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1 Baltic Support for Georgia BALTIC SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA: SOLIDARITY, NICHE, AND SECURITY POLICIES MARIAM APRIASHVILI1 June 2017 / Issue #4 Abstract: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proven to be staunch supporters of Georgia and its declared foreign policy goal − integration and eventual membership into the Euro-Atlantic area. In the context of Georgia’s achievements on its Europeanization path, having a constant support from the EU and NATO member states is significant for the country’s Euro- Atlantic future. This research paper examines the motivations behind the Baltic’s Georgian policies, their ardent backing of Georgia and its Europeanization efforts. The paper argues that the following three factors in combinations explain the Baltic support for Georgia: 1. shared historical experiences − solidarity policy; 2. a desire to increase their intra-EU visibility by finding the niches where they claim to have a unique expertise − niche policy; and 3. security considerations − security policy. In other words, the Baltic States’ position towards Georgia is linked both to their identity and strategic interests. While it provides a strong basis for cooperation, it is important for Georgia not to take this support for granted, but to further strengthen ties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to continue sharing their experience, expertise and practical knowledge when it comes to reforms, democratic advancements and Euro-Atlantic integration. Keywords: Baltic states, Georgia, Europeanization, solidarity, niche, security, development cooperation 1Mariam Apriashvili has a Master’s degree in European Union-Russia Studies from Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu (2016). WWW.GIP.GE 1 INTRODUCTION In the context of realizing Georgia’s declared foreign policy goal of becoming integrated into the Euro-Atlantic area, support from EU and NATO member states is of particular importance. The three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – represent countries that clearly understand Georgia’s aspirations and unique needs and have provided consistent support for Georgia’s democratization and efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration. The Baltics’ strong support for Georgia and its declared Euro-Atlantic path is repeatedly confirmed not only by official statements but more importantly by their actions. While close respective bilateral partnerships between Georgia and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are apparent, explanation of the reasons behind this support are not only academically interesting but also useful for Georgia as a state aspiring toward closer integration and eventual membership in the EU and NATO in the process of constructing its foreign policy priorities and orientations. As the motivations behind the Baltic states’ support for Georgia is not well researched, this paper aims to contribute to the deeper understanding of the Baltic states’ respective policies and interests in supporting Georgia. This paper has the following objectives: 1. to better understand Baltic perspectives on Georgia, including the country’s role and place in the Baltic states’ respective foreign policies; and 2. to analyze the motivations behind each state’s ardent political and economic support for Georgia, particularly in its Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Thus, this paper briefly evaluates the Baltic states’ Georgian policies and explains the motivations behind them. This paper is based on desk research and interviews with Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian experts. The research paper argues that the Baltic states’ active support for Georgia is determined by three interrelated factors: common historical experience (referred to here as solidarity policy); each country’s desire to increase its own visibility inside the EU (referred to here as niche policy); and security considerations (referred to here as security policy). In conceptual terms, this argument implies that the Baltic states employ both value/identity-based (“historical memory”) and interest-based (“intra-EU visibility” and “small state threat-perception”2) approaches to foreign policy, meaning that Baltic support for Georgia is grounded both in notions of identity and calculations of strategic interest. 2The terms “historical memory”, “intra-EU visibility” and “small state threat-perception” are used by Vahur Made in his article while explaining Estonia’s foreign policy motivations for the Eastern Partnership, see (Made, 2011) WWW.GIP.GE 2 REVIEWING THE BALTIC STATES’ SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA Georgia is viewed as a strategically important partner by all three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Bilateral partnerships between Georgia and each Baltic state have been particularly strengthened since the Rose Revolution in 2003. Since then, Georgia has actively expressed its desire to implement reforms to consolidate the country’s democracy and become a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic space accordingly, relations with Georgia represent a key priority in each country’s respective foreign policy. Due to historical linkages and shared experiences and challenges existential concerns (i.e. fighting for and seeking survival (for Baltic perspective see Mälksoo, 2006)); the burden of the Soviet legacy; the desire not to be labeled “post-Soviet”; current tense relations with Russia; and Western-oriented foreign policies since regaining independence in the early 1990s the Baltic states feel kinship with Georgia. In particular, the Baltic states understand Georgia’s needs and aspirations and emphasize the importance of close and friendly relations with the country. While taking into consideration Georgia’s aspirations and unique needs, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have provided consistent support for Georgia’s democratization efforts and for its declared foreign policy goal: Euro-Atlantic integration, including eventual membership in both the EU and NATO. Moreover, as Diāna Potjomkina of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs notes on the example of Latvia, although economic ties3 are not well developed, “mutual understanding” (2015: p.127) between the Baltic states and Georgia is strong, something reflected in the frequency of official visits4 to Georgia by high-ranking officials from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (and vice versa) and in quantity of cooperation agreements in the fields of economy, security and defense (including military training), strategic communication, and culture. Non-state relations between the Baltic states and Georgia are also well-developed (including in spheres of tourism, education, and the civic sector).5 3In 2015, Georgia ranked 39th in terms of Lithuania’s most important export market, and 46th – import market. In 2016, number 54 trade partner for Latvia and 66th export market and 41st import market for Estonia in 2014. Sources: http://www.verslilietuva.lt/uploads/media/57beae67a67d0/2016.08.25_Gruzija_ang.pdf https://www.em.gov.lv/lv/jaunumi/14308-aseradens-latvijai-un-gruzijai-ir-plasas-iespejas-ekonomisko-attiecibu-talakai-attistisanai-un- padzilinasanai http://www.postimees.ee/3384241/kruuse-arutas-gruusia-kolleegiga-toiduohutuse-vastavust-eli-nouetele 4One of the recent examples from 2017 is the official visits of the President of the Republic of Latvia Raimonds Vejonis and Minister of Interior Rihard Kozlovskis in March, 2017; of the delegation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia headed by the Minister of MFA Andrejs Pildegovičs in February, 2017; visit of the Estonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser in April, 2017. Also, Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili paid a visit to Estonia in May, 2017; Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius’s visit on 10-13 June, 2017; President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvili had an official visit to Lithuania in March, 2017, while Victor Dolidze - State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration had the official meetings in all three Baltic states in February, 2017. 5For instance, according to the information provided by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Georgia, MFA of Estonia annually grants scholarships for Georgian students to study at the universities in Tartu and Tallinn; production of the Georgian-Estonian movie “Tangerines” WWW.GIP.GE 3 It is worth underlining that after regaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the main foreign policy goal of each Baltic state was the accession to both the EU and NATO. (As Dovilė Jakniūnaitė (2009: pp.123-124), associate professor of Vilnius University, notes: this is to guarantee their security, “ensure survival” in Russia’s neighborhood and to “confirm and validate their status as the true” European (Western) states). Having successfully achieved both objectives by 2004, as well as completing the transformation to market economy and democracy (Kakachia & Skardžiūtė-Kereselidze, 2013: p.193), the Baltic states redefined their foreign policy strategies, paying particular attention to the then-newly developed European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)6(Kesa, 2012: p.98), with a specific focus on its eastern dimension since 2009 – the Eastern Partnership (EaP), of which Georgia is a focal point. As proponents of both deepening and widening the EU with the purpose of creating a larger, stronger, and more united Europe, the Baltic states have supported the development of the EU’s EaP7 initiative and striven to “keep it on the EU’s agenda” (Cigane, 2017:28). It is worth underlining that, as Katerina Kesa notes, “Lithuania was one of the very active and the initiators of a special policy for the EU’s Eastern neighborhood,
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