A Defense of Idealism

CEU eTD Collection submitted to the Central European University in partial fulfillment of A defenseofidealism

the the requirements of the degree Doctorof Philosophy of Supervisor: Professor Howard Robinson Central European U Department ofPhilosophy by Kodaj Daniel 2014

niversity, Budapest

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Long content References Appendix: Conclusion Introduction 4 3 2 1

Clock transportClock synchrony Truthmakers and l Real spacetime asexcess structure Three contemporary arguments The idealitymatter of and space: The concept of idealism

Contents aws in idealism

1 10 1 1 1 6 2 2 4 1 3 30 25 4 9 3 2 7

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G too. too u ( ll x ) . , CEU eTD Collection Lighting necessitarian makes the chancy Lightning. in nature of laws the up sums above depicted sequence nomic the that follows it spheres, annihilating and recolouring except lightning the except anything with interact not described of the spheres. colours the to due are changes These annihilated. is it lightning, by hit is sphere If yellow. turns generated freshly a If lightning. by hit is them to describe, theyanything donotinteractwith inany way. a immovable are spheres The red. is sphere generated newly Every space. empty otherwise and wide a in generated hence infini without worlds possible are there that argues section This 2. epistemologically unacceptable establish possi nomically of chain infinite potentially a with associated is instance property every that guarantees consequences. possible that guarantees of consequence possible nomically a is if so case, that in true some for that suppose For poss nomically of chain infinite potentially a with associated C infinite 1. cam ht n Lightning, in that claim I spheresdo the sincespheresand the except denizens Lightningno Sincehas possibl nomologically The of one that chance some is there Lightning, in around spheres are there If spontaneously are spheres where Lightning, world, possible a Consider Pandispositionalism

2 pandispositionalism is not metaphysically not is necessary pandispositionalism

Finite nomic sequences nomic Finite

that this consequence of pandispositionalism pandispositionalism of consequence this that - by the tree. So So tree. generation of spheresgeneration of

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a yellow sphere is hit by lightning, it turns green. If a green green a If green. turns it lightning, by hit is sphere yellow a x following s being ’s Pandispositionalism

becomes entails thatall Since l cneune. h ga o 2 of goal The consequences. ble chain ofconditionals:chain x F ,

p F

has e behaviour of any given sphere in Lightning is is Lightning in sphere given any of behaviour e

andispositionalism . o niie C infinite no Struck ( F

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nd, apart from the phenomenon I’m about about I’m phenomenon the from apart nd, Struck 36 property

Red

→ nal ta eey rpry ntne is instance property every that entails

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has no further consequences.has nofurther in not a manifestation of Gollum’s annihilation. a ofGollum’s in not manifestation s . For example, if there are 14 spheres around in Lightning when a a when Lightning in around spheres 14 are there if example, For . beyond - tree grew from redness in Lightning, the sequence depicted depicted sequence the Lightning, in redness from grew tree Perhaps t Perhaps s

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annihiliation have consequences that do not concern the concern not do that consequences have 37 an

nihiliation en generated Being

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3 s to x necessary truth necessary

from Pandispositionalism il un elw Hne te hi cn otne neiiey n the in indefinitely continue can chain the Hence, yellow. turn will being struck being Infinite epistemic descent Infinite nality theory theory D rty instance every property instance the pandispositionalist can bit can pandispositionalist the -

re ivle n niie ubr f itnt rpris ec o each properties, distinct of number infinite an involve trees pandispositionalism be s be en struck being g tuk o eeae niie ecn. o eape oe could one example, For descent. infinite generate to struck ng . For reasons unwarranted. earlier, outlined is I this think a uch that its antecedent involve antecedent its that uch in possible s

. th violates (D*). (D*) requires that the conditional linked to a a to linked conditional the that requires (D*) (D*). violates one of the manifestations of of manifestations the of one I’ll discuss the costs of making pandispositionalism pandispositionalism making of costs the discuss I’ll x e next section. next e ,

that is being struck by lightning is such that if that such is lightning by struck being is that necessitarian otnet adsoiinls i te hss ht all that thesis the is pandispositionalism contingent . Lightning is concei is Lightning . S oe ant otne h can etad n the in leftward chain the continue cannot one So .

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. I see no reason to reason no see I . tree

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s ti sgeto is suggestion this so ,

pandispositionalism is false. is pandispositionalism contingent pandispositionalism 38 grows from redness in Lightning. Since Since Lightning. in redness from grows

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claimed that there are worlds without infinite C infinite without worlds are there that claimed not necessarily true necessarily not 1. compromises the reliability of scientific evidence while relying on such such on relying while evidence scientific of reliability the compromises The problem with this suggestion is that, by (KD), we are guaranteed to to guaranteed are we (KD), by that, is suggestion this with problem dispositional The finds only science as long as that, argued be might It on accepted be can pandispositionalism contingent that suggest might One

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to cling such a such

of properties, hence we cannot attain a full full a attain cannot we hence properties, of

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to p tree for every for tree 41 andispositionalism.

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For a summary of this view, see Hawthorne (2001). See also the references in note the referencesin also See (2001). Hawthorne see view, summarythis a of For e eg Yts 21: 5. o a rtcl icsin f hs on b a by point this of discussion critical a For 95). (2013: Yates e.g. See 2 Frank Jackson thinks that fundamental physical properties cannot help being being helpcannot properties fundamentalphysical that thinks Frank Jackson Indeed, the fact that the sciences investigate causal roles has led a number of of a number led causal roles investigate has theIndeed, sciences thefact that Similarly,Lierse andBrian CarolineEllis assert that . 1

and propensities. (Ellis and Lierse 1994: 32) capacitiespowers, of nature the of are dispositional.They all are about that properties fundamental most the exceptions, few With be impinge andour onus measuring instruments. to take they way the through essentially like they are things what about know We properties the about no is This do. properties these what us tell they fundamental, us tell physicists When dispositional properties, all waythe down. only finds science But powers. or dispositions its in precisely differs explain to perhaps enough without: different region a from different very is charge with region A region. that to relations spatial in things other on effect its through only known is region a at field a of magnitude the but region, a over o point, a at charge electrical an like things find we andmagnification the up Turn effects. dynamical its by only knowable defines Le is Resistance Are Are bi isse, f hr i sm ohr rpry hs instancing whose property other some is there if insisted, ibniz fundamental physical propertie physical fundamental

