USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1100, 31 January 2014 Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal! As part of the CPC’s mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CPC is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURED ITEM: “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY 2013 ANNUAL REPORT.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2014. http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2013/ Our Airmen, Sailors, Marines, and Soldiers rely on these systems to be effective, suitable, survivable, and lethal. Because in many respects their lives depend on weapons systems that work, it is essential that adequate testing is done to fully characterize those systems’ capabilities and shortcomings across all of the relevant operational conditions in which the system is anticipated to be employed. Such characterization is needed in part so that well- informed acquisition and development decisions can be made, but also so the men and women in combat understand what these systems can and cannot do.

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Hagel Seeks Root Cause of Nuke Missile Problems 2. Air Force Secretary Proposes Changes to Missile Force 3. 92 Nuclear Officers Implicated in Air Force Cheating Scandal 4. Air Force Brass: Culture of Fear Led to Cheating

U.S. COUNTER-WMD 1. Penn State Student Arrested for Constructing 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' 2. Bunker-Buster Bomb Upgrades Effective, Pentagon’s Tester Says

U.S. ARMS CONTROL 1. US Alleges Russian Missile Treaty Violation – Report

HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. Pentagon Concerned by China’s New High-Speed Missile 2. U.S. Should Consider Re-Design of Missile Defense System-Report

ASIA/PACIFIC 1. Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons is Top N. Korea Issue: Top U.S. Diplomat on Asia 2. All Relatives of Jang Executed Too: Sources

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 3. Return Arms-Grade Plutonium: U.S. 4. North Korea Threatens Nuclear War in Run-Up to US-South Korea War Games 5. US Intel Confirms NKorea Nuke Reactor Restarted 6. N.Korea Enlarging Site for Bigger Missiles: Institute

MIDDLE EAST 1. Zarif: Nuclear Talks to Resume Next Month 2. Source: Iran Not to Give Up Arak Heavy Reactor 3. Interim Nuclear Deal Allows Iran to Continue Centrifuge Research 4. AP-GfK Poll: Deal to Curb Iran's Nuclear Program Holds Support - Even If It Might Not Work 5. Netanyahu: Interim Deal Set Iran's Nuclear Drive Back by 6 Weeks 6. IAEA Visits Iranian Mine as Part of Nuclear Transparency Pact 7. Report: Iran Nuclear Hurdles Political, Not Technical 8. US 'Concern' at Syria Weapons Delay

INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. Agni-5 Missile to be ready in Two Years 2. Pakistan holds Flawless Nuclear Safety Record, Asserts Foreign Office

COMMENTARY 1. China’s Nuclear Parasol 2. Iran Official Finally Admits Regime's Quest For Nukes 3. America’s Missile Defense System Could Be as Useless as the Maginot Line 4. DODGE: 5 Pressing Priorities for the Pentagon Budget 5. It’s Not About Trust 6. Iran and North Korea: The Nuclear 'Axis of Resistance'

Washington Post Hagel Seeks Root Cause of Nuke Missile Problems By Associated Press (AP) January 25, 2014 WASHINGTON — In taking a deep look at trouble inside U.S. nuclear forces, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is searching for the root causes of recent Air Force missteps but also for ways to make the nuclear warrior’s job more attractive at a time when the military has turned its attention away from such weapons. Nuclear missile duty has lost its luster in an era dominated by other security threats. It’s rarely the career path of first choice for young officers. And yet Hagel and others say it remains important to U.S. national security. On Friday he put the magnitude of the Air Force’s nuclear responsibilities in stark terms, quoting President John F. Kennedy who said in 1963 that nuclear airmen “hold in their hands the most awesome destructive power that any nation or any man has ever conceived.” And so it is worrisome, Hagel said, to realize that some of those same airmen may use drugs, cheat on their proficiency tests and have engaged in other dangerous misbehaviors. The Associated Press in 2013 exposed a number of serious missteps in the nuclear missile force, including training gaps, leadership lapses, inspection failures, deliberate violations of security rules and elevated levels of domestic violence and other misconduct. Hagel now wants to know what ails the force. “We know that something is wrong,” he said, and it includes what some call an attitude problem inside the force.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 2 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Dissatisfaction among the officers responsible for operating intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, is not new, but it appears to be grabbing the attention of more senior Pentagon leaders, including Hagel and Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James, who was sworn in Friday as the service’s top civilian official. “Recent allegations regarding our ICBM force raise legitimate questions about (the Pentagon’s) stewardship of one of our most sensitive and important missions,” Hagel said Friday at the swearing-in ceremony for James, who has been on the job for four weeks and is only the second woman to lead the Air Force. “Restoring confidence in the nuclear mission will be a top priority,” he added. One repair tool that James and Hagel might choose is incentive pay or other extra benefits for the young officers who do as many as eight 24-hour shifts per month in the underground command bunkers from which they would execute any presidential order to launch a nuclear-tipped Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. The ICBM force has shrunk by about half since its Cold War peak, with 450 Minuteman 3 missiles now stationed in underground silos spread across vast expanses of Montana, North Dakota and portions of Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska. It’s not a growing business. The Obama administration is considering reducing to 400 missiles as it prepares to adhere by 2018 to limitations under the New START treaty with Russia. Hagel wondered out loud Friday whether the remoteness of these ICBM locations might be a factor in dampening morale among missile operators. “Do they get bored?” he asked. More broadly, Hagel is searching for the underlying reason for the failures in the Air Force ICBM force that prompted him Thursday to order an “action plan” from military leaders to identify remedies. He also said he would convene a nuclear summit at the Pentagon to address nuclear personnel problems. The incentives idea has bounced around the Air Force for at least several years but gained little traction, likely because it does not address the root cause of weak morale in the unheralded ICBM force. “I’m not sure that simply throwing money at the problem is going to cure all the issues,” said Dana E. Struckman, a retired Air Force colonel who served as a Minuteman 3 missile squadron commander in 2003-05. “What the young men and women on the crew force would like to see is, this is a viable career path for me even if I’m not the star of the squadron,” he said in an interview Friday. Struckman, who retired in 2010 after 22 years in the Air Force, is an associate professor in national security at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. ICBM duty may never have been glamorous, but in the years after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 it appears to have become less attractive as the Air Force shifted some of its focus to wars in the Mideast and emerging threats like cyberwarfare. Hagel’s review is likely to tackle this aspect of the problem, although solutions seem elusive. The challenge of keeping reliable and experienced people in the ICBM field was highlighted in a little-noticed report published last year by the RAND Corp., a federally funded think tank that has long studied nuclear issues. “As the role of the nuclear mission is perceived to be less important to the country, it may be more difficult to attract and retain the high-quality workforce needed,” the report said, referring not only to the ICBM force but also segments of the defense industry that support the nuclear mission. Air Force leaders have been aware for some time that its missile crews feel high levels of stress. Last September the Air Force said the commander of its ICBM forces, Maj. Gen. Michael Carey, had fashioned a “Professional Actions” campaign that it said was designed to “mitigate stressors” on the troops. The campaign’s details were not made public, and Carey was fired in October for what investigators called inapproporiate behavior overseas. The nuclear mission has faded so far into the consciousness of the American public over the past decade or two that 20-something Air Force officers who are pulled into duty at ICBM bases sometimes know little of its purpose.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 3 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Col. Robert W. Stanley II, commander of the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., which has responsibility for 150 of the Air Force’s 450 Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles, recalled in an interview his astonishment at hearing one security troop’s response when Stanley asked him what is the ICBM mission. “He said, ‘Sir, I think probably to guard the frontier,’” Stanley recalled. “And I thought to myself, ‘Oh, my God.’” Air Force leaders say some of the problems that have surfaced recently can be attributed at least in part to the fact that the ICBM force is populated with some of the youngest people in the Air Force. The men and women who operate the missiles, for example, are generally lieutenants and captains, the youngest of the Air Force officer corps. In recent years the ICBM force has recorded higher levels of courts martial and administrative punishments than the overall Air Force, according to statistics obtained by the AP through the Freedom of Information Act. Last year, for example, there were 28 courts martial in the ICBM force, which is comprised of the 90th, 91st and 341st missile wings. That is about 3.5 for each 1,000 members of the force, compared to 2.27 per 1,000 in the overall Air force. There were 19.9 cases of administrative punishment, known in military parlance as Article 15 actions, per 1,000 ICBM members last year, compared to 18.4 per 1,000 in the overall Air Force. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hagel-seeks-root-cause-of-nuke-missile- problems/2014/01/25/21b8eba2-85f0-11e3-aff8-191f8d178325_story.html Return to Top

Stars and Stripes Air Force Secretary Proposes Changes to Missile Force By Jon Harper, Stars and Stripes January 29, 2014 WASHINGTON — Air Force Secretary Deborah James has outlined a series of changes she wants implemented to fix what she called a “systemic problem” in the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. During a speech at an Air Force Association breakfast Wednesday in Arlington, Va., James laid out recommendations about how the Air Force could improve its nuclear enterprise, including changing the culture within the ICBM force, modifying launch officer evaluation criteria, spending more money to improve quality of life for missileers, and punishing those who don’t live up to the service’s ethical standards. James came up with these recommendations following discussions with airmen during her recent visit to all three of the Air Force’s ICBM bases. James made the trip in the wake of revelations this month that missile launch officers cheated on monthly proficiency exams and others were implicated in an illegal narcotics investigation. At each location, James was briefed by wing commanders and participated in town halls with servicemembers, but she also conducted small focus groups with launch officers and enlisted personnel from which senior officers were excluded. Based on what she heard during those meetings, she said the command climate within the missile wings needs to change. “The need for perfection has created way too much stress and way too much fear about the future. I heard repeatedly, especially in the focus groups, that the system feels very punitive. It doesn’t feel that you’re incentivized for good but rather you’re punished merely if anything bad should happen,” James said. “I’ve also heard repeatedly that there’s a level of micromanagement within this force.” She said more money needs to be spent on personnel who man the ICBM force because servicemembers at the missile wings view Defense Department leaders as officials who merely pay lip service to them.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 4 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama “I also heard repeatedly that the airmen hear that the mission is important but we don’t necessarily put our money or out attention where our mouth is [and] there’s a difference between what we say and what they feel that we do,” James said. “We need to put our money where our mouth is. So this is everything from perhaps we should have additional funding for manning levels to get them up, perhaps [we should spend more on] military construction, [because] I saw some leaking roofs; things of this nature. There might be some quality of life things [where we can] redirect some of our investments for this force. “We need to examine the incentives, the accolades, the recognition that is available to the nuclear force,” she said. “This gets into the realm of should we consider some sort of incentive pay or, you know, scholarships for certain types of work [or] should we [award] a medal or a ribbon. So we need to look at all of that.” James said the performance grading and promotion system for launch officers is fundamentally flawed and needs to be more comprehensive. “In the current environment, there’s no room for error — no room for error all of the time. And yet when you’re talking about training, the idea of training is learning and mistakes happen and you get better. That’s what training is all about. But in this environment it sounded to me like everything was a test and that perfect test scores had become an important gauge — in some cases I heard the only gauge — allowing commanders to differentiate [among the launch officers],” she said. “This is wrong. We need to address this. And I think rather than making a 110 percent test be the make-it-or-break-it for these young people and the future of their careers, I think we need to look at a whole person concept [and] the totality of what they’re doing with a test being an element [but] not a make-it-or-break-it element all the time.” James suggested that commanders need to be punished for the cheating scandal. “We clearly have to have accountability at all levels,” she said. “For those involved — some of whom actually cheated, some of whom knew about it but didn’t stop it — there needs to be accountability, and there will be. But we’re also looking at the leadership.” James wants the Air Force to encourage missileers to inform on their peers anonymously so that they won’t be seen as ratting out their comrades. “Airmen need to understand that being a good wingman does not mean protecting others who lack integrity. And of course airmen have a responsibility not only to act with integrity in their own actions, but also to report wrongdoing that they see going on. And somehow that got a bit lost here. So we need to … remind people that there are ways to report things both directly and through anonymous sources. I heard over and over again airmen don’t want to be perceived as reporting on their buddies,” she said. James told the audience that the number of launch officers implicated in the cheating scandal has increased beyond the 34 airmen who were identified in the initial stages of the investigation. She suggested that even more cheaters might be discovered. “The numbers are up. The investigation is ongoing, and we’re going to let that investigation take us wherever it takes us,” she said in response to a reporter’s question about the status of the probe. The Associated Press reported Wednesday that nearly 70 officers have now been implicated. Spurred by the recent scandals and poor performance and conduct among elements of the missile force, last week Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel ordered a 60-day review of the Defense Department’s nuclear enterprise that will focus on management, culture and personnel issues. Air Force leaders are expected to develop an action plan by the time the review is completed. James will be a key player in the review. She met with Hagel and other leaders of the nuclear enterprise at the Pentagon Wednesday and shared her views on these issues, Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby told reporters.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 5 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama “I think there was a general recognition that, yes, there are systemic issues and, yes, we need to start trying to solve them,” Kirby said. Kirby said corrective measures will be enacted “in the coming weeks and months,” but it’s too early to tell what the action plan will include or when specific initiatives will take effect. “The work has just begun … and I would be loathe right now to characterize what it’s going to look like. I suspect it certainly will have a list of tasks that they believe need to be accomplished or checked or maintained, and then some recommendations moving forward,” Kirby said. “But again we’re just – we’re just now starting on this.” http://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-secretary-proposes-changes-to-missile-force-1.264657 Return to Top

