DOCSLIB.ORG

Shifting the Paradigm.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Shifting the Paradigm.Pdf Shifting the Paradigm Lessons from the peace process and a new road map for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Israel Piekrash Shifting the Paradigm Lessons from the peace process and a new road map for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Israel Piekrash In 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat The political process in the first period stepped onto the White House lawn and culminated at the negotiations over a signed a historical declaration of principles permanent agreement at the Camp David that led Israel and the PLO down a new path summit in 2000. After the deadlines set of political agreement. Roughly a quarter of out in the Oslo Accords passed, and despite a century later, we have to ask ourselves: stubborn, and at times, violent opposition What went wrong? from both sides, the leaders of Israel, the PA and the US decided to hold a peace The mutual consensus was that summit at the highest levels. But even״ “nothing is agreed until everything before they convened, it became clear that the distance between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat’s priorities was great. In a letter he ״”is agreed sent President Clinton ahead of the summit, The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has Arafat stated that as early as 1988, he had been waging for decades, in a never- expressed a willingness to make do with ending cycle of military, economic and 22% of historic Palestine, and therefore social confrontations alongside several expected Israel not to demand further reconciliation attempts between the two territorial concessions. He also made it clear sides. However, since the First Intifada that he did not intend to give up the right of in 1987, several changes have occurred return for refugees. However, if the issues that converged in two main periods. In of Jerusalem, refugees and territory were the first period, 1988-2000, support grew adequately addressed, he would have no among both Israelis and Palestinians for problem compromising on security issues. the formula of “land for peace” and a [3] Meanwhile, Barak made a speech in the small majority was formed on both sides Knesset ahead of the peace summit, laying supporting a political arrangement based out the opposite principles: Israel would not on the two-state solution. In the second return to the 1967 borders, Jerusalem would period, from 2000 and up to the present day, remain united under Israeli sovereignty, the trend reversed and faith in a diplomatic there would be no foreign army in Palestine, arrangement shrank on both sides.[1] After and Israel would not take responsibility for Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza, the refugee problem.[4] support for a political arrangement re- emerged, but collapsed again after the war in Gaza a decade later.[2] Heinrich Böll Stiftung Tel Aviv 2/16 Shifting the Paradigm Israel Piekrash Despite the vast differences between the to control another people.[6] As a result, parties’ opening positions, the Americans Prime Minister Sharon decided to implement managed to force them to compromise. the disengagement plan and, in 2005, the [5] Throughout the entire summit, it was Israeli government withdrew all its military evident that not all core issues were equally forces and civilians from the Gaza Strip. important to both parties. For example, for In 2006, Ehud Olmert was elected prime the Palestinians Jerusalem was the most minister in Israel and Hamas won the important issue in the summit, while Israel Palestinian elections. In response, Israel prioritized security and territory. The mutual imposed a partial but tight blockade on the consensus was that “nothing is agreed Gaza Strip.[7] Since then, the Palestinians until everything is agreed”. However, the in Gaza have been imprisoned in a severe talks failed and about two months later, humanitarian crisis, while Israelis living the Second Intifada erupted, embroiling the nearby suffer from ongoing rocket barrages. two sides in a violent, protracted struggle In 2007, the Annapolis process was launched that marked the beginning of the second between Israel and the Palestinians, with period in Israeli-Palestinian relations. In international mediation. In 2008, Olmert 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected prime offered Abbas a new, detailed proposal minister; in 2002, Israel launched Operation to resolve all the core issues. Yet despite Defensive Shield, sending IDF forces into the minor differences between positions, combat throughout the West Bank. After Abbas chose not to respond. In December the operation, Israel began building a long 2008, war broke out between Hamas and wall separating its sovereign territory from Israel, later followed by two large-scale Palestinian centers of population. Since wars and limited rounds of fighting. The then, Israeli security forces have continued Obama administration tried to promote to operate throughout the West Bank. These several rounds of negotiation, but both actions led to a turning point and a decline sides hardened their positions and refused in Palestinian terrorism. The Israeli public to make any conciliatory gestures. Today, grew convinced that military action had there is no longer an Israeli or Palestinian succeeded where negotiations had failed. majority that believes in the feasibility of The Palestinian public concluded that the a political agreement.