MAY 2015. Vol 8. Issue 5

Contents A View From the CT Foxhole:

FEATURE ARTICLE An Interview with Michael Morell 1 A View From the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Michael Morell By Bryan Price By Bryan Price

REPORTS 5 Syria’s Sunnis and the Regime’s Resilience By Chris Zambelis

10 Extremist Forums Provide Digital OpSec Training By Aaron Brantly & Muhammad al-`Ubaydi

14 Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack By Geoff Porter

17 Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines By Andrew Watkins

An image from an al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) video shows fighters being trained at a camp in Yemen. 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

r. michael morell recently retired as deputy think we’ve shown over and over again Mdirector of the Central Intelligence Agency. that when we go after them aggressively With 33 years of experience in the intelligence from an intelligence/paramilitary/ community, he is one of the country’s most military perspective, we do great prominent national security professionals. His damage to them and we do so in quick recent book, The Great War of Our Time, was fashion. published in early May and captures his experiences combating terrorism from the highest levels of When you take the pressure off, however, government. The CTC is proud to announce Mr. these groups bounce back very quickly. Morell will be joining the Center as a Senior Fellow That’s because they are vulnerable yet About the CTC Sentinel this summer. agile and resistant organizations. When The Combating Terrorism Center is an inde- you keep the pressure on, you keep them pendent educational and research institution CTC: Congratulations on publishing on their back foot. They’re so worried based in the Department of Social Sciences your book, and thank you for your about their own security that they don’t at the United States Military Academy, West lifetime of service to the nation, have time to plan, train, and plot. But Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Center’s particularly in the fight against when you take that pressure off, they global network of scholars and practitioners to terrorism. Few have as much have time to do all of these things. They understand and confront contemporary threats intelligence experience with terrorism rebuild and reconstitute. posed by terrorism and other forms of political as you do, so what have you learned violence. over the past three decades about these Sometimes after you’ve put a lot of organizations that was not apparent to pressure on a particular group and have you in the early days? succeeded in degrading it, there is the The views expressed in this report are those of tendency to take that pressure off and the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Morell: I think the most important to ease up. It is a natural thing. But the the Department of the Army, or any other agency thing one needs to know about these lesson for counterterrorism is you have of the U.S. Government. organizations is that they are both to keep the pressure on. fragile and resilient at the same time. I MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

CTC: In your book you warn that our the ISIS [also known as the Islamic satisfy concerns about privacy and civil country has a tendency to be too reactive State] threat in the news. People have liberties. than being proactive. The United States forgotten what it was like. had to endure a tragedy like 9/11 before CTC: Several elements of your book taking the terrorism threat seriously In the book I talk about the sign as you touch on the dangers of politicizing and devoting the resources necessary to enter the Counterterrorism Center at intelligence, an unnerving feature combat it. Have we as a country learned the CIA that says, “Today is September of national security in the past two our lesson since 9/11 in this area or do 12, 2001.” That’s the mindset of my guys decades. Given your 33 years in the you think we have slid back into our old at the Agency and that’s the mindset of intelligence community, serving with habits? the Agency when it comes to terrorism. administrations and legislatures When I used to get in my car and drive controlled by both sides of the aisle, Morell: I think we are who we are as a away from the Agency, the further I got, how would you evaluate this problem people and I think we’ve slipped back. the more it felt like September 10, 2001 today? Is the problem better or worse A great example for me would be the than September 12, 2001. than when you first came into the Snowden disclosures of the [Section] Agency? 215 program [of the USA PATRIOT CTC: Along those lines, if you were to Act].1 If those disclosures had been create a new counterterrorism authority that we do not currently have, or “In political fights and in “If 215 had been in place enhance one that already exists, which would it be and why? policy fights—and they are before 9/11, there’s a Morell: I’m really worried about two different things—the chance...we would have [Section] 215. We just had an appellate court say they didn’t think Section 215 CIA often found itself stuck seen the communications of the PATRIOT Act actually allows the government to do what it has been doing. in the middle.” among the 19 hijackers and It didn’t say it was unconstitutional; it didn’t say it was constitutional. 2 might have been able to The court basically said that Congress Morell: I think that during my career, stop the attack.” didn’t give the administration that intelligence has often become the “meat authority. It said very clearly, if you in the sandwich.” In political fights want to have that authority, Congress and in policy fights—and they are two has to be more explicit about it. That different things—the CIA often found made in 2002, with the attacks of 9/11 was the basic message in that court itself stuck in the middle. What I mean very fresh in people’s memory, the ruling. by stuck in the middle is that both sides public reaction would have been, “I would use what we were saying to their want my government to be doing that. I believe 215 is a very important advantage. Both sides would take parts That is exactly the right thing to do.” program. I think it helps fill one of the of what we were saying to support their gaps that existed prior to 9/11. If 215 agenda, and they would often take it out But more than ten years after 9/11, the had been in place before 9/11, there’s of context. public’s memory has faded, and now the a chance, I’m not saying for sure, but public has a different reaction. People there’s a chance we would have seen the On Benghazi, for example, I personally in general are just much less trusting communications among the 19 hijackers found myself stuck in the middle. I of their government. We have lost that and might have been able to stop the think what changed over the last 30 sense after 9/11 that we are vulnerable, attack. years, is that more national security that terrorism is a serious threat, and issues have been politicized. What’s that we need to do what needs to be I’m concerned that with the opposition changed is that more of these issues done. among some members of Congress, have become part of the “bare-knuckle” and with this court ruling, it [Section politics that is Washington. I think the When I was standing in security lines 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act] may challenge for intelligence officers is at airports soon after 9/11, nobody was expire and that would be a very, very to always, always, always stay above complaining. Now when I stand in dangerous thing I think. I really hope that, to never become part of that. We security lines, people are complaining. that Congress does the right thing and have to been seen as objective, totally People have forgotten, even with finds a way to keep the program going, objective, if people are going to listen even if it would have to change a little to to what we say. If we are seen as being in any way political, people are going to 1 Editors note: For more on Section 215 of the Patriot read our stuff with deep skepticism and Act, see Devlin Barrett, “FBI Use of Controversial 2 Editors note: See Charlie Savage and Jonathan Weis- that would be very dangerous for our Patriot Act Section Expands,” The Wall Street Journal, man, “NSA Collection of Bulk Data Is Ruled Illegal,” country. May 21, 2015. New York Times, May 7, 2015.

2 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

CTC: In your book you devote Morell: I think we are properly focused have come close in other ways. As I significant space to this topic, using on ISIS and thinking about the threat in say in the book, this group could bring several examples, the most notable of the right way. down an airliner tomorrow and I would which include the run-up to the Iraq not be surprised, but I believe most invasion in 2003 and the Benghazi I’m more concerned that as we focus Americans would be surprised. attack in which Ambassador J. on ISIS we may lose focus on other Christopher Stevens and three other Islamic extremist groups out there, the CTC: One individual that you raise Americans were killed. How did you most important of which are AQAP concern about in the book is an up- go about educating your intelligence [al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula] and-coming al-Qa`ida leader Farouq al- analysts to deal with this problem of in Yemen, AQSL [al-Qa`ida Senior Qahtani. Many view him as being highly politicizing intelligence? Leadership] in Pakistan, and quite competent and a very charismatic frankly the Khorasan group that is part leader, a possible successor to Ayman Morell: Part of it is training and part of of Jabhat al-Nusra [in Syria]. All three al-Zawahiri. Can you provide a little it is basic, day-to-day leadership. I can of those groups have the capability background on him for readers who remember several times in my career to conduct attacks both in Western may be unfamiliar with this individual? managing analysts whose analysis was Europe and the United States. It is very important that we remain focused “I’m more concerned that on those other threats, which, from a “Al-Asiri’s cooking up homeland perspective today, are still a as we focus on ISIS we may greater threat than ISIS. new ideas all the time. lose focus on other Islamic CTC: In the book you provide detailed He’s training other bomb analyses of the threats posed by some of extremist groups out these groups you just mentioned. I think makers. Who knows how some of our readers may be interested there.” in hearing why AQAP poses “an even many people he has trained greater threat to the U.S. homeland than does ISIS, at least for now.” Can now?” you discuss why you think this is the being used in a policy fight. I would sit case? down with them. I would talk with them and explain why it was happening. And Morell: If you look back at the last three Morell: Sure. Al-Qahtani was sent by I would tell them that their job was to attempted attacks on the homeland the AQ senior leadership to go from ignore it. Don’t pay attention to it. Pay that were directed from overseas—and Pakistan to the Nuristan/Kunar area [in attention to the analysis you do every I’m specifically talking about directed north-eastern Afghanistan] to create a day and call it like you see it. In the attacks—not lone wolf attacks, not potential fall-back position should AQ Iraq/al-Qa`ida story I tell in the book, Boston, not Fort Hood, not what just senior leaders have to leave the FATA I talk about the Vice President’s office happened in Texas. I’m talking about [Federally Administered Tribal Areas pushing us, in my view, inappropriately. the last three directed attacks. They in north-western Pakistan]. He was That’s why it was very important when were all AQAP-directed attacks. They given some operatives to take with him the President of the United States all used very sophisticated explosives and he’s built quite a following among [President George W. Bush] came and technology, all produced by this one the Taliban and other extremists in said to us, ignore that, continue to call it particular bomb maker, Ibrahim al- that area. The terrain he operates in like you see it. It was a really important Asiri. is very challenging—even if you had a message on his part. That messaging strong central Afghan government, they really strengthens our objectivity. It Al-Asiri’s cooking up new ideas all the couldn’t do much to go after bad guys is really important for leaders to have time. He’s training other bomb makers. in those mountains. He’s very difficult those conversations with analysts about Who knows how many people he has to get to. what’s happening and the political trained now? Even if you took him off dynamics going on around them. the battlefield, I’m not sure it would As you said, this is a guy with charisma, significantly affect the group because with leadership capability. This guy is CTC: Prior to September 11, there was he’s trained so many people. AQAP incredibly operationally savvy. I can’t a lack of consensus in our government was the group that sent [Umar Farouk] go into any details about what he does regarding the threat posed by al-Qa`ida. Abdulmutallab successfully,3 and they that gives me that view of him, but he There seems to be such a strong focus has great operational tradecraft, great today on the Islamic State that a similar 3 Editor’s note: Mr. Morell is referring to the so-called security tradecraft, and so I worry underestimation would seem unlikely. underwear bomber who failed to detonate his bomb on a about him. The U.S. military has been Are we thinking correctly about the Christmas Day flight over Detroit in 2009. For more, see aggressively going after him for some threat posed by the Islamic State? Peter Finn, “Al-Awlaqi Directed Christmas ‘Underwear Bomber’ Plot, Justice Department Memo Says,” Wash- ington Post, February 10, 2012.

