Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

First Edition About Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network

What we do CTPN brings together strategic leaders, About us in numbers practitioners and academics to inform city-level policies and practices that build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism. Member6 cities Resilience12 leaders

Why we do it The threat from terrorism has not diminished, rather it has become more complex. Cities that develop strategic arrangements and Academic7 partners Independent7 experts explore policy design and implementation in an integrated manner can use this as a lever in developing resilience against terrorism.

How we do it CTPN promotes dialogue, the sharing of Member cities practices and experiences, and provides a means of developing new approaches to counter terrorism, as well as the strategic preparedness and response arrangements of cities in this context.

Barcelona Greater Manchester

Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 is published by Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN).

Lead Author ©GLA © Jean-Baptiste Gurliat Natalia Proctor, Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network Project Officer, London Resilience Group London Paris Lead Academic Dr Timothy Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Team, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich

Independent Reviewers Rebecca Skillet, Head of Strong Cities Network, Institute for Strategic Dialogue Emily Winterbotham, Senior Research Fellow in the National Security and Resilience programme, Royal United Service Institute John White, Head of Crisis Preparation, S-RM Rotterdam Stockholm Welcome to CTPN’s 1 Executive Summary 02 2 Introduction 04 first edition report on 3 Terminology 05 Anti-Radicalisation. 4 Scope and Approach 07

5 Literature Review 08 In this report you will learn 5.1 Causal Factors and about exciting and innovative the Radicalisation Process 08 5.2 Social Capital and initiatives from other cities Violent Extremism 09 across the globe and be 5.3 Isolation and Polarisation as Key Vulnerability Factors 10 presented with strategic 5.4 Matching Policy to recommendations to consider Social Complexity 11 for your own city. 6 Responses to Radicalisation 14 6.1 Barcelona 15 6.2 Greater Manchester 17 6.3 London 17 6.4 Paris 21 6.5 Rotterdam 21 6.6 Stockholm 24

7 Key Themes 28 7.1 Involving Communities in Integration Initiatives 28 7.2 Considering the Non-Minority Viewpoint 30 7.3 Displacement of Issues 32 7.4 Mapping Social Sentiment 34 7.5 The Unintended Consequences of Policies 36 7.6 Designing Policy Holistically 38 7.7 Normalising the Discussion 38 7.8 Multi-Agency Working 40 7.9 Information-Sharing 41 7.10 A Consensus of Terminology 42

8 Conclusion 44 9 Appendix 1: The Resilience Framework 46 10 Acknowledgements 47 11 Endnotes 48

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 1 1 Executive Summary

The complex and changing nature of terrorism requires innovative and collaborative solutions at a city-level. Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN) enables cities to work together across borders to counter terrorism through the holistic lens of preparedness and resilience.

As a part of this, five first edition reports have been developed by Involve communities in the integration CTPN to dive into pertinent areas process from the start of counter terrorism. They examine current counter terrorism initiatives Challenge inaccurate perceptions from across the globe, delve into and promote credible voices to ease academic discussions, share community tensions learning and analysis, and offer strategic leaders and policy-makers Consider the non-minority viewpoint by recommendations that aim to build engaging all members of society resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism. Map social sentiment to better understand community grievances and This report focuses on the challenge inform policy development of radicalisation and has identified the following key findings: Design city policy holistically to avoid unintended consequences and displacement of issues

Normalise the discussion

Support multi-agency working

2 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 Initiatives from across the globe

Barcelona Greater Manchester Kungalv Anti-Rumour Network RADEQUAL The Tolerance Project Offices for Non-Discrimination Community Safety Partnership Plan to Combat Islamophobia

London International Paris London Tigers The Redirect Method Paris Pact to Combat Extreme Exclusion Mayor’s Countering Violent Intercultural Cities Extremism Programme ISD Hate Mapping Tool Sens Critique #London is Open SCN Local Prevention Networks Tell MAMA

Rotterdam Stockholm Safety Houses Regional Coordinator Against Violent Extremism WEsociety EXIT Fryshuset

Methodology To produce this report, we engaged with academics, subject matter experts and practitioners in London and internationally, sent out a survey to CTPN cities, undertook a literature review and desktop research, and held three working groups. Interviews Literature review Surveys

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 3 2 Introduction

groups who feel their group the extent to which the policy will Radicalisation and identity is being insulted and impact the lives of other individuals towards extremism even threatened.”.1 and groups within the complex city system. There is no suggestion that is a complex and Forms of community engagement by simply adapting one specific evolving process. and social integration are often policy, that enough momentum will be seen as the answer to the issues generated to influence positive and of polarisation and isolation by widespread change in communities This report focuses on the extent policymakers.2 There is also growing and cities. Rather that by considering to which city policy, and how it is support for such initiatives by the policies simultaneously to cover put into operation, positively or public; for instance, the Mayor of issues holistically, and viewing key negatively affects the vulnerability London’s recent report on Countering concepts more broadly, cities may of individuals or communities to Violent Extremism highlighted that begin to see a greater impact from the radicalisation process. “two-thirds of Londoners see strong anti-radicalisation initiatives. integrated communities as effective in The objective of this report is to reducing the risk of extremism, hate This report will draw from discoveries illustrate how city policymakers crime and terrorism”.3 made and advanced in the work of can address some of the key the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities challenges of radicalisation. This initiative that bear witness to the report examines how city authorities Where cities are able complex dynamics of city policy and can support this process by working to explore policy design the extent to which policy positions in a more informed way to view and implementation in in one thematic area can have anti-radicalisation through a holistic unintended consequences across systems context. an integrated manner, more value can be other areas of policy-making that can serve to both magnify and/or Specifically, this report focuses gained from similar neutralise intended benefits. In areas on polarisation and isolation as levels of investment. outside of violent extremism the 100 possible contributing factors in Resilient Cities programme has been the radicalisation process, and Although this report will outline a able to demonstrate that where cities examines the notion that community number of noteworthy initiatives are able to explore policy design engagement and integration are key in place that seek to address and implementation in an integrated to reducing these vulnerability factors. radicalisation, the way in which manner, more value can be gained Within this context, The European cities tackle the issue of polarised from similar levels of investment. Radicalisation Awareness Network communities is becoming increasingly This approach primarily focuses defines polarisation as: pertinent as research has shown on increasing interdepartmental some approaches can prove counter- awareness of objectives and “A thought construct, based on productive.4 There are cases where challenges: thinking more creatively assumptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ community engagement has caused about how resources are deployed identities. In a process of polarisation, certain groups to feel targeted or and engendering a greater sense of the dominant and active narrative marginalised, increasing the very shared goals. is about the perceived (and often conditions the initiatives were exaggerated) differences and attempting to ease in the first place.5 Finally, this report outlines case simplistic narratives about the others. Furthermore, some well-intentioned studies that portray how cities are There is a neglect of what the ‘us’ initiatives can cause individuals or tackling these complex and evolving and ‘them’ might have in common. communities who are not included issues, as well as suggesting Polarisation therefore shows itself in policy to feel “left behind” and further points for consideration in negative thoughts and attitudes this can increase grievances and and improvement. It will do this towards other groups, which could community tensions.6 by reviewing existing literature on result in growing hostility and radicalisation, polarisation and segregation. Ultimately this could That is why this report will isolation, before progressing to lead to situations in which intolerance recommend that cities view social map current approaches to anti- slips into hate speech and even hate integration with a wide-angle lens radicalisation through a series of crime. In such an environment, some inclusive of all within a city, and co- case studies. The report will then (parts) of groups or individuals can design policies with communities. highlight some key issues in anti- radicalise towards violent extremism It will argue that whether specific or radicalisation followed by strategic and terrorism. Recruiting for an broad, the development of any city recommendations of how cities can extremist ideology is much more policy should consider not only the address them at a city-policy level. successful if there are susceptible ‘at-risk’ individual or groups, but

4 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 3 Terminology

deliberately acknowledges the 3.4 Isolation Any discussions importance of viewing radicalisation Isolation is a condition of physical or around terrorism, and terrorism as encompassing psychological exclusion. It is often emerging extreme far-right and white used interchangeably with loneliness, radicalisation or supremacy ideologies. and although the two are closely extremism come related, loneliness is a subjective and 3.2 Anti-Radicalisation internal experience, whereas isolation with a number of Just as the term radicalisation is refers to the isolated individual/ possible definitions contested, it stands to reason that group’s relationship and contact with the term “anti-radicalisation” is just other persons, groups or network.11 or interpretations as challenging to define. There are Social isolation is typically described of those terms. many terms used to describe the as the absence of social contact, or process of stopping, preventing, a state of being cut off from normal The research and engagement halting or countering violent extremist social networks.12 Furthermore, in conducted during this project has behaviour and the radicalisation the case of violent extremism, social indicated that a consensus of process. This report uses the term isolation is known and accepted to terminology and definitions are vital ‘anti-radicalisation’ to encompass any be a risk factor.13 to successful collaboration among and all initiatives and programmes policymakers as will be discussed and policies that seek to either It is important to acknowledge later in this report. A number of key prevent and/or counter the process that with regard to the process terms are outlined below. of radicalisation as defined above. of radicalisation, a deep sense of community and bonding may exist 3.1 Radicalisation within the radicalised group where Like many words in the study The term vulnerability is a group dynamic exists; this may of terrorism, radicalisation is not used within this report be online, physically or idealised. contested. Nasser-Eddine et al. to imply that individuals or Therefore when discussing isolation, noted that “about the only thing communities possess any this is not always being used in the that radicalization experts agree on predisposition to violent traditional sense of an individual cut is that radicalization is a process. off from society, but may also refer Beyond that there is considerable extremism or weakness to an isolated group or an individual variation as to make existing research by being vulnerable. whose isolation might have led them incomparable”.7 A common view of to find comfort in the group. the term is that it is the process by 3.3 Vulnerability which a person comes to support It is important to state that the In addition, labelling individuals or terrorism and extremist ideologies term vulnerability is not used within communities as isolated may be a associated with terrorist groups.8 this report to imply that individuals self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, However, not all definitions or or communities possess any unintentional marginalisation of perceptions of radicalisation or radical predisposition to violent extremism or minority groups may lead to social ideas relate specifically to terrorism. weakness by being vulnerable. The isolation and its associated negative This report acknowledges that not United Nation’s Office for Disaster consequences. This makes the use all forms of radicalisation, nor the Risk Reduction10 defines vulnerability of terms such as isolation especially act of holding radical ideas, are as “the conditions determined by significant within city-policy and always detrimental in themselves. For physical, social, economic and community engagement. instance Manchester’s RADEQUAL environmental factors or processes programme of community that increase the susceptibility of engagement focuses on rethinking an individual, a community, assets the collective understanding of or systems to the impacts of prejudice, hate and extremism by hazards”. In the context of this report, tackling a range of factors played out vulnerability can therefore be viewed in communities and neighbourhoods.9 as the susceptibility of individuals or Instead this report, when mentioning groups of individuals to be radicalised radicalisation, focuses specifically towards violent extremism. on forms of radicalisation that lead to violent extremism, and acts of, or support for terrorism, and which threaten the peace and stability of European cities. This report

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 5 3 Terminology continued

3.5 Polarisation 3.6 Social Integration Using the Institute of Strategic The Greater London Authority defines Dialogue’s definition, we can this as the extent to which people view polarisation as the extreme positively interact and connect divergence of social, political and with others who are different to economic attitudes. This is often themselves. It is determined by the reflected in diverging social and level of equality between people, cultural media consumption and the nature of their relationships, and cuts across gender, class, identity, their degree of participation in the age and geography.14 Furthermore, communities in which they live. This polarisation can be exacerbated report views social integration in by issues such as hate crimes, a broader light than the traditional hate speech or dangerous speech, categories of faith, religion, culture and these key terms are therefore or ethnicity. It is also about age and included under this definition: gender and it affects all members of a society. In the context of a city, • Hate crime: a criminal offence integration should be viewed as against a person or property relevant to all who live in the city and motivated in whole or in part by should focus on fostering inclusivity an offender’s bias against a race, and tolerance of difference without religion, disability, sexual orientation, expectation of conformity. ethnicity, gender or gender identity. 3.7 City Systems • Hate speech: an expression of Commonly characterised by the size, hatred towards another person density, transient and multicultural or group of people using various nature of its population coupled means such as writing, speech or with an extensive infrastructure any other form of communication. and diversified economy, a city is The intention of hate speech is to a complex structure. By extension, harass and distress the intended a city system can be understood as target. In many cases the use of the layers that bring this all together hate speech can incite violence – the various elements that inter- from one group towards another. relate to form an overall mechanism, an interconnecting network or an • Dangerous speech: a subset of intricate whole. This includes the hate speech, dangerous speech principles, strategic policies and has been recently defined as procedures that influence, govern “speech (that) lowers human or serve as a nexus within a barriers to violence – online and city environment. offline”. It can be any form of expression, whether images or speech, that increases the risk that people will condone or commit violence against members of another group. It overlaps with hate speech, which often has a legal definition but does not necessarily fully encompass hate speech, or vice versa.

6 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 4 Scope and Approach

4.1 The City-Systems Approach It follows that in complex socio- in total.17 Additionally, countering This report proposes that a city- technical systems like cities, security polarisation and isolation will systems approach is taken when must also be established through consequently include tackling developing city-policy. This approach anticipatory and preventative loneliness. This has a broader recognises that creating solutions means. Policies and strategies must implication on the health of a city to one issue can lead to unintended anticipate future challenges, on the as studies continue to investigate consequences in other areas, and one hand, while also considering the the possibility that social isolation seeks to overcome this through a potential downstream consequences and loneliness could be greater joint policy approach at strategic of narrow policy decisions on the threats to public health than obesity, levels. For example, effectively other. The city-systems approach among other diseases.18 Tackling governing security in the city-system seeks to integrate anti-radicalisation radicalisation therefore should be relies on coherent strategy and policy policies into broader and coherent viewed as part of a broader city- that responds to threats or security city-policy development, including systems approach designed to breaches and necessarily works identifying, mitigating and monitoring address a number of social ills and across sectors and services to do so. polarisation. The approach assumes not just radicalisation on its own. that policies do not occur in a vacuum, and that failing to consider It is about creating cities the broader implications of policy that people feel are worth interaction will be counter- living for, worth investing productive for the development in and worth protecting. of safe, sustainable and integrated communities.

