Becoming-state The bio-cultural imperialism of Sid Meier’s Civilization

Kacper Pobłocki

“Representations of what lay beyond insular or metropolitan boundaries came, almost from the start, to confirm European power. There is an impressive circularity here: we are dominant because we have the power (industrial, technological, military, moral), and they don’t, because of which they are not dominant; they are inferior, we are superior (…) and so on and so on” (Said 1994: 127).

“Thanks to Civilization I lerned history and English” (Igor from Moscow, posted on the ‘HotGames’ mailing list (original spelling))

What would have happened to the world his- civilizations thesis has usually been mailed to tory, had the prospective artist A. Hitler been Huntington, it is Meier who was first, has more admitted to the Vienna Art Academy? This to say, and, as is argued in this paper, seems and other equally thrilling questions of ne- more convincing. Not only computer freaks, cessities and contingencies of history have for whom Meier is the greatest software pro- so far been tackled, and rather unconvincingly grammer of all times, but also respectful MIT at that, only by political fiction and by some researchers have been hailing Meier for the even less impressive social scientists (Fergu- educational qualities of his game (Squire 2002). son 1998). But the issues involved are wider Civilization with its three sequels from 1991, than the answers available: what is the major 1996 and 2001 means much more than millions force behind history and does the world have of copies sold all over the world: it means also to look the way it does? What is at stake here dozens of fan websites, hundreds of volun- is our identities: why are we the way we are, teers from ‘all over the world’ (i.e. Europe, the and why can we not change it? One of the US and Japan) working on open source clones least impressive although lately highly popu- of the game, a project going on for seven years lar answers to these questions was given by now.1 There is even a computer game called Sid Meier, who argued that the major force in ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ (2002), also cre- history was the clash of civilizations, as it were ated by volunteers and conceived as a dead- defining the existent socio-political order. Some ringer for Meier’s work. The latest version of people saw the events of September 11, as a Civilization has been suggested a ‘critic’s pick’ proof of Meier’s (I mean Huntington’s) thesis in Time Magazine (2001), hailed there as ‘the (Kaplan 2001) but not everyone noticed that it pinnacle of achievement’, and glorified in had been obvious to millions long before the many other major news sources. To cut it short: infamous recent hijack. The point was ‘proved’ Civilization is all-out enthusiasm. in 1991 when Microprose released a strategy Thus, with the technological generation gap game called Civilization. vanishing, computer games can no longer be Although praise or criticism of the clash of perceived as a play tool for teenage boys (Jen-

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 163 kins 1999) because their impact is much more tribute to establishing hard facts about social widespread. Not only are some computer reality, such as in the case of Schelling the games, such as flight simulators, as the co- reasons of racial residential segregation in the author of Civilization Bruce Staley reveals, tar- US. Military geostrategists of the Cold War geted solely at adults (Herz 1997: 211) but pro- used similar models in order to predict what grammers who work on Civilization clones pro would have happened if the nuclear war should publico bono elevate this game to the posi- have been launched. The outcome of their tion of a public good, ‘cause Civilization study was always mutual annihilation, which should be free’, as a slogan of Freeciv (2002) convinced US generals not to play with fire reads. Free education, health service and ac- (Herz 1997: 216). While Schelling’s model was cess to Civilization for everyone: that is where usually played on a board, the mentioned Rand the play becomes serious. Although Meier Strategy Assessment was already conceived himself is orthodoxly apolitical, for many as software. people his game does convey a major political Commercial strategy games, just as flight message. For example when asked whether the simulators, were very often simply user-friend- emphasis on pollution in Civilization was in- ly versions of such military programs (Herz deed a green statement, Meier stated: “We 1997: 216-17). Civilization was based on three very consciously avoid putting our political computer games: Empire, SimCity, and Railroad philosophy into the game. It takes you out of Tycoon as well as a board game from 1981 the fantasy and makes you aware that some- called Civilization. Empire descends from the one else designed this game” (Chick 2002). cold war military software: play itself is limited Well put: no blunt propaganda but instead to choosing the best military tactic to domi- Althusserian unconscious manifestations of nate the randomly generated planet. SimCity, cultural claims, of which Meier may well not on the other hand, follows the scientific tradi- be aware. tion: it is a real-time simulation of a city, where a player creates an environment in which vir- tual residents live, and depending on the con- The grand narrative of the ‘greatest ditions provided move in or out. Often, such game of all time’ commercial strategy games would return to the professional world, as was the case with Hid- Computer games are largely indebted to quan- den Agenda employed in the training of dip- titative science. It is in the rational choice lomats and CIA agents (Herz 1997: 222) or theory research that the foundation for strat- SimCity extensively used at the 1994 Mayors egy games was developed back in the 1950s Conference in Portland (Herz 1997: 221). and 1960s. Such concepts as the Schelling’s Civilization is the first bold attempt to simu- (1971) model of residential segregation or Axel- late the whole of human history in computer rod’s famous ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (De Landa software. Ambitious as it sounds, the game 1993) allow us to reduce human behavior to a nevertheless does not go beyond reproduc- few simple variables, create virtual agents, ob- ing models of social change well known, and serve their simulated behavior in time, as well extensively criticized, in twentieth-century as rerun the model with a possibility of alter- social science. To take a notable example, in ing the variables or the raw data at no cost Big structures, large processes, huge com- (Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 14; Gilbert parisons (1984) Charles Tilly dissects the ves- and Doran 1994). Such models, regardless of tige of nineteenth-century natural history in non-materiality of the subjects and the envi- today’s social science. The tradition often as- ronment, have the weight of a scientific ex- sumes that a society is a coherent, self-con- periment: contingencies that are explored con- tained unit (Tilly 1984: 24-25) which moves

