Militancy in Mozambique Nicaragua

WTPVBRIEFING WAR, TERROR & POLITICAL VIOLENCE LATIN AMERICA

AUGUST 2018

NICARAGUA: PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT

IN DEPTH: MILITANCY IN MOZAMBIQUE INDEX

Lead article: Pressure on Nicaraguan government 2

Recent events 3

In depth: Militancy in northern Mozambique 4-5

Global incidents 6-9

NICARAGUA: PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT TO END OPPOSITION REPRESSION

The Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States (OAS) on 2 August approved a resolution proposing the creation of a working group in Nicaragua. The OAS resolution reflects sustained pressure from the regional community on the government of President Daniel Ortega to end the systematic repression of the opposition. In the coming weeks, this will likely be accompanied by further moves against the Nicaraguan government by the US government, including the imposition of sanctions. The repression of protest action and the opposition to the regime by the National Police (PN) and paramilitaries will continue, underpinning heightened levels of violence. The OAS approved the resolution – which was presented by the US, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Chile – by 20 votes out of a possible 34 in favour. Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela (Nicaragua’s principal ally in the region) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines voted against the motion. The latter is heavily dependent on the largesse of the Venezuelan government. Belize, Haiti and Suriname – all of which are members of the Venezuela-led Petrocaribe oil alliance – were among the eight countries that abstained. The delegations from Dominica and Granada were absent. Nicaragua will become increasingly isolated in the coming weeks despite the continued (lukewarm) support from Venezuela and its regional acolytes. According to an OAS press release, the purpose of the working group is “to contribute to peaceful and sustainable solutions” in Nicaragua through “collaborative work with different regional and international actors”. In response to the most recent resolution, José Miguel Vivanco, the director of international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW)’s Americas division, described the move as “an unprecedented decision”. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Denis Moncada denounced the move as “interventionist”. OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro responded in a post on social media that said “the defence of democracy is not interventionist, it is an obligation”. These comments from Almagro presage a more concerted effort on his part to bring renegade regimes to account. Throughout his term in office, Almagro has been repeatedly criticised for being ‘soft’ on regional governments guilty of political (most notably, electoral) transgressions and human rights violations. In a related development, Paulo Abrão – the executive director of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) – on 27 July warned that the regime had begun a “third phase of repression”: the “criminalisation” of opposition leaders. Abrão’s comments are in direct reference to the regime’s use of a recently approved anti-terrorism law to arrest opponents to it. According to national newspaper La Prensa, the government has arrested at least 185 people on such Anti-government protests continue charges.

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UK-based NGO Global Witness on 24 July released a report on murders of environmental activists in 2017, highlighting Latin America as the most dangerous region. Latin America recorded almost 60% of all environmental activists’ murders worldwide. The region will likely remain the most dangerous for these activists. The majority of murders were related to resource exploitation in the Amazon, land disputes and opposition to extractive projects. Businesses operating or seeking to operate in Latin America can face opposition from environmental groups in specific sectors, particularly for extractive activities. The “At What Cost?” report highlights 2017 as the most violent year on record for environmental activism worldwide. Latin America continues to be regarded as the most violent region, registering 121 of the 207 murders recorded. The report details that there were at least seven cases of mass murders (cases where at least four people were murdered). Agribusiness became the most dangerous sector for environmental activism in 2017, with mining coming in second. According to Global Witness, impunity is rampant when it comes to these kinds of attacks and murders. The NGO also added that at least 53 of the murders were linked to government security forces. Brazil registered the highest number of murders since 57.80% of cases were related to activists opposing exploitation projects in the Amazon region. Activism and environment-related issues will remain commonplace in the country’s Amazon provinces. The report highlights that pro-business initiatives to revitalise Brazil’s economy have led to the development of major projects in the agribusiness and energy sectors – often overlooking social consultations and environmental impact regulations, and leading to opposition from environmentalists and indigenous communities. Meanwhile, Mexico in 2017 recorded the highest increase in murders of any country, with cases increasing five-fold compared to the previous year. Activists operating in areas controlled by organised crime were increasingly targeted, with notable cases of logging protests recorded in the Tarahumara Mountain Range (Chihuahua state). In Peru, murders quadrupled year-on-year. Indigenous activists represented 25% of the total number of victims, with Brazil and Mexico having the most cases – most of these were related to development projects in traditionally indigenous territories. Latin America has a long tradition of environmental activism, particularly against the development of extractive projects. Activism takes place in business-friendly and protectionist jurisdictions in the region. Development projects that have not had consultations regarding the use of land and natural resources, and social and environmental impact assessments, are more likely to face opposition from environmental groups and activists. High levels of impunity, coupled with widespread organised criminal activities, will remain the main risk factors for activism.