The State holds responsibility for 4.2 System-Wide Benefits the security of its people, deploying By crossing multiple policy domains, police and the criminal justice system the city-systems approach can to deliver this. However, it is the yield multiple system benefits. security mentality that has historically Apart from the obvious objective of 32bn extended into the domains of reducing radicalisation in cities and, Disconnected Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) subsequently, terrorism and harm to communities costing and anti-radicalisation. Like traditional the UK £32 billion society at large, tackling polarisation a year modes of maintaining internal in this manner can improve the security, the approach has largely state of city communities. Looking been reactive, and has been criticised at the unintended consequences for its perceived negative community- of city-policies in this way is also level impacts, particularly stigmatism about supporting individuals and of social groups.15 Therefore communities to live their lives in traditional security approaches need the best way they can. It is about to be considered alongside social creating cities that people feel are policy consideration. This is already worth living for, worth investing in 23.8bn being recognised. For instance, the and worth protecting. It is also about ‘neighbourliness’ UK’s Assistant Commissioner of reducing hate, isolation and its often represents annual UK saving of £23.8 billion the Metropolitan Police, Neil Basu, understated by-product, loneliness. who is also the Senior National a year Coordinator for Counter Terrorism When viewed in this light, system Policing, has recently stated that benefits begin to emerge. For the police and security services are instance, there is some evidence to no longer enough to win the fight show that disconnected communities against violent extremism. He stated, could be costing the UK economy “Policies that go towards more social £32 billion every year, and according inclusion, more social mobility and to research conducted by the more education are much more likely Centre for Economics and Business to drive down violence… than all the Research, “neighbourliness” already policing and state security apparatus delivers “substantial economic put together.”16 benefits to UK society”, representing an annual saving of £23.8 billion

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 7 5 Literature Review

quicker pace, while balancing this Anti-radicalisation is a crowded policy with the need for long-term policy space, with a significant body of literature. which can be deliberative and Naturally, a diversity of opinions exist necessarily slow. with respect to the effectiveness of policy A wealth of literature and evidence from practitioners demonstrates that in countering violent extremism and the causal factors of radicalisation interventions are most often context- toward extremism are varied and complex. In the first systematic specific. As will be seen in the next section search of its kind, Vergani et al. there is not one clearly defined path for reviewed 148 articles (after reviewing an initial 6,335 items) between radicalisation; each case is unique, making 2011–2015 on the causal factors it impossible to build a single profile of a of radicalisation.22 A common categorisation for these factors violent extremist. were “push, pull, and personal”. The research highlighted that the causes of radicalisation were not confined to simply the ‘pull’ of a A healthy academic scepticism can and radicalisation highlights the radical ideology but include many also be discerned in the ability of importance of responding to this circumstantial push factors, such as city-policies to counter radicalisation. problem in a systemic fashion, and it political or social situations or policies There is limited evidence on the is in this context that the city-systems that may influence the vulnerability effectiveness of counter-measure approach is anticipated to be of of an individual, or group of policies, largely due to insufficient most value. individuals, to being radicalised monitoring and evaluation and lack of toward violent extremism. published programme data. There are many assumptions and critiques, but The complexity of the This is important for the work without a robust data set in the field it relationship between examined in this report, which focuses is difficult to analyse and to establish polarisation and on the way in which cities’ policies any empirical evidence of the radicalisation highlights can prevent or reduce radicalisation. effectiveness of counter-measures. the importance of Pull factors are typically those that attract people into radicalisation These concerns have in part, aided responding to this problem (the consumption of extremist the research for this report by in a systemic fashion. propaganda, or monetary providing a deeper understanding of incentives for example). the complexity of the issues and the Although not typically presented necessity of clearly outlining definitions as the result of a sudden or abrupt and project scope. As a result the change on an individual level, but “a The research highlighted research for this report was focused complex social change operating on that the causes of on polarisation and isolation as key numerous levels”,19 the UK police vulnerability factors, to be discussed have recently highlighted that the radicalisation were not in further detail later in this section. pace of progression of potential confined to simply the radicalisation processes ‘pull’ of a radical ideology 5.1 Causal Factors and the is increasing.20 but include many Radicalisation Process circumstantial ‘push’ To understand how cities’ policies Assistant Commissioner of the factors, such as political can make positive inroads into Metropolitan Police, Neil Basu stated addressing the radicalisation in 2018 that “the pace and tempo” or social situations or process, it is helpful to first examine of radicalisation and attacks has policies that may influence what causes individuals or groups gone up.21 This is in part due to new the vulnerability of an of individuals to become more or methods of attack such as utilising individual, or group of less vulnerable to radicalisation everyday and easily accessible items individuals, to being toward extremism. In particular, like vehicles or knives. the complexity of the relationship radicalised toward between polarisation Cities therefore need to consider violent extremism. developing effective policy at a

8 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 Cities cannot impact radicalisation work to polarise and on the ‘pull’ factors, but isolate individuals. These factors contributing to people’s vulnerability to they can address ‘push’ becoming radicalised are discussed in factors – or ‘structural more detail in section 5.3. 60% motivators’ – by of radicalisation Although the nature of the resulting from understanding the push factors impact their policies radicalisation process is changing, often it is non-linear. The Centre for the have on them. Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violence outlines the complex By contrast, push factors are often nature of this process and the factors seen as external circumstances that affect it (See Figure 3). It highlights (such as socio-political grievances that radicalisation follows a “non-linear, and structural factors of a city, non-predetermined path, shaped by such as unemployment rates), multiple factors”.25 No one thing can 40% which are used to justify the move therefore be attributed as a singular of radicalisation toward radicalisation and can be or primary cause of radicalisation: resulting from seen to push someone or make nonetheless, there are a range of “personal” factors them more likely to participate in vulnerability factors including those violent extremism. The Royal United of polarisation and isolation. Services Institute (RUSI) further describes the drivers of radicalisation 5.2 Social Capital in a way that distinguishes between and Violent Extremism ‘structural motivators’ (such as Research has demonstrated that unemployment, corruption, inequality, social capital and social norms can discrimination), individual incentives be associated both with preventing (a sense of purpose, adventure, terrorism, or through an absence of belonging, acceptance, fear etc), social capital and norms, fostering and enabling factors (the presence it.26, 27, 28 This is dependent on the of radical mentors, access to radical community (or place of interest) with content and communities, access to which an individual is associated,29 weaponry, a lack of familiar support and the nature of the influential social and so on).23 Cities cannot impact norms.30 Social capital describes the on the ‘pull’ factors, but they can nature of social networks that are address ‘push’ factors – or ‘structural characterised by reciprocity, trust motivators’ – by understanding the and cooperation.31, 32, 33, 34 In society impact their policies have on them. it can facilitate cooperative activities and social norms35 which can be Figure 1 RUSI’s Drivers The work conducted by Vergani et beneficial – like shaking hands when of Radicalisation al. highlighted that in almost 60% of you’re first introduced to someone – cases, radicalisation resulted from or undesirable, like alcohol misuse push factors, including inequality, as a result of peer pressure. Structural Motivators marginalisation, grievance, social Importantly, the relationship between Unemployment, corruption, exclusion, victimisation, and social capital and norm-building inequality, discrimination stigmatisation.24 Although it is worth creates or maintains order in noting that there is much debate complex social situations. in this area with many academics Individual Incentives A sense of purpose, disagreeing on whether push factors Social capital reflects an intangible adventure, belonging are causative. The ‘personal’ drivers ‘resource’ established in the of radicalisation were cited as nearly relationships among people that as important, at 40% of cases. These facilitate action.36 Social capital is built Enabling Factors factors included issues like personal through interactions that generate The presence of radical mentors, alienation, isolation, friendlessness, obligations and reciprocity (you help access to weaponry, or radical loneliness and cultural/social misfit. me, I’ll help you), trust (you said content and community you’d do that for me, and you did, Examined together, the push so I can rely on your help again), and and personal factors that drive expectations (I helped you, so I can

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 9 5 Literature Review continued

call on your help some time in the blocked participation can create future). These notions go back to the grievances which may be harnessed basic philosophical concept of the to promote extremist violence.”41 social-contract theory, which sees 1,031 social capital as integral to uphold attacks on asylum democratic values in a society.37 Issues such as shelters in Germany in 2015 As a function of social relations, discrimination, social capital can exist in ‘positive’ Islamophobia, and hate and ‘negative’ ways. For instance, crime can contribute to inclusion in a violent extremist polarisation and provide group may come with strong social cohesion, just as a positive the context in which community environment can.38 radicalisation can As such, inclusion – and the take place. 27% association with positive, local approximate community-oriented activities, Vergani’s review identified that rise in homophobic people and issues – could make the push factor appearing most hate crimes in Germany the difference between positive often in the literature is the “relative from 2016-17 community inclusion and exclusion. deprivation of a social group”, which, he states, has also been framed In contrast, inclusion in a negative in terms of “injustice, inequality, environment with dangerous ideals marginalization, grievance, social and norms can lead to violent exclusion, frustration, victimization, behaviour and greater risk to and stigmatization.”42 The ‘failed communities and cities. For this integration’ theory has often been reason, attention must be directed quoted as a cause for radicalisation, to gaining a clear understanding of however this is widely challenged the way in which policy formulation and, as will be seen later in this might foster or restrain the formation report, integration initiatives in of social groups that could perpetrate themselves are not necessarily violence, or that hold negatively the appropriate response. extreme views. Polarisation and isolation are Where policy creation has an impact possible contributing factors, and on social capital, this must be as the Radicalisation Awareness addressed to mitigate the possibility Network states: “…by preventing that the very problem the policy seeks and decreasing polarisation, we to reduce is amplified by that policy. are creating the conditions that contribute to preventing individuals 5.3 Isolation and Polarisation from being lured towards intolerant as Key Vulnerability Factors ‘us and them’ ideologies. Polarisation Societal-level explanations have does not necessarily lead to often been cited as one of the radicalisation and radicalisation most common explanations for does not have to result in growing 39 radicalisation in wider literature. polarisation. The answer lays in the RUSI’s literature review on the Drivers concepts of factors that make people of Radicalisation identified a number vulnerable to extremist propaganda of factors as significant, including and recruitment.” 43 political factors such as governance deficit, state failure and grievances, Polarisation and hate are increasing alongside social/psychological factors issues often accompanied by a concerning group and individual climate of intolerance.44 As the 40 identity. The review also highlighted Director at the Centre for Fascist, that “although the evidence is mixed, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies on balance the literature shows that at Teesside University stated in 2018

10 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

of the current climate, “This is the crime can contribute to polarisation most propitious time for the radical and provide the context in which Figure 2 Average number of right since the end of the Second radicalisation can take place. They tweets per hate group type World War.”45 Such radical trends are must therefore be considered when further aggravated30000 and prompted by tackling the issue of radicalisation.57 30000 the emotional and social dynamics 25,807 46 of polarisation. 25000 5.4 Matching Policy 25000 to Social Complexity In Germany, hate crimes recorded by It is important to note that there is 20000 20000 the police have seen a spike in recent not an expectation that changing years,47 with attacks on asylum one policy or only one element of an shelters surging to15000 1,031 in 2015, up individual’s life will necessarily have a 15000 13,292 from 199 in the previous year,48 and significant impact. Social structures, 10,240 homophobic hate 10000crimes increasing and their influence on the individual, 10000 by about 27% from 2016 to 2017.49 are extremely complex.58 However, 4,817 In the UK, hate crime5000 reporting is on changing a range of policies 5000 the rise, with more than 94,000 hate simultaneously may provide the crimes recorded by police in England groundswell of positive influence that 0 0 and Wales in 2017/18 – an increase makes the difference. In addition, by Anti- Anti- Anti- White of 123% compared to five years ago, using the city-systems approach, the Muslim Migrant LGBT Suprem- acists and a rise of 17% compared to last possible reduction of extremist acts year.50 The largest category of these as a result of policy considerations (75% of all reported hate crimes) will be seen as one good outcome are race-motivated hate crimes in a range of many outcomes. (including crimes based on ethnicity, refugee status or asylum seekers), The need to match policy to this which is an increase of 14% from social complexity is informed by a the previous year.51 The Tell MAMA long tradition of research examining initiative reported in 2017 the highest the unintended consequences of number of anti-Muslim incidents policymaking in the social context.59, 60 since its launch in 2012.52 The service The city-systems approach taken highlighted that more than two-thirds in this research specifically frames of verified incidents occurred offline, anti-radicalisation policymaking or on street level (70%, n=839), in the context of the unintended which represents a 30% rise in consequences of non-systematic offline reports.53 policy development. One way that unintended consequences can be As the Institute for Strategic Dialogue avoided, or at least minimised, is by points out, these rises in offline incorporating community input into hate-crime attacks have coincided policy decision-making, as will be with increasing concerns about hate discussed in the key themes of speech on social media platforms.54 this report. Facebook’s Vice Presendent of Public Policy in Europe, the Middle East Already in 2006, UK policymakers and Asia, Richard Allan, claimed recognised the importance of social that in May and June of 2017 alone, policy and leveraging community Facebook took down 66,000 posts resources in tackling violent per week that were reported as hate extremism, with the development of speech, which makes about 288,000 Prevent following the 2005 London per month globally.55 bombings.61 This approach is also evident in other regions, where Anti-Muslim hate groups are currently building social resilience in the the most active type of hate group community is seen as a fundamental on Twitter, with over 25,800 tweets activity in the fight against violent put out in 2016, followed by anti- extremism. Communities with strong migrant tweets, at 13,292.56 This is social resilience support similarity and significant because issues such as dissimilarity within their membership.62 discrimination, Islamophobia and hate

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 11 5 Literature Review continued

Figure 3 Process of radicalisation leading to violence PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENCE

The Promise of Togetherness Pro-social Engagement Protective Factors Pro-social Orientation Socio-communitarian EARLY PREVENTION (living together) involvement Non-violent social network (face-to-face or online) Ability to handle emotions Sociopolitical engagement Hope vis-à-vis Quality relationship with a Tolerance towards ambiguity the Promise of positive role model (grey area) Sociopolitical Socioemotional Participation in public debate Togetherness Circumstances Circumstances Critical thinking and Opportunity for positive broad-mindedness social advocacy Global events Social Rejection of violence vulnerability Stable relational The State’s Empathy towards others positioning and Economic environment engagement vulnerability (committed or encouraged)

Public and Precariousness Types of Engagement Level media of family of Engagement

discourse ties Indoctrination Process / Violent Acts Search for Answers Answers Obtained Ideology Self-sacriﬁce Family Retention of

Participation Friends Social, Political, and/or Economic Unease (real or imagined) School environment Active support Feeling of frustration and discomfort Mentors Radical / Violent Orientation Social and family rupture

PRÉVENTION EN AMONT Feeling of injustice Sports and cultural environments and indignation Legitimatization of the use of violence Internet and social media Lack of recognition / Humiliation Concealment of a lifestyle or an Work environment allegiance

Feeling of failure and Justifying Engagement helplessness Association with violent radical individuals NEEDS MOTIVES Stigmatization and identity crisis Vulnerability Factors Examining extremist documents Sense of Altruism / or websites belonging Solidarity Discrimination/ Diﬃcult life events Lack of critical thinking skills Marginalization Dehumanizing others and loss of Identity Heroism moral reference aﬃrmation Precariousness of social Isolation connections Obsession with messianic and Self-esteem / Rebellion / Intolerance towards Radical social network end-of-the-world discourse Pride Revenge ambiguity (face-to-face or online)

Sudden loss of interest in school / Recognition Thrill seeking Questioning Impulsiveness Precariousness of emotional ties and professional activities the Promise of Togetherness

PRIMARY PREVENTION SECONDARY PREVENTION TERTIARY PREVENTION © Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) of Radicalization Leading to Violence for the Prevention © Centre

12 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

EARLY PREVENTION EARLY PRÉVENTION EN AMONT EN PRÉVENTION The Promise of Togetherness Circumstances PRIMARY PREVENTION Social, Political, and/or Economic Sociopolitical positioning and Global events engagement The State’s Public and discourse Unease (real or imagined) media of Togetherness (living together) Feeling of failure and Feeling of frustration Lack of recognition /

Questioning the Promise Feeling of injustice Stigmatization and Marginalization Discrimination/ and indignation and discomfort identity crisis helplessness Humiliation Socioemotional Circumstances Precariousness vulnerability vulnerability Economic of family Social ties PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENCE Sports and cultural environments Internet and social media Non-violent social network Quality relationship with a Search for Answers Precariousness of social (face-to-face or online) School environment Work environment Intolerance towards Critical thinking and Diﬃcult life events broad-mindedness positive role model Stable relational Impulsiveness SECONDARY PREVENTION environment connections Mentors ambiguity Friends Figure 3 Process of radicalisation leading to violence Family

PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENCE Vulnerability Factors PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENCE Protective Factors Precariousness of emotional ties Tolerance towards ambiguity Lack of critical thinking skills Ability to handle emotions Empathy towards others Opportunity for positive (face-to-face or online) Radical social network

The Promise of Togetherness The Promise of Togetherness social advocacy Pro-social Engagement Pro-social Orientation (grey area) Pro-social Engagement Isolation Pro-social Orientation Protective Factors Socio-communitarian Protective Factors Socio-communitarian EARLY PREVENTION (living together) EARLY PREVENTION (living together) involvement involvement

Non-violent social network Non-violent social network Ability to handle emotions Answers Obtained (face-to-face orAnswers online)

(face-to-face or online) Ability to handle emotions Sociopolitical engagement Hope vis-à-vis

Sociopolitical engagement Hope vis-à-vis Retention of Quality Retention relationship with a Tolerance towards ambiguity the Promise of positive role model (grey area) Quality relationship with a Tolerance towards ambiguity the Promise of Participation in public debate positive role model (grey area) Sociopolitical Socioemotional Togetherness Sociopolitical Socioemotional Participation in public debate CircumstancesTogethernessCircumstances Critical thinking and Opportunity for positive Circumstances Circumstances broad-mindedness social advocacy Critical thinking and Opportunity for positive Global events Social Rejection of violence broad-mindedness social advocacy vulnerability Global events Social Rejection of violence Stable relational vulnerability The State’s Empathy towards others positioning and Economic environment Stable relational The State’s Empathy towards others engagement vulnerability positioning and Economic environment vulnerability (committed or encouraged) engagement Types of Engagement Public and Precariousness Level

media of(committed or encouraged) family of Engagement Types of Engagement Leveldiscourse Orientation ties Violent / Radical Indoctrination Process / Violent Acts Public and Precariousness Search for Answers Answers Obtained media of family of Engagement Indoctrination Process / Ideology Self-sacriﬁce

discourse ties Indoctrination Process / Violent Acts Search for Answers Answers Obtained Family Orientation Pro-social Retention of Ideology Self-sacriﬁce Sudden loss of interest in school / Dehumanizing others and loss of Examining extremist documents Participation Concealment of a lifestyle or an Association with violent radical Family Obsession with messianic and Friends Retention of end-of-the-world discourse and professional activities Social, Political, and/or Economic Social and family rupture Legitimatization of the Ideology

ParticipationUnease (real or imagined) School environment Participation in public debate

Friends moral reference

Sociopolitical engagement Active support use of violence or websites individuals Socio-communitarian allegiance Feeling of frustration Rejection of violence

Social, Political, and/or Economic Radical / Violent Orientation and discomfort Mentors Social and family rupture Unease (real or imagined) School environment Active support involvement Feeling of frustration PRÉVENTION EN AMONT Feeling of injustice Sports and cultural environments and discomfort Mentors Radical / Violent Orientation and indignation Legitimatization of the Social and family rupture use of violence Internet and social media TERTIARY PREVENTION

PRÉVENTION EN AMONT Sports and cultural environments Lack of recognition / Feeling of injustice Humiliation Concealment of a lifestyle or an and indignation Legitimatization of the Work environment allegiance use of violence Internet and social media Feeling of failure and Justifying Engagement Lack of recognition / helplessness Association with violent radical Humiliation Concealment of a lifestyle or an individuals Work environment allegiance NEEDS MOTIVES Stigmatization and identity crisis Vulnerability Factors Examining extremist documents Sense of Altruism / Feeling of failure and Justifying Engagement or websites

helplessness Association with violent radical belonging Solidarity individuals Engagement of Types Discrimination/ Diﬃcult life events Lack of critical thinking skills NEEDS MarginalizationMOTIVES Dehumanizing others and loss of Identity Heroism Stigmatization and moral reference aﬃrmation identity crisis Vulnerability Factors Examining extremist documents Altruism / Precariousness of social Isolation Sense of connections or websites belonging Solidarity Self-esteem /

Recognition aﬃrmation

belonging Obsession with messianic and Self-esteem / Rebellion / NEEDS Sense of Engagement Pro-social of Engagement Diﬃcult life events Lack of critical thinking skills Identity Intolerance towards Radical social network end-of-the-world discourse Pride Revenge

Discrimination/ Pride

Active support ambiguity (face-to-face or online)

Dehumanizing others and loss of Justifying Engagement

Marginalization Participation Identity Heroism Self-sacriﬁce moral reference aﬃrmation Precariousness of social Level Isolation Sudden loss of interest in school / Recognition Thrill seeking connections Questioning Impulsiveness Precariousness of emotional ties and professional activities

Obsession with messianic and Self-esteem / Rebellion / the Promise of Hope vis-à-vis the Promise Togetherness Intolerance towards Radical social network end-of-the-world discourse Pride Revenge ambiguity (face-to-face or online) of Togetherness

Sudden loss of interest in school / Recognition Thrill seeking MOTIVES Impulsiveness Precariousness of emotional ties and professional activities Thrill seeking Rebellion /

Questioning Altruism / Solidarity Revenge the Promise Heroism

of Togetherness PRIMARY PREVENTION SECONDARY PREVENTION TERTIARY PREVENTION

(committed or encouraged) or (committed (CPRLV) of Radicalization Leading to Violence for the Prevention © Centre Violent Acts Violent

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 13 6 Responses to Radicalisation

The countries of each of the countries’ national plans deal with and polarisation, increase social participating cities in the Counter anti-radicalisation and countering integration, and build community Terrorism Preparedness Network violent extremism varies in terms of cohesion. The following outlines (CTPN) Barcelona, Greater how much responsibility rests with the some of the ways in which cities Manchester, London, Paris, national government, and how much are carrying out this work, as well Rotterdam, Stockholm – with the is adopted at the city level. as highlighting some the challenges exception of Barcelona – are members being faced. of the Strong Cities Network, an The intention of this report is not international organisation dedicated to compare the cities against one to challenge and counter violent another but rather to highlight the extremism. All have comprehensive progressive and effective initiatives national policies on countering that are being carried out to terrorism, although the way that these tackle the issue of radicalisation

National Contexts

France France has a number of frameworks relevant to tackling radicalisation, namely the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, Prevent to Protect (2018), which aligns itself to other government initiatives responsible for prisons, urban policy and dialogue with France’s Muslim community.67 The country is known for having a particular challenge with radicalisation in its prisons, where an estimated 1,400 inmates are believed to be radicalised.68

The Netherlands From 2011, the Netherlands has adopted a localised approach to countering radicalisation and violent extremism, partly based on the belief that national campaigns, as opposed to local ones, can be counter-productive and instead stimulate radicalisation. Cities take on the majority of the responsibility for anti-radicalisation, and the government provides advisory and capacity-building services to local partners.

Spain Spain’s National Plan to Fight Violent Radicalisation was introduced in 2015 and is connected to the country’s efforts to stop illegal immigration, integrate existing communities and promote social cohesion.66

Sweden Sweden had a national Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy Against Violence Promoting Extremism, released in 2011 and the Swedish Police Authority produced its first version of a national educational programme against violent extremism at the end of 2011. In 2012, and in 2015 the Police Authority began developing national guidelines for how to prevent violent extremism on a local level. A big part of that work involves municipalities and multi- agency cooperation. In 2014 a National Coordinator was appointed in Sweden with a mission to protect democracy from violent extremism.

The United Kingdom The UK’s CONTEST strategy, with its four workstreams of: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare,63 was first introduced in 2006 following the 2005 bombings.64 Anti-radicalisation sits under the Prevent workstream, and since then a specific Counter- Extremism Strategy was also introduced in 2015. CONTEST specifically recognises that “communities which do not or cannot participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation” and “a successful integration strategy is therefore important to counter terrorism”.65

14 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

6.1 Barcelona service that works to guarantee the In January 2017, Barcelona City exercising of the right to religious Barcelona at a glance Council developed the municipal freedom in Barcelona, so that all plan to combat Islamophobia as a options of conscience, regardless form of discrimination and improve of whether they are religious or not, social cohesion in the city. It was are recognised and respected, and m co-designed with representatives everyone can participate and feel Population1.7 of human-rights organisations and included within the city. The office’s discrimination experts, Muslim activities include supporting religious communities, and specialised entities with their activities in the city; municipal staff.87 facilitating collaboration between religious entities and the City Council; Districts10 Supported by a budget of more promoting the inclusion of religious than €100,000 and implemented entities in the citizen networks of by the Citizen Rights and Diversity their environment; and working to 2 Department, the plan has three normalise their presence in the km key objectives: public space.89 Area101.4

1. Highlighting Islamophobia as a type of discrimination. The three pillars of the Interculturality Plan are 2. Revealing and denouncing equity, recognition of prejudices and stereotypes. diversity and positive 3. Enhancing reporting interaction. mechanisms and improving support provided to victims of Barcelona City Council has adopted Islamophobic discrimination. the Government’s measure on “guaranteeing equal treatment for It includes 28 measures, such as religious bodies holding occasional establishment of the Hate Crime activities in public places”. Among and Hate Speech Observatory, other things, it provides clear and training for municipal workers, guidelines on the relevant needs and including the city police. At least use of public space and facilities by 1,474 people took part in 55 religious groups.90 sessions on Islamophobia and multiculturalism.88 In addition, Barcelona has an Office for Non-Discrimination (OND) run A focus on hate speech was intensified by its city council. The city has following the attacks in Barcelona had a municipal service aimed at and Cambrils in Tarragona in August addressing human-rights violations that same year. This included the related to discrimination since introduction of Barcelona’s Anti- 1998. Its duties include provision of Rumour Network which is highlighted specialised legal advice and litigating in more detail in the case study if necessary, receiving, documenting overleaf. Work was also enhanced to and collating data, providing advice make Islamophobia visible as a form and training.91 It also places efforts of discrimination and to counteract the on identifying structural problems that generalisation of negative images about cause human-rights violations and Islam and Muslims. proposes strategic recommendations on how to reverse or resolve them. Two of the issues that have been most worked on are the prevention Since the 2017 attacks, anti- of stereotypes and raising awareness radicalisation work has been of the rights that all citizens have. reinforced. Teachers have been trained in discrimination and racism, The Office for Religious Affairs in and the Day for the Elimination of Barcelona is also noteworthy as a Racial Discrimination (21 March)

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 15 Barcelona’s Anti-Rumour Network – Community Cohesion Campaign Case study 1

In 2010, Barcelona’s city council launched a public- To address the challenge of getting the message out service campaign called the Anti-Rumour Network to onto the streets, the campaign was launched through dispel rumours, misconceptions and prejudices held 80 local organisations all working in social cohesion and locally about minorities and immigrants.97, 98 coexistence. The organisations are connected through a dedicated website that offers information and free The network aimed to tackle disinformation and training sessions, as well as online guides to address stereotypes that promote polarisation and extremist the key challenges. sentiment, and it began by researching and identifying dominant stereotypes and prejudices circulating in As well as its city-wide advertising campaign, the Barcelona. These included the arrival of new migrants project has also used innovative and at times unusual and perceived associated abuse of social and healthcare approaches to spread the message. These have included services, or taking jobs from locals. public debates with leading local figures, street theatre, the production of tongue-in-cheek videos, and comic The project then recruited and trained “anti-rumour books – the latter have proved to be the most successful. agents” to dispel myths and spread the campaign through local organisations and the city’s neighbourhoods. The More than 350 people have been trained as anti-rumour aim was to challenge and contradict misconceptions agents since the start of the project and Barcelona city about immigrants and to combat discrimination by taking council has created a dedicated intercultural dialogue action in the everyday business of life. It did this by giving fund of €200,000 per year for community-led projects the agent accurate information about immigration and that promote the goals of the Anti-Rumour Network. As techniques for addressing misconceptions with tactful, further evidence of the success of the initiative, other city situation-based action at work, home or in the street. For councils within Catalonia are now establishing their own instance, when someone complained that “foreigners are versions of the Anti-Rumour Network, and Athens and receiving the majority of subsidised apartments”, the anti- Geneva have shown interest in creating similar structures. rumour agent could interject with an accurate fact, such as how this is true for only one in 20 immigrants. For more information visit: https://citiesofmigration. ca/good_idea /fighting-fiction-with-facts-the-bcn-anti- rumour-campaign/ 6 Responses to Radicalisation continued

is commemorated in schools, the National Health Service, Greater among other measures.92 Fighting Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, Greater Manchester discrimination and racist attitudes housing providers, the universities and at a glance towards Muslim women and voluntary and community groups.80 Islamophobia on social media and the internet were identified as additional The focus of anti-radicalisation in priorities at a later stage and are Manchester is early intervention and 93 m now being addressed. Overall, two prevention, and the city strives to Population2.8 key issues that have been prioritised strengthen the confidence and skills are the prevention of stereotypes, of its staff to work with communities and awareness campaigns about on this agenda. Included within this the rights that all citizens have, and is understanding the community what religious freedom and cultural concerns, grievances and potential Boroughs10 diversity means.94 drivers that might lead to people engaging in extremist activities.81 Finally, the Interculturality Plan (2010– In addition, the city works to 2 2025)95 is the initiative of Barcelona’s strengthen the understanding of km city council that aims to provide and relationship with communities Area1,276 an intercultural strategy to tackle in order to collectively deliver activities the challenges that arise in the city to support individuals who may be following the increase in socio-cultural vulnerable to radicalisation diversity. The three pillars of the plan and extremism.82 are equity, recognition of diversity and London at a glance positive interaction. The intercultural 6.3 London approach was used to improve every Like all cities in the UK, London service and policy of Barcelona’s operates in line with Prevent, and city council. The plan creates each of its 32 local authorities have conditions for people from different a Channel Panel. This panel meets 8.9m backgrounds to interact and socialise regularly to discuss referrals of Population in a positive way. It also has a individuals who are considered to dedicated interculturality programme, be at risk of radicalisation. The panel which serves as a key technical is made up of police, local authority mechanism for its implementation. staff and other relevant partners, such 32 The city council closely collaborates as social and healthcare workers, Boroughs with multiple associations and and creates a tailored wrap-around grassroots organisations in fighting support package for individuals who discrimination and ensuring positive have been referred to them via the 2 intercultural relations.96 Prevent programme. The police lead 1,572km on the assessment of the counter Area 6.2 Greater Manchester terrorism risk, and the local authority Manchester has been a priority look at any safeguarding concerns. area for anti-radicalisation initiatives There is a London Prevent network, since 2008.78 Manchester City where coordinators from each of the Council works with the Community 32 local authorities meet regularly Safety Partnership to deliver a set of throughout the year to discuss key tailored local priorities, developed to issues, including emerging threats, support the delivery of national anti- and to share good practice. radicalisation objectives. In addition, the collaboration aims to enable The Mayor of London also set up a communities to develop their Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) own solutions and promote programme in 2017 in response to better alternatives.79 the string of attacks in London that same year.69 The programme recently The Manchester Community Safety released a report after conducting Partnership demonstrates multi- “the most comprehensive listening agency working by bringing together exercise on countering violent Manchester City Council, Greater (continued p21) Manchester Police, Offender Services,

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 17 RADEQUAL – Community Cohesion and Resilience Programme Case study 2

