! ! i i

I ; I

Background Papers for the

Taranaki Raupatu Claim

il 1 I

I j

: j

I) II L, I

Hazel Riseborough Massey University 1989

II

i . 11

CONTENTS

Page

Maps iii

Introduction IV Chapter One Confiscation on Paper ""* 1

Chapter Two 2'- Confiscation on the Ground: 1866-1876 36

Chapter Three j Confiscation on the Ground: 1877-1885 91

Chapter Four A New Confiscation: The West Coast Settlement Reserves 182 Act and its Amendments

, ) Appendix A Reserves, Compensation Court Awards, and Crown Grants 241

Appendix B ~ The West Coast Settlement Reserves Acts 267

Appendix C Commissions of Inquiry 269

Bibliography 270 1Il

MAPS

Page

North Island Confiscated Lands 10

Taranaki Confiscation Boundaries 20

Waimate Plains 95

Taranaki: Lands Dealt with by West Coast Royal Commission 176

I , I, I )

I II

.1\ IV

INTRODUCTION

The confiscation of land in the following the wars of the 1860s created a sense of

grievance among the local tribes which continues to affect relations between Maori and

European to this day. Maori frustration resulting from confiscation was variously expressed

over the years by further armed resistance, by pacific resistance to the enforcement of the

confiscation, and by the presentation of a series of petitions to parliament. Governments

responded to the expressions of grievance through military and legislative means and by the

establishment of a series of commissions of enquiry, but it was not until 1926 that the

confiscation itself became the subject of official enquiry.

These background papers to the Taranaki raupatu claim to be heard by the in

1990, survey events in Taranaki from the time of the confiscations to the present day, and i I concentrate on the policy, the implementation, and the consequences of confiscation.

Chapter one is a study of the confiscation itself: its genesis, its introduction to and application

in , the New Zealand Settlements Act, 1963 and its amendments, the proclamation

of December 1864, and the orders in council of January 1865 and September 1865 - the 'real

instrument of confiscation' in Taranaki.

, I,

Chapters two and three deal with confiscation on the ground. In the period 1866-1876 the

confiscation was enforced south of the Waingongoro and north of the Hangatahua or Stoney

1 , ! River; in 1878 an attempt was made to enforce it between those two rivers. Chapter two looks

at the establishment of military settlers in the northern and southern parts of Taranaki; the

operations of the Compensation Court; the resistance offered to the enforcement of

confiscation, first by interruptions to the survey, and then by the military campaigns of

Titokowaru and his followers; the return of various hapu of Ngatiruanui and Ngarauru to their

ancestral lands both north and south of the Waingongoro, and the continuing unrest due to lack v

or inadequacy of reserves; and at government efforts to 'acquire' confiscated land through the

purchase of Compensation Court awards or the payment of takoha.

Chapter three is a resume of Days of Darkness: Taranaki 1878-1884 (, Allen and

Unwin, 1989). It deals with the enforcement of confiscation between the Waingongoro and

Hangatahua rivers, and the peaceable resistance offered to government attempts to survey the

land for sale and settlement before the reserves promised by the acts and proclamations of

confiscation were defined on the ground. This chapter also details the legislation passed to deal

with Maori resistance to the enforcement of confiscation in the years 1877-1885.

Chapter four is a study of the operations of the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act, 1881,

passed to provide for the 'proper administration and management' of the reserves to be set

aside 'for Natives' and 'for the benefit of Natives' according to the provisions of the West

Coast Settlement (North Island) Act, 1880. Continual settler pressure on government resulted i I in a succession of amendments to the 1881 act Progressive diminution of the rights of the Maori owners led to the presentation of petitions to parliament and resulted in the setting up of

commissions of enquiry. This chapter looks at the fIfteen major and several minor

amendments to the act and at twelve commissions of enquily set up to enquire into or to deal 'lI -

with Maori grievances in Taran~weeen 1881 and 1974. Finally it looks at the

i establishment in 1976 of the Paraninihi ki Waitotara Incorporation, and the continuing disquiet I f I in 1989 over the operation of the statutory provisions for perpetual lease of the west coast

settlement reserves.

, I i I I

i I CHAPTER ONE CONFISCATION ON PAPER

In a House of Commons debate on New Zealand in June 1845, Sir James Graham, a member

of Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet, announced that the government intended to calion everyone in

New Zealand, whether Maori or settler, to come in and 'prove and register' their titles to land.