3 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

time without a lot of success because he we have no anvil in Syria. I haven’t seen House in my view crossed the line is just so talented. a strategy yet that deals with the Syria about what it said about Benghazi, or problem. It’s not like I have one and it’s why Scooter Libby did what he did in CTC: In your opinion, how does the not like I know the answer. It is very, regards to Iraq and al-Qa`ida. I don’t “great war of our time” end? very difficult. know what was in their minds.

Morell: Great question. As you read in In terms of the Iranians, they pose a very The last thing I will say in that regard, the book, I think it is going to be a long significant threat to the region that goes is that a really important point is that war. I think my kids’ generation and well beyond the nuclear issue. There are there isn’t anybody who I worked for in my grandkids’ generation will still be a lot of things the Iranians do in terms government—worked with or worked fighting this fight, but I think it ends of support for their own terrorists for—whose heart was not in the right when it becomes a law enforcement and support for other insurgencies in place, who wasn’t trying to do the right problem solely, when it no longer is a the region. I think we need a broader thing for the country. I never worked paramilitary/military problem. I think strategy with regard to the Iranians. with anybody whose intentions were that’s what we should be shooting It is really important to focus on the somehow misguided. Everybody had for. You’re never going to eliminate it nuclear issue, but it is just as important the objective of protecting the country. completely, but if you can make it just to focus on the bigger strategic threat. There were differences of opinion about a law enforcement problem, I think that how to do that, but everybody was on would be a victory. board with doing everything we could “If you can make it a law to protect the country. CTC: When you examine the situation in the Middle East, what are your major enforcement problem, concerns? What is your outlook on Iraq, Syria, and our country’s future I think that would be a relationship with Iran? victory.” Morell: Let me start with a huge caveat. If you find someone who tells you they know what the Middle East will look like in five years, they are either CTC: You have done several interviews lying or they don’t know what they are for your book. What is one question talking about. I don’t think anybody can that you wish people would ask about honestly say what this region is going to the book but have not? Or what do you look like. think people should be focusing on in the book but have not? What I can say is that I do have quite a bit of confidence that the Iraqis Morell: There are a couple things. The will be able to take back the territory first is if you read the book closely, ISIS took. I saw a great map on the I actually critique myself more than CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] other people. There are a number website a couple weeks ago that showed of places where I said, “I would’ve the territory ISIS controlled at its peak done this differently. I would’ve done in Iraq and the territory they control that differently.” And that is really a today, and they’ve lost approximately reflection of what I’ve tried to do in my 25 percent of what they had, which is a career. I’ve always tried to self-assess. pretty significant number. I think we, I’ve always asked myself: how did I do the Iraqis, the Shi`a militias, and the and how could I have done better? Iranians have all done a pretty good job taking back some of that territory. Second, if you read the book closely, I critique what some other people have At the same time that I have this said and done, but in most cases I don’t confidence about Iraq, I’ve got little– attribute intentions to their behaviors, to-no confidence that we’re going to be actions and speech. As an intel analyst, able to successfully deal with ISIS in you learn pretty quickly that when you Syria. Basically, they have safe haven speculate about intentions, you’re often in eastern Syria and there isn’t much wrong. pressure being put on them there. I think what is scary is that as we squeeze So I didn’t speculate about some them in Iraq, they will just go back into Republicans saying things that weren’t Syria. So we have a hammer in Iraq, but true about Benghazi or why the White

4 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

Syria’s Sunnis and the ranks of the Syrian military have the Islamic State, has also helped the The Regime’s Resilience also taken their toll.4 Ba’athist regime hang on. By Chris Zambelis Some observers see these developments Still, these elements do not completely as signs of the Ba’athist regime’s explain its ability to endure. The syria’s calamitous civil war is now in its impending collapse but that is an regime’s notable cohort of Alawite fourth year. Amid the rising body count overreach. Despite the losses, the leaders and the support that it draws and destruction, there is little clarity regime is estimated to retain control from many Alawites and other ethnic about the viability of Syrian President of around half of Syrian territory and and religious minorities as a bulwark Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime up to three quarters of the country’s against the majority Sunni population even as the numerous violent insurgent population.5 It also continues to contest that has spearheaded the revolt is also organizations that seek to topple his areas that have fallen out of its reach.6 cited as a key factor for its durability. administration receive ample attention. Little has been said, however, of the Social media has enabled observers There is a web of factors contributing to Ba’athist regime’s support among to scrutinize the armed opposition the regime’s remarkable resilience. Its Syria’s majority Sunni population. in almost real-time via their public willingness to employ brutal, scorched- declarations, battlefield operations, and earth military tactics without regard for This article will examine the role of propaganda. civilian life and the support—political, Syria’s Sunnis in helping to sustain economic, military, and moral—that it the Ba’athist regime. It finds that while In contrast, comparatively little receives from foreign actors led by Iran, much of the conventional thinking attention has been paid to the causes of Lebanese Hezbollah, Russia, and Iraq behind the regime’s resilience is valid, the regime’s resilience. It recently has have helped it survive. The inherent a broader explanation is needed. This suffered a string of territorial setbacks, disunity of the ranks of the armed more expansive approach also considers including the loss of Idlib’s provincial opposition, whose most formidable the regime’s ability to draw on segments capital and other territories to radical elements are a collection of rival and of the Sunni majority that actively intersecting radical Islamist currents “Little attention has been that include al-Qa`ida-affiliated Jabhat “Little has been said, al-Nusra and its offshoots such as paid to the causes of the however, of the Ba’athist regime’s resilience.” 4 Frederick Deknatel, “Syria’s Assad Looks Weaker regime’s support among as Currency Slides and Army Fractures, “World Politics Review, May 4, 2015. Syria’s majority Sunni 5 For example, Fabrice Balanche estimates that the Islamist advances led by al-Qa`ida’s Ba’athist regime may control between 55 and 72 percent population.” Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra of the Syrian population. See Aron Lund, “The Political (Support Front) and aligned insurgents Geography of Syria’s Civil War: An Interview with Fab- operating under the Jaish al-Fatah rice Balanche,” Syria in Crisis (Carnegie Endowment for (Army of Conquest) banner.1 International Peace), January 30, 2015. Joshua Landis support, tolerate, or remain otherwise estimates that the Ba’athist regime can claim dominion invested in its survival and which has These losses follow the Islamic State’s over around 65 percent of the Syrian population. See proved, despite its embattled position, capture of Al-Raqqa Province in 2014 Aaron David Miller, “Is Bashar al-Assad Finished, For to be vital to its survival. and other parts of eastern Syria,2 and Real, This Time, Again?,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2015. the seizure of Busra al-Sham and Nassib 6 Sammy Ketz, “Syria Army Pushes Toward Jisr al- The “Alawite Regime” in Syria’s southern Deraa Province Shughur Seeking Morale Boost,” Agence France Presse, Syria’s demographic composition is a by insurgents in March and April, May 11, 2015. Also see Christopher Kozak, “An Army in recurring theme in the civil war. The 3 respectively. All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria,” Insti- Ba’athist regime and its entrenched tute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report power structures are frequently defined A cascade of economic troubles and 26, April 2015. At the same time, recent reports suggest through a binary of minoritarian and 7 suggestions of growing attrition within that the regime may be limiting its engagement to areas majoritarian power dynamics. In this it deems most strategically important, including major reading, an Alawite-Arab clan, led by the cities in central western Syria such as Damascus, Homs, heir to the late family patriarch former 1 Liz Sly, “Assad’s Hold on Power Looks Shakier Than and Hama, the coastal northwest, and the territories president Hafez al-Assad, the extended Ever as Rebels Advance in Syria,” Washington Post, adjacent to its border with Lebanon. This would result family of relatives, and associates rules April 26, 2015. in the de facto partition of the country, as the regime over a majority Sunni populace and a 2 Martin Armstrong, “Islamic State Strengthens Con- would, in essence, concede territories under the sway mosaic of other ethnic and religious trol in Syria,” Al-Jazeera [Doha], August 27, 2014. of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other armed 3 Donna Abu-Nasr and Dana Khraiche, “Assad Re- opposition factions. See Sammy Ketz, “Syrian regime ‘to 7 Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the minds Syrians Who is Leader After Military Setbacks,” accept de facto’ partition of country,” Agence France- Assad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013,” Middle East Bloomberg, May 6, 2015. Presse, May 24, 2015. Policy Council, 19:1, Spring (2012).

5 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

minorities. Sunnis make up between 70 these elements transcend religion threat to their economic interests.13 and 80 percent of the total population.8 and ethnicity to encompass identities Nevertheless, the regime eventually The al-Assads, according to this view, and affinities such as class and social cultivated new networks of support act on behalf of the Alawite minority structure, as well as urban-rural among the very communities that it had that makes up between 8 and 12 percent cleavages. The prominence of Alawites sidelined, particularly, the powerful of the total population. This perspective in Syrian politics and society is not in Sunni merchant classes centered in is encapsulated in references to an question. The elevation of Alawites cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Alawite regime, a label that ascribes it and their eventual assimilation into and Hama. It also lifted up rural-based with an outwardly apparent Alawite the corridors of power and over Alawite and other minority business identity and agenda.9 representation in ranking positions in the Ba’athist bureaucracy and security “The Ba’athist regime “[The conventional] apparatus is well documented.11 manufactured an unspoken portrayal of the regime The history of tensions between the Alawite minority and Sunni majority compact that balanced... misrepresents the is a recurring theme in assessments of the current conflict. The Alawites, a minority interests with complexity of Syria’s brand historically marginalized community that occupied a subservient role in Syrian those of an influential of authoritarianism.” society in relation to the Sunni majority, hailed from Syria’s impoverished rural segment of the Sunni hinterlands along the coast and in the mountainous northwest.12 Their majority.” This portrayal of the regime empowerment through military service misrepresents the complexity of Syria’s during the French Mandate and later brand of authoritarianism. It also through Ba’athist activism was met with obfuscates the mechanics of its inner great trepidation by much of the Sunni interests,14 solidifying a powerful base workings, centers of authority, and population. This was especially true of businessmen and other influential sources of support.10 Taken together, for its most conservative segments, in notables with a vested stake in regime particular the largely Sunni landowning survival.15 In doing so, the Ba’athist and urban merchant classes that 8 Syria’s Sunni majority population can be further dominated the economy. They viewed demarcated along ethnic lines. It is generally accepted 13 Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” Middle Alawites as culturally backward and the that Arabs account for approximately between 60 and East Report, 12:110, November/December (1982): Sabrina secularism, socialism, and nationalism 65 percent of Syria’s Sunni population while Kurds and Mervin, “Syria’s Alawites,” Le Monde Diplomatique promulgated by Ba’athist ideology as Turkmen account for about ten and three percent of the [Paris], January 2013. anathema to their worldview and a remaining population, respectively. Syria is also home 14 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, to small community of Sunni Circassians, Christian, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, Druze, and Shi’a Arabs. Armenians, and Assyrians are Press, 1999), David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p 8. also among the balance. Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (New Haven, Yale Uni- 15 Bassam Haddad, “The Syrian Regime’s Business versity Press, 2005), Bassam Haddad, Business Networks 9 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “The Dangerous Illusion of Backbone,” Middle East Report, 42:262, Spring (2012). in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience an Alawite Regime,” Boston Review, June 11, 2013. For a more thorough treatment of the nexus between (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012). 10 A wide body of multidisciplinary research has business networks in Syria and the Ba’athist regime, shed light on the characteristics of the Ba’athist regime 11 For an overview of the ascent of Alawites in public see Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The from different perspectives. See Hanna Batatu, Syria’s and military sectors orchestrated by France during the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford, Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and French Mandate, see Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, Stanford University Press, 2012). Incidentally, segments Their Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their of the Sunni merchant classes and other conservative 1999), Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Politics, pp. 155–158, Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle segments of society that were most affected by the Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970(Ithaca: Cornell for the Middle East, pp 14-23, Nikolaos Van Dam, The Ba’athist regime’s social and economic policies would University Press, 1999), Volker Perthes, The Political Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad lend their support to the violent insurgency launched Economy of Syria Under Asad (London, I.B. Tauris Pub- and the Ba’th Party, pp 26-27, Nazih N. Ayubi, Over- by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood between 1976 and lishers, 1995), Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle 1982 that led to the destruction wrought on Hama. The in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th East (London, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), pp 90-91, business networks cultivated by the Ba’athist regime Party (London, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), Patrick Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in would remain largely loyal during this period of crisis. Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, Syria,” Middle East Policy Council, 19:2, Summer (2012): For more background, see Nikolaos Van Dam, The University of California Press, 1988), Flynt Leverett, Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial By Fire. (Washington, French Divide and Rule,” Middle East Policy Council, 18: and the Ba’th Party, pp 105-110, Fred Lawson, “Social D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2005), Lisa Wedeen, 4, Winter (2011). Bases for the Hama Revolt,” Middle East Report, 12:110, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols 12 Nir Rosen, “Assad’s Alawites: Guardians of the November/December (1982), Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, University of Chicago Throne,” Al-Jazeera [Doha], October 10, 2011. Muslim Brethren,” Middle East Report,12:110, Novem-