The Rethinking Radicalisation programme of community The RAD in RADEQUAL represents the radical history engagement started back in 2015 and recognised that of Manchester as a city, and the EQUAL is about the challenges faced today relating to our collective demonstrating equality in what they do. understanding of prejudice, hate and extremism (including global events and incidents) are far too The RADEQUAL campaign has been co designed with complex for laws and powers to be the sole solutions. communities to build community resilience and has three key principles referred to as the three Cs, which build on It recognised that there are a range of factors that the Our Manchester approach: come together and play out in communities and neighbourhoods, which if tackled earlier would improve 1. Challenge: Identifying and understanding the the lives of residents and increase opportunities for concerns and challenges across and within people to contribute towards how we build a safer and communities that could create divisions and more resilient Manchester. Rethinking Radicalisation, tensions (hate, prejudice and extremism). delivered by the Peace Foundation, enabled communities 2. Connect: Connecting communities, groups and to come together and engage with professionals, organisations, and building relationships to create a academics, critics and others about issues relating to network of credible voices. challenging policy areas such as preventing terrorism, but also those topics that created tensions and division within 3. Champion: Championing Manchester’s radical and between communities. reputation for campaigning for equality and inclusion, and welcoming difference. The RADEQUAL campaign is aimed at getting into communities and neighbourhoods early, having honest For more information visit http://www. and often difficult conversations and then problem-solving makingmanchestersafer.com/info/18/radequal to proactively work together to prevent some of the drivers escalating into community tensions, conflict and in See also the Rethinking Radicalisation report: http:// some cases criminal activity. www.makingmanchestersafer.com/downloads/file/55/ rethinking_radicalisation_report London Tigers – Civil Society Prevention Programme Case study 3

Originally a football club in the City of Westminster, to radicalisation. In particular, London Tigers undertakes London Tigers was founded in 1997 by members projects that deal with social issues, from gang-related of the South Asian community in London. It soon and antisocial behaviour to providing resilience to branched out into community projects, and in 2012, extremist influences. as part of the Government’s Prevent strategy, the London Borough of Redbridge and the London The activities delivered by London Tigers are designed Borough of Barking and Dagenham were awarded to create an environment in which difficult issues can be £255,345 by the Office of Security and Counter discussed openly. Workshops are also run that aim to Terrorism to commission London Tigers to deliver challenge extremist narratives, including on theological a building community resilience project. After the grounds, and to build critical-thinking skills. Their aim is success of the first year, additional funding of to build future community leaders who can continue to £319,183 was provided for 2013–14. challenge extremism among their peers.

Since its conception the organisation has expanded One-to-one interventions are also offered in order to and currently has more than 70 staff and 100 volunteers assist those considered most vulnerable in order to running youth-development projects across the city of improve their critical-thinking skills and deconstruct 72 London, with further expansion now in Luton. terrorist narratives.

The initiative uses sport as a vehicle to reach out to For more information visit: young people, provide positive pathways and facilitate http://www.londontigers.org/ meaningful opportunities. It works with young people from hard-to-reach communities to build their resilience #LondonisOpen – Community Cohesion Campaign Case study 4

Following the UK’s EU referendum in 2016, the Mayor of As part of the overall campaign, unique discounts on London, Sadiq Khan, launched a major campaign called attractions, experiences, restaurants and bars, as well #LondonisOpen to foster cohesion and calm and to as helpful traveller information, have been offered on show that London is united and open for business. Visit London.77

A key aspect of the campaign was to reassure the The campaign has received backing from a number of one million EU nationals living in London that “they will high-profile celebrities and major firms such as Google, always be welcome – and that discrimination will not be Hilton, the City of London and business leaders like Sir tolerated”.74 Upon launching the campaign, the Mayor Richard Branson.78 highlighted that London does not simply tolerate its inhabitants differences, it also celebrates them.75 It represents a relatively low-cost example of a place- based identity campaign that cities can easily replicate The campaign included various media campaigns to help foster inclusion and a feeling of belonging among to celebrate London’s diversity, and the Mayor their citizens, and help push back against intolerance, commissioned artists to design a series of posters for hate and polarisation. London’s underground service, which declared the city “will not cut itself off from the rest of the world”.76 These For more information visit: https://www.london.gov.uk/ included statements such as: what-we-do/arts-and-culture/london-open

• “Dignity has no nationality”. • “Everyone welcome”. • “No them only us”. • “Work towards world peace”.

extremism the city has seen”,70 which efficient intervention, followed by sets out the opportunities to “better ensuring social and professional Paris at a glance strengthen communities, safeguard inclusion and the right to health, vulnerable groups and stop the social rights, right to work, right spread of extremist ideology”, and to leisure and sport activities. is supported by an investment fund Three years after the adoption, m launched by the Mayor.71 The Mayor’s 90% of the activities under the Population2.1 Office works with London Councils pact have been implemented or (an umbrella organisation for all 32 are being implemented. local authorities) and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime works The pact is complemented by the closely with communities to promote Plan of Mobilising Communities of Municipalities20 active citizenship, so that people can Paris for the Reception of Refugees inform and co-design local responses (Mobilisation de la Communauté de to local problems. Paris pour l’Accueil des Réfugiés). km2 In addition to policies and strategies Paris has also conducted anti- Area105 specifically focused on countering radicalisation initiatives in prisons, radicalisation and violent extremism, including the isolation of radicalised London has a social integration inmates from common criminals, and strategy, and an equality, diversity investment in a higher number of and inclusion strategy. The social prison imams.103 The former initiative integration strategy takes a wider view was ended in 2016, however, Rotterdam at a glance of social integration to emphasise that as there were concerns that it it’s an issue that impacts all Londoners deepened radicalisation among and is therefore a concern for extremist suspects.104 everyone.73 London’s equality, diversity and inclusion strategy – Inclusive ,389 6.5 Rotterdam Population635 London – also outlines how, Rotterdam has been actively working in all areas of work, the Mayor on anti-radicalisation since at least can address inequalities, barriers 2005, when its action plan, called and discrimination. Participate or Be Left Behind, was adopted. Districts14 6.4 Paris The Paris Pact to Combat Extreme Two years after this, the Radicalisation Exclusion was published in 2015, Information Switchboard was after a period of consultation led by introduced. In 2011, Participate or 2 the city’s Mayor.100 The pact provides Be Left Behind was absorbed into km Area325 a new landscape of Parisian social broader counter terrorism policy interventions, carried out not only for, and the Radicalisation Information but also with those considered to be Switchboard was transformed into most vulnerable to extremism.101 The the Radicalisation Contact and Paris Pact is aimed at all individuals in Advisory Point. The purpose of the situations of vulnerability or exclusion, Advisory Point is to provide support and aims to support them at each for volunteers and professionals stage of their life for durable social regarding both general questions and professional integration.102 about radicalisation and specific questions about individual cases. The pact provides for 106 concrete measures aimed at ensuring lasting The #Safe010 (“#Veilig010”, in integration of all who are in a Dutch only) is the overall security vulnerable situation in Paris. The first strategy for Rotterdam, aimed at component is preventing isolation or creating a safe city with reduced exclusion. The fight against exclusion, crime levels. For the most vulnerable according to the pact, starts by areas, the city has appointed “city guaranteeing access to basic services marines” as part of the strategy. for all. The second component is These are local, on-the-ground city

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 21 WEsociety – Community Cohesion and Resilience Programme Case study 5

Following the 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, LOKAAL, the city also organised the G1000 Citizen Rotterdam galvanised community support by Summit in July 2017, where 1,500 citizens of Rotterdam organising four “WE meetings” with hundreds came together to have facilitated discussions on how of citizens in different neighbourhoods. From this, peace can be maintained in the city via the following the WEsociety programme was launched under the five topics: leadership of Rotterdam’s Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb. It is based on the principle of working towards a 1. Education and upbringing peaceful, just and resilient city, where there is a place 2. Social media for everyone regardless of their background 3. Living together in a neighbourhood or religion. 4. Identity 5. Radicalisation Its aim is to further connect citizens or groups by facilitating dialogue and meetings in the city that focus on A report that captured these conversations – titled listening without judgment or prejudice, building openness “The State of Rotterdam” – was published, and policy and mutual understanding. recommendations are being taken forward by the WEsociety programme.99 Since its conception the programme has initiated several successful activities, including interfaith meetings and district-level dialogues. In partnership with Stichting

The Netherland’s Safety House provides an In Rotterdam’s Safety House, there is a particular focus integrated community-safety service to deal with on radicalisation. Participants of this initiative come complex crimes and serious misconduct. The initiative together twice a week to review all Rotterdam’s cases uses a multi-agency approach, with a group of fixed of either already-radicalised or at-risk individuals. These key partners that include municipalities, the police, meetings are operational and on a case-by-case basis. public prosecutors, healthcare (including mental health), and education. Where necessary, added Twice a year they collate the information from cases partners can join the initiative, such as housing- dealt with throughout the year, in order to analyse it at corporation representatives or social workers. a strategic level. This includes looking into any patterns or themes in the cases and allows strategic insight that Municipalities in the 25 security regions of the is then sent to the Mayor of Rotterdam. The Mayor then Netherlands have been running these initiatives since discusses with other officials any implications for city-level 2013. The initiative uses a holistic approach to focus on policy before providing recommendations. complex problems. An example may be a combination of a criminal offence, addiction and parenting problems. For more information visit https://www.veiligheidshuizen. Cases are analysed as a group and a coordinator nl/ieuws/2016/120516_engelse-versie-animatiefilm- appointed who is responsible for a collective strategy in veiligheidshuizen#.XQeT3P6Wz08 which each party is assigned its own role. Families are also considered in the analysis and creation of the plan. 6 Responses to Radicalisation continued

workers who monitor safety, develop extremism, together with appropriate Stockholm at a glance new security measures where measures. The methods and actions necessary and engage with the local change from district-to-district as the community to do so. The #Safe010 challenges vary. also encompasses radicalisation, ,000 reinforcing the centrality of the As a municipality, Stockholm’s Population965 Advisory Point. anti-radicalisation initiatives focus on raising awareness among city Rotterdam’s revised approach employees, strengthening democracy to radicalisation, extremism and through education in schools, early polarisation in 2018 highlights prevention and, on an individual level, Municipalities11 its collaboration between the helping those who need support municipality, the police and the to leave a life of violent extremism. judiciary, and has a particular focus This relates to Sweden’s national on countering polarisation. Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy 2 km Against Violence Promoting Area188 This is seen in its four courses Extremism, released in 2011, which of action, which include: contains measures to:

1. Depolarisation and tension • Increase knowledge about violence- reduction. promoting extremism. 2. Bolstering resilience against • Discourage individuals from joining radicalisation, extremism violence-promoting extremist groups. and polarisation. • Facilitate, for those who have 3. Pr omoting expertise. already joined, to leave such groups. 4. Disengagement and de-radicalisation. The city-wide objectives include continued evaluation of current Rotterdam’s anti-radicalisation initiatives, a review of their civil approach incorporates a multi-agency society grants programmes and the framework and brings together city’s leasing of facilities, which have representatives from various parties, in recent years sometimes been including colleagues from various taken advantage of by right-wing clusters and districts, representatives and Islamic extremist groups. It is from Rotterdam’s community important to ensure initiatives are organisations, religious institutions, continuously reviewed and evaluated additional municipalities and ministries, to ensure funding and facilities go and other relevant individuals. to appropriate projects.

6.6 Stockholm One of the biggest challenges to Like all municipalities in Sweden, countering violent extremism currently Stockholm has local responsibilities noted by Stockholm’s Coordinator in countering radicalisation and Against Violent Extremism is the issue violent extremism. This includes a of information-sharing. Legislation regional Coordinator Against Violent means social services are not able to Extremism, 19 local coordinators and share any information, including crime- the development and implementation preventative data, for any individuals of city-wide guidelines for the city’s over 20 years of age with schools, work against violent extremism. other municipalities’ social services The municipality’s 14 city districts or even with the Police. This has and five (of 15) “administrative” posed significant barriers to effective city-wide districts (social services, multi-agency working and was noted labour market, education, culture through this project’s consultation as and sports) are all expected to an area that would have “the biggest develop annual status reports and impact” if a solution was found. action plans for countering violent

24 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 EXIT Fryshuset – Intervention Programme Case study 7

Founded in 1998 EXIT Fryshuset is an Non- The move of radicalisation and community-bonding Governmental Organisation (NGO) that provides processes of extreme right-wing movements to the confidential, tailored support to individuals and online space has meant that former neo-Nazis engaged families of individuals wishing to leave white on the programme now enter internet chatrooms under supremacy groups. It is only provided to those who pseudonyms. With their in-depth knowledge of extreme have voluntarily come to the programme because it right-wing discourses and narratives, they can actively is important that the individual wants to change. participate in discussion and debate. The process is designed to introduce doubt. Importantly, the focus of The project is funded primarily by government grants, this form of engagement is not to prove users wrong, and from time to time participates in EU projects funded by but to introduce doubt and gradually remove black-and- the European Commission (such as ISEC, Erasmus+, etc.). white thinking.85

The concept of EXIT is based on the understanding that EXIT also provides support, information and training to the reasons for involvement do not stem from ideology relatives of neo-Nazis and conducts educational work but from social reasons, such as feelings of exclusion and with professionals who work with young people (such lack of acceptance, and the search for identity, status as schools, social services and the police).86 and support, as well as power.83 The work uses long- term cognitive treatment aimed at helping individuals to For more information visit https://www. disengage from white supremacist groups and reintegrate counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/63/exit- into society.84 fryshuset The Tolerance Project – Intervention Programme Case study 8

The Tolerance Project, more often referred to as the One of the challenges faced by Kungälv was getting Kungälv Model, was developed and funded by local decision-makers to see the importance of a long-term government of Kungälv in 1995. It was in response social-investment approach on these questions of to the murder of a Swedish teenager of Czech prevention. Curbing extremism is essential, but cities origin by four neo-Nazis. The small coastal city of also need to see the real financial savings that investing Kungälv embarked on a long-term commitment and in tolerance brings. The project quantifies the financial social-investment approach. The project focuses on savings that investing in tolerance generates through a providing opportunities for youth “with an intolerant socio-economic analysis titled “The Price of Intolerance”. worldview” at schools to disconnect them from The success of the project led to a further roll-out of the neo-Nazi groups or extremist behaviour. initiatives in 20 municipalities.

For more information visit https://citiesofmigration.ca/ Curbing extremism is essential, but good_idea/rooting-out-intolerance-the-kungalv-model/ cities also need to see the real financial savings that investing in tolerance brings ‘The Price of Intolerance’. The Sens Critique Project – Prevention and Awareness Initiative Case study 9

The Sens Critique pilot programme was a civil creators, cyber-influencers, civil society experts and society project developed to support young people more. Among other things, the scheme’s aim is to in countering the challenges that new communication raise awareness of the dangers of fake news and hate technologies pose with the spread of disinformation, speech through awareness-raising exercises concerning manipulation and online hate. disinformation and emotional manipulation. It also supports students to build skills that could be used to The project was initiated by the think tank Civic Lab pursue careers in the media or film industry.106 via the initiative What the Fake, in partnership with the The Federation of Young Independent Producers Participants completed pre- and post-survey (FJPI), Impulsion 75, ISD and Lumières sur l’Info, and questionnaires to evaluate the programme’s success. supported by the Buffon and Pierre et Marie Curie sixth- Measures of success included an increased confidence form colleges, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the in identifying trustworthy sources of information, fake Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation (CIPDR) news, and emotional manipulation, and in creating online and Facebook France.105 content of their own.107

The pilot began in June 2018 with 22 students aged An evaluation report was developed by ISD. For 13–15 from three schools across Paris. There were five more information visit: https://www.isdglobal.org/ creative workshops on topics related to digital citizenship, isd-publications/building-digital-citizenship-in-france- media literacy and critical thinking. Participants were lessons-from-the-sens-critique-project/ also involved in the production of a campaign strategy and film, and engaged with various journalists, YouTube 7 Key Themes

Current responses to radicalisation across Europe act as a showcase of noteworthy initiatives, while also highlighting how cities can learn from each other.

