SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 495 29 ries and land. Owning them enabled reorganizacion of society's policical economy in the service of socialism's ends. With the ad ADAM SMITH AND THE RIGHT vent of the digical age, however, economic production has been utterly transformed; what constituces "means of production" has James R. Otteson now become broad and open-ended. Accordingly, socialism has had to adapt to the cimes: rather chan owning the means of pro duction outright, it now proposes to centrally regulate people's behavior, and to redistribuce portions of their productive output, in preferred directions. Whether realizing socialism's moral goals The reception of Adam Smith's policical economy has undergone requires owning the means of production depends, then, on histor a sea change. 1 For almost two cencuries, Smith was hailed as the ical circumstances, but whac will always be required is to centrally founding father of capicalism, with his 1776 Inquiry into the Na organize political-economic decision making. Wichouc that, there ture and Causes of the Wea/th of Nations seen as the definitive is no socialism; wich ic, fairness, equality, and community can, it is case for free trade and free markecs.2 Since the 1970s however hoped, be achieved. a succession of commentators has daimed that Smith ~as not ; By concrast, socialism's antithesis, capitalism, has ac its core de classical liberal after all but more like a progressive liberal: his centraliz.ed political-economic decision making. les preferred values c~~c~rns for the poor, his worries about the damage that excessive might be justice, liberty, and individuality (again, properly defined), d1v1s1on of labor can do to workers, his cricicisms of merchants but ic holds that allowing individuals or voluntary groups of indi and ~onopo l.y corporations, and his apparent supporc for pro viduals co make political-economic decisions for tbemselves with gr.esstve t~xa t ton ail taken as evidence chat he was no supporter of Jittle state interference is what enables the realization of the values it laissez-fatre. 3 Indeed, some have gone so far as to daim that Smich . holds dear. So the former position tends to favor planned patterns of was a proco-Marxist.4 So who is the real Adam Smith? social order, or the correction of unplanned patterns, according to \ The .q.uesti?n of whether Smith should be categorized as on principles and auchority centrally derived and administered; white the p~lmcal nght or the political left can risk, however, becoming the latter tends to favor unplanned or "spontaneous" patterns of as futile as recent arguments over whether US President Barack social order that are deferential to whac individuals and voluncary Obama is "socialist" or not. The answer, obviously, depends on groups decide to do and skeptical of what third parties might like whac one means by "socialist"-by which, equally obviously, dif to mandate or nudge them to do. ferent people mean very different tbings. Yet perhaps we can make Let us therefore caU che two positions centralist and deœntralist, some headway by taking a eue from chat contested term "social respectively. So defined, they are end States along a continuum, and ism." Like ail systems of political economy, socialism comprehends althougb chey may act as proxies for the political left and right, re a ~et of policie_s in the service of its preferred values-principally spectively, there will be good-faith disagreemeot about where some fa1rn.ess, equal~ty, and cornmunity (properly de.fined, of course). particular policies or positions fall. But thinking about matters in Public ownersh1p of che means of production, the traditional defini this way has the benefit of allowing us co avoid some of the partisan cion of socialism, was not an end in itself but instead icself a means ship that can vitiate such discussions. In asking, then, whether Smich c.apturing the central method for achieving socialism's goals ac ; is on the lefc or the right, we might rephrase the question and ask CJme-the lace nineteench and into che twentieth century-wben whether Smith is a centralist or a decencralist. And here 1 think we "means of production" were almosc exclusively chings like facto- can corne to a fairly definite conclusion: Smith is a decentralist. SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 497 496 • CHAPTER 29
In what follows 1 lay out the decentralisrn 1 find in Smith, draw happy without loving associations with others, if you will not have ing first on his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and then on his loving associations with others· unless you achieve mutual syrn Wealth of Nations (WN). 