Università degli studi di Firenze
Scuola di Scienze politiche “Cesare Alfieri”
From Ankara Agreement to Helsinki Summit: Turkey’s Accession Process to the
EU
Muge Cinar
June 2021 Introduction 2
1.Ankara Agreement 3
2.Additional Protocol and Transitional Period 7
3.Customs Union 10
4.From Luxembourg to Helsinki 15
5.Positive Turn after the Helsinki Summit 19
Conclusion 21
Bibliography 23
1 From Ankara Agreement to Helsinki Summit: Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU
Introduction
Turkey's EU membership process began in 1963 with the signing of the Ankara Agreement.
The Customs Union was established on January 1, 1996, after Turkey's candidacy for full membership in the EU was rejected in 1989. Turkey's success in this process, as well as the fact that the EU accepted numerous states from Central and Eastern Europe until the 1990s, encouraged Turkey's attempts to join the EU as a full member. Problems developed in relations during the 1997 Luxembourg Summit as a result of Turkey's special political situation in comparison to the other candidate states, but progress was achieved in Turkey's membership process at the 1998 Cardiff Summit. As a consequence, Turkey was approved as a candidate state to the EU on the same level as other candidate countries at the Helsinki
Summit in 1999. Turkey was expected to create a National Program for the adoption of the
EU acquis in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, which were approved in 1993. At the summit, it was agreed that accession talks with Turkey would begin after Turkey had met all of the Copenhagen requirements. On March 19, 2001, the Council of Ministers approved the
National Program created for this aim. The implementation of the EU acquis by Turkey, as well as the process of negotiating for EU membership, will be addressed and analyzed in this research.
2 1. Ankara Agreement
The second World War caused destruction on the part of Europe. This led countries to cooperate to prevent a similar experience to happen again. The first step taken for this was the European Coal and Steel Community, which was established by France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with the Paris Agreement signed in 1951
(Uysal, 2001). In 1957, the same nations joined the European Economic Community. They agreed to sign the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community and the
European Atomic Energy Community. This economic integration movement has grown into a difficult force.
After the Second World War, Turkey preferred to be in the Western bloc and applied to the
European Economic Community after being accepted to NATO as a member state (Yıldırım,
2013). Turkey, in a way, took an action which would have consequences for all of its future decisions. Turkey's European Union membership process has a long history and is critical for both parties. This critical procedure began with the approval of the Ankara Agreement as an official document.
Turkey applied to the EEC on 31 July 1959, with the thought that the development process would accelerate. However, the application made by Greece to the Community on July 15,
1959, reveals that the concern of being deprived from the advantages of a possible membership was an important factor in Turkey's application (Çayhan & Ateşoğlu Güney,
1996). After making the necessary examinations, the Community Council decided on 11
3 September 1959 to authorize the Commission to conduct negotiations with Turkey regarding the application. It took four years to conclude the negotiations. The military intervention of
May 27, 1960, which took place in this period, negatively affected relations for a while.
Afterwards, during the ongoing negotiations during the Turkish coalition governments,
Turkey rejected the preferential trade agreement option proposed by the Community
(Ceyhan, 1991). The community had concerns due to the political problems in Turkey after military intervention, as well as economic reasons. The community's concerns were behind this trade agreement proposal . That is why the Trade Agreement, which was not accepted by the Turkish side, was replaced by the Association Agreement initiated in Brussels on 25 June
1963 by the representatives of the Commission and the Turkish government. The agreement was signed in Ankara on 12 September 1963 between the İnönü Government and the
Community officials and entered into force on 1 December 1964 (Ceyhan, 1991).
The Ankara Agreement covers progress in the Turkish economy and the development of a harmonious relationship with the EEC by strengthening the bond between the two parties.
With regards to Article 2, the agreement’s goal is explained as "promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people" (Ankara
Agreement). The Ankara Agreement, which consists of 33 articles and a series of protocols and notifications, is an association agreement within the meaning of article 238 of the EEC
Treaty. It was negotiated by the Community, signed by the parties, and ratified by Turkey and the Community Member States in accordance with the procedure indicated in the preceding article. The association agreement is a one-of-a-kind international deal that, under EU law, implies less than EU membership but more than a basic trade agreement. This distinctive trait
4 will become increasingly obvious as the Ankara Agreement is interpreted and implemented.