For instance, the need highlighted The quality and type of engagement The quality and type of by a number of cities for more with both individuals and groups engagement with both effective ways to share information can, however, determine whether can be seen working effectively in they support integration or actually individuals and groups can Rotterdam’s in-house IT system. The polarise and isolate further, and determine whether they following sections discusses the key this should be given greater support integration or challenges major cities are facing with consideration. Rahimi and Graumans actually polarise and regard to radicalisation, along with state, “To attempt to explain or isolate further. recommendations of how they can understand radicalization as a tackle them. consequence of simple causes and direct pathways is not only One person who went to integration programmes in Austria said that they 7.1 Involving Communities naive but also dangerous… since made him feel “excluded from his new in Integration Initiatives it can lead to ineffective, or worse, Research has shown that community friends and community, reminding him counterproductive interventions that 113 cohesion and social integration may damage intercommunal trust that he was an outsider”. are two potential solutions (among and push certain groups to their limits Furthermore, what is seen by a city a range of many) to the issues of of resilience.”110 polarisation and radicalisation.108 For as equality or integration, may not instance, there is evidence to suggest Some argue that bringing be viewed the same way by the that people in more racially diverse communities together without community with which the city is neighbourhoods are more prosocial. meaningful integration can lead to attempting to engage or integrate. Jared Nai highlights that those who conflict111 or that integration initiatives For instance, research has shown have more frequent contact with can have the reverse effect, by that Muslim women have criticised other ethnic groups experience less highlighting ‘otherness’.112 CVE strategies for seeking to impose Western understandings of gender anxiety about intergroup interactions 114 and experience greater empathy equality on their communities. towards ‘outgroup’ members.109 Therefore, when developing

28 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 There needs to be Taking this train of thought a step greater involvement from further, it seems reasonable then for Recommendation 1 integration to be discussed within communities in the initial two stages: design and implementation City policymakers of radicalisation- 1. At a basic level, communities can to engage with and prevention policies. be considered integrated if each include community respects the rights of the other to exist, and neither negatively leaders in framing the integration initiatives that seek impacts the other in the exercise integration process. to bring equality and inclusion to of those rights. communities, cities must consider which forms of equality they are City-policy should seek to 2. At a more advanced level, bringing, and the way to do this engage with appropriate and communities can be considered is by engaging with those representative community more highly integrated where communities appropriately. leaders in the framing of the cultures, economies and ways integration process from the of life are accepted, and even There needs to be greater involvement outset. The ultimate goal is to in some cases shared. from communities in the initial design develop a shared view of the and implementation of radicalisation- extent to which integration 115 is desired within the wider prevention policies. Without Fundamental to peaceful greater involvement from the start context of peaceful co- of the design, all the way through co-existence is an existence. It is important that to implementation, the mention of acceptance by one cities ensure this engagement communities can sometimes have community of the right of process is inclusive and not a “stigmatising effect”, and can another to exist in-place. tokenistic. Community leaders “confuse their role as an interested need to be representative in party or stakeholder in a radicalisation- practice, not just in name and Within this context, however, it prevention policy by considering them standing, in order to avoid should further be noted that peaceful as mere targets of the policy”.116 self-appointed leaders. co-existence is not necessarily a stable state nor one that can be This can generate two maintained without some degree of Cities must actively work to counterproductive effects: effort. Where more advanced levels of ensure community groups can integration are absent the opportunity be equally represented through 1. Encouraging the rejection for misunderstanding grows. holistic demographics, such and distrust of the targeted Where reference points for other as geography, profession, communities, increasing the communities are few, the opportunity household size, and income. feeling of being stigmatised for ill-meaning manipulation of the This is especially important and persecuted. ways communities perceive each because native population 2. Not taking advantage of the other is high. groups and groups that have necessary and crucial role of community leaders who Considering the above, it could the communities, civil society represent a wide variety of be said then that a key goal of organisations and community- ethnic and religious groups social integration is one of moving based organisations to ensure are often very fractured, and communities from a position of the success of these policies’.117 it is harder to find a leadership non-peaceful co-existence to one voice for them. Two groups need not necessarily of peaceful co-existence. interact on a daily basis to lead happy, Providing space for communities fulfilling and prosperous lives. There to retain a sense of their own are many examples across society cultural identity while living of communities with differing cultural within a diverse community identities co-existing peacefully. What might reduce some of the is, however, fundamental to peaceful factors that increase levels co-existence is an acceptance by one of isolation and polarisation. community of the right of another to exist in-place.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 29 7 Key Themes continued

Thereafter efforts clearly delineate in the context of migration and into further work streams: Recommendation 2 polarisation, showing how “many well-intentioned programmes aimed • Ensuring the circumstances and at giving special preferences to means that promote peaceful co- Cities to support self- migrants and refugees ignore the existence between communities integration between needs of local communities, thereby who choose it are well funded exacerbating rather than facilitating and maintained. communities by inclusion”.118 In this way, the “counter- challenging inaccurate jihadist” far-right narratives are also • Providing opportunities for, and perceptions and creating sometimes unwittingly supported removing barriers to greater levels platforms for accurate by official security discourses when of community integration where understandings of political leaders narrate issues of those communities involved seek differing communities multiculturalism in ways that overlap it out. with counter-jihadist ideology.119

Social media can play a vital role in Where communities are This is because the narrative is often challenging misperceptions and fake unable to maintain a peaceful used by the far-right movement, news, and championing credible co-existence, effort should be particularly the feeling that the voices. Although removing radically directed towards distinguishing “non-minority” viewpoint is being violent or extremist content from between causes that relate left behind or even replaced. This online can have a positive effect, to inaccurate perceptions, translates into a fear among these other avenues are being explored. and more fundamental levels groups that white people are being of misalignment, because “deliberately replaced”, “erased by These include redirecting individuals the ways in which these two a growing non-white population”, from seeking out such content challenges are addressed will “losing their heritage”, “slighted” towards alternative but credible differ significantly. In order to and/or “left behind”.120 A common voices. Barcelona’s Anti-Rumour improve levels of integration, complaint stemming from such Network outlined earlier in this communities need first to have groups is the “special treatment or chapter is a good example of how an accurate understanding preferences” given to minorities, cities can effectively counter and of each other. By tackling migrants or refugees.121 Angela King, challenge stereotypes. In addition, challenges associated with a former neo-Nazi and co-founder the Redirect Method case study misunderstandings, city- of Life After Hate, stated that many is another example of effectively policy can help remove of the whites she grew up with held redirecting the user to content that barriers to self-integration the belief that “people of colour get challenges the original extremist between communities. special treatment”.122 content that was being sought. (continued p32)

7.2 Considering the Social media can play a Non-Minority Viewpoint The “counter-jihadist” vital role in challenging Involving communities in the framing far-right narratives are misperceptions and fake of the integration process and also sometimes news, and championing supporting self-integration must also unwittingly supported by credible voices. take into account all members of society. Integration initiatives that fail official security discourses to do this can not only lead to some when political leaders communities feeling stigmatised narrate issues of or targeted, they can also have multiculturalism in ways an averse effect on the rest of the that overlap with counter- community. The Friends of Europe jihadist ideology.119 organisation discusses this issue

30 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 The Redirect Method Case study 10

The Redirect Method was developed via a global Since the Redirect Method’s launch, Moonshot CVE has collaboration between Moonshot CVE in the UK, partnered with governmental and non-governmental Google Jigsaw in the US, Quantum Communications stakeholders to deploy the Redirect Method in over 39 and Valens Global. The Redirect Method connects countries and over 24 languages, responding to all forms individuals attracted to extremist content with of hate and violence. compelling and credible alternative messages using targeted advertising. Significant to this methodology is the particular focus on credible voices. Initiatives such as this one can help It focuses on users engaging with high-risk extremist challenge inaccurate perceptions and foster a better content online and offers them specially curated video understanding of communities, voiced by those in those playlists, web content, or intervention services. The communities. Initiatives like these can also help avoid the Redirect Method challenges violent extremist propaganda phenomenon of echo chambers. using both existing content made by communities across the globe, and new content, often created in partnership For more information visit https://redirectmethod.org/ with local organisations and designed to resonate with the interests of the at-risk audience. 7 Key Themes continued

A recent study on the alt-right overcoming other important aspects showed that they are much more of social division, such as age, social concerned that their group is at a class, employment status, sexuality, Recommendation 3 disadvantage compared with the gender and disability.131 study’s control sample of moderately Cities to frame policies leaning individuals. Furthermore In the interest of fostering inclusive, they are afraid of being displaced by cohesive communities, cities should within the wider context “outsiders” and see themselves as consider moving away from targeted of diverse multicultural potential victims.123 or ‘special favours’132 type policies. city inhabitants, including Instead, efforts should be placed on consideration of groups This is especially important when across-the-board equality policies not directly affected the threat of far-right extremism is that cover the needs of all, rather rising across Europe.124 In the UK, for than fuelling a feeling of otherness or instance, white extremists are gaining resentment from those ‘left behind’.133 When designing policy attention because they are forming Examples of this could be found in initiatives focused towards the largest proportion of terrorist affordable housing for all (that is, not particular community groups arrests seen in 15 years125 and just integrating new communities but within a city, interventions extreme right-wing referrals are up by also existing ones).134 should be framed within 36%.126 German authorities have also the wider context of diverse recently noted that the number of far- A broadened view of integration multicultural mix of city right extremists has jumped by 50% also points to the need for the city- inhabitants. If part of the in the last two years.127 Internationally, systems approach. If integration is process of deploying in the US, far-right extremists have broadly taken to include aspects as these initiatives included caused more fatalities since 9/11 diverse as those listed above, then consideration of and/or than any other category of city policy must also reflect that engagement with groups that domestic extremist.128 integration. If, for example, policies are not directly affected by the dealing with issues like employment interventions, the wider context status and social class are dealt could be better understood. Social integration with in a non-integrated manner, can be viewed as more the fundamental interdependencies have the potential to negatively impact than ethnicity, faith and between these aspects of society will be overlooked. Not only should perceptions in another. There is rarely migration. It is also about policies be co-designed with the a perfect solution, and to some extent overcoming other people they will affect, but they also it could be said that the one of the important aspects of should be co-designed across policy many goals of city leadership is to social division, such spheres and departments. This will attempt to balance these decisions as age, social class, improve value-added effectiveness so that the lives of all city inhabitants are positively affected. To add to employment status, through cohesion and the reduced secondary consequences. the challenge, this balancing act sexuality, gender required by policymakers and city and disability. Considering all groups – not just leaders can be significantly affected those directly affected – can be done by domestic geopolitical movements Although there are strong sentiments in a variety of ways. Like the idea of and extremist ideologies, many of around whether it is right to using Equality Impacts Assessments, which are funded and promoted by 1 encourage discourse with extremist cities can consider models such as state and non-state actors . groups, for fear of giving a platform the Intercultural Cities model. This 1 to hateful ideologies, it is important however should ensure it includes For more information on the challenges cities are facing in this regard, see “The Great Displacement: for cities to consider the need to all members of society and all The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed foster dialogue with all members communities, even those viewed Extremism” by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue. of society, and broaden views of as “the majority”. Available here: https://www.isdglobal.org/isd- publications/the-great-replacement-the-violent- traditional integration to focus more consequences-of-mainstreamed-extremism/ on inclusion and citizenship.129 7.3 Displacement of Issues Referring back to London’s social The conversation with regards to integration strategy, aptly called “All non-minorities feeling left behind of Us”, social integration can be is just one example of how policy viewed as more than ethnicity, faith decisions designed to improve the and migration.130 It is also about lives of one part of the community

32 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 Intercultural Cities Case study 11

The Intercultural Cities programme assists cities • Open up spaces and opportunities for deep interaction by reviewing their policies through an intercultural and co-creation between people of different cultural lens and developing comprehensive intercultural origins and backgrounds, to build trust, cohesion and strategies to help them manage diversity positively. solidarity, and thus realise the creative potential of diversity. The programme helps cities to: • Foster intercultural competence and empower • Create a sense of pluralistic identity embracing intercultural innovators in public, private and civil cultural pluralism and the complexity of identities society organisations. through leadership discourse and symbolic actions based on the pride and appreciation of the city diversity. • Manage conflict, busting stereotypes and engage in a debate about the impact and potential of diversity for • Set up a governance model empowering all members local development. of the community, regardless of their origin or status, to develop their potential, realise their talents and enable The Intercultural Cities Network provides expert and peer them to contribute to local prosperity. support to cities that choose to learn how to better harness diversity. It offers an internationally tested and validated • Promote participation and power-sharing, involving methodology, and a set of analytical and learning tools, people of diverse origins in decision-making in urban and helps with reshaping city policies and services to institutions, be they political, educational, social, make them more effective in a diverse context.135 economic or cultural. For more information visit https://www.coe.int/en/web/ interculturalcities/how-it-works-

However, this is not an easy task • Geo-locate extremist, hateful and and this research has identified Recommendation 4 prejudicial messages across a city a particular effect of policy level (for instance mapping anti- implementation that warrants Muslim sentiment in London further investigation: displacement. Cities to proactively at roughly a borough level). Understandably, policy interventions consider the extent are typically oriented towards • Understand the connection and addressing a key challenge within to which any given correlation between online hateful a city – that is to say, something for policy may displace, sentiment and how it correlates to which the symptoms are present and rather than address, the volume, type and location of perceivable. Within the context of this polarisation. offline hate crime, over time. discussion, for example, it could be a groundswell of negative feeling within • Identify key local, regional a particular community as a result of Cities should consider using and international events that perceived underinvestment over a a 360º perspective to assess cause the greatest risk to long time. all aspects of their various community cohesion. communities and how they This research has shown that a may be impacted either • Understand who receives the most positive intervention in one area or positively or negatively by digital abuse. community can trigger a decline cohesion, integration, or in integration (or an increase in counter terrorism policy. • Understand the communities who polarisation/isolation) in another. This will ensure that by drive digital abuse, including the Although the benefits of the attempting to solve an issue aggregated age and gender of intervention may be easily measured, in one community or one those driving abuse. a consequential decline somewhere area of policy, the issue is not else takes time to manifest itself; unintentionally displaced into • Segment digital abuse, including the symptoms are neither obvious another area. identification of conversations nor immediate. The timeframe and expressing support for violent activity. method typically used to measure the mapping social sentiment is possible positive impact of policy interventions – as the UK’s Tell MAMA initiative • Identify the narratives that are most in one area does not lend itself to has shown. Or, on a global scale salient within digital abuse.138 identifying associated delayed decline over the last 19 years, Edelman’s in others. Trust Barometer has detected and Such tools can be used to inform documented some of the largest a range of responses, including It is at times like these that the agility opinion shifts shaping the world.136 and adaptability of those seeking identifying when particular communities are at greater to radicalise comes into play. There is much being done by risk of abuse in order to shape These individuals and organisations organisations across the public, better community-reassurance can be highly sensitive to shifts private and third sectors not only measures, and the more effective in community sentiment. Where in mapping social sentiment but in targeting of preventative activity interventions shift sentiment for the correlating how online opinion and and communications responses. better (making effective recruitment hateful rhetoric can impact offline They can also be used to map less likely) they can quickly identify community relations. Cities can sentiment regarding terrorist attacks new target populations and adjust consider using social sentiment themselves, and potentially assist their approach accordingly. mapping tools, such as the Institute policymakers and researchers in for Strategic Dialogue’s Strong Cities better understanding the relationship 7.4 Mapping Social Sentiment Network hate mapping tool.137 Run between hate crimes and terrorism. When used in line with other forms of in partnership with the Center for the community engagement and in a city- Analysis of Social Media (CASM LLP), (continued p36) systems approach, mapping social the technology has been used to: sentiment may help avoid displacing problems as cities develop policies • Identify extremist, hateful and in tandem with the views of their prejudicial speech targeting a range inhabitants. Although challenging of communities and groups. to quantify, given the nature of the abstract notion of sentiment,

34 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 Tell MAMA Case study 12

Launched in 2012, the Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks abuse, whether verbal or physical, and add the location (MAMA) programme is a secure and reliable service of the attack so that Tell MAMA can map incidents across that allows people from across England to report England. any form of anti-Muslim abuse. Tell MAMA can also refer people to support through Initially funded by the UK Government for the first two partner agencies if they have been a victim of an anti- years of its work, it is now a self-reliant independent, Muslim incident. non-governmental organisation that works on tackling anti-Muslim hatred. It is therefore not influenced or wholly For more information visit shaped by the Government. The programme does work https://tellmamauk.org/about-us/ with central Government, however, to raise the issues of anti-Muslim hatred at a policy level, and the work helps to shape and inform policymakers, while ensuring that an insight is brought in through the systematic recording and reporting of anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes.

