Preventing Or Redirecting Violence a Study on Violence Against United Nations Peackeeping Operations in the Presence of Other Third-Party Military Operations

PREVENTING OR REDIRECTING VIOLENCE A STUDY ON VIOLENCE AGAINST UNITED NATIONS PEACKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER THIRD-PARTY MILITARY OPERATIONS

Daniel Forslund Master's Thesis Autumn 2020

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Lisa Hultman Word Count: 21639

Abstract

United nations peacekeeping is a contentious issue. What is mostly agreed on though, is that the brave men and women around the world risking their lives in peacekeeping missions around the world deserve the best security and protection the international community can offer. However, little research has been focused on the reasons behind violence against peacekeepers. This thesis theorizes that the presence of a third-party military operation that threatens the operational capabilities of rebel groups has the potential to cause an increase in rebel violence against a United Nations Peacekeeping operation in the same conflict. Through examining conflict dynamics in the cases of Mali and the Central African Republic utilizing of a structured, focused comparison, the hypothesized relationship and causal explanations were put to the test. The expectation was that in Mali, the high levels of violence would be explained by the effectiveness of the French counterinsurgency operation in the country. In the Central African Republic, the contrary was expected. However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed. Due to some rather large caveats and limitations, the research gap could not be satisfied. Nonetheless, the study creates plenty for avenues of future research, and opportunities to learn from the challenges encountered.

Acknowledgements

This thesis came awfully close to never being finished. Thus, I owe several people a lot of gratitude for helping me getting here. First, I want to thank my supervisor, Lisa Hultman, for getting me on the right track and some invaluable pointers on how to go ahead with the research process. I also want to thank my friends, for continuously believing in me when not even I did. And finally, I want to thank my Family, who have supported me without hesitation throughout this journey. Thank you.

Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Previous literature ...... 3 Increase in fatalities among UN peacekeepers ...... 3 Beyond numbers ...... 5 Evolution of UN peacekeeping operations ...... 7 Identifying a research gap ...... 8 3. Theoretical framework ...... 10

Concepts and definitions ...... 10 Constructing a theoretical chain ...... 11 3.2.1. UN peacekeeping as a fighting force – risks and rewards ...... 11 3.2.2. UN peacekeeping and allied military operations ...... 13 3.2.3. Causal mechanism ...... 14 4. Research design and case selection ...... 20 Research method ...... 20 Operationalisation ...... 20 Questions ...... 23 Case selection ...... 24 4.5 Sources and Data ...... 28 5. The Cases ...... 29 The conflict in Mali ...... 29 5.1.1 2016 in Mali ...... 31 Central African Republic - CAR ...... 33 5.2.1. 2016 in the Central African Republic ...... 35 6. Case comparison ...... 37 Dependent variable ...... 37 Independent Variable ...... 40 Causal mechanism ...... 42 7. Analysis...... 44 Mali ...... 44 Central African Republic ...... 46 Implications for the hypothesis and causal mechanism ...... 48 8. Conclusions ...... 51 9. Bibliography ...... 53

1. Introduction Peacekeepers have always been at risk of becoming the target of physical violence and attacks as they are deployed to conflict zones around the world. United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to become one of the primary conflict management tools at the disposal of the international community (Sandler 2017). However, the nature of conflicts has dramatically changed since the first armed peacekeeping operation was deployed in 1956 and have become ever more complex and challenging. Consequently, UN peacekeeping operations have had to adapt over time, continually facing new challenges to all parts of their operation, including the security and protection of the peacekeeping personnel (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019; Conley and Langholtz 2014; Sloan 2014). The 2017 independent report “Improving security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business” (Cruz 2017) sheds light on the ever-growing challenges faced by the United Nations in its peacekeeping operations. The report reviews what the author identifies as a worrying increase in fatalities and injuries to uniformed personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations from 2013 to 2017. It discusses and analyses possible causes and solutions to what the report calls a number of fatalities that “go beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk”, calling for action to improve the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel. The use of UN peacekeeping operations as a tool for not only conflict resolution but also for other tasks such as the protection of civilians in conflict environments has become increasingly common over the years. As a consequence, political discussion on issues like what role UN peacekeeping should play in conflicts has also gained traction. One recurring topic over the years has been the reluctance of western countries to contribute troops to missions deemed dangerous, presumably fearing for the safety of their troops and the risk of potential backlash at home (Tardy 2011). The positioning of UN peacekeeping operations in ongoing armed conflicts is another contested topic, where some argue that UN peacekeeping is not suited to operate in such environments (Karlsrud 2015; Tardy 2011). With so much political discussion on topics closely related to the safety and protection of UN peacekeeping personnel, it would be no stretch to assume that academic research interest would be growing accordingly. However, this is not the case. The broader topic of UN peacekeeping operations has enjoyed a moderate amount of academic research interest over the years, with most research focusing on either the evolution of peacekeeping operations

1 throughout history or the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations (Fortna and Howard 2008; Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016). Meanwhile, the specific topic of violence against peacekeepers, under what circumstances it occurs and what motivates it, remains severely underresearched (Duursma 2019). It is indeed only during the last decade that a small amount of academic research has attempted to shed some light on this phenomenon (Duursma 2019; Lindberg Bromley 2017). It seems clear then that in order to gain insight into the motivations behind violence against peacekeepers, it is essential to examine the internal dynamics of the conflicts in which it occurs. Research has shown that rebel groups experiencing battlefield losses against the government have incentives to target peacekeepers and as a result, are more likely to do so (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). Another factor that may cause UN peacekeepers to become targets of violence is if the peacekeeping operations are seen as part of the conflict rather than as an impartial third-party, which can happen through several mechanisms. This thesis aims to contribute to the growing field of research on violence against peacekeepers and more specifically, the causes behind this phenomenon. An argument will be made, that some of the mechanisms that cause peacekeepers to become targets of coercive force can be triggered by the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict or area. Consequently, offering explanations to high levels of violence against peacekeepers. The research question guiding the research process is:

How do third-party military operations operating in the same conflict as a United Nations peacekeeping operation impact rebel violence against the United Nations peacekeeping operation?

In order to provide an answer to the question posed, a theoretical argument is formulated and applied to a selection of cases, utilising the method of structured-focused comparison. The thesis is structured as follows: First, a general overview of the research field on violence against peacekeepers, as well as peacekeeping as a whole is provided. Second, building on previous research, a theoretical argument is formulated, followed by a presentation of the research methods and case-selection. Subsequently, the cases are introduced and analysed, leading up to a final discussion that critically examines the results in the context of the research field as a whole.

2 2. Previous literature The transformation of UN peacekeeping from so-called traditional and monitoring peacekeeping operations into the increasingly complicated multidimensional missions we see deployed today has spawned plenty of research on peacekeeping in general, and over the last few years, also specifically around the topic of violence against peacekeepers. This research is of the utmost importance for several reasons. Duursma (2019) argues that one of the main reasons behind the obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers is that the armed actors perpetuating the obstruction of peacekeepers are trying to make space for themselves to carry out attacks and violence against civilians. As one of the central parts of the mandate for most peacekeeping operations deployed today is the protection of civilians, including monitoring of human rights in conflict areas, the importance of finding a deeper understanding of the reasoning and driving factors behind this behaviour cannot be overstated. This section of the thesis will explore and present previous research around violence against peacekeepers and connected research, leading up to identifying and explaining the research gap that this thesis aims to fill.

Increase in fatalities among UN peacekeepers While the notion that violence against UN peacekeepers has become more prevalent over the last couple of decades is without a doubt something to be taken seriously, it is also essential to look at the numbers presented to substantiate that claim. Beyond the policy reports and statistical numbers shown on the issue, there has also been some academic research taking a closer look at the aforementioned statistics (Henke 2016; Cruz 2017; United Nations 2020b; Rogers and Kennedy 2014). In the 2017 independent report “Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers”, Cruz (2017) quotes a consistent rise in fatalities of among UN peacekeeping personnel between the years 2013 and 2017. Moreover, not only did the total amount of fatalities among UN peacekeepers rise, but the report highlights a steep rise in fatalities resulting from malicious acts. The report quotes a total of 195 fatalities due to malicious acts during the four years between 2013 and 2017 and stresses that when put in perspective with the all-time total number of 943, the trend is a definite increase over the norm (Cruz 2017). The numbers in the years since the publishing of the report seem to be following the same trend. The year 2017 went on to become the deadliest in terms of fatalities due to malicious acts since 1994. The following years of 2018 and 2019, however, show an apparent decrease in such fatalities. Nonetheless, the numbers are still clearly higher than the all-time

3 average of 15 fatalities per year due to malicious acts, resulting in the total number of fatalities of this nature amounting to a staggering 1048 (United Nations 2020b; Cruz 2017). When looking at the numbers presented, it is tempting to conclude that peacekeeping has become more dangerous and more peacekeepers are dying due to malicious acts than ever before. The picture is not quite as clear-cut as that, however. Multiple scholarly articles have, with the help of statistical analysis, looked closer at the fatality-rates for UN peacekeeping over time. Rogers and Kennedy (2014) analyse the fatality data for UN peacekeepers, explicitly looking at the number of fatalities due to malicious acts. The data used is from between the years 1948 and 2012, with a more specific focus on the period between 2003 and 2012. The research concludes that the perceived spike in fatalities caused by malicious acts is somewhat misleading, demonstrating that when the malicious act fatality numbers are put in relation to the total number of peacekeepers deployed, no apparent percentage increase can be seen in the decade before 2012. Henke (2016) performs a similar statistical analysis in her paper “Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analysing Trends in UN Fatalities”. The conclusions drawn are similar to what is suggested by Rogers and Kennedy (2014). The statistical analysis performed for the period 1990 to 2011, accounting for the total number of peacekeepers deployed, shows a steep decreasing trend for not only the total fatality ratios but also in fatalities due to accidents and fatalities due to malicious acts. The one category where an increase is found is fatalities due to illness. Therefore it is suggested that the notion that more peacekeepers die due to malicious acts, or overall for that matter, is misleading (Henke 2016). However, it is also stressed that assessing the risks of modern peacekeeping solely based on historical trends is not desirable, but further analysis into specific factors is needed. So, the numbers are non-conclusive. On the one hand, the discussion about the perceived increase in the dangerousness of UN peacekeeping operations over the past decades seems to suggest that peacekeeping operations are increasing in danger as a result of the direction mandates have evolved (Cruz 2017; Henke 2016; van der Lijn and Smit 2015; BBC News 2015; Kugel 2014). On the other hand, statistical analyses show that in fact, there has been no significant trend-increase in total peacekeeper fatalities between 1990 and 2011. The same goes for fatalities caused by malicious acts and controlling for the total amount of peacekeepers deployed only further reinforces these results (Henke 2016; Rogers and Kennedy 2014; van der Lijn and Smit 2015). There are, however, some important observations and takeaways one can make based on this information. First, the statistics tell an interesting story and putting things into

4 perspective is essential. It may very well be the case that peacekeeping operations today are statistically safer than they have been in the past. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that 2017 was the deadliest year since 1993 in UN peacekeeping when looking at fatalities caused by malicious acts, and the years before and after were not far off. Arguably, more peacekeepers deployed should not necessarily mean more fatalities. It is also important to mention that the data used in most statistical analyses on fatalities in UN peacekeeping ends just before the increase in deadliness that is discussed in the report by Cruz (2017). It can also be somewhat misleading to look at statistics from the period between 1990 to 2011. The reason being that the extraordinarily deadly operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the Balkans (UNPROFOR) in the mid- the 1990s clearly explain a large part of why the trend in fatalities seems to be decreasing overall (United Nations 2020b; United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020b; Henke 2016). Lindberg Bromley (2017) also highlights another possible explanation as to why the trend for fatalities from malicious acts might be declining. Namely, it might very well be the case that peacekeepers have become better equipped to deal with violent attacks. As such, they may be increasingly targeted, without this altering the fatality statistics in any meaningful way.

