Secure Boot, Chain of Trust and Data Protection
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Project Log 2 2 LPC2148 USB Bootloader
Project Log 2 Project Title: USB MicroSD Card Reader EEE G512 Embedded System Design October 2018 Submitted by: Submitted to: Joy Parikh j 2016A3PS0136P Dr. Devesh Samaiya Rutwik Narendra Jain j 2015A3PS0726P 2 LPC2148 USB Bootloader The LPC2148 USB bootloader performs three steps: 1. The bootloader checks to see if a USB cable has been plugged in. If the LPC2148 detects the presence of a USB cable then it initiates a USB Mass Storage system. This will cause the target board to appear on any computer platform as a removable flash drive. The user can then seamlessly transfer files to the flash drive. In the background, the LPC2148 moves the user's files onto the SD card using the FAT16 file system. 2. The next thing the bootloader does is look for a firmware file (a file named FW.SFE). This file contains the desired operating firmware (in a binary file format) for the LPC2148 mi- croprocessor. If the bootloader finds this file on the FAT16 system then it programs the contents of this file to the flash memory of the LPC2148. In this way, the bootloader acts as a \programmer" for the LPC2148; and we can upgrade the firmware on the LPC2148 simply by loading a new file onto the micro SD card. 3. After performing the first two checks, the bootloader calls the main firmware. The main code should not even know that the bootloader was used and will run normally. 2.1 Details The USB device class used is MSCD (Mass Storage Class Device). The MSCD presents easy integration with PC's operating systems. -
PV204: Disk Encryption Lab
PV204: Disk encryption lab May 12, 2016, Milan Broz <[email protected]> Introduction Encryption can provide confidentiality and authenticity of user data. It can be implemented on several different layes, including application, file system or storage device. Application encryption examples are PGP or ZIP compression with password. Encryption of files (inside filesystem or through independent layer like Linux eCryptfs) provides more generic solution. Yet some parts (like filesystem metadata) are still unencrypted. However this solution provides encrypted data with private key per user. (Every user can have own directory encrypted by own key.) Encryption of the low-level storage (disk) is called Full Disk Encryption (FDE). It is completely transparent to the user (no need to choose what to encrypt – the whole disk is encrypted). The encrypted disk behaves as the same as a disk without encryption. The major disadvantage is that everyone who knows the password can read the whole disk. Often we combine FDE with another encryption layer. The primary use of FDE is to provide data confidentiality in power-down mode (stolen laptop does not leak user data). Once the disk is unlocked, the main encryption key remains in system, usually directly in system RAM. Exercise II will show how easy is to get this key from memory image of system. Another disadvantage of FDE is that it usually cannot guarantee integrity of data. Encryption is fully transparent and length-preserving, the ciphertext and plaintext device are of the same size. There is no space to store any integrity information. This allows attacks by direct modification of ciphertext. -
Mcafee Foundstone Fsl Update
2016-AUG-18 FSL version 7.5.841 MCAFEE FOUNDSTONE FSL UPDATE To better protect your environment McAfee has created this FSL check update for the Foundstone Product Suite. The following is a detailed summary of the new and updated checks included with this release. NEW CHECKS 20369 - Splunk Enterprise Multiple Vulnerabilities (SP-CAAAPQM) Category: General Vulnerability Assessment -> NonIntrusive -> Web Server Risk Level: High CVE: CVE-2013-0211, CVE-2015-2304, CVE-2016-1541, CVE-2016-2105, CVE-2016-2106, CVE-2016-2107, CVE-2016-2108, CVE- 2016-2109, CVE-2016-2176 Description Multiple vulnerabilities are present in some versions of Splunk Enterprise. Observation Splunk Enterprise is an operational intelligence solution Multiple vulnerabilities are present in some versions of Splunk Enterprise. The flaws lie in multiple components. Successful exploitation by a remote attacker could lead to the information disclosure of sensitive information, cause denial of service or execute arbitrary code. 20428 - (HT206899) Apple iCloud Multiple Vulnerabilities Prior To 5.2.1 Category: Windows Host Assessment -> Miscellaneous (CATEGORY REQUIRES CREDENTIALS) Risk Level: High CVE: CVE-2016-1684, CVE-2016-1836, CVE-2016-4447, CVE-2016-4448, CVE-2016-4449, CVE-2016-4483, CVE-2016-4607, CVE- 2016-4608, CVE-2016-4609, CVE-2016-4610, CVE-2016-4612, CVE-2016-4614, CVE-2016-4615, CVE-2016-4616, CVE-2016-4619 Description Multiple vulnerabilities are present in some versions of Apple iCloud. Observation Apple iCloud is a manager for the Apple's could based storage service. Multiple vulnerabilities are present in some versions of Apple iCloud. The flaws lie in several components. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to retrieve sensitive data, cause a denial of service condition or have other unspecified impact on the target system. -
