SYRIA ESSENTIAL SERVICES II

AD HOC REPORT: LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS 23 October 2019

INTRODUCTION The following report highlights locals’ attitudes, in (SDF)-held Arab majority areas of Ar-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor, and Manbij towards the return of the Government of (GoS). It also presents the latter's ongoing attempts to reach reconciliation deals with local tribal leaders and discusses potential scenarios/outcomes. The information contained within the report was gathered from USAID/SES II sources within and close to the SDF (2), the GoS (1), and other international brokers, such as Russia (1) and Turkey (1). It also includes information gathered through interviews with local key informants (8) and tribal leaders (4).

LOCAL REACTIONS

AR-RAQQAH People in Ar-Raqqah seem to be divided between those who want the GoS to come back and those who prefer to remain under the control of the SDF, despite their differences with the latter (namely lack of agency and services as well as its security approach). While some sources showed support for Turkish- Supported Opposition (TSO) groups, evidence suggests that this is not a common scenario in Ar-Raqqah1 and, thus, it will not be addressed here. There is no reliable and timely way of knowing the percentage that each of those groups represents. But the various local sources interviewed for this report stated that the majority of people are still in favor of remaining under the control of the SDF.

To have a better understanding of local dynamics and divisions in Ar-Raqqah, it is important to highlight the key groups/regions and discuss their positions separately.

1 Despite its rhetoric, Turkey is mainly interested in capturing the border region and Manbij. This was communicated to me clearly by various Turkish officials, including the one interviewed for this report. This is also evident in the US/Turkey deal. While Turkey might want to get its hands on more than that (this is debatable as it has its pros and cons), the long distance that separates Turkey from Raqqa make it almost impossible to control those areas without capturing all the territories in between (to be able to establish reliable supply lines). This would be very costly as it includes capturing many Kurdish majority areas (including YPG strongholds) which Turkey. On top of that, it would automatically mean that Turkey would be responsible for providing for those areas, which is a financial burden Turkey will be hesitant to take on. Finally, both the GoS and Russia have stated that they will oppose such a move. Unlike the GoS, Russia can easily prevent this from happening by simply preventing Turkey to use Syria’s airspace, which is something Moscow has used in the past in Afrin and other places. Plus, there is no in depend local factions capable of pushing the SDF out of Ar-Raqqah and allowing the Turkish backed rebel forces, who are originally from the area, to return.

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 1 Ar-Raqqah City: People in Ar-Raqqah seem to be divided between those who support the return of the GoS and those who strongly oppose it. Despite frequent, but small, demonstrations inside the city in the first two years of the uprising (2011-13), it was widely perceived as a pro-GoS area. Thus, it is important to highlight that the GoS decision to withdraw from the province in 2013 was done for strategic calculations (i.e., it was not due to intensive clashes with rebel forces). Sources outside the city (namely in Al-Tabqah) have repeatedly insisted on highlighting that their position is different from that of the city’s inhabitants. The former referred to the city's residents as shabiha (a term commonly used in Syria to refer to GoS supporters). While this generalization is probably not fair, it is reasonable to assume that the percentage of those who would welcome the return of the GoS to the city is higher than the rest of the province. Slow reconstruction, inadequate funding, displeasure with Kurdish-led rule in an Arab-majority city, and, above all, a yearning for security after so many years of war have prevented the SDF from gaining widespread support in the city. For example, one source stated that they “used to have free water, free electricity, free bread, free schools, and free hospitals. Now everything is expensive.” Local sources are also concerned by the ability of sleeper cells, most likely linked to the Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS), to continue to carry out attacks in the city. They blame the SDF for not implementing tighter security procedures and establishing more checkpoints. They hope that the GoS will be able to improve the security situation and put an end to hit-and-run attacks. Multiple residents complained about the release of criminals and suspected militants briefly after their arrest. They also claimed that local men who join the SDF are often petty criminals, former ISIS members, or individuals joining for a salary who are not willing to risk their lives to stop the next bombing.

