In the Supreme Court of Florida Case No. 80289 Mark
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 80289 MARK DEAN SCHWAB, Appellant, Death Warrant Signed Execution Scheduled for November 15, 2007 at 6:00 p.m. STATE OF FLORIDA Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR BREVARD COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT MARK S. GRUBER Fla. Bar No. 0330541 PETER J. CANNON Fla. Bar No. 0109710 DAPHNEY GAYLORD Fla.Bar No. 0136298 Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region 3801 Corporex Park Drive Suite 210 Tampa, FL 33619-1136 (813) 740-3544 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..........................................iii STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................................1 Case History...............................................1 Recent Events Concerning Lethal Injection..................3 Present Proceedings........................................6 STANDARD OF REVIEW.............................................11 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............................................12 ARGUMENT.......................................................14 Argument I: The Lower Court Erred in Summarily Denying Mr. Schwab's Lethal Injection Claim....................................14 The court erred by rejecting a "Foreseeable Risk" standard..................................................24 The use of a paralytic violates the Eighth Amendment......30 The court erred by declining to take judicial notice of the Lightbourne case..........................................31 The court erred in deferring unduly to the Department of Corrections...............................................33 The court erred by declining to find that the problems with the Diaz execution are relevant to this claim.............42 The lower court erred by denying Mr. Schwab's requests for public records............................................43 The court erred by rejecting the argument that consciousness assessment must meet a clinical standard using medical expertise and equipment...................................51 The court erred in finding that the Rule 3.851 motion was insufficiently pled.......................................55 i Argument II: The Court Erred in Summarily Denying Schwab's Newly Discovered Evidence Claim Based on Brain Impairment.......64 CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT...................................71 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.........................................71 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE......................................72 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Cited Page No. Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2006) ....................55 Brown V. Beck, Slip Copy, 2006 WL 3914717 (E.D.N.C., April 07, 2006)................................55 Buenoano v. State, 565 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1990)...................29 Darling v. State, C So.2d ----, 2007 WL 2002499, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S486, (Fla. July 12, 2007)..........33, 49 Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136 (2006)...........................15 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)......................14, 25 Hill v. State, 921 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2006).......................15 Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004)................12 Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1991)......................68 LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (D.Ariz. 1995)..............30 McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla. 2002)......................12 Rolling v. State, 944 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2006)....................15 Morales v. Hickman, 415 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006)........20 Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006)......20, 28 Rutherford v. State, 926 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 2006)................15 Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308 (2006) cert. den. 127 S.Ct. 1126..................................1 Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1994) cert. den. 513 U.S. 950, 115 S.Ct. 364 (1994)..............1 Schwab v. State, 814 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2002)...................1, 2 Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2000)...................15, 17 Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) ..............25 iii Other Authorities Cited Fla. Stat. '922.105(8).........................................22 Fla. Stat. '922.10(7)..........................................15 Fla. Stat. '922.11(2)..........................................23 Fla. Stat. '945.10(g)..........................................22 Arch Gen Psychiatry, Brain Pathology in Pedophilic Offenders, 64 (2007).................................................65 Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 63 (2002)................................17 International Journal of Forensic Psychology, Neuroanatomical Substrates for Sex Offenses, 1, no. 3 (2006)..............65 iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE Case History The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and capital sexual battery after a nonjury trial and sentenced to death on July 1, 1992. The judgment and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1994) cert. den. 513 U.S. 950, 115 S.Ct. 364 (1994). Thereafter, Schwab filed an original motion for postconviction relief, the denial of which was affirmed in Schwab v. State, 814 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2002). The denial of Schwab=s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed in Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308 (2006) cert. den. 127 S.Ct. 1126. On direct appeal Schwab argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse the Brevard County State Attorney=s Office, denying his motion to suppress certain statements, denying his defense counsel=s motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and admitting similar fact evidence. Schwab also argued that the death sentence was disproportionate in his case and that the heinous, atrocious , or cruel aggravator was unconstitutional. The claims raised in his postconviction appeal were described by this Court this way: Schwab's eleven claims are: (1) the trial 1 judge should have recused himself due to his apparent bias; (2) the trial judge was actually biased; (3) Schwab did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to a jury; (4) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase; (5) trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase; (6) the trial judge relied on facts outside the record, namely, Judge Richardson's experience on the criminal bench, in finding that as a child Schwab was not raped by his neighbor; (7) Schwab's death sentence is disproportionate; (8) the prior violent felony aggravator should be struck, as the predicate sexual battery conviction was obtained through an involuntary guilty plea; (9) the intent to torture element of the HAC aggravator was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) the murder during the course of an enumerated felony aggravator is an unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance; (11) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1989), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Schwab v. State, 814 So.2d 402, 406 n.3. His state habeas petition contained three claims: 1. Appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising bias of the trial judge as fundamental error, 2. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to ensure a complete record, 3. Possible incompetence to be executed. On appeal of the federal district court=s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals considered and ultimately denied relief on five claims: 1. Conflict of interest with trial counsel, 2. Insufficient evidence of corpus delecti independent of inculpatory statements, 3. Waiver of trial by a jury was 2 not knowingly and intelligently made, 4. Ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of the trial, and 5. Constitutional error in the trial court=s findings with regard to mitigating circumstances. All of these earlier claims for relief have been denied. Recent Events Concerning Lethal Injection On December 13, 2006, Angel Diaz was executed by lethal injection. Numerous reports by the press and other witnesses indicated that the execution was botched. The execution took almost three times as long as normal. Diaz grimaced, arched his body, appeared to be mouthing words, and otherwise evidenced that he was in pain, despite the injection of a paralytic. The medical examiner who conducted an autopsy reported that Athe fluids to be injected were not going into a vein, but were going into small tissues in the arm@. Later investigation showed that in both the primary venous access site in Diaz= left arm and a backup site in the other arm the needle and catheter had been pushed through the target vein into the tissue beyond. When the executioners encountered substantial resistance during the injection process, they improperly continued to inject the drugs into Diaz, switching back and forth between the two failed IV lines. As a result of the medical examiner=s findings, the Governor suspended all executions in Florida and appointed a 3 Commission to review the execution and make recommendations. The Commission Report concluded that the execution team failed to properly obtain and maintain venous access, failed to administer the chemicals properly, and failed to follow the execution protocols. The protocols as written were found to be insufficient to deal with complications that are known to have arisen in lethal injection executions around the country, and in any event the execution team had not been adequately trained as to the protocols then in effect. PC-W Vol VI 1005.1 The