Social Cognition Galen V

Overview Social cognition Galen V. Bodenhausen∗ and Andrew R. Todd

Social cognition research investigates the way information present in the social environment is represented and used in adaptively guiding behavior. Representations of persons and of social relationships form the basic building blocks of social cognition, and we review what is known about how such representations are constructed and constituted. In particular, we review a range of mechanisms whereby observers can infer the psychological qualities of the actors they encounter, including relatively automatic processes as well as more thoughtful and deliberative ones. Prominent approaches for situating person representations within the context of interpersonal relationships are also reviewed.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 160–171

esearch on social cognition proceeds from the Some have argued that there is a speciﬁc Rassumption that the profoundly interdependent mental faculty, or module, for social cognition.5–8 nature of everyday life has resulted in the develop- For example, Jackendoff7 proposed a faculty of social ment of a suite of cognitive processes that are acutely cognition that is fundamentally concerned with the sensitive to the social environment. The capacity to questions ‘who is it?’ and ‘how is the person related to detect, interpret, and use social cues constitutes an me?’ in contrast, for example, to a faculty of spatial essential component of adaptive behavior, and when cognition, which is fundamentally concerned with this capacity is compromised, as in the case of autism, questions such as ‘what is it?’ and ‘where is it?’ The the implications for effective functioning are often proposed conceptual primitives of this social cognition devastating.1 The social organization of human soci- faculty are persons, relationships, transactions,etc. 2 eties consists of a complex ﬁssion–fusion structure On Jackendoff’s view, when we encounter another in which coalitions form around cooperative pursuits person, the spatial cognition faculty constructs a in a dynamic manner, with temporal continuity vary- representation of the person’s physical dimensions ing considerably across different coalitions. In this and where her body is located in space, while context, the capacity to understand and represent the social cognition module constructs a separate the characteristics of individuals and social groups representation of the relevant personal characteristics is vitally important. Given individual differences in of the individual (beliefs, desires, traits, and so on). trustworthiness, for example, there would be an obvi- These distinct representations, as Jackendoff7 (p. 77), ous payoff for the development of forms of social puts it, ‘function somewhat independently in terms of awareness that permit such variations to be detected the knowledge they access and inferences they license’. and remembered.3 Moreover, an ability to understand In line with this claim, research has shown that when the beliefs and desires of other individuals may open perceivers encounter target persons while pursuing the door to manipulating these beliefs for personal goals that should activate the social cognition faculty, gain and to recognizing when others are engaging they tend to access background social information in similar pursuits.4 Social cognition researchers seek (gender stereotypes) that is not activated when the to identify the mental structures and processes that same individuals are encountered in the pursuit permit humans to navigate their social worlds suc- of goals that should activate the spatial cognition cessfully by understanding the psychological states 9,10 (beliefs, emotions, goals, and so on) and traits (stable faculty. Although it can perhaps be debated dispositions) of the persons they encounter and with whether there is a functionally encapsulated mental whom they are interdependent. module devoted to social cognition, the human mental system clearly has a rich capacity for representing ∗Correspondence to: [email protected] social entities and social relationships. Although in Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, fully developed form this capacity is undoubtedly tied IL 60208, USA to the representational power afforded by language,11 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.28 it is present in more rudimentary form in preverbal

160  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 1, March/April 2010 WIREs Cognitive Science Social cognition infants12 and in other species.13 In the remainder of research has revealed deliberative reasoning processes this article, we will review major features of social in line with the hypothesized discounting of dispo- cognition in the context of verbal (adult) humans. sitional causes in the presence of salient situational We consider in particular the two main elements constraints, but only when perceivers are particularly comprising social cognition: the representation of motivated and able to engage in more thoughtful persons and of relationships. deliberation.18 By default, perceivers seem to employ a much less deliberative process in making inferences about actors, one that is driven in large part by auto- CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONS matic