Chicago Sun-Times – Chicago, IL 92 Nuclear Officers Implicated in Air Force Cheating Scandal ASSOCIATED PRESS January 30, 2014 WASHINGTON — Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said Thursday the number of nuclear force officers implicated in a proficiency test cheating scandal has grown to 92 out of a force of 500. James spoke to reporters Thursday after touring nuclear bases around the country. The Associated Press has reported that personnel at the bases suffer from such low morale and burnout that there have been serious security lapses and other breakdowns. James, who is new to the job, said the nuclear force is beset by “undue stress and fear,” and said the nuclear force suffers “systemic problems.” The Air Force announced recently that initially 17 officers were believed to have been involved in cheating on a monthly proficiency test to ensure they know how to maintain, and launch, nuclear missiles. The widening cheating scandal has set off a top-level search for solutions. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel summoned 15 of his top Air Force, Navy and nuclear mission leaders to the Pentagon, where they worked Wednesday to figure out whether cultural problems within the nuclear force make launch officers feel more compelled to cheat on their proficiency tests. Pentagon press secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby said the officials spent the bulk of the meeting discussing the breadth of the problems, which include low morale, cheating and serious security lapses, and how to begin solving them. “I think the general consensus in the room was that we all need to accept the reality that there probably are systemic issues in the personnel growth and development inside the nuclear mission,” Kirby told Pentagon reporters after the two-hour meeting with Hagel. “The secretary made it clear at the end of the meeting that he intends to do these on a regular basis.” The cheating scandal is the latest revelation in a growing morass of problems among the men and women who maintain and staff the nation’s nuclear missiles. The number of officers in the nuclear corps who have been implicated in a cheating investigation has now nearly tripled. Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., is responsible for 150 Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles, or one-third of the entire Minuteman 3 force. The Air Force also is taking a closer look at its nuclear leadership. Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, who heads Global Strike Command, has ordered the 20th Air Force, which oversees the Minuteman 3 missiles, to re-evaluate all senior

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 6 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama leadership moves at the three air wings that operate the missiles. Besides Malmstrom, these missiles are kept at F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Minot in North Dakota. It wasn’t immediately clear whether the additional airmen suspected of being involved in cheating on proficiency tests are alleged to have participated in the cheating directly or were involved indirectly. The meeting Wednesday included the heads of the Air Force and Navy nuclear weapons organizations, as well as U.S. Strategic Command, which is responsible for nuclear war planning and for oversight of the nuclear forces. The Air Force announced on Jan. 15 that while it was investigating possible criminal drug use by some airmen, it discovered that one missile officer at Malmstrom had shared test questions with 16 other officers. It said another 17 admitted to knowing about this cheating but did not report it. The 34 officers had their security clearances suspended and they were taken off missile launch duty. The Air Force has 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on alert at all times, with a contingent of about 500 launch control officers, some number of which are unavailable on any given day due to illness or other reasons. So the number temporarily unavailable for duty because of the cheating scandal is substantial. It’s not clear how that affects the mission, beyond requiring the remaining crew members to bear a bigger share of the work. Each day, a total of 90 officers work in pairs inside 45 underground launch control centers, with each center monitoring and controlling a group of 10 ICBMs. They work 24-hour shifts in the missile field and then return to their base. They generally do as many as eight of these shifts per month. The tests in question are designed to ensure proficiency by launch officers in handling “emergency war orders,” which involve the classified processing of orders received through their chain of command to launch a missile. These written tests are in addition to two other types of monthly testing on the missile system and on launch codes. Malmstrom is home to the 341st Missile Wing, which is one of three ICBM groups. The other two are in North Dakota and Wyoming. http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/25278030-418/92-nuclear-officers-implicated-in-air-force-cheating- scandal.html Return to Top

Seattle Times – Seattle, WA January 31, 2014 Air Force Brass: Culture of Fear Led to Cheating A worrisome culture of fear that made launch officers believe they had to get perfect test scores to be promoted fueled a widening cheating scandal within the military's nuclear missile corps, according to Air Force officials. By LOLITA C. BALDOR and ROBERT BURNS, Associated Press (AP) WASHINGTON -- A worrisome culture of fear that made launch officers believe they had to get perfect test scores to be promoted fueled a widening cheating scandal within the military's nuclear missile corps, according to Air Force officials. Half of the 183 launch officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana have been implicated in the cheating investigation and suspended, signaling deeper morale and personnel problems in a force critical to America's nuclear security. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said the scandal hasn't affected the safety or reliability of the military's nuclear mission. Speaking to Pentagon reporters Thursday, James and Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, who heads the Global Strike Command, said that so far it appears the cheating was confined to the Montana base, even while a climate of frustration, low morale and other failures permeates the nuclear force, which numbers about 550.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 7 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The cheating scandal is the latest in an array of troubles that now have the attention of senior defense officials, including Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. The Associated Press began reporting on the issue nine months ago and revealed serious security lapses, low morale, burnout and other problems in the nuclear force. The Air Force recently announced the cheating scandal, which grew out of a drug investigation. "These tests have taken on, in their eyes, such high importance, that they feel that anything less than 100 could well put their entire career in jeopardy" even though they only need a score of 90 to pass, said James, who recently took over as secretary. "They have come to believe that these tests are make-it-or-break-it." The launch officers didn't cheat to pass the test, "they cheated because they felt driven to get 100 percent," she said. Of the 92 officers implicated so far, as many as 40 were involved directly in the cheating, Wilson said. Others may have known about it but did not report it. Separately, James said that an investigation into drug possession by officers at several Air Force bases now involves 13 airmen, two more than initially announced. The drug probe led to the discovery of the cheating problem, when investigators found that launch officers were texting answers to each other. All 92 officers -- nearly 17 percent of the force -- have been decertified and taken off the job while the scandal is being investigated. That means other launch officers and staff must fill in, performing 10 24-hour shifts per month, instead of the usual eight, Wilson said. Staff members from the 20th Air Force, which oversees all of the nuclear missile force, are also being tapped to do the shifts. The Air Force has 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on alert at all times. Each day, 90 officers work in pairs inside 45 underground launch control centers, with each center monitoring and controlling a group of 10 ICBMs. They work 24-hour shifts in the missile field and then return to their base. The latest scandal set off a top-level search for solutions, including a round of visits by James to all the nuclear bases, where she met privately with small groups of airmen to get their insights into the problems. James and Wilson said that the problems underscore the need to develop new testing and training procedures, provide more incentives and rewards for those who perform well, and set up a system that looks at more than test scores when evaluating officers. Officials have yet to discipline any commanders or officers beyond those who actually took the tests. But the ongoing reviews look at leadership and accountability within the force. That includes a culture of poor integrity that may encourage officers to share test answers as a way of looking out for each other. "I do believe there are climate issues, and part of that will be assessing commanders -- how did this happen?" said James. Wilson said all missile launch officers have now been retested, and the average score was about 95 percent. He said 22 failed. Additional nuclear testing and crew evaluations are also being done. Malmstrom Air Force Base is responsible for 150 Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles, or one-third of the entire Minuteman 3 force. The other two bases are F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Minot in North Dakota. The tests in question are designed to ensure proficiency by launch officers in handling "emergency war orders," which involve the classified processing of orders received through their chain of command to launch a missile. These written tests are in addition to two other types of monthly testing on the missile system and on launch codes. According to James and Wilson, the monthly tests all cover the same course material, but until now each base developed its own individual questions. As a result of the scandal, Wilson said the tests will now be developed by 20th Air Force. http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2022790813_apxnuclearmissteps.html

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 8 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Return to Top

NBC News.com Penn State Student Arrested for Constructing 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' By Elisha Fieldstadt, Staff Writer, NBC News January 26, 2014 A Russian college student in Pennsylvania was charged with unlawful possession of 'weapons of mass destruction' and risking catastrophe on Friday, according to authorities. Penn State Altoona student Vladislav Miftakhov, 18, was arrested Friday after Altoona police found homemade bombs and bomb-making materials in his room while investigating a possible marijuana growing operation, according to a criminal complaint. Police also found marijuana plants but called backup when they discovered fuses attached to aluminum and plastic containers. After officers removed Miftakhov from a class and attained a search warrant, investigators discovered one pound each of atomized magnesium and Chinese potassium perchlorate and a package labeled potassium nitrate powder — which are all “key components in the bomb making process,” the criminal complaint said. And although the specific charge is the "unlawful possession or manufacture or weapons of mass destruction" there's no indication that the student had anything nuclear or radioactive. Miftakhov told Altoona police and campus police that he intended to “blow things up” with the bomb-making paraphernalia that he said he purchased on Amazon, according to the complaint. State troopers safely dismantled the bombs after Miftakhov said he considered one of them a “completed device.” Miftakhov was later charged with 11 counts, including possession of weapons of mass destruction, possession of drug paraphernalia and recklessly endangering another person. The student said he constructed the devices in his room but claimed he had never detonated them in Pennsylvania. He said intended to detonate the smaller bomb in a remote field, but he was “scared” to blow up a larger device. But Miftakhov’s roommate, Andrew Leff, told the Altoona Mirror on Sunday that Miftakhov had blown up three “mini-bombs” outside their apartment. "He was off the wall," Leff said, adding that his roommate was a “crazy kid” who did “impulsive things.” A Facebook page tied to Miftakhov’s name indicates he lives in San Carlos, California and is from Moscow, Russia. Miftakhov was unable to post bail, which was set at $500,000. He will stay in the in Blair County Prison until his preliminary hearing on Feb. 2. http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/26/22456757-penn-state-student-arrested-for-constructing- weapons-of-mass-destruction Return to Top

Bloomberg Businessweek – U.S. Bunker-Buster Bomb Upgrades Effective, Pentagon’s Tester Says By Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg News January 29, 2014

