The Transdimensional God: a Proposal Regarding God, Time, and Providence by Steve W
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Emotions, Divine Suffering, and Biblical Interpretation by Kevin Vanhoozer Senior Teaching Fellow, C.S
KNOWING . OING &DC S L EWI S I N S TITUTE A Teaching Quarterly for Discipleship of Heart and Mind From the Spring 2017 issue of Knowing & Doing: Does a Red-Faced God Sing the Blues? Emotions, Divine Suffering, and Biblical Interpretation by Kevin Vanhoozer Senior Teaching Fellow, C.S. Lewis Institute Speaking (not so) well of God he God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homo- phobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously T 1 malevolent bully.” So says Richard Dawkins, for whom God is a “moral monster.” Christopher Hitchens echoes the claim, entitling his own book God is Not Great. One expects such bluster from over-confident atheists. More troubling are Christian biblical scholars and theologians who similarly stumble over biblical passages that speak of God’s jealousy, anger, grief and other emotions, and who speak of God not as a moral monster but as an emotional wreck. How can pastors and others speak well of God in the light of biblical texts that depict God as having emo- tions, especially “negative” emotions? May we depart from the classical tradition’s affirmation of God’s divine impassibility (i.e., his imperviousness to suffering), as many today are inclined to do, and say instead that God suffers change? Or does this move confuse the God of the Old and New Testament with the gods of pagan myths, or worse, ourselves? For various reasons, the doctrine of God is once again center Evangelical stage. -
God and Universal Value Commensurability Yujin Nagasawa
God and Universal Value Commensurability Yujin Nagasawa Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK [email protected] A first draft. Please do not quote. 1. Introduction In the eleventh century Anselm introduced a concept of God that is now widely accepted among Judaeo-Christian-Islamic theists: that than which no greater can be thought.1 Anselm presented primarily two applications of this concept: (i) We can construct the ontological argument for the existence of God from this concept; (ii) we can derive from this concept the proposition that God has such individual attributes as omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Over the last nine hundred years philosophers have concentrated on these applications of the Anselmian concept of God. As to (i), they have tried to examine the cogency of the ontological argument. Some have attempted, in particular, to construct objections to the argument and some have tried to defend or improve on it. As to (ii), philosophers have tried to analyse the concepts of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Some have tried, in particular, to provide proper formulations of these attributes and some have tried to show the incoherence of and inconsistency between these attributes. Ironically, however, philosophers have rarely examined in detail the Anselmian concept of God itself. In exactly what sense is God that than which no greater can be thought? The most intuitive response to this question is to say that God is that than which no greater can be thought by virtue of occupying the top link in the ‘great chain of being’, a 1 Anselm, Proslogion, in M.J. -
“Grounding and Omniscience” (PDF)
Grounding and Omniscience Abstract I’m going to argue that omniscience is impossible and therefore that there is no God.1 The argument turns on the notion of grounding. After illustrating and clarifying that notion, I’ll start the argument in earnest. The first step will be to lay out five claims, one of which is the claim that there is an omniscient being, and the other four of which are claims about grounding. I’ll prove that these five claims are inconsistent. Then I’ll argue for the truth of each of them except the claim that there is an omniscient being. From these arguments it follows that there are no omniscient beings and thus that there is no God. §1. Stage Setting The best way to get a grip on the notion of grounding – or more exactly, for our purposes, the notion of partial grounding - is by considering examples. (By “partial grounding” I mean “at-least-partial grounding”, just as mereologists mean “at-least-part of” by “part of”.) The first example hearkens back to Plato’s Euthyphro. Suppose that a theorist claims that as a matter of metaphysical necessity, a given act is morally right if and only if it is approved of by God. At first blush at least, it is plausible that this theorist owes us an answer to following question: when acts are right, are they right because God approves of them, or does he approve of them because they are right? We all understand this question right away, right when we first hear it. -
The Christological Function of Divine Impassibility: Cyril of Alexandria and Contemporary Debate
The Christological Function of Divine Impassibility: Cyril of Alexandria and Contemporary Debate by David Andrew Graham A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Wycliffe College and the Theological Department of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Theology awarded by the University of St. Michael's College © Copyright by David Andrew Graham 2013 The Christological Function of Divine Impassibility: Cyril of Alexandria and Contemporary Debate David Andrew Graham Master of Arts in Theology University of St. Michael’s College 2013 Abstract This thesis contributes to the debate over the meaning and function of the doctrine of divine impassibility in theological and especially christological discourse. Seeking to establish the coherence and utility of the paradoxical language characteristic of the received christological tradition (e.g. the impassible Word became passible flesh and suffered impassibly), it argues that the doctrine of divine apatheia illuminates the apocalyptic and soteriological dimension of the incarnate Son’s passible life more effectively than recent reactions against it. The first chapter explores the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria and the meaning and place of apatheia within it. In light of the christological tradition which Cyril epitomized, the second chapter engages contemporary critiques and re-appropriations of impassibility, focusing on the particular contributions of Jürgen Moltmann, Robert W. Jenson, Bruce L. McCormack and David Bentley Hart. ii Acknowledgments If this thesis communicates any truth, beauty and goodness, credit belongs to all those who have shaped my life up to this point. In particular, I would like to thank the Toronto School of Theology and Wycliffe College for providing space to do theology from within the catholic church. -
