aac nlsES07:4Dossier13/9/0711:11Página161 ingles balance 5 vlto n etn.Ti ertr f2600Km 266,000 of territory This its destiny. of to and imbroglio contributed evolution the indirectly or to directly due having affairs factors complex one oldest most also is the the It of of 1975. to one back is dating conflicts, dispute regional Sahara Western The Factors Determining The the by undergone mutations conflict? major Sahara Western the redefine of must they light that in identity an of within framework future the and present their perceive generation,’ ‘new the comprising Sahrawis young the primarily those concerned, do how and 2006 in evolve did conflict how the issue: problematic a identity raises its This redefine parameters. to attempts the it how conflict: and evolving this is of Sahara Western in facet dynamic social the which particular in manner a paper explore this In will topic. I this in interest my Hence France. and several , particular of involve in States, Mediterranean mutations because principle democratisation and one, evolution regional of its a and terms relations; in institutional the and including actors, monarchy, different the among political in relations plays at issue is this deal role the great considering a stake, where one fundamental internal two an dimensions: has problem Sahara Western The for Journalist Settat University, I Hassan Science Political of Professor Brouksy, Omar Identity Political Sahrawi the Redefining | Politics Mediterranean eotn onal ytmtcrpeso fteSahrawi the systematic repression of nearly was resorting to it hand, a one the adopted on authorities policy: dual-faceted Moroccan the 1999, to 1975 From Front. 1975 Polisario Algerian-backed to the territory by 1885 a claimed now is from , by Spain annexed thereafter by and held and colonised eJunlHebdomadaire Journal Le Maghreb arbitrary, 2 , atwste fetdo aiu ees h role The levels. various on effected Moroccan then was the past of those role political Moroccan the and particular reinterpretation of A monarchy). in status taboos, the many concerning good a break managedto has it years, few a only In press. country’s the laureate, Protect Hebdomadaire Award Journal to Freedom Press Committee [CPJ] Journalist (2003 the King of section press a and society successor, independent civil by played his role the of by strengthening a by accompanied was in continued VI, II Mohammed Hassan and King by initiated 1994 regime political ‘in aperture the relative live the of that emphasise all to important not is It slum do Sahrawis this opulence’. the visiting that suddenly Moroccans on discovered ‘inland’ King The 2006, insisted March neighbourhood. VI in Sahara Mohammed Western to his On trip conditions. last overcrowded in lives slums, population the Sahrawi the of essentially majority the is where Mâatallah, including contention of of hotbed rest The the and consolidated. increasingly becoming elite is population – the contested current increasingly the yet powerful by a – between gap established the government, euros) Moroccan million 650 of active the the of 2004-2008” Development, despite Economic 29% and was level population, Sahara, Western unemployment of capital the the for Aaiún, 2006, El In in Sahara. instance, Western in strategy of political aspects its some reconsider to more Morocco forced become have have implications, favouritism social indicators certain of terms evident. of In strategy the the of by aperture relative the imbalances engendered the with regime, political Moroccan 90s, the since But important with people. Sahrawi favouritism of relations establishing employed it hand, other the on and etc.); disappearances, (imprisonment, opposition stems mlmtcamong emblematic most the is cooption Pa o Saharan for “Plan h authorities the , wt budget a (with Le

161 Med. 2007 Panorama 5 balance ingles ES07:4 Dossier 13/9/07 11:11 Página 162

played by the Justice and Reconciliation Commission On 25th March 2006, during a trip to El Aaiún, King (IER) in this process and its impact on Moroccan Mohammed VI announced the dissolution of the society and the international community cannot be Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs, created by his underestimated (created by the current King in January father in 1982 and composed of members entirely 2004 and presided by Driss Benzekri, former political elected by the Sahrawi tribes. It was ‘replaced’ by a prisoner, this commission has nonetheless been greatly new organ called the Royal Advisory Council for criticised by human rights militants because it does Saharan Affairs (CORCAS). Its 141 members not authorise victims to state the names of those (important Sahrawis) are not elected but rather entirely responsible for violations). This ‘officialised’ process appointed by the Head of State. Certain observers of reconciliation of the State with society was done consider this form of constituting the council a ‘retreat’ via a reinterpretation of the recent past, including of democratic logic and believe it could weaken the the as a component of recent council’s representativeness. Moroccan political memory, the repression of the In his address at the inauguration of the new council, Moroccan State having likewise been deployed against the King defined the main identity traits of its members: Panorama the inhabitants of this territory. The repercussions on “We appeal to you, considering the virtues of patriotism Sahrawi political identity, which is constantly being and fidelity to consecrated constants and values, to ‘reconstructed,’ are considerable. be the best interprets for expressing your brothers’ positions before organizations and other international bodies, with a view to bringing out the justice of our

