CHAPTER 2 4

"MOPPING-UP" NEW GUINEA AND THE SOLOMONS

RILE the ships and men of the R .A.N. Squadron were thus cooperat- W ing with the troops of the 9th Australian Division in the fighting i n Borneo, other units of the Australian Navy were giving support to the men of the 5th and 6th Divisions engaged in operations against the Japanese in New Britain and New Guinea respectively . It will be recalled that i n November H .M.A.S. Swan, in company with Barcoo and Vendetta, carried out operation BATTLEAXE in New Britain under the operational comman d of Morrow (Commander (D)) in Vendetta, when they bom- barded targets in Wide Bay . Later Swan was briefly commanded by Morrow during his period at Mios Wundi as Commander (D) . On 9th and 10th January, in company with H .M.A. Ships Cowra l ( Gillies2 ) and Kapunda (Lieutenant Callow) she carried out bombardments of th e coast of Galela Bay, Halmahera . On 10th February Lieutenant Dovers 3 assumed command of Swan vice Morrow, and she reverted to a privat e ship. As such, her first mission was to carry N .O.I.C . Torokina (Com- mander Feldt) and staff from Madang to the Bougainville port, there t o establish a Port Directorate . Back in Madang on 22nd February, unde r instructions from N .O.I.C. New Guinea, Esdaile, Swan sailed next day for Aitape to carry out bombardments on targets selected by th e G.O.C. 6th Division, - Stevens . 4 On 10th February General Stevens received a decision by Lieut-Genera l V. A. H. Sturdee, G .O.C. First Army, commanding all Australian force s in Australian New Guinea, that the 6th Division might press on to Wewak , although it would be given no additional resources . Stevens promptly informed his subordinates that he intended to take, in succession, But , Dagua and Wewak and, in the mountains, to capture Maprik and advanc e eastward. Having issued the orders necessary to set his plans in motion , Stevens told Sturdee that the advance eastward had begun but that "administratively the operation was a complete gamble " , because he ha d no guarantee that five L.C.T's then at Aitape would remain in his area , and weather might dislocate the road, sea and air routes for days on end . By 23rd February Stevens was well on his way to his first objective, wit h his advanced forces within about ten miles of But . It was at this stag e that Swan arrived to support with bombardments.

1 HMAS Cowra, corvette (1943), 650 tons, one 4-in gun, 152 kts . 2 Lt-Cdr W . J. Gillies, RANR. Comd HMAS ' s Wongala 1940-41, Coombar 1941-43, Goonambee 1943, Cowra 1943-45 . Merchant seaman ; of Adelaide ; b. Scotland, 9 Dec 1904 . Capt W . J. Dovers, DSC ; RAN . HMAS' s Canberra, Nestor and Quickmatch ; comd HMAS Swan and SO Wewak Force 1945 . Of Wollongong, NSW ; b . Eastwood, NSW, 12 Feb 1918 . * Maj-Gen Sir Jack Stevens, KBE, CB, DSO, ED . Comd 6 Div Sigs 1939-40, 21 Bde 1940-42 ; GOC 4 Div 1942, NT Force and 12 Div 1442-43, 6 Div 1943-45 . Public Servant ; of Melbourne ; b. Daylesford, Vic, 7 Sep 1896 .

