prives oftools, but could lead to serious problems. ’s room for manoeuvre is not that is much more dangerous. Thelack of a conscious and thought-out policy towards not only de- “drift” mindless current the Continuing nowadays. justify to difficult is turn pro-Russian a of fear The “falling intoMoscow’s embrace”. the statusquo.Everyattemptatamore constructive approach toPolish-Russianrelations is seenas Polish authoritiescollaborating withtheKremlin againsttheWest.maintaining Thisfurthersupports (PiS) party’s anti-EU and anti-German rhetoric, the opposition has come to fear a pro-Russian turn; the is strongersian agent” thanits desire to criticise the government. With the governing Law and Justice than expose itselftoaccusationsoftreason ormorbidRussophobia. Thisfearofbeinglabelleda“Rus- Not even theoppositionchallengesthiswayofthinkingnow. It prefers toavoid thesubjectrather sibility foritspowerlessness, ineptitudeandirresponsibility inrelations withMoscow. defensiveness iscomfortable,asitfrees Warsaw from havingtoquestionitsactionsandtake respon- idea thatRussiaisbadandfullytoblameforthecurrent situation. This view basedonsuperiority and The belief in a lack of alternatives fits Warsaw’s usual way of thinking about relations with Moscow; the room formanoeuvre whenitcomestoMoscow. that there is consensus onRussia in Poland andthat little can bechanged,as Warsaw hasvery little politicians and experts. Forvarious reasons, they prefer theillusion that there isnothingtodiscuss, strategy towards its main opponentcausessolittle controversy. Yet this situation clearly suits most all: policy towards Russia. Amid international shocks andcrises, it might seem surprising that Poland’s At a time when Polish politicians disagree about almost everything, one subject is hardly discussed at Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz Radicalism withoutpolicy Poland’s approach toRussia

1 Stefan Batory Foundation of extracting Poland from Russia’s sphere of influence and joining the West. the joining and influence of sphere Russia’s from Poland extracting of Warsaw’sAfter the fall ofcommunism, policytowards Moscow focused onthestrategic aim can becalledthefundamental“dispute over theborders oftheWest”. changed in recent years. but alsofromneighbour, noticingwhathasalreadyin Polish-Russianrelations. happened has Much This lack of discussion prevents Poland from formulating an effective policy towards its largest Geopolitical retreat ference inPolishpubliclife. constructive energy,and nuancedeffortsspanning security, relations with Ukraine andRussianinter- involves which partner, difficult a towards policy effective an conducting than easier is animosity ing Cultivat authorities. the by effort major a require will Russia towardsstrategy effective an but small, dokad-siegaja-granice-zachodu-rosyjsko-polskie-konflikty, accessed:15November 2018. Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 18.03.2010,https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/raport-osw/2010-03-18/ 1 visible inthefollowing aspectsofPolishpolicy: is This Russia. from itself defend to defined, currently is it as community, civilizational European the or promotingor systemicmodel.It believes acivilizational that Polanddoesnotneedtobelong areRussia primarilyviewed in termsofPoland’ssovereignty territorial rather thandefending Today,government thePolish isnolongerinterested inexpanding theWest.with Relations still considers)itssphere ofinfluence. , inthecountriesofeasternEuropeto “buildaWestsought thatRussiaconsideredthe East” in (and were border not limitedtoshiftingthisgeopoliticalcommunity’s to the river Bug. Rather, it • • • K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,“Dokądsięgają granice Zachodu?Rosyjsko-polskie konflikty strategiczne 1990–2010”, Poland hasalmostfullywithdrawn from theEU’s policytransitionof supporting in its eastern cially in Ukraine. This has disappeared from the list of priorities in bilateral relations with Kiev. has becomemuchlessinterested inpromoting European standards inEasternEurope, espe- The changeinPoland’s policytowardsis also key. itseasternneighbours Inrecent years,Warsaw cans. Itissimplyready topay fortheAmericansecurityumbrella. Ameri - the to talking when benefits business cites Poland world, Western the of alliance the for was submitted without consulting others in NATO. Ratherthanshared values or responsibility ernment considersabilateral AmericanbaseinPolanditsutmostsecurity priority. Thisproposal lateral relations withNATO allies and loyalty between EUpartners.Thisisvisible in how thegov- on developing bilateral relations with the , bypassing (or even undermining) multi- concentrates government the where defence, in reflected is policy foreign of reorientation This “dispute over theborders oftheWest”. considers otherdivisions– those withintheWestern world– more dangerous thanthe strongly tohalttheexpansionmodel. ThismeansthatPoland oftheEasterncivilizational that Poland isnot a conclusion frontline state that must hold ontoitsWestern identity Poland on the peripheries of European integration. on systemic issues and allowed it to escalate. This conflict involves a conscious decision to locate Brussels with conflict a initiated government the how in seen be can This Europe”. “real the of and values.Thisgoesbeyondstitutions criticism,withthemproposingtheir own, better vision The Polishauthoritieshave distanced themselves from the “Western model” in terms of in- Poland hascarried out a geopolitical retreat, withdrawing from what This strategy can onlybe dictated by the 1 Yet its ambitions -