processing of the affordances contained in social signals. Knowing other people—both their transitory psychological states and their more enduring personal characteristics—is the foundation of social cognition. Automatic Inferences However, knowing others constitutes a substantial challenge, for the inner psychological world of another Given the wide array of animal species that are person can only be inferred, never directly observed able to communicate via signaling processes in a manner presumably devoid of reasoning and or experienced. Several distinct mechanisms provide 19 bases for using observable signals and cues in the reflection, it seems obvious that humans, too, formation of person representations. are capable of drawing much more automatic and implicit kinds of inferences about others. Inferences can be characterized as falling on a continuum Active Reasoning from highly automatic to substantially deliberative; Traditional models of person perception advanced by greater automaticity is associated with (1) lack of social psychologists were guided by the metaphor of conscious awareness of the triggering cues, the the social perceiver as an intuitive scientist who uses inference itself, and/or its consequences (implicitness); available evidence to support or refute hypotheses (2) lack of a conscious intention to draw an about the characteristics of others.14–16 According to inference (spontaneity); (3) lack of dependence of the these models, a key concern of the social perceiver is to inferencing process on the availability of cognitive determine whether observable behavior meaningfully resources (efficiency); and (4) lack of control over the reflects the actor’s dispositions (and if so, what inferencing process (inevitability).20 specific dispositions it reflects) or might instead more Affective signals have been the most widely accurately be attributed to situational factors. If Peter studied type of interpersonal cues. Extensive cross- makes a cold, dismissive comment to Paul, Paul cultural research has confirmed Darwin’s hypothesis21 may well want to determine whether this comment of a universal vocabulary of facial and postural cues reflects (1) a general unpleasantness on Peter’s part, to inner emotional states,22 and the specific features (2) a specific dislike on the part of Peter toward that afford inferences about another person’s affective Paul, or (3) some situational or transitory factors, experiences have been mapped.23 With respect to such as a bad mood. According to Kelley’s model,16 interpersonal relations, anger and happiness are this determination can be achieved by considering emotional signals of particular importance, because the consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus of the they permit observers to recognize interpersonal behavior in question and using these cues to deduce threats (in the case of anger) and warmth (in the the most likely interpretation. Such models imply the case of happiness). Decisions to approach or avoid operation of a systematic reasoning process that selects another person can be directly guided by such among rival interpretations on the basis of logically inferences. The impact of configural properties of relevant available evidence. facial cues signaling anger and warmth generalizes While influential, these models proved to be to perceptions of nonfacial stimuli (e.g., abstract inadequate in some noteworthy respects. One of geometric figures), indicating that basic stimulus their primary empirical failures concerns their shared features such as angularity and roundedness contain expectation that when salient situational accounts for the necessary affordances for rapid inferences relating a given behavior are available, dispositional inter- to threat and warmth, respectively.24 pretations of the behavior should be discounted. As Recently, much interest has emerged around it turns out, people often infer psychological dispo- the possibility that the mirror neuron system may sitions corresponding to observed behavior even in play a critical role in understanding the emotions the presence of clear situational constraints, a phe- of others.25 Of particular relevance in this context, nomenon termed ‘correspondence bias’.17 Subsequent observation of an emotional response in others is

Volume 1, March/April 2010  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 161 Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci hypothesized to activate the same brain regions in based inferences of trustworthiness predicted cooper- the observer that would be activated if she were ative behavior in a Trust Game played with a stranger, having the observed affective experience herself. This in which economic interests were on the line.38 ‘mirroring’ mechanism may play a fundamental role The relative automaticity of such inferences is in the development of empathy.26 evidenced by the fact that they can be rapidly drawn In addition to emotional states, other kinds on the basis of very minimal exposure. A question of dynamic, transitory psychological states are of of immediate interest is how accurate such judgments importance to social perceivers. In particular, under- are. Some kinds of personality inferences based on standing the goals and intentions of others would minimal cues (‘thin slices’ of behavior) have