffar It then moves on to deal with al-Maqdisi's rediscovery of the Wahhabi version of this notion and how this was picked up and developed further by Saudi-Wahhabi scholars and activists Finally, this chapter seeks to explain through the use of framing theory why al-Maqdisi's rediscovery of a!-isti ana bi-l-kuffar was probably used and built upon by several Saudi Wahhabis. As will become clear, the fact that al-Maqdisi, just like we saw in chapter 5, made his case by relying on scholars of the Wahhabi-Salafi tradition, who - as we will see - had used aZ-walä' wa-!-barä' mostly for quietist purposes, once again underlines his credentials as a quietisi Jihadi-Salafi.

From Jàhûiyya to Wahhâbiyya: The Development of ol-Wiala wa-I-Bara '

It is not clear whether wala and bara were initially connected or that they only came to be seen as two different sides of the same coin later on. In any case, the two terms that make up d-wda wa-l-bara have been translated and explained in different ways One of the most common meanings of waia (or linguistically similar terms such as wilqya) is "devotion" or "loyalty" and it is also used to denote patronage in Islam.2 Bara (or related words like

1 For a more extensive overview of the history of this concept, see Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept Al Wala wa I Bora in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi", in Roel Meyer (ed ), Global Saiapsm Islam's New Religious Movement, London Hurst & Co , 2009, pp 82 91 2 An extensive treatment of walä in early and classical Islam as patronage can be found in Monique Bernards & John Nawas (eds ), Patronale and Patronage in Eorly and Classical /slam, Leiden & Boston Bnll, 2005

151 tabami') is mostly linked with "being free or innocent", "denunciation" or "disavowal"3 and the term also seems to have been used as such in the pre-Islamic "age of ignorance" (jähiliyya), where tribes were often allies of one another and sometimes had to expel one of their members if he or she endangered an alliance." One of the terms used for such an act of expulsion was tabarru', with the tribe declaring itself ban' (innocent or free) of that particular person.5 Both terms also seem to have entered the Islamic lexicon as meaning "loyalty" and "disavowal", with the latter apparently being used by Muslims to - amongst other things - disassociate themselves from treaties with non-Muslims dating from pre-Islamic times.6 Throughout the rest of the Qur an, both terms are used to indicate similar meanings. For example, Q. 3: 28 states: "Let not the believers take the unbelievers for friends (awîiyâ', i.e. people to whom one shows wala), rather than the believers [...]." With regard to bara, Q. 60: 4 reads: "We are quit of you (bura α'u minL·m) [...]."7 Although both terms also have alternative meanings in the Qur'ân8, they have been adopted as "loyalty" and "disavowal" by different Islamic trends. These include the Khawärif and the group's more moderate Ibâdî off-shoot10, who used αί-waiä' wa-!-barâ' to show loyalty towards their own group and

1 For more on the meaning of the term, see for instance Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Vol. I, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society Trust, 1984, pp. 178-179; id., Vol. II, pp. 2060-2061; R. Brunschvig & R. Rubinacci, "Barâ'a", in: H.A.R. Gibb et al (eds ), Encyclopaedia of Isiàm. New Edition (hereafter E12), vol I, Leiden: Bnll, 1960, pp. 1026-1028, Mawil Y. Izzi Dien & P.E Walker, "Wiläya", in: P.J. Bearman et al. (eds.), E/2, vol. XI, Leiden: Bnll, 2002, pp. 208-209. 11gnaz Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, vol. I, Hildesheim etc.- Georg Olms Verlag, 2004 [1888], pp. 63-69. 5 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religioos Concepts m the Qur an, Montreal etc.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 [1959], p. 56; Etan Kohlberg, "Bara a in ShïT Doctrine" Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, vol. 7,1986, p. 140. 6 Kohlberg, "Barâ'a", pp. 140-141. This dimension has been dealt with extensively with regard to Q 9 (also known as sQrat al-Barä'a). See Un Rubin, "Bara a. A Study of some Quranic Passages", Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, vol. 5,1984, pp. 13-32. See also Richard Bell, "Muhammad's Pilgrimage Proclamation" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1937, pp. 234,238, 242; Frants Buhl, "Zur Koranexegese", Acta Onentalia, vol. 3,1924, pp. 97- 100; Hubert Grimme, Mohammed, Munster: Aschendorff, 1892, pp. 128-129, John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 11-12, who all more or less agree on this meaning of the term. 7 For an extensive treatment of this passage and the rest of sûra 60, seejoas Wagemakers, "Defining the Enemy: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisfs Radical Reading of Sürat al-Mumtahana", Die Welt des /slams, vol. 48, nos. 3-4, 2008, pp. 348-371 ' Q. 59:24, for instance, states. "He is God, the Creator, the Maker (al-börT), the Shaper [ ]." Interestingly, recent research on Genesis 1, which contains the Hebrew verb bora', has suggested on the basis of compansons between Hebrew and Mesopotamian accounts of the creation of the world that this verb should not be translated as "to create", which would correspond with the example of Q. 59. 24, but as "to separate" The latter translation would obviously bring it much closer to the meaning of barâ' as described above See Ellen van Wolde, "Why the Verb tna Does not Mean 'to Create' m Genesis l.l-2.4a", Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, vol 34, no 1, 2009, pp. 3-23. ' Kohlberg, "Bara a", pp 142-144. 10 Ibid., pp 143-144; Werner Schwartz, Die Anfange derlbaditen m NordafnL·, Wiesbaden· Otto Harrassowitz, 1983, pp. 56-66.

152 disavow outsiders", as well as Shntes, for whom loyalty to their imams and disavowal of the first three caliphs and other "enemies" became an article of faith12.

Al-Walâ' wa-l-Barâ' m Salafi Writings

What all of the descriptions of aZ-wa!a wa-l-barâ' mentioned above have in common is that they indicate a desire to enhance solidarity among and maintain homogeneity of the "in- group" on the one hand and to create a clear distinction with the "out-group" on the other. Considering the strictness and purity that Salafis strive for in their doctrine, it is not surprising that its scholars seem to have adopted al-wa/ä' wa-J-barä' precisely for this reason. Since the concept is a tool to separate right from wrong and insiders from outsiders, it is perfectly suited to steer Salafis away from religious innovations (bida'), unbelief (kufr) and polytheism (shirk) and the people that espouse such sinful ideas, while at the same time increasing the loyalty to their own creed (aqfda). This can be seen in many Salafi writings and is clearly expressed in the work of one contemporary Wahhabi author, who states that

loyalty (aJ-muwâJât) and enmity (αΐ-muadât) have a strong connection with the creed of the Muslim ('aqidat αί-Musiim) and [have] the effect of not being ignorant (la yankaru) of his behaviour because the Islamic peoples represent one community (umma), the community of Islam. There is a commitment for every individual Muslim who is a brick (fabma mm labinät) of this community that he does not separate from or leave the community of the Muslims (jama at al-Mushmî) and that his loyalty and devotion (waiä ufiu wa-iWiiäsuhu) are to God the Exalted, his messenger and his Muslim community (ii-jamâ'atihi al-Mus/ima).13

A Salafi scholar who was instrumental in introducing the idea behind αί-waiä' wa-i- barâ' to Sunni Islam was the Hanbali" scholar Ibn Taymiyya. He has devoted an entire book to calling on Muslims to refrain from religious innovations, particularly in the celebration

" Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2 und 3 Jahrhundert Hidschra, vol 11, Berlin & New York Walter de Gruyter, 1992, pp 224-231 12 Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to islamic Theology and Law (transi Andras & Ruth Hamon), Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1981, ρ 182, Kohlberg, "Bara a", pp 144 151 11 Al-Jawhara bt Abdallah, Waqfa hawla l Walâ wa I-Bara fil Islam, Riyadh Dar al-SamÌi li 1 Nashr wa l-Tawzf, 1991, ρ 11 " The fact that Ibn Taymiyya used idea of loyalty and disavowal does not mean that all Hanbali scholars agreed with the concept Some dismissed it as a Shnte concept and rejected its use See for example Abu 1- Husayn Muhammad b Muhammadb AbîYalâ, Tabaqâtal Hanäbila, Cairo publisher unknown, 1952, pp 33,35

153 of religious festivals, and adhere to "the straight path" (αί-sirät ai-mustaqim) or risk sullying the purity of their religion. This does not just involve inner beliefs but also what one says and does, what one eats and the clothes one wears, among other things.15 Ibn Taymiyya believes that participating in the outward customs of non-Muslims may lead to a situation where one can no longer distinguish between Muslims and "infidels".16 "If resembling [Jews and Christians] in worldly matters (umür dunyowiyya) leads to affection (al-mahabba) and loyalty (αΐ-muwälät) to them", Ibn Taymiyya asks, "what about resembling [them] in religious matters (umür dihiyya)?" He subsequently answers his own question by stating that this will result in "a type of loyalty that is greater and stronger. Affection and loyalty to them is incompatible with faith".17 He spends much of the rest of his book warning Muslims about the Jewish and Christian feasts that may lead to such loyalty. Ibn Taymiyya's book is not only important because it incorporated the concept of αί- walä' wa-/-barä' into Sunni - or, more specifically, Salafi - Islam but also because it indicated the direction that the concept would take: just like in Ibn Taymiyya's book about this subject, subsequent Salafi scholars dealing with the concept focussed heavily on ritual purity, manners and keeping one's distance from non-Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya's student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), for example, dealt extensively with the proper ways to greet non-Muslims18 while the North-African scholar al-Wansharisi (d. 1508 or 1509) wrote that it is forbidden for Muslims to settle among non-Muslims and stated that it is compulsory for them to emigrate to the dar al-/siäm.19 It was also as such (i.e. in a quietist, purity-focussed way) that the concept was dealt with by major 19th- and 20th-century Wahhabi scholars, including contemporary ones like Ibn Baz, Ibn al-'Uthaymin and al- Fawzan. Issues such as greeting non-Muslims20, emigrating to the dar al-Isläm" and not

15 Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halim b. 'Abd al-Salâm b. Taymiyya, Iqtidâ' al-Sirât al-Mustaqîm Ιι-Mukhähfat Ashäb al-Jahîm, ed. Näsir b. 'Abd al-Karîm al-'Aql, vol. I, n.p.: Dar al-Ishbfliyä li-1-Nashr wa-1-Tawzr, 1998, p. 92. 16/bid.,'p.94. 17 Ibid., p. 550. " Shams al-DIn Abi 'Abdallah Muhammad b. Abi Bakr b. Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ahkäm Ahi al-Dhmma, vol. 1, Dammam/Beirut: Ramâdî li-1-Nashr/Dâr Ibn Hazm, 1997, pp. 409-426. 19 Ahmad b. Yahyä al-WansharlsI, Asnä Ι-MatajirfÎBayân Ahkäm Man Ghaiaba 'alä Watamhi l-Nasärä wa-lam Yuhäßr wa-mä Yatarattabu 'alayhi mm al-'Uqübät wa-i-Zawäjir, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), 1491. 20 See for example 'Abd al-'Azïz b. Bâz, Là Yajûzu Bad' al-Kuffœr bi-1-Salâm, www.binbaz.org.sa (accessed August 2007), n.d.; Muhammad b. Sälih al-'Uthaymin, Al-Walä' wa-1-Bara, http://saaid.net (accessed 5 March 2010), n.d., pp. 13-16. 21 See for example Sulaymän b. 'Abdallah Ä1 al-Shaykh, Hukm al-Safar ilâ Bûâd al-Kufr Ιι-Αβ al-Tijâra, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), n.d ; Hamd b. 'Ali b. 'Atïq, Al-Tahdhîr mm al-Safar ûâ Bûâd al-Mus/inkin, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), n.d.; 'Abd al-'Azïz b. Bâz, Hukm al-Sakan ma'a l-'Awâ'ii/il-K/iân;, www.binbaz.org.sa (accessed August 2007), n.d.; Sulaymän b. Sahmân, Irshâd ai-Tâlib lia Ahamm ai-Matälib, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), 1917, pp. 10-16. That emigration to the därai-Jsläm is still considered

154 resembling Muslims in clothing, names or celebrating holidays22 are all dealt with extensively in Wahhabi writings on αΙ-wa/ä' wa-l-bara", as well as other Salafi24 ones.25

Al-Isti'äna bi-1-Kuffär in l#h-Century Arabia

In spite of Salafis' overwhelming application of αί-walâ' wa-l-bara to ritual matters, it is not clear whether this is also the way the concept is described in the Qur'ân and the Sunna. There are indications that wa!a may have been used to indicate loyalty to one's own group during a time of conflict, for example in Q. 60: I26, meaning that the term may have been more political in nature than Sunni works on the concept suggest. Indeed, the idea that it is forbidden to ask non-Muslims for help during a time of conflict is already present in a hadith about the battle of Uhud (625).27 It may therefore be the case that wala (perhaps in combination with bara) in early Islam primarily referred to choosing sides between two political entities during times of war and that it was later conflated with the inadmissibility of resembling non-Muslims (toshabbuh al-kuflnr or al-mushäbaha li-l-kuffar), which is how most Salafi authors seem to interpret al-wafä'wa-l-bara. Although this is a point that needs further research, it is clear that αΐ-isti ana bi-l-kuffar as an aspect of a/-wa!ä' wa-i-barä' was important among certain Wahhabi authors in the 19"' century.

relevant by Salafis today can be seen in Romain Caillet, "Trajectoires de salafis français en Egypte", m· Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu'est-ce que le salafisme9, Paris. Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, pp. 257-271 22 See for example Sâlih b. Fawzân al-Fawzân, Al-Wala wa-l-Barâ' fil-Islam, http://saaid.net (accessed 4 March 2010), n.d., pp. 4,8; Muhammad b. Ibrahim Âl al-Shaykh, Hukm al-lhtifâl bi-l-'ld ai-Watanî, www.tawhed ws (accessed 5 March 2010), 1965, Humûd b. 'Uqalâ' al-Shu'aybî, Hukm al-Mushärakafihttiäßtal-Nasärä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), n.d. 23 General Wahhâbî works on a/-walä' wa-l-bara' include Muhammad b. Satd al-Qahtânî, Al-Walawa-l-Barafil- Islâm mm Mafahïm 'Aqîdat al-Salafal-Sâlih, Riyadh: Dar Tayyiba li-1-Nashr wa-l-Tawzï", 2007 (l2,h ed ), 'Ali b Nâyif al-Shuhüd (ed.), Al-Uufassal fìSharh Ayatal-Walä'wa-l-Barâ', http://saaid.net (accessed 4 March 2010), 2004; Humüdal-Tuwayjirî, Tuhfatal-lkhwän h-maJaafil-Muwâlât, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), 1963. 21 See for example Abu Basir al-Tartüsï, Al-Hijro. Masä'ii wa-^hkäm, www tawhed ws (accessed 5 March 2010), 2001 (on the need to emigrate to the dar al-Isläm); id., Hiwâr αί-Adyän Kayfa Naqra'u wa-Kqyfa Nufassiru, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2010), 2008; Hamid b. 'Abdallah al-'Alï, Ma ward' al-Da'wa ilä Hiwâr al-Adyân, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2010), n.d. (on religious dialogue with Jews and Christians); id., Hal Yajüzu 1- Ihtifàl bi- ïd Ra's al-Sana al-Nafrâmyya71, www tawhed ws (accessed 10 March 2010); Abu 1-Walïd al-Ansän, Huhn al-lhnßl bi-l-'Am al-Hyrf, www.tawhed ws (accessed 27 January 2010), n.d. (on the inadmissibility to celebrate non-Islamic holidays). 25 For a more extensive treatment of this quietisi dimension of a/-walä' wa-l-bara', see Wagemakers, "Transformation", pp. 88-90; id, "Framing the Threat to Islam'; Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara' in Salafi Discourse", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4,2008, pp. 5-7; id., "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State· Contesting the Meaning of al-lValâ' wa-l-Bara' in the Writings of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi", paper presented at the MESA Annual Meeting, Boston, 24 November 2009. 26 Wagemakers, "Defining", pp. 353-366. 27 Cited in Majid Khaddun, The islamic Law of Nations: Shqybänfs Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, ρ 90 Interestingly, on the same page hadiths are cited that indicate that Muhammad did sometimes make use of non-Muslim help in combat, suggesting that there was no general prohibition

155 The inadmissibility of a!-isti ana bi-1-ìcuffar in Wahhabi discourse can arguably be traced back to the 18th-century writings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb himself.28 It became particularly pronounced, however, in certain 19th-century Wahhabi writings. The first important document29 with regard to this issue was written by Sulayman b. 'Abdallah Al al- Shaykh (d. 1818), a grandson of Ibn "Abd al-Wahhab who wrote at a time of Al Saud-Ottoman conflict, when some Arabians were siding with the Ottoman-supported Egyptian army and asked them to invade the Arabian Peninsula.30 As a response to this betrayal of the Arabian rulers, Sulayman stated in his treatise that it was not allowed to show loyalty to the "polytheists" - a group in which he included the Ottoman invaders of the Arabian Peninsula - and that if one did, one was like them (i.e. polytheist), quoting verses like Q. 5: 5131 to support his case.32 This became even clearer when, in the late 19th century, the Arabian ruler 'Abdallah asked the "polytheistic" Ottomans for help in defending himself against his brother Saud, who claimed the throne for himself. Although this call for Ottoman help was supported by the majority of Wahhabi scholars at the time as a necessity, several prominent 'ulama' were vehemently against it. These included Hamd b. 'Atiq (d. 1883 or 1884) and the leader of the Wahhabi scholars, 'Abd al-Latif b. 'Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh (d. 1876).33 The former dedicated an entire treatise to this question of loyalty to "infidels" and especially

2' Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhâb, Mufîd al-Mustaftd fïKufr Tank al-Towhid, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2010), n.d. The author has a tendency, for instance, to explain al-mushäbaha h-l-hiffâr in religious terms and with regard to concrete pre-lslamic idols (see for example pp. 3-4) but only starts quoting well-known verses on wald' such as Q. 5.51 and 60:1 when talking about "the duty of enmity l'adäwa) to the enemies of God from among the infidels, apostates and hypocrites" (p 16). This is also an area that needs further research, particularly since similar ideas can also be found in the work of the late Ιβ1*- and early 19'h-century Yemeni scholar Ibn 'Abd al-Bäri al-Ahdal. See 'Abdallah b 'Abd al-Bärl al-Ahdal, Al-Say/al-Battör 'ala Man Yuwälrl-Ku/J5r, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), n.d 29 'Abd al-Rahmân b. Muhammad b. Qâsim al-'Âsimï al-Najdï al-Hanbalî (henceforth Ibn Qäsim) (ed.), Al-Durar al-Saniyyafiì-Ajvnba aì-Najdiyya, n.p., 2004 (7th ed ), vol Vili, 121-143, which reproduces the text. The document is also available separately. See Sulayman b. 'Abdallah Ä1 al-Shaykh, Λΐ-0αΙοΊ1 ftHuìan Muwälät Ahi al-Ishrâk, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), n.d. 30 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London & New York· LB. Tauns, 2006, pp. 33-36. " This verse reads: "O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friends is one of them. God guides not the people of the evildoers." This verse is cited very often by scholars writing about αΐ-walä' wa-1-barâ' For more on this verse and its importance in contemporary Sunni Quranic exegesis, see Johanna Pink, "Tradition and Ideology in Contemporary Sunmte Quranic Exegesis. Quranic Commentaries from the Arab World, Turkey and Indonesia and their Interpretations of Q 5 51", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 50, no 1, 2010, pp. 3-59. 32 Ibn Qäsim, Al-Durar, vol. VIII, p. 127. 33 For more on this episode, see M J Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy. A Nineteenth-Century Saudi Qadi's Dilemma", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 14, 1982, pp. 227-248; Commins, Wahhabi, 61-66; Abdulaziz H al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism", New York University Low Review, vol. 79, May 2004, pp. 500-504; Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat m Saudi-Arabien Die wahhabitische Gelehrten, 1902-1953, Wurzburg: Ergon, 2002, pp. 427-430; id., "The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State 1745 to the Present", in. Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia m the Balance Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, London Hurst & Co , 2005, 18-19

156 the Ottomans (al-Atrâk). Just like Sulayman, he condemns loyalty to non-Muslims but stresses the necessity of bara more. He states that one can only be a true Muslim if one disavows shirk and proclaims one's own tawhrd, which is done by openly stating one's enmity of mushrilan.34 Apart from the clear political dimension that these Wahhabi scholars add to α!-ννα!ά' wa-!-barâ'35, there is also another important element in their writings on this subject. Whereas Ibn Taymiyya and others wrote about αί-walâ' wa-l-barâ' as a tool to remain pure in one's faith, Wahhabi authors - particularly Ibn 'Atiq - turned the correct wala and bara into conditions for being a Muslim. By equating wala to polytheists with "being like them" and by claiming that bara is a necessary prerequisite of one's faith, they basically increased the value of these terms. In other words, whereas Ibn Taymiyya and others used al-wala wa-l- bara in order to establish a clear separation between the Muslim "in-group" and the non- Muslim "out-group", Wahhabi authors did the same but drew the line elsewhere by including some people usually seen as part of the "in-group" in the "out-group". This attempt to change al-wa!ä' wa-1-barä' from a tool to separate Muslims from non-Muslims into an instrument that does the same but also distinguishes "real" Muslims from their "apostate" fellow-believers is an important one, to which we will return in chapter 7. Although this dimension is perhaps implicitly present in Ibn Taymiyya's work as well, the much more explicit ties in Wahhabi writings between al-wala wa-l-bara on the one hand and the opposites of tawhïd and shirk on the other are clear.36 Knowing this, it is not surprising that al-Maqdisi, who wanted sources that combined takfir (excommunication) of the state with a Salafi reasoning, was immediately attracted to these writings. In fact, the eye-opening moment mentioned in chapter 1, in which al-Maqdisi found writings in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina that gave him Salafi answers to his political questions, was based precisely on the Wahhabi writings mentioned above.

Ή Hamd b. 'All b. 'Atiq, Sabil al-Najdt wa-l-Fifailc mm Muwâlât af-Murtaddm wa-1-Aträlc, www tawhed.ws (accessed 5 March 2010), n.d., pp. 38-39. 3b For a more extensive treatment of this dimension, as well as its quietisi alternative, see Wagemakers, "Enduring". 36 This use of al-walâ' wa-l-barâ' as a sort of litmus test for being a Muslim is perhaps most clearly and explicitly argued by Sulaymân b 'Abdallah Ä1 al-Shaykh in his Awthaq Urä l-fmân, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), n.d.

157 Reframing αί-istiana bi-l-Kuffar

Al-Maqdisi's use of ai-walâ' wa-l-barä' in general does not represent a clear break with its history. Three different dimensions of the concept can be discerned in his writings. The first one is the quietist, purist dimension that is found in most Salafi writings on the subject, expressed in fatwas on whether or not to emigrate to Muslim countries, accept the nationality of an "infidel" state and inherit from non-Muslims.37 A second dimension of αί- wa/α wa-f-barä' found in al-Maqdisi's writings, dealt with extensively in the next chapter, is a legislative interpretation of the concept, using it as an instrument against "un-Islamic" laws. Finally, al-Maqdisi also re-appropriates the Wahhabi-Salafi version of αΐ-istiana bi-l- kuffar by framing it as applicable to modern-day rulers, which this section focuses on.

Al-Maqdisi's Reintroduction ofal-Isti'âna bi-l-Kuffâr

Although the legislative interpretation of α1-\να!ά' wa-l-barä' is dominant in al-Maqdisi's writings, he makes very clear where he stands on αί-istiana bi-l-kuffar, mostly in his book Al- Kawashif al-Jaliyya. With regard to Saudi Arabia, al-Maqdisi explains that it is forbidden for Muslim states to help "infidel" countries or call on them for aid and asks: "What is the rule (hukm) of those who help and aid (nosara wa-ayyada) the kings and presidents of the infidels and defend them, be it the European Christians, America or the infidel Arab rulers [...]??"" He basically answers his own question in a later section of the book by quoting Q. 5: 51 ("whoso of you makes [Jews and Christians] his friends is one of them"), just like Sulayman b. 'Abdallah did, effectively accusing states guilty of waiä' to non-Muslim countries of being "infidels" themselves.3' He also cites Al-Durar αί-Saniyya, a monumental 16-volume Saudi collection of major Wahhabi writings, as stating that "defending the infidels and helping them with money, with one's body (al-badan) or advice (aZ-ra'y) is clear unbelief (lcu/r sarih) that expels from Islam (αΐ-miüa al-is/ämiyya)". He therefore frames Saudi Arabia as being an "infidel liar (Icödhiba käfira)... because of its loyalty (muwäfätuhä) to the Eastern and Western enemies of Islam (a da αί-dih min sharejiyyfn wa-gharbiyyin)"."10

" Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Majmû' Fatâwâ l-Shaykh Abu [sic] Muhammad al-Maqdisî, n.p.: Mu'assasat Ard al- Ribât al-I'lâmiyya, 2007, pp. 90-91,122,124 respectively. " Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-Kawâshifai-Jaliyya ftKufr αί-Dawla al-Sa'ûdiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 2000/2001 [l989], p. 21. 19 Ibid., p. 79. 10 ibid., pp. 129-130.

158 After giving an overview of how this loyalty takes place in practice, particularly in the form of military co-operation with America and huge sums of money paid to that country41, al-Maqdisi summarises that this loyalty is expressed in "the consolidation (tawt/uq) of ties of brotherhood, friendliness, affection and friendship with them". Perhaps most worrying for al-Maqdisi is that these ties lead to "loyalty to them through aid and help" m "security, military and defence agreements and accords (ittißqiyyät wa-mu'ähadät ammyya wa-'askanyya wa-difa'iyya)"", particularly when turned against other Muslims. Quoting Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, who stated that "supporting the polytheists and helping them against the Muslims" is a nulhfier (näcjid) of Islam43, he contrasts Saudi Arabia's loyalty to "the enemies of Islam" with the kingdom's crackdown on Juhayman al-'Utaybi and his followers and the "true upholders of tawhfd (al-muwahhidih al-haqïqiyym)"." Al-Maqdisi's case against showing loyalty to non-Muslim states, particularly if they fight other Muslims, was not new. What was new, however, was that he employed the Wahhabi-Salafi tradition and an in-depth treatment of a/-wafä' wa-l-bara to prove his point against modern-day Muslim rulers. Moreover, al-Maqdisi clearly tried to link Saudi Arabia's supposed loyalty to the United States and other "infidel" countries with the kingdom's own past by not only referring to the 19th-century Wahhabi writings arguing against aJ-isti ana bi- l-kuffar but also by explicitly mentioning the Arabian calls for help from the Ottoman- supported Egyptian army at that time.45 By reintroducing this dimension, al-Maqdisi essentially frames Saudi-US ties as wrong from a Wahhabi and a Saudi historical point of view and uses this against Saudi Arabia itself, making it a powerful tool for others to adopt.

The Wahhabi Rediscovery of al-Isti ana bi-1-Kuffâr

In chapter 4, we saw that al-Maqdisi's book Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya was spread among like- minded scholars and activists in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Bearing this in mind, it is quite likely that al-Maqdisi's reintroduction of αΐ-isti ana bi-i-im^ar was known to many Saudis who shared his views, particularly in light of the unmistakable similarities between the I9'h- century calls for Ottoman help and the request for American military assistance during the Gulf War in 1990. While this section deals with al-Maqdisi's probable influence on Saudi-

" Ibid , pp 84-105 See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of al Maqdisîs criticism of Saudi US ties "Ibid, ρ 141 "ibid, ρ 129 " Ibid , pp 179 183 The quote is on ρ 180 45 Al Maqdisî, Al-Kawâshif, ρ 148

159 Wahhabi scholars and activists with regard to ai-isti ana bi-l-kaffar, it should not be assumed that they suddenly abandoned the more quietisi interpretations of aJ-walä' wa-1-barä'. Wahhabi authors supportive of radical ideas continued to write about the question of greeting "infidels"16, for example. From the late 1990s, however, a clear trend of Wahhabi discourse could also be discerned that showed that αΐ-istiana bi-l-kuffar had been rediscovered as a topical and politically relevant form of inadmissible wala, which is likely to have been directly or indirectly inspired by the work of al-Maqdisi. The authors who were probably influenced by al-Maqdisi do not actually cite his work. Although that seems surprising, it is not. While Al-Kawashifal-Jahyya is highly detailed in its case against Saudi Arabia and while al-Maqdisi's writings are full of arguments about the legislative version of al-wala wa-l-bara, he does not deal with aJ-istiana bi-l-kuffar very comprehensively, nor in a very organised or structured way. He does not actually explain the concept of ai-isti ana bi-l-kuffar, for example, nor does he clearly distinguish asking "infidels" for help from giving them help (i anat al-kuffar) against other Muslims. Moreover, he uses different forms of wala (muwälät and tawalli) interchangeably without explaining the difference between them and even mixes up his references to the 19th-century conflicts between the Al Saud and the Ottomans.'17 While al-Maqdisi later wrote about this issue in a slightly more organised way", ai-isti ana bi-i-ku^ar in his writings was never really more than a secondary issue at best. Furthermore, the idea al-Maqdisi was reintroducing was controversial and scholars who adopted his interpretation of αΐ-istiana bi-i-ku^ar - particularly the more established ones - may therefore have felt the need to ground their writings in sources of undisputed reputation rather than in a single book written by a relatively unknown radical ideologue. It is therefore important to stress that it was not so

" See for example Sulaymän b Nâsir al-'Ulwân, Hukm Bad'atAhl al-Kitdb bi-l-Sa/dm, www tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), 2000. " Al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawäshif, ρ 148. Al-Maqdisî writes that Sulaymän b. 'Abdallâh's and Ibn 'Atlq's treatises against asking non-Muslims for help were wntten when "some princes of the Al Sa ud [.. ] helped and asked for help from the [Ottoman-supported Egyptian] army of Muhammad 'All Pasha". There was only one prince who asked the Ottomans for help, however, and Sulaymän had long died when this took place. The calls for help to Muhammad 'Alfs army came earlier in the 19Lh century but these had nothing to do with Ibn 'Atlq, who at that time would have been only a child at best. Interestingly, when this period in Saudi history came up when I spoke to al-Maqdisi, he again mixed up the two episodes. Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009. •" See for example Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisr, Bara at αί-MuwahhidFn mm Uhüd al-Tawâghitwa-Amânihm h-ì- Muhänbih, www tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), 2002, pp 9 12; id, Al-Risâ/α al-Thalät/ifnrxya/N-Tahd/ifr mm αί-Ghulüw fil-Takjvr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 September 2006), 1998/1999, pp. 107-108.

160 much his writing about this subject as such but rather his rediscovery of its relevance for this day and age that explains his likely influence.4' Since no Wahhabi-inspired book on αί-istiana bi-i-lcu^ar applied to modern states was available before or directly after50 the appearance of Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya and considering that book's "fame" among radical Saudis in the 1990s, we may carefully assume that attempts to revive the concept after 1990 were at least indirectly inspired by al-Maqdisi's work.51 The first exponent of this trend of reviving the concept seems to have been the radical Saudi scholar Humud b. 'Uqala' al-Shu'aybi (1927-2002)." It is not entirely clear what accounts for the fact that his book was only written in 1999 - several years after Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya became known in Saudi Arabia - but it appears that the book and its successors build on al-Maqdisi's work, despite the time gap between them. This becomes clear in the way these works all clarify, expand on, deepen, organise and/or develop what al-Maqdisi wrote previously. In the case of al-Shu'aybi, who has spoken highly of al-Maqdisi53, is said to have been influenced by the latter54 and has himself received praise from him too55, this is expressed in his effort to present the inadmissibility of αί-istiana bi-l-kuffär in a much

" It is interesting to note that even Abu Jandal al-Azdî, an ideologue of al-Qa ida on the Arabian Peninsula who - as we saw in the previous chapter - was definitely inspired by al-Maqdisi, does not quote Ai-Kawoshifal- Jaiiyya with regard to al-isti ana bi-l-kuffar, even though he was greatly influenced by that book in other areas. He does adopt al-Maqdisfs application ofthat concept to modem states, however, as we will see below. s0 An exception seems to be Safar b. 'Abd al-Rahmân al-HawâlI, Kosh/al-Ghumma 'an 'Ulama aì-Umma, http://saaid.net (accessed 20 May 2010), 1991, which was published two years after al-Maqdisîs Al-Kawôshi/al- Jaliyya and nght after the Gulf War. Although the book deals with al-isti ana bi-l-ku/Jar, is does so only from a political perspective, aiming to show to Saudi Arabia's scholars that the Amencan troops' coming to the kingdom wasjust the latest step in a much broader plan to control the Gulf region because of oil, power and support for Israel. Knowing this, al-Hawalî states, they should never have been asked for help. Since the concept of αί-isti ana bi-1-kuffär is not explained, reasoned or backed up with religious evidence at all in this book, this book should most probably not be considered as a source of inspiration to other scholars using the concept. 51 This seems to be the most obvious explanation since other options could only be that (l) another book caused Wahhabi authors to revive al-isti ana bi-i-Jcu/Jîïr as a tool against modern-day states, which is unlikely since no other book called for this in a Wahhabi way prior to Al-Kawöshi/al-Jaliyya; or (2) these authors somehow decided to revive the concept of al-isti ana bi-l-lcu/Jar entirely on their own, perhaps inspired by the circumstances in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. This is possible, but considering the popularity of Al-Kowoshi/al- )aliyya during that time, we may assume that they were at least stimulated in their attempts to do so by al- Maqdisfs work. " For more on al Shu'aybî, see Thomas Hegghammer Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-/siamism since 1979, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 84-86. 53 See for example Abu Humâm Bakr b 'Abd al-'Azîz al-Atharï, Al-Qawl al-Narjisf bi-'Adalat ShayWiinâ al-Uaqdisî, www.ansar-jihad.net (no longer available), 2009, pp. 34-37; id, Ai-Soyfal-Muhannad /iMunâsirat Shaylchmâ Abf Muhammad, www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=286633 (accessed 23 March 2010, only as an html- document), 2008, pp. 7-8 (refers to the Word-file still available in 2009) These books were written by a student of al-Maqdisîs and have nothing but kind words for him. They should therefore be treated carefully, although many of the quotations of scholars praising al-Maqdisi mentioned in the book are actually correct so there seems to be no direct reason to doubt the reliability of his quotations of al-Shu'aybï and subsequent others u Interviews with Yûsuf al-Daynl, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; Mishârï al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; 'Abdallah al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008. M Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Risala ila l-ShayWi al-Siiu'aybr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed May 2007), 2001

161 clearer and more organised way than al-Maqdisi did. The book describes the alleged influence of Jews and Christians from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, through (amongst other things) the Crusades, colonialism and Marxism, to present-day America and how "the Jews and Christians are behind every corruption and deviance that took place in the Islamic creed".56 Because of this, al-Shu'aybï states, Muslims should follow Muhammad's order to drive Jews, Christians and polytheists out of the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, "we refuse to ask them for help or rely on them because asking them for help requires loyalty to them (tosta/zimu muwäJätahum), relying on them {al-rukün liayhim) and taking them as friends (awfiycf wa-asdiqa )"·" After giving a thorough linguistic explanation of αί-walâ' wa-1-bara, al-Shu'aybi goes on to state that the concept is "a basis of Islam (qaid min qawaid al-dïn) and a foundation of the faith and the creed (osi mm usüi a!-Fmän wa-i-'aqûla) without which the faith of a person is not correct".58 He subsequently writes at length about different scenarios in which Muslims can call upon non-Muslims for help (against other "infidels", against fellow believers etc.). He dismisses them all as wrong since they lead to loyalty (expressed as affection and friendship) to "the enemies of Islam", which is forbidden by the Quran (esp. Q. 5. 51 and 60: l).59 What is remarkable about this book is that al-Shu'aybi, despite being a (radical) government-employed scholar in Saudi Arabia, explicitly discusses ai-isti äna bi-l-kuffar with regard to states and not just in general, as others do.60 He even points out that asking an "infidel" state for help is even more dangerous than doing so with a single non-Muslim since a state is more powerful.61 Al-Shu'aybi's treatment of aî-istiana bi-1-kuffâr was a much more detailed and organised effort to analyse the concept than al-Maqdisi's Al-Kawashf al-Jahyya was but seemingly built on that book and drew similar conclusions. Moreover, it also represented a renewed look at Wahhabi and Islamic tradition and came up with a host of sources that were reinterpreted in light of the circumstances. Although the author does not mention Saudi Arabia by name - possibly out of fear for the authorities - it does seem that he has

56 Humüd b Uqalâ al Shu aybî, Al Qawl ai MulthtârfîHukm al-Isti äna bi I Kuffar, www tawhed ws (accessed 10 March 2010), 1999, pp 11 14 The quote is on ρ 12 57 Ibid, ρ 14 s'/bid,p 39 59 Ibid, pp 58 96 60 See for instance Sulayman b Näsiral Ulwän, Huhn lyädat Ahi al Kitäb, www tawhed ws (accessed 10 March 2010), 2000 In this fatwa, the author deals with the question whether it is allowed to help Jews and Christians but does not refer specifically to conflicts between states in this regard " Al Shu aybl, Qawl, ρ 64

162 that state in mind, particularly when discussing the inadmissibility of allowing Jews and Christians on the Arabian Peninsula. The work of al-Shu'aybi was continued directly after "9/11" by two important radical Saudi scholars. The first of these, Yusuf al-'Uyayri (d. 2003), was the first leader of al- Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) and is said to have been influenced by al-Maqdisi62, which seems likely considering the latter's strong impact on QAP, as we saw in the previous chapter.63 Al-'Uyayri appears to continue the trend started by al-Maqdisi by focussing on the question of aiding the kuffar or asking them for help against fellow believers64, by making even more use of Wahhabi sources (including the 19th-century ones rediscovered by al-Maqdisi)65 and, unlike al-Shu'aybi, by explicitly distinguishing two different forms of walâ' (tawa/ir and muwâlât). As mentioned, al-Maqdisi also referred to these terms in the context of αί-istiana bi-l-kuffar66 but made no effort to clarify the difference between them. Al-'Uyayri, on the other hand, does deal with this subject, pointing out that "a!-tawa/JF is more specific than al-muwälät. Every tawailf is unbelief. There are forms of muwäiät that are unbelief and forms that are less than that."67 While al-'Uyayri gives a short explanation of the difference between tawa/ίί and muwäiät, this becomes even clearer in a book by the second radical Saudi scholar who wrote about αί-istiana bi-l-kuffar right after "9/11": Nasir b. Hamd al-Fahd (b. 1968).6e He defines tawaJIr as a form of unbelief that involves "affection for the religion of the infidels and for their victory", which includes "helping them against the Muslims". Muwâlât, on the other hand, is forbidden but does not reach the level of icufr and includes things like greeting non- Muslims first.69 This way, al-Fahd, who is said to have been influenced by al-Maqdisi70 and is

62 Interviews with al-DhäyidT, Riyadh, 8 November 2008; Fahad al-Shäfi, Riyadh, 11 November 2008 " For more on al-'Uyayri, see particularly Roel Meijer, "Yüsuf al-'Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafl Praxis", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 47,2007, nos. 3-4, pp 422-459; id, "Yusuf al-Uyain and the Transnationahsation of Saudi Jihadism", in- Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London- Hurst & Co., 2008, pp. 221-243. 64 Yusuf al-'Uyayri, Haqïqat al-Harb al-Saltbiyya al-Jadïda, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 January 2008), 2001, pp. 74-86. a See for instance ibid, pp. 70-71,74-75. "Al-Maqdisi, Al-Kawâshlf, pp. 122,129-130,141-142. 67 Al 'Uyayri, Haqîqat, p. 67. M For more on al-Fahd, see Hegghammer, Jihad, pp. 87-89. M Nisir b. Hamd al-Fahd, Al-Tibyän pKufrMan A'äna l-Amnkän, vol. I, www tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), 2001, pp 42-43. For more on this book, see Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambndge etc.: Cambndge University Press, 2007, pp. 139-146. 70 Interview with al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008 See also Αί-Watan, 28 February 2003, cited in William McCants (ed.), The Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006, p. 283.