2 Stefan Batory Foundation West, is the right path to ensure stability”. influence of the USSR, whereas the process of joining the EU and NATO,the and common values with the under were we era, communist the “During said: Czaputowicz Jacek Affairs Foreign of 2018, Minister November 1 on Minsk Visiting West. the of representative exemplary an as itself presenting At thelevel of verbaldiplomacy, thePiS government still thenarrativeupholds of the“previous era”, their supportinitsdisputewithBrusselsover theruleoflaw. unity on Russia.It cannot criticise the pro-Russian policy of countrieslike Hungaryeither, as it needs for call to mandate the lacks Warsaw Brussels, with odds At region. the in policy eastern EU’s the of Front in France, are unambiguously pro-Russian. As a result, Poland is losing its position as the leader siders “related” to itself, like the governments in Budapest, Rome and Vienna, along with the National forcescannot gainpartnersamong ideologically akin toitself. Political forces inEurope thatPiScon- Europeanphasis ondefending values and democracy (from Russia,too). On theotherhand,Poland a tough anti-Russianstance,suchastheNetherlandsorSweden.Thesecountriesplacestrong em- with theKremlin. Ontheonehand,Polandisnolongeratrustworthypartnerforcountrieswith Neglecting the“dispute over theborders oftheWest”hasisolatedPolishgovernment inrelations way”. Westernby worldsupported the“good” civilizational model, inoppositiontoaworldbuilt“theRussian relations with Moscow. Thegovernment inWarsaw lacksthelegitimacy to present itself as partofthe The consequencesoftheseprocesses are far-reaching. Above all, Poland haslost a clearidentity in nia-rosji,880429.html, accessed: 15November 2018. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/czaputowicz-w-minsku-fort-trump-reakcja-na-agresywne-dziala- 2 ing models. questions andseekinganswersthatgobeyondRussia. Itistimetostartaskinguncomfortable exist situation. This requires leavingthecomfortzoneofbeliefinalack ofalternatives in policy towards ideology and settle its dispute with Brussels. For now, Poland must face the consequences of this new a the geopolitical Abandoning “dispute over the borders oftheWest”, Poland haswithdrawn from with Russia. relations to comes it when in itself found has Warsaw that vacuum political the camouflages just it grand policy towards Russia. Rebuilding its position will be very difficult; it wouldhave to rethinkits • “Czaputowicz wMińsku:FortTrump toreakcja naagresywne działaniaRosji”,TVN24.pl,1November 2018, Poland’s easternterritoriesortheVolhynia massacre. imperial power in terms of awareness is less important than identity issues linked to the loss of vasion of 17 would criminalisesomestatementsby Russianpoliticiansandhistorians(suchasdenyingthein- law ontheInstitute of National Remembrance completely overlooked thatthenew provisions become the central issue in the Polish memory policy. Thediscussionontheamendmentto the has Ukraine with conflict recently,historical until the importance secondary Of ago. years few a to thatwithUkraine. Polish-Russianproblems remain butgenerate farfewer emotionsnow than Poland has shifted the weight of the dispute over historical memory from the conflict with Russia but rather strengthening Ukraine’s militaryresilience againstRussianaggression. exclusively Thepriority is no longer abroadly on “hard understood Europeanization security”. too. neighbourhood, In the Russian context, PiS’s policy towards Ukraine concentrates almost September 1939). This shows that, for the ruling camp, “separation” from the former 2 This narrative does not change the essence of Polish policy; -

3 Stefan Batory Foundation European securitywere almostcompletelydisregarded. of future the and Europe, Central in those especially NATOallies, of interests The Asia. South-East in from theIntermediate-RangeNuclearForces (INF) Treaty, whichaimedtountietheAmericans’ hands considers significant for its adversaries but peripheral enough to avoid confrontation onalarger scale. This suggests that aggression in Poland’s region would be aprovocation avoid seeking to change the confrontation to enough but peripheral adversaries its for significant considers it that places strikes Moscow rules. fixed certain follows force military of use Russia’s area. atlantic broadly, the Trans more - and, Europe in remain will – “anti-American”fixation elites’ “overthrow”and democratic of fear the influence, of sphere its protecting to linked – interests security main Russia’s in NATO countries. presence