Weakness of Will, Addiction and Self- Control: Using Relapse Prevention Methods in Philosophical Counselling
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Weakness of Will, Addiction and Self- control: using Relapse Prevention Methods in Philosophical Counselling Antonia Macaro Introduction results from ignorance of the good and that it is impossible to know the good and at the same time The possibility of weakness of will has posed thorny pursue evil things. This is grounded in the doctrine that philosophical problems through the ages, and is still all deliberate action aims at the good, and that a hotly debated today. It can, however, represent an judgement about what is best is a judgement about how equally difficult challenge for the philosophical to achieve the good. If people pursued the wrong counsellor. It is a fairly common scenario for people to course of action it would show that they didn’t really give serious consideration to an issue in their life, come know the good in the first place. The problem is that to the conclusion that decision x is, all things considered, this does not seem to fit the fact that human beings best for them, and yet find themselves, when the time sometimes (or even often) do wrong while declaring comes, doing y instead. This could of course be due to a that they know what the right thing to do is. Plato is faulty decision-making process, and to overlooking held to have accepted Socrates’ position early on, and some factors that should in fact have been given more later have come to allow that knowledge of the good importance. Equally, however, it may be that the may be made ineffective by the workings of passion. decision reached is the right one, and that one needs to Plato’s explanation seems to solve the problem by find ways of counteracting whatever it may be that positing that the agent is somehow overcome by an prevents one from carrying out the chosen option. alien force. While this explanation may apply in some cases, it leaves out the seemingly plausible cases in Traditionally, weakness of will has been seen as a which action against one’s knowledge of the good is problem of rationality and addiction as a phenomenon intentional. Aristotle introduced the term akrasia , entirely outside the sphere of rationality. More recent usually translated as ‘weakness of will’, but also ‘lack of psychological theories, however, draw a more complex self-control’. Like Plato, Aristotle seemed to allow desire picture of addictive behaviour, which brings in the to override reason. However, he also introduced some notion of self-control; at the same time, philosophical novel distinctions. Akrasia involves acting on a desire theorists on weakness of will have found it problematic (in cases where most people would refrain) and contrary to account for the phenomenon solely in terms of to one’s true moral judgement, whereas the opposite is practical reasoning, and have begun to posit the true of enkrateia (self-control). Akrasia is divided into existence of other factors that may influence action. I two types: impetuosity (which involves acting to satisfy shall review the literatures on weakness of will and on a desire without thinking) and weakness (in which the addiction in order to show how the two seem to agent does reason but does not abide by the result). dovetail. I shall then outline some relapse prevention Furthermore, akrasia may be due to different types of methods that could be useful in dealing with weakness desires. There is much controversy about what of will in a philosophical counselling setting. Aristotle’s theory really was, and in particular whether Weakness of will he allowed the possibility of intentionally acting akratically. Both akrasia and enkrateia are seen by Background Aristotle primarily as character traits. The problem of weakness of will as discussed in In Greek philosophy, the debate focused primarily on Western philosophy first arose in relation to the Socratic moral concerns. A problem similar to the one that had doctrine that ‘no one does wrong willingly’. This is arisen in Greek philosophy was faced by R. M. Hare usually taken to mean that doing something wrong (1963), who believed that the very function of moral http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk 55 Practical Philosophy Spring 2002 judgements was to guide conduct, and that accepting either x or y intentionally. (1) and (2) make the that we ought to do something committed us to doing it connection between judgement, motivation and action a (hence the name sometimes given to Hare’s theory, prerequisite of rationality, and they clearly contradict the prescriptivism). Again, this did not fit the facts, and fact that there are incontinent actions (as defined above), Hare also resorted to blaming moral weakness on some since they do not, as they ought to, ensure that the agent kind of overwhelming desire that made the moral does indeed do x. judgement powerless. The only other possibility envisaged by Hare to account for moral weakness was Davidson’s solution is technical and complex but does 1 that of some kind of insincerity, which could go from not ultimately work . An important distinction that was self-deception to hypocrisy. The problem is created by made in response to his theory, however, is that positing a close connection between thinking a course of between evaluation and motivation (Watson, 1977; Mele, action good, wanting to pursue it, and pursuing it. It 1987). (1) is true or false depending on what sense we would seem that any philosophy that held a version of attribute to ‘wants’: it is true if we take it to mean that if this theory would find it impossible to solve the an agent judges x better than y he or she ranks x more problem in any way other than the ones that were highly, but it is false if we take it to mean that he or she is actually resorted to. Neither the Greeks nor Hare could more motivated to do x. Although both may be account for intentional action against one’s moral described as ‘wanting more’, what the agent ranks more judgement. However, our experience seems to tell us highly does not necessarily coincide with what he or she that this possibility exists. This was the focus of is more motivated to do. Mele writes that at this point Davidson’s work. reason-explanation comes to an end, and that the only way to deal with Davidson’s problem is to recognise Davidson and beyond that practical reasoning is not the sole determinant of motivation: reasons and judgements do have some The original problem revolved around acting contrary motivational force, but we need to take other factors into to what one knows is right, which, given the conceptual consideration in order to explain at least some actions. frameworks, could be solved only by positing some kind of ignorance, or psychological compulsion, or Mele’s account of action against one’s better judgement insincerity. In Davidson’s (1970/1980) formulation, the aims at preserving both the rationality and the problem of weakness of will became that of irrationality of such action (it is done for reasons, but not intentionally, and while aware of alternative courses of the reasons considered best). In his view, ‘action against action, acting against one’s better judgement. Clearly, in one’s better judgement is adequately explained in terms order to generate this puzzle, the agent needs to be sincere in his or her better judgement and still hold it at 1 Davidson resolves the problem by introducing a the time of action. Davidson shifted the focus of enquiry ‘prima facie’ sentential operator that limits the from moral judgements to better judgements of any desirability of the pro-attitude to certain respects kind, from moral weakness to rationality, but he (‘insofar as’) and turns the conclusion into an ‘all things accepted a version of the close connection between considered’ judgement, which includes a weighing up forming a better judgement as to what course of action of all the pros and cons known to the agent (‘a is better should be pursued, wanting to pursue it and pursuing it than b, all things considered’). An action, on the other (judgement, motivation and action). hand, reflects an unconditional judgement of desirability, later identified with an intention (‘a is better The problem then is as follows. Davidson believes that than b’). The link between ‘all things considered’ the phenomenon of weakness of will (or ‘incontinence’, judgements and unconditional ones is causal, but there as he prefers to say) exists, in the sense that it is possible is also a logical link (as rational agents we should for an agent to do y intentionally while at the same time perform the action we consider best). Incontinent action, believing that there is an alternative action x open to him on the other hand, is action in accordance with an and that, all things considered, it would be better to do x unconditional judgement that has been caused by a than to do y. At the same time, he also maintains two ‘prima facie’ judgement rather than by an ‘all things principles of rationality, which are that: 1) if an agent considered’ one. Davidson is unable, however, to judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then explain why, in such cases, prima facie considerations he wants to do x more than y, and 2) if an agent wants to are able to override the normal transition from ‘all things do x more than y, and he believes himself free to do considered’ judgements to unconditional either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does judgements/action.