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At Nemtport Chemical Depot, Indiana B244 PILOT TESTING OF ~~EUTRAL~ZATrON/s~ERCRITI~~ WATER OXIDATION OF VX AGENT AT NEMTPORT CHEMICAL DEPOT, INDIANA FINAL ENVIRON&4ENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT December 1998 PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD 21010-5401 ORGANIZATION OF THIS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT This Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addresses the U.S. Army’s proposal to construct and operate a pilot facility to test chemical neutralization and supercritical water oxidation of the warfare agent VX currently stored at the Newport Chemical Depot (NECD) in Indiana. An overview of the structure of this EIS is presented below. The SUMMARY briefly describes the proposed action and its alternative, as well as the associated environmental impacts. SECTION 1, PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION, summarizes the background of the Army’s Alternative Technology Program, and, in particular, the proposed action for NECD. It also describes the environmental impact analysis process and defines the scope of this EIS. SECTION 2, THE PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES, provides background information about the agent VX stored at NECD; the details of the pilot test activities proposed by the Army; and a brief discussion of the alternatives to this proposal. The section concludes with a summary comparing the impacts of the alternatives. SECTION 3, DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT, discusses the current physical, environmental, and socioeconomic conditions on and around NECD. This section provides the resource information upon which the assessment of environmental impacts is based. SECTION 4, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS, presents the potential environmental impacts and the socioeconomic effects associated with the various alternatives; the unavoidable environmental impacts that will accompany the proposed action; the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources that will occur under the proposed action; the manner in which the proposed action will affect the short- and long-term productivity of the environment; and the list of permits, approvals, findings, and consultations that are required prior to the implementation of the proposed action. The APPENDICES provide supporting information and/or detailed analyses, too lengthy to be incorporated directly into the main body of the EIS. A list of ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS is provided to assist the reader. It can be found immediately following the Table of Contents and the List of Tables. This document is printed on Recycled Paper LEAD AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PROGRAM MANAGER FOR CHEMICAL DEMILlTARIZATION COOPERATING AGENCIES: DEPARTMENT OFHEALTHAND HUMAN 4) SERVICES FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY STATE OF INDIANA TITLE OF PROPOSED ACTION: PILOT TESTING OF NEUTRALIZATION/ SUPERCRITICAL WATER OXlDATION OF VX AGENT AT NEWPORT CHEMICAL DEPOT, INDIANA AFFECTED JURISDICTION: VERMlLLION COUNTY, INDIANA PREPfiR.ER PROPONENT: L. BACON Manager for Chemical T chnologies & Approaches Demilitarization e REVIEWED BY: REVIEWED BY: h&K A. WELSH Commander Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Newport Chemical Depot (Environment, Safety and Occupational Health), OASA (I, L&E) DOCUMENT DESIGNATION: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ABSTRACT: In response to Public Law 102-484, the U.S. Army is considering the use of technologies other than incineration to destroy the chemical warfare agent VX currently stored at the Newport Chemical Depot (NECD) in Indiana. A series of studies, initiated by the U.S. Army’s Alternative Technologies Program and the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, has recommended the pilot testing of a chemical neutralization (i.e., hydrolysis) process followed by supercritical water oxidation as a possible method of accomplishing the required destruction of agent VX. This Environmental Impact Statement was prepared to assess the potential environmental impacts of the construction and operation of such a pilot test facility. The preferred location for the proposed facility is adjacent to the existing chemical agent storage warehouse at NECD. The alternative is no action (i.e., continued storage of the stockpile). The environmental impacts of facility construction would be minimal and would be similar to those from the construction of any medium-sized industrial facility. No adverse human health or environmental impacts are expected to occur during the g-month period of routine pilot testing operations. Preliminary risk analyses and accident assessments indicate that the proposed pilot test operations could involve accidents, but that such accidents would have less severe consequences than accidents that might occur during continued storage of the VX agent. In the event of a worst case accident, the potential number of off-site fatalities during pilot testing could be 50, compared to 18,500 for continued storage. LISTOFFIGURES . xi LES................................................xiii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . xix 1. PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION .............. l-l 1.