However, it is a standard international agreement that binds the parties, notably Turkey and the Community, as well as the Member States of the Community. It establishes reciprocal rights and obligations on its own basis in this manner. However, unlike an accession treaty, which is intended to admit a state to the Community, it does not grant private parties, like people and businesses, immediate and direct rights and obligations. As a result, notwithstanding its irregularities, an association agreement functions as a treaty-contract in the traditional sense of the term (Lasok, 1991).
Parties in line with Article 238 of the EEC Treaty, with the objective of improving trade and economic conditions to assist develop the Turkish economy and enhance employment and living conditions for Turkish nationals. The Ankara Agreement envisaged that a Customs
Union was established in three stages: preparatory, transitional, and final (Uysal, 2001).
1. Preparatory Stage: The preparatory period, as outlined in the Provisional and
Financial Protocols attached to the Agreement, lasted 9 years, during which time the
EEC eliminated trade barriers with Turkey on a voluntary basis (Mehter Aykin &
Tache, 2017). The EEC undertook to strengthen the Turkish economy and make it
ready for the transition to the Customs Union with its unilateral obligations. It is
stated in Article 3 as "during the preparatory stage Turkey shall, with aid from the
Community, strengthen its economy so as to enable it to fulfil the obligations which
will devolve upon it during the transitional and final stages" (Ankara Agreement). The
EEC's granting of import facilities to some agricultural products is determined by the
Provisional Protocol and the I. Financial Protocol had effects. The decrease in the
5 share of the EEC in Turkey's foreign trade during the period of 1958-1964, the
increase in the period of 1964-1972 is an example of these effects (Ceyhan, 1991).
2. The Transitional Stage: The preparatory period, as outlined in the Provisional and
Financial Protocols appended to the Agreement, lasted nine years. The transitional
stage lasted 22 years, guided by the provisions set in the Additional Protocol of 30
June 1973, gradually developing a Customs Union between the parties and aligning
them (Mehter Aykin & Tache, 2017).
3. The Final Stage: The latest period in the partnership relationship between Turkey and
the EEC is emphasized in Article 5 of the Ankara Agreement as follows: “The last
period is based on the customs union and requires strengthening the coordination
between the economic policies of the Contracting Parties (Ankara Agreement)”. The
last stage was implemented by the EC-Turkey Association Council Decision No 1/95
of December 22, 1995 on Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs
Union(96/142/EC)(commonly referred to as Decision No 1/95) (Mehter Aykin &
Tache, 2017). The Customs Union, as defined in article 10 of the Ankara Agreement,
entailed: the prohibition between Member States of the Community and Turkey,
of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect,
quantitative restrictions and all other measures having equivalent effect which
are designed to protect national production in a manner contrary to the objectives
of this Agreement (Ankara Agreement); the adoption by Turkey of the Common
Customs Tariff of the Community in its trade with third countries, and an
approximation to the other Community rules on external trade (Kramer, 1996).
6 The task of executing the partnership regime envisaged in the Ankara Agreement was given to the Association Council (Ankara Agreement, art. 22). The Association Council is composed of Turkish government members, member states representatives, Community
Council and Commission representatives (Ankara Agreement, art. 23). The Council carries out its work through the Association Committee, which is the permanent governing body in
Brussels. In addition, the Joint Parliamentary Commission, which consists of eighteen members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament, is the political dialogue platform of the parties and is responsible for the democratic governing of the partnership.
2. Additional Protocol and Transitional Period
During the Preparatory Period, Turkey did not have any obligations to the Community. The
Transition Period started after the ratification of the Additional Protocol (Evin & Denton,
1990). During the process of the ratification of the protocol, while the members of the Justice
Party and the Republican Trust Party voted affirmatively, the members of the Republican
People's Party and the Democratic Party voted against the Additional Protocol (“A History of
Turkey’s Association With the European Community,” 1990). It was argued that Turkey would not be able to undertake the economic obligations that the Transition Period would bring (Çayhan & Ateşoğlu Güney, 1996). At the end of the long discussions in the parliament, the protocol entered into force.