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According to Barry Dainton (2001: 232), the target of Foster’s modal argument is is argument modal Foster’s of target the 232), (2001: Dainton Barry to According tniaim bu saeie I eiv ta sbtniaim n tef ant ie s ( us give cannot itself in substantivalism that believe I spacetime. about stantivalism Premise ( Premise Foster: of behalf on reply following the venture may One of contingency the of sense make can we that is objection this of gist The ( take to appears Foster realism spatial against argument modal Foster’s place, in concept this With 11 n. ec, ( Hence, ent. ( ( ( 11) 13) 12) ) seems justified justified seems ) shoe could have a been sandal. o instead sandal a worn have could I that fact modal the than more any laws different sustained have entail that fact doesnot Butdifferent laws. this T he laws of nature nature of laws he

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space s posit which, by inference to the best the to inference by which, posit

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hscl rpris r dispositional are properties physical 2 but

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establish is established

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actual applications of the Power Regress are open to open are Regress Power the of applications we have reason to think that it does not exist not does it that think to reason have we by against is not is

needn reasons independent physical realism physical 61

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in its original form and in the weaker form defended here, defended form weaker the in and form original its in start develops the world physics.) isclosed under , the claim that idealism cannot supply tuthmakers for for tuthmakers supply cannot idealism that claim the ,

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from the definition of definition the from independent metaphysical reasons metaphysical independent , arguments.

the physical realism is preferable is realism physical or idealism. My own case for for case own My idealism. or ok at looks works for works

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1 1 one own his to confined being Albert, At certain areonthelinewhere places,there humps Albert lives: Real spacetime structure asexcess Albert the ant may thatconclude it

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64 view

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contracted starts shrinking to a point to , hovering at, hoveringof the border throughout the point, it finally enters the contraction zone, zone, contraction the enters finally it point, 67 pushes

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in the context ofin the context actual physics. sne i ta cs, el tutr i te tutr o eprec) In experience). of structure the is structure real case, that in (since, . Th . s necessary to secure realism, but it introduces an inscrutable inscrutable an introduces it but realism, secure to necessary s o predict future experience) are different representations of the same same the of representations different are experience) future predict o acts about experience, and, as such, they do not constitute an an constitute not do they such, as and, experience, about acts realist realist e best counter best e

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that there is no difference between difference no is there that

re mere mental aids. Albert is free to choose choose to free is Albert aids. mental mere re choosing the model that seems more simple simple more seems that model the choosing Albert 69 physical

physical picture

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theories into into theories for idealism. idealism. for ical realism realism ical cture of his of cture f

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CEU eTD Collection think ofthink these as points momentaryevents at theon each point example, momen represent diagram the in Points axis. the example, at For stationed observer place. the of particular trajectory aspatiotemporal visited it which at times the and object at point S 3.2 simultaneitycan the motivate realist physical than satisfying more Sect solution. solutions realist physical arguethat surveys 3.3 Section puzzle. this of details the dif in varies light of speed the that claim the with compatible seems it Specifically, observation with compatible seems relativity special that is problem the Briefly, simultaneity.” ( of conventionality “the called is puzzle The relativity. of philosophy a explore sections following The 3.2 uppose that the space of an observer is single line, with the observer standing standing observer the with line, single is observer an of space the that uppose ferent directions but the discrepancies even out. The present section explains explains section present The out. even discrepancies the but directions ferent coordinat this in line A Now let’saxis togenerate add a a time two .1

The conventionality ofsimultaneity P Measuring theone

and two mirrors positioned onbothsidesatdistance:and positioned unit twomirrors the puzzle has puzzle the o 34 ulns h iels slto. ’l ru ta i i much is it that argue I’ll solution. idealist the outlines 3.4 ion - transcendent hypotheses about variations in the speed of light. of speed the in variations about hypotheses transcendent

no straightforward and uncontroversial physical realist realist physical uncontroversial and straightforward no t an of trajectory spatial the both represents system e

axis “is” the placethe “is” axis view

- that spacetime isideal. that spacetime wayvelocity of light stra suggestions 70 n

P tary events at a point in space. For space. in point a at events tary n rclirn pzl fo the from puzzle recalcitrant and . -

P dimensional spacetime: dimensional , but at different times. We can can Wedifferent times. at but , , hence the conventionality of of conventionality the hence , P

is represented by the by represented is

distant) distant) . I’ll t

CEU eTD Collection toward their respective sources.) and 3 Rays (Perhaps from travel 4 and 3 Rays as at linestilted 45degrees tothe at from emitted rays, light two of trajectory spacetime the place, in convention the (on light t

ups ecos u ui itnet be to distance unit our choose we Suppose towards travel 2 and 1 Rays or to traveling rays light of path the Generally, = oneach 0toward thethis: looklike side, mirrors will standard conception) is 1 unit distance per second. With this this With second. per distance unit 1 is conception) standard

4 are Rays 1 and 2, crossing at the origin or reflected back back reflected or origin the at crossing 2, and 1 Rays are 4 P Ray

oad oe itn tre, leaving target, distant some toward

1 x P

axis: from a distant source, reaching source, distant a from 71

Ray c 2

meters, so that the speed of of speed the that so meters,

from from P

will be represented be will P P

at at t t

0 = = 0. = P .

CEU eTD Collection ae omlto o te as f aue n l fae o reference of frames the pre important in all in nature of laws the of formulation same 24 nondeviant speed caseall directions.where the issame in round the so back, come to seconds 0.4 2.5 0.62 is mirror the toward light of speed the say, that, lighttakes it that observation The back. and mirror the to velocity same the with travels light her 2 / in space of units 2 traveled beam light the since light, of velocity the us gives then to returns mirror, the from back reflected beam, the when from beam light out send to is this do to way straightforward seemingly A light. of speed the cones, becausal will objective. hencestructureofthe thebasic order t on agree will observers all that entails also well in results light of speed the of invariance The else). everyone (and Superman of view of point c at traveling beam light a relativity, in But physics. classical in board velocity the across relative to applies logic This hour. per mile 1 at crawl will plane the observer. the stati a of of standpoint the velocity from mph the the600 at flying is that plane with a where chasing mph, 599 at flying is varies Superman physics, objects Newtonian of from velocity departure radicalapparent a marks idea This motion relative their matter no observers, all to propagate in faster whichisimpossible than light, causally be can that areawere causallyconnected totheorigin, then th points “outermost” the point represent the by influenced 4 and 3 Rays and that points “outermost” the represent 2 and 1 Rays picture, previous the In constitute. they lightcone whose point those of collection at poi Every occurring event momentary the being itself origin (the origin

from the point of view of the sta the of view of point the from The second second The T c T to confined is observer the if that however, Notice, problem. following the consider Now relativity for thesame An important oflightis premise isthatthe velocity of The

only . In such a case, it will take the beam 1.6 seconds to reach the mirror and and mirror the reach to seconds 1.6 beam the take will it case, a such In . oft units to equal we 1,that is, expect the round

shaded means of measuring the speed of speed the measuring of means nt

basic principle basic in 2 ime. Given that we chose our metric unit tobe unit chose metric that weime. our Given

seconds to make the round the make to seconds the spacetime diagram has diagram spacetime the sent dialectic. sent ra nlsd y h fu ry i cle the called is rays four the by enclosed area P