163 even referred to by some as "a Saudi copy" of him71, establishes a hierarchy in the different dimensions of a/-wa!ä' and simultaneously accuses those of aiding "infidels" against other Muslims of being guilty of the gravest form of faulty waiö'. Importantly, al-Fahd's book, which is probably the most extensive and detailed of its kind, clearly switches the subject from a!-istiana bi-J-ku^ar to ianat al-kufjïir (helping the "infidels"). This, as Madawi al- Rasheed points out in her seminal book on the Saudi Islamic opposition, should be seen in the post-"9/ll" context, when the U.S.-led "war on terror" caused many countries (including Muslim ones) to help America in its hunt for al-Qa'ida.72 Although, as we saw before, this dimension had already been mentioned by al-Maqdisi in Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, al-Fahd made it the focal point of his book and employed the early Wahhabi scholars' writings to support his case. In fact, he explicitly refers to the late 19th-century call for Ottoman help (probably to draw a parallel with modern-day Saudi Arabia)73, as al-Maqdisi did, and he has even written a separate treatise describing the Ottoman Empire as an infidel state that was branded as such by contemporary Wahhabis.74 The latter could possibly be seen as an historical study of no great importance but, considering al-Fahd's other work and his radical ideas, should probably be viewed as another implicit attempt to show his readers that Saudi Arabia's present-day ally America is really no different from the "infidel" Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.

After the books mentioned above were published, the idea that aiding "infidels" or asking them for help against fellow-Muslims was a form of ku/r according to Wahhabi sources seems to have become common knowledge among radical Saudi scholars and activists and was further developed by them. One fatwa by 'Ali b. Khudayr al-Khudayr (b. 1955), for example, dwells further on the exact difference between muwälät and tawaf/f in the context of αί-istiana bi-l-kuffar.™ Al-Khudayr, a radical Saudi scholar whom al-Maqdisi is said to have had an impact on76 and who also praises the latter77, also quotes exactly those 19th-century Wahhabi sources whose relevance for this issue al-Maqdisi rediscovered.78 Similarly, when the Saudi scholar 'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Ubaykan issued a fatwa in early 2003 in

71 Interviews with al-Daynï,Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. 72 Al-Rasheed, Contesting, pp. 139,141,146. 73 Al-Fahd, Al-Tibyân, vol. I, p. 69. See also al-Rasheed, Contesting, p. 146. 71 Nâsir b. Hamd al-Fahd, Al-Dawla al-'Uthmäniyya wa-MawqifDa'wat al-ShayWi Muhammad b. 'Abd ai-Wahhâb mmhâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 July 2009), n.d. 75 'Alib. Khudayr al-Khudayr, Αί-Hadd al-Fösii boyna Muwälät wa-Tawaìììal-Kuffar [sic], www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 March 2010), n.d. The author's reference to al-Fahd's book makes clear that the fatwa was probably published between late 2001, when Al-Tibyän was written, and 2003, when al-Khudayr went to prison. 76 Interviews with al-Dayni, Jeddah, 13 November 2008; al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. 77 Al-Atharï, Ai-Qowl, p. 35. 78 Al-Khudayr, Αί-Hadd, pp. 2-3.

164 which he declared certain forms of tawa/if forbidden but not Jcu/r and exonerated Muslims who ask infidels for help in certain circumstances from being leu/Jar, he was quickly rebutted by another scholar, Abu Muhammad al-Najdi7'. The latter claimed that

it is known from evidence from the Qur an, the Sunna and the consensus {al-ijmâ') that there is no foundation (qiwäm) to the religion of Islam except through enmity of its enemies {bi-mu 'ädät a'daihi) and disavowal of them (αΙ-barä'a minhum). That is the path of the messengers of God, may peace be with them.80

The fact that a Saudi scholar saw the inadmissibility of aJ-tstiana bi-l-kuffar in times of war as only obvious while it seems to have been unheard of in modern Wahhabi discourse until 1989 perhaps shows that the concept had apparently gained wide acceptance among radical Saudi Wahhabi scholars. This was further confirmed when al-Qa'ida activists, some of them members of QAP (like Abu Jandal al-Azdi) who had certainly been influenced by al-Maqdisi, started applying the prohibition of help from or to "infidels" to their local conflicts in Saudi Arabia91 and Iraq82. This showed that the concept had now become so familiar that it could be applied to new situations and conflicts.

Explaining al-Maqdisi's Frame Resonance

The revival of a!-istiana bi-l-kuffar that al-Maqdisi's Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya seems to have caused should be seen in its proper perspective. The spreading of his book in the 1990s, the certain acquaintance with al-Maqdisi's work of almost all authors mentioned and the use - in the context of d-istiana bi-l-kuffar - of Saudi-Wahhabi terms (tawaJZi/muwälät), sources and events (the 19th-century calls for Ottoman help) suggests that he has influenced all of the scholars and activists cited above. This is not necessarily the case, however. While it is true that writings on the subject seem to have built on al-Maqdisi's work and have clearly n I do not know the nationality of this scholar but considering his name ("al-Najdï", i.e. "the man from Najd") it seems likely that he is (originally) from Saudi Arabia, although this is no certainty. 80 Abu Muhammad al-Najdï, Naqd Fatwä l-'C/baytón fi Huhn Muzäharat al-Mus/inkfn, www.tawhed.ws (acccessed January 2008), 2003, p. 1. " Abu Jandal al-Azdî, Al-Ayät wa-i-Ahâdîth al-Ghazîra 'ala Kufr Quwwät Dir' al-Jazira, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), n.d., p. 3; id., Al-Bähith 'an Huhn Qatl Afräd wa-Dubbät al-Mabähith, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2002, pp. 28-31; Sultan b. Bijäd al-'Utaybl, Risala fil-Tawâghît, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 22 May 2008), 2002, p. 26. See also Hamd b. Rayyis al-Rayyis, Hâdhihi 'Aqïdatimâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed December 2007), 2003, pp. 14-16. " Abu 'Umar al-Sayf, Hultm Muzäharat al-Amrìkan 'ala l-Mushmm: Al-'lräq wa-Ghazw αΙ-Salib; Durûs wa-Ta'ammulât, www.tawhed.ws (accessed January 2008), n.d. It is clear from the text that this was published in 2003 or later.

165 developed from his initial idea to its latest applications, it is not certain that all scholars and activists mentioned were actually directly inspired by Al-Kawashif cd-Jdiyya in their rediscovery of αΖ-isti ana bi-l-kuffar. The fact that none of these authors quote Al-Kawashif al- Jaliyya underlines this. It nevertheless seems likely that al-Maqdisi's book, by reintroducing the Saudi- Wahhabi-inspired concept of help from and to "infidels" against fellow-Muslims, stimulated others to rediscover their own religious and historical tradition. Because al-Maqdisi's case was rather unorganised and - in the case of his reference to 19th-century Arabian-Ottoman conflicts - even factually wrong, it becomes understandable that other authors do not actually mention his work as a source of influence. It therefore seems that al-Maqdisi contribution to the development of αΖ-isti ana bi-Z-icu^ar can be summed up by saying that he offered other scholars and activists the tools of reviving the concept, but not the proper way to use them. This was left to the other authors themselves, which leaves only one question: why were they influenced by al-Maqdisi?

Expiaining al-Maqdisi's Influence"

As we saw in chapter 4, a successful frame should propose a good diagnosis of the problem, present a viable prognosis and call for action. It became clear that Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya offers all three with regard to Saudi Arabia in general and the subject of αί-isti ana bi-l-kuffar dealt with in this chapter is no exception. It is very clear that al-Maqdisi condemns asking "infidels" for help or aiding them against other Muslims, that he openly blames the Muslim rulers for this and, as became clear from chapters 4 and 5, that he sees jihad as the solution to fix this. Considering the fact that his audience existed of radical scholars and activists whose writings show that their criticism of Saudi Arabia (and other countries) is just as severe as al-Maqdisi's (although QAP-members were much more vocal about this than the more established scholars), his frame probably easily resonated with their views. The three core framing tasks distinguished by Snow & Benford were not the only aspects of a successful frame, however, as we saw in chapter 5. Frame resonance also depends on the centrality of the frame in the public's perception, its range and interrelatedness with other important aspects of people's beliefs, the extent to which it conforms to people's experiences, whether it can be verified in reality and its congruence

For references to theoretical literature on the subjects dealt with in this section, see chapters 4 and 5.

166 with national, religious and cultural narratives. With regard to the centrality of αΐ-isti ana bi- l-kuffur or, more generally, αΐ-waiä' wa-l-bara, al-Maqdisi's framing of the situation clearly incorporates these aspects. Wahhabi writings from the 19th century onward, as we have seen, make it abundantly clear that these concepts are integral parts of Islam and touch its very basis. In the writings of some, ai-waiâ' wa-l-bara has even become a litmus test for determining whether someone is a Muslim or not. Since isti απα bi-l-kuffar is considered by several scholars to be a form of tawaür (i.e. a kufr form of waiä'), the importance of the concept in Wahhabi writings is enormous and al-Maqdisi taps right into this trend. Secondly, the range of αΙ-waiä' wa-i-barâ', of which ai-isti ana bi-l-kuffar is only one dimension, is very broad. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the concept is applied to interpersonal and social relations as well as politics and is used in times of peace but also in war. This broad applicability ensures that a frame such as "a/-isti ana bi-l-kuffar is kufr" opens doors to other, strongly related concepts such as tawhid and shirk, the basis of Islam and its antithesis. This connection not only raises its importance but also makes sure that al-Maqdisi's indictments of Saudi Arabia (and other states by implication) are immediately linked to apostasy (ridda) and kufr, making them all the more devastating. The experiental commensurability and empirical fidelity of al-Maqdisi's frame, thirdly and fourthly, are important too. Al-Maqdisi's frame questions the legitimacy of political ties with particularly the United States. Considering America's bad reputation in the region, for instance because of its support for Israel, would have made sure that this resonated with many people's experiences anyway. The Gulf War in 1990 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, widely seen across the Arab world as illegitimate invasions or even attacks on Islam84, only increased this. Similarly, it is indeed true that the U.S. has been aided in its "war on terrorism" by Muslim countries like Pakistan but also Saudi Arabia, which remained America's ally after "9/11".85 Scholars and activists intent on proving that a Muslim country aided the "infidels" therefore did not have to go out of their way to look for concrete examples but could simply point to the facts. Fifthly and finally, al-Maqdisi, just like we saw in chapter 5, made extensive use of the Salafi (but especially Wahhabi) concept of al-wa!ä' wa-l-barô' and did so on the basis of Wahhabi sources. Although the authors of the specific sources whose value he rediscovered

84 See for example the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Views of a Changing Worli How Global Publics View War m Iraq, Democracy, Islam and Governance, Globalization, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/l85.pdf (accessed 12 March Z010),June 2003, p. 46. es Roger Hardy, "Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and the 'War on Terror'", in: al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom, pp. 104- 110.

167 were known for their strictness - particularly Ibn 'Atiq - they were nevertheless part and parcel of the Wahhabi tradition and their (other) work was used extensively by government-employed scholars too. This is important to emphasise since, as Madawi al- Rasheed points out, some radical Saudi scholars were not much inspired by Islamist thinkers such as Qutb since these were "simply not their reference points"."6 Using Wahhabi sources therefore seems a necessary condition for influencing them. Al-Maqdisi not only used Wahhabi sources, however, but also appealed to an episode in Saudi history, showing that the modern-day calls for "infidel" help were not new but had been condemned before. Sahwa activist Muhammad al-Mas an may therefore only have been exaggerating slightly when he claimed that

the Wahhabi[s] in contemporary Saudi Arabia do not name the exact ancestors to which we should refer because it would undo their own arguments about authority and obedience. [...] Their writing undermines the position of the al-Saud [sic], so they have been conveniently dropped from the discourse.87

Unlike with chapter 5, it was not possible to speak with the people involved in the process of reviving al-isti äna bi-l-kuffar, who are all either dead or imprisoned, in order to verify the theoretical explanation given above. Several knowledgeable journalists assured me that a!-walâ wa-l-barâ' was very important in accounting for al-Maqdisi's influence among these scholars and activists88, however, and it does indeed seem likely that he was at least partly responsible for the start of a revival of a/-istiana bi-l-kuffar for the reasons given above. Because al-Maqdisi adhered so strictly to the tradition of al-walä' wa-1-barä and Wahhabism, which - as we have seen - was overwhelmingly used for quietist purposes, this chapter not only underlines his status as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi but also shows that this has been instrumental in explaining his likely influence in this respect. Al-Maqdisi's use of af- wala wa-l-bara was expressed much more, however, in the concept's legislative dimension, which we will deal with in the next chapter.

80 Al Rasheed, Contesting, ρ 139 87 Gwenn Okruhlik, "Making Conversation Permissible Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia", in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed ), Islamic Activism A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind Indiana University Press, 2004, ρ 258 88 Interviews with al Dhâyidï, Riyadh, 8 November 2008, al Utaybî, London, 1 August 2008

168 Chapter 7: "Si

Al-Maqdisi is likely to have had a modest but nevertheless important impact on Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi scholars and activists with regard to aJ-isti ana bi-1-kaffâr (asking infidels for help). This is not the only dimension of αί-waia wa-1-barâ' (loyalty and disavowal) in which al-Maqdisi has been influential, however, nor have only Saudis been influenced by him in this respect. This chapter deals with one of al-Maqdisi's main themes, namely a!-wa!â' wa-J- barâ' as a tool to frame the legislation of "man-made laws" (qawänfn wad'ixya) as kufr and the laws and their legislators as "idols" (tawäghit) in order to legitimise excommunication (tak/ir) of and jihad against the rulers. It also shows how and why non-Saudi authors have been influenced by his use of a!-isCi ana bi-l-kuffar. This chapter starts with an analysis of al-Maqdisi's views on ai-wa!cf wa-/-barâ' as a means to frame laws and the rulers that apply them as guilty of un-Islamic loyalty that should be fought by means of jihad. It then deals with the Jihadi-Salafi scholars who have probably been influenced by al-Maqdisi in this respect, as well as the non-Saudi authors who seem to have adopted his modern-day application of al-isti'äna bi-l-kuffar. Finally, this chapter focuses on how al-Maqdisi's influence on both groups can be explained through framing theory. Throughout this chapter, we will see how al-Maqdisi takes an inherently subversive and thus very un-quietist idea (jihad against Muslim rulers) and incorporates it into his own Salafl discourse through the use of a/-wa/â' wa-l-barä'. By reframing the excommunication of and the jihad against the Muslim world's rulers in a Salafi way - indeed by "Salafising" them - al-Maqdisi again shows his close adherence to quietisi ideas, underlining his own position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi.

Jihad as Bara against "Infidel" Wlalä'

In chapter 2, we saw that al-Maqdisi is vehemently against what he sees as un-Islamic rule and legislation, expressed in the adoption of "man-made laws", particularly if it takes on a systematic form through the exchange (tabdii) of the sharfa for a secular or otherwise non- Islamic constitution. We also saw that al-Maqdisi, like many other Salafls, believes that the systematic application of qawânïn wad'iyya is a violation of the unity of God (taw/ifd) in the legislative sphere and therefore a form of ku/r on the basis of verses such as Q. 5: 44' and

1Q. 5:44: "[...] Whoso judges not according to what God has sent down - they are the unbelievers."

169 that he has adopted the ideas of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya to support his case. It has also become clear that al-Maqdisi - just like Qutb - uses Q. 9: 312 to support the idea that the rulers applying these "man-made laws" are not just kuffar but also tawäghit. Finally, chapter 2 showed that al-Maqdisi believes that the kufr of these supposedly "infidel" Muslim rulers is even worse than "the original unbelief' {al-kufr al-asli) of Jews and Christians and that a jihad against them is justified, for which he calls in his writings. Although there is a logic to his reasoning, it only partly distinguishes itself from the works of Qutb or Faraj, who stated similar things. While al-Maqdisi, as we saw in chapter 2, goes into much greater detail explaining why a jihad against the ruling "idols" and their "infidel" laws should be fought and adheres closely to the Salafi creed in doing so, there is more to his arguments than this. The extra element al-Maqdisi adds in his writings is al- wala wa-l-bara, thereby giving his arguments a much more Salafi character since the concept is strongly associated with that branch of Islam. Since I have not found this connection between jihad against present-day Muslim rulers for their application of "man- made laws" on the one hand and ai-waiâ' wa-I-barâ' on the other in the writings of any other scholar, this can be considered a new ideological development started by al-Maqdisi. How he establishes a link between the two is dealt with in this section.

Connecting Walâ' with Worship

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, Salafis distinguish three different forms of tawhfd. One of these, tawhfd ai-uiühiyya or tawhfd al-'ibäda (respectively the unity of divinity and the unity of worship), involves the idea that only God may be worshipped. Although this seems an obvious idea shared by all Muslims, Salafis use this form of tawhfd to claim that practices such as the veneration of so-called saints is, in fact, a form of polytheism (shirk). Muslims involved in this practice probably see themselves as monotheists too, however. The fact that Salafis disagree with this suggests that they have a broader definition of divinity and worship than others, which is indeed the case. This can also be seen in the way al-Maqdisi connects al-wala wa-l-bara with legislation. Al-Maqdisi, as we saw in chapter 1, was influenced by the ideas of Juhayman al- 'Utaybi. The latter had used the concept of a!-wa!â' wa-Z-barcï' before, which he summed up in

2 Q. 9:31: "They have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God, and the Messiah, Mary's son - and they were commanded to serve but One God; there is no god but He; glory be to Him, above that they associate."

170 the term "miüat Ibrahim" (the religion of Abraham). Juhayman states that the mil/at Ibrahim is part of "that which distinguishes the sincere (ai-säcüq) from the pretender (al-mudda'i)".3 The characteristics of separating an "in-group" from an "out-group" inherent in al-wala wa- l-bara, which we saw in the previous chapter, can clearly be discerned here and even more so in Juhayman's definition of the mi//at Ibrahim. He claims it rests on two pillars (osloyn), namely "loyalty (ikWäs) to the worship of God alone" and "the disavowal (al-tabarru') of polytheism and its people (ai-shirk wa-ahlihi) and showing enmity (aJ-'adäwa) to them".'1 Unlike other Wahhabi authors, however, Juhayman believes - and his take-over of the Grand Mosque in 1979 showed - that "disavowal" should not just be expressed in verbal enmity of shirk or emigrating to the dar al-lsläm but also by withdrawing from the supposedly deviant Saudi society and "fighting".5 In his most important book describing al-wala wa-l-bara, al-Maqdisi adopts the concept of miüat Ibrahim and defines it as

loyalty (ikhläs) to the worship of God alone in every meaning that the word worship encompasses (bi-ku!/ mä tahwiJti kalimat al-'ibäda min ma'ânin) and the disavowal (al- bara a) of polytheism and its people.6

This definition obviously closely resembles Juhayman's description of the millat Ibrahim but al-Maqdisi does not attribute it to him. The reason for this may be similar to why, as we saw in chapter 6, Wahhabi authors apparently adopting al-Maqdisi's interpretation of aZ-istiana bi-l-kuffar do not cite the latter either: like al-Maqdisi's case against calling the "infidels" for help, Juhayman's treatment of ai-walâ' wa-/-barâ' is sketchy and unorganised, presenting a new idea but doing so in a superficial manner. Moreover, both al-Maqdisi's modern-day application of ai-isti ana bi-l-kuffar and Juhayman's interpretation of αΖ-walâ' wa-1-barä' are controversial and therefore perhaps best grounded in undisputed Wahhabi sources rather than the writings of relatively unknown radicals. As we saw in chapter 6, it is probably for these reasons that certain Wahhabis writing about a!-istiana bi-1-kuffär do not cite al- Maqdisi's work, despite their likely familiarity with it, and they probably also explain why

1 Juhayman b. Sayf al-'Utaybl, Raf al-Zltibôs 'anMiîîatManJa'aiahu lläh Imäman M-Näs, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 19 March 2010), n.d., p. 4. ' ibid., p. 5. 5 Ibid., p. 16. 6 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, MiHat Ibrahim wa-Da'wat al-Anbiya wa-l-Mursalm wa-Asälfb al-Tughät f! TamyTihâ wa-Sarfal-Du'ât 'anhâ, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), 1984, pp. 13-14.

171 al-Maqdisi does not mention Juhayman in this respect but instead gives the impression to have taken his definition from Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's work.7 One could argue that, since the concept of miifat Ibrahim appears several times in the Qur an8 and is indeed used by Wahhabi scholars, al-Maqdisi simply adopted it from these sources. In fact, while al-Maqdisi speaks highly of him in his early writings9, he downplayed the impact Juhayman had had on his own work when I asked him about it.10 The fact, however, that his definition of millat Ibrahim is almost literally the same as Juhayman's, as well as the fact that the name of the chapter in which al-Maqdisi wrote this is an exact copy of the name Juhayman used for his chapter, suggests that the Saudi rebel may have had more impact on al-Maqdisi than the latter is willing to admit." Whatever the case may be, the only significant difference between Juhayman's definition of mil/at Ibrahim and al-Maqdisi's is the further specification of the word "worship" by the latter by adding the words "in every meaning that the word worship encompasses". Because al-Maqdisi uses Q. 9: 31 ("they have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God [...]") to equate following non-Islamic laws with worship, as we saw in chapter 2, he can apply the word "worship" to "infidel" legislation. Since he believes loyalty should involve the worship of God alone, following non-shar'F laws is not only an act of shirk because it directs worship away from God but also a forbidden form of walâ', which is also reserved for God only. It is in this context that al-Maqdisi's criticism of "man-made laws" in countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan should be seen.12 Considering al-Maqdisi's connection between the "worship" of other laws and walâ', it is not surprising that he refers to the total lack of application of the sharia he observes in the Muslim world today as "complete loyalty (tawa!/in mutlaqin)" to non-Islamic laws,

in other words, entering the religion of the idols (din aJ-tawäghft), worshipping them and taking them as separate lords (arbäban mutafarriqa) with their obedience in

7 ibid., p. 14. 8 See for example Q. 22:78 and Q. 2:130. ' See for example al-Maqdisi, Millat, p. 16; id., Al-Kawäshifal-Jaliyya fiKufr al-Dawla al-Sa'üdiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), p. 6. Al-Maqdisi was critical of Juhayman's occupation of the Grand Mosque, however, criticising him for killing civilians and carrying weapons into the mosque. See ibid., p. 180. lc interview with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17January 2009. " Al-'Utaybi, Raf, p. 5; al-Maqdisi, Millat, p. 13. The title of both chapters is "HBayän Millat IbrähTm". " For al-Maqdisfs specific criticism of these countries' legislation, see respectively chapters 2,4 and 9 of this study.

172 legislation [...].13

Al-Maqdisi's clear opposition to loyalty to "man-made laws" is not expressed in detailed descriptions of why adherence to qawänm wad'iyya should be seen as walä', however, but much more in what he considers the best alternative: bara.

Connecting Bara with Jihad

In his book Millat Ibrahim, named after the concept he probably borrowed from Juhayman, al-Maqdisi states:

Know that the most specific of characteristics of the religion of Abraham and the most important of its requirements in which we see the majority of callers to Islam (du at) of our time being enormously negligent (muqassirm fïhâ taqsïran 'azimarì) - in fact, most of them have left it and let it die - are:

- declaring disavowal (izhâr a!-barâ'a) of the polytheists and their false objects of worship (ma'büdätihim a/-bäti/a); - announcing disbelief (ί'ίάη άΐ-kufr) in them and their polytheist gods, methods, laws and regulations; - declaring enmity and hatred (ibdâ' αί-'adâwa wa-J-baghdä') for them and for their infidel statutes and matters (li-awdaihim wa-li-ahwälihim al-kufriyya) until they return to God, leave [their infidel statutes and matters] entirely, disavow [them] and disbelieve in [them].14

Al-Maqdisi then goes on to quote a verse from the Qur'ân (Q. 60: 4) that is not only of great importance in most writings on αί-walä' wa-i-barä' but especially in his:

You have had a good example in Abraham, and those with him, when they said to their people, "We are quit of you (inno bura a'u minkum) and that you serve, apart from God. We disbelieve in you (kafarnâ bilcum), and between us and you enmity (al-

11 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Imta al-NazarftKashfShubhät Muiji'at al-'Asr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1999/2000 [l99l/l992], p. 88. " ld.. Mulat, p. 18.

173 'adäwa) has shown itself, and hatred (al-baghda) for ever, until you believe in God alone". [...]"

This verse refers to how the example of Abraham disavowing idolaters and their gods is a model for Muslims to emulate and can be said to form the basis of al-Maqdisi's discourse on αΙ-walâ' wa-l-bara. As such, it occurs very frequently in his writings.16 The need to express disavowal is used by al-Maqdisi in various ways. In his writings, examples can be seen of attempts of his to disavow Shiites17, Christian ideas on Jesus Christ18 and certain forms of armed attacks with which he disagrees". What becomes clear from al- Maqdisi's widespread use of the term bara is that he considers it an absolute necessity. He once again turns to Abraham to show this by stating that some people think

that this müht Ibrahim (i.e., loyalty to worship of God and disavowal of "polytheism" and its followers) can be realised in this time of ours (fizamäninä hädhä) by studying tawhfd and [having] knowledge of its categories and its three types, [which is] merely theoretical knowledge, while remaining silent about the people of falsehood (ah! ai- bâti!) and not announcing and declaring disavowal from their falsehood.20

Al-Maqdisi rejects this view, stating that bara' is of paramount importance in Islam since it is strongly connected with tawhid21, which, in turn, is obviously closely linked to the first part of the confession of faith (shahäda): "There is no god but God". Al-Maqdisi therefore sees bara' as the necessary expression of this part of the shahâda22 and - just as we saw before in the writings of some Wahhabi scholars - even goes so far as to state that one cannot be a true Muslim without expressing disavowal of the tawäghit:

''ibid. " For an extensive treatment of al-Maqdisîs use of Q. 60, seejoas Wagemakers, "Defining the Enemy: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisfs Radical Reading of Sürat al-Mumtahana", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 48, nos. 3-4,2008, pp. 348-371. 17 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Hâdhihi 'Agfdatunä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 8 February 2006), 1997, p. 13. " Id., Al-Tuhfa al-MaqdisiyyafìMukhtafar Tânkh al-Nasrâmyya: Bidâyatuhâ wa-Muntahähä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 1997, p. 21. " Wa'il al-Batïrï, "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: Tabarra'tu Maräran wa-Takräran mimmä Yartakibuhu 1-Ba'd min 'Amaliyyät ghayr Mundabita bi-Hudüd al-Shar' Yadhhabu Dahiyyatahä Äläf al-Abnya min düna Fä'ida", Al-Sabil, no. 896, 4 June 2009, p. 5. 20 Id., Mülat, p. 15. 21 Id., Bara at af-Muwahhidih min 'Uhüd al-Tawäghlt wa-Amämhm li-l-Muhänbm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2002, p. 11; id., Imtä', p. 114; id., Kashfal-Niqäb 'an Shaft at al-Ghäb, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 November 2006), 1988, pp. 16,19,106,110; id., Al-Kawâshif, pp. 58,113. 22 Id., Kashfal-Niqäb, pp. 102,142; id., Al-Kawâshif, pp. 113,143; id., Millat, pp. 21-22, 46.

174 Know that your Islam and your tawhfd will not be perfected and the meaning of "there is no god but God" will not be realised and that you will not find your way to Paradise until you disbelieve in and disavow every idol.23

Interpreted as such, al-Maqdisi's foremost application of bara' is to "man-made laws" and their legislators in the Muslim world. He states, for example, that the true tawhfd rests upon "the disbelief of the idols, all idols, and the disavowal of their people". This not only refers to "idols of stone and wood" but also to "the idols of ruling according to something other than what God has sent down (hulcm bi-ghayr mä amala lläh)... the idols of the law".24 More specifically, al-Maqdisi writes that one needs to disavow "all tawaghît that you serve besides God [...], be they idols (osnâm) made of stone, the sun, the moon, a grave, a tree or regulations and laws made by man".25 Elsewhere, he writes that

before everything [else], you have to disbelieve in this idol - the [Kuwaiti] constitution and its laws - hate it, show enmity to it and disavow it and you should only be satisfied with and submit to the rule of God alone. That is in order to realise the meaning of "there is no god but God" [...] You must also disavow everyone who defends it (dâfa'a anhu), protects its laws (nâfaha 'an gawänfnihi) and persists on legislating it (osarra 'aia tahJcfmihi) and enslaves mankind to it (tabid al-'ibäd iahu).26

These last words make particularly clear that bara should not just be aimed at the laws themselves but also at those who uphold them, including not just legislators but also the army and the secret service, as we also saw in chapter 3 with regard to takfir.27 Because al-Maqdisi frames "man-made laws" and their legislators as tawäghft and accuses the latter of shirk and iaifr - terms that occur frequently in the Qur an, Islamic scholarly tradition in general and particularly in Wahhabi writings on αί-waÎâ' wa-f-bara' - he can employ this tradition to support his case, even though these sources and '\x\ama do not mention or apply the concept in the way al-Maqdisi does. Although Wahhabi scholars did indeed condemn "un-Islamic" laws and also, as we have seen, wrote extensively about αί-

21 /d., Kosh/al-Niqäb, p. 19. u /A, Al-Kawâshi/, p. 58. 25 id., Millat, p. 22. 26 Id., Kash/ai-Nujab, pp. 102-103. 27 id., iAl-Masabïh al-Munira /Γ l-Rudd 'ala As'ilat Ahi al-Jazfra, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 17 January 2010), n.d., p. 7.

175 wala wa-1-barâ', they did not connect the two. While al-Maqdisi believes that a legislative dimension was implied in or can at least be justifiably deduced from Wahhabi writings on a!-wa!ä' wa-l-barä' and the Qur'ânic verses that deal with this concept, it is clear that he introduces an entirely new connection that he nevertheless tries to ground in Islamic and especially Wahhabi tradition.28 This creative use of the sources to establish the link between "man-made" legislation and al-walä wa-l-bara is perhaps best seen in the foreword to his book MiÎîat Ibrahim, where he states:

To the idols in every time and place... To the idols[:] rulers (hukkäman), emperors (qayäsira wa-akôsira), faraos and kings... To their fallacious keepers (sadanatihim) and their scholars ('ulama ihim).. To their friends (awiiyä'ihim), their armies, their police, their secret services and their guards...

To all of them... we say: "We are quit of you and that you serve, apart from God" Quit of your rotten laws, methods, constitutions and principles (qawanimkum wa- manähi/ikum wa-dasätihkum wa-mabädnlcum αί-natina)... Quit of your rotten governments, courts, signs and symbols (huJcümätikum wa- mahälamiJcum wa-shiarätileum wa-a'iämilcum al-'aßna).. "We disbelieve in you, and between us and you enmity has shown itself, and hatred for ever, until you believe in God alone"29

This addition of al-Maqdisi's own ideological statements to the literal words of Q. 60: 4 makes it look as if this verse was actually also meant to be used against "apostate" rulers and their "infidel" laws, which - considering his very frequent use of such interpretations - indeed seems to be what he believes. Al-Maqdisi's insistence on bara as a condition for true tawhfd notwithstanding, he explicitly does not apply takftr to all people who refrain from disavowing "infidel" laws or their legislators. He acknowledges that some Muslims may be under huge pressure not to confront the rulers with their "unbelief by openly disavowing them and declaring them to

29 This is particularly clear in his book Millat Ibrahim, which is full of references to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhäb and later Wahhabi scholars See also Wagemakers, "Defining", pp 360 369 29 Al Maqdisï, Millat, ρ 1

176 be infidels and he excuses such people.30 He advises Muslims who may not be strong enough to disavow the tawâghït openly to move away from them and to raise their children in such a way that they know the kufr nature of the rulers and their laws.31 Al-Maqdisi writes that the Prophet Muhammad stated that people should only act according to their abilities32 and sums up his views on this issue by stating that those who can should disavow the tawâghït with their hands, or otherwise with their tongues or at least in their hearts.33 Since it is difficult to tell what goes on in a person's heart, this implies a carefulness to judge people's faith if they do not openly disavow the rulers and their laws. As such, al-Maqdisi reconciles his strict views on the necessity of bara for every Muslim with his unwillingness to apply takßr to whole groups of Muslims. Despite al-Maqdisi's accommodation of Muslims who do not denounce the "apostate" rulers and their laws openly, he makes clear that bara in one's heart is not his favoured form of disavowal. He cites Wahhabi scholar 'Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan Al al- Shaykh, stating that God "has compelled disavowal from (αΙ-barä'a min) polytheism and polytheists, disbelieving in them, showing enmity to them, hating them and waging jihad against them"34, thereby connecting bara with jihad. Al-Maqdisi further argues that bara is embodied by "enmity" and "hatred", as mentioned in Q. 60: 4, and finds that nothing expresses this better than jihad. Consequently, he states that people should not only disavow qawcmih wad'iyya and their legislators but also that "the highest degree {a'la marâtib) of this disavowal is jihad"35, which should be aimed at "destroying these idolatrous regimes and fighting their servants until the entire religion is God's entirely.36 By thus connecting waiä' towards "un-Islamic" laws with worship and its alternative - bara - with jihad, while all the time stressing the necessity of disavowal for all Muslims, al-Maqdisi has turned al-wala wa-l-bara from a quietist tool to purify the religion into an instrument for revolution. Although, as we have seen, concepts such as tawhïd, kufr and shirk have been used for similar purposes before, al-Maqdisi employs a very Salafi concept - ai-wala wa-/-barä' - to reach the same conclusion in what may be described as a "Salafised" call for jihad, seemingly with the Qur'ân (and Wahhabi tradition) firmly on his side.