626 " MOPPING-UP " NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMONS Feb-Mar The situation when Swan arrived at Aitape on 24th February was that the Australians had reached the Anumb River, about 54 miles east o f Aitape. The Japanese held Sowom village, some 2,000 yards east of th e river, and it was appreciated that this was a probable reserve area for the defence of the Anumb River, where enemy opposition appeared to be stiffening. Kauk village, three miles east of Sowom, and the But River , six miles farther east, were apparently a reserve and store depot and a large forward store area, respectively . It was known that the Japanese ha d several 75-mm field guns on the coast, some of which had not bee n located. It was decided, after a conference between Dovers and Stevens , that Swan should carry out bombardments of Sowom, Kauk and But. Targets in two areas at Sowom were bombarded on the 25th . Just after midnight on the 26th Swan bombarded a target area at the But River, and on completion carried out an anti-barge patrol in the vicinit y of the enemy-occupied Walis and Kairiru Islands, to the north-east of But , and along the adjacent New Guinea coast . In the vicinity of the Bu t River Dovers decided to spray the shoreline and valley with oerlikon fire , and this produced retaliation in the form of two rounds of estimate d 75-mm fire from the shore—one 400 yards short and the other 50 0 yards over. Swan withdrew to seaward, and reply to the gunfire was not undertaken since the position of the gun was uncertain . Just after dawn on the 27th Swan arrived off Kauk and bombarded an area there . Dovers recorded in his report that "smoke was observed to be persistent over th e area for some time after cease fire" . It had been intended that before returning to Madang Swan should carry out a night bombardment of But on 28th February ; but in the meantime an enemy wireless station had been located on high ground abov e Onamu Point, on the western side of Kairiru Island, and this target wa s substituted. Allied Intelligence had reported the presence of guns u p to 75-mm along Kairiru's north coast, and the shoot—at 13 minutes pas t midnight on 1st March—was carried out at a range of between 9,00 0 and 10,000 yards, with the ship steaming at 12 knots parallel to th e coast. Subsequent reconnaissance photographs showed several rounds— 100 were fired—within 100 yards of the target . The 6th Division supplie d a bombardment liaison and staff, and aircraft spotting was mad e available by 71 Wing, R .A.A .F., for the day bombardment . Dovers reported that the cooperation "was an important factor in the success of the operation", while "the value of having a Naval Liaison Officer who ha s local knowledge and contacts was also very apparent" . Swan arrived at Madang in the late afternoon of 1st March, and on the 5th sailed for Jacquinot Bay, New Britain—where she arrived on th e 7th—for bombardments in support of the 5th Australian Division . In the afternoon of 6th March she exchanged identities with H .M.S. King George V, leading major units of the British Pacific Fleet on their way to Manus on their first arrival in the area. On the 8th Dovers carried

Mar-Apr 1945 ASSAULT ON WEWAK PLANNED 627 out a preliminary reconnaissance of the Wide Bay area in ML804 (Lieu- tenant Brooker) . While there, in conference with Sandover, 6 commanding the 6th Brigade, it was decided that Swan should carry ou t harassing fire on targets in Jacquinot Bay, just west of Cape Archway , the north-eastern extremity of Wide Bay and in Adler Bay, just north o f that cape. These bombardments were carried out on 9th and 10th March . Between them, Swan anchored for the night in Henry Reid Bay and Dover s reported that "an enemy aircraft, out on a search apparently, failed t o observe this and on its search bombed and strafed ML825", which shot it down. ML825 (Lieutenant Venables 7 ) was attacked about ten miles south-west of Cape Orford by a Japanese fighter aircraft . On its secon d strafing run Signalman Crowe, 8 at the bridge oerlikon gun, though wounde d by shrapnel, carried on firing until the aircraft passed over the ship . As it did so, the aircraft burst into flames and crashed close inshore abou t one mile from ML825 and sank before she could reach it . Though sh e searched the area she found no sign of the pilot. He, however, had reached the shore and was captured by natives on 13th March and taken to 5th Division headquarters. Between her Wide Bay and Open Bay firings, Swan returned to Madang . On arrival at Open Bay at 8 .40 a.m. on 17th March she embarked Lieut- Isaachsen, 3 commanding the 36th Battalion, and an A .I.B. repre- sentative for the firings . Five targets were selected but only the first, a t the mouth of the Matalaili River, was engaged . The weather deteriorated, with visibility reduced to 1,000 yards ; and since local opinion was tha t it had set in "for at least 48 hours", the army visitors were disembarked and Swan returned to Madang . II After this interlude Swan returned to her support of the 6th Division in the Aitape-Wewak area, where she arrived on 7th April . Meanwhile , on 19th March, Stevens advanced two plans for the capture of Wewak to General Blarney, who was then on a visit to the 6th Division . The first plan provided for an overland advance along the coastal plain, and th e second for a major amphibious attack at Dove Bay, east of Wewak . At the time, General Blarney visualised little likelihood of obtaining the necessary requirements for the amphibious operation, and decided that the land assault on Wewak should be undertaken . To facilitate this, he success- fully moved to have G.H.Q. allot an additional ten L .C.T' s to the 6th Division, and Stevens was advised of this on 24th March. Later, since he would soon be within range of guns of up to 105-mm around Wewa k