- at known oddities like time dilation and length contraction. It contraction. length and dilation time like oddities known t

onary observer, then, in Superman’s frame of reference, reference, of frame Superman’s in then, observer, onary - = 0 toward one of the mirrors, and record the time, time, the record and mirrors, the of one toward 0 = event at the origin. If a point from outside the shaded shaded the outside from point a If origin. the at event

of relativity theory is that observation and experiment leads to the the to leads experiment and observation that is theory ofrelativity - events that can be causally connected to the point point the to connected causally be can that events

can causally influence the point the influence causally can

tionary observer will also travel at travel also will observer tionary 72 - trip will take 2 seconds, just as in the the in as just seconds, 2 take will trip

trip is compatible with the hypothesis hypothesis the with compatible is trip its own lightcone own its The -

trip to take 2seconds.trip to light, then she cannot be sure that that sure be cannot she then light, he shape and position of the light light the of position and shape he

(Einstein 1923: 41, 200 41, 1923: (Einstein observer at observer e causalwould have influence special 5 P c .

and this experiment is experiment this and T and its speed back is back speed its and his P - c P relativity. . A lightcone is the is lightcone A . event at the origin, origin, the at event

. Dividing 2 by 2 Dividing . meters, we expect we meters, wants to measure to wants principle lightcone

at il o be not will

from the from : 78). 5:

t the of 0). = T 24 I T a f ,

CEU eTD Collection beam will we because on thesec left beam light the when value) known other some (or “0” read clock observer’s second the that saying for grounds good have must time, the beam by arrived. Dividing 1 records clock) distant the to access has who observer at observer t have we Suppose mirrors. to confined is observer the that assumption unreasonable the yearshundred since discovered was it by Einstein. that one relativity, philosophyof hand at to confined is who observer single a have we di we once disconfirm to easy trivially (in vacuum,rate atany round average the that tell only can She light. of velocity cannot “signal measu objects back”) that distant other mirrors (or to confined is who observer lonely a Hence, mirror. the hitting beam’s the of event the be could line dotted the on point each principle, takes2 light it observedfactthat the spacetime diagram ofthe we synchronized: be must clocks two the work, experiment this make To To see one why the scenario deviant the that is problem this about interesting is What with compatible are scenarios deviant such of infinity nondenumerable A If ,

at in t a no has

fact, = 0 ond clock won’t tell us how long it took light traverse ushowlong tell to distance, unit took clock it won’t ond P

from sends out a light beam at beam light a out sends light travels at 0.625 at travels light easy have no grounds for saying that when we released the light light the released we when that saying for grounds no have

, the secondread“0”, the clock solution. It is one of the most recalcitrant puzzles in the in puzzles recalcitrant most the of one is It solution. — - way velocity is not easy to measure, suppose we discard velocityeasyway we tomeasure, discard suppose isnot let’s ignore this). experiment wo clocks instead, one at one instead, clocks wo T , we theone have continues to continues c

seconds

to the right and at 2.5 at and right the to will looklikewill this: 73 t cr te nesnbe yohss that hypothesis unreasonable the scard

= 0, and the clock at clock the and 0, =

g P enerate

- bounce back from the mirror. In mirror. bouncethe fromback (or some other(or knownvalue) . w But, surprisingly But, ay oflight. velocity

P P c

ontroversy, more than a than more ontroversy, . Otherwise the readout the Otherwise .

and one at at one and - c trip velocity is velocity trip P

to the left, then the the then left, the to P

and can only only can and x

and can only use use only can and

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CEU eTD Collection ofelectrodynamics. 25 evenmethod and themistakes out. into built already is result the about assumption incorrect an because undetectable, be will one real the and value this between difference one the that figure she’ll and distance, unit buddy, so hits when emitted (on 0.625 at “0”leaves light when the beam hit will signal the reckonsthat obs clock from travel take to second will 1 it light that believes she so velocity, uniform assumes observer Our left. 0.625 at travels light reality, in that suppose and speed the at travel signals electric that assume let’s simplicity, For one. is there if even anomaly an detect not will measurements our then velocity, way constant measure we to want one from light of velocity the measure to phe th on depend if we toreadclocks want at “0” moment. the the twosame signalat to sendthe synchronizer toreach signal some time take will synchronizer the so light), than faster travel can nothing (because relativity in from sent signal, (on light ittook traversetime to distance. unit from off takes beam light the when setting from signal electric an send we beam, light the launching Before wire.

See Torretti (1979: 303) for a note on how deviances in the one the in deviances how on note a for 303) (1979: Torretti See B erver - nomena enhl, h lgt em hs one whose beam light the Meanwhile, one the for value admissible an choose arbitrarily we if that further, Note, of magnitude the then signaling, electric use we if that is trouble The clock that guarantee To synchronizer the reality, In reality. in happens what see Let’s clock Let A A B the know to have We’ll clocks. two the synchronize to light of speed way will read “1” when the light beam hits it. Hence, when the observer the when Hence, it. hits beam light the when “1” read will ’s time), ’s time), we have to know exactly how long it takes for the synchronizer synchronizer the for takes it long how exactly know to have we time), ’s

when

checks the checks B c

ed ot sga ta tls clock tells that signal a out sends to a known value that guarantees that the two clocks both read “0” “0” read both clocks two the that guarantees that value known a to from . 25 A sed f ih, since light, of speed e

A A B reads But “1.6.” So we cannot use this method to synchronize two distant clocks distant two synchronize to method this use cannot we So

reads “0.” This beam a beam This “0.” reads be at be will read “0”will when

A to second clock second

to B P B , so it reaches it so ,

, to reach clo reach to , and clock and

B prior tomeasuring it.

B leaves beam light the when “0” reads B , she’ll think that think she’ll , A

the moment the is running 0.6 seconds late in comparison to late seconds incomparison 0.6 is running . t

= B B A A

ck ck . Suppose it takes takes . Supposeit B P – A

at h sed f ih i ivle i electric in involved is light of speed the reads “0.6.”