Beyond numbers In order to paint an accurate picture of what is known about violence against United Nations peacekeepers, one needs to look beyond fatality statistics and historical comparisons. The best way to solve a problem is often to find and address the underlying causes of the issue at hand. As previously mentioned, research interest in violence against peacekeepers and the factors behind it has slowly grown over the past decade (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Duursma 2019). Among the earlier scholarly contributions aiming to shed some light on what causes peacekeepers to become the targets of violent attacks, Salverda (2013) finds that rebel groups of with a relatively high military capacity are statistically more likely to engage in violence against peacekeepers. The proposed theoretical explanation is that when the rebel groups are weaker than their main adversary, the government, they may benefit from a peacekeeping operation that makes it more difficult for the government to force the rebels into total defeat through military mean. Vice-versa, if a rebel group perceives itself to be capable of potentially driving the government to concessions through the use of military power, having a peacekeeping mission separating the warring parties might be disadvantageous to this stronger rebel group. The main objective of the rebel group would, in the latter case be to

5 discourage peacekeepers from intervening in the activities of said group or even provoke the total withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation (Salverda 2013). Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016) argue that rebel groups that experience losses on the battlefield or other military setbacks in their central conflict with the government may have incentives to resort to violence against peacekeepers. The theoretical argument is based on rebels employing a bargaining strategy and offsetting military losses. The base premise is that when in armed conflict, the rebels and the government find themselves in a bargaining situation where the goal is to settle an agreement through the use of force. When the rebels face military losses, this causes a loss in bargaining power following the loss in coercive capacity but also increases the risk of losing civilian support or even the threat of fragmentation inside the rebel groups. As a result, the rebels might turn to violence against peacekeepers. There are multiple objectives for this behaviour. Mainly, rebels strive to prevent the peacekeepers from stabilising the conflict at an unfavourable status quo and also more broadly disrupt any peace processes, but also to demonstrate their capacity to the government. The results of the statistical analysis offer support to the theoretical argument made (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). Most of the research discussed until now is based on data on peacekeeper fatalities. However, as previously mentioned, the fatality statistics available do not always tell the whole story (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Henke 2016). More specifically, as a natural consequence of the fatality data becoming more readily available over the last few years, when looking at research about violence against peacekeepers, the focus on fatalities is clear (Lindberg Bromley 2017; Duursma 2019). Duursma (2019) takes a slightly different approach not explicitly looking at violence against peacekeepers, but obstruction and threats against peacekeepers. The argument is that intimidation and obstruction of peacekeepers are used strategically and serves the purpose of preventing them from fulfilling their mandate. In practice, this means that the goal of the rebel groups making use of intimidation tactics is to deny peacekeepers access to areas where violence against civilians is used as a tactic. This denial of movement effectively hinders peacekeepers from preventing this violence or gather intelligence on civilian targeting and other human rights abuses. One important takeaway from the study at hand is that direct physical violence against is not the only form of resistance peacekeepers face in conflict areas.

6 Evolution of UN peacekeeping operations As previously mentioned, one of the leading research interests and topics of discussions concerning peacekeeping is the evolution that modern UN peacekeeping has gone through over the last decades (Fortna and Howard 2008). Since both the mandate and type of modern UN peacekeeping operations are critical for the theoretical argument of this thesis, it is imperative to provide an overview of the main points of discussion. Since the end of the cold war three decades ago, conflicts around the world have evolved in both type and prevalence, with the number of civil conflicts skyrocketing and the number of traditional interstate conflicts steadily declining (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019). In this rapidly changing world, with large numbers of increasingly complex civil conflicts emerging, UN peacekeeping operations have also had to evolve rapidly. After the failures of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia, the need for reform of UN peacekeeping doctrine became apparent, as political opinion around the world mostly began to question the effectivity of and turned against the practice of UN peacekeeping (Fortna and Howard 2008; Hunt 2017). The ‘Brahimi Report’, published in 2000 was one cornerstone of this peacekeeping doctrine reform, among other things, it reinterpreted the principle of ‘minimum use of force’ to permit the use of force in defence of the mandate and the peacekeeping operation itself (United Nations 2000; Hunt 2017; Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016). In 2009 the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’ further reinforced the possibilities of UN peacekeepers to make use of force. This development of the doctrine still entails the use of force by UN peacekeepers at a tactical level and the defence of the operation mandate and in self-defence. However, ‘defence of the mandate’ has since, become all but synonymous with protection of civilians, neutralising potential ‘spoilers’ that might disrupt peace proceedings and also ensuring the freedom of movement for peacekeepers (Hunt 2017; United Nations 2008a). The Capstone doctrine also identified the main activities of modern UN peacekeeping operations, namely: peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, including for example sizeable humanitarian components. It established that linking these activities together is critical to achieving peace and security in today’s world. This push for deeper integration of different objectives in peacekeeping operations has resulted in the so-called ‘multidimensional’ operations (United Nations 2008a; United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a). The protection of civilians is an intrinsic part of modern UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, over 95 per cent of all peacekeepers deployed today have a mandate for the protection

7 of civilians (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a; United Nations 2015b). As preventing violence against civilians and monitoring human rights has emerged as arguably one of the top priorities of current UN peacekeeping operations, there is a broad conception that this priority has contributed extensively to the evolution towards a peacekeeping-doctrine that is more permitting towards the use of force (Hunt 2017; Sloan 2014). Indeed, for example, MINUSMA’s mandate: “Authorizes MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.” and “Requests MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture”(United Nations 2020d, 7), with one of the main objectives of the mandate being the protection of civilians (United Nations 2020d). It is, however, essential to recognize that while the focus on the protection of civilians may very well be a factor heavily influencing the necessity of the use of force in UN peacekeeping, it is certainly not the sole reason behind this trend. UN peacekeeping has also become increasingly coercive in its approach to bringing stability to ongoing conflicts. As mentioned above, UN peacekeeping operations are also often authorized to ‘use all necessary means” to fulfil other parts of their mandate. Such activities could be, for example, conducting joint offensive military operations together with the armed forces of the host country government. An example of such authorisation is the ‘United Nations Force Intervention Brigade’ authorised and established in early 2013 under MONUC, with the primary objective of “neutralising armed groups” aiming at “reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security“ (Sloan 2014; Cammaert and Blyth 2013; United Nations 2013a, 7).

Identifying a research gap Given what the previous research discussed has taught us about violence against peacekeepers it is quite clear that the conditions in which peacekeepers face violence and the reasoning behind said violence are still a somewhat young topic of research, where many avenues remain unexplored. There is also the fact that most studies conducted on the subject of violence against peacekeepers and the mechanisms behind it are large-N studies in the form of statistical analyses. This type of research is, of course, essential because it creates a basis for further research into the subject. However, statistical analyses have clear limitations in that the results mainly show trends and covariation. While this previous research has provided knowledge which shows that violence or threats against peacekeepers are more prevalent in specific

8 environments where certain variables are present, it cannot look deeper into the proposed theoretical link between said variables and the outcome (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Salverda 2013; Duursma 2019). In order to get to the causal mechanisms between violence against peacekeepers and proposed causes, there is a need for more qualitative studies on the subject. While there are examples of case-studies on violence against peacekeepers, these studies are few and far between (Lindberg Bromley 2017). As a result of the relatively mild scientific interest in the phenomenon of violence and other coercive behaviour against peacekeepers, many possible variables that might help us gain a better understanding of this behaviour remain unresearched. One such variable that has been largely overlooked by the current literature is the fact that UN peacekeeping operations often are not necessarily the only third-party military operations working within a given conflict environment. In fact, over the last few decades, UN peacekeeping operations working alongside other allied third-party military operations have been abundant. Some examples are: MONUC was operational in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the same time as the European Unions ‘Operation Artemis’ in 2013; between 2014 and 2016 MINUSCA and France’s ‘Operation Sangaris’ were simultaneously active in the Central African Republic; UNAMSIL and the British ‘Operation Palliser’ in Sierra Leone in the year 2000 and on a smaller scale even afterwards (Ucko 2016; United Nations 2009; 2015a; Hémez 2016; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace 2004; United Nations 2010; Howard 2019). While the degree and type of cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and other allied military operations naturally vary a lot, such cooperation has undoubtedly been present in many mission contexts over the years. There is also a distinct lack of research touching upon the different forms this cooperation takes, not to mention what it means for the UN peacekeeping operations. This thesis aims to examine the potential consequences of the cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations. Specifically, the implication for the overall dynamic between insurgent groups and peacekeepers and violence against peacekeepers. Therefore, a theoretical framework that firstly, looks closer at the forms the cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and independent third-party military operations can take. Secondly, it examines how this might affect the dynamics between the UN operations and local rebel groups. Thus, it will provide further insight into the subject and undoubtedly benefit the research field as a whole.

9 3. Theoretical framework After having provided an overview of the existing research on the topic in the section above, the following section aims to construct a theoretical framework. The objective of this section is not only to explain why the research question How does the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation impact the level of rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation is interesting, but also to present a theoretical framework which will be able to provide an answer to the research question asked. In other words, the goal is to build a link between the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation and violence directed at UN peacekeeping operations by rebels, explaining why, and how, the prior might affect the former. Then, the objective of the hypothesis is to predict how the aforementioned effect might look once the theory is applied to the problem. In the following section concepts of the theory will be clearly defined. Then the different stages of the theoretical argument will be clearly defined and linking these together, will form a clear, logical and comprehensive theory.

Concepts and definitions In order to be able to construct a robust theoretical argument effectively, it is essential, to begin with clearly defining some core concepts and variables used in it. One of the essential issues to be discussed is the fact that this thesis will be concerned with United Nation peacekeeping operations exclusively. The United Nations is far from the only actor in the field of peacekeeping, with multiple other multinational organisations and even independent nations conducting peacekeeping operations. With NATO, The African Union and even The European Union being some of the international organisations that have engaged in peacekeeping over the last few decades (Gowan and Johnstone 2007; Barht Eide 2001; Bara and Hultman 2020). However, the UN remains arguably the most important actor in peacekeeping throughout history and today, as many of the non-UN peacekeeping operations deployed and operating under other organisations nonetheless act on a UN Security Council mandate (United Nations 2013b; Tardy 2019). There are multiple reasons as to why this thesis is concerned explicitly with UN peacekeeping operations. First, the issue of lethality in peacekeeping operations and much of the research on the topic is concerned explicitly with UN peacekeeping (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; van der Lijn and Dundon 2014). Second, the vast majority of research conducted on peacekeeping is explicitly concerned with UN peacekeeping, meaning that most of the background knowledge that this thesis is relying

10 on is only directly applicable to UN peacekeeping. Considering this, whenever the word peacekeeping is used in this thesis, it is to be seen as synonymous to United Nations peacekeeping, if nothing else is specified. As the presence of conflict is a prerequisite condition for the theory, the term conflict also needs defining. A conflict is in this thesis defined as an armed conflict between two or more actors, concerning territory or governmental control. Another important concept that needs defining and clarification is violence. In the context of this thesis, violence means the inflicting of physical harm on another party (Merriam-Webster dictionary 2020). One of the main components of the theoretical argument of this thesis is the third-party military operation. In the context of this thesis, third-party military operation is defined as a military operation which is not a UN peacekeeping operation. It has primarily combat-oriented objectives in a conflict and is not one of the primary conflict parties. Rebel group is also one crucial concept for the theoretical argument and empirics of this thesis and must, as such, be defined. In the context of this thesis, by ‘rebel group’ is meant a non-governmental armed actor participating in a conflict, which is hostile towards the government of the country.

Constructing a theoretical chain

3.2.1. UN peacekeeping as a fighting force – risks and rewards The major driving factor behind the theoretical argument of this thesis is that the presence of an allied military operation in the same conflict area as a UN peacekeeping operation will affect how the conflict parties view the peacekeeping operation and consequently alter their behaviour towards said operation. There are multiple reasons as to why this might be the case. First, as mentioned in the review of previous research on peacekeeping, some scholars have been concerned with the increasingly offensive and militarily robust stance that UN peacekeeping operations have moved towards over the last few decades. This concern stems from the notion that UN peacekeeping operations are ill-suited for carrying more offensive military tasks and operations (Howard and Dayal 2018; Howard 2019; Karlsrud 2015). In other words, the fear is that UN peacekeeping operations cannot handle what according to both scholars and others, is more akin to peace-enforcement tasks rather than peacekeeping. The reasoning as to why the UN is not suited to handle these tasks is complex. Karlsrud (2015)

11 highlights some of these concerns, arguing that there is a significant difference between UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice. While UN peacekeeping doctrine has evolved towards adopting a more lenient stance in terms the willingness to use offensive military capability and coercive force as a whole, in practice, it seems to many that even the operations in Mali and the Central African Republic which are regarded among the most military capable operations are not equipped to implement their mandates effectively (Hunt 2017). The arguments against UN peacekeeping operations increasingly being positioned as robust military actors and utilising offensive military tactics are many. It is not only the iconic blue helmets and white-painted vehicles designed for the sole purpose of attracting attention that pose a challenge to the fighting capacity of UN peacekeeping operations. Some arguments suggest that it is the organisational nature of UN peacekeeping operations that severely impedes the effectiveness of said operations as a fighting military force. The fact that UN peacekeeping operations are by nature decentralised has a clear detrimental impact on the ability of the operations to conduct complex military operations. Even though the troops serving in a UN peacekeeping operation are technically subordinated the UN military operational chain of command, and thus not acting under their national command, there are many examples of troops being reluctant to act on UN commands (United Nations 2008b; Karlsrud 2015). Furthermore, the very heterogeneous nature of the uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in terms of nationality presents significant challenges on its own. Language barriers between troops, differences in military culture, discrepancies in the quality of training and equipment are only a few of the challenges that are inherent to the structure of most UN peacekeeping operations and impede their effectiveness as a fighting force (Howard 2019; Karlsrud 2015). As a consequence of the UN peacekeeping operations arguably not being suited to engage in combat operations, some scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that the increased militarization and increased tactical use of force may lead to some unintended consequences and outcomes. The most immediate consequence argued to result from peacekeeping operations relying too heavily on forcible measures to fulfil their mandate, is an increase in one-sided violence and collateral civilian fatalities (Howard 2019; Cammaert and Blyth 2013; Hunt 2017). There are plenty of examples of peacekeepers using a forcible approach to further mission objectives and causing the civilian population being targeted as a result (Hunt 2017; Howard 2019).