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Ongoing activity by Islamist militant group al-Sunnah has prompted concerns among operators in Cabo Delgado province. Drawing on our on-the-ground presence in Cabo Delgado, we analyse the likely evolution of the threat. Al-Sunnah will pose an increasing threat to commercial operators over the coming years, with government efforts to combat the group unlikely to succeed. The group is likely to increasingly target foreign nationals and commercial vehicles in north- eastern districts of Cabo Delgado. Al-Sunnah’s ongoing attempts to enhance its capabilities require close monitoring. However, an attack on fixed commercial assets remains unlikely over the coming year. Attacks are unlikely to spread outside Cabo Delgado, but al-Sunnah is likely to develop support networks in the broader region, including in Nampula province and southern Tanzania.

IDEOLOGY TO REMAIN KEY MOTIVATING FACTOR

The government initially claimed that al-Sunnah was a criminal group. However, President Filipe Nyusi on 29 July reportedly stated that radicalisation was to blame for its emergence. In reality – and as with other militant groups Control Risks monitors across the world – a complex mix of ideology, socioeconomic grievances and criminality is likely to fuel al-Sunnah’s activities. Religious ideology plays a pivotal role, and will continue to be the main factor shaping the group’s targeting and tactics over the coming months. However, political and economic grievances among Cabo Delgado’s Kimwani population will also facilitate the group’s recruitment efforts. In addition, al-Sunnah is likely to have some links to organised criminality in the province, and Control Risks is aware that some members have been offered financial incentives to join the group. This array of factors will make it difficult for the government to combat the group by seeking to address the underlying issues driving the threat. The government will also struggle to eradicate al-Sunnah using force. There is a substantial deployment of the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM), the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) and the Rapid Intervention Unit (FIR) in Cabo Delgado. However, al-Sunnah’s cell structure means that it is able to easily evade security forces in a province that is huge, sparsely populated and densely forested. The PRM has previously claimed to have removed al-Sunnah from particular areas, only for further attacks to occur, illustrating the difficulties that the PRM will continue to face in tackling the group through military means.

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Al-Sunnah is unlikely to have the capabilities to pose a sustained threat to fixed commercial assets or established urban centres, such as the provincial capital Pemba. Its members have so far used machetes, a limited number of automatic rifles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during attacks. The IEDs appear to be basic and are unlikely to be able to cause significant damage to infrastructure. Meanwhile, the group is reported to have been sparing in its use of ammunition. This is likely because it has limited access to ammunition or is a strategy to avoid attracting security forces when conducting raids. Nonetheless, al-Sunnah is currently seeking to expand its capabilities. Several attacks in recent weeks have resulted in a small number of automatic weapons being stolen from the security forces. Most recently, several independent sources stated that a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on 29 July had been taken during a raid near Chitolo (Mocimboa da Praia district). The group’s capabilities are likely to gradually expand in the coming years, slowly increasing the likelihood of direct attacks on commercial operations, assets and personnel. Al-Sunnah is unlikely to reach a point where it can launch sophisticated attacks on fixed commercial assets over the next year. However, it is likely to be able to target commercial vehicles travelling on rural roads. The following key indicators would signal an increase in al-Sunnah’s capabilities: • Further raids on security force positions in and around affected districts of Cabo Delgado. • An increase in the use of automatic rifles and IEDs during attacks in Cabo Delgado. • The growing availability to the group of weapons smuggled into Mozambique, traditionally destined for poaching syndicates. • An increase in weapons being moved into Mozambique by criminal groups in southern Tanzania. • Al-Sunnah’s establishment of broader support networks in other provinces of Mozambique and in neighbouring countries.

PRESENCE

We expect al-Sunnah to continue to operate predominantly as a collection of loosely organised cells in certain districts of Cabo Delgado over the coming year. The group’s intimate knowledge of the footpaths in the dense bush around targeted villages and apparent familiarity with individuals in these villages have been key to its ability to stage attacks while evading capture by the security forces. The group is unlikely to be as familiar with the broader Cabo Delgado region, let alone neighbouring provinces such as Nampula and Niassa. Nonetheless, we believe that al-Sunnah is actively seeking to expand its recruitment and supply networks in both neighbouring provinces – notably Nampula and Niassa – and countries, including Tanzania, Kenya and possibly Congo (DRC). The arrests of 29 individuals suspected of having been recruited by the group in Nampula province in March, and of three Mozambican nationals allegedly recruited by the group in Congo (DRC) in 2017 suggest that al-Sunnah already has some links to these areas. Al-Sunnah is a long way off being able to expand its area of operations and carry out attacks in other provinces. With attention focused on Cabo Delgado amid an influx of investment around natural gas developments, it is also likely to want to maintain focus on the province. However, its ability to establish recruitment networks in Nampula province, southern Tanzania and the broader region will play an important role in determining its capability to present a sustained threat in Cabo Delgado over the coming years.