164 through standard and abstract stages (1984: (Ferguson 1998, De Landa 1993). The only use 41-42), each more advanced and complex than of such models has to do with their ‘univer- the previous one (1984: 11). Such a model con- salizing’ property (Tilly 1984: 97), and that stitutes the backbone of Civilization as well. quality is very well utilized by Meier. In Civilization history is embodied in a ‘tech- A major theme in both twentieth century nology tree’ that leads the player through social science and Civilization is that modern- simulated time: all major human achievements ization leads to differentiation, differentiation are structured in a cause-effect chart that en- creates greater complexity, and complexity as- ables the player, starting the game in 4,000 BC sures even greater strength, wealth and sup- with one settler and few ‘advances’ such as, pleness (Tilly 1984: 43-44). This usually in- say, irrigation, bronze-working and pottery to volves an emphasis on the “natural history of finish the game in 2020 AD with a hyper-mod- economic development” (Tilly 1984: 82), divi- ern society capable of colonizing outer space. sion and specialization of labor, as well as the How? The starting advances allow us to ‘let problem of social cohesion (Tilly 1984: 50-53). our scientists work’ on progress, for example These concerns constitute the backbone of ceremonial burial opens the way to mysticism. Civilization: we start with a ‘primitive’ tribe It also leads to monarchy but only if we have consisting of a few units, and gradually build at the disposal both ceremonial burial and up a sophisticated conglomeration of cities code of laws. Thanks to the ceremonial burial (with increasing population that after a cer- we can also build temples in our cities. Thanks tain threshold can be split into classes), infra- to other advances, such as the wheel, we can structure (roads, mines, factories, libraries, additionally build stronger military units, in etc.), units (soldiers, diplomats, workers, etc.), this case chariots. resources (wine, oil, gold, etc.), and at certain This evolutionary model cannot be influ- moment our civilization is so complex that enced by the player: the ‘tech tree’ always many players find the enterprise hard and even remains the same. The player will always move boring to administer (Chick 2002). Nearly ev- from the Ancient through Medieval and In- ery element of the game is quantified (not only dustrial to the Modern Era, and the outlook money, production of units and infrastructure of cities and clothing of citizens and advisors, but also science and culture) and gradually as well as the representation of the player him/ ‘produced’: technological advancements are herself, after every mile step will become more produced by scientists and culture is gener- fashionable, read: modern. The only choice ated by the city infrastructure. The higher and available resides in the order in which such the more efficient the production, the better advances are uncovered: the science advisor the civilization, and the higher the chances of always asks: ‘what shall we work on?’, and winning the game. depending on our strategy we can set priori- The speed of differentiation or ‘growth’ de- ties on the agenda. A dove would possibly go pends on several factors, of which the politi- for ceremonial burial before the wheel, while a cal system is the most important. In Civiliza- hawkish player would perhaps do otherwise. tion III there are six government models to The Parsonian ‘branching tree’ (Tilly 1984: 47), choose from: despotism (everyone starts with as well as naturally, the Toynbee’s model of it), monarchy, republic, anarchy, communism civilizations are perhaps figurations which are and democracy. Every political system has a the closest to Meier’s Civilization. Neverthe- ‘work efficiency’ inevitably associated with less, not only should social life not be per- ‘personal and economic freedom’ (Infogrames ceived that way (for exact reasons, cf. Tilly 2001: 129) of the citizens, and it is lowest with 1984), but the natural sciences have aban- anarchy (50 percent), average with despotism, doned such models a long time ago too monarchy, communism, and republic (100 per-