surprising have great functional significance in many circum- accuracy,39 but the evidence for veridicality is far from 40,41 stances. Monitoring others’ attentional processes by consistent and suggests that these inferences are tracking their eye gaze is one key mechanism whereby often overgeneralizations of rules that may have some their goals and priorities can be inferred,27 and this kernel of truth (e.g., masculine faces go with dominant 42 also appears to unfold in a relatively implicit and behavior), but which are far from universally valid. automatic manner.28 Beyond knowing the transi- Thus, these inferences represent a rapid, crude, tory states of others, perceivers seek to know their first approximation for social impressions. Having a more enduring traits, providing a portable basis for nonrandom basis for making immediate assessments, predicting the likely course of social interactions.29 even if imperfect, is certainly adaptive, but it is far Affective states have corresponding dispositional ver- from optimal. Thus, in many cases, these rapid first sions (e.g., a chronically angry person), but it is clear impressions are likely to be elaborated and modified, that people also can form rapid, automatic inferences to the extent that additional information is available. about many personality dimensions even in the case of In addition to appearance cues, observers often have access to samples of others’ behavior, and a great affectively neutral facial displays.30,31 Oosterhof and deal of evidence has accumulated that dispositional Todorov32 provided a theoretical model for under- inferences are often drawn spontaneously on the basis standing such inferences, based on a two-dimensional of such behavior.43 Interpersonal actions, such as framework that builds on conceptualizations of inter- hitting or helping someone, are immediately taken personal relations as being organized in terms of as evidence for corresponding dispositions (hostility affiliation/warmth and dominance.33–35 In this model, vs. kindness). Such inferences certainly appear to spontaneous inferences of affiliation/warmth convey have a much firmer basis than ones based on facial the trustworthiness of another individual and are appearance, but unlike physiognomic cues, behavioral based on subtle similarities of the person’s basic signals (including verbal behavior) are susceptible to (neutral) facial physiognomy to configurations that strategic manipulation, whereby actors can attempt are characteristic of anger or happiness displays. Spon- to manage the impressions that observers form of taneous inferences of dominance convey the potential them.44 Thus, a skill of potentially vital importance potency of another individual’s actions and are based in person perception is the ability to detect deception. on physiognomic features that signal masculinity and In fact, however, experimental research suggests that maturity; importantly, the degree of facial masculin- most people are only slightly better than chance at ity varies within genders, and the degree of facial detecting others’ deceptions,45 indicating that the 36 maturity varies within a given age group. Thus, actor’s skill at enacting deception often outpaces the these inferences respond to specific physiognomic fea- observer’s skill at detecting it. There is some evidence tures, over and above broader demographic category suggesting that deception becomes more transparent memberships. The two-dimensional space defined by when an actor’s motivation to lie is especially strong,46 differing degrees of dominance and affiliation cap- which was not the case in many of the laboratory tures a wide array of interpersonal traits, so these two tasks used in past experiments; however, in general, types of automatic assessments of others, in combina- people typically tend to interpret behavioral cues in tion, afford a basis for many more specific kinds of a straightforward, direct manner, drawing inferences dispositional inferences. For example, politicians may having seeming face validity despite the possibility of be viewed as competent (and, indeed, enjoy greater salient alternate interpretations. electoral success37) to the extent they are automati- In summary, although many social signals are cally judged as being both trustworthy and dominant. generated and interpreted quite automatically, with Evidence that automatic inferences on these basic humans the picture is undoubtedly complicated by the interpersonal dimensions can guide social behavior in deliberate use of social signals.28 The deliberative consequential ways is growing. For example, facially reasoning models that guided early attempts to

