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Home , 2020 in Morocco, Laayoune, Rabat, Sahrawi people, Sand War, Western Sahara

IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2021 IAI 1 Michaël Tanchum teachesInternational Relations of theMiddle Eastand North at struggle in favour of working through Western ,abandoned its armed an independent Sahrawi state inthe , which seekstoestablish Sahara. Since 1991, the Algerian-backed contained competition intheWestern shared threats such asterrorism anda by limited coordination against and hadbeencharacterised The enduring détente between Morocco’s risingpower. of whether andhow toattempt tooffset Algeria now facesthecritical decision dynamics of theWestern . altered thelong-standing, geopolitical Western SaharainDecember,have of Moroccan over the culminating with theUS’s recognition diplomatic successes during 2020, pandemic andMorocco’s spate of is nolonger tenable. TheCOVID-19 crossroads inwhich thestatus quo the bilateral relationship standsat a As Algeria andMorocco enter 2021, Albert Vidal Ribé for his research assistance. Policy Implementation at Başkent University in Ankara (Başkent-SAM). Theauthor thanks the Advancement of Peace, theHebrew University, , and at theCentre for Strategic Security Studies (AIES).He also holds fellow positions at theTruman Research Institute for the University of Navarra and isSenior Fellow at theAustrian Institute for European and by Michaël Tanchum Algeria, Morocco andtheWestern Sahara The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Sahara (MINURSO). Mission for theReferendum inWestern the framework of theUnited Nations Atlantic coast,is under Moroccan contested , including theentire momentum. About 80percent of the the Western Saharagainedcritical recognition of its sovereignty over juggernaut toobtaininternational 2019 elections, Morocco’s diplomatic April andtothecountry’s 12December infirm President Bouteflika to resign in during 2019,leading Algeria’s agedand mass protests bythe While Algeria waspreoccupied with policy of armedresistance. in November 2020andresumedits ended its 29-year ceasefirewith “Pivot toAfrica”, thePolisario Front disputed that beganwith Rabat’s recognition of its sovereignty over the diplomatic breakthroughs ingaining Yet, inresponse toMorocco’s multiple Hirak movement The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the

control, while the remaining 20 per media also reported that Algeria’s cent is controlled by the Polisario People’s National Army would build two Front as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic border bases in response.5 The reports Republic (SADR). were never denied by .

A cavalcade of African nations have The prospect of Algeria building bases recently opened consulates in the on the border served to reinforce the Moroccan-controlled Sahara, after long-held view among segments of

© 2021 IAI the became the first country Rabat’s security circles that Algiers to open a consulate in the regional seeks Sahrawi in the capital on 18 December Western Sahara to create a dependent 2019.1 In February 2020, the political client state that would provide Algeria heavyweight Côte d’Ivoire became an outlet to the . the seventh African country to open a consulate, with the total number of Morocco had already been wary of African consulates reaching fifteen by Algerian designs since General Saïd October 2020.2 Chengriha was appointed Chief of ISSN 2532-6570 Algeria’s armed forces immediately As African and Arab solidarity with following 23 December 2019 death of Algeria’s to Morocco’s General Ahmed Gaïd Salah. The 75-year sovereignty claims eroded, tensions old Chengriha, who served during the between Algiers and Rabat climbed. , is an inveterate supporter In May 2020, Morocco’s Royal Armed of the Polisario Front and known for Forces announced that it would be his inflammatory remarks against constructing barracks in Morocco. Jerada, 38 km from Algeria’s border.3 Although the Moroccan military made Then, on 1 November 2020, a popular clear that the facility was to have referendum, in which only 23.7 per cent no offensive capabilities, Algerian of Algeria’s eligible voters participated,6 media widely reported the action as approved a series of constitutional an escalatory provocation by Rabat, amendments, including authorisation invoking the memory of Morocco’s for the People’s National Army to border incursion that ignited the intervene outside Algeria’s borders. “Sand War”.4 The Algerian Although Algeria faces threats from the unstable security environments 1 “Comoros Opens a Consulate General in Laayoune”, in Yabiladi, 18 December 2019, 25 June 2020, https://www.observalgerie. https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/86828. com/?p=112732. 2 Ali Haidar, “ and Open 5 “L’Algérie va construire deux bases militaires Consulates in Laayoune”, in Sahara News, 27 à la frontière avec le Maroc”, in ObservAlgerie, October 2020, https://sahara-news.org/?p=2587. 2 July 2020, https://www.observalgerie. 3 “FAR : Pas de de base militaire com/?p=113979. à Jerada, mais d’une caserne”, in Le Matin, 30 6 “Révision constitutionnelle : « le oui » May 2020, https://m.lematin.ma/amp/article. l’emporte largement”, in TSA Algérie, 2 php?id=338210. November 2020, https://www.tsa-algerie.com/ 4 Ahmed Oul, “Le Maroc exerce de la provocation revision-constitutionnelle-le-oui-lemporte- diplomatique envers l’Algérie”, in ObservAlgerie, largement-2. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