[8] Oslo Accords had not managed to end Israel’s military and civilian occupation. In addition, Yasser Arafat passed away in The Failure of the Peace 2004, and Mahmoud Abbas replaced him Process as head of the PA, the PLO and Fatah. Political support for a permanent agreement The Israeli public grew fell for two reasons: (a) the failure of the negotiation attempts in the period 1988- ״ convinced that military 2000 and 2008, and (b) the weakening of action had succeeded where the PA’s autonomous institutions as of the .Second Intifada in 2000 ״.negotiations had failed Yet the international community continued Why did the negotiations for a permanent to demand that Israel end the occupation. At agreement fail? Explanations can be the time, the majority of Israelis refused to organized into four groups: continue to pay the heavy toll of continuing PEACEMISM | What Happened to the Israeli Peace Camp? 3/16 Shifting the Paradigm Israel Piekrash The first group of arguments contends that to improve their position leading up to the the talks failed due to random problems final status negotiations. Israel expanded not related to the agreement itself. For the settlement infrastructure and the example, the fact that Israeli PM Olmert Palestinians knowingly turned a blind eye was under legal investigation at the time to terror. Second, Israel’s lack of clarity caused the Palestinians to fear reaching drove Ehud Barak to initially present tough a compromise with him, as he might be positions and quickly withdraw from them. replaced.[9] This explanation seems to As a result, the Palestinians concluded fall short though: If the Palestinians were that Israel could be pressed into further indeed willing to accept Olmert’s offer, they concessions, which made them harden could have publicly declared that it was their own positions.[10] Yet this group acceptable in principle. At the very least, of explanations can only account for the they could have declared in real time that failure of the talks between Arafat and the proposal was closer to their positions. Barak in 2000. In contrast, eight years later, Representatives on both sides did so, seven Olmert presented the Palestinians with a years earlier, at the conclusion of the Taba comprehensive, detailed vision. His proposal Summit in 2001, although it was clear that was preceded by Israel’s withdrawal from Ehud Barak would be replaced in the next Gaza and without further expansion of elections within weeks. Therefore, the settlements. It was clear to all concerned overwhelming Palestinian response to that the proposal was final and would be the Israeli proposal cannot be explained dropped from the agenda if the Likud party by Olmert’s fragile legal status. was elected; yet the Palestinians did not respond. There is no longer an Israeli or״ Palestinian majority that believes The third group of explanations focuses on the mass psychology of conflict. According in the feasibility of a political to this approach, both the Israelis and the Palestinians fostered the false notion that ״agreement the other party is cruel and not interested The second group of explanations addresses in peace. The longer the conflict lasts, the ambiguity inherent to the Oslo Accords. the more each party has to justify its From the outset, the Israeli side and the victims and therefore more staunchly Palestinian side had different and even refuses compromise. According to these contrasting expectations from a permanent explanations, Palestinians believe that the agreement. Already in 1988, the Palestinians Jewish minority in the otherwise Arab space established the determined vision of a will eventually collapse, while Israelis believe Palestinian state alongside Israel, while that their strength will force the Palestinians Israel progressed slowly without presenting to compromise. Both communities have a firm public vision. The Oslo Accords a large religious population that believes stipulated that progress should be made God supports their political policies and through irreversible interim measures therefore there is no need to adjust them. on the ground, consciously ignoring the All this created aggressive opposition conflicting expectations of the parties and on either side that impeded the peace without a clear Israeli vision for a permanent process.[11] This group of explanations settlement. This led to a breach of trust. highlights the considerable difficulties First, throughout the 1990s, the loss of trust that strengthened the opposition, reducing caused both sides to try to act unilaterally the leaders’ margins for negotiation. Yet it Heinrich Böll Stiftung Tel Aviv 4/16 Shifting the Paradigm Israel Piekrash cannot be denied that, despite the hostility its successor, the State of Israel, gained between the two peoples, the peace process power at the expense of the Palestinians.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • April 6 2020
