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The Economics of the Social Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities: a Resource Book

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THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES: a resource book THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES: a resource book WHO Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data The economics of the social determinants of health and health inequalities: a resource book. 1.Socioeconomic factors. 2.Health care rationing. 3.Health status indicators. 4.Health status disparities. 5.Social justice. I.World Health Organization. ISBN 978 92 4 154862 5 (NLM classification: WA 525) © World Health Organization 2013 All rights reserved. Publications of the World Health Organization are available on the WHO web site (www.who.int) or can be purchased from WHO Press, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland (tel.: +41 22 791 3264; fax: +41 22 791 4857; e-mail: [email protected]). Requests for permission to reproduce or translate WHO publications –whether for sale or for non-commercial distribution– should be addressed to WHO Press through the WHO web site (www.who.int/about/licensing/copyright_form/en/index.html). The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the World Health Organization in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters. All reasonable precautions have been taken by the World Health Organization to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event shall the World Health Organization be liable for damages arising from its use. Photo credits: istockphoto.com/Robert Churchill (top); DFID - UK Department for International Development, creative commons (left); iStockphoto.com/Alida Vanni (right); Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco, creative commons (bottom). Design and layout by www.paprika-annecy.com Printed in Luxembourg BACKGROUND he strong links between socioeconomic factors or In 2012, the World Health Assembly passed resolution policies and health were documented in the World 65.8, which endorsed the Rio Political Declaration on T Health Organization (WHO) Commission on Social Social Determinants of Health and emphasized the Determinants of Health report. Yet even when health and need for “delivering equitable economic growth through health equity are seen as important markers of development, resolute action on social determinants of health across expressing the benefits of social determinants of health all sectors and at all levels”. Improving understanding interventions in health and health equity terms alone is of economic rationales for intersectoral policy and not always sufficiently persuasive in policy settings where programme interventions is therefore an important health is not a priority, or when trade-offs exist between component of work for countries implementing social health and other public policy objectives. determinants of health recommendations. For this reason, Previous research has shown that increased attention to WHO launched the Economics of Social Determinants policies across sectors that improve health and health of Health project to describe and discuss the potential equity requires better preparation with regard to knowledge for economic rationales to support the case for social on the economic rationales for interventions, and how determinants of health interventions, and to summarize intersectoral policies are developed and implemented. economic evidence in key public policy areas. III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS he main researchers constituting the Research Health Systems Financing Department); Carlos Dora Team of the Economics of Social Determinants of and Ivan Ivanov (Protection of the Human Environment T Health project were Professor Marc Suhrcke, Ms. Department); Joe Kutzin and Saksena Prianka (Health Carmen de Paz Nieves, Professor Richard Cookson, and Systems Financing Department); Timo Ståhl (Chronic Dr. Lorenzo Rocco. Nicole Valentine (Ethics and Social Diseases and Health Promotion Department); Eva Pascoal Determinants of Health, WHO) was responsible for overall (WHO, Mozambique Country Office); Davison Munodawafa coordination of the project, including collaboration with (WHO/AFRO); and Tiiu Sildva (WHO intern). the Mexican Task Force. The project team acknowledges with gratitude contributions The collaboration with the Mexican Task Force on the global project is gratefully acknowledged. In this regard, specific from the following individuals and institutions: Maggie thanks go to Diego González, Philippe Lamy (formerly, WHO Davies and Chris Brookes (Health Action Partnership Representative, Mexico Country Office); Adolfo Martínez International); Felix Masiye (Department of Economics, Valle, Alejandro Figueroa-Lara, Paulina Terrazas and University of Zambia); James Humuza (School of Public Guadalupe López de Llergo from the Secretariat of Health Health, Rwanda); Howard Friedman and Alanna Armitage of Mexico, and Sofia Leticia Morales and Kira Fortune (United Nations Population Fund); Brian Lutz and Douglas from WHO/PAHO. The collaboration of the coordinating Webb (United Nations Development Programme); Xenia project team members from the Public Health Agency Scheil-Adlung (International Labour Office) and Claudia of Canada is also gratefully acknowledged, in particular Rokx (World Bank). Jane Laishes, James McDonald and Andrea Long. The external reviewers provided useful insights and The Global Task Force would also like to acknowledge with comments that are also gratefully acknowledged: Dr. Anton gratitude the discussions with WHO colleagues in internal E. Kunst (University of Amsterdam) and Dr. Ajay Tandon WHO meetings in Geneva, and with experts who were (World Bank). Carmel Williams and Isobel Ludford (Health assembled by WHO at the meeting on the economics of in All Policies Unit, Government of South Australia) are social determinants of health in October 2012. Experts at also thanked for their valuable contributions to messaging. the meeting included nominations from the WHO Regional The technical editing support of John Dawson is also Office for Africa, experts representing United Nations acknowledged with gratitude. agencies and experts from nongovernmental agencies. Any errors or omissions are the fault of the project team Specific thanks are extended to colleagues from WHO, alone. as follows: Rüdiger Krech and Eugenio Villar (Ethics and Social Determinants Department); Dan Chisholm (Mental Funding for this project was provided in part by the Public Health and Substance Abuse Department; previously Health Agency of Canada. IV CONTENTS Executive summary ............................................................................................................................. 01 Background.........................................................................................................................................01 How do economists approach the assessment of economic motivation? ....................................................01 Economic arguments for investment in the social determinants of health .................................................. 02 Basic economic rationales ............................................................................................................. 02 Value for money ............................................................................................................................ 02 Findings in specific public policy areas with implications for health .......................................................... 02 Research gaps ................................................................................................................................... 04 Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................05 1.1 Why this resource book? ............................................................................................................... 05 1.2 Using this resource book ............................................................................................................... 06 1.3 How were sectors chosen? ............................................................................................................ 08 1.4 H ow are interventions classified? ............................................................................................................08 1.4.1 Intersectoral public policy and action perspective ................................................................... 09 1.4.2 Intervention evidence review orientation ................................................................................. 09 References .........................................................................................................................................11 Chapter 2. The economic argument
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