At the end of a designated period 'the right of the sovereignty of the Crown to all unregistered

lands would accrue', and all waste land registered would be taxed. Lord John Russell, then in , I i opposition, was highly critical of this policy: 'first ... there is to be a tax on the wild lands.

Then there is to be registration of all native lands, then a property tax, then confiscation of the

land'. Yet at the end of 1846, with Russell's government in power, and Earl Grey secretary of

state for the colonies, an even more drastic scheme was put forward 'not only to confiscate

unregistered land but to limit the right of the natives to land on which actual labour was

expended by them') The rest of New Zealand was then 'to be declared to be the royal

demesne'. This scheme 'for land registration and confiscation' failed, and no further attempt I I I 'to confiscate native land' was made at that time;2 it was obvious that the Treaty ofWaitangi

had to be accepted as the Maori understood it, or there would be war. It was clear from the

start to those who proposed annexation and colonization of New Zealand that control of the

land meant control of settlement, and gradually, by manipulative use of the pre-emption clause

of the treaty, the governor succeeded in creating a royal demesne of vast tracts of land not in

actual 'occupation' (as the British understood it) or cultivation by the Maori. It soon became

evident that control of the land also meant control of the Maori, and by the 1860s, when war

was no longer such an issue to the strong and numerous settler community, confiscation was

proposed as a means of deterring or controlling 'hostile' Maori.

E. Wilson Wilson, Land Problems of the New Zealand Settlers of the 'Forties, Wellington, 1935, p208.

2 ibid pp213, 224. \ i 2

Prior to Waitangi the British government had recognised that Maori title to the soil and to the

sovereignty of New Zealand was indIsputable, and that land for settlement would have to be

purchased from the Maori. Although this fact was widely known and accepted by Europeans

in New Zealand at the time, it was disputed by many prominent men in Britain who argued that

indigenous people did not have territorial rights to land which they did not cultivate. Officers

of the New Zealand Company, bent on profiting through the colonization of New Zealand's

waste lands, spoke scathingly of 'Normanby's excessive view of Maori rights') Secretary of

State Normanby instructed Captain Hobson to try to induce the chiefs henceforth to cede no

lands except to the Crown of Great Britain. This directive which, by subtle means, became the

'pre-emption clause' of the Treaty ofWaitangi, was not founded primarily on any legal or

humanitarian argument. It was made with a view to the prosperity of the future colony by

preventing the 'pernicious waste' of large-scale land speculation, and to the need for the Crown

to make a profit on the resale of 'unsettled lands'.4 As a further brake on land speculation,

Normanby recommended that all uncleared lands within the British settlements in New Zealand

, I be subjected to a small annual tax and that land be forfeited in default of payment of the tax. Pre-emption having been imposed for profit in the interests of orderly settlement, native

,( interests were to be protected through 'fair and equal contracts' between the Maori and the

Crown for the cession 'of such waste lands as may be progressively required for the

occupation of settlers'. The fair and equal contracts were to involve 'the investment of a

comparatively small sum of money', and the resale to settlers of lands so acquired was to

provide the funds necessary for future acquisitions.S

\ ' I I, 3 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847, Auckland, 1977, pp 175, 179-80, 184, 187-88.

4 Normanby to Hobson 14 August 1839, Irish University Press series of British Parliamentary Papers, I Colonies, New Zealand (hereafter BPP/IUP), vol 3, Shannon, 1970, p86. _See also Adams ppI94-95. , I I ,

5 BPP/IUP vol 3 p87. i i 3

That pre-emption was first and foremost to be the means of providing an emigration fund was

spelled out by later secretaries of state. Stanley entertained no doubts that the original intention

of the pre-emptive provision of the Treaty of Waitangi 'was to enable the Crown, as the sole

purchaser, to obtain land on easy terms from the native tribes, applying a portion of the

proceeds, when re-sold, to the importation of labourers, and the remainder to other public

objects, but especially to the purchase of more land, to be again re-sold at a profit and this

operation to be repeated toties Quoties'.6 Earl Grey described it as 'the mode by which, with

least inconvenience and difficulty, funds can be raised for emigration, and for executing those

public works which are necessary for the profitable occupation of the soil'. 7

I I I I. Despite the Crown's recognition of Maori title to the soil, it was still assumed in some circles

I i i that much of the country consisted of waste land of little value or use to the Maori, and that it .