People highlighted a widespread perception that decision making power is monopolized by the kadros. For this reason, sources stated, that many in the city view the Self Administration for North & East Syria (SNES) as a form of foreign occupation. “In meetings with SDF officials in the city, a local Arab commander rarely spoke, while his Kurdish superior, from outside the city, answered questions, even ones directed to the Arab commander,” stated a shopkeeper from the city. “The kadros are always present in the committees and offices, even though they are not technocrats with specialization,” said an activist in the city. He insisted that “there is clear marginalization of locals, which is obvious to everyone.” Some residents pointed out that another major reason for mistrust of SDF rule is the massive destruction of the city during its liberation from the ISIS, which residents believe was at time excessive and unjustified.

That said, it is not clear whether this position represents the majority in the city or not. Sources from Ar- Raqqah City insisted that most of the people still refuse the return of the GoS. However, unlike other regions in NES, including Al-Tabqah, no anti-GoS demonstrations were reported by local sources in the city since the SDF-GoS agreement was reached.2 According to local sources, the fear of GoS retaliation might help explain the absence of demonstrations against it in the city. They highlighted that people are left with no place to turn to in case the GoS captures the province, which is why they are cautious not to take any unnecessary risks.

On the contrary, at least one pro-GoS demonstration was reported there last week, where around 30 people raised the official Syrian flag and chanted pro-Assad slogans in Tall Abyad street (inside Ar-Raqqah City). Notably, the SDF used force to quickly disperse the protest. Likewise, a few video statements were posted by local figures known for their support for the GoS, such as (Majamdeh tribe),

2 Other USAID/SES II sources reported at least one anti-GoS demonstration in Ar-Raqqah City since the beginning of the Turkish military operation. It is possible that sources for this report may not have known about the demonstration, or they may fear GoS retaliation should information in this report leak to the wrong person.

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 2 (al-Ajili tribe), and (Afadleh tribe). But the SDF has not yet retaliated against those individuals.

Al-Tabqah: Unlike Ar-Raqqah City, Al-Tabqah and its people have been known for their strong anti-GoS position since the early days of the uprising. Their attitude seems not to have changed over the past several years.

This was evident in the recent demonstrations inside the city, and in its countryside, where people chanted, “Long live Syria, Down with Assad.” Various local sources also pointed out that the majority of people in Al-Tabqah still refuse the entry of the GoS. “We had scarified thousands of martyrs over the past years in order to live in peace and dignity. Allowing the regime and its thugs to control our city again means that all those people and their scarifies were in vain,” said a former (FSA) fighter from Al-Tabqah. Another source highlighted the risks that come with the entry of the GoS. “We saw the way the regime treated those who remained in the areas that were recaptured by it. Assad arrested hundreds of people just because they do not like him. He also conscripted thousands just so he can send them to die on the frontlines,” said a teacher from Al-Tabqah. While it is difficult to know the percentage of those who might support (or at least not oppose) the return of the GoS, it seems that they are a minority.

IDPs: In addition to residents who are originally from the province, there are tens of thousands of people who were displaced to Ar-Raqqah from other regions. The substantial number of this group, as well as their strong position towards the return of the GoS, makes it important to highlight them separately. Local sources estimated their number at 200,000 people. Sources among internally displaced persons (IDPs) stated that the majority of them, namely those coming from Deir ez-Zor and rural Ar-Raqqah, are displaced due to GoS presence in their areas of origin: “We had to leave our homes, properties and friends because of Assad and his crimes. We knew that we would either be killed or imprisoned if we stayed. So we had no choice but to leave everything and run for our lives.” They highlighted that despite the difficulties that come with displacement, they refuse to go back and live under GoS control. This strongly indicates that this group will also oppose the return of the GoS to Ar-Raqqah. A farmer displaced from Deir ez-Zor City said, “It is true that we are now suffering from lack of services and, thus, we can barely make ends meet. But at least we are safe. Those who stayed cannot say the same. We are still in contact with our relatives back home, and the stories they tell us about Assad’s crimes and violations makes our bad situation sound like heaven in comparison to theirs. They regret not joining us when they had the chance.”

