A Note on the Cost of Toll Highways: Congestion and Accidents in Alternative Roads

XXXIV Reunión de Estudios Regionales Política Regional Europea y su incidencia en España. Economía, sociedad y medio ambiente . X Congreso de la Asociación Andaluza de Ciencia Regional El olivar andaluz: Territorio y Economía

Baeza-Jaén, 27 al 29 de noviembre de 2008

A note on the cost of toll highways: congestion and accidents in alternative roads

Daniel Montolio * Universitat de Barcelona and Institut d‘Economia de Barcelona (Spain)

Albert Saló-Mayolas Universitat de Girona (Spain)

[Preliminary version, July 2008 - Please do not quote without the authors‘ permission]

Abstract . In this note we calculate the cost of toll highways in terms of congestion, truck traffic and number of victims in accidents with respect to alternative free routes in the Spanish region of Catalonia. The results show that toll highways do not crowd-out traffic to alternative free roads when the toll highway is a long distance route (connecting with the border or with other regions) or when the alternative free route is not in good conditions. With regard to road safety we find that all alternative routes show a higher number of accidents and victims. The explanation of this result mainly relies on the quality of the alternative free routes, and this

* Corresponding author: [email protected]

1 has clear policy implication given the unbalanced regional model of public investment on roads and (free) highways by the Spanish Central Government.

Keywords : Toll highways, congestion, road safety. JEL : R41, R53, H54

1. Introduction The actual design of a road system in a country is the result of a complicate mix of forces. From historical inheritance (political division within a country) and political strategies (pork-barrel politics) to pure economic arguments (efficiency versus equity issues when distributing public investments); all of them mix up to conform the existing road system. The Spanish road network is an interesting case of study for various reasons. First, Spain has developed in a spectacular way in the last 20 years, building up (and modernizing) during this period an important part of the road system. Second, political peculiarities make Spain a highly decentralized country de facto ,1 with very strong political regions ( Comunidades Autónomas ) but still with the Central Government deciding where to locate (in which region), and in what amount, its (productive) infrastructure investments.2 As a consequence of these (and other) factors the development of the road network in Spain has not been homogeneous from a regional perspective. Indeed, some authors such as de la Fuente, (2002) or Castells et al . (2006) point out how public infrastructure investment has been widely used by the Central Government as a redistributive tool instead of prioritizing efficiency arguments, creating an unbalanced regional transport network.3 The non-homogeneity, in terms of quantity (length) and quality (type), of the road system across Spanish regions has many implications. 4 As presented in more detail in the next section, the Spanish regions have a clear unbalanced road network between toll

1 In Spain 52% of total public spending is centralized (spent by Central Government) while 67% of public revenues are centralized (see Bosch and Espasa, 2006). 2 Budget information shows that, in 2006, road investment by the Spanish Central Government accounts for approximately 13% of total public real investments (25.263M⁄). 3 The argument goes deeper into the regional financing system in Spain that leads to the existence of a fiscal deficit of some regions with the Central Government that prevents them from taking their own decisions on where to invest in their own territories according to their own necessities, see Pons and Tremosa (2005) for the Catalan case. 4 From a pure economic point of view there is a wide consensus among scholars (and politicians) that public infrastructures have an impact on economic growth. From the seminal work of Aschauer (1989) there has been enough evidence to support road infrastructures as a productive input of production. As a consequence in many countries road investments have become a key variable for regional development.

2 and free highways. We focus in this particularity of the Spanish road system, and using data for toll highways and micro road data (at a road marker level) for their alternative free routes in Catalonia (the Spanish region with the highest percentage of toll highways), we analyse the costs of toll highways in terms of congestion and road safety. For this purpose section 2 briefly describes the road system in Spain. Section 3 describes the data base used and the procedure followed to obtain the results. Section 4 presents the main results found. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2. The highway system in Spain: some facts and figures There are three levels of administration in Spain: Central Government, Regional Governments (Comunidades Autónomas ) and Local Governments. Each level has responsibilities on road infrastructure depending on the reach of the road. The Central Government has the ownership of roads that cover more than one region; Comunidades Autónomas invest in those roads within the region while Local Governments are in charge of local roads. 5 Table 1 shows the number of kilometres of free and toll highways en each Spanish region: Catalonia is the region with the highest percentage of this type of road infrastructure (655km that represents a 24,8% of the total), nearly doubling the second regions with the highest percentage (Comunidad Valenciana with 334km that represents a 12,7% of the total).