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 165 cent), and highest with democracy (150 per- ring invasions of barbarians from Asia”. Some cent). Thus, the economic reductionism men- of such ethnocentric depictions, appearing in tioned above, which also derives from Rail- a rather erratic manner, and betraying a lack of road Tycoon (a game designed by Meier, and serious research behind the concepts of the the third that Civilization was modeled upon) game, are removed from the later versions, yet makes democracy ultimately the best political without changing the very fact that the United system. Although there are five possible ways States is made the ultimate inheritor of all the of winning Civilization III the choice does not human advancement and elevated to the po- go beyond the ‘fetishism of the consumer’ sition of the most perfect and most ‘civilized’ (Appadurai 1996). Teenage girls can choose state of all. between five members of a boys band (of deli- The only drawback of the civilization growth berately very different looks) to fall for. The and democracy (as we see no consumerism or problem is, however, that they all sing the very similar phenomena) consists in the growing same song. The five options of Military, Cultu- disorder, which once again seems a major ral, Outer Space, Diplomatic, and Geographi- theme in the models of social change criticized cal Hegemony involve high levels of produc- by Tilly (1984: 50-58). Our citizen icons liter- tivity (of military units, culture points, techno- ally turn into rebel icons, and if the number of logy, and cities) that can be only achieved by ‘content’ citizens is lower than the number of entering the Modern Era. Even if we go for the ‘unhappy’ citizens, the whole city goes on military victory, which is not easily attainable strike. Similar phenomenon occurs when we under democracy, we have to be able to pro- are engaged in war for too long. We can solve duce modern military units and thus enter the the problem either by increasing the percent- Modern Era. There is only one way leading age of economic production devoted to im- there: through climbing the ‘tech tree’, that is proving living standards (Infogrames 2001: through a dull rerunning of the History coded 131) or by stopping the war. This suggests in it. that democracy is the system under which peo- This history is not contingent in any way, ple are happiest (as opposed to e.g. commu- but it is the history of the West. The Civilope- nism, under which “many people decide to dia (such nomenclature reinforces the hidden emigrate” (Infogrames 2001: 130)) and that pedagogical aspirations of the game) explains democracy is the most peaceful system of all; for example that philosophy - which is a major offensive war is impossible (senate overrules discovery that leads to the two most advanced the decision to go to war) in Civilization I, and economic systems, democracy (in Civilization inefficient (‘war weariness’ of the population I) and republic (in Civilization III) - was inven- leads to disorder) in Civilization III. ted in Greece. More generally, the technology tree is structured around the Ancient, Medi- eval, Industrial and Modern Eras, each of them The garden of converging paths representing the European and Northern Ame- rican history. By way of illustration, in Civiliza- Yet, the basic promise given by Meier is quite tion I alphabet advancement is represented different from what has been described above. by an icon with Roman letters, and the des- What is it? An invitation to the Civilization III cription discusses the origins of the Western website makes it clear: “Rewrite History with alphabet. Medicine in all versions is ascribed the Greatest Game of All Time. Witness an epic to the Greek philosophy and Hippocrates. Per- adventure unfold before you as you wield the haps, the bluntest statement rounds off the ultimate power and reinvent the history of Civi- description of gunpowder in Civilization I: lization” (Civ3.com 2002). Does it mean that “Musketeers and Cannon (…) ended recur- we can go on our own counterfactual trip and

166 witness History at the same time? Derrida divine and absolute reason’ (Ferguson 1998: (1996: 92-93) argues that there are two types 29), even though Meier gives somewhat more of discovery: establishing what ‘there is’, and space to free will. In that respect Meier would (after Descartes) exploring contingencies. Cu- probably agree with Plekhanov: “influential riously, which at the level of this advertise- individuals can change the individual features ment seems no paradox, Meier promises both. of events and some of their particular conse- First, we can make discoveries by creating, quences, but they cannot change their gen- and explore the contingencies of the human eral trend (…) they are themselves the prod- history. We can play on a map that does not uct of this trend” (Ferguson 1998: 41, original resemble Earth, make Zulus and Russians emphasis). Indeed, as an add informs, we can neighbors, separate the French on an island, “match wits with greatest leaders of the world build the Pyramids in China and the Great Wall in an all-out quest to build the ultimate em- in Germany, discover theory of gravity in Ja- pire” (Civ3.com 2002), and we do become one pan and the like. This is what generally is called of such nearly divine leaders with a capacity ‘interactivity’: the user influences the narra- for altering the course of history (hence the tive (Darley 2000). And what Civilization prom- popular classification of Civilization in the ‘you ises is the ultimate interactivity: “Build the ulti- are the god’ genre). The telos, however, is well mate Empire - the way you imagine it”, invites known. If in the case of Hegel it was the Prus- the Discovery [in the pre-Cartesian sense] sian state (Ferguson 1998: 30), the fetish-ob- Channel add of the game (Civ3.com 2002). Yet, ject of Meier’s fantasies is the ‘ultimate em- ‘ultimate interactivity’ is a contradiction in pire’, the state that resembles most the end terms - games are still about the interaction product of all human advancement, namely the between the human and software, with one United States of America. limiting the other. Imagining what could have happened if one The software offers a disclosure of what of the great leaders, say Hitler, was replaced ‘there is’, the ‘epic’ that is to be unfolded. The by a different-minded computer player is cru- mentioned Time Magazine (2001) review puts cial, for “if we want to say anything about an equation sign between Civilization and His- causation in the past (…) we really have to tory (“History has never been so addictive”), use counterfactuals, if only to test our causal and many others emphasize the utility value hypotheses” (Ferguson 1998: 81). The coun- of Civilization as an auxiliary tool in teaching terfactual elements in Civilization are there to history that has already happened (Squire test if (and prove that) the history as we know 2002). Some of them seem to acknowledge that it is the inevitable one, which seems a rather Civilization is not keen on detail. As we see typical feature of the counterfactual genre this is a history constructed on the basis of (Ferguson 1998: 11, 18). Following the logic of nineteenth century folk wisdom.Virtually no a scientific experiment, we repeat something one considers this to be a problem. in as many different conditions as possible, The interactivity dillema, that is the ques- let’s say drop a stone in as many places as tion how much and which parts of the game possible. If the stone drops in all of the cases, can be influenced by players, and, conversely, we prove that gravity is universal, unless we which ones cannot, resembles greatly the can falsify this conclusion. heated nineteenth century debate on the rela- The advantage of computer software over tion between ‘free will’ and ‘necessity’ in his- traditional experiment is that we can drop such tory. The answer given by Meier is crude de- a stone in all places imaginable, not only those terminism, and very much in the Hegelian vein that exist but especially those that only could at that: “the world history is governed by an exist, as the guru of computer modeling puts ultimate design (…) whose rationality is (…) a it, in an ‘epistemological reservoir’ (De Landa