would be in their interests to alienate it in return for the benefits of European civilization. After

Waitangi, Sir George Gipps, the governor of New South Wales, vigorously disputed the view

that the Maori did have title to the soil, or even that the Crown had recognized such title. He

understood, as a political axiom which he had never before heard disputed, 'that the uncivilized

inhabitants of any country have but a qualified dominion over it, or a right of occupancy only',

and he took Normanby's instructions to Hobson to be confirmation of this. Gipps argued that

as the Maori had not SUbjugated the ground by cultivation they had no individual property in it,

and thus could not 'grant to individuals not of their own tribe, any portion of it'; that 'the right

of pre-emption of the soil, or in other words, the right of extinguishing the native title', was

I . I exclusively in the government of any civilized power that chose to settle the country; and that ( ! colonies could not be formed without the consent of the Crown. He went on at great length to

show that this was the law of England and that it had been applied to settlement in the United

6 Stanley to FitzRoy 30 November 1844, BPP/IUP vol 4 p 208.

7 Earl Grey to Governor Grey 23 Dec 1846, ibid vol 5 p525. 4

States and had become part of American law. Gipps did not advance either a humanitarian, or

financial argument in favour of pre-emption.8

The dispute between the New Zealand Company and the Colonial Office over the extent of

Maori rights to land and the correct interpretation of the land guarantee in the Treaty of

Waitangi led, in 1844, to the appointment of a parliamentary select committee to examine the I ! question. The committee, chaired by Lord Howick (later Secretary of State Earl Grey) argued

that it would have been better if no formal treaty had been concluded with the Maori, since the

Treaty of Waitangi was ambiguous, little more than a legal fiction and highly inconvenient

because of the interpretation placed on its stipulations regarding Maori land rights; and that

Hobson's instructions ought to have laid down clearly that once sovereignty was established , \ I I 'all unoccupied lands would forthwith vest in.the Crown'. In the opinion of the committee this

'would have been attended with no sort of injustice' to the Maori, and would have been in their

own real interests, since their 'unoccupied land, previously to European settlement, was of no

I I value to them' - land, it must be remembered, deriving 'its only value from the application of European labour and capital'.9

Secretary of State Lord Stanley refused to accept the committee's 'far from unanimous'

recommendations, especially that means be 'forthwith adopted for establishing the exclusive

, I title of the Crown to all land not actually occupied and enjoyed by Natives'. But while he I I I : believed that restricting native rights to land was 'wholly irreconcilable with the large words of

I I the Treaty ofWaitangi', and the Crown's claiming unoccupied land 'to the exclusion of the

natives ... not less at variance' with Normanby's instructions to Hobson, he had still assumed

that FitzRoy, on his arrival in New Zealand, would have found 'that there were considerable

tracts of country to which no tribe could establish a bona fide title; and still more extensive

8 Gipps speech in New South Wales Legislative Council 9 July 1840, BPP/IUP vol 3 pp 185-90.

9 BPP/lUP vol 2 pp 5-8. I I I 5

districts to which ... you would obtain a title on easy terms and by amicable arrangements'.

Stanley, moreover, was clearly willing to accept the committee's resolution that land 'not made

use of, be taxed at the rate of 2d an acre. He spelled out clearly, as not even the committee

had done, that it was intended the tax should also apply 'to all lands claimed as the property of

native tribes, and not in actual cultivation'; he could see no objection to such a tax, and he

presumed that non-payment of it would be 'followed by confiscation of a portion of the lands

equivalent to the amount of the tax unpaid .... an easy mode of obtaining a large amount of

I I disposable land'.1°

Under continuing pressure from the New Zealand Company and five years after the signing of

the Treaty ofWaitangi, Stanley was obliged to define the Colonial Office's attitude to the

treaty's land guarantee. It was, he said, 'a matter on which Maori law and custom would have

to be consulted'. The possibility of this policy being pursued was short lived. When Earl ! I I \ Grey succeeded to the office of secretary of state towards the end of 1846, he was in a position

to put into practice the recommendations of the 1844 select committee of which he had been

chairman. In a despatch to Sir , sent with the 'New Zealand Charter' (the '1846 I I I,\ constitution'), Earl Grey pointed out that he entirely dissented from the view 'that the aboriginal inhabitants of any country are the proprietors of every part of its soil of which they

have been accustomed to make any use or to which they have been accustomed to assert any

title'. Instead he agreed with Dr Arnold who had written that 'Men were to subdue the earth ... I' I I and with the labour so bestowed upon it came the right of property in it'. Dr Arnold's

reasoning, he felt, applied to New Zealand and was 'fatal to the right which has been claimed

for the aboriginal inhabitants ... to the exclusive possession of the vast extent of fertile but I I I ! unoccupied lands'; the Queen, he said, was 'entitled in right of her Crown to any waste lands in the colony'. But as to )(