Table 1. Highway infrastructure across Spanish regions by level of government. Number of kilometres in 2004. Regional and Total Central Gov‘t Local Gov‘t Free Toll Free Toll Free Toll ANDALUSIA 1,806 192 1,134 192 672 0 ARAGON 303 154 303 154 0 0 ASTURIAS 259 22 217 22 42 0 BALEARIC ISLANDS 57 0 0 0 57 0 CANARY ISLANDS 245 0 0 0 245 0 CANTABRIA 186 0 186 0 0 0 CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 966 52 966 52 0 0 CASTILLA Y LEON 1,292 282 1,104 282 188 0 CATALONIA 329 655 272 459 57 196 COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 643 334 539 334 104 0 EXTREMADURA 346 0 346 0 0 0 GALICIA 413 326 395 264 18 62 MADRID 614 135 534 135 80 0

5 Both the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities can have the ownership of free highways, toll highways and double roadways.

3 MURCIA 310 26 246 26 64 0 NAVARRA 94 137 0 39 94 98 BASQUE COUNTRY 219 206 0 85 219 121 LA RIOJA 25 119 25 119 0 0 TOTAL 8,107 2,640 6,267 2,163 1,840 477 Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2004).

Table 2 presents the evolution between 1990 and 2004 of the highway system across Spanish regions while table 3 completes this brief description of the regional Spanish highway system by showing some road and economic indicators for 2004. The data presented shows that the Catalan road system is clearly unbalanced with respect other Spanish regions. First, it is characterized by the prevalence of toll highways as major roads 6 and there is a lack of alternatives free roads such as free highways ( autovías ) as in the rest of the country. Furthermore, Catalonia is characterized by being region with a high economic activity and, as a consequence, a high use of road infrastructures.7

Table 2. Regional road system by type 1990-2004. Number of kilometres.

Toll highway Free highway Other roads

1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 ANDALUSIA 176 192 400 1.806 150 306 ARAGON 192 154 122 303 16 117 ASTURIAS 61 22 18 259 1 20 BALEARIC ISLANDS 0 0 34 57 8 24 CANARY ISLANDS 0 0 151 245 47 46 CANTABRIA 24 0 18 186 0 9 CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 0 52 429 966 6 23 CASTILLA Y LEON 207 282 272 1.292 22 112 CATALONIA 573 655 118 329 147 271 COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 385 334 136 643 40 213 EXTREMADURA 0 0 0 346 17 73 GALICIA 118 326 8 413 15 83 MADRID 95 135 264 614 113 159 MURCIA 12 26 57 310 13 113 NAVARRA 152 137 18 94 2 27 BASQUE COUNTRY 223 206 51 219 85 97 LA RIOJA 118 119 3 25 8 3 TOTAL 2.336 2.640 2.099 8.107 691 1.697 Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2004). (*) —Other roads“ include double roadways.

6 As a consequence people that more frequently use roads in the Catalan territory bear a higher (economic) transport cost than in other Spanish regions and, although this argument is beyond the scope of this note, this could have distributive effects for individuals given that public roads are mainly financed by Central Government using common taxes. 7 The distribution of transport infrastructures (including also rail, airport and harbours) has clear implications in terms of economic activity and economic growth. This is especially relevant for an economically dynamic region such as Catalonia (see, for instance Montolio and Solé-Ollé, 2008).

This unbalanced regional toll highways system, as explored in Bel and Fageda (2005), has its origin as a result of both, the distribution of public resources in road infrastructure by the Central Government and the lack of resources by (many) regional governments. In this scenario the private initiative has often replaced the lack of public investment leading to a road network dominated by toll highways in the main axes (for instance, connecting with the border in the Catalan case) of road transport in regions with a high economic activity. Although there are arguments in favour of installing tolls in a given network, 8 the claim in Catalonia is that the installation of tolls in the region does not always respond to (pure) economic arguments but to the lack of public investment by the Central Government. In this sense there is a wide (and consensual) claim that there is not enough public investment from the Central Government and, given the positive impact of these infrastructures on growth, this can worsen the economic performance of the region. Moreover, the prevalence of toll highways in a network can have perverse or inefficient effects. First, tolls can shift traffic to free (untolled) alternative roads. Bel (1999, 2002) argues that many toll sections register less traffic than the one that they could load without congestion, while the alternative free roads have equal or more intensity of traffic and, therefore, they show high levels of congestion. 9 This is because the opportunity cost for consumers of the saving of the monetary cost of the toll is bigger than the cost of time from using an alternative road (see May and Milne, 2000).