UG103.6: Bootloader Fundamentals
UG103.6: Bootloader Fundamentals This document introduces bootloading for Silicon Labs network- ing devices. It describes the concepts of standalone and applica- KEY POINTS tion bootloaders and discusses their relative strengths and weak- • Introduces the Gecko Bootloader. nesses. In addition, it looks at design and implementation details • Summarizes the key features the for each method. Finally, it describes the bootloader file format. bootloaders support and the design decisions associated with selecting a Silicon Labs’ Fundamentals series covers topics that project managers, application de- bootloader. signers, and developers should understand before beginning to work on an embedded • Describes bootloader file formats. networking solution using Silicon Labs chips, networking stacks such as EmberZNet PRO or Silicon Labs Bluetooth®, and associated development tools. The documents can be used as a starting place for anyone needing an introduction to developing wire- less networking applications, or who is new to the Silicon Labs development environ- ment. silabs.com | Building a more connected world. Rev. 1.7 UG103.6: Bootloader Fundamentals Introduction 1. Introduction The bootloader is a program stored in reserved flash memory that can initialize a device, update firmware images, and possibly perform some integrity checks. Firmware image update occurs on demand, either by serial communication or over the air. Production-level pro- gramming is typically done during the product manufacturing process yet it is desirable to be able to reprogram the system after produc- tion is complete. More importantly, it is valuable to be able to update the device's firmware with new features and bug fixes after deploy- ment. The firmware image update capability makes that possible. -
USART Protocol Used in the STM32 Bootloader
AN3155 Application note USART protocol used in the STM32 bootloader Introduction This application note describes the USART protocol used in the STM32 microcontroller bootloader, providing details on each supported command. This document applies to STM32 products embedding any bootloader version, as specified in application note AN2606 STM32 system memory boot mode, available on www.st.com. These products are listed in Table 1, and are referred to as STM32 throughout the document. For more information about the USART hardware resources and requirements for your device bootloader, refer to the already mentioned AN2606. Table 1. Applicable products Type Product series STM32F0 Series STM32F1 Series STM32F2 Series STM32F3 Series STM32F4 Series STM32F7 Series STM32G0 Series Microcontrollers STM32G4 Series STM32H7 Series STM32L0 Series STM32L1 Series STM32L4 Series STM32L5 Series STM32WB Series STM32WL Series June 2021 AN3155 Rev 14 1/48 www.st.com 1 Contents AN3155 Contents 1 USART bootloader code sequence . 5 2 Choosing the USARTx baud rate . 6 2.1 Minimum baud rate . 6 2.2 Maximum baud rate . 6 3 Bootloader command set . 7 3.1 Get command . 8 3.2 Get Version & Read Protection Status command . 10 3.3 Get ID command . 12 3.4 Read Memory command . 13 3.5 Go command . 16 3.6 Write Memory command . 18 3.7 Erase Memory command . 21 3.8 Extended Erase Memory command . 24 3.9 Write Protect command . 27 3.10 Write Unprotect command . 30 3.11 Readout Protect command . 31 3.12 Readout Unprotect command . 33 3.13 Get Checksum command . 35 3.14 Special command . 39 3.15 Extended Special command . -
ANDROID PRIVACY THROUGH ENCRYPTION by DANIEL
ANDROID PRIVACY THROUGH ENCRYPTION by DANIEL DEFREEZ A THESIS Presented to the Department of Computer Science in partial fullfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Mathematics and Computer Science Ashland, Oregon May 2012 ii APPROVAL PAGE “Android Privacy Through Encryption,” a thesis prepared by Daniel DeFreez in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science in Mathematics and Computer Science. This project has been approved and accepted by: Dr. Lynn Ackler, Chair of the Examining Committee Date Pete Nordquist, Committee Member Date Hart Wilson, Committee Member Date Daniel DeFreez c 2012 iii ABSTRACT OF THESIS ANDROID PRIVACY THROUGH ENCRYPTION By Daniel DeFreez This thesis explores the field of Android forensics in relation to a person’s right to privacy. As the field of mobile forensics becomes increasingly sophisticated, it is clear that bypassing common privacy measures, such as disk encryption, will become routine. A new keying method for eCryptfs is proposed that could significantly mitigate memory attacks against encrypted file systems. It is shown how eCryptfs could be modified to implement this keying method on an Android device. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Lynn Ackler for introducing me to the vast world of computer security and forensics, cultivating a healthy paranoia, and for being a truly excellent teacher. Dr. Dan Harvey, Pete Nordquist, and Hart Wilson provided helpful feedback during the preparation of this thesis, for which I thank them. I am deeply indebted to my friends and colleagues Brandon Kester, Andrew Krug, Adam Mashinchi, Jeff McJunkin, and Stephen Perkins, for their enthusiastic interest in the forensics and security fields, insightful comments, love of free software, and encouraging words. -