6 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

regime manufactured an unspoken and the security apparatus as well current, is a Sunni enterprise.21 The compact that balanced Alawite and as in more traditional spheres of sectarian motivations that are driving other minority interests with those of communal, clan, and tribal affairs. This large segments of the opposition to the an influential segment of the Sunni has helped cultivate a new elite whose Ba’athist regime cannot be understated. majority.16 loyalties transcend religion and other primordial factors in favor of a shared The influence of radical Sunni Islamist Interestingly, the prominent role of commitment to the Ba’athist regime.19 currents, including extremist Salafists Alawites has not translated into special The over representation of Alawites in who conceive their campaign as part of privileges for the group in general. This positions of influence in the political, a greater sectarian struggle to topple military, and security apparatus today “The prominent role of is largely the result of the legacy of the “Sunnis (and others) who French Mandate and former Syrian Alawites has not translated president Hafez al-Assad’s attempt to harbor genuine misgivings build a cadre of trusted loyalists bound into special privileges for by family, kinship, clan, and tribal toward the government ties rather than any sense of Alawite the group in general... even solidarity.20 may still feel more as most of them continue to The Sunni Factor threatened by the armed While resentment among Syrians toward side with the Ba’athists.” the Ba’athist regime may transcend opposition.” religious affiliation and ideology, the Syrian opposition, especially its armed is the case even as most of them continue a heretical government, is hugely to side with the Ba’athists.17 Alawites important within the wider opposition. have been subjected to the repression, 19 Yahya Sadowski, “The Evolution of Political Identity Salafist militants, for example, poverty, and disenfranchisement in Syria,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, perceive Alawites as unbelievers and experienced by most Syrians under (eds) Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, the Ba’athist administration as an Ba’athist rule.18 Cornell University Press, 2002), pp 145-147. Bashar al- appendage of archenemies Iran and Assad’s marriage to the British-born and-raised Asma Lebanese Hezbollah.22 At the same Regime elites, including members of al-Akhras, the daughter of a prominent Sunni family time, notable segments of Syria’s Sunni the al-Assad clan, have been known from Homs, is often described as another example of majority remain supportive of the to regularly intermarry across the strengthening ties between the Ba’athist political Ba’athists for any number of reasons.23 confessional lines in an apparent and military elite and Syria’s influential Sunni business The nature of authoritarian regimes attempt to widen their patronage and class. See I. Briscoe,F. Janssen, & R. Smits, “Stability and makes it difficult to gauge feelings of client networks in politics, business, Economic Recovery After Assad: Key Steps for Syria’s approval (or opposition). Nevertheless, Post-Conflict Transition,”Clingendael-Netherlands Insti- it is important to consider the various tute for International Affairs, No. 2, (November 2012). ber/December (1982). gradations of support that the present 20 Hanna Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social 16 A Correspondent in Damascus, “Syria’s Alawites Roots of Syria’s Ruling, Military Group and the Causes Torn Between Regime, Opposition,” Al-Monitor, August 21 It is important to point out that the Syrian opposi- for its Dominance,” Middle East Journal, 35:3 (Summer 19, 2013. tion, while overwhelmingly Sunni in its composition 1981): pp. 331-334. This legacy is apparent in the current and by now dominated by various radical Islamist 17 The reasons behind Alawite support for the Ba’athist Ba’athist hierarchy inherited by Bashar al-Assad, espe- currents, did at one point reflect a more diverse coali- regime are often framed in a sense of communal affinity cially the military and security services, where members tion, especially in the early stages of the uprising prior shared with Al-Assad. In reality, the reasons behind of the al-Assad clan figure prominently in leadership po- to its eventual militarization. Moreover, segments of Alawite support for the Ba’athist regime are diverse. For sitions. For example, Bashar’s brother Maher al-Assad the Alawite community, long regarded as a monolithic example, in light of the prevalence of extremist Islamist commands elite units such as the Republican Guard and bloc of support for the Ba’athist regime, has reflected currents within the armed opposition, including hard- the army’s Fourth Armored Division. The role of family divergent allegiances and objectives with respect to both line Salafist elements that continue to single out Alawi- networks also extends to the economic sector. Rami the regime and the opposition. See Oula Abdulhamid tes as heretics and apostates, many Alawites support the Makhlouf, Bashar’s maternal cousin, widely reputed Alrifai, “Not Alright With Syria’s Alawites: Growing Ba’athist regime for the sake of their own survival. See as Syria’s richest man, heads a number of strategic Resentment Splits Assad’s Power Base,” Foreign Affairs, Aziz Nakash, “The Alawite Dilemma in Homs: Survival, business concerns that span the telecommunications, December 3, 2014. Solidarity, and the Making of a Community,” Friedrich- banking, real estate, tourism, and media sectors. The Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Middle East and North late Hafez al-Assad’s rule has weighed heavily on his 22 Guido Steinberg, “Sunni vs. Shi’a: Opposition Fueled Africa, March 2013, Lauren Williams, “Syria’s Alawites successor, especially in earlier considerations of Bashar By Power Politics,” German Institute for International and Not Deserting Assad Yet, Despite Crackdown,” Middle al-Assad’s potential as a reformer following his assump- Security Affairs, August 13, 2013. East Eye, September 11, 2014 tion of power in 2000. See Flynt Leverett, Inheriting 23 Michael Pizzy and Nuha Shabaan, “Sunnis Fill Rebel 18 Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Syria: Bashar’s Trial By Fire, (Washington, D.C., Brook- Ranks, but Also Prop Up Assad Regime,” USA Today, Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, pp 226-230. ings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 22-56. August 2, 2013.

7 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

regime continues to draw from this The strong Sunni presence in Syria’s from as far away as Afghanistan34 has critical segment of Syrian society.24 military and security apparatus has also strengthened the Ba’athist regime. been overlooked. Much of the Ba’athist Sunnis (and others) who harbor genuine military and security apparatus is At the same time, Sunni participation misgivings toward the government commanded by Alawite officers who are likely mitigated against a catastrophic may still feel more threatened by the bound by relations to family, kin, clan, collapse of the Ba’athist military. armed opposition. These feelings are or tribe. Many elite squads and sections Indeed, Sunni participation has not likely to have crystallized given the are led directly by al-Assad’s relatives. been lost on the opposition.35 prevalence of radical Sunni Islamist Nonetheless, Sunnis and, more currents within the insurgents. These specifically, Sunni Arabs, continue to Nevertheless, there are reports that sentiments are reflected in numerous make up the majority of the regular Sunnis are sometimes assigned to less segments of Syria’s Sunnis. They are army’s rank-and-file membership. sensitive positions and have otherwise most apparent, however, among urban become the subject of increased Sunnis, including the middle- and Estimates indicate that Sunnis account attention by commanders.36 In a manner for between 60 and 65 percent of the “The strong Sunni regular army.28 Despite mass defections “Sunni participation by thousands of mostly Sunni conscripts presence in Syria’s military and mid-level officers and growing likely mitigated against a reports of recruitment problems,29 and security apparatus has Sunnis continue to be well represented catastrophic collapse of the in Syria’s security institutions in also been overlooked.” various capacities, including leadership Ba’athist military.” and other specialized roles. This is the case even as the reasons behind their continued service—and that of other upper-class strata and, in particular, Syrians—may vary.30 characteristic of autocratic regimes, the business and merchant classes the Syrian army and other sections of that were cultivated by the Ba’athist The participation of auxiliary elements the security apparatus remain highly regime over many years.25 The armed such as Lebanese Hezbollah31 and Iran’s politicized institutions.37 opposition has singled out a number of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps powerful Sunni businessmen for their Quds Force32 in Syria in both kinetic At the same time, Sunnis are known purported roles in helping to sustain the and advisory capacities, combined with to have participated in the Popular Ba’athists, including the organization the presence of Shi’a militia formations Committee detachments that preceded of irregular militias; and the smuggling from Iraq,33 and other Shi’a volunteers the summer 2012 establishment of of hard currency, arms, and critical the National Defense Force (NDF) goods.26 paramilitary. As an auxiliary to the Syria’s Urban Poor: Why the War for Syria’s Future regular military and security apparatus, Will Be Fought Over The Country’s New Urban Vil- Class-based dynamics have also shaped the NDF has emerged as a critical lages,” PRISM, National Defense University, Center negative perceptions of the opposition component of the Ba’athist military for Complex Operations, Vol. 4, Syria Supplemental, among the many Sunnis who remain (2014): pp. 33-41. loyal to the current regime. The perception of the opposition as a rural- 28 Vicken Cheterian, “The Syrian War is More Than based movement led by religiously Sectarian,” Al-Hayat, May 17, 2015. Shi’I Militias to Syria,” Middle East Institute, March 16, conservative, poor, and unsophisticated 29 Maya Gebeily, “Pro-Regime Syrians Back Army but 2015. villagers has alienated wide segments of Dodge Draft,” Agence France Presse, April 20, 2015. 34 Farahmand Alipour, “Iranian Doc Follows Afghan urban Sunnis, who have little in common 30 For example, many Sunnis and others within the Fighters in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 4, 2015. socially with their co-religionists.27 military and security apparatus may be unconvinced of 35 This view is encapsulated in the following observa- the armed opposition’s capacity to prevail, hence their tion by an opposition activist: “We all know that most of 24 For example, some observers have posited that the decision to side with what they believe to be the stron- the security forces shooting at us and killing us are Sun- incumbent regime is more popular than is commonly ac- gest actor on the ground. See Michael Pizzi and Nuha nis, not Alawites, this is not about sect” See Phil Sands, cepted. See Musa al-Gharbi, “Syria Contextualized: The Shabaan, “Sunni vs. Sunni: Pro-Revolution Sunnis La- “Sectarianism Casts Shadow Over Syria’s Uprising,” Numbers Game,” Middle East Policy, 20:1 Spring (2013). ment Assad Backers,” Syria Direct, June 21, 2013. National [Abu Dhabi], June 21, 2012. Also see Yahya 25 Sam Dagher, “Asad’s Not-So-Secret Weapon: Loyal 31 Amal Saad, “From Classic to Post-Resistance: On Alous, “Sunnis Against Sunnis,” Syrian Observer, April Syrian Businessmen,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, Hezbollah’s Transformation,” Al-Akhbar [Beirut], 8, 2015.