° Lt N . F. Brooker, RANVR. Comd HMAS's Marlean 1942-43, ML804 1943-45. Wool buyer's clerk; of Willoughby, NSW ; b. Artarmon, NSW, 22 Apr 1909. °Brig R . L . Sandover, DSO, ED . CO 2/11 Bn 1941-43 ; comds 6 Bde 1943-45. Accountant an d company director ; of London and Perth, WA ; b . Richmond, Surrey, England, 28 Mar 1910 . 7 Lt H . Venables, RANVR . HMAS Heros ; comd HMAS's Faye C . 1942-43, ML824 1943-44 , ML825 1944-45 ; SRD . Deep sea fisherman ; of Brisbane ; b . Jersey, Channel Is, 31 Dec 1912 . 9 Sig W. L. Crowe, B4997; HMAS ML825. Of Brisbane ; b. Brisbane, 4 Aug 1925 . 9 Lt-Col O . C . Isaachsen, DSO, ED . 2/27 Bn ; CO 36 Bn 1942-45 . Barrister and solicitor ; o f Malvern, SA ; b. Mannum, SA, 5 Jun 1911 .

628 " MOPPING-UP " NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMONS Apr1945 and on the near-by islands, Stevens asked for additional naval vessels, an d these were soon forthcoming.' When Swan arrived at Aitape on 7th April Dovers found that General Stevens had selected bombardment targets in the Cape Karawop an d Cape Boiken areas, 14 miles east of But . The first attempt to engage these , on 8th April, was unsuccessful, due to heavy rain reducing visibility to half a mile. The next day, however, successful shoots were carried out o n enemy store and ammunition dumps in the vicinity of Boiken Plantatio n and on Cape Karawop. After this bombardment Swan proceeded to Milne Bay to embark ammunition. She was back at Aitape on 19th April an d next day, as ordered by N .O.I .C. New Guinea, Dovers assumed comman d of Wewak Force, comprising H .M.A. Ships Swan, Colac, Group 2 (Lieu- tenant Hopper, 2 S.O.) with Dubbo (Lieutenant Roberts) and Deloraine (Lieutenant Gourlay) ; and Group 3, of ships of the 1st New Guinea M.L. Flotilla, ML804 (Lieutenant Brooker, S.O .) with ML808 (Lieu- tenant Smith"), ML816 (Lieutenant McLaren4 ), ML820 (Lieutenant Milne," R.N.V.R.) and ML427 (Lieutenant Howitt) . Initially, three M .L's of the flotilla were not available. ML808 and ML820 had not then arrived , and ML811 (Lieutenant Holohan") had been detached for duties with A .I.B. parties. The situation at this stage was that the Japanese in the Wewak area , estimated to be 1,000 effective troops, were concentrated between th e Hawain River, twelve miles to the west, and Cape Moem, five miles to the east, of Wewak . An additional 700 effective troops were estimated t o be on Kairiru and Muschu Islands . There were numerous artillery an d machine-gun positions along the coast and in the foothills . There was barge traffic between Wewak and the islands, and it was known tha t submarines had been supplying the Wewak area, though there had bee n few authenticated reports of sightings in recent months . The 16th Brigade, supported by field artillery, was concentrated in the Karawop area, four miles west of the Hawain River, across which it wa s to establish a bridgehead . This would pave the way for the attack on Wewak proper, which would be carried out from the west by the 19t h Brigade, which would relieve the 16th after the Hawain River bridgehea d was established . The final clearing of the Wewak area would be combine d with an amphibious landing in Dove Bay, in the shelter of Cape Moem . The object of this landing would be to establish a beach-head on Dov e Bay, with a view to cutting the Wewak-Forok road and preventing a