its reduce radically to US the prompts Sea China South the say, in, conflict serious a which will probably grow at the expense ofengagementin Europe. Expertsare considering scenariosin Today the main threat to the US is China. The significance of Beijing and East Asia in US security policy would playout. conflict Russian-American the which on chessboard the instrument, the be only would Poland Empire). Russian the into incorporation its (e.g. Poland about conflict a be not would it ritory ter- its on conflict armed an were there if that understand must from Warsaw’s actions. Poland Poland wouldresult more from theUS and Russia’s globalpriorities and their bilateral relations than be established in light of long-term trends, not just in Polish-Russian relations. Aggression against it in therather distant future asit is highly unlikely right now. Poland’s hard security priorities should gagement, andsecondly, thelong-termglobalcontext. IfwetalkaboutRussianaggression wemean en- American of parameters the of importance the firstly, issues: key two overlooks approach This and indisputable. presence ofAmericansoldiersinPolandwill automatically increase its security is treated asobvious debate. Talking aboutit is treated asyielding to the Russiannarrative. In contrast, claiming that the completely is Polish former overlooked the The in it. deterring provoking of of benefit the and Russia risk the factors: two between balancing is Warsaw Poland, in presence American strong a for Calling tation ofthesituationmightseeminadequatebutitcannotbeignored. the Americanmilitary presenceadversary and by itsborderthreat. asafundamental Russia’s interpre- against Central Europe, including Poland. At the same time, the Kremlin views Washington as its main The US is rightly considered the only country with the military potential to oppose Russian aggression Does co-operation withtheUnitedStatesincrease Poland’s security? Uncomfortable questions V081NFNYN0gxRUxkSUs2WHgrRXJDZFk1WDZuTks3V3MifQ%3D%3D, accessed:15November 2018. 2SUZoZGg4VlA1MnVNSlBQKys3WjB6dkl4ZzdQVkJyNUljb0pjU3NPQVVSdUhWU0RZMVlZWmVIN3pzSGpYTTJG- kt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVRKa1pXRmpORGhpWlRKbCIsInQiOiJ6S3RVZW9pejVMcU9sXC9YR09kR0E0MDJiSVNQUGlnVFY 1987 INFTreaty Means”,CarnegieMoscow Center,24October2018,https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77568?m wgRiopaCqQw, accessed:15November 2018.D. Trenin, “BacktoPershings:WhattheU.S. Withdrawal from the al_withdrawal_moscow_treaty_violation?fbclid=IwAR3oYdSbGdLZZ3HZ4x5yqTrvf9QPXipwn9bN8WMMgsXeMxpF European CouncilonForeign Relations,24October2018,https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_inf_unilater- 4 est.org/feature/can-germans-think-strategically-32642, accessed:15November 2018. 3 G. Gressel, “To How INFornottoINF? Unilateral Withdrawal HelpsMoscow GetAwaywithTreaty Violations”, M. Terhalle, “CanGermans ThinkStrategically?”, The NationalInterest, 4October2018,https://nationalinter 3 These priorities were confirmed by ’s recent decision to withdraw to decision recent Trump’s Donald by confirmed were priorities These 4

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4 Stefan Batory Foundation tion against Russian aggression in every case. To conclude: ahard security co-operation with the US does not necessarily improve Poland’s protec- does notservetostrengthen NATO allies;instead,itbypasses them. reference tocommonvaluesandistransactional innature. Itincreasingly hasananti-EUedgeand without built is US the Tusk.with Moreover,co-operationDonald Minister Prime former after named successor (for example, a Democrat) might view it, it is enough to picture PiS’s attitude to any initiative Poland tobenamed“FortTrump” raises questionsaboutits durability. Tohow understand aTrump’s dimension andeven thepersonalalliancewithTrump.US basein The callforapotentialpermanent Poland iscurrently building relations withtheUSinoppositedirection,the bilateral emphasising US andits“European vassal”. as presented be could “separated fromit other European countries” and a reaction to the irresponsible military policy of the if costly less be would provocation anti-American an Russia, For 6). page much more strongly linkedmilitarily totheUSeconomically and than Poland(seeinfographics on are countries European Western London. and Paris Berlin, with closely co-operating Poland than US would strengthen Poland’s position in relations with theUS.Polandalonemeansmuchlessto This co-operation shouldbeinscribedinthebroader allied system with European countries,which the Western modelofcivilization. legal guarantees, lasting institutional solutions and weightystrategic objectives, such asdefending security. ForWarsaw, theco-operation should beimmuneto the political climate in theUS, based on ration withtheUSrather thanthemere factitiscontinuedthatcouldprove decisiveforPoland's In this situation, the nature of the American presence inPolandis key. It will be the quality of co-ope­ with thisrelationship’scombined lackofstabilitycredibility,and couldcreate