    Israel and the Middle East News Update Monday, April 6 Headlines: • Cabinet Decides Lockdown in 8 Cities, Jerusalem Areas Amid Passover • Israel Seals Off Ultra-Orthodox Town Hit Hard by Coronavirus • Israel's Number of COVID-19 Cases Rises to 8,430 • Bennett Demands Defense Ministry Take Over Virus Battle from Health • Gantz Asks Rivlin for More Coalition-Forming Time • Eyeing Positions in Likud Govt, Labor Asks to End Left-Wing Alliance • PA Bans Israeli Goods to Prevent Spread of Coronavirus • Ex-IDF Generals: West Bank Annexation Could Cause Collapse of PA Commentary: • Ma’ariv: “‘An Appeal to Netanyahu: Health Ministry Versus the Scientists” - By Ben Caspit, commentator at Ma’ariv • Ha’aretz: “Who Needs Doctors When You Have an Army?” - By Raviv Drucker, commentator at Channel 13 News S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 www.centerpeace.org News Excerpts April 6, 2020 Times of Israel Cabinet Decides Lockdown in 8 Cities, Jerusalem Areas Amid Passover The cabinet early Monday adopted decisions to allow the government to close off several cities and neighborhoods across Israel and the West Bank to combat the spread of the coronavirus and also step up economic assistance to the battered economy. The cabinet, which met via telephone, authorized a ministerial committee to declare various areas in Israel with high infection rates as “restricted areas,” and gave the same powers to the Israel Defense Force commander in the West Bank. The cabinet statement, issued after midnight Sunday, did not say who the members of the committee would be.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of People-To-People Programs in the Current Israeli-Palestinian
    The Power of Possibility: The Role of People-to-People Programs in the Current Israeli- Palestinian Reality Forum Israel Shira Herzog and Avivit Hai ECF economic cooperation foundation © 2005 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Israel Office P.O.Box 12235 Herzliya 46733, Israel Editor: Hermann Bünz Layout: Jaffa Cohen Printing: Ra'ayon All rights reserved. Editorial The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a non-profit organisation with ideological roots in the German and international labour movement. Out of a profound commitment to social justice and peaceful coexistence both within societies and between nations, the Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung office in Israel contributes to - Strengthening German-Israeli relations - Facilitating the peace process and regional co-operation - Improving labour relations - Working for gender equality and women's empowerment - Democracy education for youth - Policy consulting and information Together with its partners, the Israel office of the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung regularly holds public forums and workshops which address the above-mentioned topics. Authoritative representatives from the political, social, economic, and academic worlds are invited to take part in these encounters. Lectures and addresses given at these events, as well as conference summaries, are reproduced in this series of brochures, entitled "Israel Forum". The series is also intended for the presentation of policy analyses and research results which constitute the backdrop to such public forums. www.fes.org.il Opening Note The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) are pleased to support this publication, "The Power of Possibility – the Role of People-to-People in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality." The last few months have seen dramatic changes in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
    [Show full text]
  • Families of Backsliding Democracies: Unhappy in Their Own Way?
    Working draft – do not cite Families of Backsliding Democracies: Unhappy in their own way? Mordechai Kemnitzer and Yuval Shany (with assistance by Oded Ron), The paper, which is part of a broader project studying the mechanics and root causes of democratic backsliding and their possible relevance for Israeli democracy, explores similarities and differences between specific legislative and administrative measures taken or contemplated in three clusters of states, which could conceivably be presented on a spectrum of backsliding from liberal democracy – (1) Poland and Hungary – two EU member states that retain democratic institutions, but whose governments have been able to change significantly the balance of power between branches of government and to decrease the space available to criticism and opposition to government policies and to certain conservative values supported by the government (such countries are sometime regarded as illiberal or anti-liberal democracies); (2) Israel - a state which retains democratic institutions, but where elements in government have been attempting, with partial success, to change the balance of power between the branches of government and to curb criticism and opposition; and (3) Turkey, Russia and Venezuela – states that preserve some democratic institutions but no longer allow meaningfully competitive elections, practice open repression against political opponents and have left very little civic space for criticism and dissent. The present paper focuses only on comparing certain measures taken in the first two clusters of countries and presents some tentative conclusions about democratic backsliding in the three states. Our concern in this paper is not with the overall assessment of the situation in backsliding democracies, or on studying the populist ideology inspiring and, at times, facilitating the backsliding.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
    Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State ..............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Israel 2020 Human Rights Report
    ISRAEL 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy. Although it has no constitution, its parliament, the unicameral 120-member Knesset, has enacted a series of “Basic Laws” that enumerate fundamental rights. Certain fundamental laws, orders, and regulations legally depend on the existence of a “state of emergency,” which has been in effect since 1948. Under the Basic Laws, the Knesset has the power to dissolve itself and mandate elections. On March 2, Israel held its third general election within a year, which resulted in a coalition government. On December 23, following the government’s failure to pass a budget, the Knesset dissolved itself, which paved the way for new elections scheduled for March 23, 2021. Under the authority of the prime minister, the Israeli Security Agency combats terrorism and espionage in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The national police, including the border police and the immigration police, are under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security. The Israeli Defense Forces are responsible for external security but also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Defense. Israeli Security Agency forces operating in the West Bank fall under the Israeli Defense Forces for operations and operational debriefing. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security services. The Israeli military and civilian justice systems have on occasion found members of the security forces to have committed abuses. Significant human
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and the Middle East News Update
    Israel and the Middle East News Update Wednesday, April 17 Headlines: • PA Prime Minister: Trump’s Peace Deal Will Be ‘Born Dead’ • Amb. Dermer: Trump Peace Plan Should Give Jews Confidence • Final Election Results: Likud 35, Blue White 35 • Netanyahu Celebrates Victory: I Am Not Afraid of the Media • Nagel: “Currently, there is No Solution to Gaza” • In First, US Publishes Official Map with Golan Heights as Part of Israel • Israel Interrogates US Jewish Activist at Airport Commentary: • Channel 13: “The Main Hurdle: Lieberman Versus the Haredim” − By Raviv Drucker, Israeli journalist and political commentator for Channel 13 News • Ha’aretz: “How the Israeli Left Can Regain Power - Stop Hating the Haredim” − By Benjamin Goldschmidt, a rabbi in New York City. He studied in the Ponevezh (Bnei Brak), Hebron (Jerusalem) and Lakewood (New Jersey) Yeshivas S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 The Hon. Robert Wexler, President ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● Aaron Zucker, Associate Editor News Excerpts April 17, 2019 Jerusalem Post PA Prime Minister: Trump’s Peace Deal Will Be ‘Born Dead’ Newly sworn in Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said Tuesday night that US President Donald Trump’s peace plan will be “born dead." Shtayyeh said the American “Deal of the Century,” was declaring a “financial war” on the Palestinian people, during an interview with The Associated Press. "There are no partners in Palestine for Trump. There are no Arab partners for Trump and there are no European partners for Trump," Shtayyeh said in the interview. See also, “PALESTINIANS TURN TO RUSSIA TO BYPASS US PEACE PLAN” (Jerusalem Post) Jerusalem Post Amb.
    [Show full text]
  • The National Left (First Draft) by Shmuel Hasfari and Eldad Yaniv
    The National Left (First Draft) by Shmu'el Hasfari and Eldad Yaniv Open Source Center OSC Summary: A self-published book by Israeli playwright Shmu'el Hasfari and political activist Eldad Yaniv entitled "The National Left (First Draft)" bemoans the death of Israel's political left. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/israel-left.pdf Statement by the Authors The contents of this publication are the responsibility of the authors, who also personally bore the modest printing costs. Any part of the material in this book may be photocopied and recorded. It is recommended that it should be kept in a data-storage system, transmitted, or recorded in any form or by any electronic, optical, mechanical means, or otherwise. Any form of commercial use of the material in this book is permitted without the explicit written permission of the authors. 1. The Left The Left died the day the Six-Day War ended. With the dawn of the Israeli empire, the Left's sun sank and the Small [pun on Smol, the Hebrew word for Left] was born. The Small is a mark of Cain, a disparaging term for a collaborator, a lover of Arabs, a hater of Israel, a Jew who turns against his own people, not a patriot. The Small-ists eat pork on Yom Kippur, gobble shrimps during the week, drink espresso whenever possible, and are homos, kapos, artsy-fartsy snobs, and what not. Until 1967, the Left actually managed some impressive deeds -- it took control of the land, ploughed, sowed, harvested, founded the state, built the army, built its industry from scratch, fought Arabs, settled the land, built the nuclear reactor, brought millions of Jews here and absorbed them, and set up kibbutzim, moshavim, and agriculture.