2 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara

in neighbouring and , the battle under a Biden administration.9 constitutional change was further Israel, however, could become an cause for concern in Rabat. alternative supplier for Rabat, greatly enhancing its capabilities. On 4 November 2020, the United Arab became the first Arab country Rabat’s parade of diplomatic successes to open a consulate in the Western in late 2020 were not just met with Sahara, further weakening Algeria’s simple acquiescence on the part of the

© 2021 IAI position. Two weeks later, Sahrawi population. On 13 November announced its intention to open a 2020, open hostilities broke out between consulate. On 14 December, the Morocco and the Polisario Front in opened a consulate too, indicating after the Moroccan military the possibility that could forcefully opened the border crossing follow suit in the not-too-distant to that had been blocked future. In late December 2020, media by Sahrawi activists. In response, the reports began circulating that Polisario Front formally ended its would open a consulate in the Western decades-long and began to ISSN 2532-6570 Sahara as well.7 engage in low-intensity conflict along the 2,700 km berm that separates The landmark 11 December 2020 the Moroccan and SADR-controlled decision of the to of the Western Sahara. recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, or the “Moroccan Morocco, which built Africa’s first high Sahara”, was part of a broader diplomatic speed rail line in 2018, now seeks to package brokered by Washington that extend the track through the Western included Morocco’s normalisation of Sahara to the Mauritanian border to its relations with Israel. Morocco and create an Africa-to- commercial the US also agreed to 1 billion US dollars transport corridor.10 The Polisario weapons sale that would provide Front’s resumption of hostilities has Morocco with four long-endurance served as justification for Rabat to MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones and JDAM take control of Guerguerat and extend precision-guided munitions.8 the berm to the Mauritanian border to secure the commercial crossing11 – a While the weapons sales will likely be approved before President Trump leaves 9 Marianne LeVine, “Inhofe Slams Trump office, future sales could face an uphill Administration on Western Sahara Policy”, in Politico, 10 December 2020, https://politi. co/3gAoBs1. 10 Michaël Tanchum, “Morocco’s Africa-to- 7 Mohamed Saied, “Egypt Denies Plans to Join Europe Commercial Corridor: Gatekeeper States Opening Western Sahara Consulates”, of an Emerging Trans-Regional Strategic in Al-Monitor, 2 January 2021, http://almon. Architecture”, in AIES Fokus, No. 8/2020 (July co/3fcu. 2020), https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2020/ 8 Patricia Zengerle and Mike Stone, “Exclusive- fokus-20-08.php. Trump Administration Moves Forward with 11 “Morocco PM Says Western Sahara Wall at $1 Billion Moroccan Arms Deal”, in , 11 Centre of Dispute Completed”, in Reuters, 17 December 2020, https://reut.rs/2JU9uOc. November 2020, https://reut.rs/38Qy6l7. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

3 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara

strategic gain for Morocco. With the Algeria’s export revenues.15 position of Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara Algeria’s economy has been forecasted remaining vacant since May 2019, the to contract by 5.5 per cent in 2020,16 international response to Morocco’s forcing Algiers to reduce the planned action has been relatively mute. investments by its state-owned energy company Sonatrach by 50 per The COVID-19 pandemic has also cent.17 Even if energy prices recover

© 2021 IAI tipped the scales in Morocco’s favour. sufficiently in 2021 to move Algeria’s While causing national crises for both economy to positive growth, the oil countries, Algeria has been worse price would still be far short of the 157.2 affected by the pandemic. Ranking US dollars mark required for the state 173rd out of 195 by the Global Health to balance its budget.18 Although the Security Index,12 Algeria’s mainly government has burned through much state-run healthcare is characterised of its foreign reserves, Algiers has so far by its lack of modern hospitals and been wary of seeking support from the proper hygienic conditions, leading International Monetary Fund, leaving ISSN 2532-6570 Algerians to often refer to hospitals the government more vulnerable to as “mouroirs” (places for dying).13 By increasing its dependence on , the time of the November flare-up at , Turkey, or one of the Arab Gulf Guerguerat, Algeria’s healthcare system states. On 11 October 2020, Beijing’s had been completely overwhelmed by China International Development the pandemic, with reports of patients Cooperation Agency signed an being asked to sleep on the floor economic and technical cooperation and critical shortages of oxygen and agreement with Algiers to deepen medical equipment.14 Algeria’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.19 The pandemic’s impact has magnified Algeria’s structural weaknesses as a 15 Hamid Ould Ahmed, “Algerian Economy hydrocarbon rentier state, with oil and Contracts 3.9% in First Quarter, Government gas sales accounting for 60 per cent Says”, in Reuters, 25 July 2020, https://reut. rs/32ST53F. of the state budget and 93 per cent of 16 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Datamapper: Algeria - Real GDP Growth, https:// www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_ RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/ 12 Elizabeth E. Cameron, Jennifer B. Nuzzo and DZA. Jessica A. Bell, Global Health Security Index. 17 “Algeria to Cut Spending and Energy Building Collective Action and Accountability, Investment, Delay Projects”, in Reuters, 22 October 2019, p. 119, https://www.ghsindex.org/ March 2020, https://reut.rs/2J9MmaK. report-model. 18 Souhail Karam and Abeer Abu Omar, 13 Adel Hamaizia and Yahia H. Zoubir, “Algeria’s “Economic Reckoning Is Coming for Algeria”, Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and Its Fallout”, in in Bloomberg, 20 April 2020, https://www. Chatham House Expert Comments, 6 May 2020, bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-20/ https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/15915. economic-reckoning-is-coming-for-arab- 14 Yousra Salem and S. Arslan, “Des médecins -s-last-debt-recluse. en détresse et des malades dans le désarroi”, 19 “Algeria, China Ink Economic and Technical in El Watan, 12 November 2020, https://www. Cooperation Agreement”, in APS, 11 October elwatan.com/?p=684853. 2020, http://www.aps.dz/en/economy/36083. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

