Feminism & Philosophy Vol. 09, No. 1 (Fall 2009)
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Feminist Theory: a Philosophical Anthology Ann Cudd (Editor), Robin Andreasen (Editor)
To purchase this product, please visit https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/9781405116602 Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology Ann Cudd (Editor), Robin Andreasen (Editor) Paperback 978-1-405-11661-9 November 2004 Out of stock £31.25 Hardcover 978-1-405-11660-2 November 2004 Out of stock £103.00 DESCRIPTION Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology addresses seven philosophically significant questions regarding feminism, its central concepts of sex and gender, and the project of centering women’s experience. • • Topics include the nature of sexist oppression, the sex/gender distinction, how gender-based norms influence conceptions of rationality, knowledge, and scientific objectivity, feminist ethics, feminst perspectives on self and autonomy, whether there exist distinct feminine moral perspectives, and what would comprise true liberation. • • Features an introductory overview illustrating the development of feminism as a philosophical movement • • Contains both classic and contemporary sources of feminist thought, including selections by Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Simone de Beauvior, Kate Millett, bell hooks, Marilyn Frye, Martha Nussbaum, Louise Antony, Sally Haslanger, Helen Longino, Marilyn Friedman, Catharine MacKinnon, and Drucilla Cornell. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ann E. Cudd is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Women’s Studies at the University of Kansas. She is co-editor of Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism (with Anita Superson, 2002). Robin O. Andreasen is Assistant Professor -
Feminism & Philosophy Vol.5 No.1
APA Newsletters Volume 05, Number 1 Fall 2005 NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY FROM THE EDITOR, SALLY J. SCHOLZ NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, ROSEMARIE TONG ARTICLES MARILYN FISCHER “Feminism and the Art of Interpretation: Or, Reading the First Wave to Think about the Second and Third Waves” JENNIFER PURVIS “A ‘Time’ for Change: Negotiating the Space of a Third Wave Political Moment” LAURIE CALHOUN “Feminism is a Humanism” LOUISE ANTONY “When is Philosophy Feminist?” ANN FERGUSON “Is Feminist Philosophy Still Philosophy?” OFELIA SCHUTTE “Feminist Ethics and Transnational Injustice: Two Methodological Suggestions” JEFFREY A. GAUTHIER “Feminism and Philosophy: Getting It and Getting It Right” SARA BEARDSWORTH “A French Feminism” © 2005 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN: 1067-9464 BOOK REVIEWS Robin Fiore and Hilde Lindemann Nelson: Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory REVIEWED BY CHRISTINE M. KOGGEL Diana Tietjens Meyers: Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life REVIEWED BY CHERYL L. HUGHES Beth Kiyoko Jamieson: Real Choices: Feminism, Freedom, and the Limits of the Law REVIEWED BY ZAHRA MEGHANI Alan Soble: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings REVIEWED BY KATHRYN J. NORLOCK Penny Florence: Sexed Universals in Contemporary Art REVIEWED BY TANYA M. LOUGHEAD CONTRIBUTORS ANNOUNCEMENTS APA NEWSLETTER ON Feminism and Philosophy Sally J. Scholz, Editor Fall 2005 Volume 05, Number 1 objective claims, Beardsworth demonstrates Kristeva’s ROM THE DITOR “maternal feminine” as “an experience that binds experience F E to experience” and refuses to be “turned into an abstraction.” Both reconfigure the ground of moral theory by highlighting the cultural bias or particularity encompassed in claims of Feminism, like philosophy, can be done in a variety of different objectivity or universality. -
Women in Philosophy: Problems with the Discrimination Hypothesis
Log In WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS WITH THE DISCRIMINATION HYPOTHESIS Dec 10, 2014 | Neven Sesardic, Rafael De Clercq Your Email Address Neven Sesardic is professor of philosophy at Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, NT, Hong Kong; [email protected]. He is the author of Making Sense of Heritability (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Rafael De Clercq is associate professor and head of the Department of Visual Studies, and adjunct associate professor of philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, NT, Hong Kong; [email protected]. The authors thank these individuals for useful comments on earlier drafts: Tomislav Bracanović, Stephen J. Ceci, Andrew Irvine, Paisley Livingston, Darrell Rowbottom, Nosson ben Ruvein, David N. Stamos, Matej Sušnik, Omri Tal, Daniel Wikler, Wendy M. Williams, and Jiji Zhang. None of these people, however, should be assumed to agree with the main claims of this paper. Editor’s Note: This is the complete version of an article with the same title adapted for the Winter 2014 Academic Questions (vol. 27, no. 4) A number of philosophers attribute the underrepresentation of women in philosophy largely to bias against women or some kind of wrongful discrimination. They cite six sources of evidence to support their contention: (1) gender disparities that increase along the path from undergraduate student to full-time faculty member; (2) anecdotal accounts of discrimination in philosophy; (3) research on gender bias in the evaluation of manuscripts, grants, and curricula vitae in other academic disciplines; (4) psychological research on implicit bias; (5) psychological research on stereotype threat; and (6) the relatively small number of articles written from a feminist perspective in leading philosophy journals. -