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 9 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Penetrator made by Boeing Co. (BA:US) from B-2 stealth bombers on targets to evaluate an upgrade called the Enhanced Threat Modification. Based on those exercises, the penetrator, called a bunker-buster, is “capable of effectively” attacking “selected hardened, deeply-buried targets,” Michael Gilmore, director of operational test and evaluation, said in his annual report on major weapons released today. The bomb, which can be dropped only from the B-2, would be counted on if the U.S. carried out military strikes on some Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has reached a six-month agreement with the U.S. and five other nations to limit its nuclear program during efforts to craft a permanent accord. In his annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, released today, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said Iran is “trying to balance conflicting objectives” in its nuclear program, at once trying to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while “avoiding severe repercussions” from economic sanctions or a military strike. Obama’s Warning “We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons,” the report said. “If Iran’s leaders do not seize this opportunity, then I will be the first to call for more sanctions and stand ready to exercise all options to make sure Iran does not build a nuclear weapon,” President Barack Obama said last night in his State of the Union address. Air Force spokesman Ed Gulick today said the service won’t disclose how many of the bombs have been delivered. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told a House committee that the bunker-buster bomb “is designed to accomplish a difficult, complicated mission of destroying our adversaries’ weapons of mass destruction located in well-protected facilities.” The Pentagon won congressional approval in early 2012 to shift $81.6 million to the improve the weapon. The move, made shortly after the Air Force took delivery of the original bombs, followed Iran’s announcement on Jan. 9, 2012 that it would begin uranium enrichment at its Fordo facility near the city of Qom that’s tunneled into granite mountains. Tail-Fin, Fuse Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale said in a request to Congress at the time that the money was needed to “fix issues identified in testing, including tail-fin modifications and integrating a second fuse, enhance weapon capabilities, build test targets and conduct live weapon testing.” A December 2007 story by the Air Force News Service described the original version of the bomb as having a hardened-steel casing and the ability to reach targets as far as 200 feet (61 meters) underground before exploding. The 20.5-foot-long bomb carries more than 5,300 pounds of explosives and is guided by Global Positioning System satellites, according to a description on the website of the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-29/bunker-buster-bomb-upgrades-effective-pentagon-s-tester-says Return to Top

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency US Alleges Russian Missile Treaty Violation – Report 30 January 2014 MOSCOW, January 30 (RIA Novosti) – The United States notified NATO allies earlier this month of Russian tests of a new missile that could be in violation of a nuclear disarmament treaty, the New York Times reported Thursday.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 10 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The weapon, a ground-based cruise missile, has allegedly been tested repeatedly since 2008 and is considered by senior US officials to have clearly violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the paper said citing unnamed government sources. Russian media have reported since 2005 that the country was considering withdrawing from the treaty, signed by the United States and Soviet Union in 1987. In June, Kremlin chief of staff Sergei Ivanov implied that the treaty benefits the US more than Russia, saying that the US faces no regional threats to its security. “The Americans have no need for this class of weapon, they didn’t need it before and they don’t need it now,” Ivanov told state news channel Rossiya-24. “They could theoretically only attack Mexico and Canada with them, because their effective radius doesn’t extend to Europe.” Development of a new missile might be an effort to ensure nuclear parity with China, which is not a signatory to the treaty and within range of such weapons. Russia has in the past threatened to station short-range Iskander nuclear-capable missiles in the country’s European Kaliningrad region in response to US missile shield plans. Russia and the United States signed the New START treaty in 2010 that caps the number of long-range missiles and bombers in the countries. The alleged new intermediate-range cruise missile, however, would not fall under the limitation provisions of that treaty. Intermediate-range nuclear missiles positioned near an adversary’s borders are considered by analysts to be destabilizing as they shorten the response time available to decision-makers to verify a nuclear attack as genuine and not a false alarm of an early missile warning system. http://en.ria.ru/world/20140130/187045403/US-Alleges-Russian-Missile-Treaty-Violation--Report.html Return to Top

The Washington Free Beacon – Washington, D.C. Pentagon Concerned by China’s New High-Speed Missile Hypersonic strike vehicle test is high-tech arms breakthrough that will be difficult for missile defenses to counter By Bill Gertz January 28, 2014 China’s recent test of a new ultra-high speed strike vehicle highlights growing concerns that Chinese military advances will overtake those of the United States in as few as five years, a senior Pentagon official told Congress Tuesday. Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing that he is concerned by large-scale cuts in U.S. defense spending that are undermining efforts to maintain U.S. military superiority. “On hypersonics, this is a good example of an area of technology that is going to move forward whether we invest in it or not,” Kendall told a hearing on the United States shift toward Asia. “China is doing work in this area.” The Pentagon is investing some resources in two forms of hypersonic arms: a ballistic missile boost glide vehicle and a jet powered, atmospheric cruise missile, he said. Kendall said the threat of such hypersonic vehicles to the United States is that they are difficult for missile defenses to counter. The vehicles travel and maneuver while flying at speeds of up to Mach 10 or 7,680 miles an hour. “The high speed of these systems makes it much more difficult for air defenses to engage,” he said.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 11 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Kendall, in testimony on the Obama administration’s so-called “pivot” to Asia, said the Chinese development of hypersonic strike weapons is an area of technology that is likely to outpace U.S. efforts in the future. “When I spoke earlier about feeling reasonably comfortable where we are today [with arms technology] but not necessarily so comfortable five or 10 years from not, this is one of the technologies that would be on that list of things that in five or 10 years we might have a much bigger problem with then,” Kendall said. The comments followed questioning from Rep. Trent Franks (R., Ariz.), who said he shares the concerns about the Chinese hypersonic glide vehicle development and testing. “My purpose here is to try to elevate that concern because I think it is a significant one, especially since given time, it will manifest,” Franks said. The Washington Free Beacon first disclosed China’s Jan. 9 flight test of a hypersonic glide vehicle that the Pentagon has called the WU-14. The experimental weapon is a new strategic strike capability China’s military is developing that is designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses. China could use the vehicle for both nuclear and conventional precision strikes on targets, including aircraft carriers at sea. U.S. officials said that, while the glide vehicle test was not an intelligence surprise, it showed China is moving much more rapidly than in the past in efforts to research, develop, and test advanced weaponry. Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that the hypersonic test demonstrated China’s ability to move quicker than the United States in developing some advanced arms. “The Chinese, as other nations are, are pursuing hypersonic technologies,” Locklear said last week at the Pentagon. “This is just one of many, you know, highly technical militarized systems that whether the Chinese are developing them, or we’re developing them, or Europeans are developing, that will continue to complicate the security environment with high-technology systems.” “We will have to figure them into the calculation of how we’re going to maintain a peaceful security environment in the future,” he added. Committee Chairman Rep. Buck McKeon (R., Calif.), along with subcommittee chairmen Reps. Randy Forbes (R., Va.) and Mike Rogers (R., Mich.), described the hypersonic test in a statement as the Chinese military “leaping ahead of us” in arms development. “The Asia Pacific is fast becoming a powder keg,” the lawmakers said. “Allowing nations that do not share our respect for free and open avenues of commerce to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and her allies only brings us closer to lighting the fuse.” Vice Adm. Frank Pandolfe, director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Staff, said during the hearing that he would only discuss the Chinese hypersonic test in a closed-door hearing. Earlier, Kendall said the Pentagon is facing numerous challenges to the U.S. military’s technological superiority, including in Asia, as part of a new policy designed to prevent China and other nations from blocking U.S. access to the region. “Anti-access/area denial capabilities that concern us cover a range of conventional capabilities,” Kendall said. “In the case of China in particular, for example, they include space control investments; offensive cyber capabilities; conventional ballistic and cruise missiles with precision seekers designed to attack both fixed land installations and surface ships, including aircraft carriers; air-to-air capabilities, including fifth-generation fighters; long-range missiles with advanced technology seekers; and electronic warfare systems.” China is expected to field a new fight-generation jet fighter, the J-20, in the next few years and also could export the aircraft to other states, he said. At the same time, the U.S. military is being cut sharply, undermining both high-technology weapons development. Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 12 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama “China’s pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization program focused on anti-access/area denial capabilities,” Kendall said. “Today our investments, on the other hand, are being limited by budget cuts that fall disproportionately on modernization, research and development and procurement.” The Obama administration has cut more than $500 billion dollars from defense spending in the past several years. “The size of the immediate reductions we are experiencing is bad enough,” Kendall said. “Uncertainty about future budget reductions make sizing our force problematic and encourages a slower drawdown in our force structure. This in turn causes even larger reductions in modernization.” Kendall said that until military forces are reduced to sustainable levels, “we will be forced to disproportionately reduce modernization, the very investments that provide with technological superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.” Last year, the Pentagon spent around $65 million on hypersonic weapons research and development in its Prompt Global Strike program. The figure included a cut of $66 million from earlier proposed spending. Another $45 million was allocated to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for hypersonic work. Officials said the Lockheed Martin hypersonic glide vehicle demonstrator, known as HTV-2, is being shelved after two tests. The HTV-2 is designed to travel at Mach 20 or 15,224 miles per hour. Boeing is developing a X-51 Waverider, a scramjet powered high-speed vehicle. The Army is also developing an advanced hypersonic weapon that could be used high-speed missile defenses. A congressional aide said U.S. development of hypersonic weapons is required under U.S. strategic nuclear reviews and guidance but the administration has failed to adequately pursue the weapons. If the forthcoming defense budget request, scheduled for release March 4, adds funds for hypersonics, it would be a sign of renewed commitment following the Chinese test, the aide said. “We’ve been pushing them and trying to get them to do more. But it’s not clear whether we’re pushing against an open door or closed door,” he said. Kendall declined to comment on the administration’s fiscal 2015 request. But other defense officials said funding for hypersonic weapons could be increased for fiscal 2015 in the aftermath of the Chinese test. Kendall said he is “very comfortable” with U.S. weapons capabilities today. “I’m not sure we will say that in five or 10 years down the road,” he said. “And the trajectory for our relationship with China is uncertain today, where we’re going to go in the future, one of the reasons we’re focused on the Asia Pacific is we want to do our best to influence that trajectory to go in a positive way.” He said there is a range of weapons and technologies that need greater investment “than we may be able to afford with the current levels.” McKeon said at the hearing that he is concerned that plans to refocus on Asia from wars in the Middle East and South Asia may contribute to global insecurity. “When the president framed rebalance, he discussed how we could now safely turn our attention to Asia because the war in Afghanistan was receding, and al Qaeda was on the path to defeat,” McKeon said. “I’m concerned these commissions haven’t panned out. Violence and instability rage in the Middle East and Africa. Preserving forces’ readiness and capabilities in [Pacific Command] means less elsewhere. Can we afford to take risk in [Central Command] or [Africa Command]?” McKeon questioned the validity of the shift to Asia and noted that the budget for the U.S. Pacific Command is being cut. Defense budget cuts have made the problem worse, he said. The recent passage of the omnibus spending bill provided some stability for the next two years, but after that the same problems will reemerge. Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 13 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama “And military leaders are left with no choice but to cut end strength, readiness and capabilities,” he said of the future. “And that has consequences for our security and military commitments in Pacom and across the globe, unless we adequately resource defense.” http://freebeacon.com/pentagon-concerned-by-chinas-new-high-speed-missile/ Return to Top

Reuters – U.S. U.S. Should Consider Re-Design of Missile Defense System-Report By Andrea Shalal-Esa Wednesday, January 29, 2014 WASHINGTON Jan 28 (Reuters) - The U.S. Missile Defense Agency should consider redesigning a key part of its ground-based missile defense system after a series of test failures in recent years, the Pentagon's chief arms tester said in a new report due to be released Wednesday. "The flight test failures that have occurred during the past three years raise questions regarding the robustness of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)," said the report, referring to the Raytheon Co-built part of the rocket used to hit enemy missiles and destroy them on impact. Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E), said the agency should redo the intercept test that failed last July and consider whether to redesign the "kill vehicle" and shore it up against failure. Boeing Co manages the Pentagon's program to deal with long-range missile threats, while Raytheon and Orbital Sciences Corp build the interceptors and rockets used by the system. Gilmore's report, which circulated in Washington on Tuesday ahead of Wednesday's release, drew praise from two groups that closely track developments on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system designed by Boeing Co. "It appears that DOT&E has finally come to the conclusion that the GMD interceptors ... may be so flawed that a complete redesign is required," said Kingston Reif, with the nonprofit Center for Arms Control and Non- Proliferation. He said neither of the two current versions of the so-called "kill vehicle" designed by Raytheon, had seen a successful flight intercept test since 2008. Reif said Gilmore's latest report raised questions about the Boeing-run missile defense system, and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's plan to build and deploy 14 more existing ground based interceptors, which have the older "kill vehicles," in Alaska at a cost of $1 billion. Riki Ellison, founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said redesigning the "kill vehicle" was "worth the time and investment it will take to create it, develop it and test it," given America's need to defend against possible enemy missile attacks. He said he expects the Pentagon's fiscal 2015 budget plan to ask for $560 million in funding over the next five years to develop a new kill vehicle, with an eye to starting their use in 2019. Additional funding would be needed to upgrade and fix the existing interceptors in the meantime, he added. "It is the right thing to do the due diligence, effort and engineering to make this missile as good as our nation can with today's technologies and research," Ellison said. Nuclear-armed Russia says it fears a Western anti-missile shield in Europe is meant to undermine its security, upsetting the post-Cold War strategic balance. Efforts to turn years of confrontation over the issue into cooperation have failed.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 14 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/usa-missile-defense-idUSL2N0L30C120140129 Return to Top