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 167 1993). In that sense Civilization resembles The same starting conditions (one settler in 4,000 garden of forking paths imagined by Borges. BC) and the same opportunities because the In his short story Borges introduces the prose rules are the same for everyone.3 The point is, of an imaginary author Ts’ui Pên that simulta- however, that there is only one path you can neously encompasses all the possible out- run on. That means that every Civilization, comes of a given chain of events (Ferguson also the Iroquois, has an equal opportunity to 1998). Civilization can generate an unlimited become the United States of America but only number of contingent maps on which a poten- those who are skilled and cleaver enough do tially unlimited number of players can make all succeed. This is where the economic reduc- the decisions desired with regard to an unlim- tionism of Civilization surfaces: the best player ited number of contingent civilizations (we can is the one who is the best manager, who can give our civilization any name, and name the attain his or her goals in the most efficient cities as we wish). Yet, the trick is that if we way, increase the productivity (military, cul- control such environment, that is write its rules, tural, scientific, etc.) and still guard the social we can make sure that the stone always falls.2 order. That regularity suggests that present- Thus gravity seems to be a universal law, and day superiority of the West lies in personal there is no way to falsify this because… we abilities of its leaders and citizens who pro- predestined it to be universal. And even duce more under democracy than under, say, though De Landa (1993) argues that some despotism, and that the backwardness of the computer models would be able to avoid this Rest lies in their individual and collective infe- circularity, this is surely not the case with riority. This is the story that we already know today’s strategy games, and neither with com- very well. puter models used in social sciences (Feat- The most obvious equivalent of Civilization herstone an Burrows 1995: 14). SimCity proves is Robinson Crusoe. Robinson personifies the that regardless of the conditions simcitizens West that gradually comes to itself by build- would always favor public transport (Herz ing up a civilized life (culture) on a wild island 1997: 223). Civilization proves that the history and reinventing all the technical tools that of the West is the only logical development of were in use in Defoe’s England. By the end of the humankind that would have happened the book Robinson the castaway manages to anywhere and any time, regardless of the ini- become Robinson the Englishman, all thanks tial conditions and players’ strategies. The gar- to hard work, discipline and reason. He is also den designed by Meier merges all the pos- able to transcend the limitations of nature and sible paths into the master narrative of the leave the island (Goody 1998: 42-43). Contin- Western success. gency of the location and of the hero turns The maneuver of moving existing phenom- this story into the modernist master narrative. ena into neutral, contingent grounds is well It is an exploration of the roots of the human- known in politics. The reason why during the kind (West) but in a sense opposite to Cold War both the West and especially the Conrad’s. Robinson Crusoe, as well as Civili- East spend so much money and effort on the zation, is a trip out of the heart of darkness Olympic Games is that only there could they towards the light of civilization. This is what prove that they are essentially better (Goldberg the Civilization III manual tells us about it: 2000, Hill 1999). Real life can be unfair. On a ring, when the two sportsmen are almost na- “When you start a game, your first units are ked, and where the fair-play is fanatically surrounded by the darkness of the unknown. guarded by international referees, it is only Though you could choose to let this Settler your skills that matter. In Civilization the race and others wander around, the first military is also fair: the human and the AI have all the unit they ran across would capture them. As

168 soon as you find a decent site, you should tually got so used to that and enjoyed it. We have your Settler build a permanent settlement made a few changes, but it was essentially the - a town. You must build at least one town, tech tree we ended up with” (Chick 2002). because only towns (which grow into cities and metropolises) can produce units, food, Thus it is no wonder that released in 1991 Civi- income from commerce, and all the other things lization I is highly inflected with the cold war that allow your civilization to grow and de- mythology. The only way to the end of his- velop” (Infogrames 2001: 47). tory or salvation leads either through military annihilation of all the enemies, or through win- In the beginning of the game we can see only ning the star wars (i.e. building a space shuttle our units and a huge black screen - the map is and colonizing a planet called Alpha Centauri revealed only when we move our unit into the first). The game, especially at the lower levels darkness. Like Robinson who just woke up on of difficulty, is constructed in such a way that the shore, we are extremely vulnerable to any around half way through only one AI civiliza- danger, and we can be captured by the sav- tion would be counting as a serious rival to ages. And thus we have to build a home/town. the human player, and others, if surviving, Then the process of domestication of the hos- would be supporting either of the superpow- tile, wild environment starts. We meet other ers. Moreover, the Russians are here led by humans/AI although in the beginning we do Stalin, while the Americans by Abe Lincoln. not know our rivals. Then we start growing Each of the civilizations has its own ‘strategy’ and developing, from a rather savage being or ‘characteristic’, and in Civilization I the (look at the animation of the most basic units, Americans are dubbed ‘friendly’ and ‘civi- such as warrior) into a modern man. It is no lized’, whereas the Russians are ‘aggressive’ accident that in the fan’s jargon playing Civi- and ‘militaristic’. In order to put that into per- lization is often referred to as ‘gettin’ civilized’. spective, for example the French are ‘aggres- sive, expansionistic and civilized’, the Egyp- tians and the Chinese are just ‘civilized’, Towards the clash of civilizations whereas the Zulus are solely ‘aggressive’. These are the innate characteristics of civili- The irony lies in the fact that the three differ- zations that cannot be influenced by the user, ent versions of Civilization present rather di- and the AI opponents act accordingly. Simi- verging views on what is meant by ‘civilized’. larly, what is later called ‘foreign advisor’ in They are simply mere reflections of the milieu the cold war version of Civilization is referred in which Sid Meier and other designers lived to as ‘intelligence advisor’. Diplomats can ful- at the time of writing the game. While playing fill the roles of spies, such as sabotage or tech- Civilization for the first time at the age of 12, I nology theft, and only in later version are the was impressed by its scope as well the histori- two separated. cal research. Unfortunately, this is how Meier I am playing Civilization I on the King level, describes the development of the Civilization’s and in 1812 there are only four civilizations ‘tech tree’: left. The Russians are the least advanced ones, and basically engage in war with everyone and “I just kind of tossed it together with the idea every time. Their medieval units attack my cit- that someday we’d go back and fix this thing. ies for no reason. Stalin every now and then That would be the real tech tree, but for now I blackmails me, and when I do not give him just kind of thought off the top of my head to what he wants, money or technology, wages a come up with fifty or sixty important develop- war against me. They are equally desperate ments and linked them together. But we even- and annoying like the numerous barbarian

