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SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 495 29 ries and land. Owning them enabled reorganizacion of society's policical economy in the service of socialism's ends. With the ad­ ADAM SMITH AND THE RIGHT vent of the digical age, however, economic production has been utterly transformed; what constituces "means of production" has James R. Otteson now become broad and open-ended. Accordingly, socialism has had to adapt to the cimes: rather chan owning the means of pro­ duction outright, it now proposes to centrally regulate people's behavior, and to redistribuce portions of their productive output, in preferred directions. Whether realizing socialism's moral goals The reception of Adam Smith's policical economy has undergone requires owning the means of production depends, then, on histor­ a sea change. 1 For almost two cencuries, Smith was hailed as the ical circumstances, but whac will always be required is to centrally founding father of capicalism, with his 1776 Inquiry into the Na­ organize political-economic decision making. Wichouc that, there ture and Causes of the Wea/th of Nations seen as the definitive is no socialism; wich ic, fairness, equality, and community can, it is case for free trade and free markecs.2 Since the 1970s however hoped, be achieved. a succession of commentators has daimed that Smith ~as not ; By concrast, socialism's antithesis, capitalism, has ac its core de­ classical liberal after all but more like a progressive liberal: his centraliz.ed political-economic decision making. les preferred values c~~c~rns for the poor, his worries about the damage that excessive might be justice, liberty, and individuality (again, properly defined), d1v1s1on of labor can do to workers, his cricicisms of merchants but ic holds that allowing individuals or voluntary groups of indi­ and ~onopo l.y corporations, and his apparent supporc for pro­ viduals co make political-economic decisions for tbemselves with gr.esstve t~xa t ton ail taken as evidence chat he was no supporter of Jittle state interference is what enables the realization of the values it laissez-fatre. 3 Indeed, some have gone so far as to daim that Smich . holds dear. So the former position tends to favor planned patterns of was a proco-Marxist.4 So who is the real Adam Smith? social order, or the correction of unplanned patterns, according to \ The .q.uesti?n of whether Smith should be categorized as on principles and auchority centrally derived and administered; white the p~lmcal nght or the political left can risk, however, becoming the latter tends to favor unplanned or "spontaneous" patterns of as futile as recent arguments over whether US President Barack social order that are deferential to whac individuals and voluncary Obama is "socialist" or not. The answer, obviously, depends on groups decide to do and skeptical of what third parties might like whac one means by "socialist"-by which, equally obviously, dif­ to mandate or nudge them to do. ferent people mean very different tbings. Yet perhaps we can make Let us therefore caU che two positions centralist and deœntralist, some headway by taking a eue from chat contested term "social­ respectively. So defined, they are end States along a continuum, and ism." Like ail systems of political economy, socialism comprehends althougb chey may act as proxies for the political left and right, re­ a ~et of policie_s in the service of its preferred values-principally spectively, there will be good-faith disagreemeot about where some fa1rn.ess, equal~ty, and cornmunity (properly de.fined, of course). particular policies or positions fall. But thinking about matters in Public ownersh1p of che means of production, the traditional defini­ this way has the benefit of allowing us co avoid some of the partisan­ cion of socialism, was not an end in itself but instead icself a means ship that can vitiate such discussions. In asking, then, whether Smich c.apturing the central method for achieving socialism's goals ac ; is on the lefc or the right, we might rephrase the question and ask CJme-the lace nineteench and into che twentieth century-wben whether Smith is a centralist or a decencralist. And here 1 think we "means of production" were almosc exclusively chings like facto- can corne to a fairly definite conclusion: Smith is a decentralist. SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 497 496 • CHAPTER 29 In what follows 1 lay out the decentralisrn 1 find in Smith, draw­ happy without loving associations with others, if you will not have ing first on his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and then on his loving associations with others· unless you achieve mutual syrn­ Wealth of Nations (WN). 