162  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 1, March/April 2010 WIREs Cognitive Science Social cognition understand person perception thus may reenter the mental states per se or merely the properties of the picture when deliberate signaling is present, provided observed action,56 investigations of both the mon- that observers have both ample motivation and key and human brain suggest that upon observing opportunity to consider and accept or reject rival another’s actions, observers automatically activate a interpretations of the meaning of particular behavioral set of neural connections in the parietal and premotor observations. cortices that is also active when they perform similar actions themselves. Thus, relevant personal representations can be activated in the course of observing Projection behavior, providing a basis for using one’s own expe- As we have seen thus far, social perceivers make riences and reactions to infer those of the party being ready use of a variety of observable behavioral and observed. appearance cues when attempting to know others. In Abundant social psychological research is also circumstances in which the meaning of these cues is consistent with the notion that projection can operate ambiguous (as is often the case), or when relevant cues in a relatively automatic fashion. For instance, are altogether lacking, perceivers have been shown to individuals who were subliminally primed with a rely on various aspects of self-knowledge to make goal to compete were more likely than a group of sense of others’ overt actions and the mental states control participants to see others as competitive.49 giving rise to those actions. According to what are Furthermore, people show no awareness of having broadly known as ‘simulation’ theories, coming to engaged in projection when explicitly asked.57 Taken know others often involves a process of self-reflection, together, these studies suggest that awareness is not a wherein the social perceiver infers others’ mental states prerequisite for engaging in projection. Studies have in a given situation by imagining his or her own also shown that people engage in projection even after 47 goals, beliefs, and desires in a comparable situation, being asked not to,58 suggesting that its occurrence a process known as projection. In this section, we may be unavoidable. Lastly, engaging in projection highlight the mechanisms involved in its execution seems to be a relatively efficient process: cognitive load and the circumstances under which it is most likely to does not attenuate its strength,59 and time pressure occur. actually increases its likelihood.60 Initially conceived by Freud as a defense Even though conscious attempts to avoid mechanism whereby an individual denies undesirable projection are typically met with little success, research self-characteristics while simultaneously attributing has identified several variables that attenuate the them to others,48 today, projection refers to a likelihood of its occurrence. One such moderator is the more general tendency of ascribing one’s own degree of perceived similarity between observer and characteristics—be they negative or positive—to actor. Whereas, observers who perceive themselves others.49 Due in part to the sheer accessibility of as being similar to an actor assume that this self-referent information, projection is among the most convenient inferential tools available to the person’s attitudes and preferences resemble their own, social perceiver. Indeed, people have been shown to observers who see themselves as dissimilar to this actor rely on projection when drawing inferences about show little to no evidence of projection when drawing 61 others’ traits,50 goals,49 emotions,51 and even their inferences about this person. Along these same transient drive states.52 While some research has lines, a recent meta-analysis revealed that projection documented benefits resulting from projection (e.g., tends to be stronger for in-group than for out- 62 increased accuracy in social perception53), other group members. In a related vein, self-categorization 63 research suggests that it can lead perceivers astray theory suggests that in intergroup contexts, people by causing them to overestimate the degree to engage in a process of ‘depersonalization’ that results which others share their attitudes and preferences, a in all members of the in-group (including the self) phenomenon known as the ‘false consensus’ effect.54 being viewed in a homogeneous way. Essentially, Projection was once thought to have a moti- group-typical qualities are projected onto all in-group vational basis, with its primary purpose being to members, while out-group members are perceived rid the self of unacceptable attributes.48 With the in ways that accentuate their differences from the advent of neuroimaging techniques and the discovery in-group. It is interesting to note, however, that of the mirror neuron system, however, projection is deliberate attempts to engage in projection can lead to now believed to have its roots in low-level neural increased perceptions of similarity between perceivers mechanisms.55 Although there is still ongoing debate and actors,64 including actors who might otherwise about whether the mirror system represents an actor’s be perceived as out-group members.65

