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Thinking Beyond the Narrow Horizon of Liberal Justice

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Thinking Beyond the Narrow Horizon of Liberal Justice Rights Discourse and Economic Domination: Thinking Beyond the Narrow Horizon of Liberal Justice by Igor Shoikhedbrod A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Igor Shoikhedbrod 2018 Rights Discourse and Economic Domination: Thinking Beyond the Narrow Horizon of Liberal Justice Igor Shoikhedbrod Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2018 Abstract This dissertation offers a theoretical reconstruction of Karl Marx’s materialist conception of right through a re-examination of his critique of liberalism. The liberal conception of justice regards individuals as equal rights-bearers in abstraction from material circumstances and asymmetries of economic power. The dominant interpretation among leading Marxist and Anglo-American political theorists is that Marx’s critique of liberalism culminates with the “withering away” of right and rights in post-capitalist society. Explanations for this view have been framed around the postulation that communist society transcends the “circumstances of justice,” and that the end of class domination would pave the way for the disappearance of juridical relations. The first part of the dissertation questions this longstanding interpretation by reconstructing Marx’s materialist conception of right. The central thesis of the dissertation is that Marx regards right as an essential feature of any mode of production, including the future communist society, and that standards of right undergo transformation throughout history. The historical expansion of human freedom also provides Marx with a normative basis for assessing between higher and lower standards of right across different modes of production. The second part of the dissertation tracks the enduring legacy ii of Marx’s critique of liberal justice by examining how leading contemporary political theorists have responded to Marx’s challenge in the face of global financial capitalism and the hollowing out of democratically-enacted law. The dissertation also reconsiders the relationship between Marxism and the idea of the rule of law in the current era of neoliberal hegemony. Taken together, the dissertation aims at reconstructing Marx’s views on right and rights in ways that resonate with ongoing debates in political theory and the broader public sphere. iii Acknowledgements As I reflect on my doctoral journey in the political science department at the University of Toronto, I am reminded of a pithy saying that is commonly attributed to Isocrates: “The root of education is bitter but its fruit is sweet.” Looking back, I have learned to appreciate the bitterness of the root along with sweetness of the fruit, although this has not been easy. One thing is certain: I would have never ventured as far as I did without the unwavering support, commitment and care of the many people who helped bring this dissertation to fruition. I was fortunate to work with an erudite group of scholars, each of whom challenged me to think rigorously without compromising the intent of the dissertation. I am grateful to Simone Chambers for signing on as supervisor and for having faith in the project throughout. Simone taught me the importance of conveying my thoughts clearly and anticipating the learned critic at every turn. In return, I hope to have made the modest contribution of persuading her that there is a neglected side of Marx that is worth retrieving and defending, now more than ever. Peggy Kohn served as co- supervisor and has been a dedicated mentor since my undergraduate days, encouraging my interest in critical political theory and seeing to it that I did not shed my normative commitments along the way. Alan Brudner made me think long and hard about the place of right and rights in a social context where freedom would be given its proper due. I have benefitted immensely from his insights about the law and have intentionally sought to reaffirm the Hegelian heritage that informs Marx’s social and political thought. Thanks as well to Joseph Carens for serving as the internal reader and to Professor Carol Gould for agreeing to be the external examiner at such short notice. iv Beyond members of my dissertation committee, I thank Edward Andrew, Richard Day and the late Abraham Rotstein for reading early chapters of my thesis and offering valuable feedback. Although I did not work with Ronald Beiner, Ruth Marshall and Melissa Williams, my work benefitted immensely from their critical insights, most of which were articulated in the context of the department’s signature Political Theory Research Workshops. I am also grateful to Markus Dubber, Simon Stern, Peter Russell, Peter Solomon, and Peter Rosenthal for showing an interest in my thesis and taking the time to discuss the law with an aspiring political theorist. From U of T’s philosophy department, thanks are due to Daniel Goldstick for reading scattered parts of my dissertation with great care and offering painstaking commentary; Derek Allen for contributing