I For the foregoing general remarks about the 6th Division, Long, The Final Campaigns, pp . 300-329, has been drawn upon . a Lt-Cdr K . J . Hopper, RANR . HMAS's Manoora, Marrawah, Adelaide, Sprightly ; comd HMAS Colac 1944-45 . Merchant seaman ; of Sydney ; b . Taree, NSW, 26 Nov 1919 . s Lt D . A. P. Smith, RANVR . Comd HMAS's ML299 1941-43, ML427 1944, ML808 1944-45 . Public servant ; of Brisbane ; b. Brisbane, 1 Oct 1918 . * Lt-Cdr K. J . McLaren, RANR . HMAS Westralia; comd HMAS's Miramar 1943, ML816 1943-44 and 1945-46 . Bank officer ; of Adelaide ; b . Sydney, 2 May 1916 . 6 Lt J . Milne, RNVR . HMAS ML813 ; comd HMAS ML820 1943-46 . B . Scotland, 27 Dec 1913 . Lt T . J . Holohan, RANVR . HMAS Stella ; comd HMAS 's ML425 1944, ML811 1945-46 . Accountant ; of Brisbane ; b . Barcaldine, QId, 2 March 1903 .

21-28Apt. 1945 FRUITLESS SEARCHES 629 Japanese retreat to the east . The mission of Wewak Force was to suppor t the Australian advance with bombardments by Swan and the corvettes , while the M.L's carried out night patrols and observation, offensive strafing and anti-barge patrols, and probed enemy defences under cover of bom- bardments by the bigger ships. Wewak Force would also provide the nava l force for the Dove Bay amphibious operation . In the initial stages Wewak Force was based on Aitape . Its first operation, on 21st April, was a searching sweep of a minefield west o f Kairiru Island, laid by H .M.S. Ariadne, and set to sink in November 1944 . This sweep, with negative results, was carried out by Deloraine and Colac, with ML816 ; while ML804 and ML427 patrolled, searching fruitlessly fo r A.I.B. personnel reported to have escaped from Muschu Island . ? Swan and Dubbo covered the minesweeping operation from seaward . There was no enemy activity, although at times the sweeping ships were less tha n one mile off shore . The first offensive patrol by M .L's, covering the area from Cape Boiken on the mainland to the entrance to Muschu Strait and the west coast of Muschu Island was carried out on the 23rd, and evoked only one shor t burst of machine-gun fire from the mainland near Cape Boiken. Next day the first major bombardment—by Deloraine and Colac—was carried out, with the main enemy defensive position on Muschu Island as target. On the 25th Swan bombarded Cape Worn—at the western end of Wewak west harbour. The ship was in close proximity to enemy territory and Colac and Dubbo guarded the mainland and Muschu Island in case of small arms fire during the bombardment . Subsequently the two corvette s fired a concentration shoot on Cape Worn . The force spent 26th April searching for a submarine reported 90 miles north-west of Kairiru Island , steering south, and presumably running supplies to the Wewak garrison . But no contact was made . Swan and the corvettes carried out bombard- ments on the 27th, with success against naval defence guns on Kairir u Island, and that night the search for the reported submarine was resumed , though fruitlessly. M.L's again carried out offensive patrols . Next day, Deloraine left the force on passage south to dock and refit .

III On the day Deloraine left Wewak Force, N .O.I.C. New Guinea signalled Swan and the 6th Division : "Information received that H.M.A.S. Hobart and two destroyers will be made available for Wewak operations ." The information came from Vice- Kinkaid who, on the 27th, advise d Captain Esdaile that the intention was to use Hobart and one America n

7 It had been contemplated in the early planning stages of the Wewak operation that a landin g on Muschu Island would be made . With this in view, an effort to reconnoitre the island was made by an A .I .B . party of eight, landed on Muschu from a motor launch on 11th April. The attempt was dogged by misfortune . Seven members of the party were killed in actio n with Japanese patrols, or were "missing believed killed" . Only one, Sapper E . T . Dennis, escaped from the island to the mainland, where he was recovered by a patrol on the Hawain River on 20th April .