10 Ibid., pp. 57-61. 11 Ibid., pp. 37-38; id., Kashfal-Niqâb, pp. 109-114; id., Al-Kawäshif, pp. 144-145. 12 id., Tabsïr, p. 142. 11 Id., Kashfal-Niqâb, p. 107. 3,/d.,Mil!atibrâhfm, p. 21. n See for example ibid., p. 47; id., Al-Kawâshf, p. 143. 36 Id., Al-Kawâshif, p. 114. The last words are a reference to Q. 2:193 and Q. 8:39.

177 Al-Maqdisi's reasoning, though rooted in past writings, clearly represents a break with what has been written about al-wala' wa-I-bara before, however. As we saw in chapter 6, the concept had always retained its character of separation between the Muslim "in- group" and the non-Muslim "out-group". Some Wahhabi scholars added to this the dimension of using a!-waiä' wa-!-barâ' to separate "true" Muslims from alleged apostates and hypocrites (i.e., placing some people of the "in-group" in the "out-group") but they nevertheless retained the basic Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy that was central to the concept. This was also the case with contemporary Wahhabi scholars (including al-Maqdisi) who stressed the inadmissibility of ai-isti ana bi-1-hiffar. Although they often used this dimension of a/-wa/ä' wa-l-barä' to accuse Muslim rulers of kufr, the underlying idea was still that Muslims should be loyal to their co-religionists while disavowing others. Indeed, the reason Muslim rulers were accused of kufr was precisely because they had supposedly violated this understanding. Al-Maqdisi's legislative interpretation of al-walä' wa-!-barä' fundamentally changed this, however. His view that Muslims should be loyal to God and their fellow-believers but should disavow "man-made laws" and their legislators shifted the separating element of αΙ-waiâ' wa-I-bara' not just partially but entirely from the Muslim/non-Muslim divide to the "true" Muslim/"apostate" Muslim one. This meant that al-Maqdisi - in his legislative version of al-walâ' wa-1-barâ' - completely abandoned the traditional "in-group" versus "out-group" dichotomy in favour of a new one. It is likely that this shift by al-Maqdisi is a highly important one, as we will see.

Adopting a "Salafîsed" Jihad

In academic literature on Islamism, the concept of al-walä' wa-1-barä' is often immediately connected with the name of al-Maqdisi.37 This is sometimes confirmed by radical Muslims themselves. The Lebanese scholar Omar Bakri Mohammed, for example, calls Millat Jbrahim and Al-Kawoshif al-Jaliyya "excellent" books and even refers to al-Maqdisi as a mujaddid (renewer)38 because he was the first to link the excommunication of Muslim leaders for

37 See for example Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism. Theory and Practice, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 22,48; Nibras Kazimi, "A Virulent ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi", in: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani & Eric Brown (eds.), Current Trends in islamist Ideology, Vol. 2, Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005, p. 59; Devin R. Springer, James L Regens & David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009, p. 50. 38 Based on a hadith, the term mujaddid is usually applied to scholars who have somehow greatly advanced or unified the Muslim community and are said to appear at the beginning of every Muslim century. Omar Bakn Mohammed probably did not intend to ascribe these qualities to al-Maqdisî and therefore probably used the

178 their allegedly un-Islamic rule with αί-wa/â' wa-J-bara, as mentioned above." As we have seen in this chapter and the previous one, al-Maqdisi has indeed contributed to the development and revival of aspects of a!-wa!â' wa-i-barâ'. We also saw in the previous chapter, however, that there is less certainty about al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to αί- isti'äm bi-l-kuffar among Saudi-Wahhabi scholars and activists. The same can be said for his impact on others with regard to his connection between legislation and al-wala wa-l-bara and the extent to which non-Saudi ideologues have been influenced by his reintroduction of a!-isti ana bi-I-ku^ar, both of which are dealt with in this section.

Adopting the Legislative Form of al-Walä' wa-1-Bara

Taking into account that al-Maqdisi appears to be the first scholar who connected the inadmissibility of legislating "man-made laws" with al-wala' wa-1-barâ', we may carefully assume that all authors who made this connection after al-Maqdisi did in Millat Ibrahim (1984) likely adopted this link from him. Also, considering the fact that al-Maqdisi wrote extensively and in a highly detailed way about this issue, unlike what he did with al-isti ana bi-l-kuffar, we may assume that the scholars and activists who have indeed been influenced by him in this respect actually quote his writings, unless there is a particular reason for them not to. Finally, it is obvious that the people who have been influenced by al-Maqdisi on this issue are familiar with him and his work. Taking all of these premises into account, it is difficult to prove that al-Maqdisi's connection between "un-Islamic" legislation and al- wala' wa-1-barä' has had much impact beyond a few mentions here and there. When trying to analyse the scope of al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to his legislative version of αΐ-walä' wa-1-barä', it is striking that only very few authors seem to have adopted this idea in their writings. To be sure, the idea that the rulers of the Muslim world are "infidels" and that they and their laws are even tawäcjhFt is a widely-held belief among Jihadi-Salafis in general and the concept of loyalty and disavowal is often used and applied, as we have seen. Al-Maqdisi's distinct connection between supposedly kufr legislation and al-walä' wa-1-barä' is much rarer, however, and cannot always be clearly discerned, particularly in the militant form (jihad as bara') that al-Maqdisi proposes.

term more loosely, indicating simply that al-Maqdisîhad developed a new idea. For more on the concept of mijaddid, see Ella Landau-Tasseron, "The 'Cyclical Reform': A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition", Studia Islamica, vol.70,1989, pp. 79-117. 39 Telephone interview with Omar Bakri Mohammed ['Umar Bakrî Muhammad], 29 August 2008.

179 One of the scholars who seems to have adopted al-Maqdisi's connection is Abu Humam Bakr b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Athari, a Jordanian friend and student of al-Maqdisi's, who has written several treatises defending the latter from others' ideological attacks.'10 The connection between the two men is clear but al-Athari does not cite any of al-Maqdisi's works in the treatise relevant here.41 In this document, he deals with the supposed need of Muslims to "avoid and denounce" elections and parliamentary candidates. The author urges his readers to "avoid [parliamentary] representatives and not to go to them in their tents (fi ìihiyàmihim) and their parliaments (majälisihim)". The connection between distancing oneself from something on the one hand (bara') and legislation on the other is left implicit here but is further confirmed by the author when he continues by stating that "the issue of al-walä' wa-l-bara is amongst the most important issues of faith and its most sublime".'12 Still, al-Athari does not establish a clear connection between legislation and walä' and this statement is a far cry from al-Maqdisi's clear call for jihad against such legislators as the most important form of bara. It could be that al-Athari feared the Jordanian authorities, who would probably not have tolerated a document openly calling for jihad against its parliamentary representatives, causing the author to refrain from issuing such a call and to limit his message to simply avoiding them. Even so, al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to the legislative version of al-waiâ' wa-l-barä' in this particular text is less than clear.

Only slightly more clarity is given in the writings of Abu Mus'ab ai-Suri, a Syrian jihad strategist. In his writings, al-Suri praises al-Maqdisi as an important scholar of jihad" and names his books among the writings that have influenced him, stating his works are "among the beneficial jihadi intellectual libraries (αί-maktabät al-fikriyya al-jihädiyya al- mfi'a)"." This is confirmed by Lia, the foremost expert on al-Suri and his writings, who states that al-Suri considered him an important ideologue45 and probably even wrote al- Maqdisi a letter asking him to advise his former pupil Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to be more pragmatic in dealing with the Taliban when he was in Afghanistan.46 Al-Maqdisi himself also

40 Abu Humâm Bakr b. 'Abd al-'Azïz al-Athari, Al-Qowl al-NarjisFbi-'Adalat Shayidiinä al-Maqdisï, www.ansar- jihad.net (no longer available), 2009; id., Al-Sayfal-Muhanmd /ïMunôsarat ShayWimä AbFMuhammad, www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php7t=286633 (accessed 23 March 2010, only as an html-document), 2008. In the former book (pp. 11-12), al-Athari writes about al-Maqdisi being "my shaykh" and about being his student. '" Id., Ai-Hajrwa-l-Taqbihli-Ahlal-ZntiWiabatwa-i-TarsliiJi, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 July 2009), 2006. ,2Jbid.,p.5. 41 Abu Mus'ab al-Sürï, Da'wat al-Muqäwama al-Islämvyya al-'Alamiyya, vol. II, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2 September 2009), 2004, p. 1052. "Ibid., ρ 1130. 15 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad. The Life ofAl-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Sun, London: Hurst & Co., 2007, p. 88. 46 Ibid., pp. 269-270.

180 mentions al-Suri as one of the people he met during his own stay in that region while working as a religious instructor in some of the training camps in Khost, teaching the trainees about issues such as ai-wa!ä' wa-l-bara.'17 It is not clear whether al-Suri was one of the recipients of al-Maqdisi's teachings in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region but it seems he may have picked up some of it. Al-Suri deals with the subject of al-wala wa-l-bara in a very general way but modern-day politics can easily be read into it, particularly since his entire book is about contemporary jihad. In this context he refers to the need to "adhere to the mil/at Ibrahim by complete disavowal (al- barâ'a al-kâmila) from the unbelievers (al-kafìrìn), hating them and showing them enmity", followed by Q. 60. 4.'"' As mentioned, the term rrnllat Ibrahim goes back at least as far as the Qur an itself and Q. 60: 4 had also been used in explaining αΙ-waiâ' wa-l-bara long before al- Maqdisi employed it extensively. The latter does seem to have been the first to explain the miüat Ibrahim primarily and almost entirely through this verse, as al-Suri also does here." While this is by no means conclusive evidence of al-Maqdisi's influence on al-Suri, it is interesting to see one of his "markers" in the writings of another scholar. Al-Suri also writes that "appealing (αί-tahäkum) to ["un-Islamic"] laws and regulations (qawänimhim wa-sharä'fihim) is the biggest form of loyalty to them (alebar ashkäl mläyatihm)". Although the author goes on to cite Ibn Taymiyya, giving the impression that he bases this thought on that scholar's work, the fatwa he quotes - while mentioning "loyalty (muwälät) to the unbelievers" - does not actually refer to legislation but to "appealing (αί-ta/iâicum) to [the unbelievers] apart from God's book (mm duna kitäb Allah)". Moreover, the Qur'âmc verse Ibn Taymiyya mentions (Q. 4: 5150) has no direct connection with legislation either.51 Al-Suri's statement does resemble al-Maqdisfs reasoning a lot, however, and - like al-Maqdisi does in his work - establishes a direct connection between wa!ä' and "un-Islamic" legislation. Considering al-Suri's praise for al-Maqdisi, their personal acquaintance and the possibility that the former actually took lessons in religious issues from the latter, it is not unlikely that al-Suri took this connection between legislation and al-wala wa-1-barä from al-Maqdisi. This would also explain why al-Suri does not actually cite

•" Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, e mail message to the author, 15 January 2010 18 Al-SÜrï, Da wat, vol I, ρ 157, ibid , vol II, ρ 967 " The reason for this seems obvious al Maqdisî clearly needs Q 60 4 to make his case for bara The term mil/at Ibrahim is much more easily based on other verses that actually mention the term, however This is probably also the reason why other scholars, including - as we have seen - Juhaymin, base their explanation of this term on other verses '° Q 4 51 reads "Hast thou not regarded those who were given a share of the Book believing in demons and idols, and saying to the unbelievers, These are more rightly guided on the way than the believers'?" 51 Al-Sürï, Da wat, vol I, ρ 158, ibid , vol II, ρ 969

181 al-Maqdisi's work: if he learned this information directly from him, there would be less need to refer to his writings. As with al-Athari, the evidence of al-Maqdisi's influence on al-Suri is not very conclusive and we must therefore be careful not to ascribe any impact to al-Maqdisi in this respect with too much certainty. This is different, however, with the writings of Abu Jandal al-Azdi, a leading ideologue of al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) who, as we saw previously, was heavily influenced by al-Maqdisi. In one of his books, he quotes al-Maqdisi at length, including where the latter states with regard to the rulers that

[the] truth of their office (wozifatihim), their post (mansibihim) and their work can be summarised in two clear reasons of unbelief. They are:

- helping polytheism (nusrat al-shirlc) - through loyalty (tawa/ii) to the idolatrous infidel legislation and the law (.al-qänün wa-l-tashn al-kufrial-tàghutì); and - help to the people [of this "infidel" legislation] and their loyalty (tawaNihum) and help (muzäharatuhum) against the upholders of tawhid (ai-muwahhidm).52

These two points can be equated with respectively the legislative version of al-wala wa-i- bara and the concept of ianat al-kuffar and thus constitute the two dimensions of loyalty and disavowal for whose development or revival al-Maqdisi has been important. The first point, especially since it is a quote from al-Maqdisi, is an unambiguous sign that al-Azdi adopted the link between legislation and al-wala wa-l-bara. In fact, right at this point, al- Azdi emphasises this by adding an explanatory note to al-Maqdisi's quote, stating - in the context of his ideological attack on the Saudi security forces: "[The unbelievers'] laws themselves stipulate that the nature of the office of [the security] apparatuses and their chief importance is the protection of the laws (hifi al-qawânïn), their application (tanfidhuha) and loyalty to its legislators (muwä/ät ahlihä)"." Al-Maqdisi's impact with regard to his legislative dimension of αΙ-walä' wa-1-barâ' can thus be said to be limited. Not only do very few scholars show clearly discernible traces of treating the application and following of "man-made laws" as a form of wafcf but even in the case of those who do we cannot always be certain about al-Maqdisi's influence on them.

52 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, Al-Bähith 'an αΙ-Hukm QatlAfräd wa-Dubbâtal-Mabâ/iith, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 April 2008), 2002, p. 29. "/bid.

182 Moreover, even the scholars who seem to have been influenced by al-Maqdisi in this respect do not frame jihad as the highest form of bara. The fact that even Abu Jandal al-Azdi, who cites al-Maqdisi's work so often, only briefly refers to the link between "un-Islamic" legislation and ai-waiä' wa-!-barâ' makes clear that this connection may have been an original ideological contribution to Salafl ideology, but not one that has had a lot of provable impact. This is slightly different, however, with the reception of al-Maqdisi's reintroduction of a/-istiana bi-l-kuffar among non-Saudi scholars.

Non-Saudis Adopting al-Isti ana bi-l-Kufïar

As we saw in the previous chapter, al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to al-isti απα bi-l-kuffar seems to have been important but limited because he reintroduced an idea that appears to have resonated particularly well with Saudi-Wahhabi scholars but was not attributed to him for various reasons. We also saw that, following al-Maqdisi's Ai-Kawoshifaf-ya/iyya, aZ-isti ana bi-/-ku$Sr was developed further into a broader, more detailed and more widely applicable concept, seemingly on the basis of elements already present in that book. It seems that non- Saudi scholars have also been part of this process but joined it at a later time. More specifically, all contemporary non-Saudi writings I have found on this topic were either released after "9/11" or are undated but appear to have been written after September 2001 as well, when several Muslim countries started helping the American-led "war on terrorism" against al-Qa'ida. Probably as a result of this development, the writings dealt with in this section focus not so much on asking "infidels" for help but giving them help (i anat al-kuffar) against Muslims. This suggests that the international political context has had a similar impact on their writings as in the Saudi authors' case - who had also been influenced by the Saudi call for American help against Saddam Hussein in 1990 - but, since their adoption of the concept happened several years later, caused them to highlight a different aspect of al-wala wa-l-bara. As such, it is not surprising that - like their Saudi counterparts - they do not quote al-Maqdisi's work since they joined the development of αί- istiana bi-/-icu^ar's inadmissibility at a later stage and are thus further removed from al- Maqdisi's Al-Kawashifal-Jaliyya, the book that reintroduced the concept.

183 Abu Basir al-Tartusi (b. 1959), a Syrian-British Jihadi-Salafi scholar who has spoken highly of al-Maqdisi54 and has been engaged in detailed ideological debates with him55, seems to be the first non-Saudi who adopted the idea of ianat al-kuffar in a book released in December 2001. In this work, he generally deals with the question of emigration (hij'ra) in the context of al-walä' wa-l-bara, possibly reflecting the fact that he lives in a (partially hostile, post-"9/ll") non-Muslim country, from which emigration to the dar al-Islâm may seem a solution to avoid wda to one's "infidel" environment. This becomes even clearer when he deals with a very specific question that became highly relevant for Muslims in the West after "9/11": is it allowed for them to be soldiers in a Western army and fight fellow- believers? Partially in response to a fatwa by the famous Egyptian Sunni scholar Yusuf al- Qaradawi, who had stated that Muslims were allowed to do so, Abu Basir categorically rejects the idea and states that such an act is "help and loyalty (al-muzähara wa-!-muwä!ät)" forbidden by the sharia, considered a form of "major unbelief (kufr akbar) that expels the person guilty of it from Islam".56 He claims that fighting Muslims as part of a Western army not only constitutes "help to the polytheists (i.e. the Americans) against the Muslims" but would also favour "loyalty to country and nationality (al-walä' !i-!-watan wa-Ii-1-jinsiyya) over loyalty to the creed of Islam ('aqïdat al-dîn)". Moreover, participation in Western armies' war would make a Muslim soldier "a partner of the Americans in every crime that they commit against the Muslims in Afghanistan".57

Abu Basir's book clearly reflects the international political context in which he found himself when he wrote it. As such, he applies the concept of helping faffar in fighting other Muslims to a new and highly topical situation and can therefore be said to be part of the broader contemporary development of al-isti ana bi-1-kuffar and its off-shoots that was started by al-Maqdisi. Like the Saudi scholars and activists dealt with in chapter 6, he therefore seems to have been indirectly influenced by al-Maqdisi, although - in the absence of more concrete evidence - the latter's impact must be assumed with carefulness.

M Abü Basir al-Tartûsï, Dhabban 'an 'Ird Akhïnâ ί-ShayWi AbfMuhammad a!-Maqdisf, www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation.htm (accessed 25 March 2010), 2002. 55 Id., Kabwat Fans: Mimâjashat Qawi AbiMuhammad al-Maqdisr/îMas'aiat al-'Udhr bi-l-]ahl wa-l-Radd 'alayhi, www.abubaseer.bizland.com/articles.htm (accessed 26 October 2009), 2000; id., Toswibätunä li-nsâlat hâdhihi 'aqfdatinâ li-akhfnä AbiMu/iammad al-Maqdisî, www.abubaseer.bizland.com/refutation.htm (accessed 20 October 2009), 2000. See also the two writings to which Abu Basir responds, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-Nultat al- Lawämi'/i'Malhüzätaf-Jämr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 21January 2008), 1998; id., Hädhihi. See also al-Maqdisîs response to Abu Basir, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Risala li-l-ShayJch AbFEasfr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 20 October 2009), n.d. * Abü Basir al-Tartüsi, Al-Hyro. Mosä'il wa-Ahltäm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 March 2010), 2001, pp. 51-52. The quote is on p. 51. "/bid., p. 53.

184 A similar attitude is called for when dealing with another non-Saudi ideologue who may have been influenced by al-Maqdisi: al-Qa'ida's Egyptian deputy leader Ayman al- Zawahin (b. 1951). He praises al-Maqdisi for his knowledge, which he got to know when the two met in Peshawar and specifically mentions his "call to the unity of God (αί-da'wa Ji-I- tawhrd) and the enmity of the falsehood (muadät a!-bâti!) in this time of ours".58 Al-Maqdisi, for his part, returns the praise and has called al-Zawahin his friend.59 The latter has written a treatise focussing entirely on a/-wa!ä wa-1-barä', which he starts by framing mankind as being engaged in a battle between "the forces of unbelief, tyranny and arrogance (quwâ /- ìcufr wa-1-tughyän wa-!-istikbâr) and the Muslim community and its jihadi vanguard (taifatihä al-mujähida)". He states that this conflict "reached its summit with the two blessed raids on New York and Washington".60 Al-Zawahiri quickly moves on to a more general treatment of al-istïâna bi-l-ìcuffar, however, and states that "the sharfa forbids us to help the leu/Jar against the Muslims" and claims that instead "it has ordered us to wage jihad against the unbelievers".61 After having built up his case that asking help from and giving help to "infidels" is wrong, he rhetorically asks what some of the scholars whose writings he has just cited would have said

if they witnessed the American planes and armies and their allies that take off from the Gulf states to bomb the Muslims in Iraq?! What would they say if they witnessed the American planes that take off from Pakistan to kill the Muslims in Afghanistan?!62

Al-Zawahin thus also applies the impermissibility of asking for help from or giving aid to non-Muslims in the context of the "war on terrorism" and as such is very much part of the trend of developing αί-isti ana bi-l-kujfar. Although he clearly knows and admires al-Maqdisi, there is no indication that al-Zawahin has been directly influenced by him and it therefore

58 Al Atharî, Al-Qawl, pp 42 44, id, Al-Sayf, ρ 7 " Al Maqdisï, e-mail message to the author, 15 January 2010, id, Hiwdr al-ShayJch Abi Muhammad al MaqdisF ma a Mq;al/at al- Ajr', www tawhed ws (accessed 3 February 2010), η d, pp 6-7 ω Ayman al Zawâhirï, Αϊ Walä wa I-Bara Acjfda Manqüia wa Wäqi Mafqüd, www tawhed ws (accessed 25 March 2010), 2002, ρ 2 (Portions of) this treatise can be found in English translation in Stéphane Lacroix, "Ayman al Zawahiri, Veteran of Jihad", in Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelh (eds ), Al Qaeda m its Own Words (transi Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, Mass & London Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2008 [2005], pp 206 234, Raymond Ibrahim (ed & transi ), The Al Qaeda Reader, New York etc Doubleday, 2007, pp 66 115 " Al Zawâhirï, Al Walä, ρ 23 62 Ibid, ρ 18

185 seems likely that al-Maqdisi has only had an indirect impact on al-Qa'ida's deputy as part of the revival of a!-isti ana bi-l-kuffär that he set in motion with Al-Kawashifal-Jaliyya. A similar conclusion seems justified with regard to several other scholars, some of whom simply repeat arguments heard before.63 Several of these are certainly familiar with al-Maqdisi and his writings, such as the aforementioned Abu Mus'ab al-SuriM but also Abu 1- Walid al-Ansari65, who claims he hosted al-Maqdisi and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in his home in Afghanistan.66 Others scholars again apply the concept of ianatal-kuffar to new situations, however. Perhaps in response to certain Iraqis who wanted Western armies to come and overthrow Saddam Hussein, the Kuwaiti Jihadi-Salafi scholar Hamid al-'Ali (b. 1962) is asked "what the ruling [is] with regard to those who call the American forces for help in their invasion of Muslim countries".67 Al-'Ali, who says he does not know al-Maqdisi personally but does praise him68, states in response that "if a Muslim helps a kafìr with invading Muslim countries he becomes an apostate unbeliever (kâfiran murtaddan)".69 Other scholars move this discussion further. As the "war on terrorism" progressed, new regimes were installed and later elected in Afghanistan and Iraq. These governments co-operated with the Americans, prompting one Jihadi-Salafi scholar to warn against "co-operation with the unbelievers occupying the Muslim countries, be they Americans or others".70 Another condemns the 'ulama who "allow the loyalty (muwälät) of [Afghan President] Karzai and [(former) Iraqi Prime Ministers] 'Allawi, al-Ja'fari and al-Maliki to the Crusaders".71

All of these references to αΖ-isti ana bi-l-kuffar and its off-shoots by non-Saudi Jihadi- Salafi scholars seem to be very much part of the concept's revival that was likely started by al-Maqdisi's book Al-Kawashifal-Jaliyya and further developed by various Saudi scholars, as we saw in chapter 6. There are three significant differences with the writings of the Wahhabi 'ulama' we dealt with previously, however. Firstly, as mentioned, the non-Saudi

61 Muhammad Ahmad, AWitarSuwaral-Muwä/äta/-iCu/7T)ryra/fQitalal-Mu5limrn, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 March 2010), n.d. See also Abu Humäm Bakr b. 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Athan, Al-Mataral-Wäbilfiljäbat ai-Sä'ü, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2010), 2008, p. 32. 61 Al-Sürl, Da'wat, vol. I, pp. 173-176; ibid., vol. II, pp. 964-967, 969-973, 985-989. 65 Abu 1-Walïd al-Ansârl, Hufen man A'äna Kâfiran /TQitäl al-Muslimih, www.tawhed.ws (27 January 2010), n.d. 66 Id., "Al-Zarqâwî al-Shaykh al-Jalïl alladhî 'araftu", Sadä l-Jihâd, no. 17, Jumâdâ 1-Ukhrâ 1428/june-July 2007, p. 26. Al-Maqdisï himself claims that he and his family even lived in al-AnsârFs house when the latter and his family were away. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, e-mail message to the author, 15 January 2010. 67 Hamid b. 'Abdallah al-'Alî, Hufen ïânat al-Kuffâr 'olà Ghazw al-Muslimm wa-l-Du'a lahum bi-l-Najr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed December 2007), 2003, p. 1. M Al-Atharï, Al-Qowl, p. 62. M Al-'Alî, Hufen, pp. 1-2. The quote is on p. 1. 70 'Abd al-Hakîm Hassan, Al-Tahdhïr mm Mu'âwanat al-Kâfirm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2010), n.d., p. 5. 71 'Abd al-Majïd 'Abd al-Mâjid, Saß'al-Manhaj Ahamm mm Tabn'at al-Ashkhäf, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 9 July 2009), 2007, pp. 2-3.

186 scholars joined the revival of condemning helping or asking for help from kuffar at a later stage and applied it to different situations. Secondly, some of the details added to the concept in Saudi writings, such as the difference between muwälat and tawalli, were more or less lost in the works dealt with in this section, perhaps because their authors were less concerned with the concept's theoretical development than with its practical application. Finally, as may be expected, although the non-Saudi authors did make use of Wahhabi and particularly more generally Salali sources, they made somewhat less use of the specific Wahhabi writings on which al-Maqdisi based himself.72 In fact, the 19th-century conflicts between the Ottomans and the Al Saud that caused several of these works to be written are hardly mentioned in the non-Saudi writings dealt with here. This suggests that the contemporary application of al-istiam bi-l-kuffar has left the strictly Saudi-Wahhabi realm and has more or less entered "mainstream" Jihadi-Salafi discourse. While this entails that the links between these non-Saudi writings and the original work by al-Maqdisi have become more tenuous, it should be borne in mind that it was Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya that probably started the revival of this concept. This, in turn, means that although these non- Saudi scholars may not even have consulted that book on this issue, they are nevertheless likely to be ideological heirs to a trend that al-Maqdisi began.

The Acceptance of al-Maqdisi's "Salafised" Jihad

If we take another look at how al-Maqdisi frames the new or reintroduced dimensions of al- wala wa-l-bara and the "Salafised" jihad emanating from them in his writings, we can see that the three core framing tasks dealt with in the previous chapters (diagnosis, prognosis and a call for action) are all there. As we saw in chapter 6, this was the case with regard to his reintroduction of al-istiana bi-l-kuffar and the same applies to his legislative dimension of af-wala wa-1-barä'. Al-Maqdisi clearly frames this problem as lying in "man-made laws" and their legislators. The solution as al-Maqdisi sees it is that Muslims should not show loyalty to them but instead wage jihad against them as the highest form of disavowal, which he calls for frequently. Differences between the frames of these two dimensions of al-wala wa-l-bara appear, however, when we look at the actual quality of al-Maqdisi's frames in relation to his audience.

72 This is particularly apparent in al-Zawahiris book, which does not quote a single Wahhabi scholar. This is odd, since - as we have seen - Wahhabi scholars have been instrumental in the development of al-walâ' wa-l- bara'. One can only guess as to why he decided to do that.

187 The Quality ofal-Maqdisi's Frames"

Al-Maqdisi's framing of the legislative dimension of a!-wa!a wa-I-bara' - "worship" of "man- made laws" is ku/r walâ' and should be countered by bara in the form of jihad - adheres to some of the conditions for a - theoretically - successful frame. As we saw above, al-Maqdisi adopts from certain Wahhabi scholars the idea that al-walâ wa-l-bara is a litmus test of Muslims' true beliefs, thereby stressing its centrality to the lives of Muslims. Because of this, the concept also has a broad range and can be applied to various subjects and is closely related to terms such as tawhfci, iman, hifr, shirk and tawâghït. The problem with al-Maqdisi's "legislative" framing of a!-waiâ' wa-!-barâ' may lie in the final three dimensions of what a good frame should be and these likely explain partly why he has had such limited influence in this respect. Although al-Maqdisi could plausibly establish a link between "worship" of laws and walâ', this may have come across as a bit too far-fetched for many scholars While Q. 9· 31 seemingly provides a Qur anic basis for the equation of "legislators" ("their rabbis and their monks") with objects of worship, such a verse is lacking with regard to al- Maqdisi's attempts to take this analogy even further by incorporating it into the concept of al-wala wa-l-bara. As mentioned, the concept had always been applied to separate an "in- group" from an "out-group" but al-Maqdisi applied it to laws and their legislators solely to weed out the "apostates" from the "in-group". This clear break with the concept's core meaning may well have seemed unknown and strange to other scholars, who may have felt it was untrue to their religious narrative. Moreover, because this legislative dimension does not appeal to actual events and trends beyond the idea that Muslim rulers apply "man- made laws" - which al-Maqdisi's audience believes anyway - the connection between al- wala wa-/-barä' and "un-Islamic" legislation probably does not resonate well with regard to expenental commensurabihty and empirical credibility All in all, al-Maqdisfs framing of al- wala wa-1-barâ' as a concept relevant to legislation may simply have been an ideological bridge too far for most scholars.

The situation is quite different, however, for the non-Saudi adoption of a/-isti ana bi- l-kuffar. As we saw in chapter 6, al-Maqdisi's frame m this respect - Saudi Arabia is loyal to the U.S. and other "non-Muslim" countries and entities by helping them and asking them for help, which are forms of ku/r - not only centres around the basis of Islam (tawhfd) but it

73 For references to theoretical literature on the subjects dealt with m this section, see chapter 5

188 also has a broad range because of its wide applicability. Precisely because al-Maqdisi ties αί- istiana bi-1-kufßr to overarching terms like tawhrd, it can be related to other relevant concepts such as kufr and shirk. Moreover, and unlike al-Maqdisi's legislative dimension of αί-wala wa-I-bara, his and others' use of αί-istiana bi-1-kaffar is likely to resonate strongly with a Jihadi-Salafi audience because of its experiental commensurability and empirical fidelity. During the time when the works adopting αί-istiana bi-l-kuffar dealt with in this chapter were written, the "war on terrorism" was a very concrete reality for many Muslims and so was the fact that several Muslim countries helped or assisted the U.S. and its allies in their efforts. Although non-Saudi scholars applied the concept to other conflicts than the Saudi authors we looked at in the previous chapter did, this only shows that they developed it even further, which again underlines the concept's breadth and wide applicability. Thus, the only real difference between the quality of al-Maqdisi's frame with regard to a!-istiana bi-l-kuffar among Saudis and non-Saudis is its narrative fidelity. Whereas Saudi authors would probably be attracted to al-Maqdisi's extensive use of Saudi history and Saudi- Wahhabi sources, this was obviously much less the case for non-Saudi scholars, who did not grow up in this tradition, although most of them did use Wahhabi sources.

Much of the above is speculative. Given the absence of personal contact with and relevant information about the people who were likely influenced by al-Maqdisi's ideas on this topic, speculating is the best we can do. Framing theory offers tools, however, with which we can speculate in a way that makes sense and at least gives us an idea of what is likely to have happened. The difference in the reception and adoption of al-Maqdisi's two different dimensions of αΐ-waiä' wa-!-barä' dealt with in this chapter is further underlined by another tool framing theory offers us: frame alignment.