ANNUAL REPORT for 2020 Finalized May 2021
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2020 Finalized May 2021 Hypatia Editors Bonnie Mann (January 2019 –) Erin McKenna (January 2019 –) Camisha Russell (January 2019 –) Rocío Zambrana (September 2018 –) Hypatia Reviews Online Editors Erin McKenna (January 2019 –) Clara Fischer (January 2020 –) Hypatia Managing Editors Sarah LaChance Adams (January 2019 –) Caroline Lundquist (March 2020 –) Hypatia Editorial Assistant Eli Portella (January 2019 – March 2020) Brooke Burns (March 2020 –) HRO Managing Editor Bjørn Kristensen (September 2019 – September 2020) Jane Nam (September 2020 –) OVERVIEW With this 2020 annual report, we resume the previous schedule in which the report is drafted after the full 2020 report from Cambridge University Press has been delivered to the editors (Feburary/March). In a new practice, it is to be presented to all interested parties within Hypatia’s tripartite governance structure during an Annual General Meeting (March 22, 2021). It covers the period from January 1 through December 31, 2020 (with some additional insights from the first months of 2021). It has been drafted by Camisha Russell, who took the position among the Co-Editors of Coordinating Co-Editor in September 2020. This year saw only minor, mostly planned changes in the Editorial teams. In January, Clara Fischer joined Erin McKenna as Co-Editor of Hypatia Reviews Online. In March, Caroline Lundquist joined Sarah LaChance Adams as Co-Managing Editor of Hypatia and Brooke Burns took over the Editorial Assistant position, which includes management of Hypatia’s social media. In September, Jane Nam took over the Managing Editor position for HRO. 1 Major accomplishments for 2020 include the following (further detailed below): (1) The reconstitution of the Board of Associate Editors in January (2) The creation of an International Advisory Board (not within official governance structure) in February (3) The online publication of curated article collections celebrating Juneteenth and in memory of María Lugones. -
2017 Abbreviated ANN GARRY Department Of
2017 Abbreviated ANN GARRY Department of Philosophy California State University, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90032-8114 310-409-8724 [email protected] http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/ann-garry Education Ph.D., 1970 University of Maryland Dissertation: Visualizing M.A., 1966 University of Chicago B.A. magna cum laude, 1965 Monmouth College, Monmouth, Illinois Selected Professional Experience Fall 2013-14 Fulbright Professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest Fall 2011 Humphrey Professor in Feminist Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Ontario 2011 Professor Emerita, California State University, Los Angeles 20 2007 Fulbright Professor, University of Tokyo 2006-2011 Professor Emerita, teaching four courses each year under the Faculty Early Retirement Program, California State University, Los Angeles 1983-2006 Professor of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles Department Chair 1982-1985, 1993-1998, 2004-2006 Associate Professor 1977-1983 Assistant Professor 1969-1977 2002-2004 Founding Director, Center for the Study of Genders and Sexualities, California State University, Los Angeles Spring 2008, Fall 2006, Spring 2004, Spring 2002, Winter 2000, Spring 1998, Winter 1991 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles 1989-1990 Acting Director, Special Academic Programs, California State University, Northridge 1988-1989 Administrative Fellow, California State University System, San Jose State University Spring 1988 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California Fall 1978, Fall 1979 Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California Spring 1977 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles Fields of Specialization Feminist Philosophy, Philosophical Method, Epistemology, Applied Ethics, Books Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, co-edited with Serene Khader and Alison Stone. -
Editorial Note. Disputatio Symposium on Sally Haslanger's Work
Editorial note. Disputatio Symposium on Sally Haslanger’s Work Teresa Marques University of Barcelona DOI: 10.2478/disp-2018-0011 BIBLID [0873-626X (2018) 50; pp.169–172] Abstract The articles collected in this symposium are result of the workshop Doing Justice to the Social, which was dedicated to the work of Sally Haslanger. The workshop took place at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona between the 6 and 8 June 2016. The workshop was also the 10th Meeting of the NOMOS Network for Practical Philosophy. The network meetings focus on philosophical issues connected with practical concerns, examined in an open-minded manner. This sympo- sium collects articles by Rachel Sterken, Esa Díaz-León, and Jennifer Saul, and also Sally Haslanger’s reply to authors. Keywords Sally Haslanger, social construction, structuralism, individualism, implicit biases. The articles collected in this symposium are result of the workshop Doing Justice to the Social, which was dedicated to the work of Sally Haslanger. The workshop took place at the Universitat Pompeu Fab- ra in Barcelona between the 6 and 8 June 2016. The workshop was also the 10th Meeting of the NOMOS Net- work for Practical Philosophy. The network meetings focus on philo- sophical issues connected with practical concerns, examined in an open-minded manner. The materials for the discussion are usually drawn not only from current scholarly debates on the matter, but also from other humanistic disciplines, social and political issues of the day and current scientific research. Sally Haslanger is the Ford Professor of Philosophy in the Depart- ment of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Disputatio, Vol. -