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IRAQ Militants in the final week of July attacked at least four electricity pylons and set fire to a power station in Kirkuk province. Disruptive and occasionally violent protests have occurred over the past three weeks in response to longstanding grievances in the southern provinces, including over a lack of employment and poor electricity and water provision. The Ministry of Electricity said that a 30 July attack on an electricity pylon near Dibis (Kirkuk province) cut electricity supply to Nineveh province, while the power station attack cause power outages in the Hawijah district (Kirkuk province). IS has routinely targeted electricity pylons in the north-central provinces and particularly Diyala province.

PANAMA Protests related to a rise in electricity tariffs have been taking place in the capital Panama City, including on 10 July when demonstrators ransacked a passenger bus. Two days later, several people were injured in clashes between the police and protesters when the latter set tyres alight and blocked traffic on Avenida Simon Bolivar. Other disruptive protests were reported on 12 July in Colon (Colon province) and David (Chiriqui province).

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Note: Hiscox Syndicates and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach will lead to removal from the distribution list TAJIKISTAN Four foreign cyclists were killed and three others injured on 29 July in the Khatlon oblast of southern Tajikistan in a car-ramming and stabbing attack. The incident is the first of its kind in Tajikistan, and was initially claimed by IS. However, the Ministry of Interior on 31 July linked the attack to the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Two assailants were killed while resisting arrest and four more were detained. Two US, one Swiss and one Dutch citizen were killed in the incident. The three injured are Dutch, Swedish and French nationals, one of whom sustained stab wounds when the assailants emerged from their car and further attacked the group. The incident occurred in Khatlon’s Danghara district, around 45 miles (70km) south of the capital Dushanbe.

. PAKISTAN Domestic media outlets on 4 July reported that an improvised explosive device attack the previous day had targeted an oil exploration company in the Toba Nakani area of the district of Dera Bugti in eastern Balochistan. The remote-controlled explosive targeted a vehicle belonging to the oil exploration company. The attack killed three people and injured five, all of whom were Pakistani nationals. Separatist militant group the Balochistan Republican Army claimed responsibility.

ZIMBABWE At least three people were killed on 1 August when security forces opened fire during violent protests in the capital Harare after the opposition alleged vote rigging at the 30 July general elections. The protests saw high levels of violence as participants first clashed with the police and then with Zimbabwe Defence Forces soldiers.

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AFRICA

The security forces forcibly dispersed a demonstration on 12 July in the capital Khartoum against two dam Sudan projects, and to condemn the deaths of participants in earlier anti-dam rallies. No casualties were reported . Unauthorised protests in the capital Kampala against a controversial social media tax deteriorated into unrest on 11 Uganda July when demonstrators clashed with the police, prompting the latter to use tear gas and live ammunition to disperse crowds. Several people were arrested and injured as a result. Local reports indicate that the security forces on 14 July fired at a speeding car near a checkpoint in the capital Mogadishu, after which the vehicle exploded, killing all those inside. According to the police, a second car bomb Somalia detonated shortly afterwards. The police said the incident was a failed attack on the presidential palace. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility, while the police said that six militants had been killed and the situation had been brought under control. South President Salva Kiir and leader of the armed opposition Riek Machar on 25 July agreed to form a joint Sudan government in August for a 30-month transition period. Protesters on 12 July set alight a fire station in Cape Town (Western Cape province) during demonstrations South Africa reportedly over land ownership. In addition to setting fire to the Gugulethu fire station, the protesters burnt a local security company car and set fire to an office block occupied by a local community court.

AMERICAS

The FBI on 1 July arrested a man who had allegedly been plotting a terrorist attack in Cleveland (Ohio state) during United the city’s Fourth of July Independence Day parade. According to the authorities, the suspect had also been planning a States subsequent attack in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania state). The suspect had reportedly been influenced by al-Qaida. Newspaper Clarín on 24 July reported on investigations into individuals linked to Islamist extremist networks in the tri- border area between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, specifically Hizbullah. The report follows the 12 July decision by Argentina Argentina’s Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF)’s to freeze the assets of 14 members of the “Barakat Clan” – an organised criminal group led by Assad Ahmad Barakat – for six months. The Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) on 26 July announced that 448 people have been Nicaragua killed in anti-regime protest action since 18 April. Anti-government unrest began on 6 July after officials announced an imminent end to petrol (gasoline) subsidies. At least seven people were killed in the violence, with roadblocks cutting off routes to the capital Haiti Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP). A reversal of the planned fuel price hike failed to quell the unrest, with protesters on 13 July in Petit-Goave (Ouest department) calling for the departure of President Jovenel Moise.