S 74

. Then the readout on readout the Then .

to clock clock to lso takes 1.6 seconds to arrive to arrive to seconds 1.6 takes lso in 1.6 seconds. Since it is sent at sent is it Since seconds. 1.6 in to

B x (on (on

. Instantaneous signaling is impossible impossible is signaling Instantaneous .

= 1. We connect the two clocks by a by clocks two the connect We 1. = B - way velocity of light is light of velocity way - , because we must already know the the know already must we because , A wa B A ’s

y reads 0, so both clocks will read will clocks both so 0, reads to set itself to 0. The observer observer The 0. to itself set to B time), telling telling time),

c eoiy s en maue is measured being is velocity it took light 1 second to travel travel to second 1 light took it . At .

to the right and at 2.5 at and right the to t S

- =

way velocity affect the laws the affect velocity way seconds. Then we have have we Then seconds.

–

1 (on 1 the synchronization synchronization the

B B

to set itself to 0, to0, itself to set will give us the us give will

A signal travels travels signal c ’s time), ’s

m/sec. The m/sec. P

of light, light, of at c , or her her or , A B

t S to the the to

, so it it so ,

t to =

will will = 0 = the the – B A 1 - , , CEU eTD Collection expositions, and see Jammer (2006: Chs.9 (2006: Jammer see and expositions, 27 to back signaling 124 2006: Jammer and 1993 Einstein (see sam the beat to clocks two for order in synchronized be also must units time of length the c clock 26 (distant) simultaneity.”It has been aofdebateever since. subject claim Reichenbach’s of English endorsement 1963) (1955, Grünbaum’s Adolf entered through science of philosophy it and theory, relativity of interpretation landmark [1927]) (1957 Reichenbach’s Hans through science of philosophy the entered claimed that we simply Einstein relativity, special on paper seminal his In directions. all in speed same up end we’ll that way a such in measuring up mucked be will setup our assumption, one the about assumption an make to have we’ll so light, of velocity the on depends clock post, clock move we when Hence, down. slow clocks synchronized, thereadout on A and we them synchronize one , discrepancies in the one the in discrepancies ,

A similar masking effect occurs if we try to use two use to try we if occurs effect masking similar A See Reichenbach (1957: §19, 123 §19, (1957: Reichenbach See ed “, w sn a ih ba to beam light a send we “0,” reads - - one the that thesis The lig whether out find to way easy no is there up, sum To predicts relativity special that is idea this with problem The at side by side clocks two set We instead: following the do we Suppose the determine us help cannot clocks synchronized remotely that follows It a velocity way way light. velocity of A when it received the received it when 1923: 391923: A from travel to light by required “time” the that definition by establish for “time” at event an time, in compare, to assumption further without possible not is of neighbourhood immediate the in events of values time the at one the resembling point the at is there If events. these with simultaneous are which hands the of positions the finding determinethe tim point the at If

to to c

B B for for

qas h “ie i rqie t tae from travel to requires it “time” the equals il hw dfeet ie than time different a show will A – . the one

40)

A to correct for the slowdown. And if we make an incorrect incorrect an make we if And slowdown. the for correct to

and s. - 27 way velocities will be undetectable. will be wayvelocities A A - e valueseventsofimmediate the e in proximityof stipulate

way velocity isn’t.(See ifit even Appendix synchronizing signal. As long as the round the as long As signal. synchronizing B

The thesis is usually known as “the conventionality of conventionality “the as known usually is thesis The of space there is a clock, an observer at at observer an clock, a is there space of with an event at event an with 26 o te latte the for , locally. clock transport we Then

- , it is possible for an observerat an forpossible is it , a vlct o lgt s mte o co of matter a is light of velocity way B

– will tellustheone will 7) and Grünbaum (1955, 1963: 341 1963: (1955, Grünbaum and 7)

that the – B 10) on theon 10) –

5). Factoring this in would also involve clock clock involve also would in this Factoring 5). of space another clock in all respects all in clock another space of cno b dfnda l uls we unless all at defined be cannot r 75 B one

B . . Since the two clocks are already already are clocks two the Since . We have not defined a common a defined not have We -

way history of the puzzle. ofthe history - way synchronization, letting clock clock letting synchronization, way A

B - speeds are uniform: upon arrival. The slowdown slowdown The arrival. upon way velocity.

from — Notice that, properly speaking, speaking, properly that, Notice B P

B to to B

to the measurement measurement the to -

trip average velocity is is velocity average trip to to determine to ht travels with the the with travels ht A –

(Einstein . x epc of respect 68) for two classic classic two for 68)

B = 1, and, when when = 1,and, . But it But .

A that moving moving that .)

can

- by language language nvention nvention e time time e B

tell tell P B ,

CEU eTD Collection Minguzzi (2002), Minguzzi (2002), Scott see uniform, not 28 the left, sothemomentof reflection than slower travels light around: way other the than (earlier early comparatively occurs th slower much and right the to the on halfway is back reflected dotted line, coinciding with is beam the when moment the that means Gra come back. and reach mirror time amount the of light the same on theone (Rememb back. come use to diagrams beam the for seconds 2 takes it that i.e., simultaneity,” three consider uniform. the that assumption the of consequences technical uniform. is light of ob same the generate to claimed whichareof all well, as generalmodels more There are areconsidering.we that spacetimes 2D of kind the to applies which (1970), Winnie’s A. John is famous proposed been have relativity special of models deviant various so, yearsor hundred last the In 3.2

For a sample of nonstandard nonstandard of sample a For than faster much goes light 1, Scenario In deviant. are 3 and 1 Scenarios takes it that assumption (nondeviant) standard the represents 2 Scenario round average the that agree scenarios three The han at problem the why see to all, of First . 2

Consequences ofdeviance - way velocity.way c , models where the speed of light is not uniform. One of the most the of One uniform. not is light of speed the where models , and and meters as the unit of distance.) But the three scenarios disagree disagree scenarios three the But distance.) of unit the as meters Ben - 28 Iversen (1944), Edwards (1963), (1963), Edwards (1944), Iversen

- Yami (ms). h ga o ti scin s o rsn sm bsc non basic some present to is section this of goal The

models t

possibilities about possibilities = 1onthe

servable predictions as models where the speed speed the where models as predictions servable

of special relativity where the the where relativity special of c

occurs lateroccurs than to the left, so that the moment of reflection of moment the that so left, the to 76 P t