Turkish governments had altered their foreign and domestic policies with regards to the relations with EEC in the transitional period. The Customs Union would be formed gradually, according to article 2 of the Ankara Agreement, and it was expected to be completed in no
7 less than twelve years (Ankara Agreement). An Additional Protocol was established on
November 23, 1970, and came into effect on January 1, 1973, amending the Association
Agreement by establishing a schedule of technical steps to be performed over the next twenty-two years in order to accomplish the aim of a customs union (Rupp, 2001).
We can summarize the important articles of the Additional Protocol as follows: There are sections such as the establishment of the Customs Union for industrial products, the acceptance of the Common Customs Tariff by Turkey and the removal of quantity of goods’ restrictions. In the 2nd part, which deals with the subject of 'The Movement of Persons and
Services', the free movement of workers between Turkey and the member countries of the
Community and the right of settlement, service performance and transportation are examined.
(Additional Protocol, 1977,art. 36-42). In the section "Approaching Economic Policies", how
Turkey will comply with the Community's provisions and legislation on competition and taxation; the issues of coordination of economic and trade policies are mentioned (Additional
Protocol, 1977, art. 43-48).
However, relations between the EEC and Turkey did not work out well throughout the 1970s and 1980s because of several domestic political issues, including military interventions in
1974 (Aksu, 2012). Turkey’s domestic instability followed by difficulties such as the oil crisis in 1973, invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and Greece's application for full membership to the EEC in 1975 (Martin, 2009). Also, the Aegean Sea dispute and the Cyprus problem caused a possible intervention of the Community for being a mediator, which could have been an act against Turkey's interest (Aybey, 2004). Turkey did not want to apply for a full membership at first, because it was not successful in implementing the Ankara Agreement, and also it was economically not in very good condition. The 1970s are known as challenging and lost years
8 for Turkey as a result of political and economic issues. It was no longer sufficient to have an accession agreement and to be recognized as European and it was no longer sufficient to be geostrategically useful as a country (Martin, 2009). Candidates have to show a willingness to strive toward political and economic liberalization as well. At the end of the 1970s, Suleyman
Demirel’s government was in charge, but economic and social hardship were significantly rising. During that time, Demirel's successor, Turgut Ozal, was employed by the State
Planning Organization. He was putting in a lot of effort to figure out what was the roots of the problems, and he understood that Turkey needed to restructure its economy to comply with the rules of Western economies.
In the late 70s, domestic instability caused radical changes in the government policies in
Turkey. Due to a disagreement over trade arrangements, the Bülent Ecevit government froze the provisions of the Association Agreement; nevertheless, the successor Demirel government attempted to rebuild relations and planned to seek full membership (Aybey,
2004). To address the worsening difficulties that had surfaced in the late 1970s, a package of economic stability measures known as the "January 24 Decisions" was implemented in
January 1980. Economic modeling and preferences were drastically altered as a result of these judgments. Following that decision, Turkey's economic policy shifted from "import substituting industrialization to export-led growth strategy," resulting in financial market liberalization and a greater emphasis on international trade. The import regime was liberalized to a large extent in this framework, export-promoting incentives were implemented, and supply and demand systems in foreign markets were established (Aksu,
2012). Without seeing the long term effects of these decisions, the military coup d’etat occured in 12 September 1980. As a response, the European Commission chose to suspend, then entirely freeze, its relations with Turkey in 1982 (ibid). The EC expected the army to
9 respect human rights, treat political detainees well, and transfer control to civilians as quickly as feasible. Following the installation of a civilian government in 1983, relations progressively improved.
3. Customs Union
Despite the tensions experienced between Turkey and EC, especially on democracy and human rights, the Turkish government applied for full membership to the Community on
April 14, 1987, and especially after 1987, very important customs reductions were made in terms of harmonization with the Community (Uysal, 2001). The point that should be noted here is that the application for full membership is not based on the Ankara Agreement and the
Additional Protocol within the scope of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome on “The
Community signing agreements with a third state”, but on the axis of the Treaty that "Every
European State can demand membership of the Community" It was made within the framework of Article 237 (Treaty of Rome).
The EP continued to criticize the issues of minority rights and the Cyprus problem and announced the rejection of the application in its commission report dated 17 December 1989.