ariskinthelongterm. forthePolishsecuritypolicy.This hasseriousconsequences Itsimageofacountrylinked totheUS, to meananall-outconfrontation. balance of power in Europe. It could target a country linked to the US, but not strongly enough forit 5 its own initiative, Poland gotridofamechanism forstrengthening pro-European attitudes in akey, and increases awareness, showing Kaliningrad’s inhabitants what life in an EU country looks like. On agreed that small border traffic benefits the local economy and is not a threat to security. It educates unanimously institutions Polish introduced, was it after years unspeci- four the citing During reinstated, threats. security be fied not would it that announced government the that, Day Youth After Kraków. World in the and Warsaw in summit NATO the to due suspended was region Kaliningrad the with traffic border small 2016, In direction. opposite the in went Russia towards policy Poland’s dialogue (even atthehighestlevel) resumed. ope­ gression in Ukraine. With time, individual European countries and the US returned to selective co- rightly Warsaw completely. joined thepolicy of internationalostracism meanttosignalthelackofacceptanceforRussianag- almost froze relations Polish-Russian Crimea, of annexation the After Does freezing relations withMoscow servePoland? make Polandanattractive placeforaRussianprovocation. could – out pulls US the if it of left is what or – co-operation this allies, Europeanfrom isolation In recent months,Putinhasmet withtheleadersofFrance, Germany, Austria andItaly, amongothers. ration withMoscow. Sanctionsagainst Russiawereeven maintainedand but political deepened, 5 If it is of tertiary significance for the US and built in

5 Stefan Batory Foundation 6 Stefan Batory Foundation Experts doubt whether the project will be completed by2022, completed be projectwill the whether doubt Experts discussed. rarely is dimension commercial the security; on focus arguments Warsaw’s Norway. from gas deliver would that pipeline Baltic a wants Poland government, previous the by completed ujście placed by a policy of ceasing to buy Russian gas completely. In addition to the LNG terminal in Świno­ the pastthree years,theideaofdiversifyingsuppliesbyGazprom’s ending monopolyhasbeenre- Finally, Poland’s strategy ongassuppliesispartofthefurthercoolingrelations withRussia.Over be overstated. reality and how itsdiplomatic serviceoperates, alongwithcontactsdeveloped whilestudying,cannot competent in a key area. In a country bordering Russia,the value of knowing the language, Russian Russia or decrease Russian intelligence’s influence in Poland, but they will make Polish diplomacy less nouncing that they would bedismissed from the diplomatic corps). Thesedecisions will not harm International Relations (MGiMO) from management posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(andan- contacts withRussiabyPoland alsocutoff dismissinggraduates oftheMoscow StateInstituteof Kaliningrad’s inhabitantstovisittheEUmore oftenthanRussia. also cut off. From the Russian authorities’ perspective, this is a good solution; the Kremlin did not want neighbouring region of Russia. Economic co-operation, which was profitable at the regional level, was ber 2018,http://biznesalert.com/baltic-pipe-gaz-system-implementation/, accessed:15No 2019. “PotentialContractors aHighlyInterested inImplementingthe BalticPipePipeline”, BiznesAlert,12Octo 6 vernment’s policymeansacceptingthatthere willbenomonumentatthecrash site. time. theproblemIn fact,abandoning meanstacit consent. InthecaseofSmolensk, the Polish go­ Russia are currently small.Yet problems thatcannotbesolvedtodaymightsolvable inafew years’ will be built there, went unnoticed. It might be said that the chances ofreaching anagreement with selling of the land around the site to a private owner, making it even more uncertain that a memorial means providing decentconditions for peopletohonourthevictims at thecrash site in Russia.The also it commemoration; symbolic about just not is It expectations. of list Poland’s from disappeared zens. Oneexample is the monument tothevictims of theSmolenskplanecrash, whichhascompletely citi Polish to matter that subjects neglecting for “camouflage” comfortable a become has Hostility risk ofconductinganuancedpolicytowards adifficultpartner. is also a conscious choice of an easier path. It is much easier to halt all co-operation than to take the lic institutions, i.e. thefearthatthey will be incapableofcontrolling relations with Russia.However, it end, butthelossis disproportionately big. Thisapproach results from the perceived weakness ofpub of unwanted influence, cutting off all contact is like treating a leg pain with amputation – the pain will against Russian influence is to cut off all relations. Poland protect to way best the that convinced are Decision-makers collaboration. dangerous with equated increasingly is co-operation Russia, towards policy government’s current the In 2 isthatitbypasses existing transit infrastructure inUkraine andPoland. pression ofinterest. Thisisparticularly surprising givenhow oneofWarsaw’s criticism of Nord Stream ex- Gazprom’s despite contract, new a signed not has side Polish the far, So unclear. also is 2019, in ate favourable conditions. The future of the contract for transit via the Yamal pipeline, whichexpires expires. Ifitisnotready,anyway; itwilljustbetoolatetonegoti- gas PolandwillhavetobuyRussian Final decisionswere originallyexpected tobemadeby theendof2018,butthesedeadlineswere moved to While linkscanindeedbeusedasaninstrument 6 whenPoland’s contract withGazprom vember 2018. - - -

