Strategic Report for Peet’s & Tea

Becca Lange Bill Slade Ian Kwok

April 20, 2009 Peet’s Coffee & Tea

Table of Contents Executive Summary ...... 3 History...... 4 BusinessModel...... 6 Competitive Analysis ...... 8 InternalRivalry...... 8 SupplierPower...... 9 BuyerPower...... 10 EntryandExit...... 10 Substitutes...... 11 Complements...... 12 SWOT ...... 12 Strengths...... 12 Weaknesses...... 13 Opportunities...... 13 Threats...... 13 Financial Analysis ...... 13 Overview...... 13 ProfitabilityandGrowth...... 15 Liquidity...... 15 Strategic Recommendations ...... 18 References ...... 20 Appendix ...... 21

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea

Executive Summary

Peet’sCoffee&Teaisaspecialtycoffeeroasterandmarketeroffreshroastedwholebean coffeeandtea.FoundedinBerkeley,in1966,Peet’shasestablishedaloyal customerbasewithstrongbrandawarenessinCalifornia.Theircoffeeissoldundermultiple channelsofdistributionincludinggrocerystores,homedelivery,office,restaurantand foodserviceaccountsandCompany-ownedandoperatedstoresinsixstates.Thiscreates twodifferentreportablesegmentsofretailstoresandspecialtysales.AsofDecember2008 Peet’soperates188retailstoresandisavailableinapproximately8,500grocerystores. Consumerspecialtysalesrepresent33%ofsalesand69%oftotalprofit.Retailsales represent67%oftotalsalesbutonly31%oftotalprofits. In2008,theCompanycontinuedtopursueitsstrategytoexpanditsmultipledistribution channelsintheUnitedStates.Theirfirstpriorityseemedtobedevelopingprimarilyinthe westernUSmarketswheretheyalreadyhaveestablishedapresenceandcustomerawareness. Theeffortsofthe2008distributionexpansioninclude:opening23newretailstores,22of whichwereinCaliforniaandentering2,400newgrocerystoresprimarilyoutsideofthe westerncore,whichhelpedgrowgrocerystorerevenueby23%.Inthelongterm,Peet’s Coffeeshouldcontinuetoopennewretailstoresinstrategicwestcoastlocationsandin grocery,theyshouldcontinuetoexpandintonewmarkets,asPeet’sspecialtysalescan penetratemarketswherethereisnoretailpresence.Oncetheyhavethisbrandname presenceinoutsideareas,theycanlookintoopeningmoreretailstoresintheselocations. TheUScoffeeindustryisverylarge,amarketofapproximately$27billion,andspecialty coffeeaccountsfor$11-12billionofthis.Thegrowthinspecialtycoffeeisparticularly strongingrocerywherespecialtycoffeedollarsspentinthelastyeargrewanestimated12%. Thismarketgeneratesmostofitssalesfromthatcurrentlynumberover20,000 intheUnitedStates.Thespecialtycoffeecategoryishighlycompetitive,butismostly dominatedbyCorporation,whichislargerthanallthecompetitorscombined.In thebusiness,Peet’salsocompeteswithsmallsingleunitmomandpop coffeehousesandlocalchainssuchas,CoffeeBean&TeaLeaf,Tully’sandCaribouCoffee.

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Outsideofthecoffeehousebusiness,whichisthespecialtysegment,Peet’smaincompetitors areGreenMountainCoffee,IllyCaffé,Tully’sandDunkin’Donuts.Toalesserextent, Peet’sCoffeealsocompeteswithmoremainstreamcoffeesuchasMaxwellHouseand Folger’s.PartofPeet’sstrategyneedstobedifferentiatingthecompanyfromthesemassof competitors.Theyshouldtrytosellthemselvesasajoyfulcoffeebuyingexperienceinorder toachievethis.Also,focusingtheirbusinessinparticularchannelsofdistribution,suchas grocery,wouldhelptheirbrandawarenessintheseparticularareas. ThecurrentrecessionoraworseningoftheUnitedStatesandglobaleconomycould materiallyadverselyaffectPeet’sbusinessastheirrevenuesbasedonexpensivespecialty coffeedependsignificantlyonconsumerconfidenceandspending.In2009,Peet’sprimary focusshouldbeonstrengtheningthecoreoftheirexistingbusinesses.Asaresult,theyare onlyopening10newstoresin2009,versus23in2008,andexpecttogaindistributionin approximately1,000newgrocerystores,versusthe2,400theyaddedin2008.Theyshould alsolookintoanalyzingtheprofitabilityandgrowthofalloftheirexistingstorestoseeif someneedtobecutfromtheirbusiness

Company Overview

History Peet’sCoffeeandTeaisaspecialtycoffeeroasterandretailerfoundedbyAlfredPeetin 1966.Peet,whoearnedthenicknamethe“grandfatherofgourmetcoffee,”workedinthe coffeetradeinhisnativecountryofHollandbeforemovingtotheUSafterWWII.His dissatisfactionwithAmericancoffeeinspiredhimtobeginbrewinghisowncoffee—starting withhisfirststoreinBerkeley,California. TwomajorfactorsdifferentiatedPeet’sCoffeefromthecontemporarycompetition.The firstwashisemphasisonbrewingsmallerbatchesofcoffee—madeupoftopnotchbeans— inordertopreservefreshness.Second,heutilizedadarkerroastingstylethatresultedin coffeethatwasricherandmorecomplexthanmostcoffeeofferedatthetime.These innovationspaiddividendslongbeforethecompanywentpublic.Injustafewyearshis