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 169 units, whose destiny is to emerge from no- ideas fairly vigorously. Culture and national- where and attack blindly, and at a certain mo- ity will play dramatic roles in your Civilization’s ment I can no more distinguish the two. On history” (Civ3.com 2002). the contrary, the Americans do not expand but Indeed. Civilization III borrowed from the Al- are happy on their own rather small island. pha Centauri a concept of explicit borderlines They have only five but exceptionally large between civilizations, but here their range de- and fairly advanced cities. Devoted to science pends on the ‘culture’ of the cities that these and building Wonders of the World (they have borders surround. Such a ‘culture’ is a nu- already Pyramids, Great Wall, United Nations meric value generated every turn by the build- and Cure for Cancer, compared to none of ings that are in the city: temples, libraries, uni- those erected by Russians), they are certainly versities, and so forth, as well as the ‘wonders heading for the space shuttle, and not for the of the world’. 10, 100, 1000, 10,000, and 100,000 military victory. And not only are they more are the turning points, when the borders peaceful than the Russians, but also way around the given city, and thus of civilization, ahead in achieving their goal. Have I heard expand. This renders much more significant this before? the Wonders, which in the previous versions Just as Abe Lincoln manages to stay in power strongly affected only the final score given in Civilization II and Civilization III, comrade after the game, but, given their extremely high Stalin is replaced by Lenin in the second and cost, influenced the actual game play rather then by Catharine the Great in the third epi- marginally. The general trend of this edition is sode.4 Their innate characteristics apparently anti-militaristic: powerful concepts such as change by 2001 as well since the Americans ‘war weariness’ are introduced, all to make become ‘expansionist’ and ‘industrious’, and peaceful hegemony more profitable than war- the Russians turn ‘scientific’ and ‘expansion- fare. ‘Cultural victory’ is possible when a ist’, whereas between 1991 and 1996 only the player has generated 40,000 points of the ‘cul- Americans change their ‘friendliness’ for ‘ra- ture score’, calculated on the basis of the ‘cul- tionality’. More changes come along with the tural’ value of city improvements and Won- Alpha Centauri, in a version of the game from ders, with the value of a single building in- 1999 set on a planet where the space shuttle creasing over time. rivalry in Civilization ultimately led to, gener- Moreover, the ‘cultures’ of different civili- ating new transcendence projects, diplomatic zations are matched against each other, and if and geographical ways to win and get out of you have a more powerful culture, others can the simulated environment. Civilization III be ‘in awe of your culture’ and thus more embraces those developments, adding one friendly and likely to give in during negotia- more, or as Time Magazine (2001) emphasizes, tions, etc. What is more, “When a rival city is the ‘key to this society’, namely culture. near your borders and your culture vastly Before the release of Civilization III fans had outranks theirs, a strong desire to enjoy the been mailing Meier their suggestions on what benefits of your society can drive the citizens should be ‘improved’, and culture belonged to defect and join your empire” (Infogrames to popular requests. A fan called Cass wrote: 2002: 53). They want to enjoy living the way “In our planet’s civilizations’ history, one as- we do, and this is a source of even more plea- pect which is somewhat repetitive but not yet sure to us (Zizek 1990). reflected successfully in any Civ (or Civ-like) Two important conclusions can be drawn game is a people’s loyalty to their culture”. from the examples above. Suffice it to say that The game designers posted on the Civiliza- the concept of culture is a recent construction tion website the following answer: “Thought and that it is ultimately connected to power you’d never ask! Yes we are addressing these (Wolf 2001). More importantly, Civilization is