1 tben review several reasons for taking pathy of sentiments with them, and if you will not acbieve mu the position that Snlith is instead a centralist, and 1 conclude that, tuai sympathy of sentiments with them unless you moderate your despite those reasons, Smjth is best understood as a member of the sentiments so tbat they approximate what others either expect or long tradition of classical liberalism now typically associated with believe they would themselves have in your position, then to be the political right. happy you should cultivate and exercise "self-command"-from which "all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre" (TMS Vl.iü.11)-so that your behavior and your standards match DECENTRALISM IN TMS those of the people about whom you care. Would that make the standards that arise according to the Smith's 1759 Theory of Moral Sentimen'ts describes morality as a Smithian evolutionary mechanism correct? Like the results of bio decentralized evolutionary system, developing according to what logical evolution, there is no way to say that some developrnents, I have elsewhere called a "marketplace model.''5 TMS attempts to varieties, or species are intrinsically better than others-only that explain where our moral sentiments corne from, how we corne to they were better adapted. But Smith believes that because these pass the judgments we do, and how we transitioned from amoral standards depend on their ability to actually serve people's inter infancy to moralized adulthood. Smith's explanation hinges on the ests (including their desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments), pleasure he daims we naturally receive from "mutual sympathy" their continued existence over time suggests that they have in fact of sentiments (TMS l.i.2)-that is, the pleasure we receive from re made people better off. The fit is not perfect, since social inertia, biases, irrationalities, institutionalized superstitions, and so on can alizing that our sentiments are ecboed in, or shared by, others. Be 7 cause all of us have this desire, it acts as a centripetal force drawing ·ail retard and even reverse the "natural" process of development. us into society with others, as well as a normalizing force inducing But Smith seems to have a cautious optimism that in the long run us to moderate our sentiments so tbat they more closely approxi destructive processes will wither and, eventually, die. mate what others would "sympathize" with. According to Smith, In a striking passage from TMS that might initially seem out shared standards of morality and etiquette are the patterns that of place, Smith describes a political type he calls a "man of sys emerge from people's localized attempts to acbieve mutual sympa tem," who, Smith says, makes the mistake of thinking that be can thy of sentiments. They are subject to change over rime, as people's arrange the metaphorical pieces of the metaphorical "great 'chess interests, values, and circumstances change, yet because no single board' of human society"-tbat is, people--with the same ease persan can create or destroy them they enjoy a level of objectivity with which the hand arranges the literal pieces on a literal chess that transcends individual schedules of value.6 board (TMS VI.ii,2.17). The mistake such a person makes, Smith Given, however, that human beings have certain unchanging daims, is to forget that people have "principles of motion" all their natural features-they desire mutual sympathy of sentiments (see, own, which the "man of system"-that is, the legislator, regulator, e.g., TMS I.i.2); their happiness depends in part on loving asso nudger, and so on-<:an neither control nor anticipate. ~ut this ciations with other people (see TMS l.ii.4.1-2); their love and mistake is facilitated by a related cluster of others-<:h1efly the concern for others is ~ scarce resource that varies directly with man of system's inflated view of the scope of his knowledge and their familiarity with others (see TMS III.3.9 and VI.ii); and so on his propensity to assume tbat bis own particular schedule of value -then hypothetical moral imperatives follow. If you will not be should hold for others as well-and it often issues in the man of 498 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 499 system's resolution to try to mandate, restrain, nudge, or otherwise The Smithian moral theory tends, then, in the direction of de influence others' behavior so that it more closely coheres with ''his centralized, rather than centralized, systems of order. Even if Smith own ideal plan of government" (TMS VI.ii.2.17). knows that people will make mistakes regarding their moral senti Once we understand how Smith's "'marketplace of morality" ments, be worries far more about the dangers of third-party inter model operates, we can understand why this discussion of the position. The reason is not difficult to understand. Despite the real "man of system" would be in TMS. In order for people to develop risks decentralized orders pose of allowing sentiments or behav- · proper moral sentiments, there must be, as Smith puts it, "free iors to arise that we dislike or find objectionable, the good news communication of sentiments" (TMS VII.iv.28). Because people's is that decentralism also allows both competition and dissocia situations, opportunities, preferences, and values change--and tion. If no single set of sentiments, preferences, values, or behaviors the flux is dynamic because people change in response to others' can be cemented into policy, people may choose not to associate changes as well-no single set of moral sentiments or cules of et with th ose who adopt sets they do not like. 8 And since everyone iquette, however