The service created a unique portal where anyone may address concerns and record any incident that they experience because of their Muslim faith, or because someone thinks they are Muslim. By using the Submit a Report section, people can describe the details of the 7 Key Themes continued

When discussing social-sentiment 7.5 The Unintended many minorities.145 Research in Dutch mapping, there are important and Consequences of Policies cities has also highlighted “a clear complex considerations, such as This report has already discussed pattern of socio-spatial polarisation” civil liberties and privacy, that also the unintended consequences and which has in turn raised questions need to be taken into account. This issues with displacement that city about the unintended consequences further highlights the need to take policies on integration and social of area-based policies.146 The way a city-systems approach to the cohesion can have. A glance at in which a city addresses affordable development of policy and ensure it is counter terror measures shows housing can also impact on isolation co-designed with community leaders. how they can have unintended and loneliness. consequences too, and much has been researched in this regard.139 The BBC’s loneliness experiment found that across cultures, countries Recommendation 5 An example of this can be seen and genders, people aged 16–24 in Black and Asian participants in are the loneliest age group.147 People UK focus groups exploring public who feel discriminated were also Cities to consider perceptions of citizenship. Some more likely to feel lonely.148 In the mapping social described increased feelings of UK, it has been argued that lack sentiment to monitor isolation and disconnect from the of affordable housing leaves most community polarisation State, and a reduced ability to young people with limited choices, and hate crimes, and participate in the public sphere and as shared homes lose living shift policy in tandem directly caused by counter rooms, and prices send millennials to terrorism measures.140 the cheaper suburbs, opportunities with social sentiment to socialise are reduced.149 Of There have also been reports course, lack of affordable housing Mapping social sentiment that young Muslims in the UK are is a widespread structural issue and can be a useful early-warning disengaging from local mosques cannot definitively be credited as system for cities to monitor for fear of being ‘tainted’ with having a causal relationship with the and combat community certain views, and British Muslim radicalisation process. What this polarisation and hate crimes. community and religious leaders illustrates, however, is the continued More significantly, it can allow have expressed feelings of pressure emerging need for cities to consider policy to shift in tandem with to “actively denounce every act policy in a holistic way. sentiment, therefore limiting of global terrorism so as to not 141 grievances through good be considered complicit.” Transport can also unintentionally governance. Cities should Respondents from the same focus impact on isolation. For instance, consider using existing groups also felt that other important a study from earlier this year in networks to engage with policy areas, such as housing, Northern Ireland showed that young communities, as well as new health, education, employment and people reliant on public transport in technologies, such as the crime were neglected because of less well-connected areas of cities Stronger Cities Network’s hate an “exclusive focus” on preventing will be limited to participating in 142 mapping tool to gain a greater violent extremism. activities in their local area which understanding of the grievances may not always be adequate for 150 held by its inhabitants. Further research is needed on how their needs. This made it difficult policies at a city level can impact to reach opportunities outside their local communities, however some immediate area and increased examples of broader policies their risk of social exclusion.151 The having unintended consequences same study showed how transport on isolation and polarisation can can be a positive force, such as in be seen in housing and transport London where free bus travel for policies. These have been cited young people was both a physically as unintentionally contributing and socially active experience to polarisation and isolation of and provided “opportunities for communities.143, 144 Some housing meaningful social interaction, a sense projects in Western Europe are built of belonging and visibility in the public in suburbs that require houses to arena, and helped to alleviate chronic be a minimum size, which makes loneliness in the city”.152 expensive homes unaffordable for

36 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 Molenbeek Case study 13

Molenbeek is an interesting example of city planning (or lack thereof) having led to an isolated community. Although much work has been done since, this municipality proved to be very relevant to the string of terrorist attacks in France in 2015, and was known for being a hotbed of radicalism in Belgium.153

The region has faced significant challenges with unemployment, lack of suitable accommodation, and low education levels. Located in central Brussels on a surface of less than 6 km2,154 Molenbeek’s population grew from 68,000 to 95,000 between 1995 and 2016 – in part due to a high birth rate and low mortality rate, and a high proportion of young migrants.155

The chief of police of Brussels-West stated that during the influx of migrants in Molenbeek, newcomers were accommodated in houses officially declared “uninhabitable” because there was no alternative housing.156 However, estimates have put the number of unused housing units in Brussels at anywhere between 15,000 and 30,000.157 the director of the largest mosque in Brussels, has stated There is a need to reposition the narrative “If people had jobs and opportunities here, they wouldn’t go [to Syria], believe me”.164 around Molenbeek away from the stereotype of a hotbed of radicalisation, Although the issues faced by Molenbeek are complex, as the long-term impact of this portrayal and tie into wider challenges in Belgium with regard to may have unintentionally further fuelled fragmented governance structures, much has since been done by the city to counter this. The Ministry of Interior radicalisation and isolation. released its Canal Plan, which aims to improve issues “precisely where the needs are most pressing, where the In addition, it has been argued that the capacity of the problems pile up”.165 The plan aims to address accessible police also decreased in the area because of “[t]oo much housing requirements, the need for workplaces, workshops localism, too many overlapping authorities and too much and sites directly related to the canal and the waterway, politicisation of nominations”.158 Another challenge the the need for recreational areas, natural spaces, places for area faced was the high number of associations working learning, cultural and public spaces.166 It also is believed in Molenbeek, but hardly any consultation between these it can “help counter terrorism and nip radicalisation in the organisations themselves or with the zonal police.159 These bud” and although there is not yet research showing a various initiatives are supported by either the Brussels direct correlation, the municipality of Molenbeek has seen region, the Flemish community or the federal government, a 14.2% drop in crime, and coordination and collaboration all of which are attempting similar outcomes, but with a among the agencies is improving.167 lack of coordination.160 Rik Coolsaaet, expert in terrorism at the University of Ghent, has stated on the issue “It was Although the situation is improving, perhaps considering (also) due to the gap between the political and intelligence the longer term unintended consequences of its housing, worlds: intelligence people did not have friends in politics, education and employment policies on its communities and politicians did not appreciate the need to keep track of may have helped to reduce some of the difficulties it is new developments like foreign fighters.”161 facing today. Furthermore, perhaps there is a need to reposition the narrative around Molenbeek away from the Referring back to the concept of vulnerability factors as stereotype of a hotbed of radicalisation, as the long-term push or pull, the municipality is responsible for addressing impact of this portrayal may have unintentionally further the push factors. In Molenbeek’s case, this combination fuelled radicalisation and isolation. of socio-economic difficulties and lack of coordination from judiciary forces (push factors) “left Molenbeek vulnerable to gangsterism and opportunistic terrorism”162 as jihadists “prey on local insecurities, promising that youngsters can redeem themselves as heroes fighting infidels in Syria” (pull factors).163 Jamal Saleh Momenah,

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 37 7 Key Themes continued

7.6 Designing Policy Holistically that it should form part of every This is not to say, of course, that Considering unintended consequences discussion, nor be a key design factors relating to the vulnerability of city-level policy can be done criteria in every policy the city seeks of individuals to radicalisation are through designing policies in a holistic to deploy, merely that awareness of expected to be found in most manner and within the appropriate the possibility that policy decisions policy decisions. It is to say that the local context. When policymakers may affect – positively or negatively likelihood of identifying the small develop or redesign policies, they – the vulnerability of individuals or number of policies that could (by should consider the whole city, all communities to radicalisation should accident rather than design) influence communities, and how or if the new be raised, and that its discussion is vulnerability in a secondary manner will or redesigned policy might impact on neither unusual nor any suggestion of be greatly increased if city employees polarisation or isolation. This can also failure on the part of the policymaker. feel comfortable in raising the topic in be done through a positive lens of all environments. how cities can solve several problems The last two decades have shown us through one initiative. that radicalisation and terror attacks The implementation of this are part of city life, no matter how recommendation will have the When tackling the challenge undesirable. Empowering people to greatest chance of success if of policy decisions directly or discuss these topics brings them into led from the top within a city indirectly influencing vulnerability to the light, which in turn encourages administration where city leaders radicalisation, cities should first try to others to feel more comfortable in can provide clear and consistent identify which of the policy areas are joining the discussion. It is in this way direction to their teams, and where more or less likely to have an impact. that greater insight, more informed employees who raise considerations By developing a matrix of policy opinions and further debate (whether or not they prove true after areas, and the extent to which they is fostered. investigation) are praised for engaging could improve or worsen polarities in the debate and protected from in public sentiment and community negative consequences. sensitivity, cities will be able to narrow Recommendation 6 their field of focus to areas in which As a first step, fostering an results are more likely. This approach inclusive environment will require an can help decision-making because Cities to consider understanding of employees’ own new techniques can be piloted and the unintended biases and experiences to ensure refined at a manageable scale before consequences of policies they are cautious of any (conscious being rolled out more widely. through a city-systems or unconscious) prejudices they could bring to their work, and that they Figure 4 illustrates this point. approach that weights know how to recognise them. policy areas to assess whether a decision is For instance, anti-radicalisation The last two decades more-or-less likely to literature has been dominated by have shown us that a focus on countering Islamist influence polarisation. 168 radicalisation and terror extremism and as seen throughout this report, anti-radicalisation attacks are part of city life, To consider unintended initiatives – whether intentionally or no matter how undesirable. consequences of policies, cities not – can end up targeting particular should not only employ a city- communities. Prejudices can also 7.7 Normalising the Discussion systems approach and consider be seen mainstreamed into society As was the case with bringing adaptation of frameworks such and even official rhetoric, such as the discussions about risk management as the Resilience Framework difficulties in calling white supremacist into daily life in the 1980s and 1990s, or development of tailored attacks terrorism.169, 170 and resilience in the 2000s, cities equality impact assessments. should consider normalising the This could help reduce discussion of the extent to which displacement of problems and policy decisions could exacerbate or unintended (and undesirable) even trigger tensions or grievances, consequences to originally which could increase vulnerability well-intentioned policies. to radicalisation. This is not to say

38 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

Figure 4 The relationship between city policy and vulnerability factors

City policies Vulnerability factors

Employment and Skills Economic vulnerability

Health Public and media discourse

Education and Youth Stigmatisation/Identity crisis

Housing and Land/Residential Development Feelings of injustice or indignation

Technology and Innovation Radical social networks

Note: Example only – vulnerability factors may link into more than one policy, and vice versa.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 39 7 Key Themes continued

Awareness of the Therefore frontline practitioners may Internationally there are also many possibility that policy be susceptible to absorbing attitudes cases of successful multi-agency and beliefs unintentionally that could working, such as the Strong decisions may affect – impact on their neutrality in their Cities Network’s establishment of positively or negatively roles. This can be mitigated through Local Prevention Networks in the – the vulnerability appropriate anti-bias or unconscious- Middle East2, and various initiatives of individuals or bias training and cities should throughout Australia, Canada and communities to consider supporting employees the US. The latter is evidenced in radicalisation both at a policymaking level and at the city of Boston, which has been frontline practitioners to address recognised for its collaborative efforts should be raised. such issues. in this regard.172 The Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau 7.8 Multi-Agency Working of Investigation (FBI), Department Multi-agency working has been of Homeland Security (DHS) identified as a key theme for and National Counterterrorism successful anti-radicalisation Center (NCTC), and a range of initiatives among practitioners in stakeholders in the Greater Boston anti-radicalisation.171 This is not a region have worked together to new concept; collaboration among develop a locally driven framework partners dealing with radicalisation is under the coordination of the US already well underway in many cities Attorney’s Office for the District of across Europe, and can be seen Massachusetts: The Framework in initiatives such as Manchester’s for Prevention and Intervention RADEQUAL programme and Strategies: Incorporating Violent Rotterdam’s Safety House. Extremism into Violence Prevention

40 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

Although there is much more Despite advances in communicative Recommendation 7 to multi-agency working than technology, sharing of information information-sharing and terminology, is also significantly challenging these two areas have been chosen across national borders. In interviews Cities to work as a focus in this report because conducted by Frontline with counter- towards normalising they have been highlighted as a terror veterans in Europe and the need through collaboration with US, a number of systemic problems the discussion of partners in this project. This report were outlined, including differences polarisation, isolation acknowledges, however, that multi- in laws and security cultures that and radicalisation. agency working requires much hamper intelligence-sharing and more than just these two aspects law-enforcement cooperation among in order to be effective. In particular, nations.177 In 2016, Europol stated To normalise the discussion successful multi-agency working that the Paris attacks showed the around polarisation, isolation also requires the knowledge and “exchange of information… needs and radicalisation, these understanding that different agencies improving.”178 Its director, Rob issues should become part of have, providing different advantages Wainright, also stated “there is a the everyday decision-making in different areas. strong consensus… We have to process. This will take time, work much more together in the but policymakers should 7.9 Information-Sharing cross-border way. consider how they can support Although much is being done, this at all levels of the society, challenges remain for cities that And that includes sharing intelligence including in public, private, and wish to foster effective multi-agency as well as understanding the need to third sector organisations. working. In particular, the sharing pass new European laws.”179 of information has been noted as a Efforts. The framework is intended challenge many times by partners Furthermore, it has been noted that to serve as a foundation for during the research of this report. having a legal framework in place communities to build resilience The Radicalisation Awareness to share information freely while and capacity in countering Network has done significant work considering civil liberties and the violent extremism.173 on outlining and deconstructing implications on privacy would be of the barriers to information-sharing great benefit to such initiatives, and More than mere cooperation and across agencies175 and provides it is proposed that further research is collaboration however, the case practical advice on how to overcome invested into what this might look like. of Boston is noteworthy because these.3 They have highlighted, it sees radicalisation as one of the barriers that are rooted in “cultures On a city level, Rotterdam’s Safety many social ills faced by its city, of secrecy in one agency (eg. House provides a noteworthy case and does not exceptionalise it. security services) and cultures study of how to overcome the data- Boston embraced a comprehensive of client confidentiality in another sharing issue. approach to the prevention of (eg. health).”176 violence rather than focusing on only one form, and evaluative research has shown that in fact “a narrow More than mere focus on ideology and/or extremism cooperation and rather than prevention of acts of collaboration however, violence of the motivation by which the case of Boston is they are perpetrated, is counter- noteworthy because it productive.”174 And as seen in Molenbeek, a lack of a coordinated, sees radicalisation as multi-agency approach can have one of the many social ills significant repercussions. faced by its city, and does not exceptionalise it.