7 Stefan Batory Foundation Emmanuel Macron’s werecampaign leaked. unprecedented decisiontoclose70,000fake accountsoperating inFrance. the made Facebook authorities, the from pressure Under “cyber-soldiers”. 2600 of unit a appointed including one addressed to party officials from across the political spectrum.TheMinistry of Defence campaign, information wide-ranging a was There too. significant, extremely were election the fore mediaoutlets Russia Today andSputnikhadlost their accreditation for Macron’s campaign.Preventive efforts be- and pro-Kremlin aninvestigation launched had office prosecutor’s the hours, few a example. ber SecurityCentre publisheddetailedinformationonconcrete attacks. Cy- National British The them. destroy to seek that those against institutions international and order isters Theresa MayandMarkRutte,whohighlightedtheir determination to defend theinternational preventative actions presented. Theconference wasaccompaniedby a joint statement by Prime Min- World Anti-Doping Agency. The agents responsible for the attacks were identified and information on the and Weapons Chemical of Prohibition the for Organisation the Britain, in outlets media Ukraine, a The results of an investigation into Russia’s hostile actions in cyberspace were presented at corruption, politicalprovocation andcyber-aggression. the EUandNATO, notjustmilitarily, butabove allintermsofhybridactivitydisinformation, spanning Supporters ofWarsaw’s “total” hostility towards Moscow oftencite Russia’s aggressive policy towards Does PolandwanttocounterRussianinterference? 7 politics. This isjustoneexample ofhow Western democracies counterRussia’sin their policyofinterfering demonstrates itsweaknesses. and opponent the humiliates it hand, other the on act; to ability and strength countries’ attacked the an effectivewayofcounteringaggression.special serviceswasdeemed it shows Ontheonehand, scale (as Dutch officials put it). Informing the public about Russia’s actions and defensive steps by the The decision to reveal the special services’ operations followed Russianattacksonanunprecedented cure report, most of the cyberattacks in Poland between October 2016 and March 2017 2016 March (65,493 and October between Poland in cyberattacks the of most report, cure F-Se an to According too. aggression”, “soft Russian of atarget is Poland that signs many are There campaign andtheelectionitself runby theDigitalSociety Institute. lin didnottake anyundesirable steps,asreliably measured by thesystemmonitoringRussianactivity duringthe ence, whichwasattendedby key ministers,military commandersandthespecialservices.Inthiscase,Krem - scheduled aspecialsessionofthe Federal SecurityCouncil dedicatedexclusively tocounteringRussianinterfer 11 sian-interference-during-the-presidential-election/, accessed:15November 2018. EurActiv, 17July2018,https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/how-france-successfully-countered-rus- 10 15 November 2018. 21 June2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/successfully-countering-russian-electoral-interference, accessed: 9 ber 2018. Relations, August2017,https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR228_-_CONTROLLING_CHAOS.pdf, accessed: 15Novem- 8 gence-service-exposed, accessed:15November 2018. Centre, 4October2018,https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian-military-intelli Dutch-British conference in the Hague on 4 October 2018. Hackers’ targets included businesses in businesses included targets Hackers’ 2018. October 4 on Hague the in conference Dutch-British Reckless CampaignofCyberAttacks byRussianMilitaryIntelligenceServiceExposed H. A.Conley,, CenterforStrategic &InternationalStudies, SuccessfullyCounteringRussianElectoralInterference M. Galeotti, The Germangovernment alsotookpreventive actionbefore the2017elections.ChancellorAngelaMerkel N. Bulckaert,“How France SuccessfullyCountered RussianInterference DuringthePresidential Election”, 8 A report by the American Center for Strategic and International Studies provides another provides Studies International and Strategic for Center American the by report A 9 Two days before the first round of the French presidential election in 2017, emails from emails 2017, in election presidential French the of round first the before days Two , European CouncilonForeign Chaos:HowRussiaManagesitsPoliticalWarinEurope Controlling 10 There were fake materials among the real ones. Within 7 , NationalCyberSecurity 11