On Being Objective and Being Objectified
On Being Objective and Being Objectified The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Haslanger, Sally. "On Being Objective and Being Objectified." A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by Louise M. Antony and Charlotte E. Witt, Rouledge, 2019. © 2002 Taylor & Francis As Published http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429502682 Publisher Routledge Version Author's final manuscript Citable link https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130235 Terms of Use Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike Detailed Terms http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ On Being Objective and Being Objectified1 Sally Haslanger University of Pennsylvania 1. INTRODUCTION One of the common themes in feminist research over the past decade has been the claim that reason is "gendered"; more specifically, that reason is "male" or "masculine". Although feminists have differed in their interpretations of this claim and the grounds they offer for it, the general conclusion has been that feminist theory should steer clear of investments in reason and rationality, at least as traditionally conceived. For example, we should avoid an epistemology which privileges reason or the standpoint of reason; we should avoid theories of the self which take rationality to be a defining trait; and we should avoid endorsing moral and political ideals which glorify reason and the reasonable "person" (read: man). The feminist resistance to ideals of reason has at least two different strands. On one strand, giving reason prominence is problematic by virtue of what it leaves out; our views (and our lives) are distorted by a failure to recognize and properly value what has traditionally counted as "feminine". -
Evaluating Arguments for the Sex/Gender Distinction
Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00157-6 Evaluating Arguments for the Sex/Gender Distinction Tomas Bogardus1 Received: 11 July 2019 /Revised: 13 December 2019 /Accepted: 16 December 2019 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/ gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biolog- ical determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experi- ments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/ gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. Keywords feminism . sex/gender distinction . gender. transgender. trans . ameliorative inquiry. conceptual engineering . biological determinism . biological sex 1 Introduction 1.1 The Traditional Definitions of ‘Woman’ and ‘Man’ Since at least the middle of the twentieth century, psychologists, psychiatrists, sociol- ogists, and philosophers have put forward a distinction between sex and gender. -
Political Epistemology and Social Critique Sally Haslanger MIT Abstract Under Conditions of Ideology, a Standard Model of Normat
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Political Epistemology and Social Critique Sally Haslanger MIT Abstract Under conditions of ideology, a standard model of normative political epistemology – relying on a domain-specific reflective equilibrium – risks status-quo bias. How do we undertake ideology critique? How is a critical standpoint achieved and what grounds its claims? One way of achieving a critical standpoint is through consciousness raising. Consciousness raising offers a paradigm shift in our understanding of the social world; but not all epistemic practices that appear to “raise” consciousness, are warranted. However, under certain conditions sketched in the paper, consciousness raising produces a warranted critical standpoint and a pro tanto claim against others. This is an important epistemic achievement, yet under conditions of collective self-governance, there is no guarantee that all warranted claims can be met simultaneously. There will be winners and losers even after legitimate democratic processes have been followed. Keywords Social critique, critical theory, non-ideal theory, consciousness raising, oppositional consciousness, moral epistemology, justice. Haslanger 26 May 2020 Political Epistemology and Social Critique Sally Haslanger Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1. Introduction My recent work defends a practice-based account of ideology. Social practices and social structures depend on a collection of social meanings – I call this a cultural technē – that provides a “stage- setting” for action and is a constituent part of the local social-regulation system (e.g., Haslanger 2018; 2017a; 2017b). These cultural technēs enable us to coordinate by providing the paths and signals of our practices. An ideology is a cultural technē “gone wrong.” It prevents us from recognizing or creating forms of value, and/or, organizes us in unjust ways. -