2 The Strong Cities Network has developed models for multi-agency design. Beginning with a partnership between Danish cities and Jordanian and Lebanese counterparts, this initiative focused on how the multi-agency partnership at the heart of prevention models in cities like Aarhus, Copenhagen and Viborg could be fostered and contextualised to meet regional PVE needs. For more information and the policy guidebook see: https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/scn-regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/

3 For practical advice on overcoming information sharing barriers, see: Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Approaches and practices by the Radicalisation Awareness Network. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran- best-practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures_en.pdf

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 41 Rotterdam’s Safety House IT System Case study 14

Like other cities, Rotterdam has faced challenges Furthermore, that information could not be taken back when it comes to sharing information across multi- to any of the representative’s organisations and would agency partners. The Safety House model experienced remain secure within the municipality’s system. these challenges, especially with regard to having healthcare professionals (in particular, mental health), Although at first some partners experienced a period of social care workers, and police representatives on its adjustment when using the system, particularly in regard panels, all of which have strict legislation and codes to cultural taboos around sharing information, in the long of conduct when it comes to sharing patient or run this has greatly supported multi-agency working. It suspect information. has been noted however that a specific legal framework tackling these issues would be of great benefit.180 To tackle this, the Justice and Policing Department funded a tailored IT system to store information of cases discussed in the Safety House. This was developed by experts, but housed in the municipality’s server, and information stored in the system would be only accessible by those involved in the Safety House initiative.

7.10 A Consensus of Terminology Finally, the terminology used can be Recommendation 8 significant in supporting multi-agency working, not just within cities, but internationally as well. Academics181, Cities to support multi-agency working by 182, 183 have been highlighting for a number of years that despite its a) Investing in further b) Developing a frequent use across the fields of research into IT and consensus of terminology security, integration and foreign legal frameworks for among key partners policy, the term “radicalisation” remains, at best, an “essentially sharing information Shared terminology and relative” term.184 Six years ago, the Further work and research understanding of the key development of a language and a should be invested into both concepts in the field have taxonomy of concepts that inform legal frameworks and IT systems been consistent issues for a academic and political discourse for multi-agency partners to number of years. Cities should on the topic (of radicalisation and share information, not just within consider how this barrier can be terrorism) was described as an cities but across borders as well. overcome. Possible solutions ‘urgent priority’ in the field.185 This is particularly important as include a facilitated approach via extremist views are becoming international networks such as the Additionally, conversations with more coherent as an international Strong Cities Network to develop numerous stakeholders in London, movement. For instance, online a consensus of terminology and Europe and internationally has forums regularly share extremist share this widely. shown that there is still a difference ideas and content. If those in understanding of key terms carrying out terrorist attacks and concepts when it comes to are sharing information, so radicalisation.186 If cities are to support must those who are trying to multi-agency working, it is integral counter them. that they place some emphasis and resources on building a common understanding of key terms, at least within their own cities. Included in this would be not just developing definitions of key terminology but also coming to a consensus among stakeholders of aims, and measures of success. Agencies and networks such as CTPN and the Strong Cities Network can play an integral role in facilitating this.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 43 8 Conclusion

Common approaches to countering The context in which cities find radicalisation and violent extremism themselves today is one where society, have included targeted integration interventions. However, these can technology and the climate are evolving be problematic because they have faster than policy can develop. not always taken into account all members of society. The consequences of this can not only lead to some communities feeling stigmatised or targeted, they can Although many of the consequences It is in these circumstances that cities also have an averse effect and create of this change are beneficial, not are compelled to address the threat feelings of being left behind by the all are. We live in a world in which of radicalisation. Large enough to remaining communities. By framing political echo chambers can magnify make a difference but small enough policy decisions within the wider smaller frustrations and polarise to push forward local change, cities context of citizen needs, city leaders points of view, in which instances of are home to dense areas of residential can prevent issues from being hate and intolerance are increasing. and commercial development, as well displaced rather than resolved. As city leaders strive to support the as populous commuter and tourism growth of peaceful and inclusive destinations – both of which create communities, it is important to take sites for terrorist attacks. Those who By framing policy these perspectives into account. might seek to promote hatred feed on the uncertainties, fears, inequalities, decisions within the angers and resentments born of wider context of citizen City-policy development inequality within the urban environment. needs, city leaders can and implementation can prevent issues from be a vital lever in the It is clear that the drivers of being displaced rather radicalisation are complex and that than resolved. creation of welcoming, not all are influenced by city policy equitable and safe spaces decisions, but cities can still help to for communities to grow reduce the threat of radicalisation. This report does not suggest that and individuals to thrive. They can influence the push factors the question on the extent to which of radicalisation by understanding city-policy influences radicalisation is complete. Moreover, it has just Cities can be exciting, curious, how policy development and begun. Although the data that is fast-paced and energetic melting implementation impacts daily life available today indicates a need pots of culture, ideas and ambitions, on an individual and community for cities to focus on issues of but they are also under immense level. City-policy development and polarisation and isolation in the fight pressure. As we look to the future, implementation can be a vital lever in against radicalisation, there is simply cities of the world will house more the creation of welcoming, equitable not enough to demonstrate this of the planet’s population than the and safe spaces for communities to scientifically. Furthermore, the subject rural areas that surround them.187 grow and individuals to thrive. matter experts who have been As budgets fluctuate and political engaged in the process of developing environments remain uncertain, Like all city-policy however, anti- this report agree almost universally public frustrations and apprehensions radicalisation policies should not that there is more work to be done in grow. Expectations of city leaders be developed in silo but should this area. The city systems approach to steward rapid change, while be designed with the whole city in proposed here is fundamental to this. providing security and stability to their mind. The need to rapidly design populations, are greater than ever and enact new city-policy must be before. Citizens are conscious of in tandem with consideration of the the problems of inequality and consequences – intentional or not. the consequences of actions Cities must not get so distracted by on the climate. the need for change that they fail to recognise the consequences of it.

44 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

Summarised Recommendations for Anti-Radicalisation

1 City policy makers to engage with and include community leaders in framing of the integration process.

2 Cities to support self-integration between communities by challenging inaccurate perceptions and creating platforms for accurate understandings of differing communities.

3 Cities to frame policies within the wider context of diverse multicultural mix of city inhabitants, including consideration of groups not directly affected.

4 Cities to proactively consider the extent to which any given policy may displace, rather than address polarisation.

5 Cities to consider mapping social sentiment to monitor community polarisation and hate crimes, and shift policy in tandem with social sentiment.

6 Cities to consider the unintended consequences of policies through a city-systems approach that weights policy areas to assess whether a decision is more-or-less likely to influence polarisation.

7 Cities to work towards normalising the discussion of polarisation, isolation and radicalisation.

8 Cities to support multi-agency working by: a) Investing in further research into IT and legal frameworks for sharing information. b) Developing a consensus of terminology among key partners.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 45 9 Appendix 1: The Resilience Framework

The Rockefeller Foundation employs displace problems, but looks at the the city-systems concept through city holistically. The approach has the Resilience Framework,188 which not been applied to the context of seeks to find solutions for a resilient anti-radicalisation and countering society that cut across numerous polarisation, but lends itself well to city-level policy domains, and that the job of approaching radicalisation are not necessarily focused on a in a systematic manner. single (original) issue. This approach allows improved, forward-thinking city-policy that does not merely

Figure 5 City Resilience Framework

M ted inima egra l Hu Int ning ma t Plan Vulne n men rab op ility vel De D i ve d r e an se r s d e r L w e Y E iv o ld G H m e o E E p l p h T A l i m e A L o h E k R T y o a T H m o t S e d S E & n & L t IB W X P E I L T E F N L H A S D L R N B U T E E D S E & E U I t D R B N o f p O f A H e i R L G h E U u c t t s F m r L E i n C v e a e R E e d n U V m I S a O T H e a e S C g E E f L e E a R L e F V a I g e n E S l t u v a R U h i L D a t M C E & r

c N T d

I e A L s f R

i f

G f

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y e t t C l i r i t o a o

n m b p e l p m e d u I M I u S N e n l o v i F i a b c t R u a i c t l t i A e u i t l o y l S M n o & T R Y C T U E C I T C U O R S & E y E & it f & r f Y u o e c c E f C M e C ti O S r v O e w i e S N a t Y iv L ic P O s f a r S C n o l o TE E e S v M h s e is S e le r i pr u v on R ic om es C

R edu le ced inab Expo usta and sure S y Fra nom gility Eco

Credit: Arup, The Rockefeller Foundation, 2015

46 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 10 Acknowledgements

100 Resilient Cities The Centre for Security Studies at the The CTPN partnering cities of Greater Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Manchester, Paris, Rotterdam, (ETH) Zurich Stockholm and Barcelona

Ko Minderhoud, Counter-Terrorism Christina Kiernan, Coordinator Greater London Authority Team Manager, Netherlands National Against Violent Extremism, Police, Rotterdam Executive Office, City of Stockholm a) Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime: Countering Violent Extremism Programme b) The Communities and Social Policy Unit

Strong Cities Network, Institute The Metropolitan Police Royal United Services Institute for Strategic Dialogue

Centre for the Prevention UK Counter Terrorism The University of Warwick of Radicalisation Leading Policing Headquarters to Violence (Montreal)

Moonshot CVE King’s College University Google Jigsaw (New York)

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 47 11 Endnotes

1 Lenos, S., Haanstra W., Keltjens uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 22 Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., Ilbahar, E. and M. and Donk M. (2017). RAN data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_ Barton, G. (2018). ‘The Three Ps of Polarisation Management Manual, Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2- Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. RAN Centre of Excellence (6 July). Interactive.pdf A Systematic Scoping Review of the Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ Scientific Evidence about Radicalization home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ 9 Manchester City Council (2019). Into Violent Extremism’, Studies in Conflict what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_ ‘RADEQUAL’, Making Manchester Safer. & Terrorism (July). awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ ran_polarisation_management_manual_ 10 United Nations (2017). Definitions 23 Khalil, J. and Zeuthen, M. (2016). amsterdam_06072017_en.pdf ‘Vulnerability’, United Nations Office for ‘Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Disaster Risk Reduction. Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design 2 Alia, M. (2019). ‘Community Engagement and Evaluation’, Royal United Services to Prevent Radicalization in the EU’, 11 No Isolation (2017). What is Social Institute for Defence and Security Studies, European Eye on Radicalization. Available Isolation? (18 April). Available at: https:// RUSI Whitehall Report, pp. 2-16. at: https://eeradicalization.com/community- www.noisolation.com/global/research/ engagement-to-prevent-radicalization-in- what-is-social-isolation/ 24 Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar and Barton (2018). the-eu/ (Accessed 2 May 2019). ‘The Three Ps’. 12 Ibid. 3 MOPAC (2019). ‘Countering Violent 25 Centre for the Prevention of Extremism’, The Mayor of London. Available 13 Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F., Kruglanski, Radicalization, ‘The Radicalisation Process’. at: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/ A., de Wolf, A., Mann, L. Feddes, A. mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/ (2016). ‘Terrorism, Radicalization and 26 Rosand, E. (2016). ‘Communities First: countering-violent-extremism De-radicalization’, Current Opinion in A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining Psychology, 11, pp. 79-84. a Global Movement Against Violent 4 Ellis, B. H., Abdi S. M., Lazarevic V., Extremism’, The Prevention Project, White M. T., Lincoln A. K., Stern, J. E. 14 Definitions provided by the Institute Washington D.C. and Horgan, J. G. (2015). ‘Relation of for Strategic Dialogue, Strong Cities Psychosocial Factors to Diverse Behaviours Network, 2019. 27 Hausman, A.J., Hanlon, A. and Seals, B. and Attitudes Among Somali Refugees’, (2007). ‘Social Capital as a Mediating Factor American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. 15 Baker-Beall, C., Heath-Kelly, C., and in Emergency Preparedness and Concerns Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ Jarvis, L., eds., Counter-Radicalisation: about Terrorism’, Journal of Community ort0000121 (Accessed 9 May 2019 Critical perspectives, (London: Psychology, 35(8), pp. 1073-83. before publication). Routledge, 2014). 28 Helfstein, S. (2014). ‘Social Capital and 5 Alia, M. (2019). ‘Community Engagement 16 Dodd, V. (2019). ‘Counter-Terror Terrorism’, Defence and Peace Economics to Prevent Radicalization in the EU’, Chief Says Policing Alone Cannot Beat 25(4), pp. 363-80. European Eye on Radicalization Extremism’, The Guardian (6 August). (21 January). Available at: https:// 29 Post, J. M., Mcginnis, C. and Moody, K. eeradicalization.com/community- 17 The Eden Project (2019). ‘The Cost of (2014). ‘The Changing Face of Terrorism engagement-to-prevent-radicalization-in- Disconnected Communities’. Available at: in the 21st Century: The Communications the-eu/ (Accessed 2 May 2019). https://www.edenprojectcommunities.com/ Revolution and the Virtual Community of the-cost-of-disconnected-communities Hatred’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 6 Ali, W. (2018). ‘Deradicalizing White People’, The New York Review Daily 18 American Psychological Association 30 Lee, J. E.C. and Lemyre, L. (2009). ‘A (16 August). (2017). So Lonely I Could Die, (5 August). Social-Cognitive Perspective of Terrorism Risk Perception and Individual Response 7 Nasser-Eddine, M., Garnham, B., 19 Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization in Canada’, Risk Analysis, 29(9), Agostino, K., and Caluya, G. (2008). Leading to Violence (2019). ‘The pp. 1265-1280. ‘Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Radicalisation Process’. Available at: Literature Review (No. DSTO-TR-2522)’, https://info-radical.org/en/radicalization/the- 31 Putnam, R. D. (2016). ‘Bowling Alone: Australian Government, Department of radicalization-process/ America’s Declining Social Capital’, Culture Defence, Canberra. Available at: https:// and Politics: A Reader. apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource- 20 Pantucci, R. (2018). ‘A View from the files/2011/03/apo-nid101921-1138111.pdf CT Foxhole: Neil Basu, Senior National 32 Flora, J. L. (1998). ‘Social Capital and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Policing Communities of Place’, Rural Sociology, 8 UK Home Office (2015). ‘Revised Prevent in the United Kingdom’, Combating 63(4), pp. 481-506. Duty Guidance for England and Wales’, Terrorism Centre, 11(2). Gov.UK. Available at: https://assets. 33 Portes, A. (1998). ‘Social Capital: Its publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 21 Ibid. Origins and Applications in Modern

48 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

Sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, with Surge in Hate Crimes: Amnesty’ 64 Klausen (2009). ‘British Counter-Terrorism 24, pp. 1-24. (9 June). After 7/7’.