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8 Stefan Batory Foundation been disinformationattemptsby Russia. toral process – even though the analysis after the local elections in late 2018 indicated that there had there is no informationaboutpreventive measures to protect Poland againstinterference intheelec- Russian interference that would show the state’s strength and made citizens feel protected. Likewise, against struggle effective an of signs them consider to hard is it investigations, British or Dutch the Berlin Brussels, to invited within afewLondon and “blacklisted”. Bothsituationsare weeksofbeing highlycontroversial. be Unlike to her for ones) services’ Polish the (unlike enough convincing were state’s detriment. Sherespondedby accusingthePolishgovernment ofpolitical persecution. Herarguments Polish the to activity pro-Russian unspecified of her accusing zone), Schengen the entering thorities added Kozłowska’s name to the Schengen Information System (thereby preventing her from Piskorski spenttwoyearsunderarrest withoutanindictmentandisstill awaiting trial. The Polishau- Foundation. Dialogue Open the of head and citizen a Ukrainian Kozlovska, Lyudmyla and sympathies, par pro-Kremlin his (Change) hidden never had who Zmiana Piskorski, Mateusz ty pro-Russian the of leader individuals: two of prosecution the about out found only opinion Public aggression. Russian counter to effects own their about silent are authorities Polish The Russia. to attributed actions aggressive enumerating involves usually This politicians. by journalists, rather than reports by public institutions. public by reports than rather journalists, and experts independent NGOs, from comes subject the on information the of Most interference. day on average) came from Russia. from came average) on day 13 taki-na-polske-f-secure/j26hq6m, accessed:15November 2018. 28 March 2018,https://businessinsider.com.pl/technologie/nowe-technologie/z-jakich-krajow-pochodza-cybera- 12 business. Macierewicz’sAntoni and Defence politics circle’sNational Russian with non-transparentconnections picions that the “Russian trace” has appeared in Polish politics. One example are former Minister of Most worryingly, the Polish state remains completely deaf to scandals in which there are serious sus- by them. Although this was raised manytimes by the media, received aprisonsentence),owed Russianentities tens ofmillionsdollarsbutwasnever pursued (who Falenta Marek recordings, the for responsible person main The 2015. in Poland in government of several topPolishpoliticians were recorded illegally. Theleakedof tapescontributedtothechange Ukraine by funded the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Theproject involved support forUkrainians tion. One example of Poles being “seduced” by Russian propaganda relates to the support effortsin Russian propaganda.On thecontrary, theKremlin’s manipulationdoesnotalwaysinvolve self-promo- People in Poland are convincedthat the dominant distrustinthe Kremlin makes society immune to The Polishauthorities’lackofresistance toRussianinformationmanipulationisequallyworrying. with silenceandthespecialservicesprosecutor’s officewithpassivity. tyka/kraj/1762482,1,afera-tasmowa-kto-stal-za-kelnerami.read, accessed:15November 2018. 15 14 glowne-cele-rosyjskiej-propagandy-w-polsce-na-2017-rok, accessed:15November 2018. , CentrumAnalizPropagandy iDezinformacji, 24Marchrok 2017,https://capd.pl/pl/prognozy/164-prognoza- wPolscena2017 propagandy lumnawPolsce/, accessed:15November głównecelerosyjskiej 2018,oraz: Prognoza: nierze-w-walce-informacyjnej/, accessed:15November 2018,seealsohttps://www.facebook.com/RosyjskaVKo jnej’”, OKO.press, 5June2018,https://oko.press/siewcy-strachu-10-dni-z-rosyjska-propaganda-w-polsce-to-sa-zol - 16 A. Mierzyńska,“Siewcy strachu. 10dnizrosyjską propagandą wPolsce.‘To sążołnierzewwalceinformacy K. Majdan,SkądpochodzącyberatakinaPolskę? GłówniezRosji,Niemieci... Polski T. Piątek, Tweet by AnnaMierzyńska:https://twitter.com/Anna_Mierzynska/status/1060875922323243008. G. Rzeczkowski, “Rosyjskiślad nataśmach”, Polityka 15 Yet the most important case is the wiretapping scandal of 2014, in which the conversations Macierewicz ijegotajemnice Macierewicz 12 , Warszawa 2017. Little is said in Poland about this and other kinds of Russian Russian of kinds other and this about Poland in said is Little 14 , 4Setepmber2018,https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpoli- 13 Interference is also mentioned in statements 16 thePolish authorities have responded , „BusinessInsiderPolska”, - - -