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea coffeehadgainedquitearabidfanbase.Regularpatronstothestorebecameknownas “Peetniks,”andthefirststoreattractedsuchavarietyofothergourmetfoodpurveyorsto theneighborhoodthattheareaearnedthetitleofthe“GourmetGhetto.” Whilethefirststoreattractedaloyalcrowd,asecondstoredidnotopenuntilfiveyearslater andanotherfouryearsuntilthethirdstoreopened.Perhapsitwasthedistincttastethat somedescribedas“burnt”thatpreventedtheimmediateexpansionofthebrand.Or,maybe itwasjustAlfredPeet’snaturetonurturehisbabyalong,andensurethatfreshnesswasmore importantthanrevenues.Oneexampleofhisrefusaltoservestalecoffeeisthefactthat Peet'scoffeebeansandteaswerenevervacuum-packedandwereshippedwithin24hoursof beingroastedtoorder.Inthestore,coffeewasmadefresheveryhalfhour,andnobeans wereallowedtostandformorethansevendays. Ofcourse,Peet’ssuccesspromptedotherstoattemptasimilarstyleofcoffeeshop.Infact, thethreefoundersofthenowubiquitousStarbuckschainknewPeetpersonally,andstarted aparallelspecialtycoffeeshopinSeattle,Washingtonin1971.Intheirfirstyearof operation,theStarbucks’foundersactuallyboughttheircoffeebeansfromPeet’sCoffee. Therelationshipbetweenthetwocompaniesdoesn’tendthere,though.In1984,oneofthe Starbucks’founders,JerryBaldwin,andanassociatewhowastobecomethe“roastmaster,” joinedwithagroupofinvestorstobuyPeet’sfourbayarealocations.In1987,theseowners decidedtosellStarbucks(tothenowfamousHowardSchultz)tofocusonmanagingPeet’s. Unlikeitscopycatandnowmuchlargerrival,Peet’shasnotgrownatarapidclip. Throughoutthelate‘80sandearly‘90s,Peet’sgraduallyincreasedthenumberofstoresby justacoupleeveryyear.Peet'sgrowthpickedupsomewhatin1994afterthecompany receiveda$6millionprivateplacementfromtheSanFranciscoinvestmentfirmHambrecht &Quist.ThefundsenabledPeet'stoopena60,000-square-footroasteryinEmeryville, California,whichhadthecapacitytosupply150stores.Storesatthistimeandthroughout theremainderofthe1990saveraged$1.2millioninsalesannually.Eachstorecost approximately$350,000to$400,000toopen,outfit,anddecorateinthecompany'scoffee- inspiredcolors,buteachlocationwasrunindependentlybyitsmanagerandreflectedthe styleoftheneighborhoodinwhichitwaslocated.

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea By1996,salesatPeet'sapproximately30stores,whichbythensoldcoffee,tea,scones,and muffins,andavarietyofbrewingaccessoriesandequipment,totaledabout$40million.In comparison,Starbucksbroughtin$696.5millionfromitsmorethan1,100storesinthe UnitedStates,Canada,Japan,andSingapore.Thetwodidn’thaveanintenserivalry,though; instead,eachviewedtheotherasafriendlycompetitorservingsomewhatdifferentcustomer bases.Infact,theiramiablerelationshipwasforeshadowedin1987whenthetwosigneda no-competeclauseinthebayarea. ByJanuaryof2001,Peet’sdecideditneededacashinjectioninordertospurfurthergrowth. ThecompanywentpublicontheNASDAQ(PEET)andraised$24.6millionintheprocess. Onthefirstdayoftrading,sharesrose17percent.Thiskickstartenabledthecompanyto continueexpanding.Today,thefirmhasapproximately200stores,mostlyconcentratedin California.Yet,alargeandhithertoignoredaspectofthecompanytodayisPeet’spresence ingrocerystores.AsofMarch,2008,Peet’sCoffeesolditsbeansinalmost6000grocery storessuchasWholeFoodsandSafeway.

Business Model Peet’spridesitselfonofferingahighqualityandfreshnessbytastingandpickingthebest beansfromaroundtheworld,roastingbyhandinitsartisanfacility,onlyroastingenough fortheday’sorders,andimmediatedeliveryuponroasting.Peet’selitegroupofroasters eachhasa10yearcommitmentandarenotconsideredmastersintheircraftuntil3yearsof training.AllofPeet’sCoffeeroastinghappensintheirnewlyopenedfacilityinAlameda, California.ItwasdevelopedwithaLEED(LeadershipinEnergyandEnvironmental Design)approachinallareasofdesignandconstruction. Thecompanyreportsitsbusinessintwoseparatesegmentsofsales:retailandspecialty.The retailstoresaccountedfor67.5%ofsaleswhilespecialtysalessegmentaccountedfor32.5%. CurrentlyPeet’sCoffeeoperates188retailsoresinsixstates,140ofwhichareinCalifornia. Theotherstatesare,,Massachusetts,Oregon,andWashington.The specialtysegmentisdividedintohomedelivery,grocerystores,restaurantandfoodservice companies,andofficeaccounts.Peet’smaincompetitorsareFarmerBros.Co.,Green

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea MountainCoffeeRoasters,Inc,KraftFoods,Inc.,Procter&GambleCompany,and StarbucksCompany. Initsstores,Peet’sensuresthebrewingofcoffeeevery30minutes,usingbeansonlywithin 10daysofroasting,andneverre-steamingtheirmilk.Peet’sCoffeeandTeahasattracteda largegroupofloyalfollowerswhonamethemselves“Peetnicks.”TheoriginalPeetnicks weredevoteesatthefirststoreonVineStreet,butthetermhasnowevolvedtorepresent anycustomerthatispassionateaboutqualitycoffeeandtea.Peet’sCoffeeoffersmany differentsignatureblendsincluding:ArabianMocha-Java,MajorDickason’sBlend,House Blend,FrenchRoast,GaiaOrganicBlend,AnniversaryBlend,Forte,Sumatra, GarudaBlend,andFairTradeBlend.Peet’sCoffeestoresofferacoffeeoftheday,caféau lait,icedcoffee,Peet’stogo,espresso,icedtea,teabags,looseleaftea,blended drinks,andbakedgoods.Peet’sstoresalsoprovidefreewirelessinternetfor2hoursforits customers. Peet’salsohasitscoffeeavailableingrocerystoresaroundthecountryalthoughstillmainly concentratedinCalifornia.IntheBayArea,Peet’shas45.9%ofthemarketshareofspecialty coffee.IthasrecentlyaddeditsproductsingrocerylocationsinFlorida,NewYork,and SouthCarolina.Peet’sCoffeebagsitsbeanswithinanhourofroastingandthenpersonally deliveredtothegrocerystore.ThecompanyhasnowdevelopedaDirectStoreDelivery (DSD)distributiontocatertodeliverycustomers.GrocerystoresthatprovidePeet’scoffee includeAlbertson’s,Von’s,Ralph’s,WholeFood’s,Safeway,Sprout’s,Smith’s,Raley’s,and Kroger.Peet’smostpopularsoldblendsingrocerystoresareMajorDickason’sBlend, DecafMajorDickason’sBlend,FrenchRoast,DecafFrenchRoast,HouseBlend,andDecaf HouseBlend. Peet’salsooffersspecialofficecoffeeprogramforsmallandlargebusinesses.Forthese businesses,theyprovidetheirfreshcoffeeandthermalbrewingequipment.Officeperks includefreeshippingwithamonthlyongoingrecurringorderof6ormorepoundsofPeet’s. Peet’scanalsobeeasilyorderedforregularlyscheduleddeliveryontheirwebsite, www.peets.com .Inthefoodserviceandofficesegment,thecompanyworkstoexpandits accountbaseanddistributionofitsproductsthroughlicensingand“weproudlybrew”