Table 3. Road and economic indicators 2004 Total Total Vehicles Vehicles % total % total network/ network/ /total /1000 GDP Pop 1000 land area network inhab. inhab. ANDALUSIA 13.8 17.9 0.28 3.14 177.2 555.7 ARAGON 3.1 2.9 0.23 8.82 63.2 557.2 ASTURIAS 2.1 2.5 0.47 4.65 112.9 525.6 BALEARIC ISLANDS 2.5 2.2 0.43 2.2 366.0 804.1 CANARY ISLANDS 4.1 4.4 0.57 2.16 293.5 635.3 CANTABRIA 1.2 1.3 0.49 4.6 124.6 573.7 CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 3.4 4.3 0.24 10 58.3 582.8 CASTILLA Y LEON 5.4 5.8 0.34 12.92 44.6 575.7 CATALONIA 18.9 15.8 0.38 1.74 360.7 628.8

8 For funding the construction, for regulating the demand and/or for fighting congestion. 9 This effect depends on the elasticity of demand for tolled highways (see Verhoef et al ., 1996).

5 COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 9.8 10.5 0.37 1.82 343.8 625.2 EXTREMADURA 1.7 2.5 0.21 8.26 68.0 561.6 GALICIA 5.1 6.4 0.59 6.31 93.4 589.1 MADRID 17.7 13.5 0.42 0.57 1.116,32 641.0 MURCIA 2.5 3.0 0.33 2.81 215.5 605.2 NAVARRA 1.7 1.4 0.37 6.57 95.2 625.3 BASQUE COUNTRY 6.2 4.9 0.59 2 267.8 535.9 LA RIOJA 0.7 0.7 0.37 6.23 87.2 542.8 TOTAL 100 100 0.33 3.76 160.1 601.1 Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2004). Total network includes all types of roads owned by all levels of government.

Second, and related with the former argument, this —crowding-out“ phenomenon can increases the number of accidents and victims in the alternative free roads (usually less safe than a highway).10 However, there are two competing arguments. On one side there can be a positive effect of congestion on road safety, especially if victims is the chosen measure of road safety, given that congestion reduces the average speed and, hence, the severity of accidents (Noland and Quddus, 2005). On the other hand, an increase in congestion implies an increase in the number of vehicles using a road facility and this in turn increases the number of accidents. Moreover, the crowding-out effect of toll highways can be important for trucks. If trucks are more prone to use alternative free routes, an increase in the number of trucks can affect negatively the safety of untolled roads (see Shefer and Rietveld, 1997). For the Spanish case, the road safety issue is analysed in Albalate (2007) comparing national roads (double roadways) that are alternative to toll highways with respect to national roads that are alternative to free highways, concluding that toll highways shift death to their untolled alternatives. One of his the main findings is that —those national roads competing with tolled highways (…) suffer more accidents involving victims per km than those [national roads] that compete with untolled highways“. It seems that toll highways (because of price) shift traffic to alternative route (more dangerous) and, hence, mortality to that alternative (untolled) route. However, this analysis misses a crucial point: the level of mortality in the tolled highway itself. The conclusion reached by the author could be different if the mortality in the untolled highway were ten times lower that of the tolled highway. 11

10 See Albalate (2007) for an excellent review of the literature dealing with the road safety issue from different perspectives. 11 Albalate (2007) does not use direct data for toll highways, as we do in this paper; and he infers his conclusion using data for 123 control stations placed in national roads adjacent to (tolled or untolled) highways.

6 This paper explores if the arguments presented by Bel (1999, 2003) hold for the Catalan case and extends the evidence presented by Albalate (2007) using direct data for toll highways to analyse the impact of this type of road with respect to congestion and road safety issues. Moreover, focusing on the Catalan case we can distinguish various types of toll highways (basically intra and inter regional) that allows us to refine the conclusions regarding congestion and road safety issues of toll highways.