fitting for a particular place or rime, could be may similarly choose, what arises is a competition for the scarce appropriate for all people or in all places: but highly desired resource of mutual sympathy of sentiments.9 If fewer and fewer people choose to associa te with any given person, How is it possible to ascertain by rules the exact point at which, in group, or community, fewer and fewer opportunîties for mutual cvery case, a delicate sense of justice begins to run into a frivolous sympathy of sentiments arise; this acts as a natural disincenrive for and weak scrupulosity of conscience? When is it that secrecy and the person, group, or community to maintain its status quo, and reserve begin to grow into dissimulation? How far an agrceable as a natural incentive to change. A person's, and a community's, irony may be carried, and at what precise point it begins to degen moral standards would retain, then, both the ability to exploit past erate into a detestable lie? What is the highest pitch of freedom and discovery and at the same cime a flexibility to adapt to changing ease of behaviour which can be regarded as graceful and unbecom ·circumstances. Srnith's model captures, therefore, both the respect ing, and when it is that it first begins to run into a negligent and for tradition and the openness to innovation that characterize the tboughtless liccntiousness? With regard to all such matters, what most prosperous and humane-what Smith would. have called would hold good in any one case would scarce do so exactly in any "civilized"----human societies. othcr, and what const itutes the propriety and happiness of behav iour varies in every case witb the smallest variery of situation. (TMS VD.iv.33) DECENTRALISM IN WN Having stood the (relative) test of time justifies a set of standards enjoying a default position with presumptive, but not absolute, Smith's Wealth ofNations employs the "market model" of decentra authority; similarly, the fact that a set of standards prevails in one's lized decision making extensively, constituting perhaps Smith's most community----or in a community (even an· imagined one) in which profound legacy to modern social science. Indeed, we find its first one would like to be a member-is a good reason to train oneself hints just three paragraphs into the thousand-page book. according toit. But it can provide no justification to prevent peo According to Smith, the degree to which any country is "'sup ple who have reached moral maturity from changing their minds, plied with ail the necessaries and conveniences for which it has oc exploring new things, or otherwise entrepreneurially experiment· casion" depends on "the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which ing with other ways of organizing their moral sentiments in efforts its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion to become happy. betWeen the number of those who are employed in useful labour 500 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 501
and that of those who are not so employed," and he daims fur the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any ther that the "abundance or scantiness of this supply too seems to savage to acquire" (WN Intro.4). 10 depend more on the former of those circumstances than upon the Smith's larger argument in WN rests on three further claims. latter" (WN lntro.2-4). But Smith's argument in the first chapter is First is his Local Knowledge Argument (LKA): because everyone that the enormous productive powers of the division of labor are has unique knowledge of his own "local situation"-including owing to three main factors, one of which is "the invention of a his skills, his schedule of value, and the opportunities available great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and to him-each individual is therefore the person best positioned enable one man to do the work of many" (WN I.i.5). This factor to make decisions about what courses of action he should take to captures Smith's discovery that workers who focus on particular achieve his goals. "What is the species of domestick industry which tasks wîll invent methods to economize their efforts-and, crucially, his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of these inventions will not have been discoverable by someone not the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local focusing on those particular tasks. A striking example Smith offers situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can to make this point is that of a boy who discovered a mechanism for do for him" (WN IV.ii.10).11 Second is Smith's Economizer Argu automatically opening and shutting a pressure valve on early fue ment (EA), which holds that because humans by nature seek to engines; only someone focused on this particular task-but who, as better their own conditions, each of them is naturally led to seek Smith tells us, really wanted to be playing with his friends instead out uses of resources and labor that will maximize their produc would have discovered this time-saving technique (WN I.i.8). The tive output: "The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of increasing productivity that the division of