    [Show full text]
  • Conference Program
    Table of Contents Plenary Sessions .............................................................................. 1 SUNDAY | June 30, 2019 ................................................................... 1 MONDAY | July 1, 2019 ..................................................................... 5 TUESDAY | July 2, 2019 ................................................................... 13 Spotlight - Policy Arenas ............................................................. 19 MONDAY | July 1, 2019 ................................................................... 19 TUESDAY | July 2, 2019 ................................................................... 20 Roundtable Sessions .................................................................... 21 MONDAY | July 1, 2019 ................................................................... 21 TUESDAY | July 2, 2019 ................................................................... 23 The Herzliya Conference War Game ...................................... 26 SUNDAY | June 30, 2019 ................................................................ 26 (Closed Session) Registration will open on Sunday, June 30, at 2pm. We kindly ask all our participants to bring with them official ID documents (Israeli ID cards, Israeli driver’s license or international passports). Admittance to the Conference area with weapons will not permitted. 1 Plenary Sessions SUNDAY | June 30, 2019 14:00 Welcome & Registration 15:00 Opening Ceremony Prof. Uriel Reichman, President & Founder, IDC Herzliya Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Jeremy Pressman
    Document generated on 09/23/2021 11:50 p.m. Journal of Conflict Studies The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Jeremy Pressman Volume 23, Number 2, Winter 2003 URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs23_2art07 See table of contents Publisher(s) The University of New Brunswick ISSN 1198-8614 (print) 1715-5673 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Pressman, J. (2003). The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Studies, 23(2), 114–141. All rights reserved © Centre for Conflict Studies, UNB, 2003 This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ Fall 2003 The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Jeremy Pressman INTRODUCTION What caused the outbreak of the second intifada? The conventional wis- dom places the blame on one of two central figures, Ariel Sharon or Yasser Arafat. In one version, Sharon, then the leader of the Israeli opposition, started the intifada by going on an intentionally provocative visit to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. Alternatively, Arafat, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), decided that the new State of Palestine should be launched in blood and fire; he unleashed Palestinian militants rather than accept a negotiated resolution of the conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Speakers & Members of the Board *
    Speakers & Members of the Board * Mr. Ammar Abdulhamid Founder and Director of the Tharwa Foundation and a leading Syrian human rights and pro- democracy activist. He is a former Fellow of the Saban Centerfor Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute and co- founder of the Hands Across the Mideast Support Alliance (HAMSA). A known poet and author, he was a Fellow at the International Institute for Modern Letters in Las Vegas. He holds a BA in History from the University of Wisconsin. Mr. Aharon Abramowicz Former General Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Currently a partner in the law offices of Lipa Meir and Co., he previously served as General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Justice. He was General Director of the Jewish Agency. He served as legal advisor to a number of organizations, such as the Jewish Agency, the World Zionist Federation, the World Jewish Restitution Organization and the United Israel Appeal. He holds an LLB from the Hebrew University. Mr. Elliott Abrams Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). As a member of the George W. Bush administration he served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Middle East Affairs as well as the Senior Director on the National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs. During the Reagan administration he served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, and later Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. He received his JD from Harvard Law School. Prof. Oded Abramsky Chairman of the National Council for Civilian Research and Development.
    [Show full text]
  • The Israeli Campaign Regarding the Iranian Nuclear Program
    Consciousness as Leverage: The Israeli Campaign regarding the Iranian Nuclear Program Ronen Dangoor1 Background Iran’s nuclear program has constituted a central security issue for Israel over the past two decades. Against this backdrop, Israel has conducted a multifaceted drive to block it, in part through a complex cognitive campaign that extended from the summer of 2002 – when the Iranian nuclear program was revealed – to July 2015, when the agreement between Iran and the world powers on restricting the nuclear program was signed. This article discusses the central characteristics of the cognitive campaign, which included four main components and motifs: the first and most basic, which was a constant for the entire period, was exposing and raising awareness of the dangers of the Iranian nuclear project; the second emphasized the other threats that the Iranian regime poses, chief among them its aggressive policy, which includes involvement in terrorism and extensive activity to develop long range missiles; the third component was the threat of a possible Israeli military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which was prominent as a central narrative mainly during the years 2010-2012; and the fourth component, which dominated from 2013, dealt with the negotiations between the world powers and Iran and with the nuclear deal that was reached between them. The struggle against the agreement has intensified in recent months against the backdrop of the United States’ withdrawal from it, but that development is not addressed here due to the lack of sufficient perspective. 1 Ronen Dangoor is a former Deputy Director of the Research Department at the Prime Minister’s Office.
    [Show full text]
  • The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    Fall 2003 The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Jeremy Pressman INTRODUCTION What caused the outbreak of the second intifada? The conventional wis- dom places the blame on one of two central figures, Ariel Sharon or Yasser Arafat. In one version, Sharon, then the leader of the Israeli opposition, started the intifada by going on an intentionally provocative visit to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. Alternatively, Arafat, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), decided that the new State of Palestine should be launched in blood and fire; he unleashed Palestinian militants rather than accept a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Both of these claims overplay the role of individual leaders and overlook a wider array of elite decisions and deeper political and social conditions. Decisions by Sharon and Arafat did matter, but not in the way that is conven- tionally portrayed. Instead, a chain of events starting in 1993 set the stage for renewed conflict. First, popular Palestinian discontent grew during the Oslo peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the peace agreements. From 1993-2000, many aspects of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip deepened rather than abated. Palestinians expect- ed their lives to improve in terms of freedom of movement and socioeconomic standing; when both worsened, significant resentment built up in Palestinian society. This discontent, further fed by the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, laid the groundwork for popular support for a more confrontational approach with Israel.
    [Show full text]