The Truth of Divine Impassibility: a New Look at an Old Argument Jeffrey G Silcock
198 Jeffrey G Silcock The truth of divine impassibility: a new look at an old argument Jeffrey G Silcock Jeff is head of the History and Systematic Theology Department at ALC and serves as chair of the LCA’s Commission on Theology and Inter-Church Relations. Introduction From his Nazi prison cell in 1944, Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote to his friend Eberhard Bethge that ‘only the suffering God can help’.1 Just after the war, the Japanese Lutheran theologian Kazoh Kitamori published his ground-breaking book, Theology of the pain of God,2 based around Jeremiah 31:20, where he developed a similar theology of the cross: the pain of God heals our pain. In the suffering of Christ, God himself suffers. In 1973 Jürgen Moltmann came out with his classic, The crucified God, where he takes this further and develops a critical theology of the cross. He holds that a ‘theology after Auschwitz’ has to revise completely the traditional doctrine of God that teaches divine impassibility. Moltmann at the outset reflects on his own experience: ‘Shattered and broken, the survivors of my generation were then returning from camps and hospitals to the lecture room. A theology which did not speak of God in the sight of the one who was abandoned and crucified would have had nothing to say to us then’.3 The old teaching of classical theism that God is beyond suffering died in the death camps of WWII and was no longer tenable. Moltmann wrote his book, which had an enormous impact in its day, with the conviction that only if God is not detached from human suffering, but willingly enters into it with compassion, is there any hope for the future. -
The Influence Aim Problem of Petitionary Prayer: a Cosmic Conflict Approach
Andrews University Digital Commons @ Andrews University Faculty Publications 2020 The Influence Aim Problem of Petitionary Prayer: A Cosmic Conflict Approach John C. Peckham Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/pubs The Influence Aim Problem of Petitionary Prayer: A Cosmic Conflict Approach John C. Peckham Andrews University Abstract: This article addresses the problem of whether petitionary prayer, specifically of the kind aimed at influencing God to bring about some good he otherwise would not have brought about, is consistent with the traditional Christian affirmations of divine omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this article, I first briefly articulate the influence aim problem of petitionary prayer, then briefly introduce and discuss some common approaches to resolving the problem. Finally, I introduce and discuss some implications of retrieving a cosmic conflict approach with rules of engagement as a possible avenue that warrants further consideration relative to the influence aim problem of petitionary prayer. Does it make sense to offer petitionary prayer to God with the expectation that such prayer might influence God to bring about some good he otherwise would not have brought about? Many Christians frequently petition God to mitigate perceived evils and bring about desired goods and do so with the belief that such petitions might make a difference relative to divine action. As Scott A. Davison puts it, “one of the primary purposes of petitionary prayer, according to those who practice it, is to influence God’s action in the world” (2017, 7).1 However, numerous philosophers and theologians have questioned whether petitionary prayer is coherent with the basic tenets of Christian theism, particularly divine omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence (see, e.g., Stump 1979, 81; Basinger 1983, 25–26). -
Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: an ESSAY in PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 5 Issue 4 Article 8 10-1-1988 Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY Ronald J. Feenstra Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Feenstra, Ronald J. (1988) "Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 5 : Iss. 4 , Article 8. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19885443 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol5/iss4/8 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. BOOK REVIEWS Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Richard E. Creel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Pp. xi and 238. $39.50. RONALD 1. FEENSTRA, Marquette University. The recent revival of interest in philosophical theology has led to renewed attention to a number of features of traditional theism, including such assertions as that God is simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. Theologians, process thinkers, and analytic philosophers of religion have devoted much effort to determining whether these claims about God are coherent and, if so, whether they are compatible with statements that God is loving, active in history, and responsive to prayer. Richard E. Creel's Divine Impassibility addresses these issues in an impressive and impor tant defense of the doctrine of divine impassibility. -
Paul Gavrilyuk, the SUFFERING of the IMPASSIBLE GOD: the DIALECTICS of PATRISTIC THOUGHT
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 23 Issue 4 Article 7 10-1-2006 Paul Gavrilyuk, THE SUFFERING OF THE IMPASSIBLE GOD: THE DIALECTICS OF PATRISTIC THOUGHT Ken Casey Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Casey, Ken (2006) "Paul Gavrilyuk, THE SUFFERING OF THE IMPASSIBLE GOD: THE DIALECTICS OF PATRISTIC THOUGHT," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 23 : Iss. 4 , Article 7. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200623441 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol23/iss4/7 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. BOOK REVIEWS The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, by Paul Gavrilyuk. Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 222. $99 (hardback). KEN CASEY, Hopkinsville Community College Jurgen Moltmann in The Crucified God makes a powerful case for the belief that God suffers. At least since then in modern theology and philosophy of religion the predominant current flows in the direction of divine pas sibility. A handful of thoughtful theologians, however, are attempting to reverse or qualify that trend. Richard Creel's Divine Impassibility argues for a qualified impassibility as does Thomas Weinandy's Does God Suffer? In addition the latest among this group is Paul Gavrilyuk's The Suffering of the Irnpassible God. Creel's work is primarily an analytic effort in philosophical theology and Weinandy's work is structured by the concerns of systematic theology. -
Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and Evil
Omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and evil Last time, we discussed Anselm’s conception of God as that being which has every property that it is better to have than not to have; and from this, we argued that God must have, at least, three properties. omniscient omnipotent omnibenevolent Last time we focused on problems which result from omnipotence alone; today we’ll focus on problems which result from the combination of omnipotence with omnibenevolence. (Later in the course we’ll return to problems involving omniscience.) One of the oldest, and most important, arguments against the existence of God tries to show that the idea that God is all-powerful and all-good contradicts a very obvious fact about the world: the fact that it contains evil. The reading for today is a powerful version of that argument, which is due to the Australian 20th century philosopher John Mackie. What we need to understand, first, is why Mackie thinks that these three claims are contradictory. The three claims are: God is omnipotent. God is wholly good. Some evil exists. Now, it is certainly not obvious that these three claims are contradictory. Mackie thinks that we can show them to be contradictory with the help of two further premises: If something is wholly good, it always eliminates as much evil as it can. If something is omnipotent, it can do anything. God is omnipotent. If something is wholly good, it always eliminates as much evil as it can. God is wholly good. If something is omnipotent, it can do anything. Some evil exists. Now our question is: why does Mackie think that these five claims are contradictory? To answer this, we can begin by thinking about the claims that God is omnipotent and that God is wholly good. -
Light, Life, and Love
Light, Life, and Love Author(s): Inge, William Ralph (1860-1954) Eckhart, Johannes (c. 1260-1327) (Author of section) Tauler, John (c. 1300-1361) (Author of section) Suso, Henry (c. 1296-1366) (Author of section) Publisher: Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library Description: This book has everything a reader needs to explore the world of German mysticism. William Inge begins with an introduc- tion of histories, biographies, and summaries of the move- ment, and his scholarly articles will prove useful for the stu- dent of mysticism. Then he includes in the book many ex- amples of the writings of the 14th century Dominicans, the Friends of God. These friends were an informal group of Catholics who strove to deepen both their communal relation- ships as well as their inner spirituality. Eckhardt, Tauler, and Suso were the major proponents of this theology, and each is represented in Inge©s collection.This book is a unique and convenient volume that will assist readers interested in the fascinating movement of German mysticism. Abby Zwart CCEL Staff Writer Subjects: Practical theology Practical religion. The Christian life Mysticism i Contents Title Page 1 Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 1. The Precursors of the German Mystics 4 2. Meister Eckhardt 7 3. Eckhardt's Religious Philosophy 10 4. The German Mystics as Guides to Holiness 19 5. Writers of the School of Eckhard–Tauler 21 6. Suso 22 7. Ruysbroek 24 8. Theologia Germanica 25 9. Modern Mysticism 26 10. Specimens of Modern Mysticism 28 Light, Life and Love 31 Eckhardt -
Why Can't the Impassible God Suffer?
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UCLouvain: Open Journal Repository (Université catholique de Louvain) 2018 TheoLogica An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology S.I. NEW THEMES IN ANALYTIC DOGMATIC THEOLOGY DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v0i0.1313 Why Can’t the Impassible God Suffer? Analytic Reflections on Divine Blessedness R.T. MULLINS University of St Andrews [email protected] Abstract: According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine attributes like timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency. In some interesting way, these attributes are meant to explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. I shall argue that these attributes do not explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. In order to understand why the impassible God cannot suffer, one must examine the emotional life of the impassible God. I shall argue that the necessarily happy emotional life of the classical God explains why the impassible God cannot suffer. Keywords: Impassibility, Timelessness, Immutability, Simplicity, God Throughout most of the history of Christianity, the doctrine of divine impassibility has enjoyed wide assent. However, its role in systematic theology has waxed and waned in different eras. During the early Christological debates, impassibility was the default view. It played an influential role against Logos-sarx models of the incarnation as well as a role in late Arian arguments against the full divinity of Christ.1 Later generations, however, have not cast a favorable eye on impassibility. Before the turn of the 20th Century, various theologians began to endorse divine passibility in reaction to the unethical implications they perceived to be involved in the doctrine of divine impassibility. -
Of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering
religions Article The “Whence” of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering Viktor Ilievski Philosophy Department, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Edificio B Campus de la UAB Bellatera, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain; [email protected] or fi[email protected] Received: 16 February 2020; Accepted: 13 March 2020; Published: 18 March 2020 Abstract: Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedanta-s¯ utra¯ II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.