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea (WPB)accounts.InWPBaccountsthecompanysuppliesequipmentandproductstobrew andsell.Inlicensingaccounts,thecompanylicensesaPeet’sstoreinanotherlocationsuch asanairportorcollegecampus. OtherPeet’sperksincludePeetniksmembershipforcustomerswithrecurringbusiness orders.Aslongasacustomerhasanactiveongoingdeliveryorder,theyreceive50% shippingdiscount,100%satisfactionguarantee,aphonenumberoftheirowntomanage theirdeliveries,andabilitytomanagetheirorderonline.Thewebsitealsonowhasaspecial offeringforcustomersthatjoinPeetniksgetafreepoundofAnniversaryBlendcoffee.The Peetniksmembershipcomeswithtwodifferentrecurringdeliveryoptions:sameitem,in whichthecustomerreceivesthesameitemeverytime,anddifferentitems,inwhichthe customerchoosesavarietyoftobesentindifferentshipments.Peet’sofficecoffee alsooffersasimilarchoicebetweensameitemdeliveryorcustomitemdelivery.Peet’salso hasspecialadvantagesgiveninthePeet’scard,are-loadabledebitcardthatcanbeusedat anyPeet’sstoreorwithonlinepurchases.Thecardcanalsobepurchasedasagiftalongwith theelectronicgiftcertificatesthatgodirectlytotherecipient’semailinbox. Competitive Analysis

FORCE STRATEGIC SI GNIFICANCE InternalRivalry High SupplierPower Low BuyerPower Low EntryandExit Medium Substitutes High Complements Medium

Internal Rivalry Thereismuchrivalryinthespecialtycoffeeindustry,butinsteadofpriceittendstodepend moreonqualityandelitismespeciallywithitshigh-endcustomers.Withcoffeebecoming suchastapleintheaverageAmericandiet,pricematterslessaspeoplearewillingtopayfor theirdailycoffee,especiallyinretailstores.

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Peet’smarketshareinspecialtycoffeeisconstantlyunderpressure.Inretailcoffee,Peet’s hasmanyrivalsincludingsmalllocal“momandpop”stores.Thesestorescanofferasimilar experienceofpremiumcoffeeandacomfortableenvironment.Coffeehousesarenow becomingubiquitousinAmericasociety,creatingmorecompetitionforPeet’scoffeestores. AlthoughthesesmallcoffeehousesdonotcompetewithPeet’sonanationallevel,local competitioncanreduceprofitmarginssincetheyappealtomanyofthesameconsumers. Grocerysalesaredifferentbecausethereisagreatpricedifferencebetweeninstantand specialtycoffees,whicharebothofferedatmoststores.Itisalsomucheasierforconsumers todirectlycomparepriceswhentheyhavemanyoptionsdirectlyavailabletothem. Peet’srivalrycanalsobethoughtofregionally.Inthewestcoast,itsmaincompetitoris CoffeeBean&TeaLeaf,butnationallyPeet’scompeteswithStarbucks,GreenMountain, DunkinDonuts,McDonalds,andotherfastfoodstoresnowofferingcoffee.Starbuckscan beconsideredtobethenaturalleaderinthespecialtycoffeeindustry,buttheirroleappears tobechangingfromanelitecompanytoafastfoodchain.NowStarbucksfindthemselves competingmorewithMcDonald’s.Thisleavesagapinthespecialtycoffeeindustrythat Peet’sandothercoffeeproducershaveattemptedtofill.Inthespecialtycoffeeindustryfor some“elite”coffeedrinkerstherecanbehighproductdifferentiation.Inotherwords,these peoplehavestrictopinionsaboutthebestcoffee,developingareputation.Moreandmore peoplearetryingtobecomeeliteintheircoffeetastessinceitisviewedaspopularin modernculture. However,forthemajorityofpeopleintoday’seconomy,apricechangeincoffeecan significantlychangetheirbrandpreference,especiallyiftheyhaven’tformedaloyaltytoa specificbrand.Sincecoffeeproductionhaslowmarginalcosts,itcanbeeasyforproducers tocuttheirpricestocreatemorecoffeesales.ThisiscurrentlywhatStarbucksistryingto do.However,thiscanbedangerousforthecompany,andcancausecompetitivepricecuts throughouttheindustry.Thusthereismuchinternalcompetitionthatcomesfromthe specialtycoffeemarketduemostlytothelargediversityandnumberofstores.