Minority rights issues and the Cyprus problem were the political grounds for Turkey's refusal to join the EC. It was stated that economic problems such as high inflation and unemployment that need to be resolved, as well as problems in democratization, political pluralism and the need of making regulations on human rights also create difficulties in
Turkey's integration with the EU. The EC's orientation towards structural goals such as accelerating the decision-making process and establishing the European Single Market, rather than enlargement, caused the report to have a negative content. As a result, the Commission's
10 report was fully adopted by the Council of Ministers convened on 5 February 1990 (Eralp,
1996).
Following these developments, the Commission was given the task of preparing a cooperation package aimed at improving partnership relations. Turkish imports from the
European Community were separated into two categories under the terms of the Additional
Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. Industrial goods for which Turkey was expected to reach international competitiveness relatively quickly were placed on a 12-year list, while other manufactured goods were placed on a 22-year list, with a customs union not expected until
1995 (Togan, 2000). In this context, it was stated that for the realization of the Customs
Union for industrial goods targeted by the Ankara Agreement until 1995, Turkey had to abolish customs duty tariffs, resulting in a 50% reduction in customs duty for products with a
12-year period and 40% for products with a 22-year duration (Uysal, 2001). Among the envisaged negotiations are the gradual liberalization of Turkey's exports of agricultural and textile products; cooperation in areas such as financial services, transportation, energy, environment, science and technology; With the entry into force of the 4th Financial Protocol, there was also the resumption of financial cooperation and the strengthening of political dialogue (Çayhan & Ateşoğlu Güney, 1996).
The decision that established the Custom Union was taken at the 36th Association Council meeting held on 6 March 1995 and entered into force on 1 January 1996. That decision started the last period of the Ankara Agreement. In other words, the Association Council
Decision No. 1/95 is not an agreement signed between the parties, but a document stating the provisions regarding the functioning of the Customs Union agreed upon in the Ankara
Agreement (Decision 1/95 of the Association Council). Accordingly, in Part I titled “Free
11 Movement of Goods and Trade Policy”, the abolition of customs duties and taxes and duties with equivalent effect; trade policies; common customs tariff and preferential tariff policies; there are provisions regarding some processed agricultural products, the list of which is attached to the Customs Union Decision (Decision 1/95 of the Association Council, article
2-23). II. Section “Agricultural Products” (Decision 1/95 of the Association Council, article
24-27), III. The part is titled “Customs Provisions” (Decision 1/95 of the Association
Council, article 28-30). IV. Protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property under the title of “Approximation of Laws”; rivalry; commercial hedging instruments; indirect and direct taxes; areas that need to be harmonized with the laws and regulations of the Community, such as public procurement is indicated (Decision 1/95 of the Association
Council, article 31-51).
Turkey unilaterally assumed obligations close to those of full members. Therefore, Turkey is the first and only country to enter the Customs Union without being a full member. Although it does not take part in the process of creating foreign trade policies (customs legislation, preferential trade agreements with third countries, other agreements, decisions and embargoes) determined by the full members in line with their own interests, they must comply with the decisions taken by the EU as a result of these policies (Uysal, 2001).
How should the benefits and costs of the customs union agreement be evaluated in order to understand the effects on both parties? In order to find out the answer to this question, it is important to analyze the long term effects of the agreement. Turkey’s trade with the EU increased at a considerably quicker rate than its overall trade in the first year . Turkey's trade with the EU, on the other hand, rose far more slowly and at around the same rate as total trade between 1996 and 1998 (Avcı & Hale, 2001). In its 1999 evaluation report, the
12 European Commission describes this tendency as the result of "very slow growth of import demand in the EU, and secondly, a dynamic expansion of Turk demand." (1999 Regular
Report From the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, 1999, page 25).
Until the 1980s, the principal argument in favor of removing Turkey's protective barriers was that developing Turkish industry would not be able to withstand the impact of unrestricted exterior competition (Avcı & Hale, 2001). However, as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's government began to pursue plans to liberalize the economy both externally and internally, official opinions, as well as those of most industries, quickly changed. Only 2% of manufacturing surveyed would not survive in an unsecured climate, but %40 could, and the remaining 58% may be globally competitive if adequate precautions were taken, according to the State Planning Organization in 1988 (Redmond, 1993).