The Resonance of a "Salafised" Jihad

Both of al-Maqdisi's versions of d-wa/a wa-l-bara dealt with in this chapter take the concept of jihad against the "apostate" rulers and give it a more Salafi character than it had in the works of Qutb and Faraj. The process of trying to make the frame of such a "Salafised" jihad resonate with a target audience has been labelled "frame alignment". Snow et al. have distinguished four different processes of frame alignment that can take place.74 The first of

" David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford.Jr., Steven K. Worden & Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobihzation, and Movement Participation", American Sociological Review, vol. 51,1986, pp. 467-476. See

189 these is frame bridging, denoting "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem".75 In other words, frame bridging is the process that takes place when the framer and his/her audience are basically in agreement about a certain issue but the latter have just not been mobilised for action (yet). As soon as this happens, a frame has been bridged.76 The second form of frame alignment, frame amplification, is slightly more difficult than frame bridging because it stresses one aspect of a particular frame that is likely to resonate with a certain audience, rather than emphasising the entire frame.77 The third form, frame extension, is the label applied to attempts to extend an existing frame in order to incorporate "interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents".78 Such efforts may be taken to make a less than fully resonant frame align more with an audience's.79 This may result in extensions that are so far removed from an original frame (frame overextension) that they do not resonate among the people targeted. Frame extension can therefore be said to be more difficult than frame amplification and also fails sometimes.80 The final and most difficult form of frame alignment is frame transformation. This is the case when "new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or 'misframings' reframed".81 Since this

also Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment", Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26,2000, pp. 623-625. 75 Snow et al., "Frame", ρ 467. 76 ibid., pp 467-469. See also Jürgen Gerhards & Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 98, no. 3,1992, pp. 584-587; Michael J. McCalhon & David R. Maines, "The Liturgical Social Movement in the Vatican 11 Catholic Church", in: Michael Dobkowski & Isidor Walliman (eds.), Research m Social Movements, Con/licts and Change, vol. 21, Stanford, Conn.: JAI Press Inc., 1999, pp. 136-138. 77 Snow et al, "Frame", pp. 469-472. See also McCallion & Maines, "Liturgical", pp. 138-143; Tracey Skillmgton, "Politics and the Struggle to Define: A Discourse analysis of the Framing Strategies of Competing Actors in a 'New' Participatory Forum", British journal of Sociology, vol 48, no. 3,1997, p. 500. 7' Snow et al., "Frame", p. 472 '* Ibid., pp. 472-473. See also Sarah Babb, "Ά True American System of Finance': Frame Resonance in the U.S. Labor Movement, 1866 to 1886", American Sociological Review, vol. 61,1996, pp. 1045-1046; Daniel B. Cornfield & Bill Fletcher, "Institutional Constraints on Social Movement 'Frame Extension': Shifts in the Legislative Agenda of the American Federation of Labor, 1881-1955", Sonai Forces, vol. 76, no 4,1998, pp. 1308-1311; Scott Davies, "From Moral Duty to Cultural Rights: A Case Study of Political Framing in Education", Sociology of Education, vol. 72,1999, p. 14; McCallion & Maines, "Liturgical", pp. 143-146; Skillmgton, "Politics", pp. 505-506; Joas Wagemakers, "Framing the 'Threat to Islam': Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara' in Salafi Discourse", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no 4,2008, pp. 10-14; Jiping Zuo & Robert D Benford, "Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement", The Sociological Quarterly, vol 36, no. 1,1995, p. 142. 80 For a good example of this, see Nicole Youngman, "When Frame Extension Fails. Operation Rescue and the Triple Gates of Hell' in Orlando" Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, vol 32, no. 5,2003, pp. 521-554, esp. pp. 533 542 " Snow et al, "Frame", ρ 473 See also Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience, New York etc : Harper & Row, 1974, pp 308-321

190 requires the (partial) transformation of the audience's frame, this process does not involve simply connecting two ideologically congruent frames, as with frame bridging, but actually altering (parts of) the prism through which the public looks at a situation or problem.92 If we apply these four different forms of frame alignment to al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to his two versions of ai-waiä' wa-1-barä' discussed in this chapter, we can see that the revival of a!-istiana bi-Z-ku^ar is clearly a case of the relatively easy frame bridging. In his book Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, al-Maqdisi frames the rulers of Saudi Arabia (and, by extension, other Muslim countries) as infidels and condemns their ties with particularly America. Instead he advocates cutting these ties and waging jihad against those rulers.83 The non-Saudi audience dealt with in this chapter agrees that the Al Saud are infidels", also condemns their ties with the U.S. and favours the same solution. In other words, al- Maqdisi's framing of the situation was congruent with theirs. The only difference was that al-Maqdisi used the concept of ai-istiana bi-i-ku^ar to reframe the situation in a more Salafi way. Since this was based on an existing concept and was rooted in sources that had existed for a long time but were rediscovered by al-Maqdisi, it was probably very easy for Jihadi- Salafis to adopt al-Maqdisi's "Salafised" jihad because they did not have to alter their beliefs in any way. They just needed to adopt a Salafi-Wahhabi concept that was actually part of their own ideological tradition but which had simply lain dormant for some time. Since that would have tied the concept of jihad even more to their own Salafi beliefs, it is likely that this was actually a preferred choice for them. The situation is different when looking at al-Maqdisi's legislative version of al-wala wa-l-bara. In this case, al-Maqdisi could not suffice with bridging his own frame but actually partly had to transform the frames of others. While his Jihadi-Salafi audience agreed that "un-Islamic" laws are fcu/r and their legislators are apostates and concurred with his conclusion that - on the basis of Q. 9: 31 - they may even be seen as idols that can be worshipped, which may account for the influence al-Maqdisi probably did have, they had never framed that problem in terms of al-wala wa-l-bara. This concept had never been used exclusively to distinguish between "true" Muslims and "apostates" instead of the traditional divide between a Muslim "in-group" and a non-Muslim "out-group". In other

82 Snow et al. "Frame", pp. 473-476; Mitch Berbner, '"Half the Battle' Cultural Resonance, Framing Processes, and Ethnic Affections in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric", Socia! Problems, vol 45, no. 4,1998, pp. 436- 444, Davies, "Moral", pp 10-14 83 See chapter 6 for a detailed description of al-Maqdisîs views on this issue 84 They may not have been ready to draw that conclusion as early as 1989, when al-Maqdisi did, but certainly believed this to be true after "9/11". See for example www tawhed.ws/c?i=141, where numerous works can be found - including by al-Tartûsî and al-Zawâhirî - that are very critical of Saudi Arabia.

191 words, for successful resonance of al-Maqdisi's frame to take place, a thorough reframing of their existing ideas on ai-wa!ä' wa-l-bara would have been required. This is difficult enough in itself but even more so as it was not even necessary to frame jihad in a more "Salafised" way by using al-wa!a wa-l-bara since the Salafi tradition already offered the tools to do this. For example, al-Maqdisi's own reasoning of takfir of Muslim rulers, as we saw in chapter 2, closely resembles that of quietisi Salafis without necessarily referring to αί-wa/ä' wa-l-bara . Also, the idea that "un-Islamic" laws could be seen as objects of worship had not just been propounded by Qutb but also by Salafi scholars long ago85, ensuring that Jihadi-Salafi scholars really had no particular need for al-walä' wa-1-barä' to "Salafise" their jihad. Since all the authors influenced by al-Maqdisi with regard to both versions of al-walâ' wa-l-bara treated in this chapter are either dead or in a situation where one is virtually unable to interview them, it is difficult to ascertain whether the make-up of al-Maqdisi's frames and his frame alignment were actually the reasons for their being influenced by him. We may carefully assume, however, that these do indeed explain both the scope of and the limits to his impact. Given the ideas that al-Maqdisi introduced or reintroduced, the personal and ideological ties he has with many of the scholars who seem to have been influenced by him, the clear development of al-isti ana bi-l-lcu^Sr by non-Saudi scholars and, finally, the political context in which all of this has taken place, this seems an obvious conclusion. Influence or not, however, al-Maqdisi's attempts to "Salafise" jihad by tying it to a mostly a-political concept such as al-walä' wa-l-bara again betray his clear desire to adhere to a quietist Salafi trend, thereby showing once more his credentials as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi.

95 Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhäb, for example, stated that a täghüt is "anything that is worshipped apart from God". He distinguished five different main types of tawäghlt, including "the one who rules according to something other than what God has sent down" and "the one who is worshipped apart from God and is satisfied with [this] worship". Even if one assumes that "rules" should be interpreted here as what ajudge - not a legislator - does, it is easy to read a legislative interpretation into these words. See Muhammad b 'Abd al-Wahhâb, Risala fi Ma'nâ ί-Täghüt, www.tawhed.ws (accessed July 2007), η d

192 Part IV: Al-Maqdisïs Influence on the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafl Community, 1992-2009

193 194 Chapter 8· ftniHanre tn the Seekers

The aspects of al-Maqdisi's influence we have seen so far have been entirely ideological, without his personal presence playing much of a role: he spent little time in Saudi Arabia, stayed relatively briefly in Afghanistan/Pakistan and during his time in Kuwait and Iraq he was still too young to have been of much influence. This changed, however, when al- Maqdisi moved to Jordan in 1992. There, he found himself in a situation where he could start building a network of followers that was not just based on his writings but also on his personal contacts. This chapter and the next focus on how and why al-Maqdisi's presence in Jordan as well as his writings influenced the radical Islamist community there. In what follows, we will first look at the political context in Jordan, starting with the role of Jordanian Islam as a social and political force in the country before moving on to an analysis of the period during which al-Maqdisi arrived in the kingdom. We will then turn to how his moving to Jordan initially influenced the radical Islamist community and how he tried to channel its wide-spread discontent. Finally, we will look at how al-Maqdisi's influence from 1992, when he arrived in Jordan, until 1994, when he went to prison, can be explained using framing theory. As we will see, the impact of al-Maqdisi and his quietist Jihadi-Salafi message in Jordan at this stage owed much to his ability to provide guidance to seekers of knowledge in need of a spiritual leader.

The Jordanian Political Context

At the time of al-Maqdisi's arrival in Jordan, the country was not unfamiliar with variants of Islam that went beyond the strictly personal sphere and touched political or social issues. In fact, the country has a long history of being engaged with such trends and its rulers even claim to enjoy a certain religious legitimacy of their own. Before moving on to al-Maqdisi's actual arrival in Jordan, it is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the religious trends and discourses that were present in the country before he came there.

Islam in Jordan

Jordan has always been an overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim country and the strong relationship between Islam and the Jordanian state actually starts with the ruling royal

195 family itself. The kings of Jordan are descendants of Husayn b. 'Ali (c. 1853-1931), the amir of Mecca and as such the ruler over the Grand Mosque in that city. This position not only carried weight in itself but was further enhanced by Husayn's status as a sharif (descendant of the Prophet Muhammad). Husayn's son 'Abdallah (1882-1951), the first king of Jordan, could thus claim to be of noble as well as prophetic descent. Although the title of sharif does not imply religious authority nor makes one entitled to a position of political power1, the Jordanian Hashimites (i.e., descendants of the Prophet's Hashim clan) do enjoy respect and prestige on the basis of their lineage.2 The Jordanian state, founded in 1921 by the British as part of their colonial plans for the Middle East, was therefore ruled by a succession of kings that had a certain religious prestige from the very beginning.3 Despite this religious legitimacy, the identity of Jordan and its Hashimite royal family is complex and this is partly related to pre-Jordanian history. Presenting himself as a champion of Arab and Islamic rights, Husayn b. 'Ali co-operated with the British during World War I by launching the Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman Empire. While the British wanted the ruling Ottomans to be defeated in order to further their colonial ambitions, Husayn was promised independent Arab rule. The Hashimites were unfortunate in their endeavours, however, as their revolt - framed as both Islamic and Arab in character - was not as broadly supported as they had hoped4 and they lost large areas placed under their control by the colonial powers, including Syria5 and Iraq6, as well as the region they had originally come from, the west-Arabian Hijaz7. The Islamic and pan-Arab credentials of the Hashimites, on which they tried to base much of their legitimacy, thus eventually only found expression within the borders of Transjordan, as Jordan was called at the time. Even within this country, however, their

1 Gudrun Kramer, "Good Counsel to the King. The Islamist Opposition in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco", in: Joseph Kostiner (ed ), Middle East Monarchies. The Challenge of Modernity, Boulder, Col : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 269. 2 Asher Süsser, "The Jordanian Monarchy: The Hashemite Success Story", in. Kostiner (ed ), Middle, p. 87 3 For extensive treatments of the dynastic and political backgrounds of King 'Abdallah and his father, see Kamal Salibi, The Modem History of Jordan, London & New York: l.B. Tauns, 2006 [1993], pp 50-71; Mary C Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 6- 24. 1 Joshua Teitelbaum, "Husayn ibn 'A]I(c. 1853-1931)", in: John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the islamic World, vol II, Oxford etc.. Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 466-467. 5 Naseer Aruri, Jordan. A Study m Political Development (1921-1965), The Hague- Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, pp. 15 24. 6 Charles Tripp, Irak Een Geschiedenis (transi. Johan de Bakker), Amsterdam/Leuven: Bulaaq/Van Halewyck, 2002 [2000], pp. 186-191. 7 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge etc • Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp 44-49. For more on the history of the Hijâz under Ottoman control in the 19'h and early 20th century, see William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society, and the State m Arabia. The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1984

196 sovereignty and identity was challenged. The British, for example, although officially no longer in control after 1946, when Jordan gained its independence, retained much of their power in the country - particularly in military affairs - after that date, challenging Jordanian identity by their presence alone but also complicating the rulers' image as upholders of pan-Arab sovereignty.8 This ambiguity was underlined during the 1950s and 1960s by the competing and revolutionary pan-Arabism of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser, r. 1954-1970), whose message was a direct challenge to the more conservative rule of the Jordanian King Husayn (1935-1999)9, who had succeeded his assassinated grandfather 'Abdallah in 1953.^ Moreover, the presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who had fled or were expelled during the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars or became part of the state through Jordan's seizure of the West Bank of the river Jordan in 1948 further complicated the situation. Their large numbers and Jordanian citizenship presented a demographical challenge to Jordanian identity, which was (and still is) far from clear." This was further complicated as King Husayn saw himself as their representative, causing conflicts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which made a similar claim.12 Amidst these challenges to its national identity and even legitimacy, the Jordanian King Husayn, who ruled the country during most of Jordan's history, relied on the themes of pan-Arabism13, the country's strong tribal system14 (neither of which concerns us here) and Islam to justify his rule and policies. As Jolen has shown, the latter was expressed in public quotations from the Qur'än to legitimise the king's position during the Gulf wars as well as the peace agreement with Israel in 1994; in references to Islamic history to emphasise a

9 For a highly detailed overview of Jordanian-British military relations and their impact on Jordanian national identity, see Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects The Making of National Identity m Jordan, New York· Columbia University Press, 2001, chapters 3 & 4. ' Unel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism. Jordan, 155-1967, Oxford etc : Oxford University Press, 1989. 10 Dunng the years between 1951, when 'Abdallah was assassinated in Jerusalem, and 1953, when Husayn took over, the latter's father Talâl was king but was quickly deemed unfit to rule due to mental illness. See Sabbi, Modem, p. 177. 11 Alexander Bligh, The Political Legacy of King Hussein, Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2002, pp. 73- 93; Laune A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of identity" Journal o/Palestme Studies, vol. 24, no. 4, 1995, pp. 46-61, Massad, Colonial, pp. 222-275; Shaul Mishal, West Bank-East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949- 1967, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979, pp. 74-91. '2 Sami Al-Khazendar, Jordan and the Palestine Question. The Role of Islamic and left Forces in foreign Policy-Mahng, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997, pp 51-91, esp. pp. 67-91. 13 See also Judith Jolen, Tlie Quest for Legitimacy: The Role of Islam in the State's Political Discourse in Egypt and Jordan (1979-1996), Nijmegen: unpublished PhD-thesis, 2003, pp. 164-165. " For an analysis of the tribal role in Jordanian national identity, see Schirm H. Fathi Jordan: An Invented Nation? Tnbe-State Dynamics and the Formation of National Identity, Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994, pp. 201-239.

197 shared Palestinian-Jordanian Muslim heritage; and by underlining his Hashimite descent to show his dedication to Muslim and Arab causes, particularly regarding Jerusalem.15 When, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, King Husayn advocated political and economic reforms, he also added "democracy" as a legitimising theme to his discourse, claiming that Jordan was a democratic state and that the reforms and political decisions - including the peace agreement with Israel - showed the country's democratic nature." Perhaps because the country lacked a clear identity of its own, had its legitimacy challenged from the very beginning and was forced to rely so much on Islam to counter these challenges, the first Jordanian King 'Abdallah decided to give his blessing to the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the largest Islamic group in the country. The king, wary of political opposition, may have believed that by allowing the Brotherhood as a religious group, he could thwart their political potential right from the start. He also wanted to offset the increasingly popular revolutionary pan-Arab nationalism and probably believed he could bolster his own religious credentials as a shanf by supporting an Islamic movement.17 Founded in Amman by the Jordanian trader 'Abd al-Latif Abu Qura in 1945, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan immediately enjoyed good ties with the king. Although the latter took a more conciliatory approach towards the issue of Palestine than the Brotherhood did, their relationship was generally good during the 1940s and early 1950s. The king allowed them to pursue their social agenda of preaching and teaching Islam and providing services to the public while the Brotherhood, in turn, could be relied upon to support the king.18 The relationship gradually soured, however, as the Brotherhood grew more politicised and critical about contested issues such as British influence, the Palestinian question and support for the revolutionary regime in Egypt after 1952, leading to increased tension between them.19 The regime, for its part, employed the Brotherhood for its own

15 Jolen, Quest, pp. 155-164. For an extensive treatment of the role of Jerusalem in the Jordanian regime's attempts to legitimise its rule, see Kimberly Katz Jordanian Jerusalem. Holy Place and National Spaces, Gainesville, Fi.: University Press of Florida, 2005. "Jolen, Quest, pp. 166-170. 17 Manon Boulby, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1999, pp. 46-47. " All Abdul Kazem, "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Histonc Background and the Ideological Origins", in: Jillian Schwedler (ed ), Islamic Movements mjordan (transi George A. Musleh), Amman· Al-Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center & Sindbad Publishing House, 1997, pp. 13-18; Boulby, Muslim, pp. 37-49; Ibrahim al-GharäybaJomä'atal- /Wiwân al-Muslimmfìl-Urdunn, 1946-1996, Amman: Markaz al-Urdunn al-Jadîd li-1-Dirâsât & Dar Sindbâd li-l- Nashr, 1997, pp 45-57 " Abdul Kazem, "Muslim", pp 19-22; Boulby, Muslim, pp. 50-65.

198 purposes. Its relations with Syria, for example, fluctuated during the 1970s and early 1980s20 and King Husayn used the Brotherhood to put pressure on Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad when bilateral relations were bad but also repressed them during a period of Jordanian- Syrian rapprochement.21 Although no large-scale crack-down on the Muslim Brotherhood comparable to those in Egypt in the 1960s and in Syria in the early 1980s has taken place in Jordan, the movement continues to have difficult relations with the regime to this day. While the Muslim Brotherhood is certainly the largest and most influential Islamic group in Jordan, it is not the only one. Others include the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami22, a- political groups such as the Jama'at al-Tabligh, various Sufi brotherhoods23, voluntary welfare associations24 and, most importantly for this study, Salafis. The Jordanian Salafi movement dates back to the 1970s, when students of Islam - for lack of Jordanian educational facilities - travelled abroad to obtain knowledge and frequently ended up in Syria to study with the prominent Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. The latter eventually travelled and even permanently moved to Jordan himself and became the focal point of the country's Salafi movement.25 The community of Salafis that gathered around al-Albani in the 1980s and the 1990s, which included scholars such as 'Ali b. Hasan al-Halabi and Salim al-Hilali, was overwhelmingly quietist in nature. They did not actively support the Jordanian regime but were vehemently against excommunication (takßr) of the king and his government, strongly rejected any form of violence against the state and adopted a strictly a-political attitude.26 This not only put them at odds with more radical forms of Salafism, which we will deal with later, but also with the Muslim Brotherhood,

20 Laune Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 26, no. 3,1994, pp. 395-402. 21 Beverley Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown The Islamic Response in Jordan", m: James Piscatori (ed ), Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, Chicago: The Amencan Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991, pp. 90-91; Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank Challenges to the Domestic Stability of Jordan, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986, pp. 40-48,53-58 22 Boulby, Muslim, pp. 52-53. 21 For an overview of Islamic groups and organisations in Jordan, see Hamed Dabbas, "Islamic Centers, Associations, Societies, Organizations, and Committees in Jordan", in: Schwedler (ed.), Islamic, pp. 195-259; Jilhan Schwedler, "Jordan", in. Esposito (ed.), Oxford, vol. Ill, pp. 266-268 ^ For an in-depth treatment of the role of Muslim voluntary welfare associations in Jordan, see Egbert Harmsen, Islam, Civil Society and Social Work Muslim Voluntary Welfare Associations m Jordan between Patronage and Empowerment, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. ^ Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism. Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power m Jordan, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 120-121, id., "The Salafi Movement in Jordan", international ;oumal of Middle East Studies, vol. 32, no. 2,2000, ρ 222. 26 Wiktorowicz, Management, pp. 123-126, id., "The Salafi Movement in Jordan", pp 223-225; id, "The Salafi Movement· Violence and Fragmentation of Community", in Miriam Cooke & Bruce B. Lawrence (eds.), Muslim Networks from Hay to HipHop, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p. 229.

199 whose political style they rejected.27 As such, quietist Jordanian Salafis can be seen as the polar opposite of the Brotherhood.28 Jordan, as the above shows, is a country whose rulers enjoy a certain religious legitimacy but also offers several (controlled) Islamic societal and political avenues of participation.2' As we saw in the chapters on Saudi Arabia, however, a religiously sanctioned state and a plethora of opportunities for people to express themselves religiously is, under certain circumstances at least, not necessarily a guarantee against the emergence of radical Islamic groups. A process somewhat similar to what happened in Saudi Arabia also took place in Jordan, where the late 1980s and early 1990s proved to be a particularly turbulent and volatile period in the history of the country. Although the country had certainly known other eventful periods - one need only think of the Arab-Israeli wars - the late 1980s and early 1990s were different because certain specific circumstances were conducive to a radicalisation that played right into the hands of ideologues such as al-Maqdisi.

The Turbulent Late 1980s and Early 1990s

The 1980s were an eventful time for the entire Middle East: the Islamic Revolution in Iran had just taken place and a wholly new regime now ruled that country; the Palestinian intifada against Israeli occupation started in 1987; and the Iran-Iraq war was fought throughout this decade. This troublesome period was preceded by years that had brought unprecedented oil-wealth to some countries, which had led to increased financial help to Jordan from Gulf states as well as a rise in employment possibilities there. The remittances from the Jordanians who had started working in the Gulf added further clout to the Jordanian economy. Both the financial help and the remittances declined sharply, however, when oil prices dropped in the 1980s, leading to grave economic problems in Jordan. In the late 1980s, the government therefore eventually decided to call on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans and they agreed on a structural-adjustment agreement. The

27 Wiktorowicz, Management, p. 128, id., "The Salafi Movement in Jordan", ρ 226 z* Although Jordanian Salafis have to some extent filled the gap left by a Muslim Brotherhood increasingly focussed on politics at the expense of their social activities, it should be added that quietist Salafis have also started tacit co-operation with the Jordanian regime in the past few years. Interviews with 'Alib. Hasan al- Halabî, Amman, 19 January 2009; Shadi Hamid, Amman, 11 August 2008. For more on the professionahsation and commercialisation of the Brotherhood's social activities, see Janine A. Clark, Islam, Chanty, and Activism- Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare m Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004, esp pp. 110-112. 2' Insight into how the Jordanian regime provides opportunities in civil society on the one hand but firmly controls and bureaucratises them is given in Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan", Comparative Politics, vol. 33, no 1,2000, pp 43-61

200 economic reforms this implied caused taxes to be raised and subsidies to be cut, leading to a steep rise in prices, which hit the tribal south of the country - traditionally a pillar of support for the regime - extra hard.30 A series of protests followed that were not just directed at the economic hardship but also called for greater démocratisation.31 In order to accommodate the wishes of the people, channel their anger and save his own regime from growing instability. King Husayn announced that national elections would be held in 1989, the first time since 1967.32 The Islamist opposition, primarily but not entirely made up of the Muslim Brotherhood, was quite successful in the elections and - in a surprise to many - won more than a third of the seats in parliament.33 During the period that followed, a policy of limited liberalisation was pursued, expressed in more freedom of organisation and the press and the country's new democratic course was even drawn up in what became known as the National Charter {al-mîthâq al-watant) in 1991.34 It soon turned out, however, that the regime's démocratisation was not aimed at achieving full democracy and strong liberalisation35 but only "to assure its political longevity, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan".36 This attitude was expressed, for example, in allocating seats to districts in ways unfavourable to the Brotherhood37 but perhaps most importantly in the changing of the electoral law in such a way that it effectively favoured

30 For a critical treatment of IMF-measures in Jordan, see Karen Pfeifer, "How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt Became IMF 'Success Stones' in the 1990s", Middle East Report, no. 210,1999, pp. 23-27. " Renate Dieterich, "The Weakness of the Ruled is the Strength of the Ruler· The Role of the Opposition in Contemporary Jordan", in: George Joffe (ed.), Jordan in Transition, 1990-2000, London: Hurst & Co, 2002, pp. 129- 130; Kathnne Rath, 'The Process of Democratization in Jordan", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 30, no. 3,1994, pp 537-540; Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", /ntemationa/ Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 30, no. 3,1998, pp. 390-391; Curtis R. Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund", Middle East Policy, vol. 6, no. 2,1998, pp. 55-57. 32 Kamel S. Abujaber & Schirm H. Fathi, 'The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections", Orient, deutsche Zeitschnfifur den modernen Orient, vol. 31, no. 1,1990, pp. 72-74; Hanna Y. Frey & Leonard C Robinson, "Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State· Jordan as a Case Study", The Muslim World, vol 86, no. 1,1996, pp. 9-10; International Crisis Group, The Challenge of Political Reform. Jordanian Démocratisation and Regional Instability, Middle East Briefing, Amman & Brussels, 8 October 2003, pp. 4-5; Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council", Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 3,1998, pp. 393-394 For a critical treatment of the underlying reasons for démocratisation and liberalisation in Jordan after 1989, see Ranjit Singh, "Liberalisation or Démocratisation? The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan", in:Joffé(ed),Jordan,pp 75-82 " Dietench, "Weakness", pp 137 138. "Ibid., pp. 131-132. 15 Russell E. Lucas, "Dehberahzation in Jordan", Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 1,2003, pp. 137-144. For Jordanian citizens' perceptions of their own country's democratic nature, see Maher J. Massis, "Jordan· A Study of Attitudes toward Democratic Changes", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3,1998, pp. 37-63. 16 Robinson, "Defensive", pp. 387-410 The quote is on p. 387 37 Julian Schwedler, "A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in Elections", Middle East Report, no. 209, 1998, p. 28

201 tribal candidates over others, including Islamists.38 While the Brotherhood continued to abide by parliamentary rules, it was thus less than successful in its political endeavours" and parts of the public - while remaining sympathetic - also became disappointed with them for their lack of achievements.'10 It was therefore not surprising that the next national elections, in 1993, resulted in losses for the Brotherhood, which now participated through a separate political party (the Islamic Action Front, IAF), and a parliament that was much more loyal to the king than the previous one.41 In addition to this economic and political upheaval, Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn decided to invade Kuwait in 1990, leading to a large-scale American-led operation to liberate the latter. In the aftermath of this war, King Husayn decided to participate in a peace process with Israel, starting with an international conference in Madrid in December 1991. Three years earlier, the king had officially relinquished Jordanian claims to the West Bank and Jerusalem, opening the way for peace talks with Israel since any attempts by Jordan to hold on to those territories would have been turned down by Israel. These talks ultimately resulted in a peace treaty with the Jewish state in 1994. This, in effect, dealt a further blow to the strongly pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli Brotherhood, which - despite its parliamentary presence - had not been able to stop this agreement despite overwhelming popular opposition to it." It was in this context of economic and political crisis, disillusionment about the Gulf War and the Brotherhood's parliamentary impotence that al-Maqdisi arrived in Jordan.

Al-Maqdisi's Arrival in Jordan

As mentioned in chapter 1, al-Maqdisi was one of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who came to Jordan in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Since these people were officially Jordanian citizens, Jordan had to accept them, thereby adding a social problem to the burden of other issues weighing down on that country's society and regime. While earlier

18 Abla M. Amawi, "The 1993 Elections in Jordan", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3,1994, pp 15-17; Frédéric Chanllon & Alain Mouftard, "Jordanie: Les elections du 8 novembre 1993 et le processus de paix", Monde Arabe Maghreb Uachrek, no. 144,1994, pp. 45-46 39 Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan", Middle East Journal, vol. 51, no. 3,1997, pp.373-387 w Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Façade Democracy and Jordan", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 20, no. 2,1993, p. 198. 41 Kirk Albrecht, "Hussein Gets a Loyal Legislature", The Middle East, no. 273, December 1997, pp 15-16. " Interview with Shadi Hamid, Amman, 11 August 2008. For an excellent treatment of how the Brotherhood and the IAF dealt with this peace treaty, see Julian Schwedler, Faith m Moderation /slamisi Parties m Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge etc. Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp 169-176

202 crises had probably contributed to a greater radicalisation of and influence by pan-Arab leftists and Muslim Brothers, the turbulent late 1980s and early 1990s, with their much smaller emphasis on Arab nationalism and the parliamentary failure of the Brotherhood, did not." This context of political, economic, diplomatic and social instability over various issues did, however, contribute indirectly to al-Maqdisi's initial influence among radical Islamists in Jordan.

Stability amidst Instability

As happened in several other Arab states during the late 1980s and early 1990s, many "Afghan Jordanians" who had finished their fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989 returned to their home country. One of the driving forces of the entire "Afghan Arab" phenomenon, 'Abdallah 'Azzam, was actually a Jordanian of Palestinian descent but it is not clear if and to what extent this benefited the efforts to stimulate Jordanians to go to Afghanistan. In any case, the exodus of probably hundreds of Jordanian fighters to that country was stimulated or at least tacitly allowed by the Jordanian regime." When they returned, however, they were not treated as heroes who had liberated a Muslim country from Soviet occupation but were frequently looked upon with suspicion and they often failed to reintegrate into society. With regard to Saudi Arabia, it has been pointed out that the radicalisation and battle-hardened attitudes of the returning "Afghan Arabs" as well as their economic marginalisation due to their long absence prevented them from fully getting back to their old lives. As a result, they often felt alienated and betrayed by society and in the end socialised mostly with fellow-"Afghans", thereby further reinforcing their radical ideas.'15 It seems that a similar process took place in Jordan, with many "Afghan Jordanians" not only remaining unemployed but also seeing a stark contrast between their own pious preferences and the "sinful" lifestyles of a number of Jordanians.46

" For a detailed analysis of the left's waning influence in the 1980s and the Brotherhood's increase in domestic impact but decline in importance with regard to foreign policy in the same period, see Al-Khazendar, Jordan, pp. 101-131 (esp. pp. 124-131) and pp. 135-169 (esp. 161-169) respectively. •" International Crisis Group Jordan's 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Isiamism, ICG Middle East Report no. 47, Amman & Brussels, 23 November 2005, p. 3. Interviews with Fans Brayzât, Amman, 6 August 2008, 'Urayb al-Rantâwï, Amman, 12 August 2008. ,s Thomas Hegghammer, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicahzation in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Policy, vol. 13, no. 4,2006, p. 51. " Anouar Boukhars, "The Challenge of Terrorism and Religious Extremism in Jordan", Strategic Insights, vol. 5, no. 4, April 2006, p. 3, International Crisis Group Jordan's, pp. 3-4. Interviews with al-Rantâwï, Amman, 12 August 2008, Samlh Khurays, Amman, 14 January 2009

203 The generally unstable situation in Jordan as a result of economic, social and both domestic and regional political discontent as well as the badly facilitated return of the "Afghan Arabs" created a spirit of disillusionment with the Arab regimes and a sense of losing control among some individuals. Many non-Palestinian Jordanians, for example, felt strengthened in their belief that their country was falling prey to "outsiders" as a result of the influx of Palestinians after the Gulf War.47 The inability of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF to tackle any of these problems, as well as the apparent unwillingness of Arab governments (including the Jordanian one) to stop the American-led war against Iraq, probably only reinforced that attitude. Although King Husayn himself took the hugely popular decision to remain neutral during the Gulf War, which many interpreted as tacit support for Iraq49, his stance did not change the attitude of those people so disillusioned with the regime that they considered it illegitimate anyway. Among this group, a search for more radical solutions began.4' The attempts to find new answers to the questions that arose during this eventful and turbulent period were expressed in the founding of all kinds of different radical groups. The best-known of these is probably Muhammad's Army (Jaysh Muhammad), a group that is said to have been founded by a former Muslim Brother, the "Afghan Arab" Sami Abu Zaydan, in 198850 but there were many more. Some of them attacked supposedly sinful places, such as shops selling alcohol or cinemas, but they do not seem to have had a clear agenda, let alone a guiding ideology. They seem to have been little more than disparate radical groups consisting of former "Afghan Arabs" as well as others and although they sometimes clearly posed a threat to parts of society, they hardly constituted a unified opposition to the regime or its interests.51 Clearly lacking any organisational structure, they

47 Brand, "Palestinians", p. 56. 41 Milton-Edwards, "Temporary", pp 97-99; Philip Robins, A History of Jordan, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp 178-180. 49 Muhammad Abu Rummân & Hasan Abu Hamyya, "Al-Sahfiyyaal-Jihädiyya"fil-Urdunn badaMaqtalal-Zarqäwv Muqärabatal-Hüwryya, Azmat al-Qiyäda wa-Dabäbiyyat al-Ru'ya, Amman: Friednch-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009, pp. 15, 93-95; Mohammed Subman Abu Rumman [Muhammad Sulaymân Abu Rummân], The Muslim Brotherhood m the 2007Jordaman Parliamentary Elections: A Passing "Political Setback" or Diminished Popularity?, Amman: Fnednch- Ebert-Stiftung, 2007, pp. 12-13; Boukhars, "Challenge", pp 3-4; International Crisis Group, Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Maan, ICG Middle East Briefing, Amman & Brussels, 19 February 2003, p. 11, id., Jordan's, pp. 5-6; Wiktorowicz, Management, ρ 121; interviews with Hasan Abu Hamyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, Yäsir Abu Hilâla, Amman, 7 August 2009, Muhammad Abu Rummân, Amman, 11 August 2008, Khurays, Amman, 14 January 2009, Marwän Shahäda, Amman, 13 January 2009. 50 Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Climate of Change m Jordan's Islamist Movement", in: Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds ), Jslamic Fundamentalism, Boulder, Col • Westview Press, 1996, ρ 127. 51 International Crisis Group Jordan's, ρ 6; Milton-Edwards, "Climate", pp. 127-134; Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam· The Case of Jordan", Survival, vol. 37, no 3,1995, ρ 140; Wiktorowicz, Management, pp. 121- 122.

204 were connected by their general discontent about the regime and its policies and rejected the Islamist but generally non-confrontational approach taken by the Muslim Brotherhood, which had yielded very little throughout the decades of Jordanian history. Their discontent was fuelled by grievances caused by the crises discussed above as well as their relatively incoherent religious ideas, which employed the radical beliefs of men like Qutb and the Salafi writings of the likes of Ibn Taymiyya.52 In this climate of disillusionment and these groups' search for a radical and clear alternative to what the regime, quietist Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood were offering, al-Maqdisi entered the fray. Unlike these radical groups, al-Maqdisi did have a well- developed ideology. By the time he arrived in Jordan in 1992, he had already written several books, had briefly studied - albeit clandestinely - in Saudi Arabia and had taught others in Afghanistan/Pakistan for a short while. Although it is clear that he was not yet the major radical scholar that he is considered to be today, ideologically speaking he was clearly well ahead of his new-found Jordanian audience, which may have been aware of his ideas. There are indications that some radical Jordanians were familiar with his writings53 and it is quite possible that at least some "Afghan Jordanians" had been introduced to his books when they were in Afghanistan. Whatever the case may be, upon meeting al-Maqdisi himself, they will most probably have been enamoured with his framing of the problems in the Muslim world as having to do with the regimes' political apostasy from Islam, expressed in their "loyalty" to "man-made laws" and Western countries. Although al-Maqdisi had not written anything about Jordan at that time, his general message is highly likely to have resonated with these men, particularly during this turbulent period in which Arab regimes (perhaps with the exception of Jordan) were severely discredited for their role in the Gulf War and - especially regarding Jordan - a willingness to make peace with Israel. In this situation of social, economic and both domestic and regional political instability, al-Maqdisi provided the radicals with a sense of purpose, ideological coherence and indeed stability. It was therefore not surprising that he quickly became a leading figure of this disparate community of fellow-radicals by starting a group of his own. Its "members" apparently saw themselves as strict upholders of the unity of God (tawhfd) and thus seem to have adopted the name Jama'at al-Tawhid or Jama'at al-Muwahhidin (the Group of Upholders of Tawhïd). The security services later applied the name Bay'at al-Imam (Fealty

52 Abu Rummân & Abü Haniyya, "Ai-Sala/tyya", p. 15. 53 Fu'äd Husayn, Al-Zarqäwt Al-ßl al-Thânili-l-Qâ'ida, Beirut: Dar al-Khayyäl, 2005, p. 85.

205 to the Imam) to them and this is also how they became known in the media, but the group's "members" did not use this name themselves.54 Notwithstanding the vague and ill-defined ideology of Jordan's radical groups, al- Maqdisi was not the only Jihadi-Salafi scholar in Jordan at the time. There was another radical ideologue of more or less the same stature as al-Maqdisi called 'Umar Mahmud Abu 'Umar, better known as Abu Qatada al-Filastini (b. I960). Being a Palestinian-Jordanian living in Kuwait, he was expelled from that country and went to Jordan just like al-Maqdisi but also spent time in Afghanistan. When he arrived in Jordan, however, he did not stay for very long but moved to Britain in 1993, where he is said to have helped spread al-Maqdisi's writings55 and where he is currently under house arrest on terrorism-related charges. Although al-Maqdisi has expressed some minor criticism of Abu Qatada56, he clearly agrees with his general ideas and has praised him57 and contributed to his writings58. The fact that Abu Qatada left Jordan so quickly after arriving there meant that, unlike al-Maqdisi, he cannot have had much direct influence on radical Islamists there through his personal presence59 and al-Maqdisi even says that he has never met him in person, although they have been in touch.60 Thus, in spite of Abu Qatada being another major Jordanian Jihadi- Salafi scholar, the spiritual leadership of the radical Islamist community in Jordan in the early 1990s seems to have been al-Maqdisi's for the taking.