= 1) on 1) = clock.observer’s d is called “the conventionality of of conventionality “the called is d

c the one

to the right and faster than than faster and right the to P Winnie (1970), (1970), Winnie one ’s clock. In Scenario 3, it is it 3, Scenario In clock. ’s t -

trip velocity of light is light of velocity trip - = 1on way - way speed of light: speedway of one

speed of light is not is light of speed - P way ’s clock. Abraham (1986), (1986), Abraham speed of light is is light of speed phically, this this phically, er that the the that er

to c c - ,

CEU eTD Collection responses, let’s consider t downplay or undermine to seek that responses various spurred therefore has models deviant of existence The directions. all in speed same the with moves light whether elegance) theoretical r these about light also is amatterconvention. of one the then convention, of matter a is this if conversely, And, di when convention of matter one the If simultaneity.” limits, certain (Within point. faraway a at mirror the hits beam light the when moment at observer The of one which is convention it consequently, And, obtains. scenarios three these the of one convention which of mattera is itThen deviant. uniform or be to lightof speeds one the assume we whether convention of matter a is it argued, explicitly simultaneous with at observer the of history reflect at observer the of history local the with simultaneous is reflection) of moment (the t in moment which disagreeon also they

axis) is simultaneous is axis) thelight with beam’s hitting them If Scenario 1 obtains, then the moment when the light beam hits the mirror mirror the hits beam light the when moment the then obtains, 1 Scenario If to unintuitive profoundly seems It (distant) of conventionality “the called is hand at problem the why is This and implied Einstein as that, suppose Now one the on only not disagree therefore, scenarios, three The ion is simultaneous with simultaneous is ion of course. arelimits considerably But diagram asthe these shows, wide.) elations and that it is a matter of definition (or convenience, or or convenience, (or definition of matter a is it that and elations P

can simply stipulate which moment in her local history is the the is history local her in moment which stipulate simply can E 3

(which is,againevent). adifferent a further E - P a vlct o lgt s ovninl te i i a is it then conventional, is light of velocity way 1 ). If Scenario 3 obtains, the moment of reflection is reflection of moment the obtains, 3 Scenario If ). – E 3 stant events occur according to my local time. time. local my to according occur events stant

E is simultaneous with the moment of reflection. reflection. of moment the with simultaneous is

2 important consequenceimportant of deviance.

(which is a different point different a is (which

heir P 77 ). If Scenario 2 obtains, the moment of of moment the obtains, 2 Scenario If ). think P importance

’s local history (i.e. which point on the the on point which history(i.e.local ’s

that there is no fact of the matter matter the of fact no is there that

as Reichenbach and Grünbaum and Reichenbach as E Bfr loig no these into looking Before . 1

(which is a point a is (which

irror: -

event in the local local the in event - - way velocity of of velocity way way velocities, velocities, way mte of matter a

- event in event - way way

CEU eTD Collection light cone of the origin will look like this: look light cone origin will ofthe round theoreticallyrequired the to addingup velocities i example, For shape. one the casethe origin)instandard when be lookslike this causallyconnected to collection the is, (that origin the of cone light The cones. light - one the If one the in Variations way isuniform: light velocity of - way velocities are not uniform, the light cone will take a different a take will cone light the uniform, not are velocities way f light goes faster to the left than to the right (with the two the (with right the to than left the to faster goes light f ( Scenario 3: L Scenario - Deviantcase:one different way velocities of light will also affect the shape of of shape the affect also will light of velocities way Uniformone and at~2.5 and ight ight -

wayvelocity2) (Scenario travels~0.625 at 78

to the left) tothe - wayvelocities c

tothe right - trip speed of speed trip

of points that can can that points of c ), then the then ), CEU eTD Collection in order to appreciate the complexities involved. in order complexities toappreciate the example an at look to useful is it But philosopher’s. a than job physicist’s a of indicates,survey one about suggestions of history venerable a is There 3.3 are with physical compatible realism. dia of spectrum the exhaust they see, can I as far as but, of conventionality the to responses realist physical possible surveys section This 3.3 of simultan I’ll puzzle. the of explanation satisfying and claim, I’ll which, solution, non that argue them I’ll and conventionality of puzzle the to responses realist also conventional. cone this: ofthe like origin looks light the and striking, more even is case standard the from difference the where distant - aoh Ben Hanoch physical various at Ilook In3.3, parts. two into falls chapter this of rest The cone light of shape the that entails simultaneity of conventionality The .

way speed of light. As Max Jammer’s (2006: Ch.12) extremely detailed detailed extremely Ch.12) (2006: Jammer’s Max As light. of speed way 1

are

Physical realist solutions Experimental tests Experimental

tagtowr ad uncontroversial. and straightforward simultaneity. Not all of the theories below entail physical realism, realism, physical entail below theories the of all Not simultaneity. e ity is motivate can theview that spacetime -

ai m. cntutd dvat mode deviant a constructed (ms.) Yami an assessment of all these (apparently, failed) attempts is more is attempts failed) (apparently,these all of assessment an

(In

fact, (light travels (light 0.5 at and with infinite and they aren’ is straightforward and uncontroversial, giving uncontroversial, and straightforward is Ben - Yami’sscenariodeviant

speed toward speed observer) the c t necessarily cone t necessarily

awayfromobserver the 79

conclude

idealist the outline I’ll 3.4, In

experiments s

that the conventionality conventionality the that deal.

any longer.) lectical strategies that strategies lectical o seil relativity special of l

to measure the the measure to

a neat neat a e s

of of is

CEU eTD Collection moves the perfectly twodiscs is But that principle rigid. isfalsethat in rod the that presupposes 1849) in Fizeau L. H. by performed experiment all directions, then theone in screen the on mark a leaves light If directions. various in contraption whole at traveling light that such all Next, screen. the on mark speed what calculate can we then slits, two the of position relative the and rotate, they which at speed the discs, second the speed a at rotate to set is rod the a if Otherwise, leave side. other and the on contraption screen the the on mark through are get the will entered light beam so light discs, when two the was between first the where position the at is slit second the moment the second the reach will slit first the through getting beam light the then speed, right the with rotating is rod the If disc. first the at side one f is beam light A control. can we that speed a with rotated be can following the using uniform) contraption: found been has (and measured been) has (and Two disks, each with a slender slit on it, is fixed to the ends of a rod that rod a of ends the to fixed is it, on slit slender a with each disks, Two an on variation a is (which test this explains, 224) (2006: Jammer Max As 121 (2012: Maudlin Tim so hss ae u mr o ls dsusd esos f uh coupling such of versions disguised less proposals. (Jammer 2006: 222) or more but are numerous thesis, fact, In rods. conventionality the disprove to such proposed procedures, synchronization by mechanisms clock coupling by simp solved be course, of could, synchronization distant of problem the existed, rods rigid perfectly If distance. a at actions of generator a as serve could rod the that so well, as moving start instantaneously w rod a such of end one if that implies shape, geometrical of preservation as rigidity, perfect of deniesphysics, alsoexistence perfectly theof rigiddefinition rods. The Newtonian in admitted were which distance, a at actions of denial The

that disc, no mark will appear. If we know the distance between the two the between distance the know we If appear. will mark no disc,

the beam entering through the first slit will fail to hit the slit on on slit the hit to fail will slit first the through entering beam - way veloci c –