170 an interactive mirror, a dynamic psyché that and technological, whereas subsequently it tells us that we are the most beautiful creature became also cultural. By embracing nineteenth in the world. It is a tool that confirms the real- century models of social change and by bru- ity of concepts that the player wants to see tal projection of the Western history onto con- confirmed. It is not only Meier and a few col- tingent grounds of randomly generated maps, laborators who write the game. Meier empha- random civilization names, random starting sizes, also for marketing purposes, but there positions, random distribution of resources is a lot of truth in it, that the user’s contribu- and the like, he essentializes the story of the tion to the game’s design is significant. In most Western success, suggesting that their causes cases the affair boils down to finding ‘bugs’, lie in personal abilities, rationality, high admi- inconsistencies in the simulated environment nistrative skills and other qualities of the West- that are then incorporated into the software in erners, reducing culture to an imperialist check the form of ‘patches’. Ideological contribu- list (one either has it or not), and suggesting tions such as Cass’ suggestion are welcome that starting conditions (both ecological and as well. It is here also that Meier’s genius lies, cultural) do not matter in the absorbing of a since the designers are able to sense which new advancement since there is no difference ‘improvements’ are expected. between ‘developed’ and imported advances. Naturally, we can always argue that the rea- Liberal democracy is the best political system, son why the cultural imperialism is so blunt in developed by the most cunning ones, and can Civilization I and subtler in Civilization III is be swallowed en bloc by all those who wish because only now does technology allow to live peacefully surrounded by thriving Meier to design programs with a larger amount economic, cultural and scientific life, just as of details. The improvements, nevertheless, the Americans do today. This is nothing but usually are restricted to the outlook of the the ‘master narrative of globalization’ (Kalb game, and AI’s sophistication. As Meier says: 2000) that stirred minds in the 1990s. Civilization is therefore the ‘greatest game of all time’ “The idea of a game about civilization is kind (Times Magazine 2001) not only because it is of scary, because it could easily get out of a good game, as Meier would wish, but pre- control and be totally unplayable, unmanage- cisely because its own master narrative em- able, and gigantic. So we wanted to reassure bodies the master narrative of globalization. people right at the beginning that these are concepts that were clear. (…) The icons rein- force that this isn’t a complicated game” (Chick Converting power: 2002). software/hardware/wetware

The cultural imperialism of 2001 is subtler than The question that comes to the foreground is: the one of 1991. And the reason why, as Time why do people like playing the game so much? Magazine (2001: 5) writes, “unlike movies, Part of the answer lies in the congruence of computer games tend to get better with each Civilization’s master narrative with the master incarnation” is that every consecutive version narrative of globalization. By comparison, Age of Civilization is to a large extent a reflection of Empires, the only serious competitor of Civi- of its socio-ideological milieu. lization, tries to do that as well but its narra- In short, Meier responded to the ‘culture tive is too fragmented. Arguably, the major talk’ that surfaced after the end of the cold reason of success resides in the carnivalesque war and incorporated it in his model of history ‘lease of power’ that the player is experienc- reduced to the clash of civilizations. In Civiliza- ing. As Tilly notices, alongside differentiation tion I the clash was mainly military, economic in some sense the process of modernization

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 171 brought about intense concentration of capi- machine (Friedman 1999: 122; Haraway 1989). tal in the hands of capitalists and concentra- In the popular culture discourse the main char- tion of the means of coercion in the hands of acteristic of a cyborg is his (it is usually a male) the state (Tilly 1984: 48-50). Civilization is an super-human power. The Terminator is per- offspring of that process. In a sense, the state haps the most typical example. Technology is the only actor in the game. It has the ulti- ‘improves’ his body with instruments of war- mate hegemony over the means of violence fare and subordination that pure biology can- and over the capital. In another, the powerful not provide (Springer 1996). Machines are the modern state (i.e. the United States) becomes fourth ‘classical Other’, along with non-whites, an object of attraction and envy, and the game animals and women (Braidotti 2002). At the promises power (empowerment) that comes same time computers are power-machines, from that state (the exclusive agent). Civiliza- compared on the basis of their calculating tion offers an opportunity, literally and in the power and memory (Springer 1996: 100). Play- absolutist sense, to become the state, and to ing the game is to a very high extent a process ‘wield the ultimate power’ over a contingent of domesticating the powerful and often scary world for a few hours. That empowering prom- Other, creating a bond that would make it less ise of the game is derived from the notion of threatening, and thus making us more power- interactivity. The state that we become at the ful, in the same way we tame a wild horse by same time comes to itself by means of a not riding it. Here the source of potestas that we always precisely formulated yet salient Hegel- can turn into potentia is the hardware we play ian dialectic waltz of thesis, antithesis and syn- on. thesis, very much a la Fred Astaire, i.e. up a Finally, the players experience the empow- stairway: e.g. mysticism and the code of laws erment because they often feel that playing lead to a more advanced monarchy. By play- computer games, just as cyberspace, liberates ing Civilization we enable the American state them from the constraints of their own physi- to come to itself, and what is more: we our- cal bodies, referred to in the cyberpunk dis- selves become that state. In that sense, Civili- course as ‘meat’ or ‘wetware’ (Stone 1992: zation is a tool of creating subjects who inter- 107). Yet, cyberspace (and so do computer nalize the logic and mythology of the greatest games) “both disembodies (…) but also re- narrative of all embodied in the technology embodies in the polychrome, hypersurfaced tree. cyborg character of the console cowboy” The two aspects of power, i.e. potestas (e.g. (Stone 1992: 109). New media offer an oppor- the repressive power of the state) and poten- tunity to reconfigure the “exterior of the body tia (empowerment) are converted to each other. as cultural representation” (McCarron 1995: The first source of potestas that we turn into 261-262), create a hybrid of an organism and a our own potentia, as already mentioned, is machine that in the consciously constructed the software: the power of the West coded in utopia of Haraway (1989) would transcend the the technology tree, the narrative as well as predominant power relations. The fantasy iden- the virtual environment that we slowly but tities from Internet chat rooms are perhaps best consequently conquer and master (Jenkins examples of the idea. Yet, the “reconstructed 1999). Moreover, Friedman (1999) argues that body does not guarantee a reconstructed cul- playing strategy games such as Civilization tural identity, but [in most cases] reinforces involves co-operating with the machine, learn- the traditional race and gender models” (Bal- ing how it ‘thinks’ and think along with it, “be- samo 1996: 128). As in Civilization, the con- coming an extension of the computer’s pro- structed technobody reinforces the predomi- cess” and ultimately learning “what it feels to nant power relations and the supremacy of be a cyborg”, that is a hybrid of a body and a the American state. In the case of Civilization