" The name "Bay'at al-Imäm" came from a similarly titled pamphlet that was discussed with al-Maqdisi by a man who was later arrested with him, thus causing the authorities to call al-Maqdisfs group that way. Abü Rummän & Abu Haniyya, "Al-Sala/îyya", p. 124, note 11. Interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009. See also Abu Muhammad al Maqdisï, Kashfal-Lithäm 'ammari Wasaß bi-Tanzïm "Bay'atal-lmâm", www.tawhed.ws (accessed April 2009), n.d., pp. 5-6. For more on the concept of bay'a and its use in the Arab politics, see Ehe Podeh, "The Bay'α: Modem Political Uses of Islamic Ritual in the Arab World", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 50, no 1,2010, pp. 117-152. " Abu Rummän & Abü Haniyya, "Al-Salafiyya", p. 24; Mary Anne Weaver, "Inventing al-Zarqawi", The Atlantic Monthlyjuly/August 2006, ρ 94. 56 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Vfaqfit ma'a Thamarät al-Jihäd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2004, p. 72. " id., Tabsïr al-'Uqala bi-Talbüsöt Ahi al-Tajahhum wa-l-lija, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1996, p. 79. ss Abu Qatada al-FilastînîJu'nat al-Mutayyabîn, www tawhed.ws (accessed 9 April 2009), n.d. Al-Maqdisi wrote the introduction to this book 59 Abu Qatada is said to have formed a separate group in Jordan in the very early 1990s called Harakat Ahi al- Sunna wa-1-Jamâ'a but it is unclear whether this was a violent group or not In any case, Abu Qatâda left quickly afterwards, meaning that he cannot have had much personal influence See Abu Rummän & Abu Haniyya, "Al-5ala/ìyya", p. 17. M Interview with al Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009

206 Channelling the Discontent

The preceding chapters have often mentioned al-Maqdisi's position as that of a quietist Jihadi-Salafi for his close adherence to both quietist and Jihadi-Salafi thinking and concepts. These similarities should mostly be seen at the level of creed ('acjfda). The fact that al- Maqdisi - despite being a Jihadi-Salafi - resembles quietist Salafis in their method (manhaj) of dealing with society (da'wa) as well, however, is also clear. This has already been generally described in chapter 3 but the full implications of al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi- Salafi manho; did not become apparent until he moved to Jordan, where his position in this regard was very important in determining who became his follower and who did not, as we will see in the next chapter. The first indications of this, however, could already be seen in al-Maqdisi's actions with the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin. The group that gathered around al-Maqdisi was very diverse and it is difficult to establish a profile of a "typical member". Although it is clear that most of them were young (between 18 and 30) at the time, had little education and were generally from poor families, this is as much as one can say with certainty.61 Important indicators such as whether members had a Palestinian or a non-Palestinian Jordanian background and whether they had gone to Afghanistan or not seem to be more obscure among the early followers of al- Maqdisi. It seems that both Palestinian-Jordanians and "East Bank" Jordanians were present in al-Maqdisi's group at this time.62 The same appears to be the case with "Afghan Arabs", who were definitely part of the group but probably not all of them had fought in Afghanistan.63 The exact size of the group is even more difficult to pin down since it was an informally organised club of people that did not have an actual membership. What is clear is that the number of people eventually arrested, charged and imprisoned for belonging to the group was 16.64 Since his move to Jordan, al-Maqdisi and the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin concentrated on da'wa activities. Although we have already seen al-Maqdisi's emphasis on da'wa in

" Abu Rummân & Abu Haniyya, "Al-Salafiyya", p. 47; interviews with 'Abdallah Abu Rummân, Amman, 15 January 2009, Brayzät, Amman, 6 August 2008, Fu ad Husayn, Amman, 5 August 2008, Yûsuf Rabâba, Amman, 12 January 2009, Marwân Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009, Usäma Shahâda, Amman, 12 January 2009. 62 Interviews with Brayzät, Amman, 6 August 2008, Rabäba, Amman, 12 January 2009, Usâma Shahâda, Amman, 12 January 2009. 63 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers m Iraq The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, pp. 171-172. 61 Abu Rummân & Abu Haniyya, "Al-Salafiyya", p. 20; Husayn, Al-Zarqäm, p. 91. This is further confirmed by International Crisis Group Jordan's, p. 9, footnote 63 and interviews with Khurays, Amman, 14 January 2009, al- MaqdisI, Amman, 13 January 2009, Marwän Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009. All of them confirm that this was more or less the number of people arrested and imprisoned in the case against Bay'at al-Imâm.

207 chapter 3, this may seem strange considering his calls for jihad that we saw earlier Why does he call for jihad against a Muslim regime in one context (particularly Saudi Arabia) but not in Jordan, particularly since the latter is supposedly much more "un-Islamic" than the former7 At least two reasons can be given for this. Firstly, unlike Saudi Arabia, which was partly founded on the basis of a Salafi ideological tradition and whose youngsters were intimately familiar with Wahhabi teachings, Jordan was still relatively new to Salafism and particularly Jihadi-Salafism, which had basically been unknown until al-Maqdisi's arrival In other words, whereas Saudi radicals could fight under the banner of Salafi Islam, Jordanian ones could not, leading al-Maqdisi to focus on educating people first before they could wage a "proper"jihad This argument was not a way of excusing his unwillingness to call for jihad in a country where (unlike in Saudi Arabia) he himself would have to suffer the consequences. This can be seen in his attitude that jihad - though perhaps unwise and imperfect - is legitimate in principle, shown for example in his praise for "martyred" mufâhidûn and his blessing for an armed attack in 1994 (see below) Conversely, it can also be seen in his belief that it was not yet time for jihad in the Palestinian territories - where he would not suffer persecution as a result - because there was supposedly nobody to fight under the banner of Jihadi-Salafism." Secondly, al-Maqdisi also takes into account that some contexts are more conducive to jihad than others. Whereas Saudi Arabia has long been a state with a relatively weak army, Jordan has much stronger and fiercer security and intelligence services, making the chances of jihad simply ending in the mass imprisonment (or even killing) of mujähtdün - as happened in Egypt and Algeria in the 1990s - much more likely. Similarly, one reason he was unhappy to see Jordanian youngsters go to Iraq after 2003 was that he feared they would simply be massacred, as we will see in the next chapter. Although the 'Abdallah b. 'Abbas mosque m the city of al-Zarqa is said to have played a central role in al-Maqdisi's da'wa efforts66 and most followers of his message seem to have come from the central Jordanian cities of al-Zarqa' and al-Salt as well as al-Rusayfa, the town where al-Maqdisi lived, their message was spread all over Jordan This was done by preaching sermons in mosques and particularly people's own homes67 as well as spreading al-Maqdisi's writings68 Later, when al-Maqdisi became better-known, youngsters

65 Interview with Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Rusayfa, 17January 2009 66 Abu Rummân & Abu Haniyya, Αϊ Sahfiyya , ρ 98, Tâhir al Sharqâwl, "Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî Thunä lyyat al Muqaddas wa 1 Unf ', Ai Misbär, no 5, May 2007, ρ 132 67 Husayn, Ai Zarqawî, pp 84 90 "Abu Rummân & Abu Haniyya, Aì-Saìafìyya ,ρ 98

208 would photocopy his books themselves and spread them on their own.69 This way, through personal contacts with people interested in the message as well as family members, the group of adherents to al-Maqdisi's ideology slowly grew.70 The radical youngsters who co-operated with al-Maqdisi in spreading his writings probably mostly relied on his existing ideological discourse but he also wrote new things in the early 1990s. It is difficult to ascertain which of al-Maqdisi's writings date back to the period between his arrival in Jordan and his incarceration (i.e. 1992-1994) since many of his books and treatises are undated. Two of them, however, can be traced to this period and give us important information about al-Maqdisi and his role in Jordan during this time. The first is a letter of advice to "some brothers" (bad αί-ikhwa) that warns against certain extremist views that go beyond those al-Maqdisi himself believes to be correct but which are nevertheless ascribed to him. As we have seen in chapters 2 and 7, al-Maqdisi stresses that concepts such as takfir and bara (disavowal) - while highly important to his ideology - should not be used carelessly, randomly or generally. It is precisely against this usage of such concepts that this letter warns. In it, al-Maqdisi tells his readers that he has never believed that Muslim societies are so steeped in unbelief that every single one of its inhabitants is an "infidel", even though these ideas are ascribed to him.71 He also mentions that it is said of him that he considers the armies of "apostate" Muslim states to be "infidel" institutions themselves. While he acknowledges that this is indeed his view, he also points out that this does not mean that every individual soldier is an apostate and refers to those who may be in the army to overthrow the regime as examples.72 The significance of this letter lies not so much in any groundbreaking new insights contained in it but in the fact that it constitutes the first of his writings in which he defends himself against the charge of having certain views that he indeed never expressed in his books. Such attempts to warn against ideological extremism (and especially the counter-charge that al-Maqdisi used to

69 Interview with Marwân Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009 70 Abu Rummän & Abu Haniyya, "Ai-Salafiyya", ρ 98 This confirms the informal organisational structure that Wiktorowicz has pointed out among Jordanian Salafi groups in general See Wiktorowicz, Management, pp 128- 144 71 Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Risälat Munäsaha wa-TadhJcfr ila ba d a!-/Wiwa, www tawhed ws (accessed 12 April 2010), 1992/1993, pp 1-2 72 /bid , pp 2 5 This argument may have struck a chord with his audience since the Islamist assassins of Egyptian President Anwar al Sâdât in 1981, for example, were members of the army It could be argued that they would not have been able to assassinate him if they had not been in that position

209 think that way too but has become more moderate) only increased as the years went by, as we will see in the next chapter." The second piece that al-Maqdisi certainly wrote while in Jordan but before he went to prison is a book specifically written against democracy. Though undated, the book makes clear that it was written around the time of the parliamentary elections and therefore probably dates from 1993.74 Some of his arguments against democracy are based on views we have already seen before: taking power and sovereignty away from God (by putting it in the hands of the people) constitutes a violation of his absolute unity as expressed in tawhitf, for which it should be condemned as unbelief and as an entirely different and un-Islamic religion of its own.75 What makes this book different from what he had written before, however, is that he attacks Islamic arguments in favour of democracy. He rebuts, for example, the claim that working for a non-Islamic system is allowed since it was also done by the Qur anic Yûsuf (Joseph), who worked for Pharaoh.76 He also refutes the idea that democracy is really a modern-day form of the Islamic concept of shürä (consultation)77. The book is too detailed to deal with at any greater length here but what is significant is that al- Maqdisi specifically wrote this book in a period in which national elections were being held in Jordan. This shows that al-Maqdisi actively tried to incorporate topical issues into his writings and applied his ideology to current events of great importance to his audience, particularly those who wondered whether voting for the Muslim Brotherhood was the right thing to do. He would do this several other times during his stay in Jordan, as we will see in the next chapter, and thus provided his followers with a detailed ideological framework through which they could vent their discontent against the Jordanian regime and its supporters.

It seems that it was precisely the wide-spread discontent caused by Jordan's instability, expressed among radical youngsters in an unclear desire to seek a religious solution, that made them susceptible to al-Maqdisi's da'wa. This may seem odd given the background of his followers. Some (or even many) of them - including Abu Mus'ab al- Zarqawi (1966-2006), an "Afghan Jordanian" who had returned to Jordan in the early 1990s and who would later become the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq - had fought in Afghanistan and

73 For an in-depth treatment of al-Maqdisîs alleged revisionism, seejoas Wagemakers, "Protectingjihad in the 21st Century: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices", in: Anisseh van Engeland & Ahmed Dawoody (eds.) Jihad in the 2Γ' Century (forthcoming). 7< Abü Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-Dïmuqrâtiyya Din, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 29 August 2006), n.d., p. 3. "/bid., pp. 4-15. 76 /bid., pp. 17-26. 77 Ibid., pp. 31-37.

210 had gained important military experience there. They were probably less inclined to stick to the quietist manhaj of practising da'wa at the expense of actual jihadi action, particularly since they were preaching a very Jihadi-Salafi message, arguing against the Jordanian system and its rulers. Al-Maqdisi, however, simply saw his own activities as part of what he had done for years, namely preaching his ideology, and does not even distinguish between the activities of the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin and his work in Afghanistan and other countries since to him they all serve the same purpose.78 Despite the discrepancy between his views on this issue and what may be assumed to be the preferred manhaj of at least some of al- Maqdisi's followers with regard to Jordanian society - jihad - he nevertheless managed to get them involved in spreading his ideas in the early 1990s. Al-Zarqawi, for instance, is said to have been quite devoted to al-Maqdisi during this period79, in contrast to his later behaviour, as we will see in the next chapter. The most probable reason for this is that al- Maqdisi's clear views gave this disparate group of young seekers a purpose to their grievances and channelled their discontent through his da'wa. Al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafism was underlined when, in 1994, an Israeli settler called Baruch Goldstein murdered dozens of Palestinians praying at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron in the West Bank. Several of the men who participated in al-Maqdisi's da'wa activities wanted to take revenge by staging an attack against Israel. Although al-Maqdisi had smuggled weapons into Jordan apparently abandoned by the Iraqi army as it left Kuwait after its invasion there80 and even gave a fatwa permitting the attack against Israel81, he did so only reluctantly since, while considering it legitimate, he wanted to focus on da'wa.82 The decision to attack Israel proved to be a fateful one since it was discovered and thwarted by the Jordanian security services, leading to the arrest of al-Maqdisi's group.83

78 Interview with al-Maqdisi, Amman, 13 January 2009. 7'' Husayn, Al-ZarqäwT, pp. 85-99. 80 Abu Rummân & Abu Haniyya, "Αί-Sala/îyya", p. 19; al-'Asr, 10 July 2005; Al-'Arabixya (www.alarabiya.net, accessed 4 March 2009), 1 March 2009; Husayn, Al-Zarqâm, p. 92; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, e-mail message to the author, 18 May 2009. " Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005, p. 63. !Z Jamal Khâshuqjî & Yâsir Abu Hilâla, "Al-Manzar al-Fikrî li-Munaffidhï nfijâr al-Riyâd: Al-'Unf Farîda, al- Dünüqrätiyya Shirk!", Al-Wasat, no. 235, 29 July - 4 August 1996, pp. 12-13; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Liqa min KhalafQadbân al-Murtaddîn 'Sana 1418', www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 March 2007), 1997, pp. 4-5,10-11. '3 This seems to have been the only violent action that al-Maqdisîs group was involved in. Although the Jordanian authorities have accused them of more armed activities (see, for example, Weaver, "Inventing", pp. 92-93), this does not seem to be the case. Several people - including al-Maqdisi, who would probably have been proud of other attacks against Jordanian targets - have told me that the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin was only involved in the 1994 armed attack against Israel. Considering the presence of a plethora of small and unorganised radical groups in Jordan during the early 1990s, it may well be that the Jordanian security services have mistakenly or consciously pinned the blame for other groups' attacks on the Jama'at al-

211 After their arrest, the da'wa of al-Maqdisi and his group actually continued during their court case. At the trial that preceded their sentencing, the men about to be convicted used the opportunity to tell the judges, lawyers and the journalists present about their ideas. Al-Maqdisi himself says he very consciously seized this chance to do da'wa against people who represented the law of a country not ruled by the sharia."4 He and the others used the court as a pulpit from which they could spread their message of tallir of the rulers, disavowing their man-made laws and openly showing their rejection of the system on which the trial was based.85 This attitude of defiance towards those in power as well as their attempts to turn an unfortunate situation to their benefit would characterise their stay in prison, during which they often confronted the authorities and al-Maqdisi used his time to spread his views. Yet it was also during their prison time that al-Maqdisi's position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi and the emphasis on the use of da'wa that resulted from this gradually stopped being a unifying factor, as we will see in the next chapter. First, however, we must turn to a full explanation of al-Maqdisi's influence in Jordan in the early 1990s.

A Visionary in the Land of the Blind

From chapter 4 onwards, we have dealt with the so-called core framing tasks, the three aspects that any good frame should possess. Until now, we have seen how al-Maqdisi's diagnosis of a problem, his prognosis and his call for action were either congruent with other people's own frames or not. In the case of Jordan at the beginning of the 1990s, however, al-Maqdisi's target audience, consisting of "Afghan Jordanians" and other disillusioned radicals who gathered around him and his teachings, had very few clear ideas of its own. Being largely unfamiliar with the doctrines of Jihadi-Salafism in an age when such ideas were not yet wide-spread through the internet, this meant that any Islamic radical solution preached by a knowledgeable scholar would probably have gone a long way to satisfy them. Al-Maqdisi's framing of the rulers of the Muslim world as unbelievers (kuffar), his solution of takftr of and jihad against them and his frequent calls for Muslims to act upon this "duty" to disavow their political leaders will therefore have been an attractive

Muwahhidîn Interviews with Hasan Abu Hamyya, Amman, 9 August 2008, Husayn, Amman, 5 August 2008, al Maqdisï, Amman, 13 January 2009 81 Interview with al Maqdisï, Amman 13 January 2009 85 Napoleoni, Insurgent, pp 64-66 For an impression of what the men accused the court and its judges of, see Husayn, Ai Zarqâwï, pp 60-62, Abü Muhammad al Maqdisï, Al Zarqöwï Amälwa Aläm (Munäsarawa Munösaha), www tawhed ws (accessed 24 August 2006), 2004, ρ 2

212 one to young Jordanian radicals hungry for an alternative. In that sense, al-Maqdisi's return to Jordan can be characterised as an arrival in "the land of the blind". Al-Maqdisi was not a "one-eyed man", however, but a scholar with clear ideas of his own who could more accurately be described as a visionary wanting to lead others to what he saw as true Islam. This meeting between a scholar and a disgruntled group of radicalising youngsters at the right time finds a more explicit theoretical explanation in the concept of cognitive liberation.

Cognitive Liberation

As will be recalled from chapter 4, McAdam coined the term cognitive liberation to refer to the realisation among the public that the time for contentious action has come. This realisation is said to be caused on the one hand by so-called "cognitive cues" provided by political opportunities (i.e. openings that allow contention to achieve actual results) and on the other by social movements' capitalisation on these cognitive cues by encouraging people to take action. Cognitive cues mentioned by McAdam include ideological or cultural contradictions (i.e. events or decisions that show a stark contrast between something many people hold dear and what takes place in practice); suddenly imposed grievances, which change an audience's perception of a situation that they previously accepted; and dramatisations of system vulnerability, showing the weak spots of a regime or government. Although others have debated whether it need necessarily be social movements that capitalise on cognitive cues - arguing that external actors can also facilitate the process of cognitive liberation or that even individual members of the public can do this themselves - these authors have not fundamentally changed McAdam's theory.86 The idea that cognitive cues partly cause cognitive liberation has been pointed out by others too. Jasper & Poulson have shown that what they refer to as "moral shocks" can cause people to join protest movements, in their case animal rights groups and anti-nuclear protestors.87 They also show that the single event of Roe vs. Wade (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court decision which stated that abortion was not in violation of the American constitution, caused larger numbers than usual to join the anti-abortion movement.88 Similarly, Wiktorowicz has argued that crises such as alienation, discrimination or even the death of a

"* For references to theoretical literature on this concept, see chapter 4. "James M.Jasper &Jane D. Poulson, "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests", Social Problems, vol. 42, no. 4,1995, pp. 493-512. ™ Ibid., p. 498.

213 family member can cause "cognitive openings", i.e. a state of mind in which one becomes open and susceptible to new ideas.69 Such cognitive openings, in the case of religious people (and perhaps also in the case of others), can lead to what Wiktorowicz refers to as "religious seeking", which is most likely when "an individual's religious views and/or established religious institutions seem inadequate in addressing concerns".90 Of course, as Wiktorowicz points out, many find their answers to pressing questions triggered by crises in previously held beliefs or at least within the mainstream of religious ideas. Others, however, go beyond these since they find the answers already available wanting.91 Religious seekers will start taking action of whatever kind once their cognitive openings are filled with ideas that they are receptive to and that call for this. As such, social movements, other external actors or the individuals themselves play a role in capitalising on religious seekers' cognitive openings, similar to what McAdam and other scholars have shown.92 If we compare the above to al-Maqdisi's arrival in Jordan and his influence there in the early 1990s, we can see some very clear parallels. There were indeed several crises going on in Jordan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as we have seen, which can all be seen as cognitive cues that shocked and contradicted existing beliefs. The IMF-inspired economic measures that led to protests, the failed démocratisation, the inability of Arab and Muslim states to stop the U.S.-led coalition from attacking the Iraqi army after its occupation of Kuwait, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and, finally, the peace treaty with Israel all constituted crises on their own and all the more so when taken together. As we have seen, these did indeed lead to the search for new and more radical answers among various Jordanians, particularly those who had returned from fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, only to find that they were not really welcome anymore. What is also clear is that these "religious seekers" did not find their answers in mainstream Jordanian religious discourse. They did not join the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the accepted Islamist opposition movement, and their views of the IAF will not have improved after that party failed to stop the peace agreement with Israel. If we try to assess al-Maqdisi's role in this situation, we can see that he was instrumental in translating the cognitive openings caused by the various crises in Jordan -

" Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical /slam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, pp. 5,20. "/bid.,p. 21. "/bid., p. 86. 92 /bid., pp. 85-87. Wiktorowicz also describes the possibility that social movements themselves are responsible for creating the cognitive openings ("facilitated cognitive opemngs") but these are less important here. See ibid., pp. 92-98.

214 which acted as cognitive cues - into action, which in his case was a radical da'wa across the country. By providing guidance to these religious seekers, he gave them answers to the questions that had arisen. Al-Maqdisi can therefore be seen as responsible for capitalising on the cognitive openings among some of Jordan's radical Islamists in the early 1990s. It is important to understand, however, that while these religious seekers lacked a clear ideology and religious agenda of their own, they were not apathetic actors waiting for someone to come and fill their heads with an idea they could not think of themselves. In this respect, it needs to be emphasised that several of these radical youngsters had already taken the initiative to establish various groups and some had even taken action by attacking "sinful" places in cities such as al-Zarqa". Although together these hardly constituted a coherent and organised plan based on a comprehensive ideology, it does show that al- Maqdisi was only partly responsible for turning cognitive openings into cognitive liberation and contentious action. Similarly, after the murder of dozens of Palestinians in Hebron - itself perhaps a "moral shock" causing a cognitive opening - several "members" of the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin decided to take action independent of al-Maqdisi's ideological input. Nevertheless, al-Maqdisi's influence was certainly important. He provided the religious seekers with a comprehensive ideology that fitted the times and the context in which they found themselves and gave them a sense of direction that they had clearly lacked before he came.

"Filling the Gap"

Cognitive liberation and its related concepts on the framing of ideas and the capitalisation on others' search for them thus suggests that al-Maqdisi played an important role in the radicalisation of a loose group of youngsters known as the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin. Although this seems likely on the basis of the information already given in this chapter, I have also tried to find out whether this suggestion is confirmed by the people involved at the time. Many interviewees did indeed state that al-Maqdisi was the person responsible for leading a disparate group of radicalising youngsters into a clearly Jihadi-Salafi direction, albeit one with quietist overtones through its stress on the manhaj of da'wa. Several former fellow-prisoners of al-Maqdisi, for example, pointed out that some people in Jordan in the early 1990s were looking for a radical alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood and the entire Jordanian system and found this in al-Maqdisi and his

215 teachings." Similarly, several Jordanian journalists intimately familiar with radical Islam in Jordan also believed this to be the case.94 Finally, this view was likewise expressed by Jordanians who held extremist ideas at the time and were closely involved with radical groups themselves but have now rejected this ideology.95 Al-Maqdisi, one former radical and prominent Jordanian journalist told me, "filled the gap" left by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had clearly been discarded by the youngsters that later followed al- Maqdisi. As such, he came at exactly the right time to capitalise on their search for something entirely different.96 This chapter has shown that al-Maqdisi's frame of anti-regime ideas expressed in religious terms found a willing audience in the radicalising youngsters searching for alternative answers to their questions in Jordan in the early 1990s. His clearly-expressed and coherent ideas provided an ideological basis to their shared grievances. We have also seen, however, that it was not their specific preference for the details of his ideology but rather their much more general search for radical Islamic ideas that caused them to accept al-Maqdisi's quietisi Jihadi-Salafism, expressed here in his stress on a quietist way of dealing with society through da'wa. Despite the fact that many of them had fought in Afghanistan and were therefore probably more inclined to favour a Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of fighting the Jordanian regime, they accepted al-Maqdisi's way, most probably because al-Maqdisi's ideas and methods were the best thing on offer at that moment. This suggests that once the situation changed and ideas and methods became clearer, some of these youngsters would start contesting al-Maqdisi's approach. This is indeed precisely what happened, as we will see in the final chapter.

91 Interviews with Abü Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, 'Abdallah Abu Rummân, Amman, 15 January 2009, Rababa, Amman, 12 January 2009. 91 Interviews with Marwân Shahäda, Amman, 13 January 2009, Usäma Shahäda, Amman, 12 January 2009. 95 Interviews with Abu Hamyy a, Amman, 13 January 2009, Muhammad Abu Rummân, Amman, 11 August 2008 Abu Haniyya himself was the leader of a group called Jam'iyyat al-Kitäb wa-1-Sunna. Although he describes himself as a former Jihâdï-Salafï, the group was officially registered and therefore unlikely to have had an overtly radical agenda. See Dabbas, "Islamic", in Schwedler (ed.), Isìamic, pp. 239 240. % Interview with Muhammad Abu Rummân, Amman, 11 August 2008.

216 Chapter 9: The leader of the Jordanian jihaHi-Salafi Community?

Throughout this study, we have seen that al-Maqdisi's adherence to his own combination of a quietisi and a Jihadi creed Çaqïda) and method (manhaj) was instrumental in explaining why he had an impact in certain political contexts and also why he did not in other situations. This final chapter focuses on Jordan in the period 1994-2009, when al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of theoretical support for jihad against Muslim rulers but a strong preference for missionary activities (da'wa) against them not only became clear among radical Jordanians but also split them in more or less two groups with regard to this position. While several factors contributed to these divergent views of al-Maqdisi, I argue that his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj is the overarching concept through which these factors should be explained and which accounts for the fact that al-Maqdisi is a major figure among Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan but not their undisputed leader. We will start by looking at al-Maqdisi's experiences in prison from 1994-1999 and the period afterwards, during which his position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi became clear, causing differences of opinion to emerge and eventually to become expressed in severe criticism of al-Maqdisi. We then move on to al-Maqdisi's numerous writings from the period 1994-2009, during which he specifically set out his ideas on his ideological enemies, including the Jordanian state and certain quietist Salafis on the one hand and "extremist" Jihadi-Salafis on the other. Finally, we will look at how al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi framing of his enemies amidst the growing tensions in the Jordanian radical Islamist community accounts for both his influence as well as his lack thereof.

The Prison Experience and Beyond

The failed attempt by some followers of al-Maqdisi to take revenge on Israel for the murder of dozens of Palestinians in 1994 by an Israeli settler was the direct cause for the group's arrest and incarceration. Their imprisonment does not seem to have dealt a blow to their Islamist ideals, however. One might expect some "members" of the group to blame the perpetrators of the attack on Israel for getting caught, leading to the imprisonment of the whole group and perhaps causing some to become disillusioned with their radical ideas altogether, but this does not appear to have happened. Instead, the prison experience not only confirmed their views of the Jordanian regime as an "un-Islamic" system but also

217 further radicalised them in ways that went beyond the quietist Jihadi-Salafi ideas and manhaj that al-Maqdisi preferred.

Growing Rifts

It seems that the Jama'at al-Muwahhidin more or less continued its da'wa activities inside prison as if nothing had changed but their new environment was obviously entirely different. The closed and confined space of prison limited their da'wa to a smaller group of people and, importantly, intensified the contacts between the "members" of the group itself. This enabled their ideas to take their definite shapes and thus eventually brought differences to the surface among al-Maqdisi's followers that had remained hidden during the pre-prison period, when they were still searching for a clear ideology and believed they were provided with one in al-Maqdisi's teachings.1 Initially, however, the group still seems to have been led by al-Maqdisi's ideas. This is shown, for example, in the sermons held by 'Abd al-Hadi Daghlas2, one of al-Maqdisi's followers who had also been one of the people behind the failed attack on Israel in 1994. His message in these prison sermons from the same year seems to have been inspired by al-Maqdisi, with its generally radical tone, its emphasis on tawhfd3 and its attention for "un-Islamic" legislation4 clearly bearing the marks of Jama'at al-Muwahhidin's spiritual leader. The message preached by al-Maqdisi and his followers was clearly not accepted by all other prisoners, who included adherents to and members of various Islamist trends and groups, such as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, as well as ordinary criminals. Secular or more nationalist-oriented prisoners are said to have been much less influenced by al-Maqdisi's message5 and one such inmate even wrote and published an article while he was still in prison that pointed out how radicals like al-Maqdisi would tear society apart6. The Islamist prisoners, particularly if they belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb al-Tahrir, may have had more fixed and less Salafi ideas than al-Maqdisi and also did not always agree with

1 Muhammad Abu Rummân & Hasan Abü Haniyya, "Al-Saiaftyya al-Jihädiyyaßl-Urdunn bada Maqtal al-Zarqäwi: Muqärabat al-Huwiyya, Azmat al-Qiyäda wa-Dabâbiyyat al-Ru'ya, Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009, pp. 23- 24; interview with Hasan Abu Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009. 2 'Abd al-Hâdï Daghlas, Majmü'a mm Khutab al-Alài al-Mujähid 'Abd al-HâdîDaghlas - Abu 'Ubayda Rahmahu lläh, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 16 December 2009), 2009. 3 Ibid., pp. 7,19. 11bid., pp. 7-8,19,34. 5 Interviews with Fuad Husayn, Amman, 5 August 2008; Yûsuf Rabâba, Amman, 12January 2009. 6 Interview with 'Ikrima Gharâyba, Amman, 15 January 2009.

218 his message. In fact, sometimes fierce conflicts are said to have raged, occasionally even leading to excommunication (takfir) of others7 In this context of confinement and confrontation with both other Islamists and, of course, the prison authorities' often harsh treatment, al-Maqdisi and his group nevertheless managed to recruit dozens of new adherents to their ideas, mostly among ordinary criminals, through their dawa activities.8 Al-Maqdisi claims to have used every opportunity in prison to practise da'wa with youngsters, who read his books and listened to him speak. He even referred to his time behind bars as "blessed days" (ayyäm mubäraka) because of the many books he wrote and the chances he got to tell (apparently susceptible) people about his views.' In fact, al-Maqdisi seems to have gone quite far in talking about his ideas to others. One journalist who interviewed al-Maqdisi in prison, for example, states that the latter insisted on the guards remaining in the room during their conversation so that they could benefit from his da'wa.10 Al-Maqdisi's da'wa was not just continued inside prison but also went on in the rest of Jordan. The group that had originally been arrested with al-Maqdisi was split up and moved to other prisons several times during their incarceration, possibly because the authorities wanted to stop their successful recruitment of others for their radical cause. At first, however, visiting rules for the prisoners, including the political ones, were fairly lax. This allowed al-Maqdisi and like-minded fellow-prisoners, to whom he would dictate some of his writings, to smuggle out his books and treatises11, sometimes page by page, via family members or even co-operative guards12 Once outside, al-Maqdisi's writings were photocopied and spread around the country.13 What all of the above entails is that even inside prison, da'wa was initially very important among the "members" of the Jama at al-Muwahhidin and al-Maqdisi was the one who led it. His leadership did not last very long, however, since after a while, al-Zarqawi is said to have become the new leader of the group. Three reasons can be given for this. Firstly, there was an important difference between the two men regarding personality.

7 A! Sharq al Av/sat, 8 March 2004 β International Crisis Group Jordan's 9/11 Dealing with Jihadi Islamism, ICG Middle East Report no 47, Amman & Brussels, 23 November 2005, ρ 9 9 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al Zarqawî Amai wa Alâm (Munâsara wa Munâsaha), www tawhed ws (accessed 24 August 2006), 2004, pp 2 3 10Jamal Khâshuqjï & Yäsir Abu Hilâla, "Al Manzar al Fikrï h Munaffidhï nfijâr al-Riyâd Al Unf Farîda, al Dünüqrätiyya Shirk'", Al-Wasat, no 235, 29 July - 4 August 1996, ρ 11 11 Interview with Abu Hamyya, Amman, 9 August 2008 12 Interviews with Abu Hamyya, Amman, 9 August 2008, Abu Muhammad al MaqdisI, Amman, 13 January 2009 Mary Anne Weaver, "Inventing al-Zarqawi', The Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2006, ρ 94 11 Interviews with al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009, Marwân Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009

219 Whereas al-Zarqawi was known for his toughness, leadership abilities and his strict discipline inside prison, al-Maqdisi had a more scholarly, much friendlier and less confrontational personality.14 Secondly, as time went by, ideological differences started to appear between al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi. While the latter became more and more interested in direct confrontation of the "enemies of Islam", preferably abroad, al-Maqdisi maintained that da'wa was the correct approach at that time and that it should concentrate on Jordan.15 One clear supporter of al-Zarqawi's approach told me that al-Maqdisi was a real Wahhabi who was always concerned about tawhrd and shar'i (Islamic legal) issues while al- Zarqawi wanted to fight.16 While this is an exaggeration of the difference between the two men - al-Maqdisi also supported various types of jihad in principle and al-Zarqawi did not simply ignore doctrinal issues altogether - it does point to an important source of conflict between them. Thirdly, and strongly related to the choice between armed action and a less confrontational approach, there was the issue of experience in jihad and the authority derived from this. As we have seen in chapter 1, al-Maqdisi did spend time in Afghanistan and Pakistan but only to teach, not to fight, unlike al-Zarqawi, who did participate in fighting there. As time went by, the issue of jihadi credentials expressed by fighting experience in Afghanistan became more and more important among the radical inmates.17 It seems obvious that in the context of a prison in which inmates are often treated badly and many prisoners have radical Islamist backgrounds and even experience in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi was more attractive as a leader than al- Maqdisi. The former's tougher personality, his preference for a confrontational and violent approach and his actual experience in fighting made him the likely candidate for such a task. Although the choice of al-Zarqawi as the new leader of the group did not necessarily entail a complete rejection of al-Maqdisi and his ideas, the change in leadership did reflect a growing unease with al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of a radical da'wa against Muslim regimes in favour of a more purely Jihadi-Salafi method of fighting only.

" Abu Rummân & Abü Haniyya, "Al-Salafiyya", pp. 23,45-47; Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face ofAl- Qaeda, New York: Other Press, 2005, pp. 44-51; Fu ad Husayn, Al-Zarqäm: Al-ßl al-ThäniU-l-Qä'ida, Beirut: Dar al- Khayyâl, 2005, pp. 14-17; Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005, pp. 66-76; Weaver, "Inventing", pp. 93-94. This should not be interpreted as meaning that al-Maqdisî was a weakling. His ability to withstand torture and his willingness to practise da'wa to guards and his superiors in prison belies such an interpretation. 15 Abu Rummân & Abü Haniyya, "Al-Salafìyya", pp. 25-26; interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, an Islamist who wished to remain anonymous, Amman, 10 January 2009. 16 Interview with an Islamist who wished to remain anonymous, Amman, 10 January 2009. 17 Interview with 'Abdallah Abu Rummân, Amman, 15 January 2009. See also Joas Wagemakers, "Invoking Zarqawi: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihad Deficit", CTC Sentinel, vol. 2, no. 6, 2009, pp. 14-17; id., "Protecting Jihad in the 21st Century: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices", in: Anisseh van Engeland & Ahmed Dawoody (eds.), Jihad in the 21" Century (forthcoming).