2013. February 13, 2015. 36 Zenobie, “How Syria Works,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 26 Michael Pizzy and Nuha Shabaan, “Under Sectarian 32 Nabih Bulos, “Commander’s Death in Syria Points Paris, October 4, 2011.

Surface, Sunni Backing Props Up Assad Regime,” Syria to Iranian Role in Civil War,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, 37 Ibid. and Michael Pizzi and Nuha Shabaan, “Sunni Direct, June 20, 2013. 2014 vs. Sunni: Pro-Revolution Sunnis Lament Assad Back- 27 David Kilcullen and Nate Rosenblatt, “The Rise of 33 Aymenn Jawaad Al-Tamimi, “The Return of Iraqi ers,” Syria Direct, June 21, 2013.

8 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

machine.38 The administration is also deployment of shabiha gangs is an The regime’s ability to draw on segments reported to be leveraging the NDF as a example. 42 of Syria’s Sunni majority in the face way to co-opt or otherwise neutralize of an intensifying insurrection rooted disenchanted insurgent elements.39 The role and influence of Sunni Arab in the wider Sunni population has far tribes in the ongoing conflict remain reaching implications that go beyond Participation in the NDF, in lieu of topics of close scrutiny. Syria’s President al-Assad’s ability to remain conscription in the regular Syrian traditional tribal heartlands along the in power. Regardless of the outcome, army—a prospect that has become borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey the web of entrenched interests within increasingly unpopular—also appears have emerged as bastions for the different the Sunni population that remain loyal to be a way to ensure that Syrians ideological currents represented within to, or otherwise invested in the survival remain loyal to the Ba’athist regime or the armed opposition. Yet the Bagarra of the current regime will have to otherwise neutral.40 tribe, which contains both Sunni and renegotiate their status in what is likely Shi’a members, has remained largely to be a treacherous political climate. In loyal to the al-Assad government.43 this context, the deep rifts that have “It is likely that significant emerged between different segments of The Ba’athist regime has also bolstered the Sunni majority will constitute a new segments of the regime’s the NDF’s ranks with loyal Sunni Arab set of political fault lines. tribesmen who act as crucial proxies Sunni constituency will for the regime to different degrees in Consequently, it is likely that significant provinces as diverse as Al-Raqqah, Al- segments of the regime’s Sunni remain supportive...for Hassakah, Dara’a, and Deir al-Zour.44 constituency will remain supportive of the regime for fear of a more dangerous fear of a more dangerous Conclusion outcome, including a protracted civil While it is difficult to gauge in war that persists well beyond al- outcome.” quantitative or otherwise precise terms, Assad’s tenure. Meanwhile, the regime observers should more carefully weigh will continue to exploit the ingrained the possibility that it is the Ba’athist divides within the Sunni majority in an regime’s support base within the Sunni attempt to preserve its position at all Sunnis, for example, are well majority, however narrow and limited it costs. represented in NDF units based in may be relative to the wider community, Aleppo and elsewhere.41 Sunnis have that has ensured its survival until now. Chris Zambelis is a Senior Analyst focusing on also continued to play a prominent role the Middle East for Helios Global, Inc., a risk in other sections of Syria’s vast security management group based in the Washington, D.C. apparatus. area. The opinions expressed here are the author’s 42 Agence France-Presse, “Syria Rebels Condemn alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Reported Executions,” August 3, 2012. The shabiha The Ba’athist’s mobilization of shabiha Helios Global, Inc. networks mobilized during the current conflict have (ghosts), irregular militia formations their origins in a network of organized criminals. For that were used to quell displays of more on the origins of the shabiha, see Yasin al-Haj popular dissent and perform other acts Salih, “The Syrian Shabiha and Their State: Statehood of repression, has seen notable traction and Participation,” Kalamon Magazine, March 3, 2014, among Sunnis. The participation of Winter Edition, No. 5. the predominantly Sunni Berri clan, a prominent criminal organization 43 Dawn Chatty, “Syria’s Bedouin Enter the Fray: How based in Aleppo that has close ties Tribes Could Keep Syria Together,” Foreign Affairs, to the regime, in the recruitment and November 13, 2013, Nicholas A. Heras and Carole A. O’Leary, “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Sur- vey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria,” Terrorism Monitor 38 For more on the role of informal militias in irregular (Jamestown Foundation), 11:13. warfare, including their propensity for engaging in criminality and human rights abuses, see Stathis N. 44 Haian Dukhan, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, (Cambridge, Revolution,” Open Democracy, December 19, 2012, Haian Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp 107-110. Dukhan, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising,” Syrian Studies, 6:2 , Nicholas A. Heras, “Shaykh Muham- 39 Syrian Observer, “We Defected from FSA Over Siege, mad al-Faris: Assad’s Man in Qamishli,” Militant Despair: Al-Anfal Commander,” March 24, 2015. Leadership Monitor Briefs (Jamestown Foundation), 6:3. 40 Ghaith Abdel Aziz, “With Assad’s Troops There are also reports of fluctuating loyalties among Stretched, Fighters Join NDF for Salary and Stability,” Syria’s major tribes with respect to the Ba’athist regime Syria Deeply, October 8, 2014. and various armed opposition currents, including the 41 Edward Dark, “Pro-Regime Sunni Fighters in Islamic State. See Aron Lund, “What’s Behind the Aleppo Defy Sectarian Narrative,” Al-Monitor, March Kurdish-Arab Clashes in East Syria?,” Carnegie Endow- 14, 2014. ment for International Peace, January 23, 2015.

9 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

Extremist Forums Provide time-consuming and difficult) for law forum and chat room participants enforcement and intelligence agencies are turning to one another with Digital OpSec Training to follow nefarious actors. The average increasing frequency to learn best By Aaron Brantly and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi potential foreign fighter or terrorist practices for digital operational cannot pick up the phone to call the security. Many of the questions are the average netizen has terrible digital Geek Squad for help hiding their digital mundane and the answers are easily hygiene. We click on random links, communications. Even as a well trained found either by consulting NGO sites open emails from unknown individuals, cybersecurity professional, it remains dedicated to providing information use public WiFi hotspots, leave remarkably difficult to maintain highly about online privacy and security or computers and devices unsecured, and robust digital operational security. popular commercial sites dedicated often do not even use basic anti-virus to information security.3 Yet, despite packages. Most Chief Information Instead of calling help desk support, multiple other avenues of information, Systems Officers’ largest problem is not jihadists have formed online technical questions of security regarding popular a talented nation state, but rather lazy support communities. The authors platforms such as Skype, Google, or ignorant employees, oblivious to the examined a variety of open source Gmail, WhatsApp, Tor Mail, are being risk they are exposing themselves, their data comprising more than 40 forum posed in jihadi forums. Individuals conversations over the past year “Instead of calling help in which terrorists and potential “The level of technical terrorists examine, discuss, and ask desk support, jihadists for assistance in establishing robust sophistication...indicates digital operational security. We have have formed online leveraged forums including al-Minbar a mid-level understanding al-I`lami al-Jihadi, an open network technical support that does not require registration unless of digital operational posting content or engaging in personal communities.” communications via the platform; security.” Shmukh al-Islam, a password-protected network with limited user access; and Al-Fida’, a network similar to Shmukh networks, and their systems to through al-Islam. Each of these networks also with higher levels of technical acumen simple careless acts. suffers from its own issues including regularly warn those inquiring about hacking, but each contains content commonly used products, indicating The majority of individuals, whether related to digital operations security.2 both their fundamental lack of security using personal or corporate devices, and the prevalence of surveillance by do not have much need for high levels This study illustrates a skill gap nation states on these platforms. These of digital operational security (often between those who are capable of hiding low-level questions are quickly and shortened to Digital OpSec) beyond their digital tracks and those who effectively answered. This illustrates the basic ability to protect personal are not. The material also highlights a fundamental change in Tactics, information from malicious actors. the regularity of these conversations, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) When they have trouble with their sometimes in response to illegally associated with online behavior. computers they take them to their local obtained and disseminated classified help desk support staff, call remote documents, including those released by These low-level questions are the tip of help hotlines, or ask their children. Edward Snowden. These discussions an iceberg and demonstrate that even However, many of the concerns the illustrate the role that information leaks inexperienced users are beginning to average person avoids on a daily basis can play in the digital environment for recognize the fundamental constraints become increasingly important when terrorist organizations. This analysis of associated with using digital tools to individuals are engaged in illegal or more than 40 forum conversations, each communicate for jihadist purposes. potentially illegal behavior. with multiple threads and participants over the past year, presents a robust

Numerous news stories show how representative sample of the dynamics 3 We will not focus on the NGOs that fund the develop- engagement with the Internet or mobile and issues facing terrorists in their ment of these projects. The development process works phones can generate a significant leakage efforts to achieve digital operational in such a way as to include multiple government and 1 of digital breadcrumbs. These clues security. privately funded NGOs as well as software develop- make it possible (although still quite ment groups who receive government grants and funds. The Jihadi Help Desk Various aspects of different software packages can 1 For a discussion on some aspects of digital tracking This analysis indicates that jihadist be developed independently of one another through see: Aaron Brantly, “You Were Identified as a Partici- multiple funding streams. Often software development pant in a Mass Disturbance, ” National Democratic 2 Muhammad al-`Ubaydi collected dozens of conversa- requests are in response to perceived and actual threats Institute for International Affairs-Tech blog, January tions from these forums on issues related to digital posed to democracy and human rights activists as well 24, 2014 operations security. as to civil liberties and privacy.