The Korea Herald – South Korea Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons is Top N. Korea Issue: Top U.S. Diplomat on Asia January 26, 2014 The most important issue concerning North Korea is the challenge it poses by continuing to pursue nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the top U.S. diplomat on Asia said Sunday. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel made the remarks after meeting South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Kyung-soo in Seoul, saying the talks were part of intensive and in-depth discussions between South Korea and the U.S. on important issues related to North Korea. Russel, who accompanied Deputy Secretary of State William Burns on a trip to China and Japan, arrived in Seoul earlier in the day to brief Lee on the results of Burns' discussions in Beijing and Tokyo. His one-day visit came amid concerns that North Korea could attempt provocations in anger over planned military exercises in the South. Pyongyang has stepped up conciliatory gestures in recent weeks, proposing that the two Koreas halt slandering each other and demanding the South call off a set of planned military exercises with the United States. The charm offensive has spurred speculation that it might be an attempt to build justification for hostilities against Seoul. The South has rejected the North's demand, saying it will hold the drills as planned. Russel also told reporters that the two sides discussed relations between South Korea and Japan. He stressed that the two nations -- as Asia's leading democracies and economies -- cannot allow bilateral tensions to continue at a time when the global economy and regional security are so important. Frayed relations between Seoul and Tokyo have been a cause for concern for the United States as Washington seeks to build strong, three-way security cooperation with the two Asian allies in an effort to keep a rising China in check. Seoul officials said they reiterated the need for Japan to take sincere steps toward improving Seoul-Tokyo relations and asked Washington to play a constructive role in getting Japan to do so. (Yonhap News) http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140126000383 Return to Top

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea All Relatives of Jang Executed Too: Sources January 26, 2014 SEOUL, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) -- All relatives of the executed uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including children and the country's ambassadors to Cuba and Malaysia, have also been put to death at the leader's instruction, multiple sources said Sunday. Jang Song-thaek, the once-powerful uncle, was executed last month on charges of attempting to overthrow the communist regime, including contemplating a military-backed coup. All direct relatives of Jang have also been executed, the sources said.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 15 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama "Extensive executions have been carried out for relatives of Jang Song-thaek," one source said on condition of anonymity. "All relatives of Jang have been put to death, including even children." The executed relatives include Jang's sister Jang Kye-sun, her husband and Ambassador to Cuba Jon Yong-jin, and Ambassador to Malaysia Jang Yong-chol, who is a nephew of Jang, as well as his two sons, the sources said. All of them were recalled to Pyongyang in early December and executed, they said. The sons, daughters and even grandchildren of Jang's two brothers were all executed, they said. It was unclear exactly when they were killed, but they are believed to have been put to death after Jang's death on Dec. 12. "Some relatives were shot to death by pistol in front of other people if they resisted while being dragged out of their apartment homes," another source said. Some relatives by marriage, including the wife of the ambassador to Malaysia, have been spared from executions and sent to remote villages along with their maiden families, according to the sources. "The executions of Jang's relatives mean that no traces of him should be left," a source said. "The purge of the Jang Song-thaek people is under way on an extensive scale from relatives and low-level officials." http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/01/26/4/0401000000AEN20140126000800315F.html Return to Top

The Japan Times – Japan Return Arms-Grade Plutonium: U.S. Kyodo January 27, 2014 Washington has been pressing Tokyo to return over 300 kg of mostly weapons-grade plutonium given to Japan for research purposes during the Cold War era, Japanese and U.S. government sources said Sunday. President Barack Obama’s administration, which is keen to ensure nuclear security, wants Japan to return the plutonium supplied for use as nuclear fuel in a fast critical assembly in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, the sources said. The highly concentrated plutonium could be used to produce 40 to 50 nuclear weapons. Japan has strongly resisted returning the plutonium, which it says is needed for researching fast reactors. But it has finally given in to repeated U.S. demands, the sources said. Since last year, Japan and the United States have been actively discussing the matter, and Washington plans to forge an accord with Tokyo on the occasion of the third nuclear security summit in March in the Netherlands. To prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, the U.S. government has called for eliminating and minimizing the use of such materials. Since the first such summit was held in 2010 in Washington at the initiative of Obama, the United States has been pressing Japan to return 331 kg of plutonium now kept at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s fast critical assembly, the sources said. The facility, which attained criticality in 1967, is the nation’s only critical assembly designed to study the neutron characteristics of fast reactors. Since some of the plutonium was made in Britain, the United States is also asking London’s permission to transfer all of it to the United States, the sources said, adding the three nations are working out their policies on the matter, the sources said. The Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry and other researchers have argued that the plutonium in question is needed for research and is vital to producing good data.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 16 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama At present, Japan has about another 44 tons of plutonium, but its quality is not on a par with the plutonium used for research purposes, a Japanese expert said. Since the March 2011 nuclear crisis at Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, the United States has expressed its concern to Tokyo over how it will use plutonium. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/27/national/return-arms-grade-plutonium-u-s/#.UubZUH9OKSM Return to Top

The London Daily Telegraph – U.K. North Korea Threatens Nuclear War in Run-Up to US-South Korea War Games North Korea has ratcheted up its rhetoric against its southern neighbour and the States in the run up to Foal Eagle, an annual war game between the US and South Korea By Associated Press, Seoul, South Korea 29 January 2014 North Korea is threatening nuclear war in the run up to scheduled, soon-to-start, joint military maneuvers between the US and South Korea. North Korea's increasingly shrill opposition to the annual joint drills named Foal Eagle looks very similar to the kind of vitriol that preceded the start of the same exercises last year and led to a steep rise in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. That round of escalation culminated in threats of a nuclear strike on Washington and the flattening of Seoul before the maneuvers ended and both sides went back to their corners. It appears the first stages of this year's battle have already begun - though some experts say they don't think it will be as high-pitched as last year's. In the latest of North Korea's increasingly frequent salvos against the exercises, it said through its state-run media that the United States is building up its military forces in Asia so it can invade the country - formally called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK - and take control of the whole region. The invectives against the exercises began earlier this month, when North Korea's powerful National Defense Commission proposed the rivals halt military actions and "mutual vilification" to build better relations. The North, however, strongly hinted it would maintain its nuclear weapons program while urging South Korea to cancel the drills with the United States, set to begin in late February. North Korea's ambassador to key ally China offered a somewhat less caustic line at a rare news conference on Wednesday. Ji Jae Ryong told international media that North Korea wants to reduce tensions to allow steps toward reconciliation and eventual unification between North and South. "First, we propose taking preparatory measures in response to the warm call for creating an atmosphere for improving North-South ties. In this regard, we officially propose the South Korean authorities take critical measures of halting acts of provoking and slandering the other side from Jan. 30," Mr Ji said. But Mr Ji reiterated that North Korea had no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Seoul-based analyst Daniel Pinkston, of the International Crisis Group, said that although some experts saw the proposal as an overture or part of a "charm offensive" by North Korea, it was intended more as a means of setting the stage for more heated actions ahead - since the North has no reason to expect that Washington and Seoul would seriously consider nixing Foal Eagle. "It feeds into the propaganda cycle again," he said. "It's a way of showing the domestic audience that, 'we made a serious overture. We tried to bend over backwards. But they showed their true colours.' I don't see any cooperative measures or charm offensive at all."

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 17 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Seoul and Washington have essentially ignored North Korea's proposal. Seoul instead demanded that North Korea take "practical" action for nuclear disarmament if it truly wants peace on the peninsula. But Seoul has proposed working-level talks on Wednesday to discuss allowing Koreans separated by the 1950-53 Korean War to reunite. North Korea didn't immediately respond to Seoul's proposals. The fighting between North and South Korea ended six decades ago with an armistice, not a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula still technically in a state of war. North Korea remains highly sensitive to all military activity in the South, and sees Seoul as a puppet state because nearly 30,000 U.S. troops are based on its soil. This year's drills, in which troops will train on land, sea and in the air, are expected to last until about April. Yoo Ho-yeol, a professor of North Korea studies at Korea University in South Korea, said he doesn't expect as much tension as last year. "North Korea is maintaining its nuclear weapons program but hasn't launched any fresh provocation, so this year's drills would be more like the routine ones they conducted in previous years," he said. Edited by Arron Merat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10604956/North-Korea-threatens-nuclear-war-in- run-up-to-US-South-Korea-war-games.html Return to Top

The Seattle Times – Seattle, WA January 29, 2014 US Intel Confirms NKorea Nuke Reactor Restarted U.S. intelligence says North Korea has followed through on its threat to advance its nuclear weapons program. WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence says North Korea has followed through on its threat to advance its nuclear weapons program. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said Wednesday that the North has expanded the size of its uranium enrichment facility at its Nyongbyon nuclear complex and restarted a plutonium reactor that was shut down in 2007. Clapper's written testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee concurs with the assessments of think tanks that monitor North Korea's nuclear program using commercial satellite imagery. South Korean intelligence also says the reactor has restarted. North Korea announced its intention to "adjust and alter" its existing nuclear facilities after an atomic test explosion last February, backtracking from denuclearization commitments. Clapper said the North has taken initial steps toward fielding a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile although it remains untested. http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2022781619_apxunitedstatesnkorea.html Return to Top

Space Daily.com N.Korea Enlarging Site for Bigger Missiles: Institute By Staff Writers Washington, Agence France-Presse (AFP) January 29, 2014

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 18 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama North Korea appears to be expanding its main launch site to permit more advanced missiles which may eventually be able to reach the United States, a think tank said Wednesday. Analyzing satellite images of the Sohae launch site over the past two months, Johns Hopkins University's US-Korea Institute said North Korea apparently tested a rocket engine needed for its road-mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile. The evidence indicates that North Korea may be preparing "for a more robust rocket test program in the future," said the institute's blog, 38 North. This expansion could involve "larger space launch vehicles and road-mobile ballistic missiles able to attack targets in Northeast Asia and the United States." Researchers have repeatedly said North Korea is expanding its nuclear weapons and missile programs, amid questions about the regime's internal stability after young leader Kim Jong-Un executed his uncle and former mentor. The 38 North blog said North Korea appears to be modifying the Sohae site to allow rockets up to 25 percent longer than the Unha-3, which successfully put a small satellite into orbit in December 2012. The construction means that North Korea is unlikely to be able to carry out any new launches until March or April, it said. In January 2011, then defense secretary Robert Gates said that North Korea could develop intercontinental missiles capable of hitting the US Pacific coast within five years. Diplomacy has been at a standstill, with the United States insisting that North Korea show a willingness to wind down its nuclear weapons program before any talks. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/NKorea_enlarging_site_for_bigger_missiles_institute_999.html Return to Top