labor enables, therefore, every man to better his condition, the principle from which pub is possible only when individuals are allowed both to specialize and lick and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, to capitalize on their locally gathered and unique knowledge. Since is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of a community's relative level of prosperity depends on the degree , things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of to which division of labor takes place within it, Smith's argument ·. government, and of the greatest errors of administration" (WN holds that prosperity itself depends on decentralization. II.iii.31).12 Finally, third, Smith's Invisible Hand Argument (IHA) Smith concludes his argument thus: "It is the great multiplication holds that as each of us strives to better his condition by exploit of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the ing his unique reservoirs of knowledge, each of us thereby also, if division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, unintentionally, betters the condition of others: that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people" (WN l.i.10). How have those communities that have As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can ... to raised their estate, including the estate of the least among them, direct (his] industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; clone so? By allowing the division of labor to flower and take its every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of natural course, and by allowing people to exploit and capitalize the sociery as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends on their localized skills and knowledge. Smith goes so far as to to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promot suggest that this marks the difference indeed between "civilized" ing it.... [HJe intends only his own securiry; and by directing that and "savage" nations: it is only in the former that "the produce of industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abun value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many dantly supplied, and a workman, everi of the lowest and poorest other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 13 order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of no part of his intention. (WN IV.ii.9) 502 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 503 So we seek to achieve our purposes, whatever they are, b~t be rectly after the "invisible hand" passage in WN: "The statesman, cause we are economizers we strive to expend the least amount who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they of energy possible while at the same time trying to get the most ought to employ their capitals, would not only Joad himself with a extensive achievement of our goals possible. When we concentrate most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could our efforts on some small range of tasks or talents, we develop safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council specialized skills and exploit our local knowledge to produce more or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous than we can ourselves consume or use. That means we create a sur as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough plus that we can trade·or sell away-which, in turn, means that the to fancy himself fit to exercise it" (WN IV.ii.10). The statesman's overall stock of goods and services increases, and their prices thus attention is "unnecessary" because, as Smith has demonstrated, decrease, for everyone. In addition, as we seek out cooperative people's decentralized strivings to better their conditions are more labor opportunities, exchanges, forms of contract and trade, and likely to succeed than centralized attempts because the former ex so on that better serve our ends, others may Iearn from our suc ploit local knowledge and natural motivation tha~ the latte~ can cesses and failures, thereby enabling them to go marginally further not. Thus what the statesman would (or should) w1sh to ach1eve in securing their own-and thus, indirectly, others'-ends. Accord bettering people's conditions-is more likely to ha ppen if he does !~g ~o Smith, then, the "invisible hand" effects a "general plenty," a little beyond maintaining a "regular administration of justic~" umversal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the (WN IV.vii.b.2). The "folly and presumption" of the statesman 1s people" (WN I.i.10). What Smith then describes as "the obvious manifested in his false assomption that he can gather and process a~d simple system of natural liberty" (WN IV.ix.51) is a society all the relevant information of people's changing circumstances, w1de allowance of the invisible-hand mechanism to operate: opportunities schedules of value, and so on required to direct their Ail systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus activities as well' as, let alone better than, they themselves can. 15 completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural ·And this mistaken belief is "dangerous" because, Smith suggests, it liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he