I . I I ; ) 10 Stanley to FitzRoy 13 August 1844, BPP/IUP vol 4 pp 3-7; Stanley to Grey 27 June 1845, BPP/IUP vol 5 P 223. I i J 6

that portion of the soil, whatever it might be, which they really occupied, the aboriginal inhabitants ... had a clear and undoubted claim; to have attempted to deprive them of their patches of potato-ground, even so to have occupied the territory as not to leave them ample space for shifting ... their cultivation from one spot to another, would have been in the highest degree unjust; but so long as this injustice was avoided, I must regard it a vain and unfounded scruple which would have acknowledged their right of property in land which remained unsubdued to the uses of man .... From the moment that British dominion was proclaimed in New Zealand, all lands not actually occupied in the sense in which alone occupation can give a right of possession, ought to have been considered as the property of the Crown in its capacity of trustee for the whole community. 11

Earl Grey realized it was too late now to impose these principles, but he instructed Governor

Grey to look to them still as the foundation of the policy which he was to pursue. He was to

'avoid as much as possible any further surrender of the property of the Crown'; he was strictly

to maintain pre-emption since to set it aside 'would be to acquiesce in the ruin of the colony';

and as a first step to introducing 'a regular system with respect to the disposal of land' he was

to 'ascertain distinctly the ownership of all land in the colony'.12 Having registered the titles,

the remainder of the land was to 'be declared to be the royal demesne', surveyed and sold at ! I i, auction, and the proceeds 'applied towards the introduction of manual labourers' from

England. 13

When news of the recommendations of the 1844 committee had reached New Zealand, FitzRoy

reported that it had thrown the northern tribes into 'a most unsettled state'.14 When news of

Earl Grey's 'Royal Instructions' reached New Zealand the reaction came from settlers,

'prominent men' and from the governor himself. Grey forwarded to the Colonial Office a

petition signed by 410 inhabitants of Auckland and its vicinity, among them Bishop Selwyn,

I I Chief Justice Martin and Attorney General Swainson, fearful 'for the future safety of , I themselves and families, in consequence of the proposed alteration of policy with respect to the

11 Earl Grey to Governor Grey 23 Dec 1846, BPP/IUP vol 5 pp523-25.

I I f I, I 12 ibid pp525-26.

I 13 I Earl Grey to Governor Grey 23 Dec 1846, BPP/IUP vol 5 pp523-26. I I 14 FitzRoy to Stanley 25 October 1845, BPP/IUP vol 5 p308. i I 7 lands of the aborigines', and humbly praying that Her Majesty would be pleased to revoke the secretary of state's instructions relating to 'the appropriation of any lands claimed by, or in possession of the natives by other means than that of simple purchase, as provided for in the

Treaty of Waitangi'.15

The northern settlers were few in number, and prepared at this stage of colonization to advocate native rights. Those in the south, unencumbered by a large Maori population, applauded Earl

Grey's stand and believed he successfully disposed of the 'Treaty ofWaitangi nonsense' and of Stanley's 'self-impeding sophistries' which had stood in the way of settlement and self­ government. 16

Grey managed to side-step the secretary of state's instructions regarding the registration of land titles and the confiscation of 'waste lands', but in effect substantially realized Earl Grey's goal of creating a royal demesne by keeping government purchase of land 'so far in advance of the wants of the European settlers as to be able to purchase the lands required by the Government for a trifling consideration'. And he professed to believe that there were large areas in the country even in the densely popUlated north, claimed by contending tribes to which neither of them had 'a strictly valid right' and which they would be happy to 'cede' to the government in return fot small reserves 'for the purposes of cultivation'.!7

Earl Grey, faced with the reality of the situation in New Zealand, reluctantly abandoned his attempt to take the 'waste lands' and agreed to Grey's purchase policy. The letter, if not the spirit of the treaty would be adhered to. Outwardly it appeared that officials on both sides of the world had accepted that the Maori owned the whole of New Zealand and not just those

