The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara
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The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara © 2021 IAI by Michaël Tanchum As Algeria and Morocco enter 2021, the framework of the United Nations the bilateral relationship stands at a Mission for the Referendum in Western ISSN 2532-6570 crossroads in which the status quo Sahara (MINURSO). is no longer tenable. The COVID-19 pandemic and Morocco’s spate of Yet, in response to Morocco’s multiple diplomatic successes during 2020, diplomatic breakthroughs in gaining culminating with the US’s recognition recognition of its sovereignty over the of Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed region that began with Rabat’s Western Sahara in December, have “Pivot to Africa”, the Polisario Front altered the long-standing, geopolitical ended its 29-year ceasefire with Rabat dynamics of the Western Maghreb. in November 2020 and resumed its Algeria now faces the critical decision policy of armed resistance. of whether and how to attempt to offset Morocco’s rising power. While Algeria was preoccupied with mass protests by the Hirak movement The enduring détente between Algeria during 2019, leading Algeria’s aged and and Morocco had been characterised infirm President Bouteflika to resign in by limited coordination against April and to the country’s 12 December shared threats such as terrorism and a 2019 elections, Morocco’s diplomatic contained competition in the Western juggernaut to obtain international Sahara. Since 1991, the Algerian-backed recognition of its sovereignty over Polisario Front, which seeks to establish the Western Sahara gained critical an independent Sahrawi state in the momentum. About 80 per cent of the Western Sahara, abandoned its armed contested territory, including the entire struggle in favour of working through Atlantic coast, is under Moroccan Michaël Tanchum teaches International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra and is Senior Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES). He also holds fellow positions at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University, Israel, and at the Centre for Strategic IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES Policy Implementation at Başkent University in Ankara (Başkent-SAM). The author thanks Albert Vidal Ribé for his research assistance. 1 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara control, while the remaining 20 per media also reported that Algeria’s cent is controlled by the Polisario People’s National Army would build two Front as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic border bases in response.5 The reports Republic (SADR). were never denied by Algiers. A cavalcade of African nations have The prospect of Algeria building bases recently opened consulates in the on the border served to reinforce the Moroccan-controlled Sahara, after long-held view among segments of © 2021 IAI the Comoros became the first country Rabat’s security circles that Algiers to open a consulate in the regional seeks Sahrawi independence in the capital Laayoune on 18 December Western Sahara to create a dependent 2019.1 In February 2020, the political client state that would provide Algeria heavyweight Côte d’Ivoire became an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean. the seventh African country to open a consulate, with the total number of Morocco had already been wary of African consulates reaching fifteen by Algerian designs since General Saïd October 2020.2 Chengriha was appointed Chief of ISSN 2532-6570 Algeria’s armed forces immediately As African and Arab solidarity with following 23 December 2019 death of Algeria’s opposition to Morocco’s General Ahmed Gaïd Salah. The 75-year sovereignty claims eroded, tensions old Chengriha, who served during the between Algiers and Rabat climbed. Sand War, is an inveterate supporter In May 2020, Morocco’s Royal Armed of the Polisario Front and known for Forces announced that it would be his inflammatory remarks against constructing military barracks in Morocco. Jerada, 38 km from Algeria’s border.3 Although the Moroccan military made Then, on 1 November 2020, a popular clear that the facility was to have referendum, in which only 23.7 per cent no offensive capabilities, Algerian of Algeria’s eligible voters participated,6 media widely reported the action as approved a series of constitutional an escalatory provocation by Rabat, amendments, including authorisation invoking the memory of Morocco’s for the People’s National Army to border incursion that ignited the intervene outside Algeria’s borders. October 1963 “Sand War”.4 The Algerian Although Algeria faces threats from the unstable security environments 1 “Comoros Opens a Consulate General in Laayoune”, in Yabiladi, 18 December 2019, 25 June 2020, https://www.observalgerie. https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/86828. com/?p=112732. 