Supplier Power

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Suppliersareratherlimitedintheirlocationandcapabilitiesinthespecialtycoffeemarket. Peet’sCoffeemustpursuecontractswithfarmers,transporters,andbrewersfortheirinputs ofcoffeebeansandmilk.Theseinputmarketshavetheirpricesdeterminedbysupplyand demand.Soifthepriceofinputschanges,Peet’scansubstitutetoanothersupplierbecause ofthecompetitivenatureofthemarket.However,thisismoreunlikelysincePeet’salready hasbuiltarelationshipandreputationespeciallywiththeirexpertbrewersandfarmers,since thecompanypridesitselfonitsquality.ItismostlikelythatPeet’swillnotbreakthe contractsithas,butwithsignificantchangesinprices,itisapossibility.ThusPeet’shasmost ofthepowerinthismarket.

Buyer Power ThepriceatwhichPeet’ssellstheircoffeeisbaseduponthepriceelasticityofdemandand othercompetitor’sprices.SincePeet’sreputationisbasedonquality,theyareabletosellata higherpricethanmostrivals,buttheystillliketokeeptheircoffeetobeconsidered affordable.Manytimesbuyershavetheirownfavoritecoffeeduetotastepreferencesand availability.Thismakesitlesslikelytheywillchangetheirfavoredcoffee.However,itisquite easyinthecoffeemarkettoswitchyourbrandwhenthepricechanges,especiallyingrocery stores.Alsogroceryretailerscanswitchtheirspecialtycoffeesupplierforanother,and althoughthisisalittlemoredifficultofaprocess,theyhaveasubstantialbargainingpower. Butbecausetherearemanyspecialtycoffeeconsumersandnotmanywellknownspecialty coffeeproducers,consumersdonothavethesametypeofpowertheywouldhaveinother industries.. Entry and Exit Thereissomepreventionofnewentrantsintothespecialtycoffeemarketfromhavingto developtheirownproductthatrivalswellknownproducerssuchasPeet’sCoffeeor Starbuck’s.However,manytimessmallcoffeeshopsareabletoestablishalocalfanbaseand dothisbybrewingtheirowncoffeeorthatofotherspecialtycoffeemakers.Thustheyare abletofindamarketsharelocally.Sinceinputgoodsarebasicallythesameforawell establishedcoffeebrandornewlystartingstoresandtheindustrylackshightechnology, barrierstoentryislimited.Alsocoffeestoresdonotrequirealargeamountoffloorspace. Soindividualslookforanuntappedspacetostarttheirownstore.However,someofthese “momandpop”storesfailwithinthefirstthreeyearslike2/3ofsmallbusinessessincethey April2009 Page10

Peet’s Coffee & Tea findtheycan’tcompetewiththelargercoffeeretailers.Thegrocerycoffeemarketisharder toentersinceitrequiresmoreresourcesandmorebrandnameaccountabilityforconsumers. Storeswillonlybuycoffeeifithasareputationthattheyknowthereconsumerswillbuy. Grocerysalesalsorequiresomesortofgrocerydeliveryandtransportationservice.Thus besidesthelocalthreatofentryfrom“momandpop”stores,Peet’sCoffeedoesnotface anythreatfromentryandexitnationally.

Substitutes

Intermsofbeverages,thereisawidevarietyofsubstitutesforcoffeeincludingenergy drinks,smoothies,tea,sodadrinks,andorangejuice.Alloftheseareconsideredeither breakfastorenergydrinksandthuscanreplacecoffee.However,themajorityofcoffee drinkerswouldnotsubstituteawayfromcoffeesincetheyareadedicatedgroupof followers.Theclosestsubstitutewouldprobablybetea,andPeet’soffersthis,evenintheir name,Peet’sCoffeeandTea.Thebiggestsubstituteofretailcoffeewouldprobablybehome productionwhichismuchcheaper,andeveninthiscase,Peet’ssellstheircoffeeinawide varietyofgrocerystores.Infact,theirgrocerysalesareprobablywhattheyaremostknown fornationallyandgeneratethemostprofit.Sothecompanyhasdoneagoodjobof protectingitselffromthreatsfromsubstitutesbywideningtheirchannelsofdistribution Thereisavarietyofsubstituteproductsinthespecialtycoffeeindustrydependingonthe venue.Inretail,largercoffeechainssuchasStarbucks,CaribouCoffee,competewithPeet’s. Ingrocerysales,Peet’shaslesscompetition.Therearelowendbrandsofinstantcoffeesuch asoreventhegrocer’sownbrand.Sincethisischeaperthanspecialtycoffeeitmight begintorivalitespeciallywithaweakeconomy.However,sincetheseinstantcoffee productsarenolongeraspopularinmodernculture,theyarebecominglessofasubstitute product.Also,ifoneconsidersthesocialaspectofdrinkingcoffee,asubstitutewouldalso bealcoholicdrinks. However,generallythemostthreatisfromotherspecialtycoffeeproducerssuchas Starbucks.McDonaldsandDunkinDonutsalsocompetetosomelevel,buthavethe negativeconnotationascheapandnotelite,sothisprobablydoesn’tappealtoPeet’s

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea customerbase.Theseplacescanofferawarmbreakfast,whichPeet’sCoffeecannot. Starbucksisbeginningtoinfiltratethismarketwithbeginningtoselltheirbeansandinstant coffeeingrocerystores.However,nowthatStarbuckshasbecomesoubiquitousitis beginningtolooseitseliteappealandcoffeeproducerssuchasPeet’s.Thuscoffee’smain formofsubstitutioncomesintearelatedbeveragesandhomecreatedcoffeewhichareboth offeredinPeet’s.

Complements Complementsinthespecialtycoffeeindustryincludethesaleofpastriesandotherbreakfast foods.TheattractivenessofthesefoodscouldhelpPeet’ssalesifpeoplewanttobuyfood withtheircoffee.Duetocurrenthealthtrends,breakfastisbecomingamorepopularand promotedmealsothiscouldhelpPeet’s.However,ifPeet’sbreakfastpastriesareclassified asunhealthy,thiscouldhurtPeet’ssales. Starbuckshastriedtoappealtotheirconsumersbyincludinghotbreakfastfoodssuchas oatmealandeggsintotheirmenu.Starbuckshasperformedthisadditiontocompetewith biggerfastfoodchainssuchasMcDonald’sthatoffertheseitemstogether.However, Starbuck’sadditionhasproducedlessthandesiredresults,andthesefooditemsmakeup suchasmallportionofPeet’ssalesthattheyshouldnotbepursuedtoacertainextent.Thus, complementstonotholdasmuchofathreattoPeet’ssincemosttheirconsumersjustcare aboutthequalityofcoffee.