10 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

The level of technical sophistication security mechanisms such as registered products serve valuable legitimate associated with the average user’s emails and phone numbers so that purposes when civil liberties are under question indicates a mid-level individuals can take advantage of more sustained threat. Many of these tools understanding of digital operational popular platforms such as Twitter and can help protect personal information security often only secured through Facebook for propaganda purposes. when traveling, particularly when consistent study or training. accessing insecure WiFi networks or Each of these tools provide ways to when visiting countries that spy on More experienced users providing establish or enhance anonymity when foreign nationals.11 advice in our sample pointed to other communicating online. Combined use tools, among them were some that are of these tools does not fully safeguard Digital security tools ostensibly often used to safeguard human and the anonymity of individuals online, developed to advance human rights democracy rights activists around the yet it can significantly enhance the are, however, now being used for world. Many of these programs or tools probability of remaining anonymous. terrorist activities. It is important to were developed with the expressed Tools such as Tor and Tails facilitate realize that despite a popular focus on anonymous browsing behavior. Tails “More experienced users can also alter the MAC address of a “Digital security tools system, which serves as the computer’s providing advice in our identification number while browsing, ostensibly developed to much like a postal address in the sample pointed to other physical world. DuckDuckGo and advance human rights are, StartPage enable anonymous or quasi tools, among them were anonymous searches.6 JustPasteIt however, now being used enables the quick and largely anonymous some that are often used sharing of information via HTML links for terrorist activities.” and has become increasingly popular to safeguard human with organizations such as the Islamic State.7 Silent Circle is an encrypted and democracy rights email platform that has recently worked the battlefields of Iraq, Syria, Libya, on the Black Phone project to enable and other zones of contention, the activists.” stronger privacy.8 The Guardian Project infrastructure that goes into supporting applications are designed to enhance the frontline fighters is deep and privacy and secure communications on diverse.12 mobile devices.9 intent of safeguarding individuals To communicate, transfer funds, plan working under the threat of states None of the democracy, human rights, and organize operations, train, and to provide added security for their or civil liberties organizations want to travel, groups such as the Islamic operations. These same tools, often facilitate terrorist activities. Each of the State and al Qa`ida rely on integrated funded in part by the U.S. Government, developers or communities behind these communications strategies within a NGOs, corporations, and others, are products seeks to encourage privacy complex information environment that now expressly being used for illicit and human rights protection.10 These is constrained by state intelligence purposes. Programs such as Tor (an services. anonymous routing network, also referred to as the Onion Network), Tails, 6 See: https://duckduckgo.com/about and https:// When organizations are small it is DuckDuckGo, StartPage, PhotoMe Beta, startpage.com/eng/aboutstartpage/ conceivable to engage in direct forms ExifTool, MetaNull, Jitsi, JustPasteIt, 7 Carmen Fishwick. “How a Polish Student’s Website of communication. Previous Combating Silent Circle, and several others from Became an Isis Propaganda Tool.” The Guardian, August Terrorism Center reports and occasional the Guardian Project are being openly 15, 2014. papers examined how the Islamic discussed on jihadi forums.4 They are 8 See: https://silentcircle.com often accompanied by well-written development of platforms in the digital space. Arabic documents explaining their 9 See: https://guardianproject.info. implementation and use.5 There are also 10 Examples of human rights protection include the 11 One project that was historically very useful was the numerous discussions on how to bypass Tactical Tech Collective’s project “security in a box” “security in a box” project that has now been overtaken found at: https://securityinabox.org/en, Reporters by more current variants. Yet the trend remains the Without Borders “We fight Censorship” project found same, to provide training and resources to facilitate 4 We found mentions and discussions of all of these at: https://www.wefightcensorship.org/article/digital- human rights and free and open societies, http://securi- tools and many more in dozens of posts on jihadist security-basicshtml.html and the Open Technology tyinabox.org. forums. Fund, a project that funds projects to help promote 12 Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion: 5 We collected 24 unique digital training manuals in human rights and open societies found at: https://www. Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Net- Arabic and saw embedded within various forum posts opentechfund.org/about-otf. These are just a small works in War,” American Political Science Review, 107:3, more than a dozen training videos. sample of dozens of similar projects that work on the (2013): pp. 418–432.

11 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

State’s administrative processes grew.13 has increasingly gone online to handle highly secure features. He explains Everything from reporting structures communications, monetary transfers, that using Wickr, user ID and device to finance structure and recruiting and other supporting and propaganda communications undergo multiple processes has to be developed. In functions. This movement to global rounds of salted cryptographic hashing constrained geographic areas this digital communications has increased using SHA256, data at rest and in transit process can occur over what can best the urgency associated with what is best are encrypted with AES256, password be described as the “SneakerNet,” described as tech support for jihad. and password hashes do not leave the which describes the ability for complex device, and lastly that messages and organizational structures to be built Jihadi Techies media are subject to auto-deletion upon up through direct personal contact Users like Tiqani al-Islam, who expiration. The application functions facilitated by for example, walking or provides detailed analysis of Virtual as a peer-to-peer encryption protocol driving. Private Networks (VPNs) and their legal eliminating the storage of encryption obligations regarding data retention, keys by a middleman. The program is As the size and complexity of an add to already robust discussions on designed for secure communications insurgency increases so do the secure communications in response to between human rights activists, challenges of managing a transnational questions posed by community members. journalists, friends, and individuals network. The logistical challenges for By identifying and highlighting which requiring high levels of privacy. Ratan managing foreign fighters are extensive. networks should not be used, they are al-‘Iraqi explains the software’s utility enhancing the aggregate security of “Individuals are highly the network. By educating users how “With the increasing to use VPNs or the Tor network they attuned to the security are increasing the costs to intelligence sophistication of geo- and law enforcement in what Hoffman status of popular calls the “Technological Treadmill,” in mapping capabilities comes which terrorists seek to stay ahead of applications including counterterrorist practitioners.15 a heightened ability to plan

Skype.” We also found clear indications in the operations.” forums that individuals are highly attuned to the security status of popular applications including Skype. The International Center for the Study For instance, in response to a question and offers up Wickr’s own $100,000 of Radicalisation and Political Violence about how to use Skype through reward for those able to crack its estimates that more than 20,000 Tor, a jihadi with more knowledge protocols as a testament to its security. individuals have traveled to Syria to responded, “Skype is insecure, and fight as of January 2015, a number that Americans are recording every single Rakan al-‘Iraqi also discusses exceeds foreign fighter estimates for call since 2008.” Later, another jihadi Telegram, a Russian-made encrypted Afghanistan in the 1980s.14 Once on the specifically indicates that Skype cannot communications application. He notes ground, these fighters need to be fed, be used through Tor. These types that Telegram does force registration, organized, and often paid, an enormous of conversations are repeated in the but provides instructions for how to challenge, which in the case of the sampled forum traffic for a number of spoof the process with fake mobile Islamic State is made more difficult by applications. Discussions on the use numbers. Al-‘Iraqi also demonstrates external intelligence services seeking to of Skype, WhatsApp and many others real technical prowess. A detailed halt foreign fighter flows. are not of themselves surprising, but discussion of and instructions on how the conversations on the forums shift to Root an Android Device16 and install The SneakerNet breaks down as logistical individuals away from using less secure Tor shows a high degree of concern for challenges increase. Globalized jihad to more secure communication. systemic protection of communications. He provides a link to a detailed The discussions also deal with facilitating instruction manual on justpaste.it (in 13 Danielle F. Jung, Jacob N .Shapiro, Pat Ryan, and secure mobile communications and Arabic and with pictures) detailing Jon Wallance, Managing a Transnational Insurgency: The browsing. A detailed post by Rakan al- how to root the device and install Tor. Islamic State of Iraq’s “Paper Trail,” 2005-2010, (Combat- Iraqi analyzes the security of several While the technical sophistication is ing Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014). Muhammad mobile platforms and a number of probably too much for the basic user, Al-`Ubaydi, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan available communication applications. the simplicity of the instructions opens Price, The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the He begins by highlighting Wickr it up to most moderately skilled users. Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, (Combating Software, a multi-platform messaging The relative enhancement of security Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014). application that claims a number of provided by the rooting of a mobile 14 Peter Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict 15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Colum- 16 Rooting a device allows for base level access to the in the 1980s.” (ICSR, 2015). bia University Press: 2006), pp. 252-253. device outside of the normal phone operating system.

12 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5 phone and the installation of Tor can (trying a different password over and 2014)17 contrasts with the high levels in be significant, it does not provide fool- over until access is granted). Although Europe and other Western countries. It proof protection. Its consideration, the absolute technical skill required to indicates that the role of jihadist tech however, demonstrates a level of exploit this vulnerability is relatively support through online communities awareness among the jihadists of the low, the discussion again serves to is likely to grow in importance in the intense level of surveillance that is highlight the use and discussion of coming years. brought to bear on them. technology vulnerabilities. Understanding how jihadists establish Cyber Tools for Terrorists This article cannot examine all instances digital security will become more Terrorists are able to leverage digital where advice and instructions are being important. By enhancing their digital tools in other ways. User Abu ‘Umbar disseminated, but the information hygiene, jihadists are augmenting costs al-Filistini, writing with the Twitter is both deep and broad. What is both in time and money for intelligence handle Usayyid al-Madani, provided frustrating for the privacy and security services and law enforcement. detailed explanations on how to download and use online mapping “Jihadist tech support These jihadist tech support posts were programs to plan and coordinate in many ways inevitable and their level “military operations.” This discussion through online of sophistication is likely to grow as harkens back to the use of Google does the percentage of the population Earth by Lashkar-i-Tayyiba operatives communities is likely to who qualify as digital natives. As to conduct the 2008 Mumbai attacks the membership of terrorist/jihadist that resulted in approximately 160 grow in importance in the organizations evolve from technically civilian fatalities. Al-Filistini provides weaker older generations to younger links to three different mapping coming years.” generations with a far greater comfort services including the Universal Maps and respect for the uses and limits of Downloader, Global Mapper, and technology, it is likely that the threat Google Earth. He also included videos environment will become increasingly explaining how to use the mapping community is the realization that the complicated. Jihadist tech support for software and how to download maps government position on so-called the application of digital tools is quite for on-the-go operations. He closes his backdoors might have some merit. The literally in its infancy and the future post with: “This work is dedicated to burden clearly does not fall entirely on offers both opportunities and threats. mujahideen everywhere, on top of them, well-intentioned developers. the mujahideen of the Islamic State and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi is a research associate Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,” illustrating the Many tools are being developed by at the Combating Terrorism Center and monitors direct linkage of the online and offline jihadis. We found conversations Arabic jihadist websites. communities. indicating jihadis are in the early stages of developing secure communications Aaron F. Brantly is Assistant Professor of The use of online mapping services and browsing programs independent International Relations and Cyber in the demonstrates an increasing of the efforts by Western privacy Department of Social Sciences at the United States organizational capacity facilitated by advocates. The effectiveness of these Military Academy, Cyber Policy Fellow for the the tools many use for normal activities. tools is likely to be limited in most cases, Army Cyber Institute and Cyber Fellow at the With the increasing sophistication yet will likely increase the concerns Combating Terrorism Center. of geo-mapping capabilities comes a of intelligence and law enforcement heightened ability to plan operations individuals as they represent a The views expressed here are those of the authors with a better understanding of local small first step down the road to and do not reflect the official policy or position terrain and its tactical advantages and developing potential cyber weapons. of the Department of the Army, Department of disadvantages. A final case illustrating Requests among the sampled forum Defense, or the U.S. Government. jihadis’ increasing technical acumen traffic for targeted low-level attacks comes in a detailed post by one Abu against websites in other countries `Umar al-Misri. In it, he includes links and information about strategies and to documentation as well as video techniques to facilitate such attacks also tutorials on how to hack into WiFi add to concerns about digital security. networks. Insights into Jihadist Behavior Online The tutorials explain how to manipulate Our sample provides intriguing insights a vulnerability in WiFi Protected Setup into an evolving area of operations. The (WPS), a feature that is enabled by low level of Internet penetration in default runs on most WiFi routers using some Middle Eastern and North African WPA2 protection. This feature is still nations (Iraq, Syria, and Yemen having enabled on many WiFi routers and poses 9.2%, 26.2%, and 20% respectively as of a security threat because the password 17 “Middle East Internet Users, Population and Face- can be broken quickly using brute force book Statistics.” Internet World Stats, 2015.