9 Stefan Batory Foundation eignty notbeingtreated seriouslyand notprotected. used to the hypocrisy: loud assurances that Poland is defending its sovereignty are mixed with sover- that a potential aggressor will The Polish society go unpunished. and politicians are gradually getting matters is the worstpossibleattitude. It sends aclear message to Russia that Poland is helpless and carry out a credible investigation into Russian interference but keeping silent about highly suspicious this problem.years hascompounded Today, thePolishgovernment lackstheinstitutional capacity to strong pointofPolishgovernment institutions..However, thepoliticisation of institutions in recent actin that institutions public a non-partisan mannerandare perceived as suchby the general public. Thishasnever been the efficient requires interference Russian against state the Protecting unconsciously, itsrepresentatives becomepartofRussianmanipulationandcorruption. or consciously class; political the undermines always almost aggression Countering country. each in weakness ofthePolish intelligence services. Kremlin’s actionsoftenblendinwiththepolitical dispute The PolishstatelacksinstrumentstohandleRussianinterference. Thishelplessnessgoesbeyond the the MinistryofForeign Affairswithdrew from theproject. Ukraine thaninPoland.ThePolishstaterespondedexactly how Russiawantedit to: withinafew days, outlet insinuatedthatthePolishgovernment cared more aboutthedevelopment ofagriculture in ditions for theirfruit.To kindleanti-Ukrainian sentiment among Polish farmers, theRussianmedia of tensions between the Polish government andraspberry producers demandingbetter sales con- growing fruit,includingraspberries. blka-maliny-Rosja/, accessed:15 November 2018. https://pl.sputniknews.com/opinie/201807068328287-Ukraina-rolnictwo-wsparcie-polski-rzad-sadownicy-ja 17 cynical co-operation withPutin. mean – not should indeed, – not need which towardsRussia, (non)policy current its from away move Russia is too important for Polandto remain lost in illusions and helpless isolation. Warsaw must Poland,inconflictwithBerlin,Paris,Brusselsand Kiev,bic” isfullysatisfying. aims, Russiadoesnotneedtomake friendly gestures towards Poland.Onthecontrary, a“Russopho- inRussia’san “instrument” anti-European, anti-democratic andanti-Ukrainian strategy. To achieve its the Kremlin’s radar. Polandisnolongerapartner,butit remains animportanttarget. It has become Russia has ceased to consider Poland a significant player. This does not mean that it is completely off dispute the over theruleoflawhasalsoreduced Warsaw’s to ability to shapeEUpolicy towards Moscow. As aresult, due EU the in position government’s PiS the of weakening The influence. of sphere Poland hasceasedto threaten what the Kremlin considers fundamental:the inviolability of Russia’s doing soandisnotdreaming ofapro-Russian turninWarsaw. some political will from Russia.Meanwhile,there are manysignsthatMoscow isnotinterested in some ofthemwouldneedtoberesolvedhowever, tojustifythiskindofturn.Thiswould, require least At countries. two the between conflicts numerous are there and Russia towards attitude ative current Polish government. Yet that kind of shift seems unlikely; most of the Polish society has a by turn pro-Russian a about concern their express often politicians opposition and Commentators A turn,butnottowards Russia L. Sigan,“Czyukraińscy rolnicy sąrealną konkurencją dlapolskich producentów?”, SputnikPolska,6July2018, 17 Theinitiative was publicisedbythe culmination Sputnikduring - neg- 10 Stefan Batory Foundation there wasjustoneBureau, inMoscow. reaus. There hadbeenthree DepartmentsinRussia; in Kaliningrad, StPetersburg andMoscow. Afterthereform, 18 • • • • Trade andInvestmentPromotion Departmentswere abolishedin2017andreplaced withForeign Trade Bu- in 2017). in It is advisable that the number oftrade representations be increased (reduced from three to one Russia as its neigbour. Given its size and proximity, Poland can benefit from the Russian market. having from benefit cannot it that mean not does regime Putin’s Vladimir of criticism Poland’s from investinginthisspecialisation. deprives thediplomaticserviceofexpertise onRussiaanddiscourages youngergenerations this as MGiMO, at studied who diplomats Polish stigmatising stop and Kaliningrad with traffic looking afterexisting formsofco-operation. Warsaw shouldalsotry to resume small border easy to destroy buttake alongtime to rebuild. It is worthresuming lower-level contacts and in whichit will want to (or have to) talk to Russia. Institutional and interpersonalcontacts are pragmatic relations with the Kremlin. Poland must also remember that there might be situations in thesetoughtimes,are particularly sensitive to unnecessaryescalation and intentonbuilding strengthensRussia to achieved.talk Poland’sto able Being credibility Westernin that, countries It isshort-sightedtobelieve thatinteractions are notworththewhilebecausenothingcanbe Poland needstomaintainatleastaminimumofinstrumentscommunicationwithRussia. Russianeffortstoseparategap inmutualtrust,whichsupports Ukraine from PolandandEurope. huge a create Kiev with disputes three-year almost Warsaw’s flank. NATO’seastern on security visited Kiev in over two years? This lack of visits undermines Poland’s credibility when it comes to supporting ifit is so at odds with it that neither the Polish prime minister nor the president have towards Russia.How canWarsaw convincetheItalians or theSpaniards thatUkraine isworth tant. Itiswrong tothinkthatbadrelations withKievPoland’s donotundermine securitypolicy Normalising relations