4) asserts that the one the that asserts4) we have to do is (i) set the rod to rotate at a speed a at rotate to rod the set (i) is do to have we will get through the second slit and (ii) turn the the turn (ii) and slit second the through get will ould be set into motion, the other end would end other the motion, into set be ould a

light ty of light is ty light of is 80

beam must have in order to leave a a leave to order in have must c -

wayveloci in alldirections. ty of light can be be can light tyof

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See Janis (2010: section 5) about other mathematical proofs. Feinberg proofs. mathematical other about 5) section (2010: Janis See For earlier versions of this argument, see Wingard (1972) and Petkov (1 Petkov and (1972) Wingard see argument, this of versions earlier For Second, the requirement that spacetime be symmetrical in a way that that way a in symmetrical be spacetime that requirement the Second, This argument hasthe followingshape: proof. Malament’s with problems two are There - . ai 20: 466 (2006: Yami 4 4 Eternalism (E3) (E2) (E1) 159 and Minkowski), 2009: (Petkov velocity. to as property a such according possess not does therefore reality absolute the (in spacetime one theof real magnitudetheincorrect aboutquestion an askedwe because forever natu a finds one the determining in circle vicious The dimensions. […] spatial three and temporal one with world dimensional four a is reality if convention of matter a be not will exists what But choiceand our on depend would three a not is reality one the of measurement the [about circle vicious the whichmessage, [T]he of simultaneity, i.e. because two observers can disagree on temporal relations. temporal on candisagree observers two because i.e. ofsimultaneity, - 1/2 particles (rejoinder: Gunn and Vetharaniam 1995). Vetharaniam Gunnand (rejoinder: particles 1/2

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all byall its

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. Suppose we want to ground the existence of English English of existence the ground to want we Suppose .

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elf better off with this move this with off better at . can assume that all physical objects are parts of the body of some some of body the of parts are objects physical all that assume can 38 true . t

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the following - It follows It period from thest period from

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In principle, the idealist could also claim that (8) is a conditional about the potential potential the about conditional a is (8) that claim also could idealist the principle, In The second objection to objection second The To secure (9), for the truthmakers idealist theist might suggest thefollowing: explicitly an in defined be also can idealism 1, Chapter in discussed As all, in All (IT)generates thefollowing alternative to(8):

travellers, or, if one locates the truthmakers in the past, one has to postulate a time time a postulate to has one past, the in truthmakers the locates one if or, travellers, on similar to similar Divine Intentions: (9) (IT) Ideality that ly one ly

projected

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(theistic version): me travelers (with some daleks thrown in, perhaps). This theory is subject to to subject is theory This perhaps). in, thrown daleks some (with travelers me

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prehistory. But this is unlikely if unlikely is this But prehistory. ithout anyithout leads Omphalism. to commitments, further

df e up one day somewhere in Africa is compatible with with compatible is Africa in somewhere day one up e

 .

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ies God iscausing orisdisposed tocause definition of idealism, I conclude that the that conclude I idealism, of definition

contemporary truthmakers for the potential experiences of of experiences potential the for truthmakers contemporary . And in that case, b case, that in And .

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visited various places various visited 40

106

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ackward Something must make it true now true it make must Something the the a Brontosaura during the Jurassic. Jurassic. the during p rojection rojection laws from

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Or, ra Or, It might be objected that that objected be might It of upshot The The theist idealist can reply the following: Wh following: the reply can idealist theist The intentional our of content the that is complaint the reading, different a On the reading, one On ways. two in understood be can complaint This

such intuitions aresuch intuitions reliable. , breathing the same air we breathe, and leaving their bones behind when when behind bones their leaving and breathe, we air same the breathing ,

ther, the truthmaker is the state of God’s having a certain conception of our prehistory. prehistory. our of conception certain a having God’s of state the is truthmaker the ther, that our intentional states about dinosaurs refer to the contents of the the of contents the to refer dinosaurs about states intentional our that iie Inten Divine Divine Intentions Divine - ld as a seemingly autonomous system. Facts about prehistory are are prehistory about Facts system. autonomous seemingly a as ld ietd netoa sae wud ae a i w hd co had we if had have would states intentional directed t o wud ae asd s f e a be aon i the in around been had we if us caused have would God at emand a physical realist ontology. Idealists lack such intuitions such lack Idealists ontology. realist physical a emand iie Intentions Divine – 22). Let methis Let 22). ignore - directed thoughts are very similar to the contents of the the of contents the to similar very are thoughts directed tions

cannot secure such facts about prehistory; it can can it prehistory; about facts such secure cannot

does not misconstrue the content of our dinosaur our of content the misconstrue not does

iie Inten Divine

is that God has a certain story about the the about story certain a has God that is 107 ealist lacks ealist entail

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en we think about dinosaurs, dinosaurs, about think we en cannot secure the kind of of kind the secure cannot

intuitions and she denies she and intuitions

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- CEU eTD Collection can generate this result. this cangenerate and is probable, will (12) that (10) entail only then indeterministic, lawsare 43 hand.at theobjection invalidate to unlikely are that they numerous so be must traces those But away). far fire a of existence the ground to enough be may distance 42 plenitude principle that independently isn’t motivated. Consequently, have we that think to reason obse no have we example, For detail. phenomenal once. least at observed been nowhave exist that objects physical all if world physicaldeterminate generatea (12). entail laws, the to according picture coherent Projection Forward etc. there table a observing 412, room visited recently have may subjects other t a buying of experience the had have entail they may subjects some laws, example, For experience. potential the about truths determinate with together because, facts, physical later ground can issue. Then Projection suggestfollowing: the re the supply can idealist the how see to the under (12) like truths following true: is proposition ri 412 room in nobodyis that Suppose dialectic. different subtly but similar a to rise gives objects contemporary unobserved of existence The 4.