12 Some scholars have also argued that another effect of UN peacekeeping operations turning to more combat-oriented is the loss of impartiality. Impartiality is one of the three basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping. It is seen as a crucial requirement to ensure the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2008a). It also enables the UN to ensure accountability for the use of force in conflicts. Furthermore, the impartiality of UN peacekeeping missions lends peacekeepers protection under international law because they are not considered a party to the conflict as long as they do not take part in direct hostilities (ICRC 2020). In practice, peacekeepers are also less likely to become targets of violence if they do not present an immediate military threat to the position of the conflict parties (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). However, for example, in the case of the UN Force Intervention Brigade established under MONUSCO in 2013, the UN went out to directly neutralize by military force, specific parties in the conflict at hand, effectively becoming a party to the conflict. Consequently, the impartiality of the UN operation has been called into question (Lamont and Skeppström 2013; Karlsrud 2015).

3.2.2. UN peacekeeping and allied military operations As mentioned above, UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations operating in the same conflict scene is far from a rare occurrence. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, ONUCI in Cote d'Ivoire, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali are examples of the UN operating alongside allied military operations (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019). How and to what extent these UN peacekeeping operations and allied military operations have cooperated in different conflict settings have significantly varied over the years. Howard (2019) briefly discusses the prevalence of this cooperation between what is called ‘ad hoc’ military interventions and UN peacekeeping operations. The general conclusion is that this type of cooperation has resulted in varying degrees of success in terms of the UN peacekeeping mission being able to fulfil its mandate or a conflict zone. There is little mention of what might explain this variation in success, but ineffective coordination between the operation is pinpointed as one potential variable in cases with less success (Howard 2019; Fortna and Howard 2008). This thesis will attempt to prove that the presence of an allied military operation in the same conflict area as a UN peacekeeping operation has potential to severely impact the amount of violence directed at the personnel of said peacekeeping operation by rebels. The theory will

13 attempt to make the argument that the severity of said effect largely depends on the capacity of the military operation to effectively threaten the operations of the rebels as well as the amount and form of cooperation between the UN operation and said military operation.

3.2.3. Causal mechanism This section will provide a detailed walkthrough of the different stages in the proposed causal mechanism theorized to explain the proposed effect of the independent variable on the outcome in the dependent variable. The starting point of the theoretical argument is a combination of a handful of different factors. First and foremost, the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in a conflict. The other main component is the presence of a second third-party military operation in the same conflict that is not part of the UN peacekeeping operation. As the theoretical argument relies heavily on the interplay between the UN operation and the allied third-party operation, it is important to specify what is meant by “the same conflict” in the context of this study. There are multiple ways one could define this concept, depending on the kind of mechanisms examined. One way would be to specify a particular geographical area, such as a country where all the actors are present—alternatively specifying a certain kind of interplay between the missions and the same conflict actors. However, as will be explained shortly, this study is concerned with mechanisms that rely on the interplay and relation between the main parties to the conflict and the UN peacekeeping mission and the military operations. Especially the relations between the non-government or rebel side of the conflict and the two external parties are of interest. As such, there is a need for a distinction which combines the two. The most crucial distinction is that both the UN peacekeeping operation and the military operation must operate in the same geographical area as the main conflict parties. The cooperation between a UN peacekeeping operation and a third-party military operation in the same conflict space can look completely different depending on the specific conflict at hand. The theoretical argument of this thesis strives to make is that this cooperation has the potential to ultimately lead to an increase in rebel violence levelled against peacekeepers. The mechanism connecting the independent variable to the dependent variable will be presented as split up into two parts that are not mutually exclusive, but rather only reinforce the effect of the other. The first one of these two theoretical pathways follows the theoretical logic proposed by Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley (2016). The central main is that when rebel groups

14 face military losses and a superior opposition on the battlefield, their behaviour will be impacted in several ways. The whole premise is based on the conflict at hand being understood as a bargaining situation in which parties try to settle an agreement through the use of force. The nature of such a bargaining process is that the beliefs of the parties about their own strength and capabilities as well as the overall balance of power between the parties are what governs their willingness to either sustain armed conflict or make concessions. As a consequence, this means that it is in the interest of all parties to the conflict to hide their own real capacity from the enemy and conversely, find out as much as possible about the military capacity of their enemies. However, the parties also have the incentive to through signalling convince their adversaries that their own capacity and resolve to keep fighting is high. One of the most reliable sources of information about the enemy’s capacity and resolve is battlefield outcomes; this is because these outcomes are often quite concrete and difficult to falsify. Not only do battlefield losses serve as a clear signal to a group’s adversaries about the military capacity and resolve of said group, but they also have a direct negative effect on the actual fighting capacity and resolve of the group. Multiple factors are contributing to this reduction in fighting capacity and resolve. Perhaps the most direct factor is that military setbacks have a depleting impact on the resource base of a group, both in terms of material resources and manpower (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Wood 2014). Furthermore, rebel groups, which often rely heavily on civilian support in their area of operations, also face the risk of losing civilian support following poor battlefield performance as civilians are generally reluctant to support the seemingly losing side in a conflict (Lyall 2009). Finally, losses suffered on the battlefield by rebels also have the potential to cause fragmentation inside a rebel group. This fragmentation may destabilize the rebel group, which further impedes its ability to conduct military operations and solicit civilian support. (Christia 2012; Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). These factors combine to suggest that rebel groups are put in a position where if they are facing an adversary which is militarily superior and thus likely to inflict heavy losses to the rebel group in direct combat, the rebel groups might turn to softer targets such as for example civilians or United Nations peacekeepers. Summarizing what has been said: when rebels cannot stand up to an adversary with means of direct military confrontation, they will look for other, more unconventional ways of showing strength and resolve, including shifting targets and attacking relatively softer targets such as UN peacekeepers (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016; Hultman 2007). According to Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016), this violence towards peacekeepers serves two primary purposes. First, it serves as an attempt to prevent the

15 peacekeepers from freezing the conflict at a point where the rebel side is at an unfavourable bargaining disadvantage. Second, they are an attempt to offset the previously mentioned mechanisms of fragmentation and loss of civilian support by showing successful battlefield results and signalling resolve to the enemies of the group. Furthermore, attacking international actors or other third parties may also serve the purpose of discouraging these parties from becoming further involved in the conflict as this may appear too costly. It is the latter of these two suggested rationales behind rebel targeting of peacekeepers that is of high interest in the context of this study. While Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016) argue that specifically battlefield losses, are the catalyst for the mechanisms described above. This study argues that there is no absolute need for battlefield losses in order to trigger the mechanisms described. Even the threat of said battlefield losses or the presence of a superior enemy is enough to cause the same behaviour. There is no conceivable reason as to why rebel groups would not be able to identify an adversary that it is unable to directly match on the battlefield, even without first suffering large losses on the battlefield. This is evident from prior experience from conflicts where rebels have elected to make use of irregular tactics and unconventional warfare rather than face their opponents on the battlefield (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Bueno de Mesquita 2013). This is not too much of a stretch from the theoretical argument originally outlined by Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley (2016). Nevertheless, it is important to specify why it fits the premise of this thesis. Only the presence of a peacekeeping mission is generally no reason for rebel groups to take military action against the said mission. This is because peacekeepers seldom mount a direct challenge to rebel groups on the battlefield. This is not the case for other third-party dedicated military operations. This is because military operations of this kind are generally designed to be able to engage in and sustain direct combat, hence a situation arises where rebel groups find themselves in the exact situation described earlier. Unable to stand up to a stronger adversary in terms of direct military confrontation, the rebel groups then resort to the targeting of other less militarily capable entities, such as UN peacekeeping missions. Naturally, not all rebel groups are the same, and it is essential to discuss how this may influence the theoretical proposition of this thesis. Some existing literature on rebel capacity and violence against third-party personnel such as peacekeepers suggests that rebel groups that are relatively weak compared to the government they are fighting, are more likely to favour the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict. Conversely, rebel groups that are comparatively stronger than the government they are fighting are more likely to resist the

16 deployment of a peacekeeping mission. This is because as was briefly mentioned earlier, stronger rebel groups see the peacekeeping operation as an obstacle to their struggle against the government. Weaker groups, on the other hand, may see the presence of peacekeepers as an advantage as the peacekeepers would act as a buffer between them and their relatively stronger foes. According to this view, groups that are weakened by battlefield losses would be expected to cease hostilities rather than target peacekeepers (Salverda 2013; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013). However, according to Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley (2016), this does not apply for rebel groups that chose to sustain their armed campaigns even in the presence of a peacekeeping force. This is because when these groups suffer losses on the battlefield, they might draw the conclusion that the peacekeeping force does not offer sufficient protection towards facing losses against the government, or in the case of this study, the other third-party military operation. Furthermore, as the rebel group faces an opponent it cannot match on the battlefield, and maybe even suffers military losses in the presence of a peacekeeping operation, this has the potential to empower so-called hardliners in rebel groups, which may gain from making use of non-conventional warfare and attacks against softer targets because these actions may paint the whole group as extremist and hard to deal with. The reason hardliners in these groups would benefit from this, is because this makes it increasingly difficult for moderate proponents in said groups to possibly cede hostilities and adopt a more lenient stance towards third party interventions such as UN peacekeeping (Kydd and Walter 2002). The second part of the theoretical argument driving this thesis revolves around the concept of the presence of an allied third-party military operation in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation tainting the perceived impartiality of the UN peacekeeping operation and thus making it a target of violence. Previous research shows that UN peacekeeping in Africa has historically sided against rebel groups and with the government in the overwhelming majority of cases where bias can be detected (Benson and Kathman 2014). This at least partly lies in the fact that host-country government consent is often required for a UN peacekeeping mission to deploy, causing rebels to more often than not perceive the peacekeeping force as aligning with the government. This perceived bias is further amplified when considering that the rebel groups that sustain their military operations even after the deployment of peacekeeping operations are likely to feel that peacekeepers impede on their ability to do so. In some cases, rebel groups may also suffer losses in direct combat with peacekeepers as a result of direct collaboration between peacekeeping forces and the government. In cases like this, and in the light of what has been previously discussed it seems only logical that rebels

17 might have increased incentives to try to weaken the presence of the peacekeeping force with the aim of strengthening their own position in the conflict (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). When applying this knowledge to a context where the rebel groups active during the presence of a peacekeeping mission only strengthens the theoretical premise of this study. Considering a situation where the rebel groups are not only fighting the government but also face the threat of a third-party military operation, the effects described above should only be amplified. This is because not only is there a distinct possibility that the objectives of said third- party military operation may explicitly or implicitly involve direct hostility towards the rebel groups. A non-UN third-party military intervention operating in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation is also highly likely to directly cooperate with said UN peacekeeping operation in some way (Hellquist and Sandman 2020). This direct cooperation would naturally reinforce the picture of the UN peacekeeping operation as biased towards the direct adversaries of the rebel groups. As a result, there is a high chance that rebel groups perceive UN peacekeeping operations active in the same conflict as another third-party military operation as biased, increasing the likelihood of the UN mission to become a target for violence. In summary, then. The presence of an allied military operation which threatens the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase the amount of violence directed at the UN operation by the rebel groups. This is because the rebel groups are not able to stand up to the dedicated military operation on the battlefield and may even sustain losses on the battlefield from combat with the operation. As a consequence, the rebel groups are threatened by diminishing material resources and internal structural problems. In order to amend these issues and signal strength, the rebel groups will resort to attacking softer targets such as the UN peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, as the military operation, which is a direct opponent to the rebel groups, often shares some type of direct cooperation with the UN peacekeeping operation. Rebel groups may perceive the UN peacekeeping operation as biased and aligning with their direct enemy, further increasing the motivation for the rebels to mount attacks against peacekeepers. As such, the hypothesis proposed is:

An allied third-party military operation threatening the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation.