to a stimulating CPSA panel on “Rethinking the Controversy of Marx on Justice”; and Frank Cunningham for offering sage advice and agreeing to participate in virtually every social justice-themed panel that I helped organize at the University of Toronto. I would also like to express my gratitude to three former instructors. John Duncan could always be counted on to offer around the clock advice on a host of practical issues, proving that the study of ethics is barren without engaging and being engaged by the community around us. I am thankful to David Carvounas for helping instill in me a sober sense of academic reality and demonstrating what it takes to be an animating lecturer. Esteve Morera helped me navigate through the maze of graduate school well after my time at York University and taught me to appreciate normative political philosophy despite its abstract character. Thanks are also due to my colleagues, past and present, who engaged with my work in the most diverse settings and gave me a much needed sense of community. I am especially grateful to Khalid Ahmed, Noaman Ali, Ozlem Aslan, Adrian Atanasescu, Mark Barbisan, Sude Beltan, Sarah v Beamish, Dragana Bodruzic, Robert Ballingall, Kiran Banerjee, Andrea Cassatella, Yi-Chun Chien, Wayne Dealy, Scott Dodds, Alena Drieschova, Kevin Edmonds, Paul Gray, Matthew Hamilton, Teddy Harrison, Xunming Huang, Kyumin Ju, Margaret Hadarer, Olga Kesarchuk, Kate Korycki Simon Lambek, Jaby Matthew, Nicola Milicic, Emma Planinc, Alesha Porisky, Evan Rosevear, Sarah Rich-Zendel, Craig Smith, Jonas Schwab-Pflug, Abraham Singer, Alexander Sodiquov, Mauricio Suchowlansky, Ella Street, Dorina Verli, Tvrtko Vrdoljak, and Constantine Vassilou. Through the course of conference travels, I met with various scholars and kindred spirits that helped make my work better. I thank the organizing committee of the Marx and Philosophy Society in the United Kingdom (especially Andrew Chitty, Sean Sayers, Meade McCloughan and Jan Kandiyali) for allowing me to present early drafts of my work in front of an engaged audience of scholars and activists. I also had the privilege of presenting an early version of my fourth chapter at the workshop on “Recognition and Socialism,” which was held on the occasion of Axel Honneth’s 65th birthday. I thank Professor Honneth for engaging thoughtfully with my spirited, albeit rudimentary critique. At the same workshop, I met Arthur Bueno, Victor Kempf, Mariana Teixeira, with whom I later collaborated on thought-provoking panels in Rome and Calgary. I also received valuable feedback and encouragement from Robert Fine, Melis Menent, and Eleonora Piromalli at the International Critical Theory Conference in Rome. In the spring-summer of 2015, following our extended T.A strike, I was a visiting student scholar at the Normative Orders Cluster of Excellence at the Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt. I am grateful to Professor Rainer Forst for welcoming me into Frankfurt’s political theory community. Julian vi Culp helped me prepare for Frankfurt while I was still immersed in Toronto and was always willing to discuss matters of practical as well as strategic reason. During multiple stays in Frankfurt, I could always count on the good philosophic company and hospitality of Marco Fataf and his flatmates. With the help of the SGS Travel Grant, I conducted research at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and at the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. While in Berlin, I had the good fortune of meeting Jürgen Herres, researcher for the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, who drew my attention to important manuscripts and left me with an informative lesson about the legal history of the Rhine province during the revolutionary period of 1848-49. Around the same time, I attended a superb workshop on “Marx und Recht” that was sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, and in which Professors Sonja Buckel and Christophe Menke delivered engaging lectures. I am grateful to Sonja Buckel and Chrisophe Menke for meeting with me in Frankfurt and offering constructive feedback. It is always encouraging to learn that one’s research interests are shared by leading scholars in the field. I also thank Rolf Hecker for drawing my attention to the Berlin workshop and educating me about the MEGA2 initiative. Closer to home, I had the unwavering support of friends who kept me smiling during the most challenging times. Thank you to Steve Halperin for joining me on at least two memorable expeditions and listening to my gratuitous philosophic rants since the sixth grade. Jaspreet Sahota was an outstanding sparring partner throughout the doctoral programme and helped me surpass self-imposed intellectual and fitness hurdles. Thanks as well to Lima Al-Said, Banafsheh Beizaei, Kristy Bard, Raluca Bejan, Kaveh Boveiri, Susanna Gafarova, Melissa Grisolia, Anna Postelnyak, vii Niloo Mouzafar and Selena Lucien-Shaboian for being there and reminding me about the big picture. I owe the greatest debt to my family: Michael, Irina, Elena, Arik, and Aiden.
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