often leads statesmen to impose, or attempt to impose, their plan does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue for society coercively-with predictably negative results. his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the CENTRALISM IN SMITH? attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innu merable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no I conclude that Smith's political economy is best understood as human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of decentralist and thus on the political right (so defined). Yet those superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it to who see centralism in Smith and thus daim him for the progres wards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. sive left adduce several reasons in support of their position. These (WN fv.ix.51) 14 reasons include: The LKA, EA, and IHA thus form an integrated foundation for 1. Smith is genuinely concerned for the poor in society (WN Intro.4 a decentralized Smithian political economy. Smith summarized and passim); its policy implications in two key passages. First is his "man of 2. Smith is committed not only to a form of moral equality-that system" passage in TMS, already discussed. The second cornes di- is, to viewing each human being as equally deserving of moral 504 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 505 respect (e.g., TMS 11.ii.2.l and TMS ID.3.6)-but also to a belief Regarding daim 4, Smith argues that the danger arises specif in rough equality of natural human ability (e.g., WN l.ii.4); ically when merchants and businessmen enlist politicians in their 3. Smith daims that "it is but equity" that laborers tao be "tolera efforts-in other words, when government grants special favors, bly well fed, cloadied and lodged" (WN 1.viii.36); protections, subsidies, monopolies, charters, and so on to preferred 4. Smith criticizes merchants and businessmen for regularly engag people or firms. The solution, Smith suggests, is not to constru~ a ing in conspiracies against the public welfare (e.g., WN l.viii.13 and WN l.x.c.27); (centralized) governmental apparatus to counteract the deletenous effects of politi.cally motivated business/state partne.rships-si~ce S. Smith argues that if division of labor is allowed to continue to that would fall prey to precisely the baleful rent-seekmg dynanucs the extremes enabled by markets it will have deleterious effects he describes-but, rather, not to allow such partnerships in the first on workers (WN V.i.f.50), and he suggests public funding for place. Thus he recommends that we forbid government interference in education as a partial remedy (WN V.i.f.55-61); such matters and instead let the (decentralized) free market operate.18 6. One of the three main duties of government, according to Smith, The ne~t three daims-5, 6, and 7-are ail places Smith sug- is to attend to "publick works" that are, while;necessary for the gests that some central authority might be justified in interposing good of Society, nevertheless not provided by private enterprise . b h . 19 (WN IV.ix.51 ); in otherwise decentralized market exchanges or pnvate e av10r. Yet in each Smith goes to great lengths to hedge that central au 7. Smith allows that intruding on people's "natural liberty" is some thority. When Smith suggests, for example, that "(f]or a very s~all times required for the common good (e.g., WN Il.ii.94; cp. TMS 11.ii.1. 7-8); expence the publick can facilitate, can encourage, and can even im pose upon almost the whol~ body of the peo~le, .~he neces~ity of 8. When discussing tax policy, Smith writes that "[t]he subjects of acquiring those most essent1al parts of education (WN V.i.f .54 ), every state ought to contribute towards the support of the gov some take this as left-progressive support for public education. But ernment, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities" (WN V.ii.b.3). Smith explains that (1) he means educating only to "read, write, and ·. account," which requires only elementary education (not middle or high school, let alone college) (WN V.i.f.54 and pas_sim?; (2) to e~ Space does not allow a comprehensive discussion of these daims, sure proper alignment of incentives, the public subs1dy 1s to constt but a few words about them will indicate why they do not suffi.ce to mark Smith as a !eh-progressive. tute less than half of the expense (WN V.i.f.55); and (3) wherever possible, private education is to be preferred to public: "Those parts The first three daims above regard, in one way or another, of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there equality, which many consider to be the provenance of the left. 16 are no publick institutions, are generally the best taught.... The Yet concern for the poor, as expressed in daim 1, is of course present three most essential parts of literary education, to read, write, and among people on both (or ail) sicles of the political spectrum.17 account, it still continues to be more common to acquire in private Claim 2, moreover, does not suggest a desire for material equality, than in publick schools; and it very seldom happens that anybody or equality of resources, which left-progressivism requires. And fails in acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to the Smithian concern for equal agency that would justify a decen 20 acquire them" (WNV.i.f.16). . . tralist political economy is quite consistent with daim 3, insofar as Similarly, when Smith suggests that one of the three prmc1pal it requires a respect for the agency-as exemplified in the localized duties of government is that "of erecting and maintaining certain decisions and valuations-of everyone equally, including also the laboring dass. publick works" (WN IV.ix.51), s~me tak~ this. as indicatin? a perhaps generalized support for public goods, 1 which they assoc1ate 506 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 507