13 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

Terrorist Outbidding: Outbidding Among Violent Organizations violent organizations that fracture Violent organizations that occupy and then are compelled to compete for The In Amenas Attack the same space and adhere to similar support from a common constituency. By Geoff D. Porter ideologies or pursue similar political goals often compete with one another for In 1994, two years into Algeria’s on january 16, 2013, a group of men under finite constituencies. As a consequence, Islamist insurgency of the 1990s, an the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar they resort to different means to assert upstart militant Islamist organization, attacked the Tigantourine Gas Facility at dominance and claim primacy. For the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), was In Amenas, Algeria, and took more than groups that have already embraced jockeying for primacy and power with 100 expatriate personnel hostage. More violence as a means of advancing their the original Islamist group fighting than two years later, the motives for the causes, escalating the level of violent the Algerian government, the Army attack on this remote facility remain in behavior can serve this purpose, in what of Islamic Salvation (AIS). In an question, despite post-mortems from has become known as “outbidding.”18 unprecedented move calculated to one of the joint venture partners Statoil, upstage the AIS, the GIA hijacked an the British government, and even one One prominent example is Fatah’s Air France flight from Algiers to Paris.21 allegedly produced by the group to embrace of suicide bombing, something which Belmokhtar belonged. which it had historically avoided. Thrust into competition with Hamas and other “One prominent example “Outbidding can aggressive non-state actors in Israel and the Palestinian territories that shared [of outbidding] is Fatah’s especially apply to violent some of Fatah’s political objectives, Fatah may have felt compelled to embrace of suicide organizations that fracture adopt some of the same tactics that had generated populist support for Hamas, bombing, something and then are compelled to in particular, suicide bombing. which it had historically compete for support.” In January 2002, Fatah did just that and carried out its first such attack.19 Support avoided.” for Fatah rose considerably after this decision and while it did not vanquish At the time, Belmokhtar claimed that Hamas as a result, Fatah’s embrace of his group had attacked the facility in suicide bombing demonstrated how The hijacking unfolded over several retaliation for Algeria having allowed outbidding narrowed the growing gap days, with French Special Forces France to use its airspace during between the two organizations, even eventually killing the hijackers in military operations against disparate though it undermined Fatah’s ability Marseilles, where the plane had stopped Islamist groups that had taken control to engage in a negotiated solution to refuel. By 1995, the GIA had become of a large portion of northern Mali. to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian the preeminent militant Islamist Evidence discovered later, showing that territory.20 organization in Algeria and the AIS had Belmokhtar’s group had begun planning been relegated to irrelevancy. the attack several months before France The Army of Islamic Salvation vs. The Armed invaded Mali, makes it impossible for Islamic Group Belmokhtar had a ringside seat at this this explanation to be the sole cause. Outbidding can especially apply to struggle for jihadi primacy from within the GIA. By this stage, he already While anger at France’s participation had plenty of experience, allegedly in the Mali campaign may have helped 18 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Ter- dating back to the anti-Soviet fight encourage planning, there must have rorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); in Afghanistan during the 1980s. He been other motives. Hostage-taking Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of eventually quit the GIA, having become has a long history among terrorist Terrorism,” International Security 31:1 (Summer 2006), frustrated with its indiscriminate organizations and serves multiple pp. 49-80. violence.22 purposes. Hostages can be ransomed 19 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing for funds. They can be swapped for Covert Violent Organizations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton sympathizers or supporters held by the University Press, 2013), p. 223. 21 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repres- enemy. They can also be used as a form 20 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of sion and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne of outbidding to raise a group’s profile Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Rienner, 2003), p.118. among its competitors. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the 22 Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Jihad’s Southern Emir” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor The last option seems to have been Organization 56 (Spring 2002), pp. 263–296; Mia M. Vol. 7:12 (2009). Andrew Wojtanik, “Mokhtar Bel- at least one of Belmokhtar’s goals at Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, mokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Tigantourine. Market Share, and Outbidding,” Political Science Quar- Sahel,” Jihadi Bios Project, Combating Terrorist Center, terly 119 (Spring 2004), pp. 61–88. West Point, 2014

14 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

Belmokhtar subsequently joined the One of the decisive events that appear In Amenas As An Instance of Outbidding Salafist Group for Preaching and to have clinched the Islamic State’s The Mouaqioun bi-Dimma’s attack on Combat (GSPC), which then evolved position as the dominant jihadi group the Tigantourine Gas Facility fits a into al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb in Syria and Iraq was its kidnapping similar pattern. Following a dispute (AQIM). Significantly, the GIA and eventual murder in 2014 of James with AQIM’s leadership, Belmokhtar battalion, or katîba, that executed the Foley after 22 months of captivity. This broke away and carried out arguably 1994 Air France hijacking was called act was followed two weeks later by the most spectacular terrorist attack Mouaqioun bi-Dimma, the same name the murder of another hostage, Steven in North African history. The hostage- as the group that conducted the In Sotloff. barricade event resulted in the capture Amenas attack. and death of 39 expatriate personnel. The killings of Foley and Sotloff After the attack, Belmokhtar’s star Jahbat al-Nusra vs. The Islamic State brought unprecedented attention to shone brightly in the jihadi universe. The same dynamics are visible in a more the Islamic State. During the decade recent episode of competition between before the Islamic State declared the A series of letters uncovered by terrorist organizations. Jabhat al-Nusra establishment of the caliphate (i.e., the journalist Rukmini Callimachi and the Islamic State have competed for from June 30, 2004 through June 29, in February 2013 confirmed long- legitimacy, supporters, fighters, and 2014), the combined Arabic and English suspected tensions between AQIM funds in Syria over the past few years. media mentions of the Islamic State leader Abdelmalek Droukdal and or predecessor organizations totaled Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of the As with the competition between the 7,865. Moulathimin Brigade, an AQIM brigade AIS and the GIA, hostage-taking proved operating in the Sahara.25 The letters instrumental in the Islamic State’s During the month following Foley’s show that Belmokhtar, despite having surpassing and, in some instances, murder and including the weeks unassailable jihadi credentials, was displacing Jabhat al-Nusra as the immediately after the murder of Sotloff increasingly marginalized from AQIM primary jihadi group operating in Syria. (August 20, 2014 to September 20, 2014) leadership decisions. there were more than 24,000 mentions. “Belmokhtar, despite Mentions of the Islamic State in English “In their own report... and Arabic media from August 20, 2014 having unassailable until May 1, 2015 increased to more than Belmokhtar’s supporters 200,000, with more than half (118,000) jihadi credentials, was occurring in Arabic.23 Obviously, many indicate that the initial of these mentions can be attributed to increasingly marginalized further attacks and murders, but the planning [for In Amenas] 300% increase in media appearances in from AQIM leadership the month following Foley’s murder is coincided with... still significant. decisions.” increasingly acrimonious Media Mentions As Proxy Compare that to the media mentions for letters.” Jabhat al-Nusra during identical time The Islamic State’s differences with al- frames. From its creation until June 29, Qa`ida’s leadership and its eventual 2014, the combined Arabic and English schism with al-Qa`ida are well known. total of media mentions for Jabhat al- The rift, according to the letters, However, it continued to operate in Nusra was 15,128, with 9,974 mentions reached a head between September Syria where Jabhat al-Nusra, which in Arabic and 5,154 in English. In the and November 2012.26 Belmokhtar remained allied with al-Qa`ida, also month following Foley’s murder, Jabhat complained that AQIM’s leadership operated. al-Nusra garnered only 958 mentions was disconnected from the front and the in English and 2,047 in Arabic. In the fight.27 AQIM’s leadership responded, Although the two organizations differed ensuing nine months, there were only chastising Belmokhtar for not attending in their ultimate goals—overthrow of 16,971 mentions of Jabhat al-Nusra in leadership meetings and for failing to the al-Assad government versus the Arabic and English, mostly in Arabic. 24 contribute to weapons procurement.28 establishment of a caliphate—they did share the common purpose of combating 25 Rukmini Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left be- the government of Syria’s President hind a manifesto,” Associated Press, February 14, 2013. Bashar al-Assad and of promoting a 23 Statistics regarding press mentions for the Islamic 26 Mathieu Guidère, “The Timbuktu Letters: New particular interpretation of Islam. As a State and Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as other organizations Insights about AQIM” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring result, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic mentioned below, are derived from Factiva searches. (2014). State found themselves vying for many While clearly not comprehensive, they serve as a func- of the same recruits and some of the tional proxy. 27 Ibid., p. 8. same financial supporters. 24 Ibid. 28 Ibid.