2 Ali Haidar, “Zambia and Eswatini Open 5 “L’Algérie va construire deux bases militaires Consulates in Laayoune”, in Sahara News, 27 à la frontière avec le Maroc”, in ObservAlgerie, October 2020, https://sahara-news.org/?p=2587. 2 July 2020, https://www.observalgerie. 3 “FAR : Pas de construction de base militaire com/?p=113979. à Jerada, mais d’une caserne”, in Le Matin, 30 6 “Révision constitutionnelle : « le oui » May 2020, https://m.lematin.ma/amp/article. l’emporte largement”, in TSA Algérie, 2 php?id=338210. November 2020, https://www.tsa-algerie.com/ 4 Ahmed Oul, “Le Maroc exerce de la provocation revision-constitutionnelle-le-oui-lemporte- diplomatique envers l’Algérie”, in ObservAlgerie, largement-2. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES 2 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara in neighbouring Libya and Mali, the battle under a Biden administration.9 constitutional change was further Israel, however, could become an cause for concern in Rabat. alternative supplier for Rabat, greatly enhancing its capabilities. On 4 November 2020, the United Arab Emirates became the first Arab country Rabat’s parade of diplomatic successes to open a consulate in the Western in late 2020 were not just met with Sahara, further weakening Algeria’s simple acquiescence on the part of the © 2021 IAI position. Two weeks later, Jordan Sahrawi population. On 13 November announced its intention to open a 2020, open hostilities broke out between consulate. On 14 December, Bahrain the Morocco and the Polisario Front in opened a consulate too, indicating Guerguerat after the Moroccan military the possibility that Saudi Arabia could forcefully opened the border crossing follow suit in the not-too-distant to Mauritania that had been blocked future. In late December 2020, media by Sahrawi activists. In response, the reports began circulating that Egypt Polisario Front formally ended its would open a consulate in the Western decades-long ceasefire and began to ISSN 2532-6570 Sahara as well.7 engage in low-intensity conflict along the 2,700 km berm that separates The landmark 11 December 2020 the Moroccan and SADR-controlled decision of the United States to regions of the Western Sahara. recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, or the “Moroccan Morocco, which built Africa’s first high Sahara”, was part of a broader diplomatic speed rail line in 2018, now seeks to package brokered by Washington that extend the track through the Western included Morocco’s normalisation of Sahara to the Mauritanian border to its relations with Israel. Morocco and create an Africa-to-Europe commercial the US also agreed to 1 billion US dollars transport corridor.10 The Polisario weapons sale that would provide Front’s resumption of hostilities has Morocco with four long-endurance served as justification for Rabat to MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones and JDAM take control of Guerguerat and extend precision-guided munitions.8 the berm to the Mauritanian border to secure the commercial crossing11 – a While the weapons sales will likely be approved before President Trump leaves 9 Marianne LeVine, “Inhofe Slams Trump office, future sales could face an uphill Administration on Western Sahara Policy”, in Politico, 10 December 2020, https://politi. co/3gAoBs1. 10 Michaël Tanchum, “Morocco’s Africa-to- 7 Mohamed Saied, “Egypt Denies Plans to Join Europe Commercial Corridor: Gatekeeper States Opening Western Sahara Consulates”, of an Emerging Trans-Regional Strategic in Al-Monitor, 2 January 2021, http://almon. Architecture”, in AIES Fokus, No. 8/2020 (July co/3fcu. 2020), https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2020/ 8 Patricia Zengerle and Mike Stone, “Exclusive- fokus-20-08.php. Trump Administration Moves Forward with 11 “Morocco PM Says Western Sahara Wall at $1 Billion Moroccan Arms Deal”, in Reuters, 11 Centre of Dispute Completed”, in Reuters, 17 December 2020, https://reut.rs/2JU9uOc. November 2020, https://reut.rs/38Qy6l7. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 03 - JANUARY 2021 21 | 03 - JANUARY IAI COMMENTARIES 3 The Post-COVID-19 Trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara strategic gain for Morocco. With the Algeria’s export revenues.15 position of Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara Algeria’s economy has been forecasted remaining vacant since May 2019, the to contract by 5.5 per cent in 2020,16 international response to Morocco’s forcing Algiers to reduce the planned action has been relatively mute. investments by its state-owned energy company Sonatrach by 50 per The COVID-19 pandemic has also cent.17 Even if energy prices recover © 2021 IAI tipped the scales in