with left-progressive politics.22 Yet note the criteria Smith daims tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged" (WN I.vüi.36), he must are requisite for a "publick work" to warrant state provision: the have intended to address it in a way other than through centralized good must be both (1) "in the highest degree advantageous to a 1 government transfer or redistribution. The means Smith intends, great society"-that is, it must benefit (substantially) everyone in therefore, is through the prosperity enabled and encouraged by the community, not merely one group at the expense of others· decentrali.zed commercial activity within the confines of markets and (2} "of such a nature, that the pro.fit could never repay th~ protected by governments limited primarily to protecting negative expence to ·any individual or small number of individuals," and justice. This is what Smith has argued, and believes, will lead to the therefore would not be provided by private free enterprise (WN "universal opulence" and "general plenty diffuses itself through ail V.i.c.1). One might wonder just how many goods would satisfy the differcnt ranks of the society'1 (WN I.i.10). Smith's claim about both. thosc criteria. Given the enormous, and unpredictable, pro "equity" can then be seen as an additional reason to favor bis ductive powers of commercial society, it might turn out to be few "system of natural liberty": the fact that Jaborers too will enjoy in indeed. In any case, Smith goes on to argue that what do qualify as creasing standards of living also matters, since laborers matter tao. proper "publick works" are "always bettcr maintained by a local Finally, regarding Srnith's endorsement of proportional taxation, or provincial revenue, under the management of a local and pro Smith believes he has demonstrated the "impossibifüy of taxing vincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state» the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation" (WN (WN V.i.d.18; cp. WN V.i.d.1 ). V.ii.k.1 ). If taxation by capitation is impossible, however, how could Tha~ leaves us with daim 8, about taxation. The passage quoted we achieve a proportional taxation that tracks the "revenue which above 1s the fuse of Smith's four "maxirns with regard co taxes in [citizens) respectively enjoy under the protection of the state" (WN general" (WN V.ii.b.2). As Smith makes clear in his subsequent V. ii.b.3)? There might be several ways, but what is clear is what discussion, the Smithian government has few (if imponant) du Smith's argument disallows-namely, progressive (or any other) ties, and it therefore requi.res relatively little revenue from taxa income taxation. Thus by "proportional" taxes Smith must mean tion. Moreover, the tax burdens he envisions are not only small but taxes requiring people who spend more or buy more to pay more apparently not in the service of charitable activities like poverty ·. taxes. Possible methods of Smithian taxation might include, then, relief~ old-ag~ pensions, or other redistributive activities typically a value-added tax, a sales tax, user fees (which Smith discusses ap associated with left-progressivism.23 There seems, furthetmore no provingly ),25 or some combination of these. But perhaps the hall indication in WN that Smith believes taxation should fund gov;rn mark of left-progressive political policy, the progressive income ment efforts at reducing, or even addressing, material inequality tax, is disallowed, making even more dubious any attempt to mar perhaps the central defining feature of left-progressivism. A recent shal Smith in support of a left-progressive political program. account of left-progressivism defincs "justice" as requiring the state to "guarantee that property is distributed throughout society so that everyone is supplied with a certain level of material means."24 CONCLUSION: WHO OWNS ADAM SMITH? B! ~ontrast, Smith's definition of justice is "negative"-that is, pro v1dmg only for protection of life, property, and voluntary contract I regard Smith's single most important contribution to social sci (TMS II.ii.2.2). Since one of Smith's principal concems is to relieve ence to be his suggestion that complicated and successful systems the misery and suffering of the poor-as suggested, for example, of social order can arise without any overall designer. He thought when he daims that "Li]t is but equity, besicles, that they who fecd, this explained the development·of moral sentiments, of means of cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such economic production and exchange, and of language. His cliscov a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themsclves ery, moreover, of the implications of the fact that humans have only 508 • CHAPTER 29 SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 509