Al Arabiya – U.A.E. Zarif: Iran Nuclear Talks to Resume Next Month January 25, 2014 Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Saturday that talks with world powers to reach a long-term nuclear deal will resume next month. Zarif said he agreed with EU foreign policy Chief Catherine Ashton "to hold the first meeting of Iran and [the] P5+1 at the end of [the] Iranian month of Bahman" which ends on Feb. 19, according to Agence France-Presse. "We wanted to hold the meeting earlier but our Chinese friends were not ready due to holidays of their new year" on January 31, he wrote on his Facebook page Zarif, who is at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss ski resort of Davos, did not specify where the talks would be held, or when the resumption was agreed with Ashton. Meanwhile, a senior Iranian official Saturday dismissed the need for a Tehran office for U.N. inspectors tasked with monitoring Iran’s partial nuclear freeze, Mehr news agency said, according to AFP. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency had said the watchdog may ask Iran for permission “to set up a temporary office to provide logistical support,” for its inspectors. U.N. inspectors are in Iran to monitor the implementation of a nuclear deal with Western powers that took effect on Monday, after Iran stopped enriching uranium above five percent fissile purities at its Natanz and Fordo facilities.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 19 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama “In our opinion, by considering the volume of nuclear activities in the country, there is no need for setting up a nuclear watchdog office in Iran,” said Reza Najafi, Tehran’s envoy to the IAEA. “We have not received such a request from the IAEA for setting up an office in Tehran,” Najafi told Mehr news agency. On Friday, IAEA chief Yukiya Amano said he might seek Iran’s permission for a Tehran office for inspectors. IAEA needs to “double our staff and efforts” in order to carry out its role in monitoring the November deal which will require intensive checks over the next six months,” Amano said. The IAEA had won backing from member states for its efforts to monitor Iran’s partial nuclear freeze, which will require an extra 5.5 million euros ($7.5 million), he added. The United States, France, Britain and Germany were among those who had offered to contribute funds, IAEA chief said. The IAEA currently has two teams of two inspectors each that take turns to monitor sites in Iran. Under the interim six-month accord reached in Geneva last November, Tehran is required to freeze or curb its nuclear activities for six months in exchange for some sanctions relief while the two sides try to reach a comprehensive agreement. The so-called P5+1 is composed of the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/01/25/Zarif-Iran-nuclear-talks-to-resume-next-month-.html Return to Top

FARS News Agency – Iran Monday, January 27, 2014 Source: Iran Not to Give Up Arak Heavy Reactor TEHRAN (FNA) - Operation of the heavy water reactor in the Central city of Arak is Iran’s redline and the country has no plan to relinquish this project by any means, informed sources said on Monday, after several US officials alleged that Iran will eventually dismantle the facility in future. “Arak reactor is the result of 30 years of efforts and Iran will not lose it even under the most difficult conditions,” an informed source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told FNA on Monday. He warned that the radical stances taken by some US officials could push the current negotiations between Iran and the Group 5+1 into a deadlock. “Iran has never been blackmailed by the Americans, and it won't be future either,” the source said. The IAEA inspectors visited Arak heavy water reactor in December. During their visit to Iran, the IAEA inspectors held a meeting with the officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and then visited Arak heavy water installations. Before the IAEA started its visits to the Arak Reactor, the AEOI announced in a statement that "the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a sign of goodwill to remove any possible ambiguity about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, has given a positive response to the request made by the IAEA to visit the plant". In mid-November, Director-General of the IAEA Yukiya Amano and AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi signed a joint statement which presented a roadmap for future cooperation to resolve the remaining issues between the two sides.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 20 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama According to the statement, the IAEA and Iran agreed on November 11, 2013 to strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA. "The IAEA agreed to continue to take into account Iran's security concerns, including through the use of managed access and the protection of confidential information," the statement said. According to the statement, it was agreed that Iran and the IAEA would cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues. "It is foreseen that Iran's cooperation will include providing the IAEA with timely information about its nuclear facilities and in regard to the implementation of transparency measures. Activities will proceed in a step-by-step manner," it said. "As a first step, Iran and the IAEA agreed to the practical measures listed in the attached Annex. Iran will provide the access and information within three months from the date of the statement (today). The IAEA will report to the Board of Governors on progress in the implementation of these measures," it said. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921107001128 Return to Top

Los Angeles Times – Los Angeles, CA Interim Nuclear Deal Allows Iran to Continue Centrifuge Research By Paul Richter January 27, 2014 WASHINGTON – The interim nuclear deal between Iran and world powers will allow Tehran to continue far more research and development on centrifuges to enrich uranium than has been publicly recognized, according to a veteran Washington nuclear analyst. In a new report, David Albright, president of the nonpartisan Institute for Science and International Security, said the deal may delay development of new centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility that haven’t yet been fed with uranium hexaflouride, a compound used to produce nuclear fuel. But the accord, which went into effect Jan. 20, will allow Iran to continue research over the next six months on several types of advanced centrifuges already at Natanz. Iran also is likely to continue centrifuge research and development at other sites, including undisclosed locations, according to the report. As a result, the deal is “not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program,” the report says. The interim deal, signed Nov. 24, is aimed at halting Iran’s nuclear progress for six months to a year while negotiators from six world powers and Iran try to reach an agreement imposing longer-lasting curbs on the nuclear program. Many nations fear Iran is aiming for a nuclear weapons capability, despite its denials. Albright said he hopes to persuade the six powers to push for much stricter limits on centrifuge research and development when they negotiate the final agreement. The issue “has to be addressed much more aggressively,” said Albright, a former United Nations nuclear inspector who has been frequently consulted by U.S. administrations and Congress. Centrifuge research is an important issue because advanced machines can generate nuclear fuel more quickly, giving Iran the capacity to reach nuclear bomb-making capability in a shorter time. The Iranians already have used uranium hexaflouride at Natanz to test five types of centrifuges, the IR-1, IR2-M, IR- 4, IR-5 and IR6 models, Obama administration officials said at a Jan. 13 briefing for reporters.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 21 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama U.S. officials have acknowledged that the deal allows Iran to continue several kinds of centrifuge work. They say their goal was to put the brakes on additional installations to prevent Iran from moving ahead in learning how to generate enriched uranium on an industrial scale. Albright said that although U.S. officials have clearly expressed their desire to roll back Iran’s nuclear program, it is not yet clear that they intend to press hard in the final negotiations for strict limits on centrifuge research and development. He said it is likely to be a tough fight because the Iranians have made clear their intention to continue centrifuge work. Last week, Iranian President declared that Iran would not accept obstacles to its “scientific progress.” http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-interim-nuclear-deal-iran-research- 20140127,0,4407943.story#axzz2rihJUHHQ Return to Top

Minneapolis Star Tribune – Minneapolis, MN AP-GfK Poll: Deal to Curb Iran's Nuclear Program Holds Support - Even If It Might Not Work By JENNIFER AGIESTA, Associated Press January 28, 2014 WASHINGTON — A majority of Americans support an agreement by the U.S. and five other world powers to limit Iran's disputed nuclear program, but fewer believe it will keep the Islamic republic from building a nuclear bomb. A new Associated Press-GfK poll gave President Barack Obama lower marks for his dealings with Iran. The five-day survey, conducted Jan. 17-21, was ongoing as the interim agreement went into effect. It calls for Iran to cap uranium enrichment at a level far below what's necessary to build a nuclear weapon. In exchange, world powers agreed to ease international sanctions by an estimated $7 billion to give some short-term relief to Iran's crippled economy. The temporary compromise is set to expire in July, giving negotiators six months to work on a plan to permanently prevent Iran's nuclear program from becoming a threat. The poll indicated that 60 percent of American adults approve of the six-month agreement. But fewer than half — 47 percent — believe it might work. "From a diplomatic standpoint, it would be great to be able to negotiate and come up with a solution that would eliminate the chance for nuclear weapons for Iran," respondent Lance Hughey, 40, a lawyer from LaCrosse, Wis., said Monday. However, "Iran is a difficult country to trust," said Hughey, who identified himself as an independent voter with slightly Republican leanings. "And the leadership that we see out of D.C., the way things have been conducted with Syria ... I don't believe (the president) has the leadership skills to deal with Iran." The poll concluded that overall, 42 percent approve of how Obama handles Iran — about the same as 44 percent in December. Fewer strongly approve of his performance, 25 percent now compared with 30 percent in December. Obama is the first U.S. president to talk directly with an Iranian leader since 1979, when the toppled the pro-U.S. shah and brought Islamic militants to power. Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke briefly by phone in late September, and opened the way for meetings and negotiations between U.S. and Iranian diplomats.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 22 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama But the Obama administration has come under fire from lawmakers who say the tough trade and financial sanctions should not be eased until Iran agrees to all international demands, including settling once and for all any concerns that it may be trying to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has denied it is seeking a bomb and says it is pursuing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes. The next round of negotiations with Iran is expected to be held in New York next month. The U.S. and its negotiating partners — Britain, France, Germany, China and Russia — will be seeking a long-term agreement to halt Iran's nuclear program. The AP-GfK Poll was conducted using KnowledgePanel, GfK's probability-based online panel. It involved online interviews with 1,060 adults. The survey has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.9 percentage points for all respondents. Those respondents who did not have Internet access before joining the panel were provided it for free. AP News Survey Specialist Dennis Junius contributed to this report. http://www.startribune.com/nation/242345571.html Return to Top

The New York Times Netanyahu: Interim Deal Set Iran's Nuclear Drive Back by 6 Weeks By REUTERS January 28, 2014 (Reuters) - An international deal capping Iran's nuclear work set the program back by just six weeks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Tuesday, accusing Tehran of using the hiatus to hone technologies with bomb-making potential. Iran this month began implementing the interim nuclear accord it clinched with world powers in Geneva in November, and which Netanyahu has condemned as a "historic mistake" for easing sanctions on Israel's arch-foe while letting it retain the infrastructure to make fissile materials. "All told, we assess that the agreement put Iran six weeks further away, no more than that, from the place where it was beforehand," Netanyahu told a security conference in Tel Aviv. "So the test remains for a permanent deal, if achieved, to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear capability altogether," he said, alluding to further planned international talks with Iran aimed at a fuller agreement on the disputed nuclear program. Iran denies its nuclear work has any military dimensions, saying it is only to produce electricity and medical isotopes. Netanyahu's estimates of the limited impact of the Geneva deal, which took effect on January 20, differ from those of some Western experts who suggest Iran would need more time than that to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb, if it were to decide to build one. President Barack Obama saw the limitations as more far-reaching, saying just after the Geneva deal was struck that its terms had "cut off Iran's most likely paths to a bomb". Washington has sought to reassure Israel it would confer closely about crafting a permanent deal with Iran after the six-month confidence-building period laid out by the Geneva deal. Israel has threatened to use force if necessary to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, which the Jewish state sees as a mortal threat. Israel is widely assumed to be the Middle East's only nuclear-armed power. Additional reporting by Fredrik Dahl; Editing by Alistair Lyon

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 23 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/01/28/world/middleeast/28reuters-nuclear-iran- israel.html?partner=rss&emc=rss Return to Top