SWOT

Strengths o Awideproductline(coffee,beverages,teaandpastries) o Areasonablywell-knownbrandandimageinCaliforniaandthePacificNorthwest o Successindifferentiatingitscoffees o ValueofthePeet’sexperience o Thehighlevelsofsalesandequipmentservicesupport o Agoodstrategythatisbeingwell-managed

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea o Thecompany’sstrongemphasisonsocialresponsibility(whichenhancestheappeal ofitscoffeestobuyerswithsimilarsocialconsciousness)

Weaknesses o Asmall,one-productcompany—whichputsitataseriousdisadvantagein bargainingwithsupermarketchainsforfavorableshelfspacewherethereisno monetaryswitchingcostsforcustomers o BrandnameisrelativelyunknowncomparedtoStarbucksandbrandsofmajor coffeemarketers o MuchsmallerfinancialandmarketingresourcesthanStarbucksandmajorcoffee marketers

Opportunities o Expansionintostateswhereithaslowmarketpenetration(Mid-WestandEast Coast) o ReplaceStarbucksasthepremiumspecialtycoffeeprovider o Roomtocompeteonmultiplefrontssuchasqualityandprice Threats o Aslowdowninthesalesgrowthofpremiumcoffees(consumerinterestinspecialty coffeebeginstowane) o Unfavorableeconomicconditionslowerdemandforexpensivebeverages o Themajorcoffeemarketersmakeabigpushtomaketheirpremiumcoffeebrands dominantinthewholesalechannel o Higherpricesforpremiumcoffeebean o Overallhighercommoditycosts

Financial Analysis

Overview

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Infiscalyear2009thecompanyreportedrevenuesofUSD249.39million,anincreaseof 18.48%fromthepreviousyear.OperatingprofitwasUSD11.61millionwhichincreased 15.52%over2006.Infiscal2009Peet’sROEwas7.67%,ROAwas6.23%,P/Eratiowas 27.69,EarningsperSharewas.8,andtheoperatingprofitmarginwas6.19%. AlargefinancialconcernforPeet’sCoffeeiswhethertherecentturmoiloftheUnitedStates economyhasmadeitdifficultforconsumerstojustifypaying$4ormoreforacupofcoffee inthemorning.Furthermore,increasingcoffeebeanpricesinhibittheperformanceofthe entireindustry.AcloserlookatthefinancialstatementsofPeet’s,andacomparisontoone ofitscompetitors,Starbuckswillshedsomelightontheseproblemsandhelpidentifysome ofthestrengthsandweaknessesofthecompany.Peet’s2009ROEof7.76%ishigherthan Starbuck’s7.10%.ThismeansthatPeet’sisslightlybetteratgeneratingprofitswiththe moneyinvestedbyshareholders.Peet’salsohasamuchhigheroperatingprofitmarginof 6.19%comparedtoStarbuck’s5.24%andahigherquarterlyrevenuegrowthof11.6% comparedtoStarbuck’sdeclineof-5.5%.AlthoughStarbuck’sisamuchlargercompany (lastyear’snetincomewas171.70McomparedtoPeet’s11.16M),Peet’sCoffeeseemstobe doingmuchbetteratturningprofits.Comparedtoanotherspecialtycoffeecompany,Green Mountain,Peet’sperformedworseinfiscal2009.ThisisperhapsduetothefactthatGreen MountainCoffeeRoastersisstrictlyfocusedinthegrocerybusiness,whichiscurrentlythe mostsuccessful,whilePeet’sCoffeeattemptstomanagemanydifferentchannelsof distribution.

Market Operating Qtr Rev. Cap P/B EPS P/E ROE ROA Margin Growth Peet's 286.86M 1.98 0.8 27.69 7.67% 6.23% 6.19% 11.60% Starbuck's 8.82B 3.28 0.23 51.72 7.10% 6.08% 5.24% -5.50% Green Mountain 1.31B 7.9 1.32 40.4 25.61% 8.22% 7.60% 55.80%

Peet’sisalsoperformingsignificantlybetterinthestockmarket.Inthelast52weeksPEET

(Nasdaq)hasrangedfrom$17.79-29.75,whileStarbuck’shasbeentradingfrom$7.06-

18.56inthelast52weeks.PerhapsthelargestfinancialproblemtowhichStarbucksowesits decliningstockpriceistheslowdowninitssamestoresales,whichhaveexperienced

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea diminishedgrowthforsometime.ItisquitepossiblethatStarbuck’saggressivestore expansionhasledtocannibalization.Starbuck’scompanyoperatedretailstoreshavenearly doubledsince2003.Duringsuchexpansion,revenuegrowthratescanonlybemaintainedif transactionsarehigheratthenewlocationsthantheamountthatwaslostfromexisting stores.Inthepastyear,PEEThasbothover-performedSBUXandtheS&P500,as evidencedbythegraphbelow.Despiterisingcoffeepricesandeconomicdownturn,

Starbucks’problemsarerootedindecliningsame-storesales,whichmayhaveother contributorssuchascannibalizationfromaggressivestoreexpansion.ThisiswherePeet’s mightbeabletocomeinandtaketheexistingmarketsharethatStarbuck’shaslostfrom theirmistakes.