220 Considering this growing divergence in preferred methods, it is not surprising that when the group was released as part of a royal amnesty on the occasion of King Husayn's death in 1999, al-Zarqawi and many others went to Afghanistan and other countries to train and wage jihad there.18 It is clear that there were push-factors causing radicals to go abroad. Like other Arab countries such as Egypt and Algeria, Jordan had cracked down on radical Islamists in the 1990s and kept a close eye on them. Staying in Jordan was therefore bound to be difficult and could easily lead to renewed imprisonment." In fact, al-Maqdisi discussed this issue with 'Abd al-Hadi Daghlas, who also went to Afghanistan, and when he told him that going there would weaken the da'wa in Jordan, the latter asked al-Maqdisi how he could possibly stay amidst the increasing scrutiny, searches and investigations he and his family were under.20 At the same time, however, the global jihad preached by al-Qa'ida since the late 1990s may well have acted as a pull-factor for jihadis seeking action21, which only increased once America launched its "war on terrorism" after "9/11" and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively.22 Al-Zarqawi's and others' move to Afghanistan to wage a jihad there thus went against the wishes of al-Maqdisi, who felt they needed to focus on da'wa in Jordan.23 This was not so much a rejection of al-Maqdisi personally as it was a dismissal of his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manho;. Although it is quite possible that al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi were still on good terms when they were in prison together, both of them later became symbols of their respective methods of radical da'wa in Jordan and jihad abroad, leading to an increasingly vocal dismissal of al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj among some.

Quietism Haunts af-Maqdisi

Although al-Maqdisi continued his da'wa activities after leaving prison in 1999, it should once again be pointed out that his methodological differences with al-Zarqawi and others did not mean he was against jihad. He has long preached in favour of jihad against the Muslim world's own regimes, has praised - as we saw in chapter 2 - the terrorists directly involved in "9/11" and has spoken highly of some of his former cellmates who had gone to

18 Brisard, Zarqawi, pp. 55-60. 19 Ibid., p. 59; interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008, Muhammad Abu Rummän, Amman, 11 August 2008, 'Urayb al-Rantâwî, Amman, 12 August 2008. 20 Daghlas, Majmua, p. 2. Al-Maqdisî wrote the introduction to this collection of sermons by Daghlas. 21 Interview with Muhammad Abu Rummän, Amman, 11 August 2008. 22 International Crisis Group Jordan's, p. 11. " Al-MaqdisT, Al-ZarqâwT, p. 4.

221 wage jihad in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.24 Al-Maqdisi did not oppose his cellmates' wishes to go abroad and wage jihad for ideological or doctrinal reasons but simply because he felt the time was not right for that and the emphasis should be on da'wa at this stage to educate people. As such, al-Maqdisi continued his missionary work in a situation that was characterised by increasing violence in Jordan, particularly after "9/11", and he was even rearrested and - though acquitted - imprisoned once again in 2002." Once in prison, al-Maqdisi produced several important writings, which will be discussed below. He did not really get much media attention again, however, until he was released in late June 2005, when he gave several interviews in which he criticised al- Zarqawi's actions in Iraq. The latter had become the leader of al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers (Iraq) during this period and was widely considered responsible for killing many Iraqi civilians - including Shiites - as well as beheading the American Nicolas Berg.26 Al- Maqdisi's criticism of his former pupil included the charges that al-Zarqawi wrongly considered certain (Muslim) civilians to be kuffar (infidels) who may be targeted and also that he used methods that damaged the image of Islam.27 These rebukes of al-Zarqawi caused some Jordanian radicals to become (more) critical of al-Maqdisi for what they saw as his insults to a brave mujähid. While al-Maqdisi's criticism of al-Zarqawi and the latter's response29 have been dealt with extensively29, what is less apparent from existing publications is that al-Maqdisi's critique - though strongly related to the issue of takßr- was

21 See for instance Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Mujä/iidän αί-Batalân; a!-Sarhân wa-Ra/ììjuhu l-Suwaynkf, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 Apnl 2007), n.d.; id., JTDhikrâ Maqtal Ikhwänmä l-Mujâhidïn al-Arba'a fi Kurdistan, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 Apnl 2007), 2002; id., Aì-Akh al-Mujâhid al-Batal: Jamal Rif at Râghib, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 Apnl 2007), 2004; id., Kawkabat al-Abtäl, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 Apnl 2007), 2004; id., Abu Anas al-Shami: Bafa! Qactó Nahbaha tahta Lrwa al-Tawhrd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 Apnl 2007), 2004. 25 Abu Rummln & Abu Haniyya, "Al-Sala/îyya", pp. 27-29. 26 "'Zarqawi' beheaded U.S. man in Iraq", http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/3712421.stm (accessed 20 January 2010), 13 May 2004. 27 Al-'Arab al-Yawm, 5 July 2005; Al-Ghad, 5 July 2005; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi Al-Saiaflyya al-Jihädyya, www.aljazeera.net (accessedjune 2007), 6 July 2005. 28 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqâwî, Boyôn wa-TawdiJi li-mä Athârahu l-Shaykh a/-Ma

222 ultimately rooted in the belief that his former cellmates should not have gone abroad to wage jihad in the first place. What spurred his critique of his former pupil was therefore not just the latter's attacks against certain people but also al-Zarqawi's use of jihad at a time when al-Maqdisi considered da'wa the most appropriate manhaj. Although these are - strictly speaking - two different issues, al-Maqdisi's critics later conflated them more and more, possibly because they felt that criticising al-Maqdisi's unwillingness to wage jihad himself was a more effective line of attack. In other words, when al-Maqdisi criticised "extremism in takfir" (ghulüw fi l-takfir, i.e. excommunicating more Muslims than he and like-minded scholars consider justified)30 it was often interpreted by his critics in light of his earlier preference for da'wa over jihad and, as such, as a stab in the back of mujähidün in general and al-Zarqawi in particular. The interviews in which al-Maqdisi criticised al-Zarqawi led to his renewed imprisonment, only a week after his release31, and the beginning of a long period of quiet. It seems that he did not release a single text for almost three years. In the meantime, the war in Iraq went on with ever-increasing numbers of people getting killed and wounded. One of those was al-Zarqawi, who was killed in an American attack in 2006. The admiration al- Zarqawi had come to enjoy among his cellmates during his time in prison because of his strength, his confrontational nature and his willingness to fight had presumably grown during his leadership of al-Qa'ida in Iraq and became even greater once he died as a "martyr".32 As mentioned, after al-Maqdisi's criticism of al-Zarqawi a growing number of Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan came to resent the fact that the former had not only refrained from joining the jihad after his release in order to continue his da'wa but had also criticised a man who did take up arms to fight for the cause of Islam. The anger towards al-Maqdisi over this issue, combined with their conflation of his criticism of "extreme takfîns" with his dim view of a wholly jihadi manhaj, apparently remained below the surface while he was imprisoned but erupted with a vengeance after he was released in 2008. In the autumn of 2008, when al-Maqdisi had been out of prison for some months, it appeared that several treatises were circulating among Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis that were

30 The term "extremism in takfir" is equated by al-Maqdisi and others with going beyond the excommunication of the rulers of Muslim countries and those who directly support their regime and extending tak/ir to apply to others too. Quietisi Salafis consider the type of tallir as applied by al-Maqdisî extreme in itself. " As mentioned in chapter 1, the official reason for al-Maqdisi's re-arrest was his contacting of the media, which had been expressly forbidden beforehand, as well as the supposed contacting of terrorists during his period of release. 12 A search on YouTube for "al-Zarqäwr in Arabic, for instance, will immediately yield numerous eulogising clips in which not only his supposedly heroic fight in Iraq but also his alleged "martyrdom" is stressed.

223 critical of him. The direct reason for these writings seems to have been the release of a book by Nur ai-Din Bayram, a student of al-Maqdisi's, in August 2008. In this book, Bayram warns against extremism in takfir among some Jihadi-Salafis and claims that one should stay away from them and reject their teachings.33 Although Bayram states that these people do not apply tak/ir to Muslims who are only guilty of non-hifr sins, as the early-Islamic extremist Khawârij did, he nevertheless feels justified in labelling them as such because they do apply excommunication more easily than Salafìs are supposed to.34 It seems that the authors of the critical pamphlets about al-Maqdisi interpret Bayram's criticism as meant for them and, since al-Maqdisi wrote the introduction to his book, start deriding both men. Interestingly, while Bayram's critique refers only to "extremism in takfir", the writings rebutting this charge focus also on his supposed opposition to jihad and its proponents and, because of this, use al-Zarqawi as a symbol to make their case. One of these treatises states that

[Bayram] is one of those who went to wagejihad in Iraq during the life of shaykh Abu Mus'ab [al-Zarqawi], may God accept him, stayed in Iraq for six months and went back to Jordan the way he came (i e., without fighting there). He has [nevertheless] described the mujähidün as ignorant and as ones who excommunicate people, shed forbidden blood and take people's possessions [...].35

Another author sarcastically refers to Bayram as "the hero Nur" and chides him for supposedly fleeing from the jihad in Iraq, which the writer describes as a sin in itself, and for treating the ones who did fight as extremists.36 Despite this criticism of Nur ai-Din Bayram, it is clear from the authors' critique that they view his negative description of certain Jihadi-Salafis as part of what al-Maqdisi expressed before about al-Zarqawi. Their documents show that it is really al-Maqdisi's da'wa at the expense of jihad that irritates them. One author blames him for focussing on missionary activities and states that when al-Maqdisi is asked aboutjihad, "he says it is not allowed because of the absence of a caliphate and that there is no profit in emigrating [to wagejihad] in such circumstances [...]."37 In what should probably be interpreted as a sign of

33 Nur al Din Bayram, Fasi ai MaqàlpHajar AH aì-Bida wa-i Dalai, www tawhed ws (accessed 3 March 2010), 2008 "ibid.p 19 35 Abu 1 Qa qâ al Shamì, Kalimat Itâb, η ρ , 2008, ρ 2 I would like to thank Hasan Abu Haniyya for providing me with this document 36 Al Yamân Abd al Karïm b Tsâ al Madam, Al-ljtihâd fîHiikm al Forar mm Sähät al Jihäd, www almedad com/vb (accessed 21 April 2009), 2008 37 Al Shâmï, Kaiimat, ρ 3

224 disdain for those advocating da'wa over jihad, the author advises al-Maqdisi to realise that the mujähidün "are the ones who write knowledge with their blood (bi-dimä'ihim) and not with their pens (bi-aqlämihim) [...]".38 Another critic states that he remembers al-Maqdisi's critique of al-Zarqawi "and then he went on to bless and write the introduction to articles of a person we all know" (i.e. Bayram), whom the author accuses of fleeing from jihad "under false pretences and lies" (bi-da'wô wa-akâdhîb bâtiîa).3' One author even mocks the claim that he and like-minded Jihadi-Salafis are Khawârij (seceders) by telling al-Maqdisi:

Yes, we have seceded (Icharqjnä) from your rotten ideas (afkârika al-'afim) [...]. We have seceded from your deceit (kidhbika) over [al-Zarqawi,] the leader of the martyrdom-seekers (amïr al-istishhâdiyyïn) [...].*"

The criticism levelled at al-Maqdisi continued into 2009, when one al-Mihdar claimed al-Maqdisi had posted a document on his website without giving credit to its author. Although al-Maqdisi quickly rebutted the accusation41, this relatively minor issue caused the criticism of his preference for da'wa over jihad at this stage to continue on radical internet forums. Once again, the accusations used against al-Maqdisi regularly focussed on his practical opposition to jihad, often invoking al-Zarqawi in doing so. Although many participants on radical internet forums, particularly Midad al-Suyuf"2, engaged in criticising al-Maqdisi for his supposed disrespect for jihad and miyähidün", none did so more than al-Zarqawi's brother-in-law Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami, who clearly romanticised the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, at which time he was a reporter there.4'1 He states that al-Maqdisi "represented the da'wa trend" while al-Zarqawi "represented the trend of jihad and its jurisprudence".45 "Al-Zarqawi differed from al-Maqdisi", Abu Qudama

18 ibid., p. 7. 19 Abu 1-Qäsim al-Muhäjir, Al-MaqdisIYataqaddamu h-l-Warâ, www.muslm.net/vb/archive/index.php/t- 315439 html (accessed 20 April 2009), n.d. 10 Abu 1-Qa'qâ' al-Shâmï, Να'am Kharajnâ, www.al-amanh.net/ vb/showthread.php?p=7086 (accessed 21 April 2009), 2008. " Abu Muhammad al-MaqdisT, Radd al-Shaykh al-Maqdisi 'ala Su alat Muntadâ Midâd al-Suyüf, www.tawhed ws (accessed 10 February 2009), 2009. " This forum (www.almedad.com/vb) has gradually developed into a platform for criticism of al-Maqdisi, although it was not always like this For more on the forum's position towards al-Maqdisi, see Joas Wagemakers, Midad al-Suyuf and al-Maqdisi: Sworn Enemies7, www.jihadica com/midad-al-suyuf-and-al maqdisi- sworn-enemies/ (accessed 16 April 2010), 2010 •" For a more extensive overview of this criticism, see Wagemakers, "Invoking", pp. 15-16; id., "Protecting". " See for instance, Abu Qudâma Sâlih al-Hâml, Fursän al-Farfda al-Ghä'iba. Al-Zarqawïwa-l-Jihâd ai-Afghân [sic], n.p, 2007, pp. 3-7. This document has no page numbers so I inserted them myself I would like to thank Will McCants for providing me with this document " ibid., p. 203.

225 writes, "in the concept (ai-tosawwur), the method (ai-manhaj) and his vision and connection with life and the reality towards jihad [...]. Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi each had their own manhaj and concept towards jihad."46 Considering his strong admiration for al-Zarqawi, who had become the antithesis of al-Maqdisi in the minds of some, he states about the latter that "with regard to jihad and fighting, I do not praise him. Practically, he is no different from the rest of the callers to Islam (du at) of our Muslim community [...]. The jihad of shaykh al- Maqdisi is the jihad of da'wa, not the jihad of fighting'"17, only to add that it would have been better for him to have fought than to concentrate on writing Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya in Afghanistan/Pakistan, which he claims people had no need for anyway.4' Some of the things Abu Qudama claims about al-Maqdisi are clearly not true, such as when he denies that al-Maqdisi has had any influence on al-Zarqawi49 or when he states that he was an adherent to the ideas of the Egyptian extremist group al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra but later recanted these beliefs50. The distinction Abu Qudama makes between al-Maqdisi's and al-Zarqawi's manhaj is a correct one, however, and it is therefore not surprising that some Jihadi-Salafis were not deterred when several scholars and activists51 defended al-Maqdisi. When one of these, the Saudi-British radical activist Muhammad al-Mas'ari, tried to stand up for him, citing a hadith stating that the best jihad is speaking a word of truth to a tyrannical leader and claiming that al-Maqdisi has been a steadfast proponent of such a jihad52, he was quickly refuted. One Sina' stated on a radical internet forum that jihad was really all about fighting and that al-Maqdisi had never participated in that, claiming that "he has not thrown so much as a stone at the Zionistsl!"53

46 id., Al-Zarqawi Al-Jü al-Thämh-l-Qä'ida - Diräsa Manhajiyya wa-Naqdiyya, n.p., n.d., p. 48. This document does not have page numbers so I inserted them myself. "ibid., pp. 167-168. 18 Ibid., p. 170. " id., Waqfât ma'a Thamarät al-Jihäd: Diräsa Manhajiyya wa-Naqdiyya, www.muslm.net/vb/showtliread.php?t=335818 (accessed 16 April 2009), 2009, p. 7. "ibid., p. 93. sl Abu Humâm Bakr b. 'Abd al-'Azîz al-Athari, Al-Sayfal-MuhannadpMunäfarat Shaykhmâ Abï Muhammad, www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=286633 (accessed 23 March 2010, only as an html-document), 2008; id., Al-Qowf ai-Narjisf bi-'Adälat Shaykhmâ l-Maqdisï, www.ansar-jihad.net (accessed 24 April 2009), 2009; Hânl al- Sibâî, Boyän Marltaz al-Maqrizf bi-Sha'n al-Mihdâr, www.almaqreze.net/bayanat/arcl068.html (accessed 2 February 2009), 2009; Abu Basir al-Tartüsï, Al-Tafnq bayna 1-Tanôsuh wa-l-Tarâju', www.abubaseer.bizland.com/articles.htm (accessed 26 January 2009), 2009 Al-Maqdisi later thanked al-Sibâl for defending him. See Al-Rasä'i! al-Mutabadala bayna I-Shaylch AbrMuhammad al-MaqdisFwa-l-Duictur Hâmal-Sibaî Hafizahu Höh, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 January 2010), 2009. 52 Muhammad b. 'Abdallah al-Mas'arî, Boyän min Abu [sic] Mâ;id Muhammad b 'Abdallah al-Mas'an, "Al-Siyâsa al- Shar'iyya" section, Shabakat Midâd al-Suyûf, www.almedad.com/vb/forumdisplay.php?2 (accessed March 2009), 26 February 2009 " Sina', Risala Ma^ûha ilâ Fadilat al-Duktûr AbiMâ/id al-Mas'arî mm Ibnatikum al-Mulchallasa Sina, "Al-Siyâsa al- Shar'iyya" section, Shabakat Midâd al-Suyûf, post no 1, www.almedad.com/vb/forumdisplay.php72 (accessed 25 January 2010), 26 February 2009.

226 Thus, al-Maqdisi's strong preference for his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of expressing his radical ideas through da'wa eventually not only caused some Jordanians to flock to al-Zarqawi but, after his criticism of the latter, also became something that certain people held against him. This meant that al-Maqdisi's quietist tinge - particularly as expressed in his critique of al-Zarqawi - eventually came to haunt him, leading to great enmity among some of Jordan's Jihadi-Salafi community. Indispensable for getting a full view of the situation of al-Maqdisi's influence, however, is his large number of writings throughout the period of 1994-2009.

Framing Jordanian Opponents

Al-Maqdisi's preference for radical da'wa at the expense of a manhaj of waging jihad only can clearly be discerned in his writings in the period 1994-2009, which show that he remained as radical as he had always been but also that he became more concerned about the excesses of unbridled takfir and jihad. Similarly, al-Maqdisi's writings also show that his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj became ever more contested, expressed in his increasingly defensive treatises against his fellow-Jordanian detractors. All these different trends are reflected in the change in general focus of his writings, moving from a sharp critique against the Jordanian state and certain quietist Salafis more or less in the period 1994-1999 to increasingly frequent rebukes of "extremism in takfir" after that period.54

The State and its Salafì Supporters

As we saw in chapter 8, one of the aspects that al-Maqdisi's da'wa focussed on after he arrived in Jordan was providing a topical and practically relevant political application of his general beliefs. This was expressed in his book on democracy before the Jordanian parliamentary elections in 1993 and this trend continued after he was imprisoned in 1994. A year after his incarceration, for example, al-Maqdisi wrote a treatise in which he presented a shortened version of his book Mil/at Ibrahim (1984).55 His message in this text is similar to the one in the original version of the book - stressing the need for disavowal (bara) of idols

M This does not entail that al-Maqdisi wrote nothing critical about the Jordanian state and its supporters anymore after 1999, nor does it mean that he only started criticising "extremists in takßr" after that year, as we will see later on, but there is clearly a general trend that can be discerned. M Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Hidâyat aì-Halìm ila Ahamm al-Muhmmät fiMülat Ibrahim, www.tawhed ws (accessed 21 April 2010), 1995.

227 (which include "legislation, laws and constitutions"56) as "the most important mark of [the messengers'] da'wa"57 - but his writing is more specific with regard to certain issues. He pays more attention, for instance, to why it is forbidden to help the authorities who base their rule on "man-made laws" and goes into greater detail than in the original book to explain to what extent Muslims should disavow government jobs and what the judgment is over those who work for the regime.58 Although this treatise does not offer insights that al- Maqdisi has not explained elsewhere before, it does give a more concrete application of his ideas on these issues, making it more practically useful. Al-Maqdisi's practical application of more general ideas expressed before became even clearer in a summarised version of his book Kashf al-Niqab 'an Shari'at αί-Ghab, which deals with the issue of "un-Islamic" legislation and why this is a form of kufr, as we have seen. This time, he applies the shortened version of the book specifically to Jordan. While repeating his claim that modern-day laws in Muslim countries are comparable to the Mongol legislation (yäsiq) condemned by Ibn Taymiyya, he singles out "the Jordanian yäsiq of open unbelief (al-kufr aJ-bawàh) and clear polytheism (aJ-shirk ai-surâh)".59 The reason for this specific focus, al-Maqdisi explains, is

to ease [Millat Ibrahim's] understanding and its circulation among our tawhfd- upholding brothers (iJchwäm'nä l-muwahhidïn), that is in order to clarify the falsehood of these man-made laws (hädhihi l-qawänin al-wad'iyya) [...] for the callers to tawhfd (du at al-tawhfd).60

Al-Maqdisi goes on to state that, whereas he used his original book to discuss Kuwait's "man-made laws", he now wants to "show the stupidity (saßha) of [Jordan's] man-made constitution".6' He does this by giving a detailed treatment of the Jordanian constitution, criticising it for its articles prescribing supposedly un-Islamic taxes62, guaranteeing various types of freedom63 and equality64 al-Maqdisi considers incompatible with Islamic law as well

56 ibid., p. 6. "/bid., p. 3. "ibid., pp. 15-16. 59 Id., Mukhtosar "Kashf al-Niqäb 'an Shan at al-Ghäb": Al-Dustür al-Urdunnï, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2007), 1996, p. 3. "ibid. 61 ibid., p. 4. 62 /bid., pp. 6-7. " /bid., pp. 7-8,10-11. 61 /bid., pp. 9-10.

228 as the whole system of separation of powers it underpins65. His conclusion, not surprisingly, is no different from what he had said before about other Muslim regimes, whose rulers he accused of placing themselves besides God because of their "un-Islamic" legislation: he calls the Jordanian king an idol (täghüt) and condemns all those who actively uphold the king's regime legislatively, militarily or politically.66 Presumably because al-Maqdisi had settled down in Jordan permanently, he was now confronted with questions from youngsters that went deeper than the broad ideology he had described in his books. These questions touched on issues that al-Maqdisi had probably not encountered before since he had never become part of any society so much throughout his adult life. Thus, al-Maqdisi gave extensive advice to youngsters about issues such as co operation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan67, whether da'wa should entail anything more than just takßr of "infidels"68, the Islamic legal status of the Jordanian army and police65 and how to deal with imams in government-controlled mosques™. He also gave more detailed advice about elections when he was in prison. It was clear from his writings that he believed the regime and democracy to be expressions of kufr and shirk, but now al- Maqdisi dealt specifically with the question of people who run for parliament or vote in elections.71 Al-Maqdisi also gave advice to youngsters on what Islam teaches them about

6i/blii.,pp 12-18. 66 ibid., pp. 25-26. 67 Id., Husn al-Ri/mja pAjwibat Su'älät Suwäqa, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 3 July 2009), 1996, pp. 5 10. Al-Maqdisfs answer to questions about this is that youngsters need to find out the Muslim Brothers' position towards the regime and its laws and whether or not they are willing to listen to new ideas. If they are, youngsters should practise da'wa to them and encourage them to disavow their party. 68 /bid., pp. 14-15. Al-Maqdisî states that da'wa involves more than tatftr alone It has two pillars: faith in God and disbelief in idols. The latter requires avoiding, disavowing and indeed excommunicating them and their helpers but one should be careful not to go to extremes in using takfir. " Id., Al-Ishräqa fi Su'älät Suwäqa, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 26 June 2009), n.d Al-Maqdisi gives an extensive treatment of different kinds of soldiers and policemen He distinguishes volunteers from those who are compelled to go into the army. While he considers the army and police as institutions that are "infidel" at heart because they exist to defend the "infidel" regimes they serve, this does not necessarily apply to individual soldiers. If Muslims do not realise the gravity of their being soldiers or onlyjoin the army to avoid prosecution for refusal of military service, they may be excused for their sins but they should try to get out as quickly as possible. 70 Id., Husn, pp 46-49. Al-Maqdisî advises youngsters to go to other mosques, not to listen to imams that work in government-controlled mosques without rejecting their message but also to refrain from excommunicating them without clear proof of their unbelief. 71 Id, Huhn al-Mushärcaafil-Intikhäbat, www tawhed.ws (accessed 2 March 2010), 1997 Al-Maqdisî states that candidates are always ku^or since they consciously run for office knowing that they will be involved in "un- Islamic" legislation based on Jordan's "polytheistic" constitution. Muslims who vote for such candidates with the intention of allowing them to legislate such "un-Islamic" laws are also "infidels", al-Maqdisi writes, but he warns that the majonty of voters is unaware of the true nature of parliaments and believes they only provide services for the people Muslims who vote with this as a motive are not guilty of kufr, al-Maqdisi maintains.

229 what they should do when caught by the authorities, fleeing from them when summoned to surrender to the police" and on helping the authorities in their struggle against drugs.73 Although al-Maqdisi did not just pay detailed attention to framing the Jordanian state and its institutions as forms of kufr between 1994 and 19997\ it was the most important theme of his writings in this period. A second important subject he wrote about during this time was quietist Salafism in Jordan. As a movement that was doctrinally close to his own ideology but advocated staying away from political discourse entirely, quietist Salafism presented al-Maqdisi with a challenge. While it is not clear whether quietist Salafism draws its adherents from the same parts of society as Jihadi-Salafism75, it is certain that Jordanian quietist scholars have been engaged in an ideological struggle with more radical and violent forms of Islam for years. They have produced many books and articles that reject the mixing of Islam and politics, denounce tak/ir of the rulers of the Muslim world and often refer to Jihadi-Salafis as Takfirïs or Khawlrij.76 Moreover, quietist Salafi scholars enjoy strong financial support from Saudi Arabia, giving them a financial power that Jihadi-Salafis clearly lack.77 All of these factors make quietist Salafis a force to be reckoned with in the ideological battle for Jordanian religious seekers, forcing al-Maqdisi to deal with them. To counter the ideological challenge presented by quietist Salafi scholars - and particularly the label of Khawârij they apply to Jihadi-Salafis - al-Maqdisi started applying the term "neo-Murji'a" (Murjfat aJ-'asr) to his quietist opponents. As we saw in chapter 2, "Murji'a" is a name applied to a trend in early Islam that advocated postponement (ir;a', hence the name Murji'a) of judgement over a Muslim's sins. Even if a person was guilty of acts that could be classified as major unbelief (Icu/r akbar), the Murji'a would not apply ta/c/ir

72 Id, La Tahzun mna lläh maona, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 2007), 1994. He states that Muslims may fight against the authorities when arrested but that they should be careful to do this within the bounds of Islamic law and must realise that fighting is not always useful. Fleeing from the authorities is also allowed but, if caught, Muslims should remain steadfast and proclaim their beliefs openly and realise that God is going to help them. 71 la., Hultm al-Taämin ma'a Ansar a/-Tawâghrt li-Mu/iôrabat Tuyâr al-Mu Wiaddirät, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 October 2008), 2008 Al-Maqdisî rejects co-operation with the authorities to arrest drug dealers since they will not be tried and convicted according to Islamic law. Besides, al-Maqdisi writes, the authonties themselves are the biggest drug dealers 74 See, for instance, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-Tuh/a al-Maqdisryya /iMukhtasar TäriWi al-Najrämyya: Bidâyatuhâ wa-MuntaJiähä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 22 April 2010), 1997. 75 Interview with Fâris Brayzât, Amman, 6 August 2008 76 Examples of such publications include Musa b. 'Abdallah Ä1 'Abd al-'Aziz (ed ), Al-Magâlât αΙ-Μαπ/iajiyya fi "Hub al-Tahrir" wa-1-Jamâ at al-Takfinyya, Riyadh: Dar al-Buhüth wa-1-Dirâsât al-Mu'âsira wa-1-Tarâjim, 2006; Muhammad Nâsir al Din al-Albânî, Fimat al-Tallir, www.mahaja.com/library/books/book/l 16 (accessed 25 February 2010), 1992; 'Ali b. Hasan al-Halabï, Al-Tabsir bi-Qawa id al-Tatyìr, Cairo. Dar al-Manhaj, 2005; id (ed ), Al-ToJidhir mm Fitnat αί-Ghulüwfiì-Taiifir, BTr Nabälä, Palestine Sharikat al-Nür h-Tibä'a wa-1-Nashr wa-l-Tawzï", 2002 [1996]. 77 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism. Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power m Jordan, Albany, NY- State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 125-126

230 to that person but leave the decision to God. Al-Maqdisi claims that just like the original Murji'a used to postpone judgement regarding Muslims' sins, quietist Salafis today also refrain from applying tak/ir to the Muslim world's rulers, even if the latter are guilty of major unbelief through their systematic "un-Islamic" rule Al-Maqdisi had already written a book about this subject in a general way several years before he came to Jordan78 and even wrote a shortened version of this book when he was imprisoned, which he tried to spread among his cellmates79, but now started applying the term "neo-Murji'a" to several Jordanian scholars Specifically, he responded to a book written by the famous Jordanian quietist Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albam and collected, introduced and edited by his student 'All b. Hasan al-Halabi.80 Al-Maqdisi claims that this book attacks "the religion of the Muslims, the tawhid of the lord of all being81 and the da'wa of the prophets and messengers and describes its followers as Takfirïs and [claims] they follow the religion of the Khawârij"82. The reason for this, al-Maqdisi writes, is that these neo-Murji'a,

even though they disagree with the original Murji'a [ ], agree with them on many requirements [ .]. They clearly say that tak/ir is only allowed with conviction and rejection in one's heart (al-i'tiqäd wa-1-juhûd αΙ-qa/bi)·83

Applying takfìr only when it is accompanied by clear evidence that a Muslim has stopped believing in his or her heart practically means that very few people - let alone Muslim rulers - will be excommunicated since they would have to admit explicitly that they have stopped believing, which they will not do This entails, al-Maqdisi explains, that quietisi Salafi scholars such as al-Albani and al-Halabi, by setting unbelief in someone's heart as a condition for takßr, basically postpone judgement over Muslim rulers in a way that is very similar to what the original Murji'a did Al-Maqdisi spends much of the rest of his book rebutting al-Albam's and al-Halabi's claims and trying to show how the latter consistently

78 Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Imtâ al NazarftKashfShubhât Murji at al Asr, www tahwed ws (accessed 28 August 2009), 1999/2000 [l99l/l992] 79 ld, KashfShubhät ai Mujâdilm an Asâkir al Shirk wa Anjâr a! Qawânih, www tawhed ws (accessed 5 May 2007), 1999 [1995], pp 1 2 wAlHalabI(ed),AlTahd/irr "The term "lord of all being" (robb αϊ äiomm) is a Qur âme phrase occurring in Q 1 2 82 Abu Muhammad al Maqdisî, Tabsîr al Uqala h Talbîsat Ahi al Tajahhum wa I Irjâ, www tawhed ws (28 August 2009), 1996, ρ 11 " Ibid, pp 23 24

231 twists and misquotes the words of other scholars to make his case." This way, al-Maqdisi tries to show that while he does not consider them kuffar in principle95, quietist Salafi scholars are certainly wrong, should not be followed in their way of thinking and incorrectly label Jihadi-Salafis - who do have the right ideas about talcßr - Khawârij.8* Al-Maqdisi thus framed the Jordanian state and the quietist Salafi scholars who implicitly supported the regime by accepting the political status quo as towaghft and Murji'a respectively. While maintaining this radical stance towards the state and quietist scholars after his release from prison in 1999, from that year onward a shift in al-Maqdisi's writings can be discerned. Although this shift was neither absolute nor immediate and also did not constitute a revision of earlier-held beliefs, it is nevertheless clear that al-Maqdisi's attention turned more towards a new group of ideological opponents from 1999 onward.

"Extrem ist" Jihadi-Salafis

As mentioned above, the 1990s saw a large-scale crackdown on Islamist groups in countries like Egypt, Algeria and Jordan. While there are several reasons why this happened, one reason in Algeria was that some Islamists there applied takfir to ever-larger groups of people, leading to increasing numbers of casualties among civilians.87 It is not clear whether it was news of what was happening in Algeria or other events that spurred al-Maqdisi to write a forceful critique against "extremism in taicßr" but in late 1998 or early 1999, he finished what is perhaps his most thorough study of all, Al-Risala al-Thalathiniyya. As we saw in chapter 2, this book, written while al-Maqdisi was still in prison, is a sustained attack on "extremism in takfir" and presents a comprehensive set of rules that should be followed

" Ibid, pp. 13-103. Much of the rest of the book is dedicated to refuting al-AlbanÌs ideas. For a discussion of how al-Maqdisï does this, see Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept Al-Wala' wa-1-Βατα in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi", in: Roel Meyer (ed.), Global Salafism Islam's New Religious Movement, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, pp. 99-101. es Al-Maqdisï, Tabsfr, p. 174. 86 For more on the debates between quietisi and Jihadi Salafis and the labels they use for each other, see Joas Wagemakers, "'Seceders' and 'Postponers'? An Analysis of the 'Khawanj' and 'Murji'a' Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietist andJihadi-Salafis", in: Jeevan Deol & Zaheer Kazmi (eds.), Contextualizmgjihadi Ideologies, London: Hurst & Co (forthcoming). 97 See for example Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria", Middle East Journal, vol. 54, no 4,2000, pp 572-591; id, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria", in. Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloommgton & Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 37-60; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Centrifugal Tendencies in the Algerian Civil War", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol 23, no 3,2001, pp 65-82

232 before using excommunication against other Muslims as well as dozens of cases in which one should be careful not to apply takßr too hastily." While he had not expressed his criticism of "extremism in takftr" as forcefully before Al-Risala al-Thalathimyya, al-Maqdisi had earlier shown his concern about the way some radicals were using Ιαΐφτ", especially if they attributed their ideas to him90. This was strictly a question of doctrine and was not necessarily related to al-Maqdisi's preference for da'wa over jihad in Jordan in the 1990s and afterwards. As shown above, however, this was how some of al-Maqdisi's critics interpreted it after he expressed his criticism of certain jihadi practices, particularly those of al-Zarqawi. While the content of his writings dedicated to his criticism of jihadi practices" has been dealt with extensively in chapter 3, we must now look at how al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafì manhaj is the source from which this criticism sprang. In his only book dedicated to jihad, for example, al-Maqdisi mentions da'wa throughout the text and points out that on many occasions, such as in confronting manifestations of supposedly sinful behaviour like cinemas and sports clubs, jihad is unnecessary and illegitimate. Such sinful places, al-Maqdisi states, should be targets of da'wa so as to bring the people engaged in activities there back to Islam. Moreover, though these people may be sinners, they do not deserve to be killed through armed attacks.92 Because jihad may not always be the right or even the legitimate manhaj to apply one's 'aqida, al-Maqdisi stresses the continued need for da'wa among Jihadi-Salafis. This is further underlined by al-Maqdisi's belief that jihad cannot be effective without da'wa and that the two must go together. Considering the two as complimentary, al-Maqdisi believes that any jihad that discards da'wa will quickly become nothing more than isolated attacks that do not bring about true change. He therefore states that jihadi groups and movements ignore da'wa at their peril and advises them to make a constant and sustained effort at confronting their enemies by calling them to Islam. This way, people may actually adopt these beliefs, thus ensuring that the goals of jihad may be consolidated through the use of da'wa, leading to a more positive and lasting effect in the form of a truly Islamic state.93

8' Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Al-Risâlaal-ThaiathmtyyafH-Tahdhîrmm al-Ghulüwfil-Takpr, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 September 2006), 1998/1999. " See for example id., Al-ishraqa, pp. 1-2. "" See for example id., Hödhihi 'Aqidatunä, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 8 February 2006), 1997, pp. 1-2. " Id., Viaqfât ma'a Thamarât al-Jihäd, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 1 July 2009), 2004; id., Al-Zarqäwü 92 Id., Waqfit, p. 8. See also Wâ'il al-Batïrî, "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî: Tabarra'tu Mirâran wa-Takrâran mimmâ Yartakibuhu 1-ba'd min 'Amaliyyât ghayr Mundabita bi-Hudüd al-Shar' Yadhhabu Dahiyyatahâ l-Âlâf al-Abriya min dûm Faida", Al-Sabil, no. 896,4June 2009, p. 5 91 Al-Maqdisî, Waqfit, pp. 33-34, 80-91,114,129.