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rved all planets, grounding later facts about the structure of the cosmos. cosmos. the of structure the about facts later grounding planets, all rved nobody is in roomnobody 412now,(11) isin reduces to Projection:Forward (12) (11) (10)

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is true ection

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standard

is n is

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is still open toadecisiveis still objection.

t s niey ht u ps i s rc in rich so is past our that unlikely is It definition of ideality. As before, it isn’t easy easy isn’t it before, As ideality. of definition

must be complemented with an implausible an with complemented be must 108 able, taking it to 412, assembling it there, it assembling 412, to it taking able, quisite truthmakers. The idealist might idealist The truthmakers. quisite

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God is the truthmaker forGod isthe truthmaker truths (14) (13) s . We do not think about the divine conception of the world. world. the of conception divine the about think not do We . . When we think about tables, we think about hunks of matter located matter of hunks about think we tables, about think we When .

this this in room412. God isnowdisposedtocausea table subjects observe to to observe412. inroom a table now disposedtocauseGod isnowcausing oris subjects u world our version of the version of e our phenomenal states, and the inferences we make on the the on make we inferences the and states, phenomenal our e two readings of this complaint.two readings ofthis - directed tho - - ietd huhs I ol voae te ph the violates only It thoughts. directed ietd thoughts directed

complaint isineffective. ughts. about unobserved physicalabout objects. unobserved 109 seen

l objects are similar to the contents of contents the to similar are objects l

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examined t examined 1 n .., smlr ilci ufle about unfolded dialectic similar a 4.1.2, In Note that Bonjour’s complaint only has bite if the physical realist is not not is realist physical the if bite has only complaint Bonjour’s that Note idealism, but of instead phenomenalism to refersBonjour text, original Inthe

ht hs theory this that .3

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Summary of 4.1

e claimed that the only non only the that claimed argued that theistic idealism can idealism theistic that argued o hscl els itiin ad one and intuitions realist physical to

which , - xperience by extrapolating from extrapolating by xperience explained byexplained existence ofreal the hitc om o iels hv a ad ie on s. n 4.1.1, In so. doing time hard a have idealism of forms theistic , according to the to according , yLaurenceBonJour: ruths about prehistory. I argued that argued I prehistory. about ruths

the content

cnttts th constitutes , […]

— is

hr i n etra raiy ht osris ht id of kind what constrains that reality external no is there require rdctd n h ie that idea the on predicated ? What is the the is What ?

of our past - chrnl miti ta te rtmkr for truthmaker the that maintain coherently n [idealist] theist idealist can come up with, cannot cope with with cope cannot with, up come can idealist theist s

an implausibly rich stock of past experiences. experiences. past of stock rich implausibly an eitne f mtra ojc o o the of or object material a of existence e The physical realist must establish that laws of of laws that establish must realist physical The

and I defended this this defended I and

its its - theistic idealist solution in sight is sight in solution idealist theistic , are the orderly sense orderly the are , explanation - sm without anysm without furt directed t 110 counterpart

(BonJour 2011: 2.1) supply a truthmaker for truths about truths for truthmaker a supply

past past physical objects. houghts.

o te ut complicated quite the for urnl unobserved currently

Backward Projection Backward experience that in 4.1.1. in [idealist] one charged

thesis two complaints, one that that one complaints, two

can h -

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hs suggestion This

Suppose, for Suppose, Macki L. J. To clear the ground, let me note, and push aside, two easy idealist rejoinders rejoinders idealist easy two aside, push and note, me let ground, the clear To reason have we then true, are (16) and (15) both If butcomplementaryTo sumup,wedistinct have two reason physical idealism, prefer to asfar to realism are as concerned. laws ec t or am ad u cletv rcleto o ps lvs se eto XXI of XXXII section (see lives past of recollection collective our and karma our to rence

contention

specific specific because of of because (16) (15) numerable infinity of specific rules. rules. specific of infinity numerable unexplained if there is no real matter at the placewhereat realmatter no there if is unexplained . An easy theist idealist rejoinder would be that be would rejoinder idealist theist easy An . h actua the teleology. The strongly idealistic Yogācāra school of Buddhism explained laws by by laws explained Buddhism of school Yogācāra idealistic strongly The teleology. law] holdlaw] for all objects. need we what intrinsicNewtonian same the of instances[specific withthat coincidence remarkable just lawfully some is but has forces contingently imposed object reacts which material feature each quantitative that postulation The G

m Laws of be naturecan by explained presencereal the of matter. Laws offacts natureare brute idealism true. if is laws laws , where , just happen to co to happen just Vimśatikā advocated by Ramsey and Lewi and Ramsey by advocated

certainl l e makes the following suggestion about the advantages of of advantages the about suggestion following the makes e that He did did He that God’s providential providential God’s illustration as tie n pia blne ewe smlct ad strength and simplicity between balance optimal an strike laws s lal peet n h hsoy f daim ee th even idealism, of history the in present clearly is Gm as a result result a as G

. It follows that Newton’s that follows It . in Tola and Dragonetti 2004: 113 Dragonetti 2004: and Tola in

ymerits discussion. is a gravitational constant. No matter the magnitude of magnitude the matter No constant.gravitationala is the aid and and aid

because “simplicity of the ways [of nature] is in balance with the withthe balance in nature]is ways[of the of “simplicity because story htNwo’ law Newton’s that , f gravitation of

A - ( theistic theistic Discourse on Metaphysics on Discourse - ugss that suggests

comfort of mankind. Leibniz, prefiguring prefiguring Leibniz, mankind. of comfort . (Mackie 1973: 151) obtain. Or so the physical realist realist physical the so Or obtain.

(mass: Berkeley ( Berkeley in mind in mind

concerns om o idealism of forms 111 1 kg) and ball ball and kg) 1 when He New Theory of Vision Vision of Theory New s

( el u that us tells see h hptei that hypothesis the . And

p. aws of nature are not brute facts facts brute not are nature of aws law law o xli te otherwise the explain to

of gravitation of 11 – can can

instituted 4, 147 4, this remarkable coincidence coincidence remarkable this 3

§5, Leibniz 1989: 38 1989: Leibniz §5, sums a drv laws derive can below), B xli why explain

to prefer physical realism realism physical prefer to

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rtl aho is lawhood Brutal have a similar story to tell about the metaphysics of laws. To make matters matters make To laws. of metaphysics the about tell to story similar a have n epne te hscl els cn ge that, agree can realist physical the response, In Needless to say, I don’t expect the following dialectic to settle all problems all settle to dialectic following the expect don’t I say, to Needless plac preliminariesin these With easy Another

. In. . Note a Note the nature of nature the c instances of Newton’s third law together. But the idealist does not not idealist But together. does law third the Newton’s c of instances focus on focus

o ta mtvts h ter o bue as Il asm ta lw of laws that assume I’ll laws. brute of theory the motivates that ion 4.2.1 hidden In each case, I will argue that the idealist can adapt the theory in in theory the adapt can idealist the that argue will I case, each In lso lso induction) as ultimately unexplained. ultimately as induction)