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According to a model of mental state inference times is linked to genetic determinism,70 which proposed by Ames,61 when perceivers are faced with produces the expectation that group characteristics ambiguous behaviors and thus are unable to rely are innate and immutable.71 upon cues afforded by the behavior itself, they often To understand the stereotyping process, the turn to ‘extratarget’ strategies to fill in the gaps. first question that must be addressed is how In this section, we discussed the role of projection a given actor will be categorized. Actors can in shaping perceivers’ perceptions of others, noting inevitably be categorized in multiple ways, but that its occurrence is more likely when observing the rather than simultaneously activating all of these actions of others who are similar to the self. When possible categories, perceivers are likely to employ observing the actions of dissimilar others under similar a much more focused approach that is governed circumstances, Ames argues that perceivers should be by a number of predictable factors.72 For example, more likely to rely on stereotyping than projection. generally or contextually rare categorical identities are In the next section, we turn our attention to the role likely to provide a salient basis for categorization.73 of stereotyping in person perception. Recently (and chronically), accessed categories are likely to be used again when relevant individuals are encountered.74 Categories that maximize coherence Stereotyping and meaningful differentiation often stand out to Another quite distinct way of cognitively representing perceivers63 (e.g., in many circumstances it would other people is in terms of their social categories be more meaningful to categorize politicians by their or group identities. Readily detectable features often party affiliation rather than by their age or sex). This provide a basis for rapidly categorizing people in process of category selection typically unfolds in an terms of relevant social identities, such as gender, automatic fashion. race, age group, or occupation. As just noted, when Once an actor has been categorized, characteris- an actor is categorized as a member of a social group tics that are stereotypically associated with the selected to which the observer does not belong, projection category are automatically activated. For instance, if is not likely to be used as a basis for inferring the a given actor is categorized as an African American, actor’s inner qualities.61 However, characteristics that then various mental associations that are linked to are associated with the actor’s group as a whole this group will become activated in working mem- can be inductively applied to this person; indeed, ory. Where do such stereotypic associations come the hallmark of stereotyping is the tendency to regard from? Many distinct theories of the process of stereo- group members as fundamentally interchangeable and type formation have been proposed, but attempts equivalent in terms of their basic characteristics, which to account for the specific content of stereotypes in are simply the characteristics that have come to be a systematic way have been relatively rare. In one associated with the group as a whole. Theorists have exception, Fiske et al.75 proposed a generalization disputed whether stereotypes are represented via an of the previously discussed two-dimensional inter- abstracted category prototype66 or as the aggregated personal relations models (based on affiliation and activation of multiple category exemplars.67 Definitive dominance) to the case of intergroup relations. In their critical tests of these competing views have proven model, a group’s relative social status vis-a-vis` one’s to be elusive, but one compromise position is own group shapes inferences about its competence, that as representations of a group are first being while a group’s perceived competitiveness or coop- established, exemplar-based representation prevails, erativeness with one’s own group shapes inferences but as familiarity with the group is established, a about its warmth. Interestingly, the stereotypes held prototype-based representation is formed.68 Whatever of many minority groups are somewhat ambivalent, the representational format, there is a good reason to in that such groups are either regarded as warm but believe that stereotypes do not consist merely of lists incompetent or as cold but competent. Once again, of features possessed by a group; rather, the group’s the fundamental importance of dominance and affili- characteristics are embedded within causal theories ation concerns in shaping social cognition is evident. that provide accounts of how group characteristics are Here, too, one can see the functional value of having interrelated.69 For example, a group may be thought a basis for rapid appraisals bearing on key interper- of as economically disadvantaged and poorly educated sonal dimensions, but questions about the accuracy of because its members are lazy or lacking in intelligence. stereotypic inferences have proven to be thorny.76 The ultimate explanation for the causally relevant To the extent that an actor is perceived to be characteristics ascribed to many groups lies in an a prototypic member of the salient social category, implicitly assumed ‘group essence’ that in modern automatically activated stereotypes are likely to