233 The question of consolidating the gains of jihad is clearly related to the issue of qitäl al-nikäya (fighting to hurt the enemy or its interests) and cjitâl αί-tamicfn (fighting to consolidate one's presence in a certain territory) that we saw in chapter 3. These concepts and al-Maqdisi's strong preference for the latter should be seen through the prism of his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj expressed in his tendency to favour radical da'wa over fighting only. Whereas fighting opens up new territories to (the Jihadi-Salafi version of) Islam, da'wa can ensure that their inhabitants also embrace this religion, thus effectively turning the area in question into part of the abode of Islam. Al-Maqdisi even goes so far as to say that Muslims should preferably only abandon da'wa in favour of a jihad that transcends the level of qitäl al-nikäya. In other words, he deems da'wa so important that the possibility to stage hurtful but fruitless attacks - irrespective of their legitimacy - is no excuse to abandon it.94 His remark in 2005 that "every period has priorities and I do not want Iraq or some other place to become a crematory of the sons of this [Jihadi-Salafi] trend"95 should thus be interpreted as rooted in al-Maqdisi attempts to encourage radical youngsters to engage in useful da'wa instead of wasting their efforts on a jihad that is only going to get them killed.

Despite al-Maqdisi's consistent quietist Jihadi-Salafism throughout his life as a radical ideologue, his books critical of certain jihadi practices made some journalists claim he had revised his earlier and supposedly more radical views, a process that some say started with A/-Risa!a ai-Tha/athiniyya.96 As we have seen throughout this study, however, al- Maqdisi has always qualified his views on issues such as takßr and bara' (disavowal) and these nuances do not just go back a few years but can even be traced to his works in the mid-1980s.97 Moreover, al-Maqdisi has expressed clear support and even praise for mujâhidm who he felt did have the chance to consolidate their gains earned through jihad, primarily in the Caucasus, thereby again showing that he did not reject jihad in principle.98 What ultimately has been and presumably will be much more damaging to al- Maqdisi's reputation than journalists' claims of revisionism are the accusations from fellow

" Id., Waqfit, pp 55-56. 95 Abu Muharnmad al-Maqdisî Al-Salafiyya al-Jihädyya, www.aljazeera net/channel/archive/archive7Archiveld=129776 (accessed June 2007), 6 July 2005 % Al-Ghad, 7 July 2005; Al-Hayat, 13 March 2008, Muhammad Abu Rummân, "Al-Maqdisî.. wa-stihqâq al-Tashîh (3)", Mq;allat αϊ-'Air, 11 July 2005, Marwan Shehadeh, "Weakening al-Qaeda: Literature Review Challenges its Authonty", Arab Insight, vol 2, no. 6,2009, pp. 27-28. See also Nelly Lahoud, "In Search of Philosopher-Jihadis- Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihadi Philosophy", Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol 10, no. 2, 2009, pp 209,214, where the author states that al-MaqdisT may not have revised his earlier writings but is "inconsistent" in his ideas 97 For an extensive treatment of this subject, see Wagemakers, "Abu Muhammad"; id., "Protecting". " See for example Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Risölat Nusra wa-'tizäz bi-imärat wa-Mufâliidri-Qawijâz, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 8 September 2009), 2009 See also id., Risâlat Nusra li-l-Miyähidm fîl-Sùmâl wa-Kashf Shubhât Mas/iâyikfi al-Daj;âl, www tawhed.ws (8 October 2009), 2009

234 Jihadi-Salafìs in Jordan that he has betrayed jihad and the mujähidün, particularly al- Zarqawi. It is therefore not surprising that al-Maqdisi made a sustained effort to disprove these accusations against him. While his quick re-arrest in 2005 did not offer him any chances to do so in that year, he did try to rebut his opponents' claims when he was released again in 2008. Interestingly, while his opponents conflated his criticism of "extremism in tallir" with his choice for da'wa and against jihad and countered the former with a critique of the latter, as we saw above, al-Maqdisi in effect did the exact opposite. He tried to refiate those who accused him of betraying jihad and mufâhidûn by labelling them as "extremists in takfir" (ghulät al-takfìr). This was not just ironic given the fact that al-Maqdisi himself had been accused of being a Takfîrï or a Khârijî by quietist Salafis but it probably also showed that he was rather unwilling to address what was perhaps the core issue: his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of radical da'wa in favour of jihad. Just like his opponents may have felt that they had a strong line of attack with this issue, al-Maqdisi was possibly uncomfortable discussing his jihadi credentials and therefore chose to focus on the topic of tak/ir, which he knew provided him with a stronger case." Thus, al-Maqdisi started his own defence by pointing out that, despite accusations to the contrary, he had never revised his views and never would, "even if my entire family died one by one: my mother, my children, my wives and my brothers".100 Quickly after, he addressed the critics whose writings circulated in Jordan in the autumn of 2008. These critics' treatises, as we saw above, tried to rebut al-Maqdisi's and Nur al-Din Bayram's claims that they were extremists in tak/ir but also focussed strongly on the two accusers' lack of jihad experience and supposed betrayal of jihad, the mujähidün and al-Zarqawi. The communiqué issued by al-Maqdisi and several of Jordan's most important Jihadi-Salafi scholars (including Bayram) to counter these critics' accusations does not focus on the latter charge, however. It simply accuses the writers of the anti-Maqdisi pamphlets of being "extremists in takßr".101 The communiqué - in what seems to be a reference to the accusations levelled at Bayram and al-Maqdisi himself- does state that al-Maqdisi's critics

sometimes accuse some of the muwahhidfn brothers of holding back from jihad,

" Wagemakers, "Invoking", pp. 15-16. 100 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Thabät al-Thabät fiZaman ai-Taräju'ät, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 28 October 2008), 2008, pp. 5-6. 101 Bara at mm Fiat al-Daìàl Ghulät al-Takfîr wa-Mu'taqidâti/iim al-Zä'igha, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 10 December 2008), 2008, pp. 1-3. See also Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Ghulüw Yamhaqu l-Barakätwa-1-Rifq mâKânafîShay' illâ Zânahu, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 13 December 2009), 2009, pp. 1-3.

235 slandering the mujähidün, fleeing the fronts of jihad, calling the mujahidün Khawârij and Takfïrïs and fabricating things and lying about the mufähidün.102

This criticism is, however, simply dismissed by saying that "all of these are false allegations (da'awâ kâdhiba) for which there no evidence".103 In a later treatise, al-Maqdisi did become more specific by pointing out once again that his criticism of certain jihadi practices was not meant as criticism of jihad itself. The key question of his own unwillingness to wage jihad and his conscious choice for da'wa, however, was again left unaddressed.104 This does not mean al-Maqdisi is an opportunist or a hypocrite, however. On the contrary, his recent views on this issue are entirely consistent with his long-held beliefs and his critics can indeed be accused of only reading his books superficially. They are nevertheless correct to point out that al-Maqdisi has not engaged in jihad himself and his unwillingness to fully address this issue suggests that he realises this. Although al-Maqdisi has also written about topics entirely unrelated to this after his release in 1999, such as international law105, American foreign policy106 and Christianity107, the contentious issue of his quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj dominated much of the past decade. That his quietist Jihadi-Salafism is indeed the central factor explaining his (lack of) influence among Jordanian radicals is what we must turn to now.

A New Generation of Quietist Jihadi-Salafis?

Unlike in Saudi Arabia, about which al-Maqdisi simply wrote a (long-uncontested) book criticising its religious credentials without his personal presence playing any role, al- Maqdisi faced stiff ideological competition in Jordan throughout the period 1994-2009. This obviously came from the state's official rhetoric about the rulers' Islamic and Hashimite credentials but more clearly from quietist Salafis and Jihadi-Salafis critical of al-Maqdisi. Such attempts to frame concepts or situations (in this case the Jordanian state and aspects of Islam) in opposition to other framers have been described as counterframing, together

'02 Barä'at, pp. 1-2. ,05Jbid.,p.2. 'w Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Al-Laghw/il-Dm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed March 2009), 2009, pp. 4-7. 105 Id., Al-Shar'iyya al-Dawlyya wa-Mimäqadatühä h-l-Shana al-lslämiyya, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 23 April 2010), 2002. 106 Id., Mashm al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Kabir, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 29 August 2006), 2004. 107 Id., Man Κάπα Baytuhu mm Zujäj fa-lâ Yarmïghayrahu bi-Hajar Qiraa v/a-Ta'ammul fiAsßr al-'Ahd al-Qadïm wa- Muqäranat bayna Akhbânhâ wa-bayna l-Qasas al-Qur'aniol-'Azfm, www.tawhed.ws (accessed May 2009), 2008; id., Ila 'Abd al-Saltb, www.tawhed.ws (accessed May 2009), 2009.

236 making up what is referred to as a frame dispute. These can take place between different groups108, in opposition to the state's framing109 or within a single movement110. In this section, I argue that - apart from contextual factors - al-Maqdisi's specific (lack of) ideological influence on Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis can be explained by analysing his efforts at counterframing his opponents' views. One's position in frame disputes and one's success in counterframing others' portrayals of events, persons or situations depends on two factors: the frame itself and the framer. Regarding the former, we can see why al-Maqdisi's ideas did not appeal to all Jihadi- Salafis. Although al-Maqdisi's initial identification of the problem (the Jordanian state's "un-Islamic" system and their quietist Salafi "neo-Murji'a" supporters) can be presumed to have been broadly acceptable to them, his solution of engaging in da'wa in Jordan and his frequent calls for this cannot. As we have seen, al-Maqdisi's stress on da'wa in Jordan became a major source of contention among Jordanian radicals preferring jihad abroad and their support for his frame was in certain cases half-hearted at best. This ambiguity towards al-Maqdisi's views becomes even clearer when we look at his position as a framer with regard to the state and quietist Salafis as well as "extremist" Jihadi-Salafis.111

Successful Counterframing

Wiktorowicz has distinguished two different processes in the establishment of "sacred authority" in framing disputes: crediting and discrediting, which respectively refer to emphasising one's own credibility and attacking one's opponent's authority."2 The former has to do with the framer's knowledge of his surroundings and the topics on which he or

108 Scott Davies, "From Moral Duty to Cultural Rights: A Case Study of Political Framing in Education", Sociology of Education, vol 72,1999, pp 14-17, Anne W. Esacove, "Dialogic Framing: The Framing/Counterframing of 'Partial-Birth' Abortion", Sociological Inqmry, vol 74, no. 1,2004, pp 70-101, Deana A. Rohhnger, "Framing the Abortion Debate. Organizational Resources, Media Strategies, and Movement-Countermovement Dynamics", The Sociological Quarterly, vol 43, no. 4, pp. 479-507. 10, Roberta L Coles, "Peaceniks and Warmongers' Framing Fracas on the Home Front: Dominant and Opposition Discourse Interaction during the Persian Gulf Crisis", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 3,1998, pp 369-391; Robert M. Entman & Andrew Rojecki, "Freezing Out the Public· Elite and Media Framing of the U.S Anti-Nuclear Movement", Political Communication, vol. 10,1993, pp. 155-173; David S. Meyer, "Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War", Political Communication, vol 12,1995, pp. 173-192. 110 Robert D Benford, "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement", Social Forces, vol. 71, no 3, 1993, pp. 677-701; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framingjihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority", international Review of Social History, vol. 49, supplement 12,2004, pp. 159-177. 111 For references to theoretical literature used in this paragraph, see chapter 4 112 Wiktorowicz, "Framing", p. 164.

237 she speaks, his or her character (morality, honesty, reputation etcetera)113 and the logic and consistency of his or her arguments.114 Discrediting, on the other hand, is often a process of vilification of one's opponents and name-calling in order to decrease or diminish the other's credentials.115 Among some Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan, al-Maqdisi has clearly been successful in conveying his counterframe. Although this chapter has dealt with a lot of criticism of al- Maqdisi, this should not obscure the fact that he does indeed have many followers and people who admire him. The above suggests that al-Maqdisi is thus considered by these young men to be a knowledgeable person with a strong character and logical and consistent arguments who is good at vilifying his opponents. My fieldworki n Jordan has shown that his followers do indeed feel this way about their spiritual leader. They admire him as a scholar, his ability to express difficult things in an easy way, his clear knowledge about the reality in which they live and his translation of old ideas into detailed answers to topical and practically relevant questions.116 Similarly, his character is also admired by his followers, who like his friendliness, his ability to remain steadfast in his ideas in the face of imprisonment and his willingness to speak truth to power.117 Finally, and unlike some others, al-Maqdisi's followers also believed in the internal logic and consistency of his writings and rejected any claims that he had revised or moderated his earlier views.118

113 Others refer to these qualities as "expertise" and "reputation". See Marvin E. Goldberg &Jon Hartwick, "The Effects of Advertiser Reputation and Extremity of Advertising Claim on Advertising Effectiveness", Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 17,1990, pp. 173-174. '" Ibid, pp. 167-168. For more on the issue of credibility, see R. Glen Hass, "Effects of Source Characteristics on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion", in: Richard E. Petty, Thomas M. Ostrom & Timothy C. Brock (eds.), Cognitive Responses in Persuasion, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981, pp. 141-172, Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 15,1951, pp. 635-650 115 Wiktorowicz, "Framing", pp. 164-166. For an extensive treatment of how vilification is used in the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" movements in the United States, see Dawn McCaffrey &Jennifer Keys, "Competitive Framing Processes in the Abortion Debate: Polarization-Vilification, Frame Saving, and Frame Debunking", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 1,2000, pp. 41-61; Marsha L Vanderford, "Vilification and Social Movements. A Case-Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric", Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 75, no 1,1989, pp. 166-182. 116 Interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008 & 13 January 2009, 'Abdallah Abu Rummân, Amman, 15 January 2009, Marwan Shahâda, Amman, 13 January 2009, vanous students of al-Maqdisï, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 117 Interviews with Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008 & 13 January 2009, Muhammad Abu Rummân, Amman, 11 August 2008, vanous students of al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 118 Interview with vanous students of al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. Some of his students actually asked him about several seeming inconsistencies in his wntings but these were so obviously wrong and easily refuted that their publication seemed to be aimed more at showing al-Maqdisîs consistency than anything else. See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Su öl 'απ 'Adad mm al-Umür aliati Nasabat li-l-Shaykh AbiMuhammad al- Maqdisiba'da Liga' Saliifat al-Sabil, www.tawhed.ws (accessed 25 June 2009), n.d.; id, Su al 'an Ishkälayn pba'd Kitäbät al-Shaykh Abf Muhammad al-Magdisf, www.tawhed ws (accessed 13 January 2010), n.d.

238 Conversely, his vilification of the Jordanian state and quietist Salafis was also appreciated by his followers. Since his audience consisted of youngsters who rejected the regime, this was obvious regarding the Jordanian state. With respect to major quietist Salafi scholars, however, this was less natural. As pointed out elsewhere119, the label al-Maqdisi used for these scholars - "neo-Murji'a" - is a strong one since it is partly correct, avoids the (in this case) clearly ridiculous label of kuffar but nevertheless puts a negative stamp on them and is too complicated to be easily refuted. Al-Maqdisi's ability to confront quietist Salafis on their own terms - with Salafi arguments and concepts - was mentioned as a major asset in his attacks on them120, just like his forceful refutation of them in their ideological disputes.121 The fact that his followers apparently accepted al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi teachings perhaps suggests that they themselves had also been strongly influenced by quietist Salafism prior to encountering al-Maqdisi's teachings. While there need not be a strict correlation between support for al-Maqdisi and a quietist background, most of his students I spoke to did indeed have roots in quietist Salafism and told me that al-Maqdisi's closeness to quietism was instrumental in his attraction to them.122

Failed Counterframing

Al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi counterframing thus explains much of his influence on those who admire him. As we have seen, however, al-Maqdisi was subjected to a lot of criticism among some Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis. This can also be explained through his position as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi counterframer. With regard to his knowledge, it may be expected that some of al-Maqdisi's critics at least accept that he is a scholar. On the Midad al-Suyuf forum, however, al-Maqdisi is regularly dismissed as someone who lacks any scholarly credentials. One thread on this forum, for example, states that "I have not found anyone with knowledge who follows al-Maqdisi"123, while a participant cites a treatise stating that

"' Wagemakers, '"Seceders"'. 120 Interviews with Abü Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, Rabâba, Amman, 12 January 2009. 121 Interviews with Abü Haniyya, Amman, 13 January 2009, Usâma Shahâda, Amman, 12 January 2009, various students of al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 122 Interview with various students of al-Maqdisî, al-Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 12' Hosam_one, Lam Ajid Ahadan Yatba'u l-Maqdisïdhü [sic] Bâtira, "Al-Siyâsa al-Shar'iyya" section, Shabakat Midâd al-Suyûf, post no. 1, www.almedad.com/vb/showthread.php7K1932 (accessed 7 January 2010), 23 March 2009.

239 shaykh al-Maqdisi is a scholar to the people of ignorance (ah! al-jahäla) that do not know what knowledge is [...]. Anyone who says al-Maqdisi is a mujähid is crazy (ahmaq) and anyone who says that he is the theorist (munozzir) of Jihadi-Salafism is stupid (akhraq) and so is anyone who claims al-Maqdisi is a mujähid scholar [...].'"

This remark, as well as those mentioned before in this chapter, make clear that it is not so much al-Maqdisi's "bookish" knowledge that his critics want but his "jihadi knowledge". In this respect, he is regarded as ignorant and this is clearly held against him, especially in light of his criticism of others, as we have seen. Moreover, the steadfast and upright character his admirers ascribe to him contrasts with the image of al-Maqdisi as a liar and an opportunist that his critics claim he is, particularly when contrasted with their hero al-Zarqawi, who was known for his toughness and perseverance.125 Finally, at least some of his critics believe al-Maqdisi has revised his views or is at least inconsistent in his writings, damaging the logic of his arguments.126 It may be assumed that his critics agreed with his counterframes of the Jordanian state and quietisi Salafis but they obviously disagreed with his attacks on certain radicals as Takfîrîs and Khawärij, particularly if those included al-Zarqawi and others who had spent time in prison with him but who later went abroad to wage jihad. These men's decision to go to Afghanistan or Iraq in order to fight instead of remaining in Jordan to engage in da'wa basically constituted a rejection of al-Maqdisi's quietisi Jihadi-Salafi manhaj, perhaps suggesting that they, unlike al-Maqdisi's current followers, did not have a background in quietisi Salafism. Although, again, there is not necessarily a connection between having no roots in quietist Salafism and waging jihad abroad, it is clear that none of his students who went off to wage jihad after being released in 1999 had quietist Salafi backgrounds.127 Thus, there is a clear distinction between al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of emphasising da'wa and the more purely Jihadi-Salafi manhaj of fighting only. While adherents to both methods support jihad, those favouring the latter are perhaps more inclined to view jihad as a goal in itself, regardless of the outcome. This difference in manhaj

"* Anas al-Shamrï, Ai-Shqykh al-Maqdisi 'Ahm 'inda Ahi al-jahäla (bi-qaìam: al-Gharib al-MuhäjirJ/Wa-Taiaba 1-Gharib Munämrat al-Maqdisï, "Al-Siyâsa al-Shar'iyya" section, Shabakat Midâd al-Suyûf, post no. 1, www.almedad.com/vb/showthread.php7t-12654 (accessed 7 January 2010), 13 July 2009. 125 Husayn, Al-Zarqawi, pp. 98-99. Interviews with 'Abdallah Abu Rummân, Amman, 15 January 2009, an Islamist who wished to remain anonymous, Amman, 10 January 2009. 126 See for example Faysal, Matrah li-l-Niqash; Ishkälät fîFikr al-Maqdisï, "Al-Radd 'ala Firaq wa-1-Milal wa-1-Nahl al-Däla" section, Shabakat Midäd al-Suyüf, post no. 1, www.almedad.com (Unk no longer available), n.d. 127 Hasan Abu Haniyya, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, e-mail messages to the author, 26 May 2009.

240 not only once again illustrates al-Maqdisi status as a quietist Jihadi-Salafi but also that this has both helped and prevented his influence in Jordan. Whereas among some in Saudi Arabia and with regard to certain aspects of al-wala wa-1-barä' al-Maqdisi's adherence to quietist ideas, concepts and sources was an asset, as it was among some in Jordan, it clearly became a liability to others. This not only shows that al-Maqdisi's message is received differently in different contexts but it also makes clear that there are limits to what his quietist Jihadi-Salafism can achieve. Consequently, one could indeed speak of a new generation of quietist Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan (and elsewhere) who look to al-Maqdisi as their leader. His and their particular ideas and methods, however, are likely to remain contested and disputed for years to come.

241 242 Summary_and

Having arrived at the end of this study, this final chapter summarises its contents and draws conclusions about al-Maqdisi's quietisi Jihadi-Salafìsm as well as broader ones that can be drawn from the preceding chapters. As such, this chapter shows that despite this study's focus on one individual ideologue, a close and detailed look at his writings and his influence makes clear that there are wider implications.

Summary

This study deals with the Palestinian-Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whose guiding ideology - Salafism - plays an important role in this book. Salafis are referred to as such because they feel the duty to emulate the first three generations of Muslims - the "pious predecessors" (al-salaf al-sälih) - as meticulously and in as many spheres of life as possible. They believe this can be achieved by adhering closely to a strict creed Çaqïda) and its correct method (manhaj) of application in various contexts. By emphasising the unity of God (tawhid), rejecting alleged religious innovations {bida"), advocating a literal reading of the Qur an and hadrths and dismissing the blind emulation (tatjird) of Islamic schools of law (madhähib) in favour of independent and direct interpretation of the sources (ijtihäd), Salafis believe they can live up to the supposed ideal embodied by the salaf. This seemingly clear-cut ideological basis obscures huge disagreements between Salafis, however. To clarify these disagreements, three different types of Salafis have been distinguished: quietists or purists, who advocate a peaceful and non-political manhaj in society through education (tarbiya) and calling to Islam (da'wa); politicos, who engage in political debates and sometimes even participate in elections; and jihadis, who combine Salafi ideology with the belief that jihad is not limited to waging war on non-Muslims but may also mean fighting against supposedly apostate Muslim rulers. This study argues that this distinction is an interesting and useful one but also that it obscures the differences within and the similarities between the individual categories and that this does not just apply to manhaj but also to 'aqfda. Al-Maqdisi is a prime example of this, combining a Jihadi-Salafi basic creed and method with a strong preference for sources, arguments, concepts and methodological applications rooted in the quietist tradition. This is why al-Maqdisi may be more accurately referred to as a "quietist Jihadi-Salafi".

243 Salafism has its roots in the general Sunni tendency to model their behaviour after the life of the Prophet Muhammad but particularly in a historical trend of Islamic scholars who relied on accounts of his and his companions' lives (hadïths) to discern rules at the expense of other devices used to build an Islamic jurisprudence. This trend is usually ascribed to scholars such as Ahmad b. Hanbal (780-855) and Taqi al-Din b. Taymiyya (1263- 1328), whose ideas find expression in various Salali groups and trends, perhaps most successfully in Wahhabism, the form of Salafism that emanated from the central-Arabian region of Najd through the writings of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Because Wahhabism became the state version of Islam in Saudi Arabia, it found a solid base there, from which it was subsequently spread with the use of the country's oil wealth as a conservative alternative to the revolutionary rhetoric from Egypt's President Nasser and Iran's revolutionary regime in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. Because of this and because of the many Arab workers who moved to the Gulf to work in its oil industry and adopted the conservative form of Islam applied there, the Wahhabi version of Salafism spread across the Arab world. At the same time, the decline of Nasser's pan-Arabism after the Arab losses to Israel in 1967 had led to a greater susceptibility to religious alternatives, creating openings for (Wahhabi-)Salafism. Combined with the spread of radical ideas such as those of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), this led to forms of radical Salafism expressed, for example, in the violent and anti-state groups in Egypt responsible for assassinating Egyptian President Anwar al- Sadat in 1981. The move of many of these radicals (as well as others) to Afghanistan after it was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979 militarised them further and gave them important networks and contacts. These, together with other radicalising factors such as the rejection by society of "Afghan Arabs" returning to their home countries and the American invasion of Iraq in 1990, would later be instrumental in founding al-Qa'ida and its off-shoots in various countries. The influence of al-Maqdisi and his quietist Jihadi-Salafi ideology on the development of some of these radical trends form the subject of this study. In particular, it tries to answer the question why al-Maqdisi has been influential on certain radical Islamists.

A/-Ma

Against the backdrop mentioned above, chapter 1 shows that al-Maqdisi, born in the West Bank in 1959 and raised in Kuwait, was influenced by friends and local Islamist preachers to become more religious and critical of Muslim rulers and slowly drifted towards the quietist

244 Jihadi-Salafism that characterised his writings later on. During the 1970s and early 1980s, he was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the ideas of Juhayman al-'Utaybi (d. 1980) as well as the books of major quietist Salafï scholars such as Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Baz (d. 1999). Because of this mix between criticism of Muslim rulers and Salafism, he was initially attracted to the writings of Muhammad Surur, who combined a Brotherhood-inspired critique of politics with Salafi sources. After finally realising his dream of studying in Saudi Arabia, however, he discovered the rich Wahhabi religious tradition and found that it was fully Salafi in nature but also offered him the tools with which to excommunicate the political rulers. With this intellectual and religious baggage, he moved to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he discovered that - his support for jihad notwithstanding - he was really more suited to practise a radical da'wa. Al-Maqdisi's strong preference for Salafi writings rooted in a mostly quietist tradition such as the Saudi-Wahhabi one as well as his tendency to favour da'wa over jihad for himself and - in many situations - for others too shows his quietist Jihadi-Salafism in both 'aqïda and manhaj. To al-Maqdisi, as well as to many of his Wahhabi-Salafi role models, there was no contradiction between calling on others to wage jihad and staying away from the battlefields yourself. This attitude, rooted in his quietist Jihadi-Salafism, was not easily accepted by all others however, particularly in Jordan, where he moved in 1992 and still resides today. Chapter 2 shows that the quietist Jihadi-Salafi ideology that al-Maqdisi gravitated towards during his life can also be discerned in his writings. Although he has not written much about his specific ideas on jihad, it is clear that he supports the classical form of jihad described extensively in writings on Islamic law (sharia), which was waged between the abode of Islam or faith (dar al-Isläm/där al-ïmân) on the one hand and the abode of war or unbelief (dar al-harb/där al-kufr) on the other. He holds the same view of Osama bin Laden's global jihad, which involves attacking the Western supporters of the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world, primarily the United States, and it is therefore not surprising that al- Maqdisi praises al-Qa'ida and "9/11". The most important dimension of jihad described in al-Maqdisi's writings, however, is the fighting aimed at overthrowing the "apostates" (murtaddün) ruling the Muslim world. Though partly inspired by Qutb's political writings, al-Maqdisi's ideas on what constitutes kufr are very close or even identical to what some quietist Salafi scholars

245 believe. Al-Maqdisi states that God's tawhfd - the basis of Islam as expressed by its confession of faith (shahâda) - should also be found in legislation. In practice, this means that in his view all laws applied in a country should comply with the sharia. If rulers occasionally deviate from Islamic law by mistake or because they were bribed to do so, this only makes them guilty of minor unbelief (kufr asghar), which is no cause for excommunication. As soon as rulers apply "man-made laws" (qawanîn wad'iyya) as a result of outright rejection (jahd) of the sharia, the conviction (i'ticjäd) that other laws are better or their attempt to make non-sharT rules permissible (istihläl), however, or even go so far as to exchange Islamic law for a different legislative system altogether (tabdil), this changes the situation. Al-Maqdisi considers such a conscious or far-reaching application of laws other than God's a violation of tawhfd and, therefore, an act of polytheism (shirk) and major unbelief (kufr akbar). This reasoning, as well as the conclusion that kufr akbar justifies takßr of the person guilty of it, is shared by some major quietist Salafi scholars. Al-Maqdisi further concludes that all Muslim rulers - whom he refers to as idols (tawäghit) for their supposed assumption of divine legislative tasks - may be fought through jihad. While quietist Salafi scholars disagree with this conclusion, there is nevertheless a strong resemblance between al-Maqdisi's and their 'aqida with regard to the important topic of kufr.

Even though quietist Salafi scholars disagree with al-Maqdisi's manhoj' towards politics and society, expressed in his calls for jihad against the Muslim rulers, chapter 3 shows that they are still closer to him than the above suggests. This chapter points out that, while al-Maqdisi supports jihad in principle, he strongly emphasises the need for da'wa, the preferred manhaj of quietist Salafis. His stress on the importance of da'wa besides or even instead of jihad is also related to al-Maqdisi's belief that fighting should be well-organised and should not just be aimed at hurting the enemy and his interests (cjitä! aJ-niköya) but also at consolidating the gains of military victory by setting up a safe haven for "true" Muslims or even an Islamic state (qitâi aZ-tamkfn). Since he considers da'wa to be the ideal tool to bring people in conquered territories to the "true" Islam, he believes jihad and da'wa cannot be seen separately. Al-Maqdisi's call against a sole reliance on jihad is also related to his belief that violence is not always necessary and should be used with the utmost care. He warns against the targeting of women and children, although he does believe that if they help "infidels" (kujfar) against Muslims during a war, they do become combatants and thus legitimate targets. Unlike other Jihadi-Salafis like Osama bin Laden, who try to expand the definition

246 of combatants in order to justify and legitimise their attacks against civilians such as on "9/11", al-Maqdisi mostly tries to expand the number of targets of jihad within his own preferred struggle against the Muslim world's regimes. By describing those who help the rulers by supporting or defending their "un-Islamic laws" as "helpers of the idols" (ansar al- tawäghft), al-Maqdisi effectively expands his definition of targets of jihad in such a way as to include military officers, customs officials and diplomats among others. He is careful, however, to point out that not everyone working for "infidel" regimes should be excommunicated since, he states, most people do not actively uphold or defend the rulers' legislative system and many do not even realise its sinful nature. This carefulness to apply tallir as well as his strong emphasis on the manhaj of da'wa once again show that al-Maqdisi is quite close to quietist Salafism.

Al-Maqdisi's Influence on the Saudi islamic Opposition

Chapter 4 shows that al-Maqdisi's also adhered to his quietist Jihadi-Salafism with regard to a specific issue such as the state of Saudi Arabia. This country is obviously not a regular Muslim country since its application of Wahhabism sets it apart in the eyes of many as a truly (or perhaps even overly) Islamic state. Throughout the 20th century, there has nevertheless been Wahhabi opposition against the Saudi regime for its supposed failure to live up to its own religious credentials. Chapter 4 deals with one example of this: the Sahwa (awakening). This revivalist trend has its roots in the 1960s, when foreign Muslim Brothers expelled from their home countries as well as like-minded Saudis provided Wahhabism with some politically-inspired zeal, thereby creating a much more politicised form of Wahhabism than had existed until then. This trend became especially apparent immediately after the Gulf War in 1990, when Saudi Arabia invited 500,000 U.S. soldiers to protect the kingdom from a potential attack by the Iraqi army, which had just occupied neighbouring Kuwait. This invitation created such anger among many that a popular protest movement came about that was mostly guided by Sahwa scholars and activists. Shortly before the anti-U.S. protests erupted in 1990, al-Maqdisi had written a book on Saudi Arabia in which he harshly criticised the country for its "un-Islamic laws", its ties with "infidel" organisations and states and its strong relations with the U.S. Instead of praising the regime for its piety, al-Maqdisi claimed Saudi Arabia was an "infidel" state and - importantly - did so on the basis of sources that were firmly rooted in Saudi-Wahhabi

247 history and its quietisi tradition, which once again underlined his quietist Jihadi-Salafi credentials. The book in which he wrote these things was spread among "Afghan Arabs" in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was subsequently smuggled into the country by returning fighters. Although the book's harsh religious conclusions about Saudi Arabia went too far for the politically-inspired Sahwa, it did enter the country at a time of heightened criticism of the state and was spread among many of the state's critics. As such, it made a modest contribution to the general formation of anti-Saudi views in the early 1990s. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's focus on combating the non-violent but seemingly dangerous Sahwa allowed al-Maqdisi's book to spread across the country relatively easily, becoming well-known among more radical Saudi activists not yet mobilised against the state. The importance of the spreading of al-Maqdisi's book about the kingdom throughout the 1990s becomes clear in chapter 5, which shows that radicalised pietistic youngsters who gathered in Bayt Shubrâ, a house in Riyadh, as well as the later al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) were heavily influenced by al-Maqdisi. Some members of the group that met at Bayt ShubrI launched an attack in Riyadh in 1995, killing several people, and QAP was responsible for several deadly attacks in the period 2003-2005. Most of these were aimed at American targets, but one may nevertheless assume that these were supported by an underlying anti-Saudi discourse since the Americans had been invited or were at least allowed by the Saudi authorities, making attacks against U.S. targets implicitly anti-Saudi too. Chapter 5 shows that the main use of al-Maqdisi's writings - particularly his critical book of the Saudi regime - to Bayt Shubrâ and especially QAP was his providing them with a justification and legitimisation of this anti-Saudi ideological undercurrent. Although this did not translate into many attacks against Saudi targets, it did lead to an anti-Saudi discourse that was clearly and to an important extent fuelled by al-Maqdisi's writings. Whereas al-Maqdisi's radical conclusions about the Saudi state went too far for the Sahwa, they were embraced by the visitors to Bayt Shubrâ and particularly QAP. This can be explained by their greater radicalism but also because al-Maqdisi's descriptions of what was wrong with the regime and what should be done about it conformed neatly with the situation in which both groups found themselves. He portrayed the Saudi state's "un- Islamic laws" and ties with "infidel" organisations and countries as a direct violation of tawhrd, a concept of supreme importance in Wahhabi discourse, emphasised the state's controversial and widely-resented relations with the United States and supported his arguments with detailed numbers and figures. Moreover and perhaps most importantly, al-

248 Maqdisi made extensive use of Saudi history and the Wahhabi religious tradition to accuse Saudi Arabia, effectively showing to his audience that - in his view - the kingdom could not even live up to its own standards and was indicted by its own history and tradition. Al- Maqdisi thus appealed to deeply-felt and widely-valued feelings and sensitivities, thereby expressing his quietist Jihadi-Salafism to an audience that was highly susceptible to it.