172 the ‘console cowboy’ is the state that comes many, were perceived as a ‘machinery’. The to itself and that we gradually become. How Nuremberg Rally parades were perhaps the does it happen? most powerful manifestation of the state’s bio- This new cyborg technobody has little to mechanical power. do with the traditional physical body, but re- In short, the extraordinary carnivalesque em- sembles rather the Deleuzian ‘body without powerment that is offered by Civilization is a organs’, or as Kroker puts it, “fantastic simu- trade-off. We pay for the possibility of having lacra of body rhetorics” (Woods 1999: 219), a an illusion of ultimate agency (once again ‘feti- process rather than a product (Balsamo 1996: shism of the consumer’) by engaging in a play 131), “a sensor, an integrated site of informa- with the state, and more specifically by inter- tion networks (…) a messenger carrying thou- nalizing, cannibalizing as well as identifying sands of communication systems: cardio-vas- with the modern Western state. The game is cular, respiratory, visual, acoustic, tactile, olfac- constructed in such a way that we can only tory, hormonal, psychic, emotional, erotic (…) become all-powerful by becoming the US. a living recording system” (Braidotti 2002: 230). This is where the bio-politics (Foucault 1977) One of the ultimate consequences of trans- of computer strategy games manifests itself. lating nineteenth century natural sciences as The great bulk of the actual play of Civiliza- well as behaviorist psychology into social tion amounts to constructing the representa- sciences and history, and thus into computer tion of the mega-powerful cyborg state-body strategy games, is the individualization of ob- and disciplining the ‘meat’. Once our settler served phenomena: “the only way around this metamorphoses into the city/home (i.e. the unit problem”, Ferguson writes, “is to take up diplo- disappears after establishing the city, and from matic history, where states can, in the time- the initial number one on, turns into the num- honoured tradition, be anthropomorphized” ber indicating the population size), it multi- (1998: 63). The concept of stages and growth plies like primitive cells. In Civilization I units as well as the idea that such civilizations are actually look like cells, and the play in which coherent and self-contained entities based we ‘grow’ and ‘develop’ as Meier notoriously around a set of values and philosophical prin- calls it (Chick 2002) boils down to a monstrous ciples (Huntington 1993) all belong to the an- orgy of non-sexual reproduction. We impreg- thropomorphic natural history and the moder- nate, to paraphrase Vivian Sobchak, “not the nist idea of the rational self.5 Meier blindly woman, but the universe” (Springer 1996: 118- follows this tradition, also because the histori- 119). We live off the generated map, exploiting cal determinism in Civilization can only be its ‘natural’ resources, and the body-state we modified by the ‘great leaders’ who embody construct resembles more a neural network or their states in the absolutist sense, as well as a fungus than a body with organs: a network for the simple reason that only one player can of cities, roads, railways, irrigations, mines, and actually lead the state, and without that ele- fortresses. The way we arrange our cities on ment the game play would become rather non- the map is the main domain of our creative sensical. control, and we can project our self onto the The state is not only conceptualized as a map, or reconfigure our body in whatever way body (e.g. in Hobbes’ Leviathan, or Brinton’s we want. The body-state seems to be gender- perception of revolutions as a fever), but also less (we can be either female or male but this often described as a machine (e.g. Kafka’s bears no influence upon the play) and raceless, Trial, or Weber on bureaucratization). In that since regardless of which civilization we play, sense the state is a peculiar hyper-powerful the cities still look identical, only different play- cyborg too. Interestingly, the most powerful ers have different city and boundary colors, and destructive states, such as the Nazi Ger- and those are fully accidental. We can call our

Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology no. 39, 2002: pp. 163-177 173 body-state and cities in any way we want. that this is precisely the problem: basing com- At the same time, our real body is left be- puter simulation on nineteenth-century mod- hind on the chair we are seated on. It is a very els of natural history is not adequate to ex- well known phenomenon amongst the Civili- plore contingencies of human history, but in- zation fans that the game sessions usually take stead in a quasi-scientific fashion in fact rein- long hours during which the ‘wetware’ is os- forces the well established narratives of cul- tensively neglected and marginalized. The tural imperialism. ‘meat’ undergoes a training during which it We should be rather skeptical about any has to stay in one place without moving for hopes of designing computer models that hours, while the restructured powerful body would simulate the social environment, no of a cyborg is being constructed. The game matter if they resemble heat or light or dis- sessions end when the ‘flesh’ cannot support close laws or probabilities. Instead, a histori- the restless mind any more, and the player goes cally embedded analysis, as advocated by Tilly to sleep either with a feeling of victory, in case (1984), should be used to shed some light on the virtual cyborg body he or she cared to processes of large-scale social change. Hid- construct is powerful enough, or humiliated if den Agenda, a game designed in 1988 and now the player has been defeated both by the AI largely forgotten, which places the player in a opponents, i.e. both software and hardware, position of a freshly elected president of a Latin as well as one’s own ‘wetware’. American state who has to slalom between The machine either cannibalizes us, that is different pressure groups, both internal (army, takes over our cities and territory, or beats us guerillas, church, labor unions, etc.) and ex- up. If we lose the game, in Civilization I we see ternal (US, USSR, IMF and the like) provides archaeologists digging out remains of us/our us with an ample sense of direction for the civilization. In Civilization III the losers are historically embedded computer game that re- bruised and wounded, just as if a moment ago organizes our perception of the Other. Games they have lost a boxing duel, surrounded by should be interactive museums that “offer talking heads of victorious leaders who hu- strategies of making history into personal miliate us even further by making juvenile re- memories, (...) provide individuals with the col- marks: ‘what’s that smell? Did someone step lective opportunity of having an experimental into something?’ or ‘what’s the matter? Are relationship to a collective or cultural past they we too rough?’, or to quote my favorite and either did or did not experience” (Landsberg lucid ‘Only human…’. Indeed, if we remain 1995: 178). Historicism (Tilly 1984) and nomad- ‘only human’, that is a creature less powerful ism, conceived as locating the focus of atten- than a cyborg, the result is a humiliating vic- tion on the periphery (Braidotti 2002), can rem- tory of the flesh over the technobody. edy the strategy games. Many critics of the computer games express their skepticism towards extrapolating conclu- Final remarks sions from the game narratives onto the play- ers’ behavior in real life. The heated debate Criticism in the similar vein has been voiced about the effects of violent games as well as from many sides by those who pinpoint Civi- violence on television has not been conclu- lization’s historical inaccuracies, yet usually sively resolved. Indeed, there is no convinc- concluding that although Civilization is not ing evidence that players who turn into hyper- very keen on detail, it does show a ‘larger pic- masculine ‘console cowboys’ or Terminators ture’ of social change and interrelations be- are ready to shoot everyone in their real lives tween large processes (Friedman 1999, Squire (Squire 2002, Herz 1997). 2002). The present paper is aimed at showing Taking the character of Total Recall for a

174 proof, Landsberg (1995) suggests that the Acknowledgements ‘prosthetic memory’ of the constructed tech- nobody blurs with the memories of the physi- I would like to express my gratitude to Don Kalb, cal bodies. Of course only an empirical analy- as well as Bonno Thoden van Velzen, and Günther sis of attitudes of the Civilization fans towards Landsteiner, my reviewers for Focaal, for their the current ideological rhetorics and policies comments and encouragement. Needless to say, the of the United States could tell us anything author himself is the only person responsible for the content of this paper. conclusive about that subject. Such an en- deavor, nevertheless, goes beyond the scope of this paper. My line of argument runs paral- lel to Edward Said’s (1994) analysis of the cul- tural imperialism of the English and French novels. I suggest that what Robinson Crusoe did for the colonial England, Civilization does Notes for today’s United States. It is up to the reader to assess the weight of that influence. 1. When I refer to Civilization I mean all the three My own guess is that software such as Civili- versions. When I refer to any of them separa- zation is more likely to generate support for tely, e.g. Civilization II, I refer only that particu- the Western superpowers than the traditional lar version of the game. tools of cultural imperialism. In examples pre- 2. There is a new ‘edit scenario’ option in Civili- zation III that gives players certain possibili- sented by Said (1994), cultural imperialism is ties with regard to altering the game rules, inclu- coded in a medium that one can objectively ding the ‘default’ technology tree (so far it was distance oneself from. The perfidity of Civili- possible only to make new maps). Such scena- zation’s cultural imperialism goes one step fur- rios created by Civilization III players have ther: it sneaks into players’ own activities, pen- appeared on fan sites only recently, but it goes etrating as deep as their own reconstructed beyond the scope of the present paper to ex- body. A critical distance to a process that one amine their content here. is part of is very difficult to assume. We are 3. There is no artificial intelligence per se in Civi- not only reading Robinson Crusoe but actu- lization but only simulated opponents. They are, nevertheless, dubbed AI by the game de- ally writing it, or more precisely, paraphrasing signers and fans, and for convenience I keep to Ford, we are told that we can write anything that nomenclature in this article. In Civiliza- we want as long as it is the master narrative of tion III at the higher difficulty levels AI is globalization. The history of Western civiliza- ‘cheating’ a little, but this is, as Meier claims, tion is to a very high extent a history of the to compensate for other deficiencies of non- camouflage of power and the means of coer- human players, thus to use positive discrimi- cion, and not as Elias wanted its dissolution nation to make the game really fair (Chick (Bauman 2001, Foucault 1977). It is always dif- 2002); also in Civilization III different Civili- ficult to spot power in the concept of culture zations have some ‘unique’ features, e.g. the French musketeers are stronger than other mus- (Wolf 2001, Said 1994) but in strategy com- keteers, although this impact is rather cosmetic, puter games such as Civilization power is al- and this option anyway can be switched off by most invisible because, at least at the level of the player. rhetoric, it belongs to us. 4. In Civilization II there are in fact two leaders of the Russians: when the Russians are led by the human player, ‘Lenin’ pops out in the box where the player has to type his name; when the Rus- sians are led by an AI, it is Catharine the Great. 5. On civilization, cf. Toynbee (in Tilly 1984: 99).

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