164  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 1, March/April 2010 WIREs Cognitive Science Social cognition color the observer’s impressions of him.77 However, Research on stereotyping thus fits the broader the processes through which this happens are not theme that social impressions are often based on necessarily straightforward. Indeed, if observers have automatic initial reactions, but under the right nothing to go on except for an actor’s salient circumstances, observers may deliberate in a more category membership, they often are reluctant to active way about the meaning of a stereotyped apply group-typical traits to the actor.78 Stereotypic actor’s behavior. Such deliberations may themselves associations appear to provide an automatic initial, be contaminated by activated stereotypic concepts, albeit tentative assessment of an actor, but such but with sufficient motivation and opportunity, it associations are only explicitly endorsed when they is possible for observers to go beyond merely seem to have been validated in some way. This stereotypic interpretations and engage in more validation process proceeds in a largely implicit and complex, deliberative forms of inferencing such as the automatic manner. ones that were developed under the guiding metaphor Activated stereotypes can acquire the appear- of the social perceiver as an intuitive scientist. ance of validity through a number of well-documented information-processing biases. For instance, stereotypes can bias attention and perception in a number Individuation of ways.79 Individuals who are relatively high in All of the aforementioned mechanisms for making implicitly assessed racial prejudice evinced a greater inferences about others are perhaps most relevant in readiness to interpret ambiguous Black faces as being circumstances where there is limited prior familiarity hostile80; what was ambiguous to a lower prejudice with the person being represented. With more expe- observer was taken as validating evidence of hostil- rience, observers can begin to build representations ity for a higher prejudice observer. In another set of specific persons that are grounded in more exten- of studies, the processing of case evidence in a simu- sive behavioral evidence and that are more likely to lated juror decision-making task was influenced by the reflect something more than rudimentary impressions activation of social stereotypes, such that incriminat- based on facial affordances, projections, stereotypes, ing evidence was better recalled, and case judgments and the like. were more negative, in the presence of stereotypes Individuation implies forming a multidimen- that were descriptively relevant to the alleged crime.81 sional impression that takes most of the salient The selective processing of the case evidence pro- features of an actor into account.85 In essence, the per- vided the necessary validation of the observer’s initial son becomes his or her own cognitive category (e.g., stereotypic associations, but when this selective evi- ‘Michelle’ becomes a category that consists of many dence processing was precluded, stereotype activation features, such as woman, Black person, affluent white- had no discernible effects on judgments or memory. collar professional, crossword puzzle enthusiast, and Stereotypes often produce biased assimilation of rel- so on), and this individuated person representation evant behavioral evidence, thereby providing enough is what is salient when the individual is encountered apparent validation to justify stereotypic judgments (i.e., the observer sees ‘Michelle’, not ‘a woman’ or and discriminatory behaviors. Because the cognitive ‘a Black person’). This does not mean that character- biases producing these results are largely implicit ones, istics such as race or gender become insignificant once perceivers are unlikely to feel that they have been in an individuated representation is formed; however, any way prejudiced or unfair. these characteristics function as attributes of the per- A number of moderators of stereotyping in social son concept, rather than as an organizing categorical perception have been identified.82 In general, these framework to which the person is subordinated, as in moderators bear on (1) awareness of the potential the case of stereotyping.86 The demographic attributes for stereotyping to occur, (2) motivation to control of well-known persons can still exert an influence on stereotyping or go beyond a cursory, stereotypic information processing,87 but observers may typically appraisal of the actor, or (3) availability of cognitive be unlikely to judge individuals who are represented resources that permit greater deliberation about the in rich, individuated ways merely in terms of simplis- actor. For instance, stereotypic biases are stronger at a tic, stereotypic associations. With enough experience, person’s nonoptimal times of day (e.g., in the morning the relevant evidence base could be quite substan- for a ‘night owl’83), presumably because cognitive tial, supporting the formation of a representation of resources and motivation that might be deployed in the the actor that is differentiated according to behav- service of going beyond initial, stereotypic impressions ioral settings.88 For example, longtime colleagues at are in relatively short supply at these points in the the law firm where Michelle works may have sepa- circadian cycle.84 rate representations for ‘Michelle in court’, ‘Michelle