RAQQAWI REACTIONS TO THE SDF-GOS AGREEMENT Local sources highlighted that people of Ar-Raqqah are concerned about the initial agreement SDF-GoS agreement, yet they somewhat feel relieved that the deal was limited to the border areas. More precisely, they feel better knowing that their areas will not be directly impacted by the deal. However, those sources highlighted that locals largely believe that their area would be among the first trade-offs the SDF would offer the GoS. Ar-Raqqah is not considered strategically important for the SDF, especially in comparison to other Kurdish majority regions such as Kobani. In addition, the proximity of GoS troops to Al-Tabqah makes it easier for the GoS to move in quickly.

Those fears were amplified when the GOS started using Al-Tabqah’s military airport, which remains under SDF control, as a transit station for the troops deployed to the border region. The first GoS military

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 3 convoy reached the base shortly after the SDF-GoS deal was announced. The sudden appearance of a sizable number of soldiers at a late hour caused panic among locals, who were not aware of such arrangements. The SDF tried to assure locals that Ar-Raqqah, and other areas, will remain under its control and that GoS troops were only passing through. Nonetheless, people were still alarmed. To provide further assurances, the SDF installed checkpoints around the airbase preventing GoS soldiers from leaving the site. Those feelings of rage and uncertainty might help inform why people in Al-Tabqah have actively demonstrated against the GoS.

At the time of writing, there was no indication that the return of the GoS to Ar-Raqqah was imminent. As SES II’s previous report on this topic (‘Rapid Analysis of SDF and GoS Negotiations’) suggested, the current dynamics in the SDF non-border regions, including Ar-Raqqah, will likely remain the same. This information was confirmed by SDF officials who met local notables in Ar-Raqqah to assure them that the province will remain under their control at least until a mutually accepted agreement is reached with the GoS, which will unlikely happen soon as negotiations are currently suspended due the Turkish incursion. Even when negotiations are resumed, the vast gaps between what the two parties desire mean that it would likely take significant time to reach a compromise they, and Turkey, are happy with. (This issue was discussed in detail in the first report of this series.) Local sources think that the return of the GoS to Ar- Raqqah, when it happens, will likely be the result of negotiations (i.e., not through military means).

GOS OUTREACH TO RAQQAWI TRIBES Notably, multiple sources highlighted that the GoS has continued to activate communication channels with locals in Ar-Raqqah, in parallel to the official negotiations with the SDF. This outreach aims at sidelining the SDF and reaching a deal with Ar-Raqqah's tribes directly. This would weaken the SDF’s negotiating position and allow the GoS to dictate its terms. But this move does not come as a surprise. Since 2016, the GoS has increased its efforts to restore its ties with leaders of prominent tribes in NES, including prominent tribal figures such as , who was based in Ar-Raqqah and then moved to Damascus and has lived there since. However, local sources highlighted that the GoS has dramatically increased such efforts since the announcement of the deal with the SDF. To that end, the GoS has reportedly asked its supporters inside the city (none of whom are considered high-profile) to issue statements and organize demonstrations calling for the return of the GoS. This likely explains the pro- GoS incidents highlighted above.

Likewise, the GoS has also reportedly used those contacts to reach out to other key local figures and offer them the chance to reconcile with Damascus. But according to well-informed tribal sources, those efforts have not been able to convince any prominent figures to change their position to favour the GoS. This can be asserted with reasonable confidence since the GoS usually publicizes such reconciliation deals when high-profile figures are involved, especially at a critical time like this it could help improve its negotiating position, and in this case no such incidents were reported. Because many tribal leaders, among others, feel that the return of the GoS is inevitable it would be fair to assume that some of them already started to work to preserve their interests. Nonetheless, such figures are still cautious not to change positions too early, fearing retaliation from the SDF. Notably, the SDF organized a meeting with tribal leaders in Al-Tabqah on Friday, 18 October. A video was shared with USAID/SES II by a key figure who attend the meeting, which shows the head of Al-Tabqah Military Council, , using strong language to warn those leaders against attempting to reach reconciliation deals with the GoS. A larger meeting was also organized by the SDF for all key actors and local officials in Ar-Raqqah on Saturday, 19 October, where SDF officials, as well as , tried to assure people that GoS

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 4 troops will not control any part of Ar-Raqqah currently held by the SDF. The attendees were also warned against reaching reconciliation deals with the GoS. Similarly, local sources reported that Russia, which showed no obvious interest in Ar-Raqqah in the past, seems to be reaching out to local tribal leaders in an attempt to reach a deal with them. However, not much is known with regards to who they might be reaching out to or what sort of a deal they may offer.