3. Data We use various data sources (for the year 2003) to obtain the average daily traffic (ADT, hereafter), the percentage of trucks, the number of road accidents involving victims and the number of deaths. We construct our data base not only for the whole network of toll highways but also for the free (untolled) alternative route to those highways (using always free highways and double roadways when possible). We use a GIS to obtain the best alternative route (in terms of distance and/or time) to the toll highway. There are mainly four toll highways in Catalonia (see table 4) that can be divided in three types: transversal , coastal and interior .12 First, transversal tolled highways connect the Catalan region with other regions or with the French border. More precisely, there are two transversal tolled highways: the AP-7/E-15 and the AP-2/E-90. The AP-7/E-15 coming form southern Spain crosses all the Catalan territory and connects with the French border. We have divided this toll highway in three main sections: (1) BarcelonaœLa Jonquera, (2) BarcelonaœTarragona 13 and (3) Salou-Amposta. The other transversal toll highway is the AP-2/E-90 (4) Lleida- Mediterrani that connects with the neighbour region of Aragon and extends to the centre of Spain.

Table 4. Toll highways and alternative free routes. Sections Toll highway Alternative free route Transversal 1 AP-7 / E-15 (Barcelona-La Jonquera) C-31 / N-II

12 We use the common notation for roads. E: European road (connecting with the border); AP: highway; N: national road; C: regional road; and B: local road. 13 The Barcelona-Tarragona section of the AP-7/E-15 toll highway has two free alternative routes: the C- 32/C-31/N-340 and the B-23/N-340. The results presented in this section take the first alternative because is the shortest in terms of time and also because involves a free highway. Nevertheless the main results and conclusions obtained do not change if we use the B-23/N-340 as an untolled alternative.

7 2 AP-7 / E-15 (Barcelona-Tarragona) C-32 / C-31 / N-340 3 AP-7 / E-15 (Salou-Amposta) N-340 4 AP-2 / E-90 (Lleida-Mediterrani) N-240 / C-51 Coastal 5 C-32 (Montgat-Mataró-Palafolls) N-II 6 C-32 (Castelldefels-Sitges) C-31 7 C-32 (Sitges-El Vendrell) C-31 Interior 8 C-16 / E-9 (Barcelona-Sant Cugat) C-58 / B-30 9 C-16 / E-9 (Sant Cugat-Terrassa) B-30 / C-58 10 C-16 / E-9 (Terrassa-Manresa) C-58 / C-55 Source: Own elaboration.

Second, there is a coastal system of toll highways (C-32) that runs parallel to the coast line. We have divided this system into three main sections: (5) Montgat-Mataró- Palafolls in the northern cost of Barcelona, and (6) Castelldefels-Sitges and (7) Sitges- El Vendrell in the southern cost of Barcelona. Finally there is an interior toll highway (C-16/E-9) that connects Barcelona with the central part of Catalonia. We have divided this system into three main sections: (8) Barcelona-Sant Cugat, (9) Sant Cugat-Terrassa and (10) Terrassa-Manresa. The transversal system has a lot of pass-by traffic (coming from France and going to the other Spanish regions) while the coastal and interior network of highways does not connect with other regions and is basically used by residents in Catalonia. The data sources have been mainly two depending on the ownership of the toll highway and the alternative route: Ministerio de Fomento from the Spanish Government and Departament de Planificació Territorial i Obres Públiques from the Autonomous Government of Catalonia. From both sources we have detailed information of the main variables of interest: kilometres of the section, travel time without congestion, total number of vehicles that pass by a given marker during the year (ADT), percentage of trucks that circulates in the road and the price of the toll in the case of tolled highways. In the case of road safety outcomes we could find all the relevant data for two variables: number of accidents involving victims and number of deaths. We report both the total number and the relative measure of this variable per km for both the tolled and the free alternative. Moreover, we use three ratios with regard safety variables: the number of accidents involving victims/ADT, number of deaths/ADT and, finally, the number of deaths/number of accidents involving victims (measure of the severity of the accidents occurred).

8 Data for toll highways is not available at a marker level but for the whole route. This is why we aggregate, for the (free) alternative routes, marker information to an overall road level by weighting data from each marker with the weight of the section on the overall road length. Therefore, we make our comparisons for the whole route instead of just comparing sections of a given road as, for instance, in Albalate (2007).

