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The Role of Parliaments in the Resilience of Non- Democratic Regimes: a Case Study of the Iranian Parliament (Majles)

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The Role of Parliaments in the Resilience of Non- Democratic Regimes: a Case Study of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) The University of Hull The Role of Parliaments in the Resilience of Non- Democratic Regimes: A Case Study of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) Being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Hull By Pedram Saeid MA (Politics) Imam Sadegh University (Tehran) June 2010 Abstract The new prominence of authoritarianism ushered in a series of new studies that seek to explain the reasons behind the longevity of these regimes. An integral part of these studies is that the institutional arrangements contributed to the survival of autocrats and the maintenance of authoritarian regimes. In particular, they recently began considering the dark side of nominally democratic institutions under authoritarian regimes such as legislatures arguing that they predominantly serve as the means of regime survival. Given these facts, the overall goal of this study is to produce an understanding of the role of parliaments in the survival of authoritarian regimes by focusing on their institutional capacity and related performance. Using the Iranian parliament, Majles, as a case study, the major point of contention in this study are the conditions under which Majles contributed to the resilience of post-revolutionary Iranian regimes. Inspired by the legislative institutionalization approach, three main characteristics are identified to explain the authoritarian legislatures: subordination as opposed to autonomy, exclusiveness as opposed to representativeness and secrecy as opposed to deliberativeness. With respect to these criteria, it is demonstrated that Majles is marked as a subordinated institution, caught between powerful and influential formal and informal institutions. Majles also fell short of meeting the representativeness and deliberativeness identified as decisive criteria in distinguishing authoritarian from democratic legislatures. With respect to the Majles performance, it is shown that Majles has been at the centre of the regime co-optation strategies since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution to encapsulate the loyal oppositions and to exclude those were regarded as outsiders. Majles also acted as the main agent of manipulation of political institutions through its law making function and by this contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic. i Acknowledgments I feel very fortunate to have been surrounded by so many people that have made my experience as a PhD student a rich one that I will remember fondly. Very special thanks and deep appreciation go to my supervisor, Prof. Philip Norton [Lord Norton of Louth], who provided guidance during the entire process. Philip was the model supervisor for me. He helped me explore a research topic that interested me. He provided continued guidance and direction throughout the research and completion of my doctoral programme. I would like to thank Dr. Leston-Bandeira for giving invaluable advice in the early development of this research. Her insights shaped this topic into a theoretically and methodologically rigorous study. I would like also to extend my special thanks to Dr. Petr Kopecky for his worthwhile contribution to the literature and for taking the time to examine and review the first draft of thesis. My former colleagues in Majles Research Centre, it has been a great pleasure to share my happiness and sorrow with you. Also, special thanks to Hassan Taee for his unconditional support, friendship and encouragement. This dissertation would not have been possible without the love and support given by my wife, Massi. She has contributed to the successful completion of this dissertation more than she will ever know. My mother played a special role in this accomplishment by supporting my never-ending studies. This dissertation is dedicated to my father who passed way when I was seven. ii LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ACC, Association of Combatant Clergy BII, the Builders of Islamic Iran CE, the Expediency Council CG, the Council of the Guardians CPA, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association ICA, the International Council on Archives IIPF, the Islamic Iran Participation Front IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union IRGC, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRIB, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting IRP, Islamic Republican Party MRC, Majles Research Centre PR, Proportional System RoP, Rules of Procedure s SCC, the Society of Combatant Clerics SE, Southern European SMD, Single-Member Districts SOC, the Servants of Construction WPO, World Public Opinion iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract................................................................................................................................. i Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ ii LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... iii LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. ix LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... ix INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 CHAPTER 1: PARLIAMENTS AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES CHANGE AND STABILITY ............................................................................... 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 8 Authoritarian regimes and authocratization ................................................................. 11 Authoritarian regimes definition ......................................................................................... 11 Democratization and authocratization .............................................................................. 15 Institutional arrangements and regime change and durability ....................................... 18 The presence and absence of parliaments in authoritarian regimes .................... 22 Parliaments as ornamental institutions ......................................................................... 27 Parliaments as the agent of democratization ............................................................. 30 The role of parliaments in the authoritarian breakdown and liberalization .................. 30 The role of parliaments in the democracy consolidation .................................................32 Parliaments as the means of authoritarian survival ................................................. 36 Symbolic system maintenance ..........................................................................................36 Active system maintenance ............................................................................................... 38 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 44 CHAPTER 2: THE CAPACITY AND INSTITUTION OF AUTHORITARIAN LEGISLATURES ............................................................. 45 iv Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 45 Theoretical foundation of legislative institutionalization .........................................47 Autonomy vs. subordination ............................................................................................. 51 Professionalization .............................................................................................................. 51 External environment and informal institutions ...............................................................56 Representation vs. exclusion ........................................................................................... 59 Representation as reflection of population diversity ....................................................... 60 Representation as responsiveness to the will of constituents .........................................62 Deliberativeness vs. Secrecy ........................................................................................... 64 Summary and conclusion .................................................................................................. 68 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ....................................................................... 69 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 69 The aim and objectives of the study .............................................................................. 70 The significance of the research ..................................................................................... 70 Research questions ............................................................................................................ 70 Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................... 73 Research strategy................................................................................................................ 76 Data collection methods .................................................................................................... 78 Archival and documented-based methods ........................................................................ 78 Elite interview .....................................................................................................................
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