15 Enclosed with Governor Grey to Earl Grey 9 March 1848 No 27, BPP/IUP vol 6 (P79).

16 A. H. McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand, Wellington, 1958, p 228.

17 Governor Grey to Earl Grey 15 May 1848 No II, BPPIIUP vol 6, (p22). 8

parts they occupied and cultivated. But Dr Arnold's theories did not just go away; they were

deeply rooted in the European psyche. Official recognition of Maori rights to the 'waste lands'

caused resentment among settlers and created barriers to colonization which successive

governors and later settler governments sought to overcome. By one means or another the i I 1 I Maori lost not just their so-called 'waste lands' but in some cases even their pa and cultivations

1 I where these stood in the way of European settlement Many of the New Zealand Company's , 1 I I, \ 'purchases' were of dubious validity - but Hobson was prepared to 'sanction any equitable

arrangement' to get the Maori to abandon their pa and cultivations to the company, and the

Maori were told they had 'no chojce but to accept compensation, as they could not be allowed

1 ( to resume lands already built upon by settlers, even though they had not been validly

purchased. FitzRoy exerted considerable pressure on the Te Aro Maoris to accept £300 for I ! I valuable land which they had never sold and which happened to be right in the middle of Wellington'. The Colonial Office did its bit by promising 'cordial assistance' to the company

in its efforts to gain Maori land not already awarded to it by Commissioner Spain.18 The Land

Claims Commission, set up to enquire into the pre-Waitangi land purchases, could not

recommend grants exceeding 2,560 acres and it was decided that lands in excess of this figure, I claimed by settlers but not awarded to them, should be 'vested in the Sovereign, as \ ) representing and protecting the interests of society at large. In other words such land would

become available for the purposes of sale and settlement'19 - a ruling which created resentment

amon~ both settlers and Maori.

It became increasingly obvious that it was not just a question of land for settlement. A far more

basic issue underlay the drive to part the Maori from their land: the Maori were to be civilized

through amalgamation, their reserves interspersed among the properties of European settlers.

Allowing them to maintain their isolation from Europeans was considered tantamount to

18 Adams pp191-92.

19 Stanley to FitzRoy 26 June 1843, quoted by Wilson p197. 9

preserving them in a state of barbarism.2o Those who had been obliged to accept the view that

the Maori owned all the land in New Zealand, were determined, 'in the Maori's own interests',

to relieve them of the so-called 'waste lands' guaranteed them by the treaty. They found a

handy tool for their schemes in the pre-emption clause by which the Crown would monopolize

land transactions. Maori who wished to sell land could sell only on such a scale and at such

prices as the Crown would agree to. And both FitzRoy and Grey soon found 'that there was

no better way of controlling the Maoris than by refusing to buy land from those who opposed

the Government; to them, pre-emption had possibilities as a political weapon to subdue

recalcitrant Maoris'.21 \. I i r , It was soon realized too that those who could not be controlled by means of the pre-emption

provisions, could be controlled by 'fines in land', in other words by confiscation. Late in

1841 Tirarau's people in the Kaipara muru'd a settler, Thomas Spencer Forsaith, on account of

his supposedly having desecrated a burial ground. Forsaith in fact was not gUilty and the

colonial government, anxious to suppress 'repugnant Maori practices', ordered Tirarau to pay a

fine of 19,000 acres of land. When Forsaith applied for compensation for his losses -

'estimated by three respectable Inhabitants totally disinterested' at £678 - the impecunious

government decided to award him 678 acres of land instead. This was hopefully to be paid

from land which he had earlier bought from Tirarau and which might be in excess of that

allowed him by the land claims commissioners. But should no such excess exist, the 678 acres

was to be 'taken from the block of land ceded to the government by Tirarau in compensation

for the outrage'.22 In either case the royal demesne had been extended by many thousands of

acres. , l 20 Evidence ofE. G. Wakefield to House of Commons Committee on New Zealand, 1840, quoted in Kenneth N. Bell and W. P. Morrell, eds, Select Documents on British Colonial Policy 1830-1860, 'i Oxford, 1928, p564.