4. Main results As shown in table 5 toll highways, as expected, save time. Without congestion, time savings are higher the longer the highway: highway sections with more than 50km imply savings that range from 20 minutes to 54 minutes. The transversal (connecting with the border or with other regions) system of tolled highways (AP-7/E-15 and AP-2/E-9) is used intensively, registering higher use (higher ADT) than alternative free routes. Therefore, it seems that these toll highways do not shift traffic to alternative routes. This result is in contrast with Albalate (2007) who finds that —those national [free alternative] roads competing with a tolled motorway present higher average daily traffic (ADT) (…) than those that compete with untolled motorways“. The author infers the impact of toll highways on alternative routes indirectly, when using direct data for toll highways we obtain that they are more heavily used than alternative routes. Nevertheless, our results are obtained for the whole route while Albalate‘s results are drawn for an analysis at a control station level. There are various reasons to explain this result. On one hand we could obtain this result because the nature of traffic in long routes (65km and 150km respectively): basically pass-by traffic or long distance traffic, 14 implying that users of long distance highways have a low elasticity of demand for highways. On the other hand the result could be due to the low quality of the free alternatives to the toll highway. Indeed, the three different sections of the coastal toll highway are also more congested than the alternative routes, confirming the results previously found for the transversal tolled highways. In this toll highway system the percentage of trucks is also

14 This is confirmed by the high percentage of trucks that use this toll highway and do not shift to alternative roads.

9 higher than in alternative free routes. In this case the reason to obtain these results lies in the bad quality of the alternative route. 15 The interior toll highway, which in turn has an adequate alternative (C-58), presents less traffic than the alternative route that is more congested.16 In this case we find crowding-out effect and the alternative free route is clearly more congested and used by trucks, results that are in line with Bel (1999, 2002) and Albalate (2007). For instance the ADT of the first section of tolled highway (Barcelona-Sant Cugat) is 33.958 vehicles a day while the alternative free route (C-58/B-30) shows 108.885 vehicles per day (with a maximum of 146.904 vehicles per day). In general, our results seem to indicate that drivers prefer toll highways for long journeys or when the alternative free road is of low quality. Or in other words, it could be case that the lack of investment in free (high-quality) alternative roads force users to use toll highways.

Table 5. Comparing toll highways versus alternative free routes. Distance % ADT- ADT- Toll highways Time ADT Price (Km) trucks Max Min Transversal 1 Barcelona-La Jonquera AP-7 / E-15 148.91 1h 25min 49,070 22.4 114,323 17,939 11.36 ⁄ 2 Barcelona-Tarragona AP-7 / E-15 89.21 1h 9min 58,746 19.5 81,655 41,645 9.86 ⁄ 3 Salou-Amposta AP-7 / E-15 64.9 43min 25,557 21.2 28,179 22,132 5.60 ⁄ 4 Lleida-Mediterrani AP-2 / E-90 93.62 55min 15,288 14.7 17,547 14,454 7.95 ⁄ Coastal 5 Montgat-Mataró-Palafolls C-32 63.73 32min 74,146 20.4 114,323 52,625 3.62 ⁄ 6 Castelldefels-Sitges C-32 11.4 17min 39,782 6.4 39,782 39,782 4.69 ⁄ 7 Sitges-El Vendrell C-32 30.03 22min 21,111 6.4 29,837 12,599 2.57 ⁄ Interior 8 Barcelona-Sant Cugat C-16 / E-9 9.02 18min 33,958 0.8 33,958 33,958 2.45 ⁄ 9 Sant Cugat-Terrassa C-16 / E-9 13.25 10min 35,308 6.9 85,802 21,689 1.89 ⁄ 10 Terrassa-Manresa C-16 / E-9 32.52 23min 15,781 7.3 15,781 15,781 2.91 ⁄ Distance % ADT- ADT- Alternative free routes Time ADT Price (Km) trucks Max Min Transversal 1 C-31 / N-II 160.7 2h 19min 21,435 14.9 85,313 9,312 -,- 2 C-32 / C-31 / N-340 105.8 1h 25min 19,700 12.0 103,345 13,730 -,- 3 N-340 73.8 1h 5min 13,350 28.2 19,437 11,359 -,- 4 N-240 / C-51 95.9 1h 21min 10,254 16.2 26,492 2,986 -,- Coastal

15 The N-II national road is one of the oldest roads in Spain, and its section in the Catalan coast is one of the most dangerous road sections in Spain. 16 The C-58 is a free highway alternative to the toll sections (8) Barcelona-Sant Cugat and (9) Sant Cugat- Terrassa. Indeed, table 5 shows how the ADT differences between these two free sections with the corresponding tolled sections are the highest in favour of the free alternatives.