Figure 1 – Suggested Causal Mechanism

19 4. Research design and case selection The purpose of the following section is to outline the specific method used and other research design decisions made in order to be able to correctly answer the research question with the help of the theoretical proposition laid out in the previous section. This includes the main method of analysis utilised, the operationalisation of theoretical concepts and variables, as well as discussion on case selection, sources and data collection. Finally, a clear overview of the empirical analysis will be provided.

Research method In order to be able to test the hypothesis thoroughly, this thesis makes use of a qualitative comparative research design. The choice of a small-N qualitative research design is motivated by the nature of the theoretical puzzle and research question of this thesis. A qualitative design seems to be the best fit for properly examine the causal mechanism proposed by the theory, as the hope is to be able to provide a richer analysis of the observation than for example more extensive statistical approaches would. As such, the method of “structured, focused comparison” (Powner 2014, 129) has been selected. The method of structured, focused comparison provides a good balance between the validity of statistical studies and the rich detail provided by more intimate case studies. The method itself provides a clear research path that can be divided into a couple of distinct stages. The first stage of the process entails formulating a set of clear questions corresponding to the research objective. These questions serve to examine the phenomena detailed by the proposed theoretical framework in an unbiased and clear way. The second stage is to pose these questions to all the selected cased. This results in very structured and easy to follow results to be analysed. Combined with a strict and precise case selection strategy, this approach should result in good comparability between the cases. Furthermore, the well-structured nature of this process ensures that the study also remains focused on the phenomena of interest. Hence the name structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005).

Operationalisation One of the most challenging tasks in the research process is the operationalisation of the variables and concepts relevant to the thesis. Simply put, operationalisation is the process of

20 making concepts and variables measurable by assigning them attributes and measurable indicators. The independent variable of this study is a third-party military operation threatening the operational capacity of rebel groups in a conflict. As often is the case when researching the behaviour and inner workings of rebel groups, this introduces a handful of challenges regarding data availability. While having access to the internal communication of rebel groups to get a look at the intentions and workings of said groups would be ideal, it is self-evident why this is not possible for this or most other studies for that matter. Instead, it is necessary to develop alternative ways to deduce whether rebel groups perceive that the presence of the third- party military operation is impeding on the ability of the group to conduct and sustain military operations. One way that one could possibly get information about the position and intentions of a rebel group is by looking at the public messaging of the group and especially that of its leadership. This kind of information has the potential to be extremely useful but also needs to be taken with a grain of salt. This is because, even though public messaging and statements about the intentions of the group and on its stance towards the third-party military operation might give some insight on otherwise black-boxed information, it is important to take into consideration that it is often in the interest of rebel groups to misrepresent or overrepresent their intentions and capacity (Fearon 1994; Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). This is exacerbated by the precarious position the rebel groups in question are presumed to find themselves in when facing a militarily superior foe as suggested by the theoretical argument of this thesis. Nonetheless, this information is far from useless. When combined with other information, public signalling from a group could in-fact be immensely helpful. Another way of gathering information about the intentions of a rebel group and what situation the group perceives itself to be in is to simply look at the nature of the military engagements the group is participating in. Following the theoretical argument proposed, rebel groups would be expected to sway away from direct military confrontations with the third- party military operation. This does not mean that rebel groups will not mount any armed opposition to the third-party military operation. Still, they might utilise more unconventional warfare rather than engage in direct large-scale combat. An additional indicator of the independent variable for this study is rebel groups suffering significant losses on the battlefield to the third-party military operation. Losses like these are an explicit, almost impossible to falsify example of the independent variable having the effect proposed by the theory.

21 As for the dependent variable, which is the amount of rebel violence levelled against the UN peacekeeping operation in the area, there are multiple considerations to be made. One would be tempted to only look at numbers of peacekeeper fatalities due to malicious acts, as this data is readily available from the United Nations. However, the theoretical argument states that rebel groups that are not able to match their main adversary on the battlefield will resort to attacks against a softer target such as UN peacekeepers. This means that all attacks against the UN peacekeeping mission in the conflict are not necessarily relevant to this analysis. It is thus necessary to examine and take into account which rebel groups are perpetrating the attacks against peacekeepers. This is to ensure that only the attacks committed by groups that have been affected by the third-party military operation are seen as indicators, as stated by the theoretical argument. However, it is not necessarily the case that the exact same rebel group that commit an attack against UN peacekeepers must have been in direct contact with the third- party military operation. This is highly dependent on the specific case, but it is not uncommon for rebel groups to form alliances and cooperate (Gade et al. 2019). Consequently, this must be examined on a case-to-case basis. Additionally, an argument can be made for the fact that if a rebel group commits violence against a UN peacekeeping operation in a strategic manner, with the motivation of offsetting their losses through showing strength and resolve as outlined in the theoretical proposition, they are likely to publicly claim responsibility for said violence (Abrahms and Conrad 2017). Since this study is not only concerned with a covariation between the independent and the dependent variable, but also with the causal mechanism proposed by the theoretical argument of the thesis, it is also important to examine factors that might strengthen this argument. The cooperation between the third-party military operation and the UN peacekeeping operation is one of these indicators. This indicator should be relatively easy to measure or observe. Official statements of cooperation by the parties are a clear indicator of cooperation. Furthermore, activities such as joint military operations or logistical support are also clearly observable indicators of cooperation. Moreover, the language used by rebel groups about the UN peacekeeping operation might indicate whether the rebel group regards the UN operation to be an enemy party in the conflict. Finally, there is one more decision to be made, which is of the utmost importance to the execution of the research design. Conflicts can be very long-lasting and modern peacekeeping operations tend to follow suit, with some operations active today stretching back over multiple decades (United Nations 2019). While it would no doubt be rewarding to examine the chosen

22 cases over an extended period of time, the scope of this project prevents such an approach. Instead, a period of one year will be examined for both cases. A one-year period is suitable because it provides enough time for data availability to be good while still being focused enough to allow for more in-depth analysis and discussion of the findings in each case. This will also be further discussed at a later stage.

Questions Based on the operationalisations and indicators identified above. The following set of questions have been formulated to be applied to the cases selected in order to identify indicators to support the proposed hypothesis: Independent variable – third-party military operation threatening the operational capacity of rebel groups in a conflict. 1. What objectives do the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active publicly state/display? 2. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active significantly altered their military operations? How? 3. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active suffered battlefield losses to the third-party military operation?

Dependent variable – Rebel violence against UN peacekeeping operation. 1. Are there attacks on the UN Peacekeeping operation? If so, which rebel groups are perpetrating these attacks? 2. Do rebel groups claim responsibility for the attacks?

Causal mechanism

1. Is there cooperation between the UN peacekeeping operation and the third-party military operation? Is this cooperation observable from the outside? 2. Do the rebel groups in the area of the third-party military operation use language or otherwise communicate that suggests they see the UN peacekeeping operation as an enemy in the conflict?

23 Case selection One of the main challenges of a qualitative comparative case design is the selection of comparative and representative cases. The importance of a good case selection cannot be understated when it comes to producing accurate and reliable results. The first step in a good case selection is determining the population of interest. This means setting parameters from inside which the cases are chosen. Considering the theoretical argument presented and the objectives of this study the following section will outline the population of interest, present and discuss the case selection strategy employed and finally present the case selection. The population of interest for this study has been restricted to conflicts where both a UN peacekeeping operation and a second third-party military operation are active during the same time period. A further prerequisite for cases is that there still must be a degree of ongoing conflict in the area, even in the presence of the UN peacekeeping operation and third-party military operation. The most common way of conducting a comparative research design is to compare two or more cases and through variations in variables be able to deduce knowledge about each case. In the case of this study, the cases have been selected by using Mills method of difference which entails selecting cases that are as similar as possible to each other on as many variables as possible while differing on either the independent or dependent variable. As such, the researcher should be able to draw conclusions based on the outcome of the unknown variable (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe 2010; Powner 2014). The cases have been selected based on variation in the dependent variable, that is the amount of rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping mission. The hope is thus, to be able to track the outcome of the dependent variable back to the variation in the independent variable with the help of the indicators outlined in the research design section. Even though a population of interest has already been defined, it is still of utmost importance for the validity and generalisability of the results of the study to make an attempt to choose cases which are similar on factors such as geographical location, which can impact a large number of variables. The cases for this study have both been selected from the continent of Africa. Although it is more than a stretch to assume similarity between two countries or conflicts just because they are both located on the world’s second-largest continent, this definitely has its perks when it comes to keeping variables constant across cases. Firstly, although Africa is the most ethnically and culturally diverse continent on earth, many of the countries in contemporary Africa share a relatively similar recent history (Green 2013).

24 Namely, the colonialization of all but the whole continent of Africa in the late 19th century to the mid-to-late 20th century has left somewhat similar cultural and societal remnants in many countries across the continent. Examples of this would be that many of the former French colonies in Africa suffering from challenges with developmental efforts, or the development of legal structures akin to those of European countries (Njoh 2000; Rios and Dobkin 1968; Joireman 2001). Again, this may be an extensive generalisation. However, it is nonetheless within reason to make the argument that this will result in a more similar case selection than if the geographical factor was to be disregarded entirely (Austin 2010). It is also essential to consider the objectives and mandates of both the UN peacekeeping operations and the third-party military operations in both cases. It is of utmost importance for the comparability of the cases that the mandated of the UN missions do not differ substantially from each other in key areas that may impact their relations with the rebel groups in the conflict at hand. An example of this would be one of the operations having a mandate for the protection of civilians, while the other one does not. This would mean that the mission with a mandate for the protection of civilians is far less limited in its ability to make use of armed force towards rebels or by denial of movement or other means disrupt the operations rebel groups that rely heavily on civilian support (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020a; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019). Additionally, only cases where the third-party military operation has distinct objectives which position them as adversaries to rebel groups in the conflict will be considered, as this will ensure that there is an equal chance for the independent variable to activate. Suppose one of the third-party military operations where to be aligned in a way which puts them on the side of the rebels; this should not trigger the causal mechanism proposed by the theory and as such. In that case, it cannot have an effect on the dependent variable. Based on the case population of interest and considering the abovementioned factors, two cases have been selected: The conflict in the Central African Republic in the year 2016 and the conflict in Mali in 2016. The time period of one year is chosen because it ensures a necessary data availability as some information and statistics of interest may only be categorized by year. It also ensures a long enough period for events to unfold in the chosen cases. The reason as to why the time period is not more extensive is that considering the scope of the research process, a more extended time period may have a negative impact on the depth and quality of the analysis. The reasons for selecting specifically the year 2016 for both cases are to keep as many factors as possible constant, for example, military doctrine and weaponry change considerably over time, and these factors may impact the outcomes. 2016 was also a

25 year where the dependent variables varied significantly between the two cases, making it a good choice for a case comparison (Plümper, Troeger, and Neumayer 2019). It is however noted, that answering some of the questions to be asked of both cases may benefit from including data from periods of time immediately prior to the year 2016. These questions are those which look for indicators which effects might conceivably leave a lasting impression on opinions and memory of people, as well as questions which benefit extra comparative time-comparison element to in their answers. As such, the answers to questions 2 and 3 for the independent variable, and questions 1 and 2 for the causal mechanism will in addition to 2016, also take into account and discuss data from a time period up to two years prior to 2016. For clarity, this will be indicated when the questions are posed later in the thesis. In the year 2016, the conflict in the Central African Republic saw the presence of both the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the unilateral French military intervention named Operation Sangaris. Similarly, in Mali, both the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French counterinsurgency military operation, Operation Barkhane were operating simultaneously. Thus, both cases fall into the population of interest as they both have UN peacekeeping operations and other third-party military operations acting in respective countries at the same time. The two countries are also further comparable for several reasons. First, both countries are former French colonies, gaining independence from France only in 1960, and French is an official language in both countries. The ethnicity of the populations in both countries is similarly diverse and fractionalised, with one or two larger ethnolinguistic groups making up a total of around 50% of the total population in each country. Furthermore, both countries have experienced extensive spells of internal conflict throughout the 2010s and up until today (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020b; 2020a; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019b; 2019a). However, the dependent variable differs substantially between the cases. MINUSMA in Mali suffered a comparatively high 39 total personnel fatalities in 2016, with a remarkable 27 of these fatalities being due to malicious acts. Meanwhile, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic suffered 14 total fatalities among personnel, with only two being due to malicious acts (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020b; United Nations 2020a). For clarity, see “Table 1” below.