2007 The New Order cause for territorial integrity.” Action by CORCAS would thereafter be deployed Med. The young Sahrawi generation born in the 70s and within the framework of the ‘official’ policy culture of having studied at Moroccan universities seems to have the State of Morocco, which perceives the Western conceived and redefined the essence of their political Sahara issue from an authoritarian and stilted identity on the basis of this recent history. The perspective of the Nation: a presupposed and quite structuring of collective memory, built upon decades vague ‘unanimity’with regard to a ‘just and consecrated 162 of contention, struggle, resistance and repression, cause.’ The expressions used in the royal address of has given rise to a construction of identity now seeking 25th March 2006 recall certain ‘principles’ expressed to go beyond the specificities of Sahrawi society in Article 19 of the current Moroccan constitution: and its conceptual mutations. The third-world ideology, ‘the consecrated values of the kingdom’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘fidelity to constants’, ‘national unity and The young Sahrawi generation territorial integrity’, etc. seems to have conceived and redefined the essence of their A Dual-Faceted Dynamic political identity on the basis of this recent history It is in the context of these ‘traits,’ falling under the official line of political identity, that the Moroccan State the weight of the cold war context and decolonisation, intends to implement its new strategy in Western the basic principles from which the combat for “the Sahara by involving a Sahrawi political elite which it liberation of the ” drew its ideological scrupulously selects and whose missions it establishes. and identity-building foundations are thus being Hence, in this same address, the CORCAS, whose replaced by new legitimising concepts: human rights faculties are strictly consultative, is entrusted by the culture, universal principles governing individual and King to engage in “serene, in-depth reflection… (on)… political rights and liberties, international legality, the autonomy plan within the framework of the etc. All of these concepts, both precise and generous, sovereignty of the Kingdom and its national unity and are in turn being grafted on a fundamental principle territorial integrity.” based on dissidence, protest and a legitimizing capacity The concept of an autonomy plan for Western Sahara, – the principle of self-determination for the Sahrawi launched unilaterally by the King of Morocco in March nation, to be attained through a referendum supervised of 2006, aims in reality to replace the Baker III Plan by the . (April 2003). Considered ‘obsolete’ and ‘outdated’ by 5 balance ingles ES07:4 Dossier 13/9/07 11:11 Página 163

This official will for rupture, dynamic to the level of two actors, each referring to taking the form of a re- a different legal and political situation: on the one hand, an ‘authoritarian’ State (lacking legitimacy, definition of official concepts, is primarily due to its acknowledged repressive past and deployed in parallel to the controversial present); and on the other hand, a emergence of a new Sahrawi ‘colonised’peoples (who claim their rights on the basis elite, which is trying to assert its of international law). visibility and political identity via new mechanisms Conceptual Mutations and Legitimising Discourses Moroccan diplomats, the Baker III Plan called for a referendum after five years of autonomy for Western The eminent ‘personalities’of this power struggle have Sahara. Nonetheless, no longer certain of the favourable moreover gained a certain degree of militant and results of the referendum, Morocco intends to make political legitimacy because of their condition as former Panorama this ‘new’ autonomy plan its diplomatic hobby-horse. prisoners of conscience. The cases of , To uphold it in Western Sahara and before international Mohammed El Moutawakil and Tamek are organizations, it has involved the important personalities certainly the most emblematic. They were last on the CORCAS, albeit in consultative status, while sentenced to definite prison terms (ranging from seven