Profitability and Growth In2007netrevenueincreased18.5%fromcontinuedexpansionofretailandspecialtysales to$249.39million.Operatingprofitofthecompanywas$11.61millionduringfiscalyear 2007,representinga15.5%over2006.Peet’shastworeportablesegments:retailstores, whichcontributedto67.5%oftotalrevenuesandspecialtysales,whichcontributed32.5% oftotalrevenuesinfiscal2007.In2007,salesofwholebeansincreased14%to$134.1 millionandsalesfrombeveragesandpastriesincreased24.1%to$115.3million.Intheretail

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea segment,netrevenuesincreased19.1%from2006asaresultfromincreasedsalesfrom30 newstoresthatopenedin2007.Inretail,salesofwholebeancoffeeincreased8.1%while salesofbeveragesandpastriesincreased24.9%.Theslowergrowthofwholebeancoffeeis duetothecannibalizationofwholebeansalesinretailstoresduetotheirincreased availabilityingrocerystores. Inspecialtysalessegment,netrevenueincreased17.2%from2006.This$11.9million increaseconsistsof$7.4millionincreaseingrocerysales,a$1.2millionincreaseinhome deliverysales,anda$3.2millionincreaseinfoodserviceandofficesales.Grocerysaleshad thehighestincreaseof21.6%duetotheiradditionof1,400newgrocerystoresin2007.This bringsthenumberofgrocerystoresthatsellPeet’sproductsto5,800.Netrevenuetothe homedeliverychannelgrew7.0%comparedto2006duetospecialofferingstoexisting customers.Inaddition,foodserviceandofficecoffeerevenueincreased18.7%duetoefforts toexpanddistributorshipsandlicensedpartners. Net Revenue of Specialty Sales (dollars in thousands) 2007 2006 Increase Percentage Grocery $ 41,879 $ 34,440 $ 7,439 21.60% Foodse rvice and office 20,430 17,211 3,219 18.70% Home delivery 18,688 17,465 1,223 7.00%

Total specialty $ 80,997 $ 69,116 $ 11,881 17.20%

Costofsalesandrelatedoccupancyexpensesconsistingofproductcosts,manufacturing costs,andrentincreasedfrom47.0%in2006to47.5%in2007,asapercentoftotalnet revenue.Thisincreasewasdrivenbyanincreaseofoccupancyasapercentofnetrevenue. Occupancyincreasedapproximately0.5%comparedto2006duetotheimpactofopening newstores,whichhadlowersaleslevelthanpreviousstores.Operatingexpensesconsistof bothretailstoreandspecialtyoperatingcosts,suchasemployeelaborandbenefits,repairs andmaintenance,supplies,training,andtravel.Operatingexpensesasapercentofnet revenuefor2007increased0.1%to34.4%from2006.Theincreasewasprimarilyduetoa 1.2%increasefromopening55newstoresinthelasttwoyears.Generalandadministrative expensesin2007were$22.7million,or9.1%ofnetrevenue,comparedto$20.6million,or 9.8%for2006.Thedecreaseinexpensesasapercentofnetrevenueisprimarilydueto highernetrevenue.

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Inthefourthquarterof2008,Peet’sCoffeeandTeawashadanEPSof$.29,betterthanthe consensusof$.28.PEETwasabletobeat4Q08throughbelttighteninginthefaceof challenges.Peet’sEPSfortheyearwas.8.Overshadowingthissuccessisbelievedtobethe grocerychannelinwhichPEEThasplaceditsemphasisoverthepasttwoyears.Revenues of$79.1millionwaslowerthanexpectedfromlowermerchandisesalesbutitwasalso helpedwitha20%growthinspecialtysalesinthegrocerychannel.PEETisslowinggrowth ofitscoffeeshopsto10%from17.5%andhasinsteadturnedtogrowingthehighermargin specialtybusiness.Thefirstquarterof2009hasanexpectedEPSof$.17-.19anda2009EPS of$.94to$1.00.Peet’sEPSisexpectedtogrownextyearduetosolidgrocerychannel growthasthecompanyaddedalmost50%ofstoresin2008througheastcoastexpansion. However,thechallengesinthenextquarterincludeapossibletradedowntomainstream coffeeduetotheeconomicenvironmentandPeet’srecentstrategyIn2009Peet’shas expectedrevenueof$318.6million. Liquidity

AsofDecember28,2008,Peet’sCoffeehad$4.7millionincashandcashequivalents and$8.6millioninshort-termmarketablesecuritiesforatotalof$13.3million.Working capitalwas$36.4millionasofDecember28,2008comparedto$38.4millionat December30,2007.Netcashprovidedbyoperationswas$25.4millionin2008comparedto $20.1millionin2007.Operatingcashflowswerepositivelyimpactedin2008bynetincome.

Netcashusedininvestingactivitieswas$19.0millionin2008.During2008,maturities netofpurchasestotaled$6.9millionasPeet’susedfundstoinvestinpropertyand equipmentandthepurchaseoftheircommonstock.Cashpaidforpropertyandequipment totaling$25.9millionincluded:$13.4milliontobuildnewstoresandremodelexistingones, $2.3millionusedforfoodservicekiosksandgrocerydisplays,$1.9millionusedforadditional machineryforthenewroastingfacility,$3.9millionusedforconversionofPeet’sprevious roastingfacilityintoofficespace,and$4.4millionusedforinformationtechnologysupport systems.

April2009 Page17

Peet’s Coffee & Tea The2009capitalexpendituresareexpectedtobebetween$14.0and$16.0million. Approximately$8.5millionisexpectedtobeusedfortheopeningofabout10newretail storesandforremodelingandtoexistingstores.Approximately$2.5millionisexpectedto beincurredforthedesignanddevelopmentofanewenterpriseresourceplanningsystem (ERP).