ASIA

Protests have been held in the wake of the death of two students in a road accident on 29 July in the Bangladesh capital Dhaka. Some of the demonstrations have turned unruly, with protesters clashing with the police, vandalising vehicles and sporadically blockading roads. IS on 15 July claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in the capital Kabul targeting government employees. The attack killed seven people and injured around 15. It targeted employees of the Ministry of Rural Development and Afghanistan Rehabilitation as they were leaving work. The ministry is located among other government buildings in an area of north-western Kabul with a heavy security presence. A small explosion on 26 July occurred outside the US embassy in the capital Beijing, but caused no injuries except to the man suspected of carrying the device. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it an “isolated security incident” China and, while it is impossible to independently confirm details of the circumstances, there is little reason to doubt the official characterisation of events. At least 149 people were killed on 13 July in a suicide explosion targeting a Balochistan Awami Party (BAP)-led rally in Pakistan Mastung (Balochistan province); IS claimed responsibility. Separately, on 12 July, at least two people were injured in the attack near the BAP election office in Khuzdar (Balochistan). An attack on 31 July targeted a meeting between government officials and non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers Afghanistan in Nangarhar province. Fifteen people were killed. Two members of an international aid organisation were killed during the attack. No group has claimed responsibility but IS was suspected

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An Armenian Defence Ministry spokesperson on 1 July posted on Facebook that Armenian troops had thwarted an attempt Armenia/ by the Azerbaijani army to reinforce several of its frontline positions on the Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nakhichevan) border. One Azerbaijan Armenian soldier was reportedly lightly injured. The Azerbaijanis denied that there had been any exchange of fire. At least 200 residents on 10 July blocked the Yerevan-Yeghvard highway, the main route to Yerevan, to protest against Armenia the construction of an oil plant. Residents claim that the plant will pose serious environmental and health risks. Youth groups on 4 and 5 July clashed with police in Nantes after a police officer on 3 July shot dead an individual during a France police check. Approximately 100 individuals threw petrol bombs and set several bins, cars and buildings on fire. The authorities on 15 July detained 18 alleged religious radicals in Sumgait. Four people on 16 July were arrested in the city of Ganja on suspicion of terrorist activity. Protests and arrests had occurred in Ganja and other locations since a reported Azerbaijan assassination attempt on 3 July on the mayor of Ganja. The national authorities claim that the attempt was a terrorist attack but local sources have disputed this assessment. Gunfire and petrol bomb attacks were reported from 7-11 July in Londonderry (also known as Derry) in Northern Ireland. The United Police Service of Northern Ireland has blamed dissident republicans (Irish nationalists) for shots being fired at police and around Kingdom 100 petrol bombs being thrown into the nearby pro-UK unionist Fountain estate, as well as setting a car on fire. As of 11 July, police had arrested three people and reported that two police officers and one civilian had been injured after being struck with bricks.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Six members of the Tunisian National Guard in Ain Soltane (Jendouba governorate) on 8 July were killed when Tunisia militants detonated an improvised explosive device and attacked the military convoy patrolling the Ain Soltane area, near the Algerian border. Al-Qaida affiliate Uqba Bin Nafi (UiN) on 8 July claimed responsibility. The government has designated nine mining and energy production sites in central and southern areas as closed military zones. Yemen The decision came after a foreign hydrocarbons company withdrew after its operations were paralysed by continued social protests. Unidentified militants on 8 July attacked a security forces checkpoint in Buraidah, the capital of the central province of Qassim. The authorities said three militants had approached the checkpoint in a car and opened fire. The resulting Saudi exchange of gunfire resulted in the deaths of two militants, one member of the security forces and one Bangladeshi Arabia expatriate. The security forces injured and apprehended the third militant. Individuals linked to or inspired by IS are likely to have carried out the attack. Militants belonging to the Houthi rebel movement on 25 July attacked a Saudi-flagged crude tanker. The Saudi government suspended oil shipments through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. The Saudi government on 25 July said that the Houthis had attacked two Saudi laden crude tankers 70 nautical miles (130km) west of Hodeidah, a key Houthi-controlled port city. Hodeidah is the target of a major Arabia/ Yemen coalition offensive that has been paused since 1 July. One vessel suffered minimal damage during the attack, which was likely carried out using an anti-tank guided missile launched from a small vessel. Although no information has been publicly released about the second tanker that was allegedly targeted, Houthi media claimed the attack was launched against a coalition military vessel.

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