adopting a ‘subtext’ of ‘participation’ based on “good to ten months) in December of 2005, following the 2007 governance (...) the expansion of space for participation May 2005 incidents in El Aaiún. Med. in the management of local affairs and the emergence Released from prison on 17th January 2006 after a of new elites capable of assuming responsibilities, 51-day hunger strike, Aminatou Haidar was nominated (...) mobilising the legal means and material resources for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought by the necessary to concretise the afore-stated objectives, European Parliament during her detention. On 17th at the service of the citizens, their dignity and the September 2006, she received the 2006 Freedom common interest.” (excerpt from the Royal speech on Award in Washington DC from the US Defense Forum 163 25th March 2006) Foundation “for her struggle to defend human rights This ‘subtext,’ which is expressed through the use of and the international legality of Western Sahara.” different terminology in a single address, is impelled In the face of pressure from the international community by the King and seems to indicate a certain wish for and NGOs, the Moroccan Authorities were obliged rupture in the internal management of the Western to release these activists, but once again involving the Sahara issue. The King’s recourse to ‘universalist’ members of the CORCAS, such that the Council, concepts such as: ‘citizen’, ‘good governance’, playing a role approaching that of an NGO, was placed ‘emergence of new elites’, ‘dignity’, ‘the common in an advantageous position. Indeed, a week after the interest’, and so on, is highly significant. creation of the CORCAS on 25th March 2006, the This official will for rupture, taking the form of a re- Council’s first ‘initiative’ was to ‘propose’ the King definition of official concepts, is deployed in parallel grant the ‘militants’ imprisoned after the El Aaiún to the emergence of a new Sahrawi elite, which is incidents of May 2005 ‘amnesty’; a ‘proposition’ that trying to assert its visibility and political identity via the King, of course, saw fit to accept. new mechanisms. The protests in El Aaiún in May The support that these militants – who are most often of 2005 succeeded in empowering the main presented as ‘human rights advocates’ – receive from ‘personalities’ of this generation, with whom many international civil society and semi-official organisms young Sahrawis identify on a political and identity can be ascribed, in part, to the content of their level. Today, they are embodied in certain, media- discourse, i.e. non-violent (given they have never hyped people conveying a legitimating discourse considered the terrorist option), legalist, universal or based essentially on international legality and a universal even a so-to-speak ‘attractive’ discourse essentially conception of human rights. The use of the Polisario aimed at the West. It has a real impact on civil society flag during demonstrations, for instance, as well as and semi-official organisms. the introduction of the term ‘Intifada’ into the protest What is the content of this discourse? It is a discourse movement, among other things, limit the dissidence of identification and repositioning, with marked identity 5 balance ingles ES07:4 Dossier 13/9/07 11:11 Página 164

MAURITANIANS VOTE FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania voted for a new Constitution on 26th constitute about a third of the country’s population. June 2006 with a referendum approved by an overwhelming majority The referendum paved the way for the return to civilian rule in the country according to results announced by the Minister of Home Affairs after a military junta seized power in a bloodless coup in August 2005, Mohamed Ahmed Ould Mohamed Lemine. ending two decades of strong-arm rule. In August 2005, while President Taya was abroad, the long-time national The new Constitution provides for a presidential form of government, security chief, Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall led a coup that replaced Taya with the President commanding significant powers, including the with a 17-member military council headed by Vall, thus ending two appointment of the prime minister. The Parliament, though, can vote for decades of strong-arm rule. The coup was quickly denounced by the no-confidence in the government or censure it. Presidents could only , United States, and others, but Colonel Vall immediately serve two terms in office, each of five years instead of six and a maximum began liberal reforms, including the promise of free elections, and the presidential age limit of 75 years is imposed. The new constitution international community started watching with interest to see if reforms disallows members of the present junta from running for the President’s were followed through. post and requires future leaders to swear on the Qur’an not to change Mauritanians generally greeted Taya's overthrow with celebration, and the rules on presidential terms in order to cling to power. opposition groups with qualified approval. Colonel Vall affirmed he was not The new Constitution replaced the 1991 one and the referendum led to

Panorama going to stand in the presidential elections that were held in March 2006. municipal and legislative elections in November 2006. Over 96% of votes were in favour of the new Constitution and the For further information: turnout was over 76%, close to one million registered voters, who Ministry of Home Affairs of Mauritania: www.mipt.mr

2007 The support that these militants 14th to 20th October 2006). “Our discourse, which is at the same time an integral part of our political Med. – who are most often presented identity, is clearly based on a human rights culture. as ‘human rights advocates’ – The right to self-determination is part of this. Without receive from international civil this right, our people will have no political existence. society and semi-official The position of women in our society confirms that our culture is consistent with universal principles,”

164 organisms can be ascribed, in asserted Mohammed El Moutawakil. part, to the content of their This discourse is conceived and developed to discredit discourse, i.e. non-violent Moroccan diplomatic initiatives. The latter now seems legalist, universal and essentially aware of this issue, and more precisely, of the role aimed at the West played by the notions of ‘human rights’, ‘international law’, and so forth in the ‘new’ Sahrawis activists’ redefinition of their political identity. By way of example, dimensions. Its development is legitimising, as it takes on 7th October 2006, a confidential report by the UN the form of nearly constant recourse to international High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) principles and legal references, raised to the level of revealed that the Parisian daily, Le Monde, had qualified components of Sahrawi political identity, under the “human rights situation (as) a matter of concern, redefinition. Several declarations made by the main particularly in the section of Western Sahara under individuals concerned express it in a clarifying manner: Moroccan administration.”Its publication by Le Monde “We demand that our most basic rights be respected, in October 2006 called forth vivid reactions among as, for instance, the freedom of assembly. We likewise Moroccan official circles, because now the power demand international law be respected, namely, our struggle is on the legal level and that of universal right to self-determination,”declared Aminatou Haidar, ‘principles’. It is essentially on this level that the new for instance, in Le Journal Hebdomadaire (No. 273, Sahrawi elite are redefining their political identity.