Despite this maneuvering, the current status quo in Ar-Raqqah, in absence of any major changes,3 will likely remain intact. However, in case a complete US withdrawal occurs (what people fear most), tribal leaders will likely attempt to reach a deal for Ar-Raqqah. In such a scenario, it is likely that tribal figures would prefer to broker this deal with the GoS, rather than Russia. As discussed above, the level of support for the GoS, especially in the city, is higher than other regions in the NES. Likewise, the open communication channels that the GoS has maintained with key tribal figures in Ar-Raqqah (such as ) and figures outside the province with strong influence there (such as ) would allow the parties to broker a deal without any need for external mediation (namely Russia or Iran).

While lives in Damascus, (the current leader of Shammar tribe and the sponsor of SDF affiliate Sanadid forces), despite his alliance with the SDF, has publicly and repeatedly stated, over the past years, that he does not oppose the return of the GoS to Ar-Raqqah. He publicly admitted meeting with the GoS last February to test the waters and see if a deal for Ar-Raqqah could be reached. But no progress was made at the time as he refused to reach any agreement behind the back of the SDF and without taking their interests into account. In response to the February meeting, which took place in the Hmeimim airbase, was asked during an interview about the role that Russia is expected to play in brokering such a deal with the GoS. He stated, publicly, that he is fully capable of reaching a deal with the GoS alone and without Moscow’s help.

Thus, the GoS will likely continue to try to reach a deal with him, as he is somewhat considered a kingmaker in Ar-Raqqah due to his influence (even beyond his tribe), popularity, and ties to the SDF. Besides, he is considered the only tribal figure with an affiliated armed wing. The GoS will also likely use other prominent figures, such as , who, despite being based in Damascus, still exercises influence in Ar-Raqqah, to play a role in those negotiations.

The GoS has been offering roughly the same deal everywhere; surrender in exchange for safety. As such, it is unlikely the GoS will offer Ar-Raqqah anything else, especially because tribal leaders there, unlike in Deir ez-Zor, are not demanding local autonomy. More precisely, the final deal will likely allow the GoS to control the city in exchange for guarantees not to punish people for their involvement in resisting it. Besides, the GoS would likely offer to provide services, allow government employees to get their jobs back, and free detainees. But those promises, which were included in other agreements, were largely ignored and/or violated. As mentioned above, Russia’s lack of interest in the province would likely mean no objection on its side to such arrangements.

However, the only detail that remains unclear is whether such a deal will be reached outside/in parallel to the ongoing negotiations with the SDF or as part of a bigger deal with the latter. seems to be the only tribal leader insisting on taking the interests of the Kurds (not the SDF in particular) into

3 Such as a complete US withdrawal, a final deal between the SDF and GoS/Russia, or a GOS-led attack to capture Ar-Raqqah militarily.

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 5 consideration when reaching a deal. He clearly stated that he has been living in harmony with the Kurds for decades and he does not want to betray them. As such, his answer to this question would depend mainly on: 1) whether he sees such a deal as a betrayal to the Kurds; and 2) if this deal is seen as the only option left.

For now, it seems that the influence of and the SDF pressure would likely continue to prevent the GoS from capturing Ar-Raqqah through a direct deal with local tribal leaders. In such a scenario, the current status quo will remain and the city will continue to be run by the SDF and the Self Administration. However, if tribal leaders were forced to choose between a deal and a direct confrontation with the GoS, they would likely strike a deal. In such a scenario, a deal might be reached for Ar-Raqqah City first and then be duplicated elsewhere. Since people in some areas in Ar-Raqqah, namely Al-Tabqah, still strongly oppose the return of the GoS, a small number of them will likely continue to carry out assassination attacks against pro-GoS members.4

DEIR EZ-ZOR According to local sources, the position of people in Deir ez-Zor is easier to grasp, as the majority of them still have strong public resentment towards the GoS. Local sources pointed out that the majority of people reject the return of the GoS, and they prefer to remain under the authority of the SDF and the US-led International Coalition. While some sources showed support for TSO groups, evidence suggests that this is not a realistic scenario in Deir ez-Zor5 and, thus, it will not be addressed here.