10 5 N-II 50.4 52min 27,933 7.0 41,772 17,591 -,- 6 C-31 20.5 20min 15,638 0.1 16,611 13,730 -,- 7 C-31 31 31min 16,972 0.1 22,996 13,730 -,- Interior 8 C-58 / B-30 28.9 22min 108,885 12.4 146,904 47,500 -,- 9 B-30 / C-58 24.5 15min 81,040 9.2 91,750 47,500 -,- 10 C-58 / C-55 32.1 31min 22,803 10.9 33,058 15,394 -,- Distance % ADT- ADT- Differences (toll œ free) Time ADT Price (Km) trucks Max Min Transversal 1 La Jonquera vs [C-31 / N-II] -11.79 -54min 27,635 7.5 29,010 8,627 -,- 2 Tarragona vs [C-32 / C-31 / N-340] -16.59 -16min 39,046 7.5 -21,690 27,915 -,- 3 Amposta vs [N-340] -8.9 -22min 12,207 -7.0 8,742 10,773 -,- 4 Lleida vs [N-240 / C-51] -2.28 -26min 5,034 -1.5 -8,945 11,468 -,- Coastal 5 Montgat vs [N-II] 13.33 -20min 46,213 13.5 72,551 35,034 -,- 6 Sitges vs [C-31] -9.1 -3min 24,144 6.3 23,171 26,052 -,- 7 El Vendrell vs [C-31] -0.97 -9min 4,139 6.4 6,841 -1,131 -,- Interior 8 Sant Cugat vs [C-58 / B-30] -19.88 -4min -74,927 -11.6 -112,946 -13,542 -,- 9 Terrassa vs [B-30 / C-58] -11.25 -5min -45,732 -2.3 -5,948 -25,811 -,- 10 Manresa vs [C-58 / C-55] 0.42 -8min -7,022 -3.6 -17,277 387 -,- Source: own elaboration from Ministerio de Fomento and Departament de Planificació Territorial i Obres Públiques.

The above evidence needs to be completed with an important piece of information regarding road safety issues. We can observe (see table 6) that all free alternatives have more accidents with victims per km and deaths per km than tolled highways. It seems that toll highways shift accidents to the alternative free routes; however, results need to be explained in more detail. As long as transversal and coastal toll highways have more ADT this result cannot be due to the shift of traffic from tolled highways to the untolled alternative. Hence, the conclusion that —those routes with tolled motorways shift traffic to the untolled alternatives, which is a lower quality infrastructure and thus, more accidents happen“ (Albalate, 2007) seems not to occur in the Catalan case for the transversal and coastal toll highways. These types of toll highways are used more intensively (are more congested) and show less accidents with victims and deaths. As suggested by Peirson et al . (1998) congestion can reduce the average speed of the tolled highway and, therefore, the number of accidents (and victims) per kilometre, or in other words, congestion is indeed helping road safety outcomes. The reason why these transversal and coastal toll highways present a higher ADT is different. Previous results show that transversal toll

11 highways absorbs long distance traffic coming from the border and passes by the region to the rest of Spain while the coastal toll highway shows more congestion because the alternative free road, as mentioned before, is a dangerous road. Therefore, in general, the average speed can be higher in less congested free alternative roads that combined with low quality can induce more accidents and more victims in road accidents. Something different happens in the case of the interior toll highway which also has less accidents and deaths per kilometre but contrary to the other types of highways is less congested. The reason, as explained before, is the existence of a high quality alternative. In this case, the toll highway shifts traffic to the untolled alternative which is a quality free highway. In this alternative free highway more traffic probably does not congests the road up to the point that reduces the average speed and, hence, the increase in ADT can result in an increase of the number of accidents with victims and deaths.