The customs union did not have the same impact on all sectors of the Turkish economy. The textile sector, for example, was a strong supporter, while the car industry struggled to keep some protection in place. Manufacturers of other consumer durables were also concerned about the possibility of increased imports from third countries as a result of the CET's lower duty rates (Avcı & Hale, 2001). The Turkish Union of Chambers, which primarily represents smaller businesses, had come to embrace the customs union among business organizations, while the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), which represents primarily large corporations, kept doing so. Because the agreement did not cover agricultural products, the agricultural chambers were less concerned and informed about the situation.
Not all of the predictions by various industry groups have come true. Exports of vehicles and spare parts, for example, increased by 32% in the first half of 1996 after the customs union was enacted (Avcı & Hale, 2001). Imports of automobiles almost likely grew during the same
13 time period, but the notion that the custom union would be globally less competitive appears to have been exaggerated (ibid). However, the anticipated increase in textile and garment exports did not take place. Rapid increases in yarn prices and the relatively low rate of devaluation of the Turkish lira were blamed, although the impact of antidumping measures imposed by the European Union had not yet been determined (ibid). Textiles, apparel, fibers, leather items, and processed meals, for example, are expected to benefit from the custom union. On the downside, state industries, which are inefficient, would struggle to compete.
Regardless of the customs union, rationalization of the public sector should be a top economic goal.
Domestically, Islamist parties ideologically opposed to Turkey's deeper integration into
Europe have been the most outspoken critics of the customs union deal. Secular critics had argued that improving Turkey's ties with Europe is important, a particular deal on the customs union would be unfair to Turkey. Others have pointed out that, while the customs union agreement imposes significant economic responsibilities on Turkey, it does not offer the
Turkish government a greater involvement in the European Union's decision-making machinery that specifies those requirements (Avcı & Hale, 2001).
Even if the customs union were not in practice, the EU would still be Turkey's most important trading partner. If Turkey had rejected the customs union, it would have remained essentially reliant on the European Union in the economic realm, notwithstanding the customs union agreement's limited consultation processes. The majority of Turkish administrations and articulate public opinion have always supported the notion of ultimate membership, viewing the customs union only as a stepping stone.
14 4. From Luxembourg to Helsinki
International climate had altered after the end of the cold war and it affected the relations between the EU and Turkey. Meanwhile, the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union strengthened Turkey's geopolitical position, which had a favorable impact on restructuring Turkey-EC relations, resulting in the revival of the Ankara Agreement (Krauss,
2000, p. 225). Furthermore, since the conclusion of the Cold War, Turkey's main foreign policy goal has been to devise new strategies to avoid possible isolation (Aybey, 2004).
Changing international climate due to the end of the Cold War caused two important developments. First one is the application of 10 Central and Eastern European countries to become a member of the Union between 1994 and 1996. The second important development is the Agenda 2000 which was drafted by the Commission and presented to the European
Parliament by the Commission President Jacques Santer on 16 July 1997 (Uysal, 2001).
Three main issues discussed in Agenda 2000 were the policies that the Union will follow in the new century and the reforms that need to be made; enlargement; and the financial framework to be implemented in the 2000-2006 period. Within the scope of this report, the elements of the Union's next enlargement strategy and the criteria according to which the situation assessments of the applicant countries will be made were outlined.
Application of 10 countries created a challenge in the enlargement approach. Process of enlargement covers two issues that the EU has to face and these issues are broadening and deepening its base. History of the EU’s Evolution indicates that it has opted to focus on these
15 two issues at different periods. However, due to a significant shift in the international climate, the EU was forced to deal with both at the same time this time (Eralp, 1998). Rather than prior enlargement approaches, a novel and flexible form of integration was required (Nugent,
1995). It was stated that, due to the large number of applicants and the political and economic challenges they face in adapting to EU regulations, the integration process could not be completed at this time and that it would have to be differentiated (Hughes, 1996). There were numerous predictions regarding flexible integration, but the majority of them demanded that it should be a long-term process in which candidates were integrated into different processes at different pace. Applicants would not be given full membership right away, according to these estimates, but would be given a special status which would eventually result in full membership. Turkey’s application for full membership was surprising for many actors in the international era. In the domestic policy, problems concentrated on democracy, human rights, and financial cooperation throughout Turkey's transitional phase.
Another reason for the European Community's unwillingness to accept the Turkish application was that it arrived at a time when the European Community was experiencing problems in consolidating its single market plan by the end of 1992. In these conditions, the
European Commission's report on Turkey took more than two and a half years to complete.