Unlike Ar-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor was more active in the early months of the uprising, which quickly turned into a military rebellion against the GoS. The FSA in the province, which had emerged from the ranks of the uprising, led the fighting and managed to control more than three-quarters of the city by summer 2012. Sources pointed out that an estimate of over one million people currently live in SDF-controlled areas. Many of these people have either been directly involved in anti-government activities or have family members who were. Therefore, on top of their anti-GoS political position, they fear GoS retaliation against them. The GoS has reportedly implemented widespread punitive measures against those considered “out of order” in the areas it recaptured, which has further amplified people's concerns. Besides, there is an estimated 300,000 people who were displaced from other regions due to GoS presence and still refuse to live under the control of the latter.

The strong anti-GoS sentiment among IDPs was evident when dozens of them took to the streets in September, weeks before the latest developments in NES. The protests were attributed to military threats on social media made by commanders of Baqir Brigade (an Iranian-backed militia affiliated with the GoS)

4 Such attacks emerged in Daraa a few months after the province was re-captured, where over 120 assassinations have taken place over the last four months. 5 Despite its rhetoric, Turkey is mainly interested in capturing the border region and Manbij. This was communicated to USAID/SES II clearly by various Turkish officials, including the one interviewed for this report. This was also evident in the US/Turkey deal. While Turkey might want to seize more than that, the sheer distance that separates Turkey from Deir ez-Zor makes it almost impossible to control those areas without capturing all the territories in between. This would be very costly as it includes capturing many Kurdish-majority areas (including YPG strongholds). On top of that, it would mean Turkey would be responsible for providing for those areas, which is a financial burden Turkey will be hesitant to take on. Finally, both the GoS and Russia have stated that they will oppose such a move. Unlike the GoS, Russia can easily prevent this from happening by simply preventing Turkey to use Syria’s airspace, which is something Moscow has used in the past in Afrin and other places. Additionally, there are no independent local factions capable of pushing the SDF out of Deir ez-Zor and allowing TSO originally from the area, to return.

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 6 to storm the western rural parts of Deir ez-Zor held by the SDF. The protests kicked off from SDF- controlled areas and moved towards checkpoints and areas taken over by GoS forces near the Salhiya crossing. The protestors held signs calling for the withdrawal of the GoS from their towns east of the Euphrates, to which the forces responded by shooting at the protestors. As a result, three protestors were killed in addition to the injury of more than 10 civilians and the arrest of many others, as reported by the Hawar News Agency.

According to local media networks, similar demonstrations broke out, on a larger scale, in several areas of eastern Syria over the past few days protesting the entry of the GoS. The protests broke out in the province after the entry of GoS troops into neighboring Al-Hasakah province, which created panic among locals. The protests spread across most of the villages west of Deir ez-Zor. People of Al Busayrah, Abriha, Sabha, Dahlah, and Jdid Bakara in the eastern countryside gathered in Jadid ‘Uqaydat. Likewise, the people of Al Kasrah, Muhaymidah, Al-Hissan, Zghir Jazira, and Hawayj west of Deir ez-Zor carried out demonstrations and gathered in Al-Hissan town, while the people of the northern countryside gathered in Izba. Local sources highlighted that people chose these gathering points because of their proximity to areas held by the GoS.

People reportedly chanted anti-GoS slogans, rejecting any sort of agreement with it, and calling on the US-led Coalition to protect them. According to various sources, people fear that GoS opponents will be arrested and that young men will be conscripted into the army.