12 Table 6. Road safety outcomes. Accidents Accidents Deaths with Toll highways with Deaths per IF1 IF2 Sev victims victims km per km Transversal 1 Barcelona-La Jonquera AP-7 / E-15 14 1 0.09 0.01 28.5 2.0 0.07 2 Barcelona-Tarragona AP-7 / E-15 9 2 0.10 0.02 15.3 3.4 0.22 3 Salou-Amposta AP-7 / E-15 56 7 0.86 0.11 238.7 27.4 0.13 4 Lleida-Mediterrani AP-2 / E-90 6 1 0.06 0.01 39.2 6.5 0.17 Coastal 5 Montgat-Mataró-Palafolls C-32 4 0 0.06 0.00 6.7 0.0 0.00 6 Castelldefels-Sitges C-32 10 0 0.88 0.00 32.7 0.0 0.00 7 Sitges-El Vendrell C-32 11 2 0.37 0.07 61.6 9.5 0.18 Interior 8 Barcelona-Sant Cugat C-16 / E-9 8 3 0.89 0.33 176.7 8.8 0.38 9 Sant Cugat-Terrassa C-16 / E-9 3 0 0.23 0.00 22.7 0.0 0.00 10 Terrassa-Manresa C-16 / E-9 6 1 0.18 0.03 158.4 6.3 0.17 Accidents Accidents Deaths with Alternative free routes with Deaths per IF1 IF2 Sev victims victims km per km Transversal 1 C-31 / N-II 205 25 1.29 0.16 956.38 116.63 0.12 2 C-32 / C-31 / N-340 104 14 1.24 0.17 527.92 71.07 0.13 3 N-340 74 12 1.10 0.18 554.30 89.89 0.16 4 N-240 / C-51 38 4 0.40 0.04 370.58 39.01 0.11 Coastal 5 N-II 80 8 1.73 0.17 286.40 28.64 0.10 6 C-31 15 2 1.02 0.14 95.92 12.79 0.13 7 C-31 26 3 0.99 0.11 153.19 17.68 0.12 Interior 8 C-58 / B-30 25 3 2.00 0.24 22.96 2.76 0.12 9 B-30 / C-58 41 5 2.43 0.30 50.59 6.17 0.12 10 C-58 / C-55 63 8 2.27 0.29 276.28 35.08 0.13 Accidents Accidents Deaths with Differences (toll œ free) with Deaths per IF1 IF2 Sev victims victims km per km Transversal 1 La Jonquera vs [C-31 / N-II] -191 -24 -1.20 -0.15 -927.85 -114.59 -0.05 2 Tarragona vs [C-32 / C-31 / N-340] -95 -12 -1.14 -0.15 -512.60 -67.66 0.09 3 Amposta vs [N-340] -18 -5 -0.24 -0.07 -315.62 -62.50 -0.04 4 Lleida vs [N-240 / C-51] -32 -3 -0.34 -0.03 -331.34 -32.47 0.06 Coastal 5 Montgat vs [N-II] -76 -8 -1.67 -0.17 -279.65 -28.64 -0.10 6 Sitges vs [C-31] -5 -2 -0.14 -0.14 -63.24 -12.79 -0.13 7 El Vendrell vs [C-31] -15 -1 -0.62 -0.04 -91.61 -8.20 0.07 Interior 8 Sant Cugat vs [C-58 / B-30] -17 0 -1.11 0.09 153.73 6.08 0.26 9 Terrassa vs [B-30 / C-58] -38 -5 -2.20 -0.30 -27.93 -6.17 -0.12 10 Manresa vs [C-58 / C-55] -57 -7 -2.09 -0.26 -117.86 -28.75 0.04 Source: Own elaboration. IF1: Accidents with victims*100 millions/ADT (vehicles per km). IF2: Deaths * 100 millions/ADT (vehicles per km). Sev (severity): Deaths/accidents with victims.