Ai-Maqdisi's Influence on the Development of al-Walä' wa-1-Barä'

An explanation similar to the one mentioned in chapter 5 can be given for al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to asking "infidels" for help (αί-istiana bi-i-ku^ur), especially against other Muslims during times of war, as is shown in chapter 6. Al-isti'άπα bi-l-kuffar is an aspect of αΐ-νναία wa-I-bara' (loyalty and disavowal), a concept dating back to pre-Islamic times but which is nowadays used to indicate that Muslims should be loyal to the "in-group" of fellow-believers whilst shunning and even hating the "out-group" of non-Muslims and, in the case of Wahhabism, even other "apostate" Muslims. This concept has long been used in a quietist, a-political way and the notion of αί-isti ana bi-l-kuffar as applied by several 19th- century Wahhabi scholars with regard to the impermissibility of asking "infidel" armies for help when fighting other Muslims had long lain dormant. During al-Maqdisi's stay in Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, however, he rediscovered the concept of al-walä' wa-Z-bara (including ai-istiana bi-l-kuffar) and saw its value as a tool to indict present-day Muslim regimes for their military ties with contemporary "infidel" states and armies. Several years after the Gulf War in 1990, when the Saudi call for American help against Iraq looked quite similar to the 19",-century events that had caused some Wahhabi scholars to write about αΖ-isti ana bi-l-kuffär in the first place, several Saudi scholars picked up the concept and seemingly started developing it from where al-Maqdisi had left it. The latter, though probably responsible for the concept's rediscovery, had made a rather shoddy case for the notion's revival. He did not explain the concept very clearly, for example, nor did he specify its different shades of meaning and he even mixed up his references to 19th-century Saudi history. Other scholars corrected these mistakes, however, and each in their own way dealt with the different interpretations of the concept, adapting it to new situations and applying it to new conflicts by probably building on al-Maqdisi seminal but imperfect earlier work. As mentioned, this can be explained by al-Maqdisi's extensive use of the very concepts that these Wahhabi scholars most probably influenced

249 by him hold dear. His emphasis of tawhfd, the broad range and applicability of αί-isti'äna bi-l- kuffar, its relevance for contemporary conflicts and al-Maqdisi's close adherence to Saudi and Wahhabi historical, cultural and religious tradition together explain his likely influence and also show once more his mix between quietisi and Jihadi-Salafi sources and arguments. Irrespective of al-Maqdisi's influence with regard to aJ-istiana bi-l-kuffar, he has actually written much more about another dimension of al-wala wa-l-bara, namely its legislative interpretation, as becomes clear in chapter 7. This dimension of al-wala wa-l-bara seems to be an original contribution to the concept by al-Maqdisi and is explained by viewing the following of "man-made laws" as a form of worship and thus as a sinful form of walä'. This should be countered, according to al-Maqdisi, by bara of the persons guilty of this misplaced loyalty, preferably in its highest form: jihad. This way, αί-waiä' wa-1-barä' is turned from an instrument to separate the Muslim "in-group" from the non-Muslim (or, in some Wahhabi cases, "apostate") "out-group" into a revolutionary tool that solely focuses on dividing "true" Muslims from their deviant fellow-believing rulers. As such, al-Maqdisi does not just partially but entirely abandon the core meaning of the concept that it has had over the centuries. This is probably also the reason why very few radical scholars have clearly adopted this interpretation of αί-walä' wa-/-barä': although they shared his critical view of Muslim rulers and agreed that jihad against them was justified, using αΐ-waiä' wa-l- bara to justify this may have seemed odd and disconnected from their religious narratives. Al-Maqdisi's likely influence was greater with regard to ai-istiana bi-l-kuffar among non-Saudi scholars, which is also dealt with in chapter 7. Their adoption of this concept after "9/11" and their application of it to new conflicts and situations but without referring to Saudi-Wahhabi tradition and its different shades of meaning so much suggests that this dimension of aJ-wa!a wa-l-bara' has more or less become "mainstream" among Jihadi-Salafi scholars. It also means that the links between their writings and al-Maqdisi's reintroduction of the concept have become more tenuous but it should be kept in mind that it was his rediscovery that probably started the concept's revival in the first place, thus making these non-Saudi scholars distant heirs of al-Maqdisi's work. The reason for this lies not so much in al-Maqdisi's use of Saudi-Wahhabi sources, which were probably less important to these non-Saudi scholars, but possibly in the fact that al-Maqdisi was offering his audience a more Salafi version of something they agreed with anyway: tak/ir of and jihad against Muslim rulers. Whereas al-Maqdisi's legislative version of αΖ-walâ' wa-!-bara' had to break with tradition to achieve this and was probably less successful as a result, his rediscovery of αί-

250 isti'äna bi-l-kafßr was firmly rooted in Wahhabism and, to a lesser extent, Islamic tradition in general. Thus, his adherence to the quietist Wahhabi tradition once again probably caused him to be influential among fellow Jihadi-Salafis.

Al-Ma

As mentioned, al-Maqdisi moved to Jordan in 1992, which is dealt with in chapter 8. Though it is not like Saudi Arabia, Jordan nevertheless has a strong tradition of mixing Islam with politics and/or society, both by its Hashimite royal family, who claim to descend from the Prophet Muhammad, and the well-established Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as well as other Islamist groups, including quietist Salafis. When al-Maqdisi arrived in Jordan, he entered a country that was deeply mired in economic, political and regional crises. This caused a shock among many Jordanians and some of them, particularly those who had returned from Afghanistan only to find that they were not really welcome anymore, started looking for more radical alternatives than what the regime, the Brotherhood opposition and quietist Salafis were offering. Many of these did not have clear-cut ideological goals but had simply turned against the regime and wanted something new and Islamic to express their contention. In this context, al-Maqdisi - who obviously did have clear ideas of his own - quickly became the leader of a group of mostly poor and uneducated youngsters. Despite the radical and sometimes violent tendencies of these youngsters, the group concentrated on learning, discussing and spreading al-Maqdisi's books to a wider audience of like-minded men. Although the group was sent to prison in 1994 because several of its members had tried to attack Israel, da'wa was their most important activity in the early 1990s. This way, it became clear that al-Maqdisi not only adhered closely to the quietist 'aqida but also to its manhaj instead of relying solely on jihad to express his contention. This can be explained by pointing to the ill-defined ideas al-Maqdisi's followers had and his willingness and ability to offer these "religious seekers" a radical Islamic alternative that nobody else was giving them but also to his own quietist Jihadi-Salafi tendencies. While al-Maqdisi's distinct creed and method were acceptable to the Jordanian radical youngsters looking for a religious alternative to what they knew in the early 1990s, the prison experience from 1994-1999 - dealt with in chapter 9 - clarified people's ideas and showed that the group was not as united on al-Maqdisi's manhaj as it seemed to be. This was

251 most clearly expressed in the youngsters' attitude to al-Maqdisi's famous follower Abu Mus ab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006), whose toughness, confrontational nature and willingness to fight was more popular in prison than and contrasted sharply with al-Maqdisi's friendly, more "bookish" and peaceful demeanour. These differences ultimately - and because of various other factors - culminated in the decision by some to leave Jordan in order to wage jihad when the group was released in 1999, instead of staying in Jordan to practise da'wa, as al-Maqdisi wanted them to do. Al-Maqdisi's strong preference for the quietist manhaj was further expressed when he criticised jihad fighters (mufâhidûn) - and al-Zarqawi, who had become the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, in particular - for their reckless use of violence and their targeting of other Muslims. This criticism seems to have created a lasting resentment among several Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis who not only rejected al-Maqdisi's manhaj of radical da'wa in Jordan at the expense of jihad abroad but whose admiration for al-Zarqawi was also hurt when the latter's erstwhile mentor criticised his former student even though he had never participated in any jihad himself. This subsequently caused a lot of criticism to be expressed at al-Maqdisi, which was particularly scathing with regard to his choice of a quietist manhaj to express his radical beliefs instead of waging jihad. In the meantime, al-Maqdisi had facilitated the growth of his group of followers, both inside and outside prison, by writing relevant and topical applications of his general beliefs against the Jordanian state, quietist Salafis and the people he considered extremists in takßr. Although he was considered a powerful critic of the state and quietists, his writings on "extremists in tak/ir" sometimes missed the point. While al-Maqdisi's critics interpreted his criticism of excesses in jihad as demeaning to miyahidûn and especially al-Zarqawi, although this was not meant that way, al-Maqdisi seems to have been too quick to dismiss his own detractors as "extremists in tak/ir", even if they only (and rightly) pointed out that he never participated in a jihad. In post-1994 Jordan, al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafism was therefore both an asset and a liability. While some Jordanian radicals - including many who had roots in quietist Salafism themselves - were attracted to his particular 'aqida and manhaj, others - especially those who had never had ties with quietist Salafism before - dismissed him as a dai (caller) instead of a mujähid. Al-Maqdisi's inability to convince his critics that he was part of Jihadi-Salafism too entails that his position as the major scholar of the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi community is contested to this day.

252 Conclusions

This study has described al-Maqdisi as a Jihadi-Salafi with a particular tendency towards quietist Salafism, expressed in his use of sources, arguments and concepts, as well as in his preferred method of applying this creed to society through da'wa While this tendency can be seen throughout his life and his writings, it has not always been successful Whereas Jihadi-Salafis in Saudi-Arabia and many scholars writing about al-wala wa-1-barä liked al- Maqdisi's work, others, such as the Sahwa and especially some Jihadi-Salafis in Jordan, were less enthusiastic or even openly hostile to him and his work. This can probably be explained - respectively - by the radical views al-Maqdisi expresses in his writings, which went too far for the non-violent and partly institutionalised Sahwa, and the strongly doctrinal approach that al-Maqdisi takes in his writings, which was acceptable to Saudi scholars steeped in Wahhabism but unfulfilling to Jordanian action-oriented radicals. This is probably also the reason why al-Maqdisi's combination of support for jihad in theory but sticking to da'wa in practice was easily accepted in Saudi Arabia but not in Jordan In the latter country, al- Maqdisfs critics basically wanted him to be like 'Abdallah 'Azzam (1941-1989), the Palestinian Muslim Brother who not only wrote extensively on jihad but, as soon as the opportunity arose, also moved to Afghanistan to organise and facilitate the armed struggle against the Soviets. This shows that al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafism, despite seemingly combining the "best" of both worlds, clearly has limits Strongly related to the limits of al-Maqdisi's quietist Jihadi-Salafism is a conclusion that goes beyond his personal influence and challenges broader notions of the reasons behind Salafism's popularity Authors such as Olivier Roy suggest that certain Muslims strive for deculturahsed and deterritonahsed forms of Islam so as to purify their religion from the cultural remnants of, for example, Egypt, Pakistan or Morocco ' Since Salafis strive to purify their beliefs from such cultural bida, this seems particularly relevant to Salafism Indeed, the term "Salafism" is sometimes also used simply to indicate "purity" or "authenticity" in Islam, quite apart from any doctrinal connotations.2 This study on al- Maqdisi shows, however, that his close adherence to Wahhabi-Salafi teachings was

1 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam The Search for a New Ummah, New York Columbia University Press, 2004, pp 21 26 2 Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries7 On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism", in Roel Meijer (ed ), Global Salafism Islam s New Religious Movement, London Hurst & Co , 2009, pp 246 249

253 sometimes considered alien by Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis, suggesting different Salafi "cultures" after all. Similarly, ties between Salafi scholars and the regimes under which they live may create new religious traditions. Saudi scholars such as Ibn Baz, for example, have dedicated several fatwas to discussing the proper way to greet non-Muslims, probably because social relations between Muslims is one of the few areas that Saudi scholars have a say in. In Jordan, however, where Salafi scholars are not given social leeway in return for political loyalty, I found that issues such as greeting non-Muslims were not considered important at all. As such, the widely-divergent reception of al-Maqdisi's writings may show that Salafism is not a universal "one-size-fits-all" type of Islam that is easily accepted among like-minded Muslims everywhere. Although stripped of cultural baggage in theory, Salafism can acquire new "cultural" traits and characteristics in practice, making it more acceptable to some than to others. Moreover, while this study has focussed on one ideologue, it has become clear throughout the various chapters that the radicalisation that al-Maqdisi has influenced is not simply a matter of ideas and ideologies. As chapters 4-9 have shown, al-Maqdisi's ideas sometimes coincided with changes in politics and society that made people susceptible to them, particularly in the early 1990s in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This shows that radicalisation does not entail perfectly happy people waking up one day, reading a radical idea and suddenly going off to wage jihad, nor do people radicalise solely through circumstances around them. Instead, this study suggests that it is often a dynamic combination between them and that neither can simply be dismissed, which is something many academics dealing with ideology have perhaps known for some time but may not have seen in such detail. The successes and failures of al-Maqdisi's attempts to influence others therefore entail that the role of ideology in radicalisation is part of a reciprocal relation between ideas and their political and socio-economic surroundings, a cross- fertilisation of text and context, as it were. Furthermore, this book also has implications for the study of dynamics in ideology. Movements and their actors are often masters at framing and reframing, appropriating and re-appropriating terms and concepts in different circumstances while at all times making them seem the definitive interpretations of that particular notion. Throughout this study, we have also seen this phenomenon with regard to terms such as kufr, tawäghit and, especially, a/-waiä' wa-l-bara. The latter term's dynamic change from its pre-Islamic beginnings to its modern-day applications by scholars such as al-Maqdisi attest to the

254 flexibility such ideological concepts have. At the same time, the trajectory of αΐ-walä' wa-1- bara also suggests that concepts can be overstretched and cannot simply be adapted to mean everything. Al-Maqdisi's use of the term to portray "man-made laws" as sinful loyalty that should be fought through jihad as the ultimate form of disavowal was hardly adopted by others, perhaps, as this study maintains, because this interpretation abandoned the concept's core meaning of establishing a strict dichotomy between Muslims and non- Muslims. This suggests that while ideologies and their concepts are flexible, there are limits to which they can be adjusted and they should no lose their core meaning to avoid becoming altogether meaningless. The introduction to this study started by citing an American report that named al- Maqdisi as the most important jihadi scholar alive. Perhaps this is true. Al-Maqdisi has indeed been a major ideologue with regard to al-walâ' wa-l-bara as well as among Jihadi- Salafis in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and, although this is difficult to measure, probably beyond. He has, moreover, been consistent in his beliefs and has not revised or renounced his radicalism, despite possibly being pressured to do so. It is therefore ironic that this man, at the height of the criticism levelled against him in Jordan and on jihad forums, was forced to cite a publication of mine3, a newspaper article by Saudi journalist (and former follower of al-Maqdisi) Mishari al-Dhayidi4 and, indeed, the very American report cited above5 to underline his jihadi credentials. Al-Maqdisi's need to cite these particular sources to assert his credibility is one indication of the ferocity of the debates surrounding his ideas which, as this study has shown, are often closely related to his quietist Jihadi-Salafism. It also indicates that these debates are not about to end anytime soon.

3 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Αί-Laghw fiì-Dìn, www.tawhed.ws (accessed March 2009), 2009, p. 4. ' Ibid., p. 8. 5 Ibid., p. 7.

255 256 Bibliography

Below follows a list of sources cited in this dissertation. The actual number of sources used is far greater but for reasons of space, these have been omitted and only the works referred to in the preceding pages are mentioned. Similarly, the numerous references to articles in newspapers and magazines, including Islamist periodicals, have also been left out.

Interviews

During the course of my research, I have learned a lot from informal conversations I had with many people, as well as prepared interviews with Islamists and others who wished to remain anonymous. These have been omitted from the following list, which only shows the semi-structured interviews of the people who allowed me to use their names.

Muhammad al-Mas'arï, London, 10 March 2008. Sa'd al-Faqlh, London, 11 March 2008. Camille al-Tawîl, London, 28 June 2008. Sa ud al-Sarhän, London, 2 July 2008. 'Abdallah al-'Utaybï, London, 1 August 2008. Fuad Husayn, Amman, 5 August 2008. Fâris Brayzât, Amman, 6 August 2008. Yâsir Abu Hiläla, 7 August 2008. Husayn Abu Rummän, Amman, 11 August 2008. Muhammad Abu Rummän, Amman, 11 August 2008. Shadi Hamid, Amman, 11 August 2008. 'Urayb al-Rantâwî, Amman, 12 August 2008. Hâzim al-Amïn, Beirut, 14 August 2008. Omar Bakri Mohammed, by telephone, 29 August 2008. Mishârï al-Dhâyidî, Riyadh, 8 November 2008. Fahad al-Shâfï, Riyadh, 11 November 2008. Yûsuf al-Daynï, Jeddah, 13 November 2008. 'Abd al-'Azïz b. Faysal al-Râjihï, Riyadh, 18 November 2008. Muhammad al-Dawsarï, Riyadh, 25 November 2008.

257 Jamal Khashuqjî, by telephone, 27 November 2008. Mansür al-Nuqaydän, by e-mail, 6 December 2008. Usäma Shahäda, Amman, 12 January 2009. Yüsuf Rabâba, Amman, 12 January 2009. Hasan Abu Haniyya, Amman, 9 August 2008,13 January 2009. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisî, Amman, 13 January 2009. Marwan Shahäda, Amman, 13 January 2009. Samih Khurays, Amman, 14 January 2009. 'Abdallah Abu Rummän, 15 January 2009. 'Ikrima Gharâyba, Amman, 15 January 2009. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisï, Rusayfa, 17 January 2009. 'Alïb. Hasan al-Halabï, Amman, 19 January 2009. 'Abd al-Rahmân b. 'Abd al-'Azïz al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, 26 November 2008.

Websites and forums used

Please note that some of these websites may not be accessible anymore.

http://dienoelislaam.web-log.nl http://islamancient.com http://otiby.net http://prostrate4allah.wordpress.com http://saaid.net http://tawhid.over-blog.com http://tibyan.wordpress.com/ http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com http://www.al-amanh.net http://www.alarabiya.net http://wTvw.alhramain.com http://www.aljazeera.net http://www.allaahuakbar.in http://www.almaqreze.com http://www.almaqreze.net

258 http://www.almedad.com http://www.almuslimoon.com http://www.alradnet.com http://www.ansar-jihad.net http://www.binbaz.org.sa http://www.e-prism.org http://www.jihadica.com http://www.mahaja.com http://www.memri.org http://www.muslm.net http://www.qaradawi.net http://www.salafìkurd.com http://www.salafipublications.com http://www.tawhed.ws http://www.ummah.net

Media used

Al-'Arab aZ-Yawm Al-'Arabiyya Al-Dustûr Al-Ghad Al-Hayät Al-Jazïra Αί-Quds al-'Arabr Al-Ra'y Al-Riyäd Al-Sabü Aì-Sharq a!-Awsat A/-iVasat A!-lVatan Jakarta Post Majallat al-Ansär Majallatal-'Asr

259 Majallat al-Jamä'a Middle East Times Mu'askar al-Battâr New York Times Qanät al-Jazîra Reuters Sadä l-Jihäd Sawt al-Jihâd The Economist The New Yorker

Books, articles, reports and fatwas

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299 300 Samenvatting

Een quietìstìschejihadi-salafì: De ideologie en invloed van Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Dit boek behandelt de ideologie en invloed van de radicaal-islamitische ideoloog Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (geb. 1959), die van oorsprong Palestijns is maar via Koeweit, Saoedi-Arabië, Irak en Afghanistan/Pakistan uiteindelijk in Jordanië terecht is gekomen, waar hij nu nog woont. De ideologie die al-Maqdisi aanhangt - het salafisme - speelt een belangrijke rol in deze studie. Salafi's worden door mij zo genoemd omdat ze stellen dat het hun plicht is als moslims zo strikt mogelijk en op zoveel mogelijk verschillende manieren de eerste drie generaties moslims - de "vrome voorvaderen" (al-salafal-sälih) - na te volgen in hun levensstijl. Dit uit zich onder andere in een letterlijke lezing van de Qur an en de overleveringen van de Profeet Muhammad (hadfths) en een nauwgezette toepassing van hun interpretatie van die bronnen. Salafi's zijn echter geen homogene groep. Gedeeltelijk in navolging van de bestaande literatuur onderscheid ik drie soorten salafi's: quietisten, die met de vreedzame en apolitieke methode (manhaj) van missionaire activiteiten (da'wa) en onderwijs (tarbiya) hun leer ('aqïda) verspreiden; politico's, die zich actief mengen in politieke debatten en soms ook deelnemen aan de politiek om hun ideeën aan de man te brengen; en jihadi's, die salafistische ideologie combineren met het idee dat jihad (islamitisch geïnspireerde gewapende strijd) niet alleen tegen niet-moslims gevoerd mag worden maar ook tegen moslimleiders die zij als afvalligen zien. Dit proefschrift stelt dat deze verdeling in principe goed is maar verschillen binnen en overeenkomsten tussen de categorieën verhult, zowel op het gebied van de leer als de methode van toepassing hiervan. Al-Maqdisi is hier een voorbeeld van. Hij is, gezien zijn ideeën, duidelijk een jihadi-salafi maar wel eentje met een sterke voorkeur voor bronnen, argumenten, concepten en toepassingen die geworteld zijn in de quietistische traditie. Hij kan daarom ook beter omschreven worden als een "quietistische jihadi-salafi".

Het salafisme is via het Wahhabisme - de centraal-Arabische variant van het salafisme, oorspronkelijk gebaseerd op de ideeën van de hervormer Muhammad b. 'Abd al- Wahhab (1703-1792) - de staatsversie van de islam geworden in Saoedi-Arabië. Als zodanig is het door middel van de oliegelden die dat land bezit verspreid over de hele wereld en vooral het Midden-Oosten, waar het gemakkelijk ingang vond door de crisis van alternatieve ideologieën als het socialisme, Arabisme en Nasserisme. Tegelijkertijd vond er

301 in Egypte en andere landen als gevolg van onder andere politieke crisis en onderdrukking een radicalisering plaats die, in combinatie met het door Saoedi-Arabië verspreide Wahhabisme, tot een militant salafisme leidde. Dit radicaliseerde nog verder door de strijd in Afghanistan tegen de Sovjet Unie (1979-1989), waar vele Arabieren naar toe trokken om een jihad te voeren, de frustrerende terugkeer van deze "Afghaanse Arabieren" naar hun thuislanden, waar ze vaak niet meer welkom waren, en de oorlog tegen Irak (1990-1991). Deze factoren hebben bijgedragen tot het klimaat waarin al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan en andere landen werd gesticht. Het onderwerp van dit proefschrift is de mate van invloed van al- Maqdisi op de ideologische ontwikkeling van deze trends en hoe dit te verklaren is. Al-Maqdisi groeide op in een gezin dat niet erg religieus was maar hijzelf werd dat wel door vrienden en klasgenoten die hem tijdens zijn jeugd in Koeweit meenamen naar de moskee. Hij werd daar niet alleen vromer maar raakte ook meer politiek geïnteresseerd en kwam, onder invloed van radicale predikers en de politieke omstandigheden in het Midden- Oosten, tot de conclusie dat de leiders in de regio ongelovigen (kuffar) zijn omdat ze niet regeren op basis van islamitische wetgeving. Onder invloed van andere denkers raakte hij echter ook gecharmeerd van de puristische en ogenschijnlijk authentieke maar wel apolitieke boodschap van bepaalde salafistische geleerden. Hij begon een zoektocht naar bronnen uit de salafistische traditie die hem in staat zouden stellen zijn politieke engagement te uiten op een religieuze manier. Uiteindelijk vond hij dit tijdens een verblijf in Saoedi-Arabië, waar hij bronnen vond die geworteld waren in de quietistische traditie van het Wahhabisme maar die hem tegelijkertijd de handvatten boden om politieke leiders te bekritiseren en zelfs excommunicatie (tak/ir) op hen toe te passen. Na een periode in Afghanistan/Pakistan te hebben gezeten kwam hij erachter dat het voeren van militaire strijd niets voor hem was en dat hij beter geschikt was als geleerde en prediker die zich slechts met da'wa bezig zou moeten houden. Vanaf deze periode - de jaren '80 - ging al- Maqdisi een radicale jihadi-salafi boodschap prediken maar deed dat onder andere met behulp van elementen uit de leer en methode van het quietistische salafisme. Deze combinatie van aspecten van twee trends binnen een traditie is een belangrijke factor in het verklaren van al-Maqdisi's invloed in sommige gevallen maar, in andere contexten, juist ook van het gebrek daaraan.

De combinatie tussen quietistisch salafisme en jihadi-salafisme die zo aantrekkelijk was voor al-Maqdisi is terug te zien in zijn geschriften. In zijn boeken spreekt hij zich uit voor de klassieke vorm van jihad tegen niet-islamitische aanvallen op moslims en hij

302 schrijft ook lovend over de wereldwijde jihad van Osama bin Laden. Al-Maqdisi besteedt in zijn geschriften echter de meeste aandacht aan de strijd tegen "afvallige" heersers in de moslimwereld. Net als veel andere radicaal-islamitische ideologen en geleerden stelt al- Maqdisi dat deze politieke leiders ongelovigen zijn omdat ze het islamitisch recht (sharfa) niet volledig invoeren in de wetgeving van hun landen. Hoewel al-Maqdisi zich in zijn concentratie op wetgeving onder andere heeft laten beïnvloeden door de Egyptische, niet- salafistische denker Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), laat hij in zijn redenering achter dit standpunt duidelijk zijn voorkeur voor quietistische argumenten zien. In zijn rechtvaardiging van excommunicatie van de heersers onderscheidt al-Maqdisi - anders dan sommige andere jihadi-salafi ideologen - dezelfde soorten zonden, types ongeloof en categorieën van oordeel als quietistische salafi-geleerden, al trekt hij er verdergaande conclusies uit dan zij. Hij concludeert dat de toepassing van "mensenwetten" (cjawänfn wad'iyya) in plaats van die van de islam zo vergaand is in moslimlanden dat er in feite sprake is van een complete vervanging (tabdiî) van de sharfa door een ander systeem. In navolging van verschillende quietistische geleerden stelt al-Maqdisi dan ook dat deze vervanging niet slechts voortkomt uit ondoordacht gedrag of een verkeerde interpretatie van de islamitische bronnen maar het resultaat is van een weloverwogen poging om eigen wetgever te willen spelen naast of zelfs in plaats van God. Dit tast op zijn beurt weer de absolute eenheid van God (tawhid) aan, waardoor het een daad van ongeloof (ku/r) wordt die de dader ervan buiten de islam plaatst en rechtvaardigt dat deze met jihad bestreden wordt.

Jihad is echter niet de enige manier van omgaan met "on-islamitische" elementen in maatschappij en politiek die al-Maqdisi propageert. Opnieuw anders dan veel andere jihadi- salafi's, die zich voornamelijk of zelfs uitsluitend richten op jihad om hun doelen te verwezenlijken, legt al-Maqdisi - wederom in navolging van quietistische salafi's - veel nadruk op de methode van missionaire activiteiten. Volgens hem is jihad in veel gevallen gerechtvaardigd en goed maar kan het uiteindelijke doel - een islamitische staat - niet gerealiseerd worden zonder da'wa-activiteiten die mensen op vreedzame manier moeten tonen waarom de islam de juiste weg is. Deze nadruk op vreedzame middelen om een radicaal doel - de uiteindelijke omverwerping van de huidige regimes in de moslimwereld en de stichting van een islamitische staat - te verwezenlijken wordt onderstreept door al- Maqdisi's kritiek op "extreme" uitingen van excommunicatie en jihad. Hij stelt dat deze middelen voorzichtig en weldoordacht gebruikt moeten worden en bovendien niet op

303 dezelfde manier tegen "gewone" moslims mogen worden toegepast omdat die zich niet schuldig maken aan het implementeren van "on-islamitische" wetgeving. Vanuit deze ideologische achtergrond werden al-Maqdisi's geschriften verspreid over de Arabische en islamitische wereld, aanvankelijk door individuen en later via internet. Op deze manier kwam ook een boek van al-Maqdisi waarin hij stelt dat het Saoedische regime ongelovig is in Saoedi-Arabië terecht. Dit gebeurde rond het moment dat de Irakese dictator Saddam Husayn Koeweit binnenviel in 1990 en Saoedi-Arabië het volgende slachtoffer dreigde te worden. De Saoedische koning vroeg toen een half miljoen Amerikaanse soldaten te komen om het koninkrijk te beschermen tegen een eventuele Irakese aanval. Deze uitnodiging van 500.000 militairen uit de Verenigde Staten riep onder veel Saoedi's woede op en veroorzaakte een oppositiebeweging die voortbouwde op een al langer bestaande politiek-salafistische trend in het land, de Sahwa (heropleving). Hoewel de sterk religieus- (en niet zozeer politiek-) geïnspireerde en radicale boodschap in al- Maqdisi's boek over Saoedi-Arabië niet erg goed aansloot bij deze beweging, kwam het geschrift wel op een moment dat veel Saoedi's ontvankelijk waren voor een stellingname tegen het regime en als zodanig verspreidde het boek zich dan ook snel in het land. Dat de verspreiding van dit geschrift over Saoedi-Arabië niet zonder gevolgen bleef bleek in 2003, toen de Saoedische tak van Al-Qa'ida (QAP) aanslagen begon te plegen in het land en zich sterk geïnspireerd voelde door al-Maqdisi's boek. Waar de Sahwa nog weinig op leek te hebben met de radicale en sterk Wahhabitisch-salafistische taal van al-Maqdisi, sloot dit juist uitstekend aan bij QAP. Hoewel er meerdere redenen zijn waarom al-Maqdisi's boek populair was onder Saoedische radicalen na 2003, is de belangrijkste dat hij in zijn boek veel gebruik maakt van de Saoedische en Wahhabitische geschiedenis, ideologie en geleerden. Doordat al-Maqdisi liet zien dat deze grotendeels quietistische traditie de middelen bood om jihad te rechtvaardigen tegen Saoedi-Arabië, stelde zijn boek QAP in staat de strijd tegen de Saoedische staat te legitimeren en het regime met de eigen retoriek te bestrijden. De goede aansluiting bij de Wahhabitisch-salafistische traditie en alles wat daarmee samenhangt is ook een belangrijke reden waarom al-Maqdisi op een ander gebied waarschijnlijk invloedrijk is geweest, namelijk met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van het concept a!-wa/ä' wa-l-bara (loyaliteit aan moslims en afwijzing van niet-moslims). Deze term is verankerd in de islamitische traditie als geheel maar wordt gedomineerd door wat Wahhabitische geleerden erover geschreven hebben. Een van de dimensies van dit concept is al-istiana bi-l-kuffar (het om hulp vragen van "ongelovigen", vooral ten tijde van oorlog

304 tegen andere moslims), wat als zonde wordt gezien. Deze dimensie was in de 19e eeuw bijzonder belangrijk geworden toen een Saoedische prins de hulp inriep van Osmaanse troepen. Hoewel deze soldaten ook moslims waren, dachten veel Wahhabitische geleerden daar anders over en sommigen van hen schilderden de inschakeling van Osmaanse steun door de Saoedische prins dan ook af als het vragen om "ongelovige" hulp, wat zij stellig afwezen. Al-Maqdisi haalde deze dimensie van αί-walä' wa-1-barâ' weer naar boven door te wijzen op de Saoedisch acceptatie van Amerikaanse hulp, wat rond de Golfoorlog extra duidelijk werd. Het samenspel tussen al-Maqdisi's herontdekking van de ontoelaatbaarheid van αί-isti απα bi-l-kuffcir en de Saoedische roep om Amerikaanse "ongelovige" hulp heeft waarschijnlijk een beweging van herwaardering voor dit concept in gang gezet, waarbij verschillende geleerden dit onderwerp steeds dieper gingen behandelen en in nieuwe situaties gingen toepassen. Tegelijkertijd heeft al-Maqdisi a/-wa!â' wa-!-barâ' ook gebruikt om een salafistischer tintje te geven aan zijn afwijzing van "mensenwetten". Door het volgen van wetgeving gelijk te stellen aan het dienen van afgoden en door dit vervolgens weer afte schilderen als een verkeerde vorm van loyaliteit (waicT), kon al-Maqdisi het belangrijkste onderwerp uit zijn geschriften ("on-islamitische" wetgeving) koppelen aan het zeer Wahhabitische en salafistische αί-waiä' wa-1-bara. Deze verkeerde vorm van loyaliteit moest, aldus al-Maqdisi, tegengegaan worden door het tegenovergestelde van wala: bara. Volgens al-Maqdisi is er geen hogere en duidelijkere vorm van afwijzing dan jihad en dus kon hij door gebruik van het overwegend quietistische concept van aJ-waiä' wa-!-barä' toch weer oproepen tot strijd tegen de heersers in de moslimwereld. Hoewel al-Maqdisi's redenering op zijn eigen manier logisch is, lijkt hij door vrijwel niemand te zijn overgenomen. Waarschijnlijk heeft dit te maken met het feit dat al-Maqdisi met zijn redenering wel heel ver afwijkt van bestaande interpretaties van al-wala wa-l-bara en andere radicale geleerden bovendien al de religieuze middelen hadden om excommunicatie en jihad te rechtvaardigen. Hoewel al-Maqdisi dus succes heeft gehad in zijn pogingen om met zijn quietistisch jihadi-salafisme anderen te beïnvloeden, heeft hij gedeeltelijk dus ook gefaald. Dit is tevens te zien in Jordanië, waar hij in 1992 ging wonen. Toen eindjaren '80 en beginjaren '90 een economische crisis, politieke liberalisering en deliberalisering en een vredesproces met Israël plaatsvonden in Jordanië, gingen sommigen die hierdoor getroffen werden en/of fel tegen het laatste waren radicaliseren. Terwijl crises in vroegere jaren wellicht ten goede kwamen aan linkse oppositiebewegingen of de islamitische Moslim Broederschap, werden

305 deze groepen in de jaren '90 door radicalen niet meer als realistische en werkelijke oppositie gezien. Dit was vooral het geval onder de Jordaniers die na enige jaren in Afghanistan te zijn geweest terugkeerden naar hun land. In plaats van als helden ontvangen te worden vanwege hun strijd tegen de Sovjet Unie, werden ze vaak als criminelen behandeld, met alle frustratie van dien. Precies in deze periode kwam al-Maqdisi naar Jordanië toe met een jihadi-salafì leer die, anders dan in Saoedi-Arabië, nog grotendeels onbekend bleek en daardoor aantrekkelijk was voor radicalen die op zoek waren naar een ideologisch kader dat hun anti-regime ideeën (en soms zelfs aanslagen) een plaats gaf. Als zodanig werd al-Maqdisi dan ook al snel de ideologische leider van de jonge jihadi-salafì gemeenschap in Jordanië. Hij belandde met een deel van zijn volgelingen echter al snel in de gevangenis toen enkelen van hen een aanslag wilden plegen tegen Israël in 1994. De context waarin al-Maqdisi in Jordanië terecht kwam was er een van ideologische verwarring en een zoektocht naar de juiste antwoorden waar vooral armere, radicale jongeren mee zaten. Toen al-Maqdisi en een deel van zijn volgelingen in de gevangenis belandden, werd echter steeds duidelijker welke ideeën men wel en niet wildde aanvaarden. Veel van de jongeren die zich aanvankelijk aangesproken voelden door al-Maqdisi's boodschap, kwamen erachter dat hij zichzelf vooral zag als leraar van radicale ideeën en niet als uitvoerder van radicale acties en vooral in Jordanië aandacht wilde geven aan missionaire activiteiten, niet aan jihad. Hoewel een gedetailleerde lezing van zijn geschriften laat zien dat dit consistent was met de boodschap die hij altijd al had verkondigd, zagen sommigen dit als zwakheid of zelfs verraad. Waar in Saoedi-Arabië sommige radicalen juist veel waarde hechtten aan al-Maqdisi's gebruik van de quietistische traditie waarmee ze opgegroeid waren, werd hem dat in Jordanië - waar sommige radicalen liever wilde vechten dan studeren -juist kwalijk genomen. Al deze diverse interpretaties van al-Maqdisi's quietistische jihadi-salafì ideologie laten zien dat ook radicaal-islamitische ideeën dynamisch en multi-interpretabel zijn. Bovendien laten ze zien dat salafisme, soms omschreven als een soort a-culturele en "pure" islam die overal ingang kan vinden, ook zijn eigen "culturen" kent die niet altijd onderling uitwisselbaar zijn. Tenslotte laat deze studie naar al-Maqdisi's ideeën en invloed zien dat radicalisering geen proces is van politieke en/of sociaal-economische omstandigheden alleen of juist ideologische beïnvloeding op zich maar dat het veeleer voortkomt uit een combinatie van en wisselwerking tussen deze twee.

306 dirrirnliim Vifrae

Johannes Wagemakers werd geboren op 19 mei 1979 te Kaatsheuvel. Hij deed in 1996 met succes het Eindexamen HAVO aan het Willem van Oranje College te Waalwijk. In datzelfde jaar ging hij Engels studeren aan de lerarenopleiding van Fontys Hogescholen te Tilburg, waar hij in 2000 afstudeerde. Na eenjaar te hebben gewerkt als docent Engels op het Willem van Oranje College te Wijk en Aalburg, begon hij in 2001 met de studie Arabisch & Islam aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (RUN, destijds Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen). In 2004 haalde hij aan die opleiding zijn Bachelorsexamen (cum laude) en in 2005 zijn Mastersexamen (cum laude) binnen de afstudeerrichting geschiedenis. Na opnieuw eenjaar te hebben gewerkt als docent Engels aan de Hogeschool Arnhem en Nijmegen (HAN), begon hij in 2006 als promovendus en in 2007 als docent aan de RUN. Sinds 2010 is hij ook werkzaam als onderzoeker bij Instituut Clingendael in Den Haag. Joas Wagemakers zit tevens in de redactie van ZemZem: Tijdschrift: over het Midden-Oosten, Noord-Afrika en islam en blogt opjihadica.com, een weblog over ontwikkelingen in jihad.

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