While the majority of residents are reportedly against the return of the GoS, local sources pointed out that there is a small percentage of people who are openly known to be pro-GoS- various families in the town of Shahil. Most of those individuals were traditionally affiliated with the GoS and maintained that position throughout the conflict. The GoS alliance with other groups (namely fighters from al-Shaitat tribe) is relatively more recent and is largely due to the atrocities committed against them by ISIS. According to local sources, this pro-GoS group is small and does not include high-profile figures. But while those individuals were scared of publicly disclosing their support for the GoS in the past, they are now actively calling for a GoS return. Local sources pointed out that this recent shift is due to requests from the GoS to publicize support. This was evident in video statements shared by individuals from al-Shaitat and Shahil town on social media calling for the return of the GoS. Others raised the official Syrian flag on their houses or in public places (the flags were quickly and forcibly removed by the SDF and other local figures). Similar to Ar-Raqqah, those individuals reportedly reached out to relatives and various tribal figures and offered to facilitate their reconciliation with the GoS. However, according to local tribal and SDF sources, those efforts were not successful in bringing any prominent figures to the fold of the GoS.

Likewise, Iran started to reportedly use its tribal contacts to reach out to people in SDF parts of Deir ez- Zor to establish a foothold in the area. According to multiple sources, the key figure used for that purpose is (the Sheikh of al-Bakara tribe and the sponsor of Iranian backed Baqir Brigade), who was a prominent opponent of the GoS until he, with Iran’s help, made amends with the GoS and moved to Damascus in January 2017. has been reportedly trying to restore contact with figures from his tribe on the SDF side of the river to convince them to reconcile with the government under the sponsorship of Tehran. The same sources highlight that those efforts were not successful in bringing people to the GoS fold, as no public statements were made in that regard. That said, it is important to highlight that already has supporters among his fellow tribesmen inside SDF areas. This was evident when he used his network of supporters to allow the GoS to capture four villages from the SDF in Deir

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 7 ez-Zor last April. Shortly after, the SDF recaptured the villages and arrested several of supporters, which limited the base of his supporters.

At the same time, it seems that Russia is also racing to establish contacts with key tribal figures in SDF areas. A well-informed local source stated that Russia contacted (al-Akidat tribe) in an attempt to reach a deal through him with the tribes in the SDF part of Deir ez-Zor. The eldest son of confirmed Russia’s initial contact, however, he stated that his father did not respond yet. Instead, has reportedly called for a general meeting for all tribal leaders in that region to his madafeh (reception area for guests) in al-Hriaji town (east of Deir ez-Zor) to discuss the recent developments and reach a common position on what should be done in case of a US withdrawal from the area. Invitations have been sent to tribal figures and the meeting is expected to take place soon. told USAID/SES II that while all options will be considered, the preference would be to remain under the control of the SDF/International Coalition.

Notably, to respond to the GoS’s attempts to reach a deal with local tribal leaders, the SDF called for a meeting on 19 October with key local public figures and officials. During the meeting, SDF officials, namely head of Deir ez-Zor council and other kadros (a term commonly used to refer to the inner circle of the PYD), assured people that the situation in the region will remain the same. They repeatedly stressed that no GoS troops will be allowed to enter the area. The meeting was partially organized to calm people who were demonstrating in the streets against the return of the GoS. However, local sources who attended the meeting stated that SDF officials made it clear that they will not tolerate any independent negotiations with the GoS. As such, many of them felt that the meeting was an attempt to put an end to the various efforts, by the GOS and its allies, to broker a deal with local tribal leaders.

Moving forward, local sources stated that, in the absence of any major development, the current status quo will likely remain intact. However, should a complete US withdrawal occur, tribal leaders will likely attempt to reach a deal for Deir ez-Zor. In such a case, a key tribal figure highlighted that based on the deals that took place in other rebel-held areas across the country, local figures generally feel that Russia would be the most preferable broker for a number of reasons: 1) it may lead to a deal that ensures some sort of local autonomy (similar to the one brokered by Russia in Daraa); 2) it can potentially prevent the troops and security agencies allied with both the GoS and Iran from entering the area; 3) it can potentially allow local factions to be in charge of running the area under the umbrella of Fifth Corps and its backer, Russia; 4) it can potentially allow local troops to maintain their light weapons which would, in turn, make them feel safer. Those reasons, somewhat, outline the conditions that the tribal leaders will most likely ask for in the future, in case of direct negotiations with Russia. , among other tribal leaders, will likely lead such negotiations in the future.