1 tben review several reasons for taking pathy of sentiments with them, and if you will not acbieve mu­ the position that Snlith is instead a centralist, and 1 conclude that, tuai sympathy of sentiments with them unless you moderate your despite those reasons, Smjth is best understood as a member of the sentiments so tbat they approximate what others either expect or long tradition of classical liberalism now typically associated with believe they would themselves have in your position, then to be the political right. happy you should cultivate and exercise "self-command"-from which "all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre" (TMS Vl.iü.11)-so that your behavior and your standards match DECENTRALISM IN TMS those of the people about whom you care. Would that make the standards that arise according to the Smith's 1759 Theory of Moral Sentimen'ts describes morality as a Smithian evolutionary mechanism correct? Like the results of bio­ decentralized evolutionary system, developing according to what logical evolution, there is no way to say that some developrnents, I have elsewhere called a "marketplace model.''5 TMS attempts to varieties, or species are intrinsically better than others-only that explain where our moral sentiments corne from, how we corne to they were better adapted. But Smith believes that because these pass the judgments we do, and how we transitioned from amoral standards depend on their ability to actually serve people's inter­ infancy to moralized adulthood. Smith's explanation hinges on the ests (including their desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments), pleasure he daims we naturally receive from "mutual sympathy" their continued existence over time suggests that they have in fact of sentiments (TMS l.i.2)-that is, the pleasure we receive from re­ made people better off. The fit is not perfect, since social inertia, biases, irrationalities, institutionalized superstitions, and so on can alizing that our sentiments are ecboed in, or shared by, others. Be­ 7 cause all of us have this desire, it acts as a centripetal force drawing ·ail retard and even reverse the "natural" process of development. us into society with others, as well as a normalizing force inducing But Smith seems to have a cautious optimism that in the long run us to moderate our sentiments so tbat they more closely approxi­ destructive processes will wither and, eventually, die. mate what others would "sympathize" with. According to Smith, In a striking passage from TMS that might initially seem out shared standards of morality and etiquette are the patterns that of place, Smith describes a political type he calls a "man of sys­ emerge from people's localized attempts to acbieve mutual sympa­ tem," who, Smith says, makes the mistake of thinking that be can thy of sentiments. They are subject to change over rime, as people's arrange the metaphorical pieces of the metaphorical "great 'chess­ interests, values, and circumstances change, yet because no single board' of human society"-tbat is, people--with the same ease persan can create or destroy them they enjoy a level of objectivity with which the hand arranges the literal pieces on a literal chess­ that transcends individual schedules of value.6 board (TMS VI.ii,2.17). The mistake such a person makes, Smith Given, however, that human beings have certain unchanging daims, is to forget that people have "principles of motion" all their natural features-they desire mutual sympathy of sentiments (see, own, which the "man of system"-that is, the legislator, regulator, e.g., TMS I.i.2); their happiness depends in part on loving asso­ nudger, and so on-<:an neither control nor anticipate. ~ut this ciations with other people (see TMS l.ii.4.1-2); their love and mistake is facilitated by a related cluster of others-<:h1efly the concern for others is ~ scarce resource that varies directly with man of system's inflated view of the scope of his knowledge and their familiarity with others (see TMS III.3.9 and VI.ii); and so on his propensity to assume tbat bis own particular schedule of value -then hypothetical moral imperatives follow. If you will not be should hold for others as well-and it often issues in the man of 498 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 499 system's resolution to try to mandate, restrain, nudge, or otherwise The Smithian moral theory tends, then, in the direction of de­ influence others' behavior so that it more closely coheres with ''his centralized, rather than centralized, systems of order. Even if Smith own ideal plan of government" (TMS VI.ii.2.17). knows that people will make mistakes regarding their moral senti­ Once we understand how Smith's "'marketplace of morality" ments, be worries far more about the dangers of third-party inter­ model operates, we can understand why this discussion of the position. The reason is not difficult to understand. Despite the real "man of system" would be in TMS.
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