26 MINUSMA (CAR) MINUSCA (MALI)

TOTAL FATALITIES 39 14

FATALITIES DUE TO 27 2 MALICIOUS ACTS Table 1 – Total Fatalities in MINUSMA & MINUSCA 2016

As previously mentioned, the cases are comparable in terms of history, some societal factors and recent history of conflict. However, one factor that needs to be taken into account is that in the case of the Central African Republic, the French military operation, Operation Sangaris, concluded in the autumn of 2016, more specifically at the end of October. This is something that will need to be considered when conducting the case-analysis. However, since the mission operated at full capacity way over halfway into the year, possible indicators for the theoretical argument of the study should still be observable (Hémez 2016; Luengo-Cabrera 2016). A comparison of the mandates of both UN peacekeeping operations further strengthens the comparability of the selected cases. Both MINUSMA and MINUSCA not only have a mandate for the protection of civilians, but it is regarded as one of the main priorities of each mission (United Nations Security Council 2014a; 2014b). Looking at the comparability of the two third-party military operations, Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic and Operation Barkhane in Mali, there are some noteworthy points to make. First, both of the aforementioned military operations are French-led operations started on the initiative of France and the host country governments. Moreover, while Operation Barkhane, is not a completely unilateral mission, which Sangaris is, it is still firmly lead by the French armed forces. As this is the case, the stated objectives of both missions are like each other. Operation Sangaris was launched acting on a UN mandate mandating the mission to “take all necessary measures” to support the African Union mission MISCA in implementing its mandate. This includes the protection of civilians, but most interestingly “the stabilization the country and the restoration of State authority over the whole territory of the country” (United Nations Security Council 2013; French Armed Forces 2016). This, in practice, meant authorization to directly engage any rebel groups causing instability in the country, in order to stabilise the country. Operation Barkhane in Mali even formally designated as a counterterrorism mission, holds a similar stance. Its main stated objective is taking over the responsibilities of “Operation serval”, the

27 mission it replaces. These objectives are among others ”to put an end to the industrial organization of terrorism that had increased in North Mali desert” and to “Prevent the re- establishment of safe havens for terrorists in the region” (French Armed Forces 2020). To summarize, the factors discussed above makes both the UN peacekeeping operations and the third-party military interventions well-matched and comparable across cases.

4.5 Sources and Data For the sake of transparency, a discussion of the sources that will be used to collect the data needed for the analysis of the cases. The indicators set up under in the operationalisation section of the study make necessary the use of a multitude of different types of sources. The main sources used for statistical data for information such as conflict intensity and summarized fatality tolls in different categories are mainly academically rooted data-projects such as the Uppsala conflict data program, or in the case of statistics revolving around peacekeeping personnel, data will be sourced directly from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping operations datasets. For more qualitative data, such as for example information on cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations and allied third-party military operations, the principle is to always acquire the data from as close as possible to the original source. So, for example, information on peacekeeping operation mandates will always be sourced from security council resolution protocols published by the United Nations, and data on the intentions of third-party military operations will be sourced from documents or speeches published by the government leading said operation. However, all qualitative data will not be as readily available as UN Security Council resolutions. Information such as reports on intentions of rebel groups or actions of said groups are examples of data that will most likely not be available from the original source. In this case, the data will be sourced from reporting elements of non-governmental institutions, or larger media outlets such as Reuters, The Associated Press or the BBC. Triangulating of data through the use of multiple sources will be done when possible. Finally, the use of smaller local news reporting may also be utilized if data availability is otherwise scarce. While the reliability of the sources may vary considerably, an attempt will be made to draw data from primarily well-known sources. When utilizing less well-known sources, extra efforts will go into a triangulation of the information sourced.

28 5. The Cases In the following section, first, both the cases will be briefly introduced one at a time, providing some background and context for the analysis as well as a walkthrough of the main events throughout the time-window of analysis. Following this, the cases will be compared side-by- side using the questions formulated previously, and finally, a thorough analysis of the findings will be conducted.

The conflict in Mali Mali is one of the countries that during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century made up the federation of colonial territories known as French West Africa. Although borders were subject to extensive change during this period of time, most of the land-area making up what is contemporary independent Mali was known as the colony of French Sudan (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020b). Upon proclaiming its independence in September of 1960, Mali rapidly established connections to countries of the communist bloc of the cold war, adopting socialist economic policy and cultural revolution. Following public dissatisfaction with economic policies, a successful coup in 1968 resulted in the country being under military rule for a decade. In 1979 the country entered a new era of civilian rule under a new constitution adopted in 1974. Following this and up until 1991, the county was led by Moussa Traoré, who had led the coup in 1968 and governed the country for the previous decade. Under the rule of Traoré, Mali maintained a pragmatic stance in foreign relations, not aligning with either block of the cold war. In 1991, Mali saw a push for a more democratic rule, and a coup in 1991 led to a transition with a new president being elected in 1992. As the country then headed towards a more democratic rule under a new constitution, large structural problems severely hampered the progress of the country throughout the 1990s. Examples of these problems were a weak economy, droughts, decreasing foreign aid and a bloated civil service. These issues caused public unrest and even resulted in armed confrontations. An issue that would come to affect the future development of the situation in Mali was the influx of Tuareg rebel groups to the north of the country from the neighbouring countries Libya and Algeria. The 2000s in Mali were largely dominated by conflict between the Tuareg rebels in the north and the government. Furthermore, towards the end of the decade, militant Islamic groups also started gaining a foothold in the northern part of the country (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020b; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019d).

29 It was really in 2012 when Tuareg activity in the northern regions of the country surged drastically with rebels capturing large parts of the country which led to the displacement of large population groups in the north. The separatist Tuareg rebellion was organised mainly under the umbrella of a group named “Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad” (MLNA) which translates to National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. In the years following 2012, the Tuareg separatist movement slowed down remarkably, not so much thanks to fragile ceasefires and peace agreements signed with the government as because of the surge in militant Islamist groups in the north. In mid-2012, the MLNA started to face opposition from multiple militant Islamist groups that allied against the MLNA, and the influence and capabilities of the group have steadily decreased since. In mid-2013 the MLNA together with other Tuareg groups in the region formed a coalition named “Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad” (CMA) translating to Coordination of Azawad Movements. Its explicit operations against the government continued until 2015 when a peace deal was signed between the parties. However the group continued to struggle to stand up to the Islamist factions in the region, which its sees at its enemies (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019d; 2019e; Encyclopedia Britannica 2020b; Government of Mali, Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, and Platform 2015). In 2013 France deployed its military intervention Operation Serval upon request from the Malian government with the objective of neutralizing the Islamist insurgency in the north of the country. Operation serval was in 2014 replaced by Operation Barkhane. 2013 also saw the deployment of MINUSMA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. A multidimensional peacekeeping operation which main objectives were updated in 2014 by the UN Security Council to encompass not only supporting the political processes in the country but also ensuring the security, stabilisation and protection of civilians (United Nations Security Council 2014b; Frisell and Lackenbauer 2018; French Armed Forces 2020). The years leading up to 2016, saw an increase in attacks by Islamist groups against Malian armed forces but also civilians and peacekeeping personnel. The Tuareg rebel coalitions, however, did not conduct operations at the same level as in the years prior, with some internal fighting occurring in 2015 (Human Rights Watch 2014; 2015; Encyclopedia Britannica 2020b).

30 5.1.1 2016 in Mali In 2016, The conflict in Mali continued to be characterized by the activities of the Islamist rebel groups in the northern parts of the country, but also with limited attacks moving in towards central and southern parts Mali. Targets for these attacks were Malian Armed Forces personnel, but also MINUSMA peacekeepers and civilians. During the first three months, there were two lethal attacks on MINUSMA peacekeepers, one shooting against a patrol, and one suicide bomb targeting a MINUSMA camp, leaving a total of eight peacekeepers dead and over 30 wounded. There were also further unsuccessful attacks against the UN operation, including unsuccessful attacks using improvised explosive devices (Henceforth called IED) against vehicles and light mortar fire that was off-target (International Crisis Group 2020b; AP NEWS 2016; United Nations 2017; Lyammouri 2016a; Security Council Report 2020). In the second Quarter of 2016, the situation looked similar to that earlier in the year. April was comparatively calm, with mortar attacks on a camp occupied by MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane as well as Malian Armed Forces claiming no fatalities. However, an Operation Barkhane convoy was hit with an IED, killing three French soldiers (Agence France- Presse in Paris 2016). In May, there were multiple clashes between Islamist groups and other ethnic armed groups in the north. Meanwhile, Operation Barkhane and its local partners continued to put pressure on Islamist groups in the northern border region, successfully apprehending a high-ranked military leader of one group. Attacks against MINUSMA continued, with two ambushes killing six and five peacekeepers on the 18th and 29th of May respectively, a total of three peacekeepers were also injured in these attacks. Further, a Chinese peacekeeper was killed by a vehicle bomb at a MINUSMA camp, and a French civilian contractor for MINUSMA was killed by unknown assailants (International Crisis Group 2020b; United Nations 2017; BBC News 2016a; Voice of America 2016; Cabestan 2018; United States Department of State - Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017). June saw an uptick in Islamist group violence against Malian government forces, with multiple attacks against government forces in the central regions of the country around Timbuktu. The UN Security Council also renewed the mandate of MINUSMA and the ceiling for deployed troops was raised by 2500 (International Crisis Group 2020b; United Nations Security Council 2016). July saw an apparent decline in the security situation in the country. In the city of Gao, Malian security forces opened fire at youth associations protesting the instalment of interim authorities in the north of the country, leaving four dead and 37 injured. This sparked further

31 large protests both in Timbuktu and the Capital city of Bamako (Anara 2016; International Crisis Group 2020b). Furthermore, on the 19th of July, there was a sizeable armed assault on a Malian Armed Forces base in Nampala which left 17 soldiers dead and at least 30 wounded. What group lies behind the attack remains unclear, but evidence points to one of the Islamist insurgent groups in the country (Dialo 2016; BBC News 2016b; International Crisis Group 2020b). There were also two MINUSMA vehicles struck by IED attacks on the 13th of July and 14th of July with the former leaving two peacekeepers with minor injuries (United Nations 2016b; 2016a). The beginning of August saw heavy fighting between different Tuareg armed groups and Islamist groups in the northern regions of the country (International Crisis Group 2020b). There were also multiple smaller attacks on Malian Armed Forces, but no larger clashes. One MINUSMA peacekeeper was left dead and five more injured after his vehicle hit a landmine or an IED on the 7th of August. There was also a similar incident only hours later the same day, which caused only material damage (United Nations 2016d; 2017). In September, the security situation in Mali declined further. Large-scale fighting took place between different splinter groups of rebels in the north of the country. At the same time, Islamist groups ramped up efforts against the government, pushing deeper into central Mali (International Crisis Group 2020b). The final quarter of 2016 also did not show any sign of an improving security situation. October saw further splintering among the non-Islamist rebel groups in the north of the country, leading to further if somewhat suppressed fighting. A surge in violence against civilians was also recorded. Multiple attempted attacks on MINUSMA peacekeepers were recorded on the third of October, killing a total of two Chadian peacekeepers and injuring several more. A patrol of Swedish MINUSMA peacekeepers was also narrowly avoided a failed suicide bombing on the 10th of October (International Crisis Group 2020b; United Nations 2016e; 2017; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016b; Försvarsmakten 2016). November brought with it local elections in Mali. These elections were hampered by low voter turnout and high levels of violence, such as for example attacks against Malian Armed Forces personnel guarding ballot boxes. Islamist groups continued their offensive against the Malian government, conducting several attacks such as suicide bombings, claiming at least seven lives (International Crisis Group 2020b; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016e). MINUSMA was also the target of an attack carried out against a convoy on the 5th of November, leaving one peacekeeper and two others dead and seven injured (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016b; United Nations 2017). The last month of 2016 saw no slowing down in the hostilities in the country. Sporadic attacks on Malian Armed Forces

32 soldiers continued. As for MINUSMA, one soldier was injured in mortar attacks on a joint MINUSMA Malian Armed Forces and Barkhane camp (International Crisis Group 2020b).