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In contrast to Algeria, Morocco’s been seeking a greater economic healthcare system ranks 68th out role in Morocco’s development and of 195 in the Global Health Security neither would be enthusiastic about Index and the fourth highest in an escalation in tensions. Ultimately, Africa.20 Nonetheless, according to the however, neither Algeria nor Morocco World Health Organisation Morocco’s can afford a total rift given the mutual shortage of medical staff are estimated threats they face from militant groups to stand at approximately 32,000 based in the . 21

© 2021 IAI doctors and around 64,000 nurses. To avert a large scale-disaster, Morocco At the same time, providing limited setup six field hospitals and has resorted support to the Polisario Front to to temporary confinements in areas restrict Morocco’s gains will continue where the medical system was close to to prove less and less effective. As in being overwhelmed.22 Guerguerat, low intensity conflict will provide Morocco with the justification Morocco is scheduled to hold general to use hard power instruments. elections in 2021. With popular Continuation of the status quo will ISSN 2532-6570 dissatisfaction over Morocco’s handling result in Morocco deepening its the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely the control of the Western Sahara without and the government will creating any framework for the highlight its nation-building project Sahrawi to exercise wide autonomy in the Western Sahara to mobilise or providing incentives for Algeria Moroccan and shore up in terms of commercial connectivity loyalty to the monarchy. and economic cooperation. Facing a closing window of opportunity, Algeria Algeria, which places a priority on its could turn further toward Turkey and strategic autonomy, faces a difficult set Russia in the absence of an alternative. of policy choices. If Algiers significantly ratchets up its support for the Polisario This critical junction is also an Front, it would alienate Algeria’s inflection point that could provide European partners. Any escalation the opportunity to reorient the whole with Morocco would require Algeria conflict towards more cooperation – to deepen its security cooperation if the more neutral countries of the with either Turkey or Russia. Yet, , such as and Moscow and especially Beijing have Germany, step up to play a conciliating role, perhaps in coordination with 20 Elizabeth E. Cameron, Jennifer B. Nuzzo and Egypt. Jessica A. Bell, Global Health Security Index, cit., p. 233. It would behove Morocco to be 21 Ahmed Eljechtimi, “Moroccan Medics Protest magnanimous following its recent Over Conditions, Staff Shortages As Pandemic Surges”, in Reuters, 14 September 2020, https:// gains. Rabat can start by offering reut.rs/3bV2WbI. to work with Algeria and relevant 22 Reda Zaireg, Covid-19 Pandemic Case Study: international actors to provide relief Morocco, Washington/Brussels, Heinrich-Böll- for the challenging living conditions Stiftung, December 2020, https://eu.boell.org/ en/node/7839. facing the Sahrawi, made more direr IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

5 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara

by COVID-19. Rabat would also be well-served by incentivising Algiers with opportunities to participate in Morocco’s developing commercial connectivity.

For its part, Algeria needs to join talks between Morocco and the Polisario

© 2021 IAI Front to secure future autonomy arrangements for the Sahrawi. By utilising its status as the SADR’s de facto guarantor, Algerian engagement could incentivise Rabat to provide an optimal level of autonomy for the . At the same time, Algeria’s would benefit from demonstrating some flexibility, ISSN 2532-6570 coming to terms with the fraying status quo and the changing regional and international context, understanding that sticking to old positions is unlikely to serve its interests, or those of the Sahrawi people. Bridging proposals or compromises should instead be pursued, as these could provide benefits to all sides and simultaneously help improve Algeria’s relations with regional and international states as well.

In combination with the precarious ceasefire in Libya, 2021 will be a crucial year for the Western Maghreb. Constructive interaction between Rabat and Algiers, facilitated by countries trusted to act as even-handed brokers, will determine whether the Western Maghreb’s trajectory will be toward greater cooperation or greater conflict.

15 January 2021 IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

6 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and , , , Africa and © 2021 IAI the . IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), three book series (Global Politics and Security, Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

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