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Social Cognition Galen V Overview Social cognition Galen V. Bodenhausen∗ and Andrew R. Todd Social cognition research investigates the way information present in the social environment is represented and used in adaptively guiding behavior. Representations of persons and of social relationships form the basic building blocks of social cognition, and we review what is known about how such representations are constructed and constituted. In particular, we review a range of mechanisms whereby observers can infer the psychological qualities of the actors they encounter, including relatively automatic processes as well as more thoughtful and deliberative ones. Prominent approaches for situating person representations within the context of interpersonal relationships are also reviewed. 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 160–171 esearch on social cognition proceeds from the Some have argued that there is a specific Rassumption that the profoundly interdependent mental faculty, or module, for social cognition.5–8 nature of everyday life has resulted in the develop- For example, Jackendoff7 proposed a faculty of social ment of a suite of cognitive processes that are acutely cognition that is fundamentally concerned with the sensitive to the social environment. The capacity to questions ‘who is it?’ and ‘how is the person related to detect, interpret, and use social cues constitutes an me?’ in contrast, for example, to a faculty of spatial essential component of adaptive behavior, and when cognition, which is fundamentally concerned with this capacity is compromised, as in the case of autism, questions such as ‘what is it?’ and ‘where is it?’ The the implications for effective functioning are often proposed conceptual primitives of this social cognition devastating.1 The social organization of human soci- faculty are persons, relationships, transactions,etc. 2 eties consists of a complex fission–fusion structure On Jackendoff’s view, when we encounter another in which coalitions form around cooperative pursuits person, the spatial cognition faculty constructs a in a dynamic manner, with temporal continuity vary- representation of the person’s physical dimensions ing considerably across different coalitions. In this and where her body is located in space, while context, the capacity to understand and represent the social cognition module constructs a separate the characteristics of individuals and social groups representation of the relevant personal characteristics is vitally important. Given individual differences in of the individual (beliefs, desires, traits, and so on). trustworthiness, for example, there would be an obvi- These distinct representations, as Jackendoff7 (p. 77), ous payoff for the development of forms of social puts it, ‘function somewhat independently in terms of awareness that permit such variations to be detected the knowledge they access and inferences they license’. and remembered.3 Moreover, an ability to understand In line with this claim, research has shown that when the beliefs and desires of other individuals may open perceivers encounter target persons while pursuing the door to manipulating these beliefs for personal goals that should activate the social cognition faculty, gain and to recognizing when others are engaging they tend to access background social information in similar pursuits.4 Social cognition researchers seek (gender stereotypes) that is not activated when the to identify the mental structures and processes that same individuals are encountered in the pursuit permit humans to navigate their social worlds suc- of goals that should activate the spatial cognition cessfully by understanding the psychological states 9,10 (beliefs, emotions, goals, and so on) and traits (stable faculty. Although it can perhaps be debated dispositions) of the persons they encounter and with whether there is a functionally encapsulated mental whom they are interdependent. module devoted to social cognition, the human mental system clearly has a rich capacity for representing ∗Correspondence to: [email protected] social entities and social relationships. Although in Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, fully developed form this capacity is undoubtedly tied IL 60208, USA to the representational power afforded by language,11 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.28 it is present in more rudimentary form in preverbal 160 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 1, March/April 2010 WIREs Cognitive Science Social cognition infants12 and in other species.13 In the remainder of research has revealed deliberative reasoning processes this article, we will review major features of social in line with the hypothesized discounting of dispo- cognition in the context of verbal (adult) humans. sitional causes in the presence of salient situational We consider in particular the two main elements constraints, but only when perceivers are particularly comprising social cognition: the representation of motivated and able to engage in more thoughtful persons and of relationships. deliberation.18 By default, perceivers seem to employ a much less deliberative process in making inferences about actors, one that is driven in large part by auto- CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONS matic processing of the affordances contained in social signals. Knowing other people—both their transitory psy- chological states and their more enduring personal characteristics—is the foundation of social cognition. Automatic Inferences However, knowing others constitutes a substantial challenge, for the inner psychological world of another Given the wide array of animal species that are person can only be inferred, never directly observed able to communicate via signaling processes in a manner presumably devoid of reasoning and or experienced. Several distinct mechanisms provide 19 bases for using observable signals and cues in the reflection, it seems obvious that humans, too, formation of person representations. are capable of drawing much more automatic and implicit kinds of inferences about others. Inferences can be characterized as falling on a continuum Active Reasoning from highly automatic to substantially deliberative; Traditional models of person perception advanced by greater automaticity is associated with (1) lack of social psychologists were guided by the metaphor of conscious awareness of the triggering cues, the the social perceiver as an intuitive scientist who uses inference itself, and/or its consequences (implicitness); available evidence to support or refute hypotheses (2) lack of a conscious intention to draw an about the characteristics of others.14–16 According to inference (spontaneity); (3) lack of dependence of the these models, a key concern of the social perceiver is to inferencing process on the availability of cognitive determine whether observable behavior meaningfully resources (efficiency); and (4) lack of control over the reflects the actor’s dispositions (and if so, what inferencing process (inevitability).20 specific dispositions it reflects) or might instead more Affective signals have been the most widely accurately be attributed to situational factors. If Peter studied type of interpersonal cues. Extensive cross- makes a cold, dismissive comment to Paul, Paul cultural research has confirmed Darwin’s hypothesis21 may well want to determine whether this comment of a universal vocabulary of facial and postural cues reflects (1) a general unpleasantness on Peter’s part, to inner emotional states,22 and the specific features (2) a specific dislike on the part of Peter toward that afford inferences about another person’s affective Paul, or (3) some situational or transitory factors, experiences have been mapped.23 With respect to such as a bad mood. According to Kelley’s model,16 interpersonal relations, anger and happiness are this determination can be achieved by considering emotional signals of particular importance, because the consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus of the they permit observers to recognize interpersonal behavior in question and using these cues to deduce threats (in the case of anger) and warmth (in the the most likely interpretation. Such models imply the case of happiness). Decisions to approach or avoid operation of a systematic reasoning process that selects another person can be directly guided by such among rival interpretations on the basis of logically inferences. The impact of configural properties of relevant available evidence. facial cues signaling anger and warmth generalizes While influential, these models proved to be to perceptions of nonfacial stimuli (e.g., abstract inadequate in some noteworthy respects. One of geometric figures), indicating that basic stimulus their primary empirical failures concerns their shared features such as angularity and roundedness contain expectation that when salient situational accounts for the necessary affordances for rapid inferences relating a given behavior are available, dispositional inter- to threat and warmth, respectively.24 pretations of the behavior should be discounted. As Recently, much interest has emerged around it turns out, people often infer psychological dispo- the possibility that the mirror neuron system may sitions corresponding to observed behavior even in play a critical role in understanding the emotions the presence of clear situational constraints, a phe- of others.25 Of particular relevance in this context, nomenon termed ‘correspondence bias’.17 Subsequent observation of an emotional response in others is Volume 1, March/April 2010 2010 John
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