15 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

In their own report documenting the attack, Belmokhtar was essentially challenges. Although Belmokhtar’s the In Amenas attack, Belmokhtar’s unknown with just 1,121 media mentions infamy has now far surpassed that supporters indicate that the initial in English, French, and Arabic of his of Droukdal, it is difficult to assess planning coincided with the exchange name during the decade before the whether the attack resulted in tangible of increasingly acrimonious letters operation. benefits for Belmokhtar. between Belmokhtar and Droukdal.29 In the 17 months after the attack, there Viewed through the lens of practical The Tigantourine Attack were six times as many. From January gains, the evidence that Belmokhtar’s On January 16, 2013, after two months 16, 2013, the day of the attack, until May In Amenas operation was strategically of planning, 32 men loyal to Belmokhtar 1, 2015, there were 6,881 mentions by successful is less clear. His organization launched an attack on the Tigantourine name and an additional 900 mentions did absorb another jihadi group, the Gas Facility. More than 800 workers of “Those who Sign in Blood,” the Movement for Unity and Jihad in were employed at the facility, including English translation of the name of the West Africa (MUJAO) in August 2013, 146 expatriate personnel. After brigade that carried out the attack. This and formed a new group called the breaching the security cordon, the is in contrast to fewer than 1,700 media Mourabitoun. The new group, though, attackers searched housing and the results in Arabic, French, and English has not been very active, apart from a central processing facilities looking for Abdelmalek Droukdal in the decade deadly attack in Bamako in March 2015. for employees. The attackers corralled prior to the Tigantourine attack, and Moreover, MUJAO recently announced the foreign personnel in the housing only 1,101 immediately after the attack that it was splitting with Belmokhtar facility’s main courtyard and let the until May 1, 2015. and allying itself with the Islamic Algerian employees go free.30 State.32 The hostage-taking certainly succeeded in generating media attention The attackers not only allowed the “Hostage-taking succeeded and raising the group’s profile, but it is foreign hostages to use their mobile and less clear whether the Mourabitoun has satellite phones to call their employers in generating media been able to convert that higher profile and the media, but actually encouraged into meaningful sustained support in them to do so in order to call more attention and raising the terms of money and manpower, which attention to the attack. The attackers are, after all, the ultimate goals of also spoke with Algerian security group’s profile.” outbidding. forces, communicating a number of demands, including the halting of The hostage-barricade situation at France’s military operations in northern Tigantourine is also an unfortunate Mali, and the release of both convicted What Does Hostage-Taking Achieve? instance where tragedy accommodates terrorists held in U.S. facilities and Hostage-taking as a form of irony. At the heart of Belmokhtar’s terrorists held by Algerian authorities.31 outbidding and asserting dominance dispute with Droukdal was the in a competitive jihadi landscape is permissibility of kidnapping and On the second day, Algerian forces about more than just garnering media hostage taking. According to Mathieu attacked. In the ensuing violence, 39 attention. It also relates to practical Guidère, “Belmokhtar did not consider hostages, an Algerian security guard, things such as attracting recruits and kidnapping and ransom to be part of and all 29 attackers died. None of the generating funding, elements that ‘jihad’ (holy war) since the hostages attackers’ demands was considered. are nonetheless vital in advancing a were generally non-combatants or violent organization’s strategic political civilians. Secondly he believed that Mokhtar Belmokhtar Raises His Profile objectives. These components, though, such practices would attract unwanted If the In Amenas hostage-taking was at are harder to measure. It is hard to gauge attention from Western countries…” least in part motivated by Belmokhtar’s beyond rough estimates how many competition with Droukdal for primacy, fighters have tried to join the Islamic Belmokhtar’s opposition to hostage then it appears to have worked, at least State or Jabhat al-Nusra following taking was overruled by Droukdal in generating media attention. Prior to the kidnapping and murders of Foley who argued that “as for the status of and Sotloff. It is also, for now at least, hostages, the [AQIM] Legal Committee impossible to disaggregate funding considers that any Western citizen 29 December 18, 2014, “Dirasa tawthiqiya li-`amaliya for either organization. Without is an enemy combatant because “al-muwaqiyun bi-al-dima’” al-fida’iyah bi al-jaza’ir. access to Islamic State or Jabhat al- Western countries have all declared 30 “In Amenas Inquest” U.K. Coroner’s Office, Day 12, Nusra bookkeeping, it is impossible to to be engaged in the war on terror and October 7, 2014, p. 23. know how much either organizations’ their political and military actions 31 “Foreigners seized after deadly Algeria attack” Al finances changed in the wake of the globally target the Islamist and jihadist Jazeera, January 16, 2013; Bill Roggio, “Belmokhtar Foley and Sotloff murders. claims Algerian raid, slaying hostages for al Qaeda” The Long War Journal (January 2013); “Algeria Hostage Analyzing the Tigantourine attack 32 Thomas Joscelyn, “Confusion surrounds West Deal: Kidnappers Offer to Swap US Hostages for Jailed and any likely dispute between African jihadists’ loyalty to Islamic State” The Long War Militants,” Reuters, January 18, 2013. Droukdal and Belmokhtar poses similar Journal, May 14, 2015

16 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5 groups.”33 Belmokhtar’s dispute with Islamic State Operations By exploiting gaps in the positioning Droukdal regarding kidnapping and of security personnel resulting from hostage-taking comes as a surprise and Iraqi Fault Lines these twin domestic conflicts, the because Belmokhtar was at the By Andrew Watkins Islamic State has been able to make forefront of kidnap for ransom in the significant territorial gains. One Sahara for many years and participated during the offensive by Islamic State consequence of Iraq’s internal divisions in numerous operations that resulted in militants that began in early June 2014, is that the Islamic State is not fighting a substantial revenue for AQIM. 34 the group parlayed tactical advantages unified, strong, Iraqi army. Instead, an into significant territorial gains. Its assortment of localized security forces— In his bid to supplant Droukdal, use of multidirectional, vehicle-borne including well-trained Peshmerga in the Belmokhtar may have revisited their assaults made it seem as though Islamic Kurdish region, increasingly powerful dispute in an attempt to beat the AQIM State fighters were ubiquitous.1 The Shia militias organized under the al- leader on his own ground. If Droukdal speed of these attacks threw Iraqi Hashd al-Shabi (popular mobilization) considered kidnapping and hostage- security forces (ISF) on their heels and forces in central Iraq, and Sunni tribal taking to be legal, then Belmokhtar allowed the militant group to capture protection forces scattered throughout was going to do it on an unprecedented land and weapons as state security the country—have taken control of scale. Belmokhtar would walk the walk, forces withdrew. The Islamic State also security arrangements at a localized while Droukdal simply talked. And succeeded in slowing the organization level.3 This fracturing of the national Belmokhtar would take the mantle of of an ISF counteroffensive by planting defense posture as a result of political jihadi dominance in North Africa. improvised explosive devices (IEDs) disputes helps explain the Islamic along roads and in houses.2 While State’s rapid expansion. Dr. Geoff D. Porter is an assistant professor with the Combating Terrorism Center at “Iraq’s Sunni community Marginalized Sunnis West Point and president of North Africa Iraq’s Sunni community has largely Risk Consulting. He specializes in political has largely been left out of been left out of the political and security stability, violent non-state actors, and the decision-making process in post- extractive industries in North Africa. the political and security Saddam Iraq.4 Iraq’s Sunni heartland, principally in Anbar but with large The views expressed here are those of decision-making process in populations in Salahaddin, Diyala, the author and do not reflect the official and Ninewa provinces, has struggled policy or position of the Department of the post-Saddam Iraq.” to develop effective, locally-staffed Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. security institutions. One reason for Government. this is a hesitance on the part of the federal government to provide arms or these tactical successes have been funding for Sunni tribes that could be discussed extensively by a number of used to oppose the state. Iraq analysts, the broader geopolitical context in which they took place Though these areas are unquestionably requires further analysis. part of federal Iraq, their security arrangements have been a source of The Islamic State’s military considerable tension. This is primarily achievements have taken place largely due to the sectarian composition of the along two preexisting, culturally defined mainly Shia Iraqi national army and fault lines. The first is between the the increased power of Shia militias.5 primarily Shia Iraqi security forces and Local Sunnis, many loath to support the Sunni majority areas where these the draconian rule of militant groups, forces are now operating in western still see a threat in the armed forces Iraq. The second is the zone between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 3 The House Armed Services Committee in the 2016 in Erbil that demarcates disputed National Defense Authorization Act sought to allocate territories between the two levels of one-quarter of the proposed $715 million earmarked for government. Iraq military support to go directly to the Kurdish Pesh- merga and Sunni militias. Julian Pecquet, “Defense bill recognizes Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni militias as a country,” 1 Sam Jones, “Iraq crisis: sophisticated tactics key to Isis Al Monitor, April 27, 2015. strength,” Financial Times, June 26, 2014. 4 Stephen Wicken, “Iraq’s Sunnis in Crisis,” The Insti- 33 Ibid. 2 Alice Fordham, “Ambushes, Mines, and Booby Traps: tute for the Study of War, May 2013. 34 Geoff D. Porter, “AQIM’s objectives in North Af- Islamic State Militants Change Tack,” NPR, October 21, 5 Dexter Filkins, “The Real Problem In Iraq,” The New rica,” The CTC Sentinel, 4:2, (2011). 2014. Yorker, May 19, 2015.

17 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

ostensibly sent there to protect them.6 was in part a result of preexisting Iraqi army, Shia militias, and Kurdish At the same time, the Iraqi chain of tensions in those areas. In some Sunni Peshmerga from mounting a serious, command has appeared to lack the communities, Islamic State forces were coordinated defense of Mosul. motivation to assert military power able to bolster their ranks through the in Sunni areas. Part of this is due to recruitment of local Sunnis.9 Part of In one particularly destructive attack, poor training, inadequate supplies, this is likely a result of alliances based the Islamic State targeted the Kurdish and weak leadership. However, the on expediency rather than ideological Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) principle cause is the overtly sectarian agreement.10 office in the contested city of Jalula on nature of the Iraqi state and the Sunni’s June 8, 2014 with a car bomb, killing diminished position within it.7 In combination with local recruitment, 18 Kurdish Peshmerga. These types the Islamic State graphically promoted of attacks forced state security forces In contrast to disputes between Erbil and the killing of Shia civilians, government to focus attention on multiple fronts Baghdad, the nature of Sunni disputes employees, and anyone else opposed despite being ill prepared for the one with the central government has not to the creation of a new caliphate. evolving in the west of the country. been defined by territorial ambition. These terror tactics polarized the While some in the Sunni community local security environment and caused Baghdad, Erbil and the Disputed Territories advocate for an autonomous region, the further hesitation among the under As the Islamic State’s forces pushed main concern is maintaining a force to resourced, poorly trained Iraqi army into the predominantly Sunni areas protect Sunni areas from Islamic State forces charged with halting the Islamic of western Iraq, they also expanded State’s advance. That advance took “The Iraqi government’s ad place in the mainly Sunni cities and “The disputed territories... towns on the banks of the Tigris and hoc response to the Islamic Euphrates rivers.11 form an arc stretching