13 5. Conclusions The results presented show that the impact of having a road network based in tolled highways, as in the Catalan region, is not straightforward. This impact, in terms of use and road safety, depends on many factors such as the type of the tolled highway or the nature of the free alternative road. The data presented shows that tolled highways in Catalonia are highly used, especially the north-south transversal highway (AP-7/E-15), the transversal highway connecting with the neighbour region of Aragon (AP-2/E-90) and the coastal highway system (C-32) running parallel to the northern and southern cost of Barcelona. Moreover, the percentage of trucks in these toll highways is also higher than in the alternative free routes. These results are in contrast with the arguments presented in Bel (1999, 2002) and the estimations performed in Albalate (2007) who, differently from us, derives his conclusions by comparing free alternative roads competing with tolled and untolled highways. The reason for our results is, however, different depending on the type of toll highway analysed. In the first case, transversal highways absorb all international and inter regional traffic. The long distance nature of such traffic makes more convenient (for instance, comfort and time saving) the use of toll highways. In the case of coastal highways the low quality of the alternative free route makes the toll highway a more attractive place to circulate. Indeed, the interior toll highway (C-16/E-9), with a good alternative (a free highway), congests the alternative free route and also crowds-out heavy traffic. These results have also an impact on road safety issues. Although all alternative free routes have more accidents with victims and deaths than tolled highways, more can be said if we take into account the type of both toll highways and untolled alternatives. First, transversal and coastal tolled highways (that do not crow-out traffic) have fewer accidents with victims and deaths per km, indicating that congestion could be helping road safety outcomes (maybe through a lower speed level). Alternative free routes are less safe but not because of more use or because of more truck traffic crowded-out from tolled highways; it could be the case that the combination of low quality (lack of investment) and high speed (due to less congestion) can result in a higher number of accidents in these alternative free roads. The results are different for the interior toll highway, which has an optimal (high-quality) alternative. In this case, the number of

14 accidents in the alternative route is high because traffic effectively shifts to the free alternative route but congestion has not reduced average speed. The results found have clear policy implications. Governments with responsibilities on road construction (specially the Central Government that decides public investment in road infrastructures across Spanish regions) should be aware that the lack of public investment in high-quality free roads (free highways) in some regions could lead to an intensive use of toll highways, as in the Catalan case, which in turn has clear economic impacts on users (either individuals or firms) of the whole road network. Moreover, this lack of public investment can imply low quality of alternative free routes resulting in less road safety.

References

Albalate, D. (2007): —Shifting death to their alternatives: the case of toll motorways“, Document de treball XREAP2007-09.

Aschauer, D. A. (1989): —Is public expenditure productive?“, Journal of Monetary Economics 23, p. 177-200.

Bel, G. (1999): —Financiación de infraestructuras viarias. La economía política de los peajes“, Papeles de Economía Española 82, 123-139.

Bel, G. (2002): —Infraestructures i Catalunya: alguns problemes escollits“, Revista Econòmica de Catalunya 45, 11-25.

Bel, G. and Fageda, X. (2005): —Is a mixed funding model for the highway network sustainable over time? The Spanish Case“, in G. Ragazzi & W. Rothengatter, eds., Procurement and Financing of Motorways in Europe . Elsevier, pp. 195-211.

Bosch, N. and Espasa, M. (2006): La hisenda local europea (UE-15) , Col.lecció Món Local, 18. Diputació de Barcelona.

Castells, A., Montolio, D. and Solé-Ollé, A. (2006): —Infrastructure investment across Spanish regions: determinants and calculation of an expenditure needs index“ Hacienda Pública Española , 127(3), 23-54. de la Fuente, A. (2002): Is the allocation of public capital across the Spanish regions too redistributive?. CEPR Discussion Paper : 3138.

May, A. and Milne, D. (2000): —Effects of alternative road pricing systems on network performance“, Transportation Research Part A , 34(6), 407-436.

15 Montolio, D. and Solé-Ollé, A. (2008): —Road Investment and Regional Productivity Growth: the Effects of Vehicle-Intensity and Congestion“, Papers in Regional Science , forthcoming.

Noland, R. and Quddus, M. (2004): —A spatially disaggregate analysis of road casualties in England“, Accident Analysis and Prevention , 36, 973œ984.

Peirson, J., Skinner, I. and Vickerman, R. (1998): —The microeconomic analysis of the external costs of road accidents“, Economica , 65, 429-440.

Pons, J. and Tremosa, R. (2005): —Macroeconomic effects of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish state (2002-2010)“, Applied Economics , 37, 1455-1463.

Shefer, D. and Rietveld, P. (1997): —Congestion and safety on highways: towards an analytical model“, Urban Studies , 34(4), 679-692.

Verhoef, E.T., Nijkamp, P. and Rietveld, P. (1996): —Second-best congestion pricing: the case of an untolled alternative“, Journal of Urban Economics , 40(3), 279-302.