The view amounted to a recommendation when it was issued on December 17, 1989, that accession discussions with any nation should not begin before 1993 (Eralp, 1998). The commission also noted that a detailed examination of Turkey's economic and political condition revealed that the country would struggle to deal with adjustment issues. As a result of this unfavorable attitude toward full membership, the Association Agreement and the CU remained common denominators between Turkey and Europe, and both parties concentrated their efforts on revising the CU.
16 Turkey was granted a special status at the Luxembourg Summit, with a long-term goal of full membership, and it was engaged in the enlargement process alongside the other candidate nations. The EU developed a unique "European strategy" to prepare Turkey for EU membership by bringing it closer to the union. This decision was a significant step forward from "Agenda 2000." (Eralp, 1996). Officials from the European Union believe the Turkish issue was handled fairly. The Turkish administration, on the other hand, thought that Turkey had been treated unfairly and responded with a negative attitude to the decision. The
Luxembourg conclusion, according to Turkey, was unfair and partisan. As a result, the EU's aspirations and Turkey's views were visibly in contrast. The Turkish authorities also believed that the Cophenagen criteria were used in a subjective manner. Turkey blamed EU for taking the Greek side in the Cyprus issue. The anti-European sentiment among Turkey's political elites, which had been growing since the rejection of Turkey's full membership in 1987, was strengthened by the Luxembourg Summit (Eralp, 1996). For the first time, the coalition government's parties have taken a stand against the EU. Turkish political and economic elites supported this viewpoint.
At the Cardiff Summit of 15 – 16 June 1998, the satisfaction of preparing a regular monitoring report for Turkey was emphasized and there was a call for Turkey to continue harmonization with the Community acquis. It is stated that the Regular Report of the
European Council will evaluate the situation of Turkey in terms of candidacy based on the
28th article of the Ankara Agreement and the results of the Luxembourg Summit (Uysal,
2001).
17 Turkey was one of the 12 nations included in the Commission's report on November 4, 1998.
This was viewed as Turkey's candidacy being confirmed. The European Strategy will be evaluated in accordance with Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement and the Copenhagen criteria, according to the first regular report. Therefore, the report makes an assessment based on the Copenhagen criteria. As a result, according to the political criterion of "ensuring the stability of institutions safeguarding democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities," Turkey failed. Turkey, on the other hand, performs better in the economic criterion of "having a functioning market economy, as well as its ability to withstand competitive pressures.". Turkey, on the other hand, performs better on the economic criterion of "having a functioning market economy, as well as its ability to withstand competitive pressure and market forces inside the EU." Long-term macroeconomic stability and regional development should be accomplished with most of the essential elements of a market economy, a vibrant private sector, and free trade laws. According to the third and final criterion, "the ability to adapt to the obligations arising from full membership, including political, economic, and monetary union," Turkey has implemented the majority of the legislation envisioned in the Customs Union decision and has begun the process of harmonization with Community laws in areas covered by the European Strategy. Other than this, it had been stressed that there is still a long way to go.
Following the release of the assessment, the Vienna Summit on the 11th and 12th of
December 1998 urged that the European Strategy be followed in order to prepare Turkey for full membership, and that it be done in accordance with the Luxembourg and Cardiff agreements. Because the situation did not fulfill the parties' expectations, the parties' relationships were maintained in their existing state.
18 Turkey's position was assessed using the Copenhagen criteria in the Second Regular Report, which was issued on October 13, 1999 . Deficits in human rights and minority protection, the persistence of torture, and the government' ongoing limitation of freedom of expression are cited as causes for the weaknesses in political criteria. The death penalty imposed on
Abdullah Ocalan is just another illustration of Turkey's problems with this criteria. In terms of the economic criteria, it was claimed that Turkey would be able to deal with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union if legislative and structural reform plans were completed. Turkey was said to have market economy features, indicating that the economic requirement had been satisfied.
5. Positive Turn after the Helsinki Summit
As mentioned before, Turkey had an Association agreement with the EC since 1963 and had completed the necessary requirements of a customs union after that. Certain economic and political problems occurred during the transitional period and when there was a customs union between the EC and Turkey. These considerations had persuaded Turkey that it would be given privileged status in the membership process compared to the other candidate nations. Those aspirations and expectations of Turkey were not met with much success. Even if Turkey applied for full membership in a very early year which was 1987, it could be considered as the last country that was given a candidate status when compared to other countries. Turkey attained candidate status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 (Baykal, 2002). It was a crucial footstep after having made an effort in the long process to be a member state of the EU.