Central African Republic - CAR The History of the Central African Republic is Akin to that of Mali in the way it too became a French-governed colonial territory at the end of the 19th century. Together with the surrounding territories that today make up among others Gabon, Republic of the Congo and Chad, it was part of the French territory of French Congo and later French Equatorial Africa. Like Mali, the Central African Republic became formally independent in 1960, following shut down hopes of creating a larger unified nation together with neighbouring countries. After holding one-party elections and subsequently having its leadership toppled in a coup inside the first six years of independence, the Central African Republic ended up under authoritarian rule. The country remained under authoritarian rule for the following two decades, enjoying military and economic support from France, which was invested in retaining control of the diamond riches of the country. In 1979 the French grew tired of the governing Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who had proclaimed himself as Emperor Bokassa I of the Central African Republic in 1975, all while being financed by France and keeping most of the country’s diamond profits to himself. The new French-installed president was toppled by a military coup only two years later. Following the coup, general André Kolingba governed the country and all its institutions until 1993 when he was forced to give in to pressure for open and fair elections. The first democratically elected government struggled to stabilize the country, inheriting a nearly bankrupt treasury and dysfunctional civil service. The country fell into mayhem, and unpaid military factions attempted no less than three military coups in 1996. Similar factions also looted the capital city of Bangui multiple times in 1996 and 1997. During this time, human rights abuses, including violence against civilians, were perpetrated both by the government and the groups opposing it. The French involvement in the country ended with the withdrawal of troops in 1997. The UN peacekeeping mission MINURCA was deployed in 1998 with the objective to maintain stability and security and help support legislative elections in 1998. The mission remained in place until the year 2000 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020a; BBC News 2018a; 2018b). The unrest continued into the 21st century, leading up to a coup in 2003 followed by a new constitution in 2004 and general elections in 2005. Former army chief François Bozizé was elected president. However, the situation in the country did not improve, and large-scale

33 military confrontations between government and rebels caused the displacement of tens of thousands of people in the following years. After years of unrest, presidential elections were held in 2011 and Bozizé was declared the winner with his opponents alleging fraud (Ngoupana 2011). The years after the election saw further conflict, and in 2012 a rebel coalition known as Seleka mounted a major offensive against the government in the north of the country. A cease- fire and power-sharing deal were agreed upon by the Seleka and the Government in 2013. However, not content with the implementation of the deal, launched another offensive, taking control of the capital and governmental power in March 2013. A rebel leader, Michel Djotodia, took the position as leader of the state. Under international pressure, Djotodia accepted the installation of an interim governing body to govern until an election could be held. The interim government failed at restoring order in the country. Seleka rebels continued pillaging in some regions, committing large amounts of human rights abuses against local populations. Djotodia formally disbanding the group had no effect. As a reaction, the primarily Christian population started forming militias to protect their communities as the state had no capacity to do so. These movements became known as Anti-balaka or Anti-balles AK. As the formerly Seleka rebels were mainly Muslim, the country quickly became engulfed in a spiral of sectarian violence (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020a; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019a; Council on Foreign Relations 2018). In late 2013, the United Nations Security Council authorized an African Union peacekeeping mission to stabilize the country following the coup and ensuing violence in 2013. The resolution also mandated a French unilateral operation to deploy in order to support the African Union operation. As such, the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) and Frances Operation Sangaris were both deployed in December 2013. In 2014, MISCA was replaced by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as the scale of the conflict in the Central African Republic was deemed too much for the African Union-led mission to handle. Djodita was forced to resign in January 2014, and Catherine Samba-Panza took over as interim president. However, violence in the country still persisted. In 2015, a constitutional referendum and general elections were held in the country but without any presidential candidate winning a majority. Elections were subsequently rescheduled to 2016 (United Nations 2020c; Encyclopedia Britannica 2020a; Council on Foreign Relations 2018; United Nations Security Council 2013; 2014a; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2020).

34 5.2.1. 2016 in the Central African Republic As January 2016 in the Central African Republic started, sectarian violence was raging on in the central and western parts of the country. This violence was perpetrated by both Christian sectarian groups and rebel groups. Presidential elections were held, and no absolute majority was won, leading to a run-off in February (International Crisis Group 2020a; BBC News 2018b; Human Rights Watch 2017). February saw continued violence against civilians perpetrated by rebels and Christian militias against the civilian population in the country. However, the total amount of violence saw a decrease. The presidential elections were won by the former prime minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected president winning 63% of the vote. In March, A clear spike in the militia on militia violence between previously Christian and Muslim groups was observable. Moreover, rebel violence against governmental troops also increased somewhat during this month, with several attacks being levelled at Armed forces personnel. However, the amount of violence remained relatively low compared to previous years (ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016; International Crisis Group 2020a). April Saw a small downtick in violence in the country. The one type of violence that stayed on a similar level as before was violence against civilians by militias. A government was formed in the country, drawing complaints from some rebel factions that the government was not representative. One Moroccan MINUSCA peacekeeper was also killed when fired upon by multiple assailants during a patrol on the 17th of April. The level of violence remained largely the same throughout May, with the lighter militia on militia fighting continuing and civilians continuing to be targeted. (United Nations 2017; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016a; International Crisis Group 2020a). In June, the security situation in the Central African Republic saw a steep decline as rebel on rebel violence surged in multiple regions of the country. The month also saw multiple clashes between government forces and rebel militias. Furthermore, a Médecins Sans Frontiéres convoy was attacked on the 17th of June, leaving one person dead. One Senegalese MINUSCA peacekeeper was killed by small arms fire in an attack by multiple men on the 24th of June. The French Operation Sangaris also began a reduction of troops in the country, but still maintaining a presence (de Koning et al. 2016a; United Nations 2016a; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères n.d.; UN News 2016a; International Crisis Group 2020a; ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016).

35 Going into the second half of 2016, the situation in the country did not improve during the month of July. Fighting between rebel factions continued in large parts of the country throughout the month. The civilian population also continued to suffer from attacks directed directly at them but also from collateral from the rebel clashes. August did not see any remarkable change in the security situation of the country. While the amount violence against civilians by all parties reportedly fell, clashes between rebel forces and Government Security Forces increased (ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016; International Crisis Group 2020a; de Koning et al. 2016a). The month of September witnessed a remarkable spike in conflict intensity and worsening of the security situation in the country. Clashes between rebel groups intensified drastically along with steeply rising levels of violence against civilians throughout many parts of the country. MINUSCA peacekeepers were also the target of an attack on the 3rd of September. However, the UN operation suffered no casualties (International Crisis Group 2020a; ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016; de Koning et al. 2016b). October came with a further decline in the security situation in the country. Violence against civilians by rebel militias continued to be a problem. Rebel forces also carried out attacks against government forces and police. MINUSCA troops became the target of violent protests and attacks on the 24th of October. No peacekeepers were killed as a result of these events. France formally ended its Operation Sangaris but left behind advanced surveillance equipment and a quick response force the size of two companies to further support the UN peacekeeping operation (International Crisis Group 2020a; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016c; ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016; de Koning et al. 2016b). November and December saw a continuation of similar levels of violence as the month before. The amount of violence against civilians by rebel militias remained remarkably high. Following a declaration by ex-Seleka rebel groups that all government involvement was banned in the regions controlled by the groups, violent clashed between government security forces and rebels increased. Clashed between different rebel militias also continued (ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2016; International Crisis Group 2016; UN News 2016b; International Crisis Group 2020a; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016f).

36 6. Case comparison The previous section has provided a thorough description of the conflict during the year 2016 in the cases chosen for analysis. The cases will now be compared and analysed utilizing the questions formulated in the research design section.

Dependent variable First, the questions regarding the dependent variable will be asked and answered. This is motivated by the decision to make case selection based on the dependent variable, and as such, it makes sense to explore it first. In this case, the questions relate to each other in a way which makes it convenient to answer both questions at the same time. As such, this will be done.

1. Are there attacks on the UN Peacekeeping operation? If so, which rebel groups are perpetrating these attacks? 2. Do rebel groups claim responsibility for the attacks?

In Mali, Attacks on the peacekeeping operation MINUSMA were a monthly occurrence throughout the year of 2016. The first quarter of the year was tumultuous. At least four attacks against MINUSMA peacekeepers were recorded. Out of these attacks, two had lethal outcomes, leaving nine UN personnel dead and more than 30 wounded. In the second quarter of 2016, the violence against MINUSMA only accelerated, with five total attacks levelled against UN personnel, three being lethal, leaving 13 Peacekeepers dead and three more wounded. In the third quarter of the year, four attacks on MINUSMA personnel left one peacekeeper dead and at least three wounded. In the final quarter of the year, five attacks on MINUSMA personnel were perpetrated, two of which, with deadly outcomes, leaving four dead and four or more wounded. (International Crisis Group 2016; United Nations 2017; United States Department of State - Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017; ACLED - Armed Conlfict Location & Event Data Project 2019; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2016f) In total, this adds up to, 18 total attacks, out of which eight with lethal outcomes. Moreover, these attacks left a total of 27 UN peacekeeping personnel dead and at least another 40 wounded. This is illustrated in “Table 2” below.

37 TOTAL LETHAL MINUSMA MINUSMA MINUSMA ATTACKS ATTACKS FATALITIES WOUNDED Q1 4 2 9 30+ Q2 5 3 13 3 Q3 4 1 1 3 Q4 5 2 4 4+ TOTAL 18 8 27 40+

Table 2 – Violence against MINUSMA in 2016 It is thus clear that the UN operation in Mali experienced a high amount of violence levelled at it in 2016. For reference, the total number of peacekeepers killed by malicious acts in all peacekeeping operation in 2016 was 34 (United Nations - Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020b). The Majority of the attacks on the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali in 2016 were perpetrated by one of the many Islamist rebel groups in the north of the country. Mainly the large Islamist group Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for around half of the attacks levelled against MINUSMA (Lefèvre 2016; US Department of State 2020; International Crisis Group 2020a). Additionally, smaller Islamist rebel groups made attempts to claim some of the attacks, multiple groups even claiming the same attack in some cases (Lyammouri 2016b; International Crisis Group 2020a). Only a handful of attacks were not claimed by any group. The situation in the Central African Republic was more or less chaotic throughout large parts of 2016, with violence against civilian populations being especially high. Clashes between different militias and rebel groups were also a prominent factor, as were rebel attacks on government forces. However, the UN peacekeeping operation in the country, MINUSCA, did not experience the amount of violence that may be expected. The UN peacekeeping experienced no direct attacks levelled at its personnel in the first quarter of 2016. However, in the second quarter of the year, there were two direct attacks recorded against MINUSCA personnel. Both these attacks had lethal outcomes, leaving a total of two peacekeepers dead. The third quarter of the year saw a further degrading security situation in the country, this was reflected in another two attacks on MINUSMA personnel. However, these attacks did not result in any fatalities or deaths. In the fourth quarter of 2016, the Central African Republic only saw one attack against the UN peacekeeping operation in the country. This attack, as with the two prior ones, was unsuccessful and there were no casualties in terms of fatalities or injuries (International Crisis Group 2016; 2020a; United

38 Nations 2017; ACLED - Armed Conlfict Location & Event Data Project 2019; de Koning et al. 2016b; 2016a). In total, this adds up to five attacks, out of which two were lethal. The total fatalities for MINUSCA in 2016 were two personnel, with no injuries publicly reported. “Table 3” below gives a summary of the findings described.

TOTAL LETHAL MINUSCA MINUSCA MINUSCA ATTACKS ATTACKS FATALITIES WOUNDED Q1 0 0 0 0 Q2 2 2 2 0 Q3 2 0 0 0 Q4 1 0 0 0 TOTAL 5 2 2 0

Table 3 – Violence against MINUSCA in 2016 The attacks against the UN peacekeeping operation in The Central African Republic were almost entirely perpetrated by parties that remained unidentified. The exception to this was the attack on September 3rd, where the assailants were identified as part of an ex-Seleka rebel group. One factor that remains crucial in the inability to identify the attackers in these cases is that none of the attacks was claimed by rebel groups. Even if there is always a reason to take such claims with a pinch of salt, they do often provide some indication as to what kinds of groups might have incentives to perpetrate such attacks. The data collected shows that MINUSMA in Mali was targeted more extensively in 2016 than its counterpart MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and that by no small margin. This is illustrated in “Table 4” Below.

SUMMARY TOTAL LETHAL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL 2016 ATTACKS ATTACKS FATALITIES WOUNDED MINUSMA 18 8 27 40+ MINUSCA 5 2 2 0 Table 4 – Summary of violence against MINUSMA & MINUSCA In Mali, most attacks against MINUSMA were most likely perpetrated by the Islamist rebel group Ansar Dine or its close partners, as these groups often claimed the attacks. In the Central African Republic, most attacks remained unclaimed, and only violent encounter could be attributed to an ex-Seleka rebel faction.