630 " MOPPING-UP " NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMONS Apr-Ma y and one Australian destroyer at Wewak, and asked Farn- comb 's views as to flying his broad pendant in Hobart during the operation . Farncomb was then in Shropshire in Australia and on the 25th had tol d Kinkaid of his intention not to remain in Shropshire while she worked up after refit, but to leave Sydney about mid-May and wear his broad pendan t in Hobart until Shropshire was fully operational. He welcomed Kinkaid's suggestion and arranged to join Hobart at Hollandia about 7th May . Later Kinkaid's earlier intention to use one Australian and one America n destroyer at Wewak was amended and the two Australian ships, Arunta and Warramunga, were used. Meanwhile, Admiral Fraser wanted British representation at Wewak , and on 1st May informed Admiral Nimitz that the cruiser H .M.S. New- foundland, 8 then in Sydney, was not required immediately with TF .57 and could leave Sydney on 4th May . "If you approve and Commander 7th Fleet concurs I would like her to join in the operation serving unde r Commodore Farncomb and subsequently as required . Commodore Farn- comb agrees . " Thus Newfoundland (Captain R . W. Ravenhill, R.N. ) joined TG.74.1 temporarily . Throughout the remainder of April and the early days of May Wewa k Force continued its support of the 6th Division with planned bombard- ments and strafings, both of the mainland and the islands . On 30th April the force left Aitape and based at But, where the divisional headquarter s were now established . ML808 joined during the 30th and McLaren o f ML816, having been promoted to lieut-commander, assumed the title o f Senior Officer Motor Launches, vice Brooker in ML804. Naval orders for operation DELUGE—landing the Australian assaul t force, designated Farida Force, in Dove Bay and covering the landin g with bombardments—were prepared and issued by Dovers as S .O. Wewak Force. 9 The force comprised H .M.A. Ships Swan, Colac, Dubbo ; M.L's 816, 804, 808, 820 and 427; and 12 landing craft . TG.74.1, in the role of Wewak Support Force, was assigned the task of carrying out pre- liminary bombardment and fire support duties during the landing period. D-day was set for 11th May . The first preliminary rehearsal of the landin g was carried out by Wewak Force on 6th May, and on the 8th troop s were embarked and a full dress rehearsal of the operation was staged successfully . Reconnaissance of a possible landing beach resulted in a strip of 500 yards on the beach 700 yards west of Cape Forok—six miles east of the Moem peninsula which forms the western arm of Dove Bay , and ten miles east of Wewak—being selected as Red Beach. On the day of Wewak Force's full dress rehearsal of the landing a t Wewak, Commodore Farncomb arrived by air at Hollandia—after havin g conferred with General Stevens at Dagua—and hoisted his broad pendan t

HMS Newfoundland, cruiser (1942), 8,000 tons, nine 6-in guns and ten 4-in AA guns, six 21-in torpedo tubes, 31I kts. 9 Dovers' report, when read at Navy Office in June 1945, was endorsed by the Director o f Operations (Commander L . Gellatly) "S .O . Wewak Force appears to have handled his force with ability . His orders are clear and concise . His report well presented . "

9-11 May 1945 WEWAK 'S D-DAY 63 1 in Hobart. Next day, 9th May, that ship and Warramunga sailed thenc e for the scene of operations, as did Newfoundland and Arunta from Manus. At 6.30 a.m. on the 10th Hobart and Warramunga met Swan some 30 miles north of Wewak, and Dovers' operation orders were transferred to Hobart. Soon afterwards, Newfoundland and Arunta arrived at the ren- dezvous, and while Swan returned to But for the landing operation, th e Wewak Support Force proceeded to carry out an afternoon bombardmen t of the Cape Moem peninsula area . At the conclusion of the bombardment the Support Force returned to sea, reversing course at 11 .20 p.m. for the landing day bombardment. Meanwhile, at But, troops were embarke d in Dubbo, Colac and landing craft before dark on the 10th, and Wewa k Force, led by Swan, followed by Colac, A.L.C's, Dubbo and L.C.T's in that order, sailed at 11 p .m . for the assembly point, six miles N .E. by E. of the landing beach, and arrived there without incident at 6 .55 a.m. on the 11th. Weather at the opening of Wewak's D-day was marked by misty rain inshore, with poor but improving visibility as the meteorological disturb- ance moved eastwards. The Support Force, standing in for its pre-landin g bombardment, observed Wewak Force approaching the assembly point a t 6.30 a.m. Colac took charge of the assembly point while Swan proceeded to her bombardment position, and at 7 .30 a.m . the pre-landing bombard- ment, by the Support Force, Swan and Dubbo, and strafing M .L's of Wewak Force, commenced . The landing, timed for 8.30 a.m., was carried out to schedule. The first wave of four landing craft grounded about 1 0 yards from the beach at 8 .34, and the men waded ashore, a little to th e west of the position planned . In a chronological survey of events, Hobart recorded among them : 0745. All ships shooting including corvettes . There has been no sign of any retaliation from ashore and the target area has a pall of white smoke . . . . 0754 . Land- ing craft are strung out in a line towards the shore . . . . 0815 . Five ML's are doin g a strafing run on Red Beach . . . . 0840. First wave landed on beach—no opposition . . . . 0843 . Wave 2 going ashore . Wave 3 approaching beach . Wave 1 discharge s personnel. . . . 0847 . Wave 1 leaving beach—no sign of enemy activity . 0849 . Scheduled fire is completed. Ships are standing by for call fire . . . . 0911 . Wave 4 on beach discharging personnel. . . . 0912 . Dubbo firing on Forok Point . . . . 0919+ . Dubbo has silenced opposition and troops have occupied position . 0920-0945 . Received occasional reports from ashore—everything satisfactory .