Notably, Russia has shown more interest in Deir ez-Zor, which was obvious during the preparations for Deir ez-Zor’s battles against ISIS. Moscow engaged in negotiations with the International Coalition to establish clear rules and frontlines to avoid confrontations. The natural resources in Deir ez-Zor, which do not exist in Ar-Raqqah, may also play a role in motivating Russia to broker a deal directly with local tribal leaders. However, Iran has a strong presence in Deir ez-Zor as well as obvious economic and strategic interests (its desire to establish and maintain secured land access from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon), which might make Russia’s mission in Deir ez-Zor more challenging. However, the strong anti- Assad and anti-Iran sentiments in the SDF region of Deir ez-Zor will likely play in Russia’s favor. Moscow has also shown a strong ability to get the deals it wants inside Syria despite Iran’s objection. The former was also able to repeatedly block Tehran from implementing some of the deals it signed with the GoS to

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 8 contain Iran’s influence inside Syria. In case of strong Russian-Iranian competition over Deir ez-Zor, dividing the province into various pockets of influence (which is what happened in Daraa) will be the most likely scenario.

It is important to highlight that in case future negotiations fail to prevent GoS troops and security agencies from controlling the SDF region of Deir ez-Zor, then some level of local armed resistance will likely be expected. Local sources have reported that dozens of locals, if not more, will almost certainly fight back against any military presence affiliated with GoS, most of which are expect to be young men who fought at some point during the conflict (FSA or SDF). The same sources shared a video of a small group (around 30 people) who filmed themselves on 16 October shooting in the air in a show of force. It is not clear how many people will end up resisting, as those individuals have not started organizing themselves in any sort of traditional formations. But despite its size, this group will unlikely to be successful in defeating GoS forces. However, in such a scenario, those individuals might still continue to carry out assassination attacks against pro-GoS members.

MANBIJ The situation in Manbij differs from the regions discussed bove, as the city’s fate seems to be largely sealed. In response to the Turkish incursion into NES, the SDF/GoS deal allowed the latter to expand its presence in Manbij to halt an expected Turkish assault on the city. Consequently, GoS troops established checkpoints and observation points along the Sajur River to create a buffer zone between Manbij and al- Bab, which is controlled by TSO factions. Furthermore, local sources reported that the GoS has established joint checkpoints with the SDF at the city’s main entrances including, Madfaa roundabout, Haiah village (west of Manbij), and Khataf village (east of Manbij). One source in the Manbij Military Council stated that the presence of GoS forces is limited to the areas at risk of being attacked by Turkey. The source highlighted that apart from that, the only compromise they agreed to for now is to raise the Syrian flag inside Manbij and around it. He stressed that Manbij civil and military councils will remain in charge of the city’s administration and internal security until a more comprehensive agreement is reached with the GoS.

Local sources state that Manbij’s residents did not have influence over the agreement. One source stated that they learned about the deal from the news, the same way everyone else did. According to various sources, people in the city are divided between those in favor of living under the control of TSO forces and those who prefer any other agreement. The first group thinks that allowing the entry of the rebel forces, many of which are from the areas, is good for the following reasons:

• It may help create a more balanced governing authority that can end the absolute power of the predominantly Kurdish SDF. Manbij is majority-Arab, and many see any violation by the SDF forces and their affiliated institutions, regardless of how trivial or major, as an ethnically motivated act.

• Changing the status quo in Manbij could also end its isolation from the nearby Euphrates Shield areas by removing the entry restrictions imposed in the city for security purposes. In May 2017, the SDF issued new regulations preventing the residents of the areas out of its control from entering SDF-controlled territories unless they show a ratified and hard-to-obtain sponsorship. These restrictions in Manbij brought about major social and economic consequences. Locals struggle with the high customs tariffs and taxes imposed by customs offices in Manbij and

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 9 Euphrates Shield areas. Allowing rebel forces to enter would likely move the domestic borders between the two areas and relieve residents of customs tariffs.

• The return of GoS troops means that the people that opposed the former in the past might be arrested. Young males are also scared of forced conscription.