39 Independent Variable Having looked at the outcome of the dependent variable, it is time to turn to the dependent variable. This is done by systematically examining the indicators specified earlier and then comparing the cases to each other. The independent variable is “A third-party military operation threatening the operational capacity of rebel groups in a conflict”. The questions formulated to identify the indicators for this variable are:

1. What objectives do the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active publicly state/display? 2. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active significantly altered their military operations? How? 3. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active suffered battlefield losses to the third-party military operation? 1. What objectives do the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active publicly state/display?

In Mali, Operation Barkhane has defined its area of operation as the Malian part of the Sahel area. The Sahel is the southern border of the Sahara Desert stretching through the African continent. This area encompasses the centre-northern and north-eastern parts of Mali. In practice, this means that Barkhane also operates in the parts north of the Sahel in Mali (French Armed Forces 2020; Hellquist and Sandman 2020). The main rebel groups operating in the area of operations of Barkhane in 2016 that were opposed to the operation were Ansar Dine and its affiliates Katiba Ansar Dine Macina as well as Al Qaeda affiliate AQIM (Maïga 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019e; 2019b; 2019c). These groups have all stated the objective of creating a united Malian state governed by Shariah law. They all also have stated the objective to target western civilians and military forces in Mali. Ansar Dine has also demonstrated that it actually enforces its objective in areas captured, installing Shariah law in the northern parts of Mali it controlled in 2015 (US Department of State 2020; Stanford University 2016). In the Central African Republic Operation Sangaris was deployed mainly in central and western parts of the country throughout the duration of the operation in order to be able to cover almost the entire area of the country. The main groups operating in the Central African Republic in 2016 were ex-Seleka rebel groups and Anti Balaka militias. Although the ex-Seleka groups were fractionalized into smaller factions, they still mostly shared the same separatist goals. Capturing land from the government and rival Anti-Balaka. (French Armed

40 Forces 2016; Hémez 2016; Isaacs-Martin 2015; Human Rights Watch 2017; Ingerstad 2014; Colchester, Poblicks, and Dumasy 2016). Although there were separatist motives and motives for governmental control in both cases, it becomes clear that there are some things that differ quite substantially—the motivations of the groups in Mali were more purely a struggle for control of the country. Meanwhile, in the Central African Republic, rather than having the government as their main adversary, the groups struggled against each other. Furthermore, the groups in Mali had outspoken goals stating animosity towards international actors in the country. In the Central African Republic, there were no such objectives stated.

2. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active

significantly altered their military operations? *(includes 2014-2015 data)

In Mali, Operation Barkhane launched major operations towards the main rebel groups in the northern parts of the country. One of the primary objectives of these operations and the offensives of the French forces in previous years was to deny the rebel forces freedom of movement and the ability to gain a static foothold in areas. The Rebel groups in the north were not able to engage the French troops square on the battlefield. This is something that had been possible in clashes with the comparably weak Armed Forces of Mali prior. There is evidence of a clear shift in military strategy by the rebel groups. In 2016 rebels effectively avoided and even hid from the French operation among the civilian population, to then conduct irregular warfare against their adversaries when they moved to other areas, rather than engage their enemies straight on. (Tessier 2019; Boserup and Martinez 2018; Powell 2019; Harding 2013; France 24 2018). In the Central African Republic, Operation Sangaris remained relatively static throughout 2016, mainly securing the capital of the country and other points of strategical interest such as the Bangui international airport. The rebel and militia groups in the country were able to continue their military operation as they had before. The militia on militia violence continued on a similar level throughout the year, with larger clashes between different groups becoming more common towards the end of the year. In the instances where government or MINUSCA troops were targeted, guerrilla tactics were utilised (Ingerstad 2014; ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2019; International Crisis Group 2020a; de Koning et al. 2016a; 2016b). Comparing the two cases, there are apparent differences that need to be mentioned. The rebel groups in the operational sphere of Operation Barkhane were in 2016 utilizing

41 militia warfare and actively avoiding straight-on confrontation with the French forces. In the Central African Republic, However, the rebel and militia groups did not shy away from more extensive head-on combat. The exception being attacks on Government security forces or MINUSCA.

3. Have the rebel groups in the area where the third-party military operation is active suffered battlefield losses to the third-party military operation? *(includes 2014-2015 data)

The Islamist rebel groups in the area of operation of Operation Barkhane in Mali have all suffered military battlefield losses to the French operation in 2016 and the years prior. Examples of such events include the killing of multiple AQIM fighters, including one of the groups central leadership figures on February 29th 2016 and the killing and arrest of multiple Islamist fighters in early April 2016 (French Armed Forces 2020; Diagana 2015; Reuters 2015; International Crisis Group 2020b; Lagneau 2016). In the Central African Republic, ex-Seleka rebels had faced heavy losses to Operation Sangaris in the two years before 2016. In 2016 however, the French forces were not reported to have engaged in any combat (Ministry of Armed Forces 2015c; 2014). The two cases differ substantially on this point. Operation Barkhane continuously inflicted at least minor battlefield losses to its opponents in the year 2016 and years prior. In the meantime, Operation Sangaris only engaged in combat and inflicted battlefield losses to the ex-Seleka rebels twice in the years before 2016. Furthermore, In 2016 no rebel party suffered battlefield losses to the French forces in the Central African Republic.

Causal mechanism Now that both the independent and dependent mechanisms have been examined, finally, the questions designed to investigate the causal mechanism further will be used to detect possible indicators for the stages in the said mechanism. These questions are:

42 1. Is there cooperation between the UN peacekeeping operation and the third-party military operation? Is this cooperation observable from the outside? *(includes 2014-2015 data)

In the case of Mali, there is clear cooperation between MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane. While the operations were by no means integrated in the sense that they would have been considered the same mission, multiple factors were pointing towards relatively close cooperation between the parties. Examples of this cooperation are French troops and MINUSMA peacekeepers occupying the same camps in multiple areas of the country, and if operations were not sharing the same camp they would often be placed close together (International Crisis Group 2020b; UN News 2014; Hellquist and Sandman 2020). Further, MINUSMA and Barkhane also shared information and intelligence between operations. Medical facilities were also shared between missions. However, activities in the form of joint military operations were not undertaken (Hellquist and Sandman 2020; Charbonneau 2019). Both the United Nations and the French Government acknowledge and discuss the coexistence and cooperation of the other operation in official documents and statements (French Armed Forces 2020; United Nations Security Council 2016). Some of these forms of cooperation were more visible to outside parties than others. For example, the operations sharing or building camps in the immediate vicinity to each other are forms of cooperation that are clearly observable by the public. Information and intelligence sharing are examples of non-observable activities. In the Central African Republic Cooperation between the French Operation Sangaris and MINUSCA was close throughout the year of 2016 and in the years prior. The objectives of the operations were aligned to the degree where they worked in parallel throughout this time. Sharing camps was one of the main ways of cooperation, sharing information, and intelligence was also prominent. Operational activities such as joint patrols between the operations were also conducted (Ministry of Armed Forces 2015a; 2015b; Amnesty International 2016; United Nations Security Council 2013; 2014a; Carayannis and Fowlis 2017). In the Central African Republic, Both the sharing of camps and bases as well as joint operations such as patrols are observable ways of cooperation. The information and intelligence sharing are not. Both cases are similar to a certain degree on this point. They both include multiple forms of cooperation between the UN peacekeeping operation and the third-party military operation. Both included sharing camps as well as information and intelligence sharing. However, in the Central African Republic, there were also joint field operations in the form of patrols.

43 2. Do the rebel groups in the area of the third-party military operation use language or otherwise communicate that suggests they see the UN peacekeeping operation as an enemy in the conflict? *(includes 2014-2015 data)

In Mali, the Islamist rebel groups have clearly stated objectives that imply hostility towards the UN peacekeeping operation in the country. This has also been communicated through multiple attacks on the UN forces by the different groups. The group Ansar Dine, and its affiliates have stated that they intend to target all western military operations in Mali. The group AQIM has also stated that is intends to rid Mali of all western influence, which naturally includes the UN and its operations (Stanford University 2016; Laub and Masters 2015; US Department of State 2020). In the Central African Republic, large public protests were demanding the withdrawal of MINUSCA both in 2016 and the years prior (Reuters 2016; UN News 2015) However, despite this seemingly public dissatisfaction with the operation, none of the rebel groups in the country could be confirmed to have outspoken motives against the mission. The two cases differ remarkably on this point. While the rebel groups in the area of operations of Operation Barkhane in Mali all communicated clear animosity towards MINUSMA, none of the rebel groups in the operational area of Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic had any outspoken animosity towards MINUSCA.

7. Analysis The previous case comparison provided insight into deciding indicators for the causal explanation and theory proposed. The following section provides an analysis of the findings for the cases one by one, followed by a comparison between the cases. This is done to be able to determine the implications for the proposed hypothesis and the level of explanatory power of the causal mechanism. Then a discussion on the study provided, alternative explanations for the findings and other possible concerns will be discussed.

Mali Looking at the findings on the independent variable in the case of Mali provides some interesting results. The rebel groups active in the operational area of Operation Barkhane all had multiple objectives. The two main objectives identified were: To topple the Malian government, gaining control of the country and creating a new state governed by Shariah law;

44 to rid Mali of all western influence including Operation Barkhane and the MINUSMA. The prior seemingly being the main objective, and the former being motivated by the international military presence was preventing the rebels from effectively work towards the main objective. Thus, their main struggle is against the government of Mali, but also clearly against Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA. The strategy used by the Rebel groups in their struggle against the government of Mali before the international forces got involved, was partly based on the use of irregular tactics such as guerrilla warfare. However, the groups also did not shy away from larger direct engagements with Malian Armed Forces. In contrast, during 2016, the tactics utilized by the rebels involved almost exclusively guerrilla warfare and actively avoiding the French military operation. Only sporadically and in the absence of French forces, were larger engagements between rebels and Malian Armed Forces recorded. This shows an evident change in the strategy used by the rebel groups in order to reach their objectives. Something that may well be explained by the theoretical proposition that the rebels realised that their chances of matching the French operation in direct combat were minuscule. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that all the rebel groups in question had also suffered significant military and material losses to the French forces in the years before 2016, giving them direct incentives to draw these conclusions and avoid further direct confrontation with the operation. Moving on to the questions posed to identify possible support for the causal explanation provided by the theory, there are even more interesting findings. The cooperation between the MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane was extensive. The operations often shared camps or built them in the immediate vicinity to each other. And although no joint military operations were conducted between the parties, it was clearly observable to the general public and rebel groups that MINUSMA and the French forces worked closely together. It is thus no stretch to make the argument that rebel groups may have considered MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane to be allies and thus had increased motivation to target the UN operation. Looking at whether the rebel groups had made statements or otherwise communicated that they regarded MINUSMA to be a direct enemy in the conflict seems to support this notion. It seems clear that all the rebel groups concerned saw MINUSMA as being allied to Operation Barkhane, causing MINUSMA to be considered a direct foe by the rebel parties. Examining the dependent variable, the data does paint a clear picture. MINUSMA was by far the deadliest UN peacekeeping operation in the world in 2016. The attacks against the mission were also mostly perpetrated by the same three rebel groups that were the most affected by the activities of Operation Barkhane. The vast majority of the attacks came in the form of

45 guerrilla tactics, with IEDs and ambushes on convoys being the most prominent methods used. Furthermore, the attacks were very often claimed by one or more of the rebel groups, showing a remarkable willingness and urgency among the rebel groups to take credit for the combat- related activity. In conclusion, then, it seems that based on the information extracted from the case of Mali, it is safe to be cautiously optimistic regarding the hypothesis and the explanatory causal mechanism. All the indicators found seem to point towards the ability of the French military operation being able to effectively challenge the military operations of the rebel groups at hand. Causing the rebel groups, who need to sustain their combat operations to signal strength and through this retain support, manpower and material resources, to resort to engaging an easier target and using less risky tactics. MINUSMA being the comparatively easy target in this case. The groups then work to make it known that they were the perpetrators in attacks against the UN operation by publicly claiming responsibility for the attacks. It is also notable that while 27 MINUSMA personnel were killed in 2016, Operation Barkhane recorded only four fatalities in the same year (French Armed Forces 2020). However, one might argue that this could be partly due to the superior armoured vehicles of the French operation being able to withstand attacks better. It does seem likely that this is a somewhat accurate representation of how much more willing the rebel forces were to engage MINUSMA rather than the French forces.