Volume 1, March/April 2010  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 165 Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci at the office’, and ‘Michelle at the company picnic’, dominant approaches to modeling and representing which may contain both overlapping and unique interpersonal relationships. aspects, reflecting the role of particular settings in eliciting (or constraining) the expression of various personality traits. Such well-tuned impressions should Interdependence and the Structure of Social have maximal functional value in guiding one’s social Situations interactions, but they can only be constructed with Interdependence theorists have attempted to delineate more extensive experience. the basic situational structures that characterize As previously noted, self-categorization how two or more individuals’ well-being can be 91 theory63 proposes that individuated representations mutually intertwined. The principal dimensions of others—and, indeed, of oneself—can be supplanted of interdependence concern (1) the degree to which by social-category-based representations under cir- one person’s outcomes depend on another person’s cumstances in which collective identities are salient, actions, (2) the distribution of power across actors i.e., intergroup settings. In such settings, personal (mutual vs. asymmetric power), (3) the degree to qualities are hypothesized to become largely irrelevant which actors’ interests correspond or conflict, and and one’s group identity, defined by the norms and (4) the degree to which coordinated action is necessary stereotypes attached to the relevant category, prevail. for satisfactory outcomes. The role of each of This process of ‘depersonalization’ applies equally to these factors in social cognition and interaction one’s in-group as well as to the relevant out-group(s), can be explored in isolation. Beyond this, certain so that one no longer represents oneself in terms combinations of these variables are hypothesized to of idiosyncratic personal characteristics but rather characterize a finite set of basic social situations that engages in a process of self-stereotyping, resulting actors are likely to encounter with varying degrees of 92 in an active self-image that is fundamentally defined regularity. Having available representations of such by group-typical characteristics. This perspective recurring situations could obviously orient and guide highlights the dynamic, context-dependent nature of the unfolding of actual interactions in potentially social perception and emphasizes that individuated profitable ways. and social-categorical representations can each be There are numerous ways that ostensibly basic applied to the same set of actors, under different processes of social cognition have been shown to circumstances. be moderated by the type of relationship that exists between the relevant parties.91 For example, one issue that has been the subject of a great deal of research concerns how power asymmetries CONCEPTIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS modify person perception. This research has shown that individuals who are relatively more dependent If representing persons is the foundation of social on another individual tend to attend more closely cognition, it is becoming increasingly clear that to that person’s behavior,93 form more complex such representations need to be situated within the and individuated impressions of the more powerful context of the relationships in which these persons are person,94 engage in more perspective taking,95 and embedded.89,90 We have already noted that the core work harder at impression management vis-a-vis` the dimensions upon which representations of persons power-holder.96 Much more work needs to be done to are scaffolded are the interpersonally significant better understand how the insights of interdependence themes of affiliation and dominance. Specifically, the theory can be integrated into models of social type of information that observers are most likely cognition. to represent in their conceptions of actors is that which bears upon trustworthiness and threat, power, and competence—issues that provide a basis for Relational Models anticipating the likely impact of the actor’s behavior Fiske97 proposed an elegant, comprehensive theory on the observer’s well-being. Person representations of the structure of interpersonal relationships. The are inherently suffused with relational concerns, but theory postulates that the seemingly infinite variety beyond this, people rely upon general understandings of human relationships constitutes variations on of the structures comprising social relationships in just four basic themes. Representations of these order to navigate their social worlds; that is, they four basic relationship structures (termed ‘mods’) represent relationships as well as individuals, and they are hypothesized to be cross-culturally universal tailor their representations of others to the type of and likely innate, but these representations are also relationship(s) they share with them. We consider two fundamentally flexible in that they require socially