The Potential of Solidarity in Existential Feminist Discursive Methods
Portland State University PDXScholar University Honors Theses University Honors College 5-22-2020 The Potential of Solidarity in Existential Feminist Discursive Methods Bella Brown Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses Part of the Feminist Philosophy Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Brown, Bella, "The Potential of Solidarity in Existential Feminist Discursive Methods" (2020). University Honors Theses. Paper 879. https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.900 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. The Potential of Solidarity in Existential Feminist Discursive Methods by Bella Brown An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in University Honors and Philosophy Thesis Advisor Monica Mueller Ph.D. Portland State University 2020 Brown 2 In the following paper I will show, through a myriad of feminist scholars, the nuances of individual freedom and the constraints that come with being an individual ingrained in the cultural context of society and community: as some existentialists call it, the burden of the human condition. There is no possibility of understanding exactly where another individual is coming from, nor complete amelioration of differences; this is because these should not be the aspirations of discourse. Discourse is meant to provide a field for individuals to maintain individual differences and take authorship in defining how transcendence of norms can be broached. -
General Editor's Introduction
General Editor’s Introduction PAISLEY CURRAH ike any new transdisciplinary area, at the moment of trans studies emergence L there were no conventions limiting what one could look at, no particular sets of methodological processes one must follow, no “proper objects” (Butler 1994). Before Sandy Stone launched the field with the appearance in 1991 of “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto,” the study of all things trans had pretty much been limited to pathologizing medical and psychiatric discourses (1991). After its publication, the horizons seemed endless. Since then, the truly trans- disciplinary side of trans studies—distinct from the medical and psychological literatures, which, if no longer explicitly pathologizing, are certainly disciplinarily bound—has made possible the comingling of things that are not supposed to go together: biological and text-based disciplines, or the study of humans and the study of other animals, to give just two examples. But it’s difficult for a new area of inquiry to maintain its transdisciplinarity for very long. If it is to survive, it must adopt at least some of the conventions of a discipline. As institutional formations, disciplines matter in important and concrete ways. The differences between how disciplines organize the production of knowledge justify the existence of departments and programs, jobs, grants, and publication opportunities. Emerging areas of inquiry have no departments and no academic jobs, and fewer grant opportunities. If editors and hiring committees think the object of your research is weird, or if your evidence seems nonsensical, it’s much more difficult to get published. Important work gets done in the institutional homes that disciplines offer. -
Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 71, No. 4; December 1993 SYMPOSIUM on FEMINISM and REASON the 1992 Women in Philosophy C
Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 71, No. 4; December 1993 SYMPOSIUM ON FEMINISM AND REASON The 1992 Women in Philosophy conference, held in conjunction with the annual conference of the Australian Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, was organised around the theme of Feminism and Reason. Participants in the Women in Philosophy conference were invited to submit their papers for pub- lication in a special symposium in this Journal. Of those submitted, the following five were accepted for publication. Thanks are due to Karen Green, Rae Langton and Genevieve Lloyd for various forms of help in bringing the papers to a wider audience, and to the many people from whom I obtained help in the refereeing process [Ed.]. BEYOND A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF REASON Rae Langton I. Prolegomena Introduction Much recent feminist work in philosophy has focused on the broad claim that reason is gendered. Some say that the traditional privileging of rationality is bad because of what it leaves out: there may be norms other than norms of reason; and there may be norms of reason other than those traditionally privileged. On this first view, there is nothing objectionable about the traditional norms as such; what is objec- tionable is an undue preoccupation with them, at the expense of norms -- tradition- ally associated with women, perhaps -- that are just as important. Others say that the norms themselves are objectionable, that they are directly implicated in the power relations of oppression. On this second view, traditional norms are to be challenged, not because of their sins of omission, but their sins of commission.2 We I am grateful to Sally Haslanger, Richard Holton, Jennifer Hornsby, Lloyd Humberstone, and Natalie Stoljar, for ideas and comments that helped to improve this paper.