Swan later recorded that the preliminary bombardment and strafing was most effective and 89 dead Japanese were found after the landing in the area; it was the opinion of the officer in charge of landing troops that this had effectivel y silenced opposition on the beach and only light opposition was encountered o n the flanks . One barge was hit on the run in by a 20-mm gun on Cape Forok an d light machine-gun and mortar fire was encountered on the right flank . Our casualties were only one wounded . There were prepared defences in the form of three trenc h systems behind the beach but these were effectively shelled during the bombardmen t and the enemy withdrew . It is considered that if the preliminary bombardment ha d not been successful, there would have been strong opposition .

632 " MOPPING-UP " NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMONS May1945 After dispatching the last assault wave from the assembly area, Colac joined the bombardment ships, and these stood by to answer calls fo r fire throughout the day, bombarding as necessary. At 5 .05 p.m. the Support Group completed its bombardment program, and at 7 p .m. it set course for Hollandia, its mission of covering the overwater movement of Wewa k Force from But to Wewak, and of providing the preliminary bombardmen t and fire support, successfully carried out . Wewak Force remained in support of the 6th Division for most of May . From the 12th Dallman Harbour, just west of Cape Worn, became it s base in place of But. The force carried out daily bombardments a s requested, and strafed areas both on the mainland and islands . Typical extracts from Dovers' report of Wewak Force's activities are : Tuesday, 15th May . Swan bombarded Cape Boram and a heavily defended gu n position at 427001 which had been shelling the beach-head . Bunbury [Lieutenan t Bleckman l ] arrived with five new Bofors barrels for ML's as Swan was proceeding, and also bombarded Cape Boram with 30 rounds, after Swan . . . . Friday, 18th May. Dubbo and Colac with air spotting proceeded to engage gun which had fired o n ML427 . . . . On return to Dallman Harbour Colac proceeded towing ML820 to Madang . [The M .L., whilst strafing Cape Moem during the dark hours on 16th May , struck a nigger-head and damaged her starboard propeller shaft .] . . . Tuesday, 22n d May, at 1430 two beach-head forward patrols called for fire support and Swa n proceeded and engaged two enemy positions 200 yards SW of Brandi Plantation . The campaign on shore proceeded with success. Early in May it wa s evident that the Japanese were abandoning Wewak and withdrawing their main forces southward over the Prince Alexander Mountains . Whilst an Australian force was sent on an encircling movement to counter the enemy' s southward withdrawal, another advanced eastward through Wewak, an d took Wewak Point on 10th May. The advance eastward continued, an d on 20th May Boram airfield and foothills to the south were capture d by the 2/8th Battalion and the coastal sector cleared towards Cape Moem. Wewak Force cooperated in the attack on the 20th . Swan, Dubbo and M.L's 816, 804 and 808 sailed from Cape Worn at 5 .45 a.m. and at 6.30 a.m. commenced a bombardment of targets in the Boram airfiel d area, and in the foothills . The M.L's strafed Cape Moem. All ships late r stood by to answer calls for fire . The eastward advance of the 2/8th Battalion continued, and it occupied Cape Moem on 22nd May and made contact with Farida Force . By the end of May the 6th Division had driven most of what remaine d of the XVIII Japanese Army away from the coast and into the mountains . Swan ended the month making a survey of Wewak Harbour, and on the 27th sailed for Madang . It was her last operation against the enemy in the war, though she had one more wartime mission to perform, tha t of towing a wounded companion to Australia . The survey of Wewak subsequent to Swan ' s departure was continue d by Warrego, which also provided some support bombardments for the

Lt-Cdr J . F . Bleckman, RANR . Comd HMAS ' s Yandra 1943-44, Bunbury 1944-45 . Merchant seaman ; of Brisbane ; b. Brisbane, 1 Jan 1920 .