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................... l-l 1.2 PURPOSE AND NEED .................................. l-l 1.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE NEPA PROCESS AND THE ARMY DECISION PROCESS .......................... l-3 1.3.1 Description of the NEPA Process ...................... l-3 1.3.2 Army Decision Process ............................. l-4 1.4 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS DOCUMENT AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS ............. l-5 1.5 SCOPE OF THIS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ...... l-7 1.6 ALTERNATIVES ..................................... 1-8 1.6.1 Alternatives Addressed in this EIS ...................... l-8 1.6.2 Alternatives Eliminated from Further Consideration .......... l-8 1.7 AGENCY INTERACTIONS AND SUPPORTING STUDIES ........ l-11 1.8 REFERENCES ...................................... 1-12 2. THE PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES ................... .2-l 2.1 BACKGROUND ..................................... .2-l 2.1.1 Agent VX Characteristics ........................... 2-l 2.1.2 Storage Configuration .............................. 2-2 2.1.3 Surveillance and Inspection .......................... 2-2 2.1.4 Treatment of Leaking Containers and Emergency Response ..... 2-4 2.2 THE PROPOSED ACTION .............................. .2-4 2.2.1 Overview of the Disposal Technology ................... 2-5 2.2.2 Facility Description ............................... 2-9 2.2.2.1 Proposed site .............................. 2-9 2.2.2.2 Primary process and process support buildings ........ 2-9 2.2.2.3 Roads .................................. 2-13 2.2.2.4 Utilities and support facilities ................... 2-14 2.2.3 Detailed Process Description ........................ 2-15 2.2.3.1 Punching, draining, and washing ................ 2-15 2.2.3.2 Chemical neutralization ...................... 2-16 2.2.3.3 Supercritical water oxidation ................... 2- 18 2.2.3.4 Waste management ......................... 2-20 V Table of Contents 2.2.4 Maturity of the Disposal Technology ................... 2-25 2.2.5 Schedule and Labor Requirements ..................... 2-25 2.2.6 Future Use, Dismantling, and Closure .................. 2-29 2.3 THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE ........................ 2-30 2.4 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL PACTS AMONG ALTERNATIVES .............................. 2-3 1 2.5 ARMY’S PREFERRED ~TE~AT~E ..................... 2-38 2.6 REFERENCES ...................................... 2-38 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING E~ONMENT . .3-l 3.1 NECD OPERATIONS .................................. .3-l 3.1.1 History and Mission ............................... 3-l 3.1.2 Facilities and Layout .............................. 3-3 3.1.3 Existing On-Post Emergency Preparedness ................ 3-3 3.2 METEOROLOGY, AIR QUALITY, AND NOISE ............... .3-4 3.2-l Climate and Meteorology ........................... 3-4 3.2.2 Air Quality .................................... .3-5 3.2.3 Noise ....................................... 3-10 3.3 WATER RESOURCES ................................. 3-l 1 3.3.1 Surface Water .................................. 3-11 3.3.1.1 Flow and water quality ....................... 3-l 1 3.3.1.2 Floodplain, flooding, and drought ................ 3-16 3.3.1.3 Effluent discharges ......................... 3-17 3.3.2 Geohydrology .................................. 3-18 3.3.2.1 Physiography and topography .................. 3-18 3.3.2.2 Geology ................................ 3-20 3.3.2.3 Soils ................................... 3-20 3.3.2.4 Groundwater ............................. 3-22 3.3.2.5 Water supply and requirements ................. 3-26 3.3.3 Preexisting Contamination .......................... 3-28 3.4 ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES ............................ 3-29 3.4.1 Terrestrial Resources ............................. 3-30 3.4.2 Aquatic Resources ............................... 3-35 3.4.3 Wetlands ..................................... 3-36 3.4.4 Threatened and Endangered Species ................... 3-39 3.5 LANDUSE ........................................ 3-41 3.5.1 LandUseWithinNECD ....................... ... 3-41 3.5.2 Land Use Outside NEC ....................... ...3-4 1 3.6. COMMUNITY RESOURCES ............................ 3-42 3.6.1. Population .................................... 3-44 3.6.1-l. Residential population ....................... 3-44 3.6.1.2. Transient population ........................ 3-45 3.6.2. Public Services/Infrastructure ........................ 3-46 3.6.2.1. Education ............................... 3-46
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