The Lebanon Daily Star – Beirut, Lebanon IAEA Visits Iranian Mine as Part of Nuclear Transparency Pact Reuters January 29, 2014 DUBAI: U.N. nuclear inspectors visited an Iranian uranium mine for the first time in nearly a decade on Wednesday, Iranian media reported, as Tehran gradually opens up its disputed nuclear program to greater international scrutiny. A three-member team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) went to the Gchine mine near the southern Gulf port city of Bandar Abbas, a spokesman for Iran's atomic energy organisation said. The IAEA was last there in 2005. They "are now conducting their inspection," Behrouz Kamalvandi was quoted as saying on the web site of Press TV, Iran's English-language state television. Allowing the U.N. nuclear agency - which is investigating suspicions that Iran may have carried out atomic bomb research - to go to Gchine was among six concrete steps Iran agreed to under a Nov. 11 cooperation agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA- Iran deal is separate from a Nov. 24 breakthrough accord between Iran and six world powers to curb Iran's nuclear program in return for a limited easing of sanctions that have battered its economy. That agreement took effect on Jan. 20. Both accords signalled a rapid improvement in Iran's troubled ties with the outside world, made possible by the June election of a relative moderate, Hassan Rouhani, as president on a platform of ending Tehran's international isolation. Going to Gchine would allow the IAEA to know the amount of uranium mined there, making it "harder for Iran to generate a secret stock of natural uranium", the U.S. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said last month. As the first step to be implemented under the Iran-IAEA agreement, U.N. inspectors went in December to the Arak heavy-water production facility, a plant that is linked to a nearby reactor under construction that the West fears could yield plutonium for nuclear bombs once operational. The other measures concerned provision of information about nuclear facilities Iran has said it plans to build. The IAEA says it needs such access and data to gain a better understanding of Iran's nuclear program and to ensure there is no diversion of atomic material for military purposes. Iran says it is only refining uranium to fuel a planned network of nuclear power plants. But the same material can also provide the fissile core of an atomic bomb if enriched more. The two sides will meet on Feb. 8 to discuss future steps under the cooperation agreement, with the IAEA expected to press for more access and information related to its investigation into alleged nuclear weapon research by Iran. Tehran denies the accusations and says they are fabricated. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jan-29/245705-iaea-visits-iranian-mine-as-part-of-nuclear- transparency-pact.ashx#axzz2roU2WI24 Return to Top

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 24 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Politico.com Report: Iran Nuclear Hurdles Political, Not Technical By JOSH GERSTEIN January 29, 2014 Iran’s ability to make missiles loaded with nuclear warheads now rests primarily on the “political will” of its leaders, rather than any technical constraints, according to an annual U.S. intelligence assessment presented on Capitol Hill Wednesday. “Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas — including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles — from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in written testimony submitted as he appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee. “These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.” On that point, the U.S. Worldwide Threat Assessment suggests a lack of consensus at high levels of the Iranian government and notes that the interim agreement Iran reached to halt and roll back aspects of the program appears to be the product of uncertainty about whether the effort is worth the severe economic price the country has paid in economic sanctions, set to be eased somewhat under the six-month deal. “Iran’s overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so,” the assessment says. “We judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions — such as a military strike or regime-threatening sanctions. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” The U.S. intelligence report also says the Iranian nuclear program made further progress in the 12 months before the interim deal kicked in last week. “Iran has made progress during the past year by installing additional centrifuges at [its] Fuel Enrichment Plant, developing advanced centrifuge designs, and stockpiling more low-enriched uranium,” the report says. “These improvements have better positioned Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium…using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, if it chooses to do so.” During his State of the Union address Tuesday night, Obama pressed lawmakers to put aside plans for legislation aimed at applying new sanctions on Tehran, and threatened to veto any such measure that reaches his desk. Such an effort might be able to win a veto-proof majority in both houses of Congress — but it’s unclear whether Senate leaders would allow such legislation to come to a vote. http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/report-iran-nuclear-hurdles-102805.html Return to Top

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) News – U.K. 30 January 2014 US 'Concern' at Syria Weapons Delay The US is "concerned" that Syria is behind schedule in handing over its chemical weapons, Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel has said. Mr Hagel told reporters in Poland he did not know the reason for the delay but said Damascus "needs to fix this". The international watchdog overseeing the destruction of Syria's chemical arsenal is meeting in The Hague to discuss the operation's progress.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 25 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The stockpiles are due to be removed and destroyed by 30 June. 'Spotlight' In a statement to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the US ambassador, Robert Mikulak, said "the effort to remove chemical agent and key precursor chemicals from Syria has seriously languished and stalled". Mr Mikulak said only around 4% of the chemicals declared by the Syrian government had been removed. "The spotlight now is on Syria to proceed without further delay to comply with its obligations and make this effort a success," he added. Under the terms of the UN-backed plan to destroy Syria's arsenal, the Syrian authorities are responsible for packing and safely transporting the chemical weapons to the Mediterranean port of Latakia. Denmark and Norway are providing cargo ships and military escorts to take them to Italy, where they will loaded onto a US Maritime Administration cargo ship, MV Cape Ray. The materials will be destroyed in international waters. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25968616 Return to Top

Chandigarh Tribune – Chandigarh, India Agni-5 Missile to be ready in Two Years By Vijay Mohan, Tribune News Service January 28, 2014 Defence Research and Development Organisation will test the “containerised” version of Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile later this year, with user trials by the armed forces scheduled for the end of the next year. DRDO’s Director General, Missiles and Strategic Systems, Dr VG Sekaran told The Tribune during his visit here that three more developmental phase trials of the Agni-5 are required to validate the design configuration and new technologies, before user trials commence by the end of 2015. User trials, he said, are as good as handing over the missile system for induction, implying that Agni-5, India’s longest range nuclear armed missile that has hit targets 5,000 kms away, could be operational in about two years’ time. Agni-5 would be road or rail mobile and will be stored in and launched from a hermetically sealed canister made of special steel that preserves the missile for several years. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140129/main7.htm Return to Top

The Express Tribune – Pakistan Pakistan holds Flawless Nuclear Safety Record, Asserts Foreign Office Foreign Office rebuts New York Times story that hints at US fears of a possible nuclear crisis in the region. By Web Desk January 29, 2014 ISLAMABAD: Pakistan observes the best safety practices and holds a perfect nuclear safety record for the last 40 years, the Foreign Office spokesperson asserted on Wednesday refuting suggestions to the contrary in a news report.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 26 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Tasnim Aslam Khan in a statement released on Wednesday expressed regret on the story published in The New York Times on January 26 titled “Afghanistan exit is seen as peril to CIA drone mission,” authored by David Sanger and Eric Schmitt. Published two days ago, the story had hinted towards US fears over a possible nuclear crisis in the region and the maintainability of a drone campaign in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan. The foreign office spokesperson said that the story was “yet another manifestation of a clichéd theme, conjuring up baseless scenarios.” Khan further asserted that “Pakistan follows best practices and standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has an impeccable record of safely operating nuclear power plants for over 40 years.” “The timing of this story, purportedly based on briefings by anonymous US officials, is rather intriguing, coming, as it did, on the eve of the ministerial level review of the strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States in Washington.” The spokesperson added that “the contents and drift of the story contradict the expression of desire by senior members of the US Administration to develop an enduring partnership with Pakistan on the basis of mutual trust and mutual respect.” “Such tendentious reporting is also at variance with the confidence expressed by US leaders and officials in the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.” She underscored “the fact that Pakistan has both the will and the capacity to thwart all threats to its nuclear assets.” “This clarity of purpose is underpinned by national consensus on the indispensability of a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to the strategic calculus of Pakistan.” http://tribune.com.pk/story/664944/pakistan-holds-flawless-nuclear-safety-record-asserts-foreign-office/ Return to Top

The Diplomat – Japan OPINION/China Power China’s Nuclear Parasol Beijing offers a “nuclear security guarantee” to the Ukraine. How does that fit with its nuclear doctrine? By Christian Conroy for The Diplomat January 26, 2014 Discussion of a “nuclear umbrella” in the Asia-Pacific has traditionally referred to the U.S. strategy of extending nuclear security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. From the Chinese perspective, the concept of the “nuclear umbrella” has been relevant only in that China’s growing nuclear potential is a perpetual motivation for U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in Asia. On December 12, however, the Washington Times reported that China had turned the tables and opened a nuclear umbrella of its own. In early December, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a bilateral treaty and issued a joint statement that said “China pledges unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-free Ukraine and China further pledges to provide Ukraine nuclear security guarantee when Ukraine encounters an invasion involving nuclear weapons or Ukraine is under threat of a nuclear invasion.” From a tactical perspective, Beijing benefits from the pact in the form of both Kiev’s official opposition to calls for Taiwanese independence and continued economic and military cooperation between the two countries. In recent years, Ukraine has provided China with the Zubr-class amphibious hovercraft, the Soviet Varyag aircraft carrier (refurbished into China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier), and hundreds of Russian-made aircraft engines. The partnership Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 27 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama guarantees that Ukraine will continue to provide China with military technology and technical expertise as Beijing continues military modernization efforts. The initial reporting of the pact by Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, did not use the phrase “nuclear umbrella,” but instead said that through the pact, China is providing Ukraine with a “security guarantee.” According to Wu Dahui, a professor at the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, the agreement signed in December does not represent a departure from China’s 1994 pledge that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. According to Wu, the parallels Western commentators are drawing between the wording of the agreement and the “nuclear umbrella” the U.S. extends to its allies in the Asia-Pacific represents a misunderstanding. The security guarantee of the new pact is simply a manifestation of Beijing’s global nonproliferation responsibilities enshrined under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is no question that China recognizes value in the concept of a nuclear umbrella. According to Major General Zhu Chenghu, a professor at China’s National Defense University in Beijing, by extending a nuclear umbrella to Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar and other countries, China can promote norms of international nonproliferation while simultaneously increasing regional stability. From Beijing’s perspective, a nuclear umbrella could potentially stave off a potentially destabilizing regime collapse in Pyongyang, guarantee a strategic buffer between China and U.S. forces in South Korea, and demonstrate Chinese independence on the global stage. China’s state-run People’s Daily argued that a Chinese nuclear umbrella over Ukraine will allow China to further resist U.S. efforts at nuclear blackmail and coercion, a fundamental component of China’s stated nuclear doctrine. These tactical benefits of a Chinese nuclear umbrella are overshadowed by the strategic challenges that would arise, particularly if Beijing were to extend nuclear security assurances to Ukraine. First, any nuclear crisis involving Ukraine would likely emanate from Russia. Trade between China and Russia is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015 and Chinese President Xi Jinping has even characterized the Sino-Russia relationship as the “best” among major countries. Therefore any consideration of a nuclear response to a Russian attack on Ukraine would place China in a difficult strategic conundrum. Second, extending a nuclear umbrella to the Ukraine would require China to abandon its long-standing policy no- first-use (NFU) nuclear pledge, which stipulates that China will not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Responding to a nuclear invasion or threat of nuclear invasion directed at Ukraine would require China to violate NFU. Despite continued Western skepticism over China’s commitment to the pledge, NFU has been a fundamental component of China’s nuclear posture since the country first tested a nuclear weapon in 1964. Chinese leadership has traditionally viewed the NFU pledge not as a self-imposed constraint, but rather as a statement about the fundamental role of nuclear weapons. There is also the question of whether a Chinese nuclear umbrella over Ukraine would be characterized by the same logic of conventional-nuclear ambiguity that defines Beijing’s own deterrence posture. Under the strategy advanced by former President Hu Jintao, Beijing endorses three components related to conventional-nuclear balance: dual deterrence, dual operations and dual command. With the line between conventional and nuclear attack blurred under such a policy, the threshold at which China would respond to military aggression directed at Ukraine is unclear. Were relations between Russia and Ukraine to deteriorate into large-scale conventional conflict in the future, China’s dual posture may force Beijing to ponder a nuclear response. On the other hand, faced with such military aggression from Russia, the Chinese nuclear umbrella over the Ukraine could fold in the face of much larger strategic concerns. It is conceivable that China could further international nonproliferation goals by extending a “nuclear umbrella” in the same fashion in which the U.S. extends nuclear security assurances to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. However, China’s fundamental nuclear doctrine – characterized foremost by NFU, dual deterrence, and a minimum deterrence posture based on a small nuclear arsenal – would face the prospect of radical reform were the concept of the “nuclear umbrella” to be adopted in Beijing. Christian Conroy is a Washington-based researcher who writes on issues of nuclear weapons and East Asian regional security.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 28 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-nuclear-parasol/ Return to Top