Apr-Iun1945 EFFECTIVE LIAISON 63 3 6th Division. After her participation in the landings at Zamboanga an d Iloilo in March, Warrego spent April and May surveying Guivan Naval Base, and re-establishing navigational lights in the Philippines . She was required for the forthcoming OBOE Two operation—the capture of Balik- papan—and for that was to report to Morotai on 20th June . She was in that port on 30th May, and proceeded thence to Wewak to commenc e surveying. She reached Wewak on 3rd June, and on the 5th, whe n CTG.70.5 (Commander Oom) was discussing the survey with General Stevens, Stevens raised the question of the possibility of Warrego bom- barding some Japanese positions which could not be reached by arm y artillery. The necessary arrangements were made, and on Tuesday an d Wednesday, 12th and 13th June, Warrego carried out bombardments of Forok Point—where patrols had been ambushed the previous Sunday— Forok village, and on other targets where concentrations of the enemy had been reported . Most of the targets required aircraft spotting, and thi s was arranged with No. 71 Wing R.A.A.F. based at Aitape. The bombard- ments were also helped by the presence on board of an army bombardmen t liaison officer, as in the earlier bombardments . The bombardments achieved excellent results, and Byrne, Warrego's commanding officer, commented in his report : There is no doubt that ships of Warrego's class can be of great value to the army, in that important targets which the army cannot get at are readily brought under fire by ships steaming close inshore on the flanks of the army perimeter . Survey of the Wewak area (carried out by Warrego's boats while she was on bombardment duties) was completed by the afternoon of the 13th, and at 6 p .m. the ship sailed, and arrived at Morotai on the 17th , where Commander Little (CTG .70.5) joined, and reported for the OBOE Two attack. IV As mentioned, Colac left Wewak Force on 18th May and sailed fo r Madang, where she arrived on the 19th . This was to be have been the firs t stage on her way to Australia for refit . Orders from N.O.I.C. New Guinea, however, deferred her return to Australia, and on 20th May she saile d from Madang for Torokina, where she arrived on the 23rd. Her presence in Bougainville—as was explained to her commandin g officer, Lieutenant Hopper, at a conference with II Australian Corps a t Torokina—was needed for operations planned to stop transit of enemy troops from Choiseul Island to Bougainville, and to harass and destroy Japanese installations on north-eastern Bougainville . Allied Intelligence Bureau information indicated that Japanese troops were leaving Choiseul in barges for Bougainville ; that Shortland and Fauro Islands were heavil y defended by the enemy ; and that coast defences were suspected in th e Toimonapu area in south-east Bougainville . The Choiseul Bay area, i n the north-west extremity of Choiseul Island, was clear of artillery so far as could be ascertained .

634 " MOPPING-UP " NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMONS 24-26 May Hopper's operation orders from N .O.I.C. Torokina, covering the perio d 24th to 26th May, directed him to search for enemy barges in Bougain- ville Strait—between Bougainville and Choiseul—from midnight on th e 24th to daylight on the 25th ; to bombard targets at Porapora and in Choiseul Bay during the 25th ; again carry out an anti-barge patrol in Bougainville Strait during the dark hours of the 25th-26th ; and during the 26th to bombard targets

at Toimonapu before re- '+5S° +5 6 peating the bombardments S of Porapora and Choiseu l Bay. Lieut-Colonel Arthur2 of II Australian Corps took passage for the operation , as did Lieutenant Seton of the A.I.B. Seton was to give advice on local condi- tions and targets. This he ° o H

was well qualified to do, u f,; c having had rich experienc e as a planter on Shortland o k 'r ' ti