21 Adams pp187, 197.

22 Adams pp 192-93; Executive Council minutes 23 May 1843, EC 1/1. 10

NORTH ISLAND CONFISCATED LANDS

. East Cape

NGAITERANGI I I I NGATI­ i MANIAPOTO NEW C""'l L...... :-:.. VTaupo PLYMOUTH :.:.:.:.:NG TIAWA Cape . ..:.:t}~:~~{::::·· Mohaka Block Egmollt ®I.~::::::::::::., ~~~A IRUANUI ...... ~ ~ ~ ":'::::N~A AURU i'5 fatea ":::::::::::\::: ... Waimate '.:::::.' I I. ) btl] Confiscated Lands

1@~ItM~ East Coast Titles ';::::::::::::::::: I nve s t i gat ion

WELLINGTON a 50 Miles 1-----'1--, a 100 Kilometres

CONFISCATED LANDS (ACRES)

Waikato Tauranga Opotiki Taranaki Totals ! i Compensation to Friendly 221 979 9 822 48967 91 667 372 435 Natives Reserves for Returned 25 000 2 616 110 000 (a)21 866 159 482 Rebels Land given back to 15 000 63 346 40 832 180 000 299 178 \ 1 Owners ! ) Missionary and School 4 867 800 5 667 Claims \ I Immigrant's Allotments 26 171 26 171 1\ Military Settlers 214 884 26 701 (b)70 485 95 118 407 188 Lands Sold 94 017 211 46 94 274 Lands Unsold 490 147 96 852 132 716 563 751 1 283 466 I( Lands Unsaleable 125 372 13652 37 000 291 852 467 876

Totals 1217 437 (c)214 000 440 000 1 244 300 3 115 737

Total of Confiscated Lands 3 490 737 acres. Including MohAka Block Established, 375 000 not yet dealt with. '- !I .I Note (a) The engagements amollnt to nearer 50 000 Although all no! Gazetted. (b) 40 000 to Arawa Contingent. (c) 164 000 really returned anti the Total includes a purchase as well as the Confiscation.

I ! Based on: BPP/IUP vol 15 fFtcillq pl2fl 11

Confiscation as a punishment for rebellion was proposed during Heke's war in the north when

FitzRoy told Secretary of State Stanley that, reluctant as he was to take land, in this case he

was 'obliged to demand some, as the only method of marking the punishment of these

rebellious adversaries and warning the ill-disposed in other parts of the island'.23 Before

FitzRoy could conclude his negotiations for peace, which included the cession of land

,, i, supposedly belonging to Heke and Kawiti, he was recalled and replaced by Sir George Grey ,I and the peace initiative was not pursued. When the northern Maori made peace among

themselves Grey 'merely expressed his assent ... to a fait accompli'. Despite his earlier view

that it would be necessary to crush either Heke or Kawiti before tranquility could be restored

, I Grey's peace proclamation granted the rebels a free pardon and proposed no punitive measures

at all. He was in no position to impose any, although he managed to present 'as an act of

:1 considerable clemency' the fact that he did not confiscate land and that there was therefore in

the north no smouldering legacy of resentment to drive the Maori to take part in later

conflicts.24

Not twenty years later Grey showed that he had forgotten the lesson he learned after Heke's

war, when he sanctioned massive confiscation 'as punishment for rebellion' and created a

legacy of resentment which has smouldered to this day. The New Zealand Settlements Act,

introduced by the Domett ministry, was finally passed by the Whitaker-Fox ministry on 17

November 1863, just a year after pre-emption was waived by the Native Lands Act, 1862.

The policy of land confiscation which the 1863 act authorized was expected by both ministries

to be the means of preventing further rebellion and, like the pre-emption policy before it, of

solving the colony's financial difficulties. In the event, confiscation failed to achieve any of the ! I I .I objects of those who had advocated it, and it led to further armed conflict in Taranaki as well as

23 FitzRoy to Stanley 25 October 1845, BPPIIUP vol 5 p298.

24 James Belich, The and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict, Auckland, 1986, pp56, 58, 65; Grey despatch 22 January 1846, BPPIIUP vol 5 pp392-93; Grey despatch 6 Jan 1864, AJHR 1864 App to E2 p19. 12

to sustained pacific resistance throughout the confiscated territories. It also failed to return a

fraction of the revenue expected of it. In addition, it alienated many of the 'loyal' and neutral

Maori whose rights it overrode and it soured relations between Britain and New Zealand.