State’s advances in Mosul The Iraqi government’s ad hoc response from northeastern Diyala to the Islamic State’s advances in and other Sunni areas Mosul and other Sunni areas helped province on the border the Islamic State gain momentum along helped the Islamic State the Euphrates and Tigris corridors. The with Iran to northwestern time it took for Baghdad to mobilize a gain momentum along counteroffensive, combined with the Ninewa province on the extensive road infrastructure along the the Euphrates and Tigris two rivers, allowed the Islamic State to border with Syria.” bolster their local positions rather than corridors.” be content with hit-and-run attacks reminiscent of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). eastward into the disputed zone The movements of Islamic State forces in between the semi-autonomous Kurdish fighters and Shia militias.8 The Islamic the Sunni heartland did not take place in region to the north and federal Iraq to State has been able to capitalize on a vacuum. During the campaign to take the south identified in Article 140 of the these localized disputes in Sunni areas Mosul, the Islamic State simultaneously Iraqi constitution.12 and exploit the security weaknesses undertook targeted operations in the they engender. territories that Baghdad and the KRG The disputed territories fall principally were fighting over. In part, this move within four governorates: Ninewa, Islamic State Operations in Sunni Areas was a consequence of circumstance Erbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala. These The Islamic State has exploited the due to the generally inchoate nature of territories form an arc stretching from fractious security relationship between the preexisting security arrangements northeastern Diyala province on the the ISF and the Sunni population. The in the disputed territories. It was also border with Iran to northwestern group’s initial conquest of Fallujah in a tactical move meant to distract the Ninewa province on the border with January 2014 and subsequent success Syria.13 The contested status of areas in taking Mosul five months later within this belt is largely a legacy of 9 Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea J. Carter, “Officials: former President Saddam Hussein’s Islamic State recruiting on the rise in Sunni areas of 6 Jim Muir, “Fears of Shia muscle in Iraq’s Sunni heart- Iraq,” CNN, August 11, 2014. land,” BBC News, May 18, 2015. 10 Alice Fordham, “The Other Battle In Iraq: Winning 12 Full Arabic text of Iraq’s constitution with English 7 Ishaan Tharoor, “Why the Iraqi army keeps failing,” Over Sunni Muslims,” NPR, February 3, 2015. translation by Zaid Al-Ali, “Iraq’s final constitution

The Washington Post, May 19, 2015. 11 For an updated map of territorial control in Iraq see: (English),” 2006. 8 Joost Hiltermann, Sean Kane, Raad Alkadiri, “Iraq’s “Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of 13 Sean Kane, “Iraq’s Disputed Territories: A View of Federalism Quandary,” The International Crisis Group, April 2015,” The United States Department of Defense, The Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy,” February 28, 2012, pp. 3-4. April, 2015. The United States Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 12.

18 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

Arabization policies.14 During the tension, the status quo was effectively populations. In what would become parliamentary discussions of the 2005 maintained. Kurdish Peshmerga and a frequent strategy employed by the draft constitution, all sides agreed to Iraqi security forces even jointly Islamic State, the group mounted postpone a decision on the disputed exercised control in parts of the sustained sorties in the countryside territories, especially oil-rich Kirkuk. contested districts through a combined around Jalula and Sadiyah prior to Instead, they adopted Article 140 as the security mechanism.17 launching a full attack on the cities principle legislative mechanism through directly. which the issue would be settled. The Islamic State in the Disputed Territories text outlines a series of steps to be Beginning in June 2014, the Islamic The territorial acquisitions were an taken, including public referendums in State was able to exploit gaps in extension of previous military victories each of the disputed territories. the security cordon in the disputed by the Islamic State in Suliman Beg, territories to devastating effect. In Amerli, and Hawija.21 It took nearly This status quo held even as these areas, neither the Iraqi army five months for a combined force of implementation of Article 140 was nor Kurdish Peshmerga had solidified Iraqi army, Shia militias, and Kurdish postponed initially on December 31, their positions and instead relied on a Peshmerga to retake Jalula and 2007 and then effectively shelved.15 disjointed, but stable arrangement of Sadiyah.22 mixed administrative and territorial “Tensions [with the KRG] control that had developed since 2003. “The Islamic State was increased somewhat The Islamic State was able to expand its influence in this environment as able to exploit gaps in the during the government the governments in Erbil and Baghdad struggled to craft a coherent response.18 security cordon in the led by Nouri al-Maliki, Tactically, Islamic State operations in the disputed territories allowed disputed territories to especially after he the group to draw ISF and Peshmerga attention away from the critical task of devastating effect.” deployed forces to the retaking Mosul and other areas in the country’s western region.19 border between Salahaddin The extent to which local security A similar demonstration of the and Kirkuk.” forces—Kurdish and Arab alike—were Islamic State’s exploitation of security ill prepared for the Islamic State’s weaknesses within the disputed actions in the disputed territories territories took place in early August can be seen in events that played 2014 in the Ninewa town of Sinjar. The The arrangement worked for Erbil and out in northern Diyala. On June 13, assault on Sinjar was combined with a Baghdad because both sides could say 2014, Islamic State forces entered the string of attacks on Peshmerga forces in publicly that they were in control and disputed towns of Jalula and Sadiyah, Gwer, Makhmour, Tal Keif, Qaraqosh, neither had to make the politically approximately 80 kilometers northeast and Bartella. difficult move of ceding territory. and 60 kilometers north of Baghdad, respectively.20 The closest of these, Gwer, is roughly Tensions increased somewhat during 25 kilometers from the Kurdish capital the government led by Nouri al-Maliki, These towns, though formally part in Erbil. The scale of the Islamic State especially after he deployed forces to the of Diyala province, are each home to attacks, their speed, and their scope border between Salahaddin and Kirkuk mixed Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen forced a rapid change in the Peshmerga in a bid to deter the Kurdish Peshmerga force posture.23 Consolidating their from occupying more territory south of 17 Joint Peshmerga-ISF positions in the disputed defensive position to protect Erbil Kirkuk City.16 territories were initially part of the U.S.-administered province, the Kurds were initially Combined Security Mechanism (CSM). Larry Hanauer, ill prepared to expand their security Even during this period of heightened Jeffery Martin, and Omar al-Shahery, “Managing Arab- cordon in order to mount a sustained Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal defense of Sinjar.

14 John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, “The Internally of U.S. Troops,” RAND, 2011. pp. 2-3. Displaced People of Iraq,” The Brookings Institution- 18 Harvey Morris, “Islamic State occupation puts ter- SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, October 2002, ritorial dispute into perspective,” Rudaw, April 11, 2014. 21 “Control of Terrain in Iraq,” The Institute for the p. 11. 19 Greg Botelho and Jim Acosta, “U.S. official: Mosul Study of War Blog, June 19, 2015. 15 Steven Lee Meyers, “Politics Delay and Iraqi Cen- invasion ‘might be some time from now,’” CNN, April 22 Saif Hameed, “Iraqi forces say retake two towns from sus,” The New York Times, December 6, 2010. 9, 2015. Islamic State,” Reuters, November 23, 2014.

16 Karim Abed Zayer, “Maliki Deploys ‘Tigris Force’ to 20 “In Iraq, Islamic militants continue drive, grab 2 23 Dexter Filkins, “The Fight of Their Lives,” The New Kirkuk,” Al Monitor, November 13, 2012. towns near Baghdad,” CBS News, June 13, 2014. Yorker, September 29, 2014.

19 MAY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 5

The Kurds had long maintained Difficult Days Ahead CTC Sentinel Staff administrative and security control The Islamic State has proven adept at of the area, and the Iraqi army had mounting rapid attacks across multiple positioned itself too far south on the geographic locations simultaneously. Managing Editor Ninewa plain to be of assistance. Even This has allowed the group to control John Watling if it had been close by, consistent huge swaths of Iraq. While a number of threats to Ramadi and areas much factors have contributed to its military closer to Baghdad in the Sunni success, Iraq’s internal divisions have Editorial Board heartland would have likely continued been crucial. COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. to draw Baghdad’s attention to the Department Head nearer threat. As the Islamic State was Disputes between the central Department of Social Sciences (West Point) eventually pushed back from Erbil the government and Iraq’s Sunni group had consolidated around Sinjar, community regarding the composition COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. taking the city and forcing many of its of security forces and the division of Deputy Department Head Yazidi inhabitants to look for shelter on political power have contributed to Department of Social Sciences (West Point) the slopes of nearby Mt. Sinjar.24 significant security gaps in western and northern Iraq. At the same time, the LTC Bryan Price, Ph.D. One of the disputed areas where Kurdish continued failure of Baghdad and Erbil Director, CTC forces have had notable success is in to agree on a final status of the disputed oil-rich Kirkuk province. Islamic State Brian Dodwell forces launched a series of raids near “The Islamic State has Deputy Director, CTC Kirkuk in early June 2014 prompting Kurdish forces to rapidly expand their proven adept at mounting line of control south to cover the entire province.25 This shift south drew a rapid attacks across significant number of the Peshmerga force away from the frontlines in Ninewa multiple geographic and Diyala provinces. Iraqi army forces positioned in Kirkuk as part of the joint locations simultaneously.” CONTACT Arab-Kurdish units fled south toward Combating Terrorism Center Baghdad, again illustrating the poor U.S. Military Academy security coordination in the disputed 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall territories. territories has fostered the development West Point, NY 10996 of vulnerabilities in the local security Phone: (845) 938-8495 In contrast to Islamic State operations structure. Email: [email protected] in the Sunni heartland to the southwest Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ or in the disputed territories to the north The Islamic State’s military strategy and east, the militant group appeared has parlayed these internal divisions * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 content to harass Kirkuk City with to expand its presence in the country. insurgent-style attacks and bombings Its rapid, multi-pronged attacks from its positions in nearby Hawija. against a variety of targets are well suited for success against the largely By concentrating its forces on uncoordinated response of the Iraqi SUPPORT consolidating territorial gains in other army, Shia militias, and Kurdish The Combating Terrorism Center would areas, particularly recently retaken Peshmerga. Though some successes like to express its gratitude to its financial Ramadi, the Islamic State can continue have been seen, the underlying disputes supporters, for without their support and to utilize its Hawija position as well remain unaddressed and will need to be shared vision of the Center products like the as its forces throughout the disputed dealt with if Iraqi and other forces are to CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you territories to harass Kirkuk and draw have any chance of decisively defeating are interested in learning more about how the attention of Kurdish Peshmerga the Islamic State. to support the Combating Terrorism Center, away from the group’s positions please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call elsewhere. Andrew Watkins is an energy and security Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of analyst with the Iraq Oil Report. Mr. Graduates at 845-446-1561. Watkins has spent more than four years living in and writing about Iraq.

24 Mohammed A. Salih and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, The views expressed here are those of the The views expressed in this report are those of “Iraqi Yazidis: ‘If we move they will kill us,’” Al Jazeera, author and do not reflect those of the Iraq the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, August 5, 2014. Oil Report. the Department of the Army, or any other agency 25 “Iraqi Kurds ‘fully control Kirkuk’ as army flees,” of the U.S. Government. BBC News, June 12, 2014.

20