19 Reasons for this very slow process of accession are several. Most important reasons that caused tension between the two parties are “Kurdish problem” and “Ocalan factor” in the
90s. The difficulties in the relationship began to ease with the capture of calan in February
1999, as well as the ongoing fundamental changes in the Greek administration. Changes in the global environment also contributed to a more favorable relationship between the EU and
Turkey. The ongoing issues in the Balkans, as well as the Kosovo conflict, demonstrated the need for a more thorough geopolitical knowledge of the region, as well as a more welcoming approach toward Turkey (Eralp, 2009).
The European integration process, as well as the Association Agreement with Turkey, demonstrate a step-by-step economic integration process that leads to political integration
(Eralp, 2000). Furthermore, the Turkish ruling elite views the customs union as a means to a goal and wants to play a more active part in Europe's evolving security policy. European security had become more regionalized in that period. As a result, it provided a favorable atmosphere for Turkey's integration into the European security system. Turkey's position in security grew in importance as NATO became the primary organization in European security concerns, and the European security policy was created in cooperation with NATO (Eralp,
2000). Some European policymakers are concerned that Turkey is becoming a "consumer" of securities rather than a "producer" as it was during the Cold War (ibid). Because of this worry, it was stated that, despite Turkey's role in the European Union enlargement being minor, Turkey plays an "essential" role in the Eurasian area. Excluding Turkey would not reduce Europe's security threats, but it would have a negative impact on the European security system. The Ocalan issue demonstrated that establishing boundaries between Europe and Turkey is impossible (ibid). Within the framework of the trans-regionalization of security concerns, Turkey's security challenges have crossed Europe and become internal European
20 problems. It was understood that there is a mutual interest between two parties to overcome the problematic issues among them. European Security issues such as Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated the special attention of Europe through Central and Eastern Europe. The union came into realization of the importance of the stability of its surrounding regions. Because of that realization, solutions were sought for the problems between the relations with Turkey.
The Helsinki Summit took into account European security concerns, Turkey's question of full membership, and ties to specific funding sources connected to the problem. It's not surprising that Turkey's candidacy was announced during a conference in which key decisions on
European security and defense were made. In addition to international crises, the Helsinki
Summit resolved to develop armed forces of up to 50,000-60,000 people to initiate and conduct EU-led operations (Eralp, 2000).
Giving Turkey candidate status in the Helsinki Summit was a game changer in relations between the two parties. After decades of struggle to build a good working relationship between the EU and Turkey, a positive turn had finally been accomplished. The Helsinki
Summit resolved the long-standing uncertainty regarding Turkey's status as a European country, putting an end to the argument over whether Turkey is a European country. Turkey, along with the other twelve candidate nations, had a defined place in the current enlargement process.
Conclusion
With the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, the relations between Turkey and
European Union started. The period between 1963 and 2000 regarding the relations between
21 two parties was examined in this article. It is important to note that, the relations were sometimes good and sometimes come to the breaking point. Unpredictable developments, such as changes in the global political and economic environment, had happened since the signing of the agreement in 1963. These global changes including the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, and the application of ten Central and Eastern European countries for full membership in the EU following the transition of the former Eastern Bloc countries to a free market economy, all impacted the relations of both parties.
It was possible to identify an increasing contact between Turkey and the EC/EU in the months leading up to the Helsinki Summit. We have seen the involvement of the economic elites in the context of the customs union, which has stayed at the governmental level for a long time. After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, this trend began to shift, with Turkey being designated first as a "candidate" and subsequently as a "negotiating" state (Eralp, 2009).
Turkey-EU relations began to change in this shifting climate, as non-governmental engagement became as essential as governmental interaction.
As a result, Turkey is through a complete membership process in which it must satisfy its obligations.The responsibilities deriving from the Customs Union, as well as efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria, have forced a succession of political, economic, and administrative changes, with each step taken bringing Turkey closer to the Union. If Turkey does not want to be left off the map of the future European Union, it must continue to organize for all of the reforms that appear to be tough at the present.
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