withUkraine, especially a return tohigh-level visits, is incredibly impor- Affairs inresponse totheUSpullingoutofINF. ation ofanew disarmamentstrategy likeby theoneannounced theGermanMinisterofForeign contribute to discussions about peacebuilding. It should actively participate in the conceptualis- vassal-like relations with Washington. Polandshouldnot only talk about armaments,butalso European partners,Warsaw not only discourages importantallies but also condemns itself to its ignoring By immediately. sides pick to needs Poland that mean not does US the and Europe between Divisions allies. European with relations good with its supporting while values of nity incorporating this co-operation into multilateral NATO institutions andthetransatlantic commu- and long-termcredibility of Washington’s engagementiskey. Today, this is only possible by The claimthat a biggerpresence meansgreater security is not necessarily true. Thedurability sonal relationship withTrumpa quantitativefocusontheUSmilitary andpresence inPoland. Above all, Poland shouldendits single-minded policy of seekinghard security, reduced to a per- Finally, thePolishgovernment mustaddress thequestionofRussianinterference seriously. from Russiasuchathreat. protect its energy security, especially since thegovernment doesnotconsidercoal or oil imports to completely Russia from deliveries gas halt to need not may Poland Świnoujście. in terminal the riskofRussiausinggastoblackmailPolandismuch smallernow, inpartduetotheLNG switching to gas from Norway (including building new infrastructure) could be huge. Meanwhile, –  (proposed onmultipleoccasionsbyexperts). commentatorsand Itscompositionshouldbe solution best the be to seems committee investigation Sejm a scandal, wiretapping the For 18 The decision to stop importing Russian gas should be rationally assessed; the cost of cost the rationallyassessed; be should gas Russian importing stop to decision The 11 Stefan Batory Foundation 19 minister offoreign affairsandthen,in2014–2016,asPoland’s ambassadortoRussia. directordeputy was Centrethe of Warsaw.in Studies Eastern for deputy as 2012–2014, served In she she 1999–2012, In policy. Eastern and European Poland’s on focuses she scientist, political and ogist Pełczynska-Nałecz Katarzyna A Poland shoutinghostileslogansmakes almostalltheKremlin’s wishescometrue. on thecontrary, inits current form,it suits it.Moscow doesnotneedapro-Russian turninWarsaw. Russia; hurts barely hostility our frank: be us Let approach. possible worst the is – hostility of cade a behind interference Russian notice to failing – Hypocrisy aggression. Russian real counteract to needs Poland conflicts, armed hypothetical in sabre” a “swing than Rather things. other among fairs, strategy builtintoEUandNATO policiesonsecurity, Ukraine, gassuppliesandselectedbilateral af- threats. Rather thannoisy declarations of moral indignation, it needs amore constructive and realistic place areal Russiapolicythatwouldpromote Poland’s interests andbeanadequateresponse to Poland is not treating its biggest neighbourandmain opponent seriously. Hostility and isolation re- *** https://www.cer.eu/insights/protecting-european-networks-what-can-nato-do, accessed:15November 2018. S. Besch, –  –  –  ly tohelpmemberstatesprotect themselvesagainstcyberattacks. this kind, as well as support from the EU and NATO. Both organisations are working intensive process. Polandshoulddraw ontheexperience ofcountriesthatalready havemechanismsof Special arrangements should be put in place to protect critical infrastructure and the electoral state structures tointerference. strategy, as awareness of these mechanisms increases the resistance of publicopinion and but give in toit themselves. The populationshouldbeinformedabouttheexistence of aconcrete manipulation, about public the alert to fail only not officials which in situation a avoid which manipulation, information would provide aclearprocedure forrespondingto provocations from Russia. Polandmust countering for strategy a prepare to needs also Poland the affair. in entangled most the are which PiS, or (PO) Platform Civic parties, biggest two the of either as politically balanced aspossible.Forexample, itcouldbechaired by someonenotlinked to of commonEuropean protection mechanismsby thePolishstate,shouldalsobeavoided. image any favours. Situations like the Lyudmyla Kozlovska case, involving the reckless abuse credibility in international co-operation. The conflict over the rule of law does not do Poland’s its strengthening is interference Russian against Poland protecting of part crucial a Finally, Protecting European Networks: WhatcanNATOdo?,Centre forEuropean Reform,31October2018, European Protecting – director of the Batory Foundation’s forumIdei programme. A sociol- programme.A Foundation’sforumIdei Batory the of director – 19 fa- - 12 Stefan Batory Foundation www.batory.org.pl [email protected] fax (48-22)5360220 tel. (48-22)5360200 00-215 Warsaw Sapieżyńska 10a Stefan BatoryFoundation

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13 Stefan Batory Foundation