Investor’s Business Daily (IBD) OPINION/IBD Editorial Iran Official Finally Admits Regime's Quest for Nukes January 27, 2014 Nuclear Terror: A key Iranian official close to the Ayatollah Khomeini finally admits the Islamofascist regime got clerical approval to acquire nuclear weapons. The charade about "peaceful purposes" is over. Gen. Mohsen Rafiqdoost, one of the richest, most powerful figures in Iran, close to both the late Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran's current Supreme Leader, and a founder of Tehran's Revolutionary Guards, which consolidated Khomeini's power after the 1979 revolution, made a startling revelation to the government's Mehr News Agency on Saturday. "We pursued ways in order to gain nuclear arms," Rafiqdoost admitted, "until Khomeini said 'Do not pursue atoms,' and we stopped." This contradicts Tehran's constant position over the years that there's never been an Iranian government nuclear weapons program. It was Rafiqdoost who drove Khomeini, after his exile in France, from the airport to the seat of government power, through streets filled with Islamist devotees, after the Shah's fall. A 2009 Rand Corp. report on the Revolutionary Guards says Rafiqdoost's "pseudosecret" Noor Foundation is in fact a lucrative commercial venture with offices that just happen to be near a Tehran nuclear research facility. Reza Kahlili, pseudonym for an ex-CIA spy who spent decades in the Revolutionary Guards and in 2010 chronicled his experiences in the book "A Time to Betray," translated Rafiqdoost's quotes from the Mehr agency in a Daily Caller story appearing over the weekend. But according to Kahlili, Rafiqdoost's comment "falls short of the truth" because a letter written by the Guards' chief commander during the Iran- War, Mohsen Rezaei, asked Khomeini "for approval of the nuclear bomb program." Kahlili writes: "It showed the leader had approved of seeking nuclear weapons." The Revolutionary Guards' intelligence concluded that Saddam Hussein was actively seeking nuclear weapons, which is when "Rezaei received Khomeini's approval to do likewise," according to Kahlili. Guard commander Ali Shamkhani even offered rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan billions of dollars, "which helped access the nuclear blueprint and Iran's first centrifuges." So much for the Iranian regime's claim that nukes would violate its religious principles. Tehran has gone to a lot of trouble over the years to get nuclear weapons capability, then lied to the U.S. and the world about it. Why do President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry now naively trust these fanatics to squander all those years of effort? http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/012714-687788-peaceful-purposes-charade-ended-by-iran-nuclear- revelation.htm Return to Top

Business Insider.com OPINION/Commentary America’s Missile Defense System Could Be as Useless as the Maginot Line By Basil Hart, Contributor

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 29 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama January 27, 2014 It was a multi-billion dollar technological masterpiece of military engineering. Each battery was equipped with air conditioned personal quarters, a sophisticated fire control communication network, state of the art weaponry, even an underground railway system linking each position together. The Maginot Line was painstakingly designed, maintained at great cost, and meticulously rehearsed to defeat the German invasion of 1914 through absorbing a first-strike and counterattacking. But 1914 had come and gone, and it was 1940 that condemned the 3rd French Republic to the most humiliating defeat of a World Power in modern warfare. How could such a thing happen? France was objectively stronger than Germany in 1940 in terms of economic GDP, armored divisions, aircraft, and soldiers – not even counting the 316,000 strong British Expeditionary Force - yet was forced to surrender in six weeks to a nation whom the Third Republic had written off a decade before. Their fate was sealed not solely by Panzerkorps Guderian smashing through the Ardennes, but by their timidity and fear of seeming aggressive. A nation apprehensive of future conflict will seek out the best way to protect their interests with the least potential loss of life, no matter the financial costs. The investment that the United States Department of Defense is currently pouring into the Missile Defense Agency is a dangerous analogue to a modern Maginot Line, a defensive structure designed for the last war fought, marvels of engineering that can be rendered undone by an enemy displaying the sort of initiative that was displayed in 1940. Such commitment to missile defense must be appropriately balanced with the realization that such weaponry cannot win wars alone, and in the end, can only at most serve only as support for the offensive. History is rife with examples of catastrophic defeat brought on by the obsession with defense. Defense is seductive, for at its core it is the stronger form of warfare, and builds upon the things that all generals are comfortably familiar with: lessons learned from prior experience. Such strength, however, comes at the cost of surrendering the initiative to the enemy. “In the pure defensive,” wrote Carl von Clausewitz, “The positive object is wanting, and therefore, while on the defensive, our forces cannot at the same time be directed upon other objects; they can only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy.” In 1925, the French General Staff, shaken by the horrific loss of French lives on the Western Front and faced with a suddenly tightening military budget, sought to build an unbreakable defense to deter further attack, instead of discussing how to best use the new technologies of tanks and aircraft for purposes of offensive doctrine. Modern American policy makers, caught in a similar situation after the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, must take care not to fall into a similar passively-minded trap. At a time when the Army is being cut across the board, the only branch of the service that is being significantly expanded is the Air Defense Artillery. Even as each post in the Army is being forced to disband a brigade apiece, Air Defense and the Missile Defense Agency have never received such a high proportion of budgetary spending. In 2011, the DoD requested that $9.9 billion be set aside for the Ballistic Missile Defense System, a slice of the budgetary pie second only to the overhyped and over-budget F-35 Lightning II. For comparison, BMDS received a portion equal to one-third of the entire budget of the U.S. Marine Corps that year. This allotment of funds is matched by the high tempo deployments of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) batteries to both the Middle East and Pacific theaters. After the wide publicity that the Patriot system received protecting Kuwait and against Saddam’s SCUDs in 2003, it is not surprising that the Army is currently fielding ADA units all over the world. Such deployments show resolve and commitment to allies, as well as having the bonus of not appearing too bellicose to temperamental adversaries. Now, with an air defense unit in place, commanders can draw a circle around defended assets, confidently claiming an unassailable shield against any enemy attack.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 30 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The only trouble is that there is no such thing as an invincible defense. Constantinople’s double walls were stormed by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1453. The Great Wall of China, largest fortification in the world, fell to Manchu invaders in 1644. The ‘invincible’ Fort Eben-Emael was taken by 56 German glider troops in 1940. The 1986 Chicago Bears, “Monsters of the Midway”, lost in the first playoff round to the Redskins. The examples of defeat are limitless and point to the same flaw. A defensive force may deter or hold for a time, but it must be followed by offensive action or the attacker will inevitably discover a weakness and smash through. This is a known failing of the defensive war of war. Even chapter 3 of Army FM 3-90.6 states: “The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that enables Army forces to regain the initiative.” In practice, however, Army policy gives the lie to Army doctrine. The vaunted ‘shift to the Pacific’ relies more heavily on missile defense contracted from Lockheed Martin (THAAD), Boeing/Lockheed (AEGIS) and Raytheon (Patriot) than any other deployment in history. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has hundreds of tactical ballistic missiles, but for all the posturing of North Korea, the rogue state pales in comparison to the People’s Republic of China. China, whose rising nationalism and expansionism have not gone unnoticed by the Pentagon, has weighted her military exercises and equipment explicitly towards defeating American missile defense and naval assets. As a matter of procurement, it will always be cheaper and faster to build a basic guided tactical ballistic missile (TBM) than interceptors designed to shoot down that missile. Considering the massive bases and logistical structure necessary for the U.S. Air Force and Navy to operate, it is not difficult for an enemy to determine the most cost-effective localities to target its weapons. In a war of attrition - which is all that ballistic missile defense boils down to - massed volleys of TBMs have the potential of overwhelming and destroying its air defense units across the Pacific. Even in the face of such a scenario, the Department of Defense insists on procuring ever more and more Patriot and THAAD batteries and AEGIS-armed warships. The effective response from our adversaries is already in progress – just build more ballistic missiles to overwhelm them. Increased American military presence in the Pacific will lead to escalating tensions with others seeking to expand their reach there; there is little doubt about that. What remains to be seen is how these other players in the region will maneuver in the widely publicized view of U.S. missile defense, and the countermeasures that they will continue to refine to defeat it. In the event of an open war - which is oft the historical case between a rising power and a power in denial about its fading strength - what will happen if the Maginot Line of the Ballistic Missile Defense System fails to be little more than a speed bump? The offensive is the nature of a victorious armed force, and the Department of Defense should be more mindful of history’s lessons as we move forward into the uncharted waters of the Western Pacific. "Basil Hart" is an active duty Army officer and a missile defense expert. His views and opinions do not represent those of the Department of Defense. http://www.businessinsider.com/us-missile-defense-2014-1 Return to Top

The Washington Times – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Analysis DODGE: 5 Pressing Priorities for the Pentagon Budget By Michaela Dodge Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 31 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Washington’s annual appropriations circus will start soon, and there’s lots of work to be done — especially in the realm of defense. Two rounds of automatic cuts arising from budget sequestration, compounded by earlier cuts requested by President Obama, have taken a toll at the Pentagon. Army Chief of Staff Ray Odierno recently said readiness levels are now the lowest he’s seen in his 37 years of service. Across all military services, capabilities have decreased since Mr. Obama took office. And that’s something congressional appropriators should help turn around. After all, the world isn’t getting any safer and “to provide for the common defense” is one of the primary responsibilities of the federal government. Here are five defense priorities Congress should pursue in fiscal year 2015. 1) Preserve U.S. force readiness. American soldiers have been — and should be — the best trained, best equipped in the world. Anything less, and U.S. service men and women will die in higher numbers. Last February, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey told Congress that “military readiness is in jeopardy.” Fighter squadrons have stopped flying, carriers have not sailed, and ground units have not trained due to inadequate funding. Last September, Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert predicted that Navy surge capacity “will be about one-third of the norm as we’re looking to 2014.” 2) Reform military compensation. In May 2010, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates famously observed: “Health care costs are eating the Defense Department alive.” The current compensation system — with rich benefits, including defined-benefit (rather than defined contribution) retirement plans — is inefficient, needlessly draining resources from training and equipment. Service personnel — and taxpayers — deserve a better, more efficient system. 3) Advance missile defense. More than 30 nations — Iran and North Korea among them — now have ballistic missile technologies. And Tehran and Pyongyang are not the only nations striving to become the world’s next nuclear power. Multilayered missile defense has never been more necessary. Compared to the damage just one ballistic missile could inflict, missile-defense costs are negligible. Congress should provide for an expanded Aegis missile defense system (sea-based defenses against short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles) and an East Coast ground-based defense (against long-range missiles). Command-and-control facilities for missile-defense radars also need to be reinvigorated, especially in space. 4) Maintain and modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal. North Korea already has “the bomb.” Iran has enough enriched material for several weapons, and continues to accelerate its nuclear program. Russia and China are vigorously adding new and better types of nuclear weapons to their stockpiles. Meanwhile, Mr. Obama has barred development of new U.S. nuclear weapons. And all the while, our aging arsenal — with weapons decades old — is starved of basic maintenance. The Pentagon nuclear delivery systems are slated to receive over the next seven years less than what Americans spent on their pets in 2013. Such budgeting is negligent and dangerous, undermining both the effectiveness and the deterrent value of our nuclear forces. 5) Maintain overseas military bases. A global economic power must be able to defend its interest anywhere in the world. And it is impossible to project power globally, in a timely fashion, without overseas bases. U.S. forces must be able to reach potential hot spots within hours, rather than days — it’s the difference between life and death. The terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi stands as a grim reminder of the need to be able to react speedily and flexibly as conflicts unfold. A lack of U.S. presence emboldens our foes and discourages our allies from cooperating in securing our interests. Elected officials naturally tend to focus on domestic issues affecting their constituents. Yet leaders cannot afford to take our national security for granted. Foreign threats may be distant, but they are very, very real. The American people cannot afford to have Washington give short shrift to “the common defense.” That’s something for congressional leaders to remember as they begin the authorizations and appropriations process. Michaela Dodge is analyzes defense and strategic policy issues for The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 32 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/29/dodge-5-pressing-priorities-for-the-pentagon-budge/ Return to Top