ThefollowingtablesummarizestheCompany’scontractualobligationsandthetiming ofsuchcommitmentsthatareexpectedtohaveaneffectontheCompany’sliquidityand capitalrequirementsinfutureperiodsasofDecember2008:

Payments Due by Period (in thousands) Less than After 5 Contract ual obligations Total 1 year 1-3 4-5 years years years Equipment operating leases $ 387 $ 295 $ 92 $ - $ - Retail store operating leases (1) 102,666 14,927 27,747 25,032 34,960 Fixed -price coffee p urchase 37,765 33,609 4,156 - - commitments Not -yet -priced coffee commitments 384 305 79 - - Development commitments (2) 437 437 - - -

Tota l contractual cash obligations $ 141,639 $ 49,573 $ 32,074 $ 25,032 $ 34,960

Strategic Recommendations

ThestrategicframeworkforPeet’scoffeecanbedividedintothreesections:competitive differentiation,distributionchannels,andretaillocation.Peet’soverallstrategycanthenbe dividedintoshorttermwhichisdependentontheweaknessofthecurrenteconomy,and longterm,inwhichexpansionshouldbeconsidered. Fortheircompetitivestrategy,Peet’sbiggestgoalistobeabletodifferentiatethemselves fromtheirbiggestcompetitioninStarbucks.Starbuckshascurrentlyengagedinexpansionin everyaspect.Theynowhavebranchedoutintohotbreakfast,awidevarietyof individualisticdrinks,andinstantcoffeenowsoldingrocerystores.Byhavingretailstoresin multiplelocations,Starbucksisnowbecomingmoreofafastfoodchainandconsidersits

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea maincompetitortobeMcDonald’sAtthesametime,addingsomevarietytotheir menucouldbehelpful,ascustomersareusedtotheabilityofStarbuckstomakeanydrink theywant,andthishasbeensuccessful.However,addingtoomanydrinkscouldbe consideredconfusingtoaloyalPeet’scustomersothisadviceshouldbetakenwith discretion.Alongwiththis,Peet’sshouldtrytoadvertisethemselvesassellinganexperience. Starbuckscaterstobusinesspeoplewhowanttogetinandoutwiththeirdailycoffee.If Peet’sbringsinthecoffeehouseexperienceaspect,thiswouldcatertoaseparategroupof specialtycoffeecustomerswhowanttoenjoytheirbeverageandtheirbuyingprocess,and areevenwillingtopaymoreforthebettercustomerservice. IntermsofPeet’sstrategyfordistributionchannels,itseemsasnowtheyarefocusedin manydifferentaspectsofthespecialtycoffeebusiness.Theirchannelsinclude:retail, grocery,officeandfoodservice,andhomedelivery.IbelievethatPeet’sneedstofocusthe companyonthosedistributionchannelsthatarethemostprofitable,whichoverthelastfew yearshavebeenretailandgrocery.Withsomanychannels,theycannotspecializeinany area.IbelievethatPeet’sneedstohaveasetgoalforwhatkindofcompanytheyarelooking tobecome.Alsoforbrandrecognition,itwouldbehelpfultobeassociatedwithamain channelofdistribution;justlikeStarbuck’sisknownforitsretailsstoresorFolger’sis knownfortheiravailabilityingrocerystores.SincePeet’sfoodservice/officeandhome deliverychannelsrepresentthesmallestproportionofnetsalesandhaveexperiencedthe leastamountofgrowth,Ithinkitwouldbeprofitabletoeitherscalebackonthese operationsoreventuallycutthemoutoftheirbusinessmodelentirely.Theretailsegment representsthelargestproportionofsalesbutthegrocerysegmentisthefastestgrowingso thesetwoseemvitalforthecompany’sexistence.However,becauseoftheeconomiccrisis, Peet’sneedstoanalyzethecurrentstatusoftheirretailandgrocerystorelocations.Ifanyof theseappeartohavedeclininggrowthinsalesorarenotoperatingataprofit,theyshould lookintogivinguptheirownership.Theyshouldperformthisanalysisbeforetheylookinto anyfutureexpansion.Inthenextyear,Peet’sdoesnotseemtobeopeningtoomanystores andIbelievethisisagoodidea.Retailstoresaremoreofariskybusinessbecausethey requiresuchhighfixedcosts.

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Intermsoflocationexpansion,thisseemslikeagoodlongtermgoalforPeet’sCoffee,butI don’tthinkthisistheyearforcompanyexpansionespeciallyretailasconsumersarecutting backspendingasaresultoftheeconomicrecession.AtthesametimethatPeet’scompetes withStarbucksfortheirmarketshare,pursuingthesamestrategyofretailexpansioncould beconsidereddangerous.Byhavingnumerousstores,Starbuckshascannibalizedtheir profitabilityofmanyoftheirexistingstores.Peet’sneedstodifferentiatethemselvesfrom Starbucksandsoneedstoavoidthisstrategyofexcessiveexpansionandmarketdomination. IbelievethatthereexistsaneventualmarketintheEastCoast,andthatawaytopenetrate thismarketwouldbethroughthegrocerystoresinsteadofretail.Grocerystoresrequirevery littlecapitalandinvestmentbutareabletoreachalargeamountofpeople.Thiswaythey couldexposeshopperstotheirbrandnamewithoutmanycosts.Theeastcoastissomewhat loyaltoDunkinDonutsalreadyastheirgrocerycoffeebrand,butIbelieveifitPeet’swere toselectivelychoosewhichgrocerystoresinwhichtheirproductswereavailabletheycould besuccessful.IbelievethatstoreswhicharealreadyknownashigherendsuchasWhole Foodswouldbesuccessfulbecausetheyarereachingouttoadifferentkindofconsumer, onethatchoosesqualityofaproductoverprice.IfPeet’sbecomessuccessfulinthespecialty coffeegrocerychannelintheEastCoast,thenIbelievetheycouldlookataddingretail storesaswellthere.

References www.peets.com http://investor.peets.com www.starbucks.com Peet’sAnnual10-KReport2008 Peet’s2009ProxyStatement GlobalMarketsDirect:Peet’sCoffee&Tea,Inc.-FinancialAnalysisReview Oppenheimer&Co:Peet’sCoffee&TeaInc.QuarterlyUpdate CowenandCompany:Peet’sCoffee&Tea

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Appendix

PEET'S COFFEE & TEA, INC.

CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS

(In thousands, except share amounts)

December 28, December 30, 2008 2007 ASSETS

Current assets Cash and cash equivalents $ 4,719 $ 15,312 Short-term marketable securities 8,600 7,932 Accounts receivable, net 11,924 8,287 Inventories 26,124 24,483 Deferred income taxes-current 2,922 2,950 Prepaid expenses and other 7,193 4,285

Total current assets 61,482 63,249 Long-term marketable securities - 7,831 Property, plant and equipment, net 107,914 99,231 Deferred income taxes-non current 3,059 3,353 Other assets, net 3,897 3,883

Total assets $ 176,352 $ 177,547

LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY

Current liabilities Accounts payable and other accrued liabilities $ 9,858 $ 10,104 Accrued compensation and benefits 8,852 8,909 Deferred revenue 6,350 5,856

Total current liabilities 25,060 24,869 Deferred lease credits 6,645 4,924 Other long-term liabilities 740 501

Total liabilities 32,445 30,294 Shareholders' equity Common stock, no par value; authorized 50,000,000 shares; issued and outstanding:13,174,000 and 13,932,000 shares 90,123 104,616 Accumulated other comprehensive income 34 52 Retained earnings 53,750 42,585

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Total shareholders' equity 143,907 147,253

Total liabilities and shareholders' equity $ 176,352 $ 177,547

PEET'S COFFEE & TEA, INC.

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY

(In thousands)

Common Accumulated Stock Other Total Shares Retained Comprehensive Shareholders' Comprehensive Outstanding Amount Earnings Income/Loss Equity Income Balance at January 1, 2006 13,902 $ 100,562 $ 26,392 $ (76) $ 126,878 Stock options exercised, including tax benefit 160 3,531 3,531 Stock sold in Employee Stock Purchase Program 44 1,065 1,065 Stock-based compensation 4,022 4,022 Stock purchased in accordance with share purchase program (590) (15,934) (15,934) Net unrealized gain on marketable securities, net of tax of $59 61 61 $ 61 Net income 7,816 7,816 7,816

Balance at December 31, 2006 13,516 $ 93,246 $ 34,208 $ (15) $ 127,439 $ 7,877

Stock options exercised, including tax benefit 391 8,026 8,026 Stock sold in Employee Stock Purchase Program 25 530 530 Stock-based compensation 2,814 2,814 Net unrealized gain on marketable securities, net of tax of $46 67 67 $ 67 Net income 8,377 8,377 8,377

Balance at December 30, 2007 13,932 $ 104,616 $ 42,585 $ 52 $ 147,253 $ 8,444

Stock options exercised, including tax benefit 133 2,484 2,484 Stock sold in Employee

April2009 Page22

Peet’s Coffee & Tea Stock Purchase Program 50 939 939 Stock-based compensation 2,711 2,711 Stock purchased in accordance with share purchase program (941) (20,627) (20,627) Net unrealized gain on marketable securities, net of tax of $12 (18) (18) $ (18) Net income 11,165 11,165 11,165

Balance at December 28, 2008 13,174 $ 90,123 $ 53,750 $ 34 $ 143,907 $ 11,147

PEET 'S COFFEE & TEA, INC.

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME

(In thousands, except per share amounts)

2008 2007 2006 Retail stores $ 187,719 $ 168,392 $ 141,377 Specialty sales 97,103 80,997 69,116

Net revenue 284,822 249,389 210,493 Cost of sales and related occupancy expenses 133,537 118,389 98,928 Operating expenses 98,844 85,800 72,272 General and administrative expenses 22,519 22,682 20,634 Depreciation and amortization expenses 12,921 10,912 8,609

Total costs and expenses from operations 267,821 237,783 200,443

Income from operations 17,001 11,606 10,050 Interest income 726 1,446 2,456

Income before income taxes 17,727 13,052 12,506 Income tax provision 6,562 4,675 4,690

Net income $ 11,165 $ 8,377 $ 7,816

Net income per share: Basic $ 0.81 $ 0.61 $ 0.57 Diluted $ 0.80 $ 0.59 $ 0.55 Shares used in calculation of net income per share: Basic 13,723 13,724 13,733 Diluted 13,997 14,120 14,202

April2009 Page23

Peet’s Coffee & Tea

PEET'S COFFEE & TEA, INC.

CONSOLIDAT ED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS

(In thousands)

2008 2007 2006 Cash flows from operating activities: Net income $ 11,165 $ 8,377 $ 7,816 Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided by operating activities: Depreciation and amortization 15,113 12,861 10,244 Amortization of interest purchased 193 242 415 Stock-based compensation 2,711 2,814 4,022 Excess tax benefit from exercise of stock options (462) (1,350) (724) Tax benefit from exercise of stock options 285 1,234 708 Loss on disposition of assets and asset impairment 900 494 288 Deferred income taxes 322 (3,100) (3,495) Changes in other assets and liabilities: Accounts receivable, net (3,637) (1,449) (1,686) Inventories (1,641) (4,950) (2,532) Prepaid expenses and other current assets (2,908) (433) (480) Other assets, net (21) (45) (244) Accounts payable, accrued liabilities and deferred revenue 1,464 3,519 2,473 Deferred lease credits and other long-term liabilities 1,960 1,919 969

Net cash provided by operating activities 25,444 20,133 17,774

Cash flows from investing activities: Purchases of property, plant and equipment (25,930) (30,824) (44,443) Proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment 67 23 28 Changes in restricted investments (87) - 1,500 Proceeds from sales and maturities of marketable securities 7,857 31,304 49,888 Purchases of marketable securities (917) (21,688) (26,356)

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Peet’s Coffee & Tea Net cash used in investing activities (19,010) (21,185) (19,383)

Cash flows from financing activities: Net proceeds from issuance of common stock 3,138 7,322 3,888 Purchase of common stock (20,627) - (15,934) Excess tax benefit from exercise of stock options 462 1,350 724

Net cash (used in)/provided by financing activities (17,027) 8,672 (11,322)

(Decrease)/increase in cash and cash equivalents (10,593) 7,620 (12,931) Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period 15,312 7,692 20,623

Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 4,719 $ 15,312 $ 7,692

Non-cash investing activities: Capital expenditures incurred, but not yet paid $ 734 $ 1,995 $ 2,751 Other cash flow information: Cash paid for income taxes 8,293 6,761 7,890

April2009 Page25