However, others have welcomed the entrance of GoS troops, which despite allowing a symbolic GoS presence, help maintain the status quo in Manbij. They prefer this option for the following reasons:

• Any fighting will likely lead to catastrophic humanitarian consequences. At least dozens of civilians will be killed while thousands will likely be displaced.

• Manbij is considered more stable and secure than the other parts of Syria controlled by TSO forces, such as al-Bab, which are riddled with infighting and assassinations. Thus, people feel that allowing rebel factions to enter Manbij might turn it into a battlefield over interests.

• Another concern is the safety of people who are perceived to be pro-SDF or have collaborated with the YPG, and who face the potential of being reported in TSO forces’ records as ‘traitors’ and, thus, will likely be persecuted.

However, it is not clear which group represents the majority of people in Manbij. This detail seems to be irrelevant to how the future of the city will be decided. The SDF is trying to determine the fate of the city through negotiations with the GoS under Russia's sponsorship. But the huge gaps between what the two actors are willing to settle for (which are discussed in the first ad hoc report of this series) makes the possibility of reaching a mutually accepted agreement slim.

On the other hand, instead of capturing the city through military means, Turkey seems to be willing to allow the GoS to control it in exchange for expelling all entities affiliated with the SDF, which is a goal both entities seem to share. This was evident in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s press conference on 16 October in which he stated the presence of Syrian troops in the Manbij is acceptable as long as the “terrorist Kurdish YPG [People's Protection Units] and PYD [Democratic Union Party] fighters” leave. Erdogan also stated on various occasions that he had positive discussions with Russia about the future of Manbij and that “they are at the stage of implementing our decision.” While Turkey’s demands are clear, less information is known on what Russia might be willing to agree to. If Russia agrees to push the SDF out of Manbij, then it might jeopardise the prospects for a long term deal between the SDF and GoS across NES. It may also lead to a limited scale of local resistance against the GoS. A local from Manbij stated that “people are terrified right now. The entry of the regime will cause a catastrophe. Many are wanted by the regime." Notably, residents of Manbij called for a general strike on 21 October, against the looming takeover of the town by the GoS.

Local sources stated that major families and tribes have supported the strike in Manbij, which is why it was partially successful. Multiple local sources stated that the strike was largely implemented and, thus, most of the city was shuttered, including the main market, Salalien and Akashien markets and Kawakibi and Sarab streets. This was also evident in various videos showing the shops that did not open their doors in response to the strike call, which were circulated on social media. However, that only lasted a few hours as people were reportedly forced to open their shops. Shops in Manbij typically opens at 7:00 but the majority of them were closed until they were forced to open (around 12:00), but even then at a sizeable number of them remained closed until the end of the day. (The sources estimated the percentage

USAID.GOV LOCAL REACTIONS TO SDF-GOS NEGOTIATIONS | 10 of the latter at 50%.) One shopkeeper stated that “pro-GoS shabiha (such as Radwan Darwish and Maher Jisy) were roaming the streets of Manbij and threating to register the names of those who refuse to open their doors and send the list the regime. They also threatened to break into the shops that stayed close until the end of the day. We were scared of being targeted by the regime in the future; that is why many shops opened before noon.” Two other sources confirmed that people were forced to open their shops due to those threats and stated that the GoS arrested a number of young men in Manbij recently, which amplified the impact of those threats. They highlighted that the SDF did not do anything to stop the GoS from threatening people or offer to provide protection for the shops of those who wanted to participate in the strike.

That, in turn, might lead to a limited number of assassination attacks against people affiliated with the GoS. However, the situation might not be significantly different in case Russia does not commit or succeed in pushing the SDF and its affiliates out of Manbij. In such a scenario, Turkey might continue to sponsor armed activities inside Manbij (namely hit and run attacks) or allow its allies to continue to carry out occasional skirmishes along the frontlines. A video issued by a small group of local SDF fighters on 16 October describing themselves as “Sons of Manbij” says they refuse the entry of the GoS and vow to resist it. The people in the video, who were armed, said that they have never forgotten the GoS’s barbarism and its brutal grip on society.

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