USB Mass Storage Device (MSD) Bootloader
Freescale Semiconductor Document Number: AN4379 Application Note Rev. 0, October 2011 Freescale USB Mass Storage Device Bootloader by: Derek Snell Freescale Contents 1 Introduction 1 Introduction................................................................1 Freescale offers a broad selection of microcontrollers that 2 Functional description...............................................2 feature universal serial bus (USB) access. A product with a 3 Using the bootloader.................................................9 USB port allows very easy field updates of the firmware. This application note describes a mass storage device (MSD) USB 4 Porting USB MSD device bootloader to bootloader that has been written to work with several other platforms.........................................................13 Freescale USB families. A device with this bootloader is 5 Developing new applications..................................15 connected to a host computer, and the bootloader enumerates as a new drive. The new firmware is copied onto this drive, 6 Conclusion...............................................................20 and the device reprograms itself. Freescale does offer other bootloaders. For example, application note AN3561, "USB Bootloader for the MC9S08JM60," describes a USB bootloader that was written for the Flexis JM family. The MSD bootloader described in this application note is offered as another option, and has these advantages: • It does not require a driver to be installed on the host. • It does not require an application to run on the host. • Any user can use it with a little training. The only action required is to copy a file onto a drive. • It can be used with many different host operating systems since it requires no host software or driver This bootloader was specifically written for several families of Freescale microcontrollers that share similar USB peripherals. These families include, but are not limited to, the following: • Flexis JM family MCF51JM © 2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. -
Bootloader and Startup Feature Overview and Configuratoin Guide
TechnicalTTechnicalechnical GuideGuidGuidee Bootloader and Startup Feature Overview and Configuration Guide The AlliedWare Plus™ Bootloader Every switch has a startup process. The end result of the startup is that the unit is running a specific version of the operating system software, with the features configured according to a specific startup configuration file. The startup process goes through two main phases: First, the switch boots up off a dedicated bootloader software image, which initializes core functionality of the unit. Then, the bootloader launches the main operating software image, and passes control over to this operating system. The bootloader is the executable code responsible for setting up the system and loading the operating system software. The bootloader is the software that runs the unit when it first powers up, performing basic initialization and executing the product software release. As part of the startup process of the switch, the bootloader allows you various options before running the product operating system software. C613-22004-00 x REV A alliedtelesis.com Products and software version that apply to this guide This guide applies to all AlliedWare Plus products, running version 5.4.4 or later. However, not all features in this guide are supported on all products. To see whether a product supports a particular feature or command, see the following documents: The product’s Datasheet The AlliedWare Plus Datasheet The product’s Command Reference These documents are available from the above links on our website at alliedtelesis.com. Feature support may change in later versions. For the latest information, see the above documents. Content The AlliedWare Plus™ Bootloader .................................................................................... -
Flash Bootloader
Flash Bootloader Product Information Flash Bootloader Table of Contents 1 Flash Bootloader Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Overview of Advantages .......................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Application Areas ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Flash Bootloader System Architecture ................................................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Functions.................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 1.5 Configuration ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6 1.6 Scope of Delivery....................................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.7 Availability ................................................................................................................................................................................ -