Foreign Policy.com OPINION/Argument It’s Not About Trust Why Russia's missile mischief shows that the United States needs to think differently about arms control. BY Elbridge Colby January 30, 2014 The New York Times reported today that the United States this month informed its NATO allies that it had discovered that Russia had tested a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the landmark 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which permanently banned Russia and the United States from possessing ground- launched cruise and ballistic missiles. Nor, evidently, is this the only such Russian activity along these lines: Bill Gertz reported in October that Russia had flight-tested its RS-26 missile -- which it claims is an intercontinental ballistic missile -- to intermediate ranges. Some regard this as an outright violation of the treaty, although the New York Times reported that "Western officials" consider this to be a "circumvention" rather than a straight violation of the INF Treaty. What does all this mean? Well, let's put it in perspective first. Russia's apparently rather blatant flouting of the INF Treaty doesn't jeopardize America's nuclear deterrent or even really do much to the overall nuclear balance. Moscow already wields nuclear weapons that can hit the United States and also has plenty of nuclear weapons of varying ranges (including intermediate-range air-launched forces) that can hit Europe. Indeed, the capabilities Russia appears to be working on don't even really increase the threat to the nuclear forces of America's British and French allies, both of which now rely on submarines at sea for survival and retaliation. So why should Americans care about what appears to be a violation of a seemingly abstruse arms control agreement from another era, especially a violation that doesn't really pose a particularly new threat to the U.S. defense posture? The answer is that we should care because of what it tells us -- about Russia, about arms control, and about how we should look at America's own nuclear deterrent. First of all, it tells us that Moscow seems to have decided that, when it suits its purposes, it will, if not ignore, then effectively circumvent the legacy arms control architecture inherited from the Cold War. This is interesting, given that Russia apparently at least considered a more open and legally-minded approach to getting out of what it regarded as a nettlesome arms control regime. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's recent memoir, Moscow proposed jointly terminating the INF Treaty to the Bush administration in 2007, but was rebuffed. And, if the Bush administration wasn't interested, the Obama administration has definitely not been interested in dismantling existing arms control agreements. Evidently, observing Washington's resistance to ending INF, Moscow has decided simply to circumvent rather than go through the bother of abrogating it. This suggests that, in the future, we can expect Russia will be prepared to, at the very least, play fast and loose with inconvenient arms control agreements rather than withdraw from them (as the United States did in the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002). More broadly, Russian violations and circumventions only lend further strength to growing doubts about Moscow's reliability as a constructive partner. As demonstrated by the Syrian chemical weapons negotiations, Russia may be willing to work with the United States on specific points when interests overlap, but the higher hopes of the "reset" should certainly be laid to rest for the time being -- the current regime in the Kremlin is not one to trust without a good dose of verification. Needless to say, this is unfortunate and should not be taken as a permanent state of affairs; but it nonetheless is the only conclusion that seems prudent about the current government in Moscow.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 33 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Beyond bilateral relations, Russia's activities tell us something about Moscow's threat perceptions and strategy. As Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2007 when proposing the termination of the INF Treaty, Russia is building up its ground-launched intermediate missile forces -- not so much to deal with the United States and NATO but for threats from points South and East that fall within the 500 to 5,500-kilometer range covered by treaty: namely, China, Iran, and Pakistan. Moreover, while Russia may be intending to use such weapons in conventional variants, it seems reasonable to infer that Moscow expects to have to continue to relying to a significant degree on its nuclear forces in dealing with these unpredictable neighbors -- and above all with China. Indeed, especially when coupled with the increasing clamor from top Russian strategic thinkers about the possibility that the PRC's nuclear forces are much larger than conventional wisdom would allow, one can see these developments as an indirect indicator of rising anxiety in the Kremlin over Beijing. But Moscow's actions also speak to more than just the peculiarities of Vladimir Putin's Russia. Rather, they tell us some interesting things about arms control and nuclear deterrence. Above all, Moscow's behavior shows that arms control agreements -- even such cornerstone deals as the INF, which had achieved a near-totemic status in arms- control lore -- can't be seriously relied on for our security. This is doubly so because the INF was probably the most intrusive and exhaustive arms control agreement of the Cold War -- perhaps ever. Though it included mind- numbingly detailed provisions for verification and monitoring, it also simply eliminated many of the usual problems by banning a whole class of weapons. So if an agreement that is as long-lasting and as exhaustively elaborated as the INF can be flouted in a period of moderate tension, can we really expect such agreements to hold in periods of far more serious tension, let alone conflict? It would seem imprudent to expect so. That means arms control is no substitute for deterrence. Ultimately, the United States needs to rely on the credible threat of decisive military power when it makes calculations about security. But this doesn't mean that it shouldn't pursue arms control. Quite the contrary, Washington should pursue arms control -- but of a different kind than we've been led to expect over the last years. Rather than seeing arms control agreements as way-stations on the way to disarmament or as permanent masterworks never to be altered or surpassed, we should see them in a much more limited but practical light: as utilitarian means to shave off the unnecessary sharp edges of military competition and political tensions between countries that have real differences. Arms control agreements aren't pledges of fidelity; they're things you negotiate with states you don't trust -- or sometimes even like -- to dampen tensions and minimize the chances of unnecessary war due to miscalculation or misperception. Thus, while the administration needs to hold Moscow to account for its violations, it also shouldn't miss the forest for the trees: the United States should continue to seek ways to find agreements with Russia that increase its security -- for instance, by trying to constrain Moscow's development of a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, or persuading them that American missile defenses are not a reason to put their forces on a hair-trigger alert, and the like. (Note that reducing numbers is not a part of that agenda.) We can work with potential adversaries to mitigate risks and reduce tensions, but Moscow's infidelity is another reminder that competition and the threat of conflict is endemic to international relations. Arms control will always be, at most, a useful ancillary aid but never a reliable foundation of security. Elbridge Colby is a Fellow at Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He previously worked for the Department of Defense on the negotiation and ratification of the New START Treaty. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/30/it_s_not_about_trust_russia_inf_arms_control Return to Top

The Daily Beast OPINION/Article Iran and North Korea: The Nuclear 'Axis of Resistance'

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 34 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama A new U.S. intelligence report warns North Korea could resume exporting nuclear technology and material. That could spell trouble for U.S. efforts to keep Iran from getting the bomb. By Josh Rogin and Eli Lake January 31, 2014 The comprehensive nuclear deal Iran is negotiating with the West could be undermined by increased Iranian cooperation with North Korea, a country that the U.S. intelligence community reports is ramping up its nuclear enrichment and illicit export programs. Iran has halted its enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level as part of the interim agreement it signed with the world’s major powers last November. That temporary deal doesn’t address Iran’s illicit trade with countries like North Korea, which has been building a massive complex of uranium-enriching centrifuges. Given North Korea’s penchant for selling Iran illicit technology, the risk of Pyongyang exporting nuclear technology is real, according to the U.S. intelligence community. “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor… illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities,” the U.S. intelligence community wrote in its annual Worldwide Threat Analysis, released Wednesday. And despite its repeated pledges “not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology.” North Korea has already expanded its uranium-enrichment facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, and restarted a plutonium reactor at Yongbyon that was shut down in 2007, the IC report stated. North Korea conducted its third nuclear test last February. Meanwhile, Iran continues to pursue capabilities that could ultimately be used to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, the IC report added. The central question is whether Tehran has the political will to actually build a nuclear bomb. Iran’s president last week said his country would not dismantle the cascades of centrifuges that the West fears Iran could use to one day rapidly produce weapons-grade fuel. Tehran is also developing advanced centrifuge designs and stockpiling low-enriched uranium. But Iran would not be able to enrich enough uranium to weapons-grade levels to produce a nuclear bomb before the world detected that activity, the IC concluded. That’s where North Korea could come in. Last September, at the same time Iran was secretly meeting with U.S. officials to set up the current nuclear talks, North Korea leaders visited Tehran and signed a science and technology agreement that is widely seen as a public sign the two countries are ramping up their nuclear cooperation. “Iran declared Sept. 1, 2012 North Korea was part of their ‘Axis of Resistance,’ which only includes Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. They’ve announced to the world they are essentially allies with North Korea,” said David Asher, the State Department’s coordinator for North Korea from 2001 to 2005. North Korea signed a similar agreement in 2002 with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, after which North Korean scientists aided Syria in building a nuclear reactor that was destroyed by an Israeli strike in 2007. Iran is suspected to have aided in the funding of that reactor. “It’s a very suspicious situation and rather alarming given the precedent with Syria,” said Asher. “The last time North Korea signed an agreement like this it led to the largest act of nuclear proliferation in modern history.” The Institute for Science and International Security, a think tank that closely monitors Iran’s nuclear program, issued a report on Jan. 15 on a possible agreement that would actually preclude Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. The report said that if Iran is allowed to maintain any nuclear-enrichment program, the supply channel for that program should be dictated by the United Nations Security Council and overseen by a panel of international experts, to ensure North Korea is not involved. “You don’t want North Korea to become Iran’s supplier for critical components for their centrifuge program. Raw materials that Iran needs to go out and buy. If Iran can buy the raw materials they need from North Korea, there’s Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 35 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama no way to control that or stop it,” said David Albright, president of ISIS. “Part of the challenge of these negotiations is to make sure there are conditions to say that at least if Iran cooperates with North Korea on nuclear, that would be a violation of the agreement.” North Korea is creating a program for up to 10,000 centrifuges but nobody knows how many are operational, said Albright. “That provides Iran another option to keep their [highly enriched uranium] program advancing,” he said. The Obama administration is tight-lipped about how and when they have raised North Korean nuclear cooperation with Iran in the context of the current round of nuclear negotiations. “We have raised all the issues involved with Iran's nuclear program and will continue to do so throughout the comprehensive negotiations,” a senior U.S. official told The Daily Beast. In May testimony to Congress, Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman declined to discuss the administration’s view on Iran-North Korea nuclear cooperation in an unclassified setting. But she noted that both countries had been part of the network of notorious Pakistani nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. “Everyone is very well aware of the history with Pakistan, for instance, and A.Q. Khan in a network of proliferation,” she said. “So, it is very important and we think very careful about where there may be interaction that affects one or the other of these situations.” North Korea is suspected of providing Iran with nuclear assistance in the form of scientists, hard-to-obtain centrifuge components, and raw materials, experts said. North Korea also has large natural uranium deposits. Olli Heinonen, a former deputy at the International Atomic Energy Agency, said there has always been speculation about Iran-North Korea nuclear development. But he said proof has been very difficult to come by. “This is one of many issues that needs to be addressed about the possible military dimension of Iran's program,” he said. He also stressed that his agency was able to surmise a list of technical items and techniques that Iran had been seeking in general, such as technology to refine steel needed for advanced centrifuges. Some of Iran's wish list, he said, had correlated with the kinds of expertise the North Koreans had. But he stressed, “this is not hard evidence.” Other U.S. experts have pointed to other kinds of cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the Hermit Kingdom. Last March, the Washington Post reported that the two countries had cooperated on missile technology One such example is Iran’s development of its Shahab 6 missile, which has used North Korean technology for its boosters. The first reports of this cooperation go back to the 1990s. In 2012, the German publication Die Welt quoted a former senior German defense official as saying North Korea’s 2010 nuclear test was actually a test on behalf of the Iranian program. Josh Rogin is senior correspondent for national security and politics for The Daily Beast. He previously worked at Newsweek, Foreign Policy magazine, Congressional Quarterly, Federal Computer Week magazine, and Japan’s leading daily newspaper, The Asahi Shimbun. Eli Lake is the senior national-security correspondent for The Daily Beast. He previously covered national security and intelligence for The Washington Times. Lake has also been a contributing editor at The New Republic since 2008 and covered diplomacy, intelligence, and the military for the late New York Sun. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/31/iran-and-north-korea-the-nuclear-axis-of- resistance.html#url=/articles/2014/01/31/iran-and-north-korea-the-nuclear-axis-of-resistance.html Return to Top

ABOUT THE USAF CPC The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 36 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended that "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons School, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

Issue No.1100, 31 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 37