limited and localized knowledge, and that all humans are roughly 3. See, for example, Samuel Fleischacker, A Third Concept ofLiberty (Prince equal in their abilities to develop skills and knowledge requisite to ton: 1999), A Short History of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, MA: 2005), and their ends (and would do soif allowed),26 led him to conclude that On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion (Princeton: third parties, including the state, need do little for people other 2004); and Emma Rothschild, "Adam Smith and Conservative Economies," Eco nomie History Review 16, no. 1 (1992), pp. 74-96, and Economie Sentiments than give them the opportunity to act according to their own lights (Cambridge, MA: 2002). For general discussion, see Craig Smith, "Adam Smith: and to take responsibility for the consequences, positive or nega Left or Right?," Politica/ Studies 61, no. 4 (2013), pp. 784-98. tive, of their actions. People's natural desires for mutual sympa 4. See, for example, Ronald L. Meek, "Smith, Turgot, and the 'Four Stages' Theory," History of Political Economy 3, no. 1 (1971), pp. 9-27; and Murray thy of sentiments and to better their own conditions largely take Rothbard, An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economie Thought, 2 vols. care of the rest. He is willing to allow that there might be cases in (Cheltenham: 1995). which the state should take on duties beyond those of the night 5. James R. Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketp/ace of Life (Cambridge: 2002). watchman, but the default is against such interventions, and the 6. See Otteson, Adam Smith (London: 2013 ). See also Fonna Forman Bar zilai, Adam Smith and the Circ/es of Sympathy (Cambridge: 2011) and Ryan burden of proof falls on those recommending them to show why Patrick Hanley, Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue (Cambridge: 2009). an exception should be made. And while Smith is quite skeptical 7. See Lauren Brubaker, "Why Adam Smith Is Neither a Conservative Nor of centralized institutional attempts at improving others' lives, he a Libertarian," Adam Smith Review 2 (2006), pp. 197-202. See also Smith on seems optimistic that under the conditions of "regular administra tempering religious enthusiasm, WN V.i.g.8. 8. Many passages in TMS reflect this part of Smith's argument. It is, for tion of justice" people's decentralized pursuits will steadily improve example, the implication of his discussion of laughter and joke telling, in which their lives. he examines the differing judgments people make about what is an appropriate How, then, should we categorize Smith? Smith's government is joke to tel! and what not (see, e.g., TMS l.i.2). Another example is when Smith remarks that the "philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of certainly not nonexistent, but by modern standards it is quite small, a club, to his own little knot of companions" (TMS 11.ii.2.6). A third example is and it leaves to individuals, rather than to centralized authorities Smith's discussion of the fact that "[e]very individual is naturally more attached the freedom and responsibility to direct their lives. 1 would therefore' to his own particular order or society, than to any other" (TMS VI.ii.2. 7). call Smith a skeptical and empirical decentralist, in the tradition 9. Smith's account is actually quite Darwinian-as Darwin himself no ticed. See Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex of classical, not progressive, liberalism. His project was a serious (Princeton: 1981 [1871]), pt. 1, chap. 3. See also Jerry Evensky, Adam Smith's and open-ended investigation into the moral, economic, political, Moral Phi/osophy (Cambridge: 2005). and cultural institutions that lead to human prosperity. He called 10. See Otteson, Adam Smith, chap. 6. himself a "moral philosopher": that seems about right. 11. Other statements of the LKA can be found throughout WN. See, for ex ample, WN I.i.8, IV.v.b.16, IV.v.b.25, and IV.ix.51. 12. The EA can be found throughout WN. See, for example, WN l.i.8, 1.vii.44, I.x.c.14, 11.i.30, 11.iii.28, 11.iii.31, Il.v.37, lli.iii.12, IV.ii.4, IV.ii.8, IV.v.b.43, NOTES IV.ix.28, and V.i.b.18. See also LJA vi.145. 13. Smith repeats variants of this argument throughout WN as well. See, for example, WN lntro.8,' 11.intro.4, 11.iii.39, IV.ii.4, IV.v.b.25, and IV.vii.c.88. For 1 thank Ryan Hanley for his many helpful suggestions and criticisms on an earlier discussion, see G. Kennedy, Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political draft of this chapter. Ali remaining mistakes are mine. Economy (London: 2008); E. Rothschild, Economie Sentiments: Adam Smith, 1. Smith's discussion of sympathy and faimess, as well as his general position Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: 2001); and C. Smith, Adam in the "sentimentalist" camp, have inclined some commentators to redefine his Smith's Po/itical Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order (Lon place in moral philosophy as well. See, for example, Amartya Sen, The Jdea of don: 2006). Justice (Cambridge, MA: 2011). 