34 Morrison, N. (2003). ‘Neighbourhoods 49 Bleiker, C. (2017). ‘Hate Crimes Against 65 UK Home Office (2018). ‘Counter- and Social Cohesion: Experiences from Homosexuals on the Rise in Germany’, Terrorism Strategy’. Europe’, International Planning Studies, DW (9 August). 8(2), pp. 115-38. 66 Lahnait F. (2018). ‘Preventing Violent 50 UK Home Office, (2018). ‘Hate Crime, Extremism to Counter Home-Grown 35 Helfstein (2014). ‘Social Capital England and Wales 2017/18, Statistical Jihadism: Learning by Doing’, Institute and Terrorism’. Bulletin 20/18’. Gov.UK. for Statecraft and Governance (London) (2 February). 36 Coleman, J.S. (1988). ‘Social Capital 51 Ibid. in the Creation of Human Capital’, The 67 Government of France (2018). American Journal of Sociology, 94, 52 Tell MAMA, (2017). Available at: https:// ‘Prevent to Protect’, National Plan to S95-120. tellmamauk.org/ Prevent Radicalisation.

37 Friend, C. ‘Social Contract Theory’, 53 Ibid. 68 Counter Extremism Project, ‘France: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Extremism and Counter-Extremism’. Available at: https://www.iep.utm.edu/ 54 Information provided by the Institute Available at: https://www.counterextremism. soc-cont/ for Strategic Dialogue, Strong Cities com/countries/france Network, 2019. 38 Helfstein (2014). ‘Social Capital and 69 MOPAC (2019). ‘Countering Terrorism’. 55 Ibid. Violent Extremism’.

39 Youth Justice Board (2012). ‘Preventing 56 Safe Home, (2017). ‘Hate on Social 70 Ibid. Religious Radicalisation and Violent Media: A Look at Hate Groups and Their Extremism: A systematic review of the Twitter Presence’, safehome.org. 71 Ibid. research evidence’, Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (16 November). 57 Lenos, Haanstra, Keltjens and Donk 72 UK Home Office (2018). ‘Counter- (2017). ‘RAN Polarisation Management’. Terrorism Strategy’. 40 Harriet, A., Glazzard, A., Jesperson, S., Reddy-Tumu, S. and Winterbotham, 58 Holling, C. S. (2001). ‘Understanding the 73 Greater London Authority (2018). ‘All of E. (2015). ‘Drivers of Violent Extremism: Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Us: The Mayor’s social integration strategy’, Hypotheses and Literature’, RUSI. Social Systems’, Ecosystems, 4(5), Mayor of London. pp. 390-405. 41 Ibid. 74 Crerar, P. (2016). ‘London Is Still Open for 59 Merton, R. K. (1936). ‘The Unanticipated Business Despite Brexit: Mayor launches 42 Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar and Barton (2018). Consequences of Purposive Social Action’, #LondonIsOpen campaign’, Evening ‘The Three Ps’. American Sociological Review, 1(6), Standard (18 July). pp. 89-904. 43 Lenos, Haanstra, Keltjens and Donk 75 Ibid. (2017). ‘RAN Polarisation Management’. 60 Baert, P. (1991). ‘Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples’, 76 Gibson, E. (2016). ‘David Shrigley and 44 Townsend, M. (2018). ‘UK Towns International Sociology, 6(2), pp. 201-210. Sadiq Khan Launch LondonisOpen Poster ‘Polarised’ by Rise of Rar Right’, The Campaign for the Tube’, Dezeen (1 August). Guardian (27 October). 61 Klausen, J. (2009). ‘British Counter- Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community 77 Crerar (2016). ‘London Is Still Open 45 Ibid. Policing to the Fight Against Domestic for Business’. Terrorism’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 46 Bruxelles Prevention & Securite, Studies, 35. 78 Ibid. ‘Polarisation and radicalisation’. Available at: http://www.veiligheid-securite.brussels/ 62 Mirahmadi, H. (2016). ‘Building Resilience 79 Manchester City Council (2019). ‘Prevent en/plan/topic-sheets/polarisation-and- Against Violent Extremism’, The ANNALS in Manchester’, makingmanchestersafer. radicalisation of the American Academy of Political and com. Available at: http://www. Social Science, 668(1), pp. 129-44. makingmanchestersafer.com/mms/info/16/ 47 OSCE (2017). ‘Hate Crime Reporting’, prevent/25/prevent_in_manchester ODHR. 63 UK Home Office (2018). ‘Counter- Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) 2018’, 80 Ibid. 48 Reuters (2016). ‘Germany Failing to Deal Gov.UK.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 49 11 Endnotes continued

81 Ibid. 96 Barcelona City Council (2017). ‘On 111 Rahimi, S. and Graumans, R. (2015). Guaranteeing Equal Treatment for Religious ‘Reconsidering the Relationship Between 82 Ibid. Bodies Holding Occasional Activities Integration and Radicalization’, Journal for in Public Places’. Available at: https:// Deradicalization, 5, (Winter 15/16). 83 Ibid. bcnroc.ajuntament.barcelona.cat/jspui/ bitstream/11703/114543/4/mesura_ 112 Ibid. 84 European Forum for Urban Security govern_tracte_igualitari_en.pdf (2016). Practice Sheet. Available at: https:// 113 Ali (2018). ‘Deradicalizing White People’. efus.eu/files/2016/09/PS_Stocolm_Exit- 97 Council of Europe (2017). ‘Intercultural Sweden_EN.pdf Cities’. 114 Ibid.

85 Ibid. 98 Cities of Migration (2011). ‘Fighting 115 Winterbotham, E. and Pearson, E. Fiction with Facts: The BCN Anti-Rumour (2016). ‘Different Cities, Shared Stories, 86 Ibid. Campaign’, citiesofmigration.ca (14 A Five-Country Study Challenging September). Assumptions Around Muslim Women and 87 Ibid. CVE Interventions’, The RUSI Journal, 99 Barcelona City Council (2017). ‘Barcelona 161(5), pp. 54-65. 88 Council of Europe (2017). ‘Intercultural Sets Out a Campaign to Curb Rumours’. Cities: Good practice examples, Barcelona 116 Alia (2019). ‘Community Engagement’. City Council presents a pioneer plan to 100 : Resilient Rotterdam, ‘WeSociety Unites combat Islamophobia’. Available at: https:// the City’, resilientrotterdam.nl. Available 117 Ibid. www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/-/a- at: https://www.resilientrotterdam.nl/en/ pioneer-plan-to-combat-islamophobia initiatieven/wesociety-unites-the-city 118 Ibid.

89 Ibid. 101 City of Paris (2019). ‘Lutte Contre 119 Ali (2018). ‘Deradicalizing White People’. l’Exclusion’. Available at: https://www.paris. 90 Barcelona City Council (2017). fr/grande-exclusion 120 Kundnani, A. (2012). ‘Blind Spot? ‘Commitment to Fighting Gender Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence Islamophobia’. Office of Religious 102 Ibid. in Europe’, The International Centre for Affairs. Available at: https://ajuntament. Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 3(5). barcelona.cat/oficina-afers-religiosos/en/ 102 Ibid. noticia/commitment-to-fighting-gender- 121 Ali (2018). ‘Deradicalizing White People’. islamophobia 104 Mucha, W. (2017). ‘Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. 122 Ibid. 91 Barcelona City Council (2010). Counterterrorism and Homeland Security ‘Interculturality Plan’. Available at: in France and Germany’. Journal for 123 Islam, Rohde, Huerta (2019). ‘Europe’s https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ Deradicalisation, 10. Migration Challenge’. bcnacciointercultural/sites/default/files/ documentos/web_bcn_angles.pdf 105 Counter Extremism Project, ‘France’. 124 Resnick, B. (2018). ‘Psychologists Surveyed Hundreds of Alt-Right 92 Council of Europe (2017). 106 Gatewood, C. and Boyer, I. (2019). Supporters. The Results Are Unsettling’, ‘Intercultural Cities’. ‘Building Digital Citizenship in France: Vox Science and Health (12 August). Lessons from the Sens Critique project’, 93 Ibid. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 125 News Wires (2019). ‘European Intelligence Services See Far-Right 94 Barcelona City Council, ‘Commitment to 107 Ibid. Extremism as Growing Threat’, France 24 Fighting Gender Islamophobia’. (19 March). 108 Ibid. 95 Barcelona City Council (2017). ‘Barcelona 126 Giordano, C. (2019). ‘Growing Threat Sets Out a Campaign to Curb Rumours 109 Islam, S., Rohde, A., Huerta, G. (2019). from Far Right as White Extremists Form and Discriminatory Messages on Social ‘Europe’s Migration Challenge From Largest Proportion of Terror Arrests Seen in Networks’. Available at: https://www. Integration To Inclusion’, Friends of Europe. 15 Years’, The Independent (14 June). barcelona.cat/infobarcelona/en/sharing- efforts-to-wipe-out-rumours-and-hate- 110 Nai, J., Narayanan, J., Hernandes, I., 127 BBC, (2018). ‘Prevent Scheme: Extreme speech-on-social-media_552471.html and Savani, K. (2018). ‘People in More right-wing referrals up by 36%’, BBC.co.uk Racially Diverse Neighborhoods Are More (13 December). Prosocial’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(4), pp. 497-515. 128 Dettmer, J. (2019). ‘European Security Chiefs Alarmed at Threat From Far-Right

50 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

Terrorism’, Voanews.com (3 May). Spatial Polarization within Large Cities in the 161 Ibid. Netherlands’, Delft University of Technology 129 Reitman, J. (2018). ‘U.S. Law and IZA, Discussion Paper No. 8882. 162 Cendrowicz, L. and Peachey, P. (2016). Enforcement Failed to See the Threat ‘Brussels Attacks: How Extremism of White Nationalism. Now They Don’t 146 Garewal (2006). ‘Social Polarization and Flourished Amid Lack of Integration in Know How to Stop It’, New York Times (3 Role of Planning’. Molenbeek’, The Independent (23 March). November). 147 Zwiers, Kleinhans, van Ham (2015). 163 Ponsaers and Devroe (2016).‘How 130 Islam, Rohde, Huerta (2019). ‘Divided Cities’. Integrated Is Local Prevention?’ ‘Europe’s Migration Challenge’. 148 BBC (2018). ‘Who Feels Lonely? The 164 Cendrowicz and Peachey (2016). 131 Greater London Authority (2018). results of the world’s largest loneliness ‘Brussels Attacks: How Extremism ‘All of Us’. study’, BBC.co.uk. Flourished’.

132 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 165 Rettman, A. (2015). ‘Belgian Radicals: Bring Me Your Unschooled, Your Jobless’, 133 Islam, Rohde, Huerta (2019). 150 Schifferes, J. (2018). ‘To Tackle EUobserver.com (23 November). ‘Europe’s Migration Challenge’. Loneliness, Start with Millennials’ Housing’, Royal Society for the Encouragement of 166 Urban Development Corporation (SAU- 134 Ibid. Arts, Manufactures and Commerce. MSI) of the Brussels-Capital Region (2019). ‘The Canal Plan’. Available at: https://canal. 135 Ibid. 151 Lucas, K., Stokes, G., Bastiaanssen, brussels/en/canal-plan J. Burkinshaw, J. (2019). ‘Inequalities in 136 Council of Europe (2019). ‘Results Mobility and Access in the UK Transport 167 Ibid. and Impact of the Intercultural Cities System’, Social and Political Science Programme’. Group, Institute for Transport Studies, 168 Flanders News (2017). ‘Has “Canal Plan” University of Leeds. Solved Molenbeek’s Crime Problem?’ (27 137 Edelman (2019). The 2019 Edelman October). Trust Barometer. 152 Ibid. 169 Ferguson, K. (2016). ‘Countering 138 Information provided by the Institute 153 Ibid. Violent Extremism Through Media and for Strategic Dialogue, Strong Cities Communication Strategies: A review of the Network, 2019. 154 Sarma S. (2016). ‘Special Report on evidence’, Partnership for Conflict, Crime Counter Terrorism Strategies in Select and Security Research. 139 Ibid. European Union Countries: An Evaluation’, Indian Council of World Affairs. 170 Bergengruen, V. and Hennigan, W.J. 140 Choudhury, T. and Fenwick, H. (2011). (2019). ‘“We Are Being Eaten From Within.” ‘The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures 155 Ponsaers P. and Devroe, E. (2016). Why America Is Losing the Battle Against on Muslim Communities’, Equality and ‘How Integrated Is Local Prevention White Nationalist Terrorism’, Time (8 Human Rights Commission, Research of Radicalisation and Terrorism?’, August). Report 72. Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key challenges and Policy Options, Egmont 171 Hamid, S. (2019). ‘White Supremacy 141 Bellis, M. and Hardcastle, K., eds. (2019). Paper 89., pp. 23-33. Isn’t Insanity’, Foreign Policy (21 March). ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in the UK: Public Health Solutions’, Faculty of Public 156 Ibid. 172 London Resilience Group (2019). Health, Public Health Wales. Interviews and consultation with partners in 157 Ibid. Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations 142 Ibid. project. 158 D’hoore, A. (2018). ‘The Housing Crisis 143 Ibid. Paradox: How the Citizens of Brussels are 173 The Emergency Preparedness Research Reclaiming Unused Space’, The Brussels Evaluation and Practice Program, Division 144 Garewal, G. (2006). ‘Social Times of Policy Translation and Leadership Polarization and Role of Planning – (29 November). Development (2016). ‘Evaluation of The Developed and Developing World’, the Greater Boston Countering Violent 42nd International Society of City and 159 Ponsaers and Devroe (2016). ‘How Extremism (CVE) Pilot Program’, Project Regional Planners Congress. Integrated Is Local Prevention?’ Report, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. 145 Zwiers, M., Kleinhans, R., van Ham, M. 160 Ibid. (2015). ‘Divided Cities: Increasing Socio- 174 Ibid.

CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019 51 11 Endnotes continued

175 Ibid. 188 United Nations (2018). ‘68% of the World Population Projected to Live in Urban Areas 176 Radicalisation Awareness Network, by 2050, Says UN’, un.org (16 May). (2018). ‘Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: [ii] Khalil and Zeuthen (2016). ‘Countering Approaches and practices’, RAN Collection Violent Extremism’. of Approaches and Practices. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 189 The Rockefeller Foundation (2015). ‘City homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/ Resilience Framework’. Available at: https:// radicalisation_awareness_network/ran- www.rockefellerfoundation.org/report/city- best-practices/docs/creating_counter_ resilience-framework/ violent_extremism_infrastructures_en.pdf

177 Radicalisation Awareness Network, (2018). Multi-Agency Working and Preventing Violent Extremism: Paper 2. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_ awareness_network/about-ran/ran-h-and- sc/docs/ran_hsc_policy_mawr_report_ sarma_26032019_en.pdf

178 Cendrowicz and Peachey (2016). ‘Brussels Attacks: How Extremism Flourished’.

179 Ibid.

180 Rotella, S. (2016). ‘How Europe Left Itself Open to Terrorism’, Frontline (18 October).

181 Consultation with Rotterdam Police (2019). Natalia Proctor, London Resilience Group.

182 Sedgwick, M. (2010). ‘The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(4), pp. 479-494.

183 Schmid, A. (2013). ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review’, International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, ICCT Research Paper.

184 Rahimi and Graumans (2015). ‘Reconsidering the Relationship Between Integration and Radicalization’.

185 Schmid (2013). ‘Radicalisation, De- Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation’.

186 Ibid.

187 London Resilience Group (2019). Interviews with CTPSR project.

52 CTPN: Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

CTPN brings together strategic leaders, practitioners and academics to inform city-level policies and practices that build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism.

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