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Attachment E Bidding Rules for Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.'S Competitive

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Attachment E Bidding Rules for Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.'S Competitive Attachment E Bidding Rules for Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.’s Competitive Bidding Process Auctions Bidding Rules for Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.’s Competitive Bidding Process Auctions Table of Contents Page 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Auction Manager ......................................................................................................................................... 2 2. THE PRODUCTS BEING PROCURED ........................................................................................................ 2 2.1 SSO Load ................................................................................................................................................... 2 2.2 Full Requirements Service ............................................................................................................................ 3 2.3 Tranches ..................................................................................................................................................... 3 3. PRICES PAID TO SSO SUPPLIERS ............................................................................................................ 4 4. PRIOR TO THE START OF BIDDING ........................................................................................................ 5 4.1 Information Provided to Bidders ................................................................................................................... 5 4.1.1 Load Data ................................................................................................................................................... 5 4.1.2 Minimum and Maximum Starting Prices ........................................................................................................ 5 4.1.3 Tranche Size, Tranche Target ....................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Qualification Process ................................................................................................................................... 7 4.2.1 Part 1 Application: Certifications and Other Qualified Bidder Requirements ..................................................... 7 4.2.2 Part 2 Application: Certifications, Indicative Offer, and Pre-Bid Security ......................................................... 8 4.2.3 Sanctions for Failing to Comply with the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications ......................................................... 13 4.3 Starting Prices (Round 1 Prices) .................................................................................................................. 13 4.4 Extraordinary Events ................................................................................................................................. 14 5. BIDDING FORMAT FOR AUCTIONS OF MULTIPLE PRODUCTS ........................................................... 15 5.1 Descending-Price Clock Format .................................................................................................................. 15 5.1.1 Rounds ..................................................................................................................................................... 15 5.1.2 The Announced Prices and a Bid ................................................................................................................. 16 5.1.3 Reservation Prices and Starting Prices ......................................................................................................... 16 5.1.4 Restrictions on What a Bidder Can Bid ........................................................................................................ 17 5.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder .......................................................................................................................... 18 5.1.6 Default Bid ............................................................................................................................................... 18 5.1.7 The EOR Procedure ................................................................................................................................... 19 5.1.8 Price Decrements....................................................................................................................................... 21 5.2 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices .................................................... 22 5.2.1 Bid Stack for a Product has All Tranches at the Same Price ........................................................................... 22 5.2.2 Bid Stack for a Product has Tranches at Two Different Prices ........................................................................ 22 5.3 Example of Round by Round Bidding .......................................................................................................... 22 5.4 Reporting Round Results ............................................................................................................................ 23 5.5 Frequency of Rounds ................................................................................................................................. 23 5.6 Auction Pause Declared by Auction Manager ............................................................................................... 24 6. BIDDING FORMAT FOR AUCTIONS OF A SINGLE PRODUCT .............................................................. 24 6.1 Clock Phase .............................................................................................................................................. 25 6.1.1 Rounds ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 6.1.2 The Announced Price and a Bid .................................................................................................................. 25 6.1.3 Reservation Price ...................................................................................................................................... 26 i Bidding Rules for Duke Energy Ohio’s Competitive Bidding Process Auctions 6.1.4 A Bidder’s Eligibility to Bid ....................................................................................................................... 26 6.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder .......................................................................................................................... 26 6.1.6 Default Bid ............................................................................................................................................... 26 6.1.7 Price Decrements....................................................................................................................................... 27 6.1.8 Frequency of Rounds ................................................................................................................................. 27 6.1.9 Insufficient Supply for the Tranches ............................................................................................................ 27 6.2 Transition Rule ......................................................................................................................................... 28 6.3 Sealed-Bid Round...................................................................................................................................... 29 6.3.1 Allowed Bids ............................................................................................................................................ 29 6.3.2 Multiple Bids by a Bidder .......................................................................................................................... 32 6.3.3 Default Bid ............................................................................................................................................... 33 6.4 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices .................................................... 33 6.4.1 Excess Supply = 0 at End of Clock Phase ..................................................................................................... 33 6.4.2 Excess Supply < 0 at End of Clock Phase with No Sealed-Bid Round ............................................................. 34 6.4.3 Excess Supply < 0 at End of Clock Phase with Sealed-Bid Round .................................................................. 34 6.5 Reporting Round Results ............................................................................................................................ 35 6.6 Auction Pause Declared by Auction Manager ............................................................................................... 35 7. AFTER THE AUCTION CLOSES.............................................................................................................. 36 7.1 Notification of Results ............................................................................................................................... 36 7.2 Execution of Master SSO Supply Agreement ............................................................................................... 37 7.3 Sanctions for Failure to Execute the Master SSO Supply Agreement............................................................... 37 8. USE OF THE BIDDING WEBSITE ..........................................................................................................
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