14. In his 1793 Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D., 2. See, for example, James M Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty (Indianapo Smith's student Dugald Stewart speaks of a manuscript of Smith's, now unfor lis: 2000 [1975]) and Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: tunately lost, that Stewart reports as stating, "Little else is requisite to carry a 2011 [1960)). state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, SMITH AND THE RIGHT • 511 510 • CHAPTER 29 easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; ail the rest being brought question Smith's categorization as a liberal capitalist, see Donald about by the natural course of things. Ali governments which thwart this natural Winch Adam Smith's Politics (Cambridge: 1978) and Ronald L. course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the Meek, '"Smith, Turgot, and the 'Four Stages' Theory," History of progress of society at a panicular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves Political Economy 3 (1971), pp. 9-27. Meek goes so far as to con are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical" (Stewart IV.25). 15. Cf. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (Chicago: 1991), chap. 5 and The Constitu sider Smith a proto-Marxist. Samuel Fleischacker's A Third Con tion of Liberty, chaps. 1 and 2. See also Otteson, "Adam Smith and the Great Mind cept of Liberty (Princeton: 1999) and On ~d~m Smith's W~alth of Fallacy," Social Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 276-304. Nations (Princeton: 2005) argue that Smith is a progressive, not 16. See, e.g., Michael Newman, Socialism: A Very Short Introduction (Ox ford: 2005). classical liberal· and Emma Rothschild's Economie Sentiments 17. As Fleischacker ("Adam Smith on Equality," in The Oxford Handbook (CambrÎdge, MÀ: 2001) similarly questions the attempt to daim of Adam Smith, ed. Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith Smith for the conservative right. On the other sicle of the ledger, [Oxford: 2013], pp. 485-99) and before him Sen (lnequality Reexamined [Cam Craig Smith's Adam Smith's Political Philosophy (London: 20?6) bridge, MA: 1992]) have pointed out, a call for equality-of one sort or another has been a part of much, even most, moral and political theory. argues that Smith should be seen as an early part of the Hayekian 18. See, for example, WN I.vii.26-30, l.x.c.30-31, l.xi.b.5-9, IV.viii.17, spontaneous-order classical liberal tradition. James ~· ?tteso~'s IV. vii.c. 8 8-99, IV.ix.17-28, and IV.ix.50-51. · Actual Ethics (Cambridge: 2006) attempts to use Smith m partial 19. See Smith, "Adam Smith: Left or Right?" defense of a classical liberal political economy. Gavin Kennedy's 20. See also WN V.i.f.4, V.i.f.12, and V.i.g.8. 21. 1 use "public goods" here not in the technical, modem sense of goods that are Adam Smith (London: 2008) places Smith in his own context and both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, but, rather, in the more common (nontechni relates him to contemporary debates concerning free trade and cal) sense of goods that benefit many people or are generally beneficial to society. globalization. Dennis C. Rasmussen's The Problems and P~om 22. Fleischacker speculates that were he alive today Smith might recommend ise of Commercial Society (University Park, PA: .2009). reviews state-mandated pollution standards, mandatory 5 percent of lifetime eamings paid by companies to any of their workers they fire, a mandatory "bicameral Smith's Rousseauvian worries about the commercial society, and form of governance" for corporations "in which one chamber would consist of Ryan Patrick Hanley's Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue employee representatives along with representatives of the communities in which (Cambridge: 2009) examines Smith's concerns about the nature of firms are located, while the other chamber continue[s] to consist of stockholders" (On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, pp. 273-79). virtue in capitalist society. 23. Smith elsewhere mentions approvingly that private entities have often provided "pensions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, &c." (WN l.x.c.34). 24. Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, MA: 2004 ); p. 4. 25. See, for example, WN V.i.d.3 and V.i.e.3. 26. See David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart, The "Vanity of the Philosopher": From Equality ta Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economies (Ann Arbor, Ml: 2005).
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
How to characterize Smith's political philosophy has been the sub ject of many treatments for some time. For a classic account, see Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith and Laissez Faire," journal of Political Economy 35 (1927), pp. 198-232. For more recent accounts that