166  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 1, March/April 2010 WIREs Cognitive Science Social cognition transmitted complements (termed ‘preos’) to become the four discrete relational models and has confirmed operational. Different cultures implement the basic many aspects of their hypothesized influence on social mods in different ways, by propagating different preos cognition and behavior; neuroimaging evidence sug- dictating how and when, and with respect to whom, gesting that different brain structures are involved a given mod applies. in the perception of instances of different kinds of The communal sharing mod focuses on what relational models has also been reported.99 individuals in a relationship have in common and Although social cognition research has histori- dictates that resource allocations be based on need. cally proceeded relatively independently of research Different cultural preos specify the scope and applica- on relationship processes, it is clear that each field has bility of this mod by defining the specific individuals much to offer the other, and complementary theory and situational contexts in which communal sharing development holds the promise of important progress. should be invoked (e.g., within the nuclear fam- Although perhaps obvious in retrospect, the newfound ily, within a religious community, and so on). The attention to the relational contexts of social cognition authority ranking mod focuses on ordered differences promises to illuminate fundamental truths that would between individuals and aligns with concerns about be obscured by a decontextualized approach to the status and dominance. This mod specifies that some study of social-cognitive representations. individuals are entitled to greater resource allocations than others by virtue of their position in a ranked, hierarchical structure. Preos are required to determine which respects for ranking individuals are relevant CONCLUSION (e.g., seniority, gender, etc.) and specifying the con- The representations that social perceivers form of oth- texts in which their relative rank should or should not ers are of interest to cognitive scientists because of be considered relevant. The equality matching mod their presumed role in guiding behavior.100 These rep- focuses on additive imbalances, in which there is a resentations can influence behavior by determining focus on returning to a balanced reference point by how the actions of others (and the circumstances in engaging in behavioral practices and outcome allocations that offer each party equal opportunities and which these actions occur) are construed and also by directly triggering action tendencies and goals that equal obligations. Concerns about reciprocity and 101 turn-taking epitomize this mod, but here again, cul- are incorporated into social representations. As tural preos are necessary to define who is entitled we have seen, multiple mechanisms exist for con- to equality matching and when the mod’s principles structing such representations, with many of these apply. Finally, the market pricing mod focuses on mechanisms providing a very rough initial approx- relative ratios and dictates that outcome allocations imation possessing less than robust validity. These should be in proportion to one’s inputs or contribu- first-pass impressions generally arise rapidly and auto- tions, as stipulated for example in equity theory.98 matically and can be fine-tuned and elaborated when The market pricing mod, not surprisingly, has direct more extensive evidence is available and when more implications for economic exchanges, prices, wages, deliberative kinds of cognitive processing are engaged. etc. Cultures differ, however, in respect to which However, sufficient cognitive resources and motiva- types of relationships and which types of resources tion are prerequisites for reflective deliberation and 102 are considered to be governed by equity principles. reasoning of this sort. Thus, the focus of each mod differs, but in each case, In describing the processes that govern the con- by processes of socialization, culture-specific preos struction of social impressions, we have generally are integrated into these universal mods to produce considered the situation of observers attempting to functional relational models that are specific to each make sense of the behavior of actors. In real-life inter- society. action contexts, individuals cannot be neatly assigned Fiske proposed that these culturally instantiated to one or the other of these roles, because in fact relational models are used by actors to plan their they simultaneously occupy both roles. Thus, another actions, to anticipate, understand, and remember the important direction for social cognition research is to actions of others, and to coordinate their interpersonal better understand the reciprocal processes of mutual transactions. In short, he proposes that effective social influence that are involved in negotiating shared rep- interaction is grounded in cognitive representations of resentations of social interactions.103 Basic processes these four key types of social relationships. Research of social cognition form the foundation for effective examining these claims has so far been supportive. human functioning and much remains to be learned In particular, research has confirmed the existence of about their operation.

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FURTHER READING Ambady N, Skowronski JJ, eds. First Impressions. New York: Guilford Press; 2008. Fiske ST, Taylor SE. Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill; 2008. Hamilton DL, ed. Social Cognition: Key Readings. New York: Psychology Press; 2005. Smith ER, Semin GR. Socially situated cognition: cognition in its social context. Adv Exp Soc Psychol 2004, 36: 53–117.

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