Island and a coastwatcher K1Q C on Choiseul. Empress Aug,,I L Colac sailed from Toro- Motupena y < To m'Lda u kina in the morning of the ` 24th and successfully car - ried out her various missions —though without detecting any barge traffic across '• Bougainville Strait — until the evening of the 26th. Enemy camp areas wer e 155 ' bombarded at Porapora, Siposai Island and other Bougainville Island targets in the vicinity of Choiseul Bay on the 25th . On the 26th the bombardments at Luluai Poin t and Toimonapu Plantation on Bougainville were, according to the spottin g

aircraft, marked by " excellent shooting and the area well covered" . At 6 p.m . on 26th May Colac arrived off Emerald Entrance, Choiseu l Bay, for a repeat bombardment of that area. Intelligence from A.I.B. commenting on the effectiveness of the previous day's bombardmen t reported in detail the position of Japanese small craft and camp areas o n Kondakanimboka Island at the northern end of Choiseul Bay, and of a camp area on Terekukure Plantation, a point opposite the Emeral d Entrance . Entering the bay through Emerald Entrance, Hopper intende d

2 Brig A. E . Arthur, DSO, ED . 2/2 Fd Regt ; Staff Officer (Intelligence) HQ RAA II Corps 1944-45 ; CRA 11 and 5 Divs 1945. Draftsman ; of Burwood, Vic; b. Royal Park, Vic, 30 Aug 1909.

26 May-18 Jun COLAC HOLED 635 to deal with the northern targets first—since daylight was now limited b y time—and then return southward and bombard the Terekukure camp o n his way out of the bay. Fire was opened on the way in, at 6 .5 p.m., on Siposai Island, th e southern shore of the entrance, with several rounds of 4-inch and small- arms fire. Then, as Colac started to round Parama Island, the norther n shore of the entrance, to head north up the bay, two shells from a gu n on Terekukure Plantation passed over her and landed on Parama . Wheel was put hard a'starboard and Colac turned towards, and silenced, th e enemy gun—at a range of about 1,300 yards—with ten rounds of 4-inc h from the gun on her forecastle, fired in about 30 seconds . Fire was the n shifted left to cover the whole plantation area . The ship was still swinging to starboard since it was now intended, in view of the presence of enem y artillery, to retire at speed through Emerald Entrance as soon as th e gun would not bear, and complete the bombardment from outside . Colac was beam on to Terekukure when, at 6 .15 p.m., an enemy shell fell close astern, and almost immediately she suffered a hit on the por t side of the quarter-deck, which caused casualties but negligible damage . A second hit reversed this and, causing no casualties, holed the engin e room on the port side at the waterline . Colac then headed out through the Emerald Entrance at 6 .20 p .m., bombarding and strafing Siposai and Parama Islands as she did so . At 6.23, as the last fall of enemy shot was sighted off the starboard bow, a message from the engine room reported that it was flooding rapidly through a hole, three feet by two feet, and at 6.25, as the ship cleared Emerald Entrance, the engine room had to be abandoned. At 6.30 p.m. Colac was settling rapidly by the stern . But despite the flooded engine room the engines continued to give her four to five knots , and it became apparent that the bulkheads were holding and that floodin g was confined to the engine room . N.O.I.C. Torokina was asked for assist- ance, and course was set for Treasury Island . At 9.25 p.m. the engines stopped, due to salting up . A collision mat was positioned and a han d pump was started on seepage into the boiler room . At 1 .20 a.m. on 27th May Colac anchored in 17 fathoms about 10 miles east of Fauro Island . Thence she was towed, at 6 .30 p.m. on the 27th, to Treasury Island wher e she arrived at 11 p.m. on the 28th. Four casualties, two of them fatal, were suffered in this encounter .3 This marked the end of the war for Colac. At Treasury Island temporary repairs were carried out by the salvage ship Caledonian Salvor (1,360 tons ) which, from 1st to 3rd June, towed Colac to Finschhafen, screened on the voyage by H.M.A .S. Lithgow. On 7th June Swan took Colac in tow from Finschhafen and on the 18th the two ships arrived at Sydney . They were both in dockyard hands when hostilities ceased in August 1945.

8 Steward B . M. P . Shute was killed and AB S . R. Smith died of wounds. Stoker H . L . Fishe r and AB S. Ingham were slightly wounded .