Ubuntu Server Guide Basic Installation Preparing to Install
Ubuntu Server Guide Welcome to the Ubuntu Server Guide! This site includes information on using Ubuntu Server for the latest LTS release, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (Focal Fossa). For an offline version as well as versions for previous releases see below. Improving the Documentation If you find any errors or have suggestions for improvements to pages, please use the link at thebottomof each topic titled: “Help improve this document in the forum.” This link will take you to the Server Discourse forum for the specific page you are viewing. There you can share your comments or let us know aboutbugs with any page. PDFs and Previous Releases Below are links to the previous Ubuntu Server release server guides as well as an offline copy of the current version of this site: Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (Focal Fossa): PDF Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (Bionic Beaver): Web and PDF Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus): Web and PDF Support There are a couple of different ways that the Ubuntu Server edition is supported: commercial support and community support. The main commercial support (and development funding) is available from Canonical, Ltd. They supply reasonably- priced support contracts on a per desktop or per-server basis. For more information see the Ubuntu Advantage page. Community support is also provided by dedicated individuals and companies that wish to make Ubuntu the best distribution possible. Support is provided through multiple mailing lists, IRC channels, forums, blogs, wikis, etc. The large amount of information available can be overwhelming, but a good search engine query can usually provide an answer to your questions. -
Z/VSE Security Overview and Update Ingo Franzki
z/VSE Live Virtual Class 2013 z/VSE Security Overview and Update Ingo Franzki http://www.ibm.com/zVSE http://twitter.com/IBMzVSE ©2013 IBM Corporation z/VSE Live Virtual Class 2013 Trademarks The following are trademarks of the International Business Machines Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both. Not all common law marks used by IBM are listed on this page. Failure of a mark to appear does not mean that IBM does not use the mark nor does it mean that the product is not actively marketed or is not significant within its relevant market. Those trademarks followed by ®are registered trademarks of IBM in the United States; all others are trademarks or common law marks of IBM in the United States. For a complete list of IBM Trademarks, see www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml: *, AS/400®, e business(logo)®, DBE, ESCO, eServer, FICON, IBM®, IBM (logo)®,iSeries®, MVS, OS/390®, pSeries®, RS/6000®, S/30, VM/ESA®, VSE/ESA, WebSphere®, xSeries®, z/OS®, zSeries®, z/VM®, System i, System i5, System p, System p5, System x, System z, System z9®, BladeCenter® The following are trademarks or registered trademarks of other companies. Adobe, the Adobe logo, PostScript, and the PostScript logo are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated in the United States, and/or other countries. Cell Broadband Engine is a trademark of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. in the United States, other countries, or both and is used under license therefrom. Java and all Java-based trademarks are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. -
MCU Bootloader V2.5.0 Reference Manual
MCU Bootloader v2.5.0 Reference Manual Document Number: MCUBOOTRM Rev. 1, 05/2018 MCU Bootloader v2.5.0 Reference Manual, Rev. 1, 05/2018 2 NXP Semiconductors Contents Section number Title Page Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................................9 1.2 Terminology....................................................................................................................................................................9 1.3 Block diagram.................................................................................................................................................................10 1.4 Features supported.......................................................................................................................................................... 10 1.5 Components supported....................................................................................................................................................11 Chapter 2 Functional description 2.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................................13 2.2 Memory map...................................................................................................................................................................13 2.3 The MCU Bootloader Configuration Area (BCA)........................................................................................................