– explanation of laws. It does not tell us what it is it what us tell not does It laws. of explanation help 4.2.3, I examine three different metaphysical accounts of laws. In Iexamine threedifferentlaws. 4.2.3, metaphysicalof accounts Foster

, Go (16)

so Humeanism about laws Humeanism rejoinder to rejoinder endorsed

d’s providential plans. d’s providential

the idealist the it cannot constitute a constitute cannot straightforwardit toidealism. objection , the claim , the ’s laws

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argument special theory of lawhood or some other nontrivial nontrivial other some or lawhood of theory special

arl (94, ag (09, n Muln (2007) Maudlin and (2009), Lange (1994), Carroll

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, arguably,, e, let me outline my dialectic against against dialectic my outline me let e, physical realism

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CEU eTD Collection 51 in the present context.) unimportant is issue This tropes. as or universals as either powers of think as of conceived powers with properties objects, intrinsic of powers the in grounded as laws of think ripen.the observed Generally,can regularity unripeplumstend one to that in resulting normal, are circumstances when activated naturally is power This ripen to power the power, intrinsic an having as plums unripe of conceive can one example, previous the to return to Or, powers. such of consequences the be then power electricitychargedwill attractingpositivelylaws of The of particles. electrons of conceive can one example, For laws that laws. under theory falling objects the the by possessed powers laws, intrinsic the from of derive theory unHumean second a consider Finally, 4.2 phenomenal second the that assume to have not does unlike because, states indistinguishable phenomenally from objection the rebut can idealist theist The plums. ripe of conception God’s later of conception God’s distinct. are conceptions two these an plums of conception God’s st phenomenal same the though even Therefore, later. that say experiences can waxlike us cause will God that entail that conceptions or idealist intentions theist the Specifically, plums. unripe suppose to that reason no has idealist theist the because blocked is objection The conception structural or intention certain a has God because obtains of virtue in at looking is Alice when happens what universals, story idealist theist the On plum. unripe an at looking universal, same the characterizedby is Suppose thatAlice at islooking determinate conception of time the those not

See e.g. Bird (2007) and Ellis (2001). Ellis (2001). and (2007) Bird e.g. See The objection from phenomenally indistinguishable states has no bite either. either. bite no has states indistinguishable phenomenally from objection The all observed be not need change lawlike to subject are that objects Physical a laws of theory the on take idealist theist The

open . S 3 visual experience of ripe plums, because because plums, ripe of experience visual objections G

Laws from powers Laws s h sm itnin o intention same the is

n h tes iels story idealist theist the in to q the the ern a eti relation certain a bearing ualities in turn. objections objections

that entail, but are not reducible to, conditionals. (One can can (One conditionals. to, reducible not are but entail, that

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m 125

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is transported to transported is 126 pancy before we begin the experiment, experiment, the begin we before pancy P velocity n , and we synchronize them locally. Then locally.them synchronize we and , A

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(1998). (2000) (1994) (1986) 21) O te niiuto o pwr. n . amdr (ed.), Marmodoro A. In powers. of individuation the On (2010): (2010): Journal of Physics s Paradox p Metaphysics of Powers Laws Nature of 383 s American Journal Physics of 159 Australian Journal of Physics Philosophy (eds.), Press. relativity patiotemporal imultaneity

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Introduction 1

1.5 Summary of Chapter 1 Chapter of 1.5 Summary grounding of 1.4 Theproblem 1.3 Complications adefinition 1.2 Introducing idealism defining about 1.1 Problems 1.3.9 P.S. Idealism 1.3.9 P.S. abstracta about 1.3.8 The fine 1.3.7 Summary 1.3.6 Alienobservers 1.3.5 Thoroughly matter psychofunctional 1.3.4 Psychophysical laws 1.3.3 Essentiality oforigin objects1.3.2 Worldbound 1.3.1 Self 1.2.6 Trivi 1.2.5 Toothin? 1.2.4 The story sofar withphysical1.2.3 Clash realism 1.2.2 Historical comparisons 1.2.1 The basic criterion The concept of - observation ally false?

Long contents Long - tuned definition of ideality tuned definition

of 1.3.1

idealism

–

1.3.6

137

10 8 5 4 1 2 2 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 17 1 14 14 13 12 10

8 5 6

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3 2

solutions realist 3.3 Physical simultaneity of 3.2 Theconventionality the ant 3.1 Albert 2. 2. 2. 2.1 3.3.6 Summary of3.3 3.3.5 Gauge freedom 3.3.4 Eternalism 3.3.3 Mathematical arguments 3.3.2 Appeals simplicity to tests 3.3.1 Experimental 3.2.2 Consequencesdeviance of 3.2.1 Measuring theone 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2.1. 2.1. 2.1.2 2.1.1 Real Real spacetime asexcess structure Three contemporary arguments The idealitymatter of and space: 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2

.3 Summary of2. .2 The against abductiveargument .1 The modalargument against spatial realism . . . . T Summary of Chapter 2 Chapter of Summary worlds gappy and Scrambled t From 4 3 2 1 4 3

he Powe spatial real properties dispositions? Summary of2.1 Unknown categorical bases Th Arephysical fundamental Objections Finite nomicsequences Infinite e Infinite C e problem of position spatiotemporal he Power Regress he Power r Regress pistemic pistemic - trees

ism

and 2.2 and descent

- way light velocity of 138

to idealism

5 5 5 4 4 4 4 41 3 36 3 30 29 90 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 70 70 6 6 6 6 5 1 1 0 8 7 5 3 8 2 6 5 4 2 9 9 6 4 4 1 0 6

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References Appendix: Conclusion 4

4.3 Summary of Chapter 4 Chapter of 4.3 Summary 4.2 Laws 4.1 Truthmakers solution 3.4 Theidealist Clock transportClock synchrony 4.2.4 Summary of4.2 Laws4.2.3 from powers Laws4.2.2 as second 4.2.1 Humean laws 4.1.3 Summary of4.1 4.1.2 Trut prehistory 4.1.1 Truthmakers for 3.4.4 The theidealist superiority solution of 3.4.3 Two objections 3.4.2 Elaborating thesolution 3.4.1 Sk Truthmakers and laws in idealism

etch of thesolution

hmakers the for present

order universalsorder

139

1 11 1 1 1 1 10 10 10 10 100 9 9 9 9 1 12 1 1 2 1 1 10 10 7 2 2 2 30 2 2 2 9 7 3 8 4 3 2 6 3 2

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