Central African Republic The indicators for the independent in the Central African Republic tell an interesting story. The rebel and militia factions in the Central African Republic mostly shared the objectives of governmental control and separatism. However, a prominent factor that is not to be overlooked is the high level of militia on militia or rebel on rebel violence in the country. The ex-Seleka groups continuously clashed with anti-Balaka militias, and both sides committed high amounts of violence against the civilian population. This may be an indication that rather than concentrating on campaigns against the government, the groups may have been preoccupied with the main objective of fighting each other. The data collected suggests that the rebel groups in the country did not considerably change their battlefield tactics in 2016 and the years prior. There are a couple of factors that may explain this. Firstly, it may be that the nature of the violence in the Central African Republic was mostly of rebel-on rebel nature. This, in turn, might be a result of the sectarian spiral of revenge-based conflict in the years before 2016. The primary objectives of both

46 MINUSCA and Operation Sangaris were to prevent violence against civilians and support the government in maintaining stability, not aligning with either rebel side. If most of the rebel groups were targeting other rebels as their main objective and Operation Sangaris or MINUSCA was not aligned with either side making it difficult for them to conduct operations, the groups had no reason to alter their tactics. Secondly, when looking at this through the lens of the theoretical argument of this study, an argument could be made that the reason for the rebels not conducting operations against the government was the presence of Operation Sangaris. However, this is unlikely to be the case considering the sectarian violence had been ongoing for multiple years before 2016. The size of Sangaris was also reduced significantly in the latter part of 2016, which seemed to have no measurable effect on the violence. The ex-Seleka rebel groups had suffered moderate battlefield losses to the forces of Operation Sangaris a total of two times in the years before 2016. In 2016 however, Operation Sangaris did not engage in any combat in 2016. Further putting into question, the claim that the rebel groups in the Central African Republic felt substantially threatened by the French forces. Turning to the causal mechanism. The cooperation between MINUSCA and Sangaris was remarkably close. In addition to information and intelligence sharing and sharing camps, MINUSCA and Sangaris also conducted joint patrols. It is thus clear that the two missions had the potential to be considered very close allies by the rebel groups in the country. The rebel groups in the Central African Republic did also not explicitly state any animosity towards the UN peacekeeping operation in 2016 or the years prior. Together these two factors could be considered strengthening for the theoretical proposition of the thesis. This is because if Operation Serval did not severely hamper rebel groups in their ability to conduct combat operations against their military foe, they have little reason to regard the allies of the French operation as their direct enemies. The outcome of the dependent variable in the case of the Central African Republic is clear. Two attacks with lethal outcomes were levelled at MINUSCA personnel in 2016, leaving two peacekeepers dead. A total of five attacks were recorded throughout the year. One of the lethal attacks was confirmed to be perpetrated by an ex-Seleka rebel group, but the perpetrators of the rest of the attacks remain unidentified. The other finding was that no groups seemed to want to claim responsibility for the attacks on MINUSCA. Concluding the analysis of this case then, there are some important takeaways. When looking at the proposed causal explanation offered for the state of the dependent variable, as well as the data gathered on the case, it is possible to make the following case for the theoretical

47 argument. The violence in the Central African Republic was mostly rebel-on rebel violence in 2016. This could be because MINUSCA and Operation Sangaris supporting the government had made it unfeasible for the rebels to conduct military operations against the government. As such, rebel groups turn against each other because they need to sustain combat operations in order to signal their capacity and keep support. Thus, as the other rebel groups are easier targets than MINUSCA, Sangaris or the government, they are the targets of these combat operations. Thus, this is essentially the causal mechanism proposed by the theoretical argument, but instead of violence being redirected at the UN peacekeeping mission, rebels choose to attack other rebels. When analysing the situation in the Central African Republic closer; however, this seems unlikely to be the case. The reason for this is that as mentioned, the rebel on rebel violence in the country largely stems from a revenge fuelled conflict spiral that started before the arrival of both MINUSCA and Operation Sangaris (Ingerstad 2014). The evidence of Operation Sangaris or MINUSCA halting substantial rebel military operations against the government is also all but questionable. This being the case, it is more likely that the nature of the conflict in the Central African Republic is such that the theoretical proposition of this study lacks explanatory power for the relation between the variables in this case. Although the rebel groups were threatening the government of the country in the years before the deployment of Operation Sangaris and MINUSCA, their main objective in 2016 would likely have switched towards the sectarian conflict even without the deployment of the operations. Now if Operation Sangaris had been successful in threatening the military advances of the ex-Seleka groups against Anti-Balakas, it is possible that this could have led to the effect proposed by the theory of this study. However, this would have entailed essentially siding with the ex-Seleka groups, which is highly unfeasible.

Implications for the hypothesis and causal mechanism The proposed hypothesis for this study is: An allied third-party military operation threatening the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation. Based on the results of the empirical analysis conducted on the chosen cases, this study can not confirm support for the hypothesis. This does not mean, however, that the theory and causal mechanism formulated lack all explanatory power. There are, in fact, reasons for optimism when looking at the results

48 of the data compiled and the analyses for the cases chosen, although this comes with some rather large caveats. In the case of Mali, the empirical analysis seems to support the proposed hypothesis. The presence of Operation Barkhane in the country, and more specifically its ability to disrupt the military operations of rebel actors in the conflict, can plausibly be connected to a high level of violence against the UN Peacekeeping operation in the country. The indicators examined all seems to suggest that the phenomena observed can at least in part be explained by the causal mechanism proposed by the study. Thus, this means that there is reason to believe that in Mali when rebel groups are unable to challenge their main adversaries on the battlefield, they will instead redirect their military attacks against weaker targets in order to signal capacity. This weaker opponent being MINUSMA. Additionally, the close and visible cooperation between Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA may contribute as to why specifically the MINUSMA is targeted, as the rebels see it as an ally to Operation Barkhane. The most significant caveat to this finding and the ability of the study to confirm support for the proposed hypothesis is the lack of a proper comparative element. This is due to the Central African Republic, turning out to be unsuitable as the second comparative case for the study. The theorized causal mechanism lacks explanatory power in the case of the Central African Republic. This is because the theoretical proposition is based on a third military operation threatening the operational capacities of rebel groups in a conflict. In the case of the Central African Republic, the issue is that this is not tested to a satisfactory level. This is because the objectives of Operation Sangaris never really challenged the capacity of the rebel groups to carry out attacks on their main target, other rebel groups. As such, Operation Sangaris never became a main adversary or threat to the rebel groups in the Central African Republic. Due to this, even though there looks to be covariation in both the dependent and independent variable in 2016, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the proposed causal mechanism and theory based on this case. There are also some additional challenges to the validity and reliability of the study. One of these challenges is the availability and reliability of the data collected. An example of this is the accuracy of the measurements of the number of attacks and injuries in United Nations Peacekeeping operations. The UN does not regularly provide data on the amount of injured peacekeeping personnel in missions as it does with fatalities and causes behind fatalities. Nor does it publish official information on all attacks on peacekeeping personnel. This poses a challenge because violence against peacekeepers does entail not only fatalities but also injuries and attacks that did not result in either. Consequently, this study utilised the method of

49 manually finding and triangulating data on the total number of injuries and attacks. This may well cause the numbers to be skewed low. However, the triangulation of the data minimizes the risk of false reports inflating numbers. Furthermore, when relating the data found compiled on attacks and injures to the fatality data published by the UN, they relate well in both cases. The third-party military operations in the cases chosen, Operation Barkhane and Operation Sangaris were also slightly problematic in terms of data availability. There were difficulties sourcing accurate data on movements and the operational details of these missions. This is presumably out of necessity due to operational security measures, but it also no doubt caused inaccurate data on among other the operational areas and movements of the operations. Something else that would undoubtedly have substantially improved the ability of the study to make inference based on its findings is the addition of an across-time comparison— for example, analysing cases where a third-party military operation is deployed after a peacekeeping operation is already in place and collecting data both before and after the deployment. This would add another layer of comparative element, thus making the result more reliable. However, this would also make the already tricky case selection process even more difficult. Besides, the amount of extra data that such an approach would bring to the table causes it to be way beyond the scope of this thesis. In terms of alternative explanations for the findings of the study, there are also some concerns. It is inherently challenging to isolate the proposed variables and causal mechanism from outside actors or to control for them properly in a small-N study. This is mostly done by ensuring a good case selection and utilising a comparative research design, both being somewhat reliant on each other. This study did not perform well in this regard. This results in difficulties in terms of dismissing alternative explanations for the variation in the variables. An example of this is that the high number of peacekeeper fatalities in Mali could well be due to the extraordinarily proactive and robust mandate the mission holds (United Nations Security Council 2016). It could be argued that due to this, the mission would take a more offensive in the conflict and as such more fatalities would be expected. In the case of Mali, however, this is arguably controlled for somewhat by chance, with MINUSMA receiving its most notable increase in robustness and proactivity through mandate in UN Security Council resolution 2295 on the 29th of May 2016 (Frisell and Lackenbauer 2018). As the data collected shows, the number of attacks on MINUSMA personnel was the same for both the first and second half of 2016. Furthermore, even though the case of the Central African Republic does not match the intended case population of interest because of the relation between the objectives of the third- party military operation and the rebel groups in the country, it does provide other benefits.

50 Namely that MINUSCAs mandate was also updated on the 26th of June 2016, adopting a similar “robust and flexible” posture as its counterpart in Mali (United Nations Security Council 2016). As such, the robust stance if MINUSMA cannot possibly explain alone, the considerable variation in the dependent variable in the cases.

8. Conclusions This study has attempted to provide insight into the nature of and reasons behind rebel violence against United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Building on knowledge assembled from previous research a hypothesis was formulated that an allied third-party military operation threatening the operations of rebel groups in the same conflict as a UN peacekeeping operation will increase rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation. Attempting to investigate the proposed effect, a comparative study was conducted of two cases which where Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA in Mali 2016 as well as Operation Sangaris and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic 2016. The cases were chosen based on factors such as the stances and objectives of the military operations and the mandates of the UN Peacekeeping operations. Further selection criteria were levels of conflict in the areas chosen as well as geographical and historical properties of the countries. The cases, however, differed on the dependent variable of rebel violence against the UN peacekeeping operation. A structured-focused comparison was then conducted examining a set of indicators designed to enable inference about the relation between the independent and dependent variable. The expectation following the theoretical proposition of the study was that the substantially higher numbers of UN peacekeeper fatalities in MINUSMA would be explained by the third-party military operation “Operation Barkhane” and its ability to threaten the operational capacity of rebel groups in the area. Vice-versa, in the Central African Republic, “Operation Serval” was expected not to have the same effect on local rebel groups. Thus these groups would not need to turn against MINUSCA. After data collection was complete, an analysis of the cases was conducted. Despite finding the expected covariation int the dependent and independent variables of both cases as well as there being clear indications of the proposed causal mechanism in the case of Mali, the results do not meet necessary requirements to be able to confirm the hypothesis. This is because of a case-selection inadequacy rendering the theorized mechanism unable to clarify the reasons behind the covariations of the variables in the case of the Central African Republic. Furthermore, there are some concerns regarding the validity and reliability of measurements and sources.

51 There are nonetheless some reasons to be optimistic about the potential implications of the findings of this study. While this study did not satisfy expectations and as such, failed to satisfy the research gap, it was designed to fill; it creates a robust base for further investigation of the topic. The main contribution this study provides to the field is the successful application of the theorised mechanism in the case of Mali. The findings show that the theoretical has potential explanatory power over the variations observed in the variables. This study is, however, far too small and limited in its scope to be able to make any inferences on a larger population of cases, even if it had been successful in providing a valid comparative component. Further research into the subject may want to put more emphasis on the case selection and ensuring comparative cases. This is extraordinarily difficult, but of the utmost importance when researching the type of conflict dynamics, this study has attempted to shed some light on as conflicts are wildly different from each other and constantly changing phenomena. As such, a plethora of factors must be considered when comparing elements of one conflict to those of another. Other paths that may help further studies into the subject include: Including elements of across-time comparison or delving deeper into precise conflict dynamics such as specific movements and offensives by the parties in the conflict, both of which were out of reach for this study due to data limitations and the scope of this study. Expanding the number of cases analysed is also always beneficial for further reliability and generalisability o the results. To conclude, although this study was unable to rigorously test the validity of the hypothesis formulated, it does provide a solid base for future qualitative research into the important issue of violence against peacekeepers. Future studies should be able to utilise the theoretical proposition made, the suggestive evidence provided by the analysis of the Mali case as well as learn from the shortcomings of this study in terms of case selection and other research design elements. Thus, providing better attempts at filling the research gap.

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