Having confiscated on paper a huge area of land in Taranaki, the government found it had

neither the means to enforce the confiscation on the ground nor the finance to pay

compensation either to those who had not been 'in rebellion', or to those who had but who had

come in and submitted to the Queen's law. By 1869 Cabinet was agreed that the confiscation

policy had been an expensive mistake; in 1872 there was talk of abandoning the confiscation;

and by 1878 it was clear that its enforcement on the Waimate plains would at least exacerbate

racial tensions and might well lead to further bloodshed.

Confiscation had been a hotly debated issue for some time and became a source of contention

between Grey and his responsible advisers, each accusing the other of originating the idea.

According to William Gisborne it was the premier, , alone and unaided, who

devised the scheme of confiscation and military settlement; Rutherford credited it to Grey.2S

Whoever first suggested the scheme, both governor and ministers approved its adoption.

The idea of confiscation as punishment for rebellion may well have come from Ireland. After

the- Ulster uprising of 1641, as after almost every previous Irish rebellion, land was

I confiscated. The 1641 rebellion was so widespread that it was expected to result in extensive I I forfeiture of land, and with this prospect in view the English parliament passed the

I i J Adventurers' Act of 1642 which 'promised repayment in Irish land to those who advanced

money for the war, and set aside 2,500,000 acres out of the expected confiscations to meet this , , I I i liability'. It required further legislation, the Act of Settlement, 1652, to give effect to the 1642

I I act by declaring 'what persons or classes of persons were to forfeit the whole or part of their

25 William Gisborne, New Zealand Rulers and Statesmen 1840-1885, London, 1886, pp 211-12; J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey K.C.B .. 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government, London, 1961, pp 492-93. 13

estates'. All those who had been in rebellion, who had 'in any way aided or abetted the

rebellion', or who were still in arms and failed to submit within 28 days of the publication of

the act, were to forfeit their estates. All others who possessed real estate and had not

'manifested their constant good affection' for England were to suffer partial forfeiture of their

estates, in proportion to their degree of 'delinquency'. Moreover, the land remaining to them

might be exchanged for land of equal value 'in such places in Ireland, as the parliament, for the

more effectual settlement of the peace of that nation, shall think fit' .26

Confiscation in Ireland, or the threat or promise of it, might have achieved its short-term aim of

I I I ending the insurrection, but as the former chief justice Sir William Martin pointed out in 1863, 'The example of Ireland may satisfy us how little is to be effected towards the quieting of a i I I I I country by the confiscation of private land; how the claim of the dispossessed owner is

remembered from generation to generation, and how the brooding sense of wrong breaks out

from time to time in fresh disturbance and crime'.27

The scheme of military settlement proposed in New Zealand may have been adapted from that

I J which Grey had used in South Africa, as he claimed, but it too could have had its genesis in

Ireland. There the government had aimed not just to 'meet its liabilities at the expense of the

Irish rebels, but to establish such a strong population of English protestants as would ensure

I the future loyalty and tranquility of Ireland'. But the military settlement that followed the • I I I Ulster uprising was no more successful than those that preceded it The unsettled state of the

country deterred the 'Adventurers' from taking possession of their allotments, many

discharged soldiers were either reluctant to settle on the frontier, or were not prepared to wait

for possession of their claims, and speculators did a brisk business buying up land debentures.

I The result was an increase in the number of large holdings and a decrease in the number of

I I

26 J. C. Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923, London, 1966, pp 82-87, 104-08.

27 AJHR 1864 App to E2 p 14. 14 military settlers who had been expected 'to form a resident garrison, overawing the Irish and protecting the other colonists'.28

In South Africa there had been frequent uprisings among tribes displaced by European expansion eastward from the Cape. When Grey arrived at the end of 1854 Cape colony was just emerging from two or three years of war, and the question Cape colonists asked was not whether there would be another Kaffir war, but when. Grey's predecessor General Cathcart had resisted settler pressure to clear the Kaffirs from British Kaffraria and open up the whole province to European settlement, but he did confiscate land from 'rebellious' tribes and allot it both to 'loyal' ones and to European farmers on condition that they organize a militia force to defend the frontier. Grey proposed to abandon Cathcart's policy of segregation-and non­ intervention in tribal affairs and instead attempt to civilize the tribes by winning their confidence, sorting out their problems of location and land tenure, and employing them on public works, especially roadmaking which would open up their country. But both Kaffir employment and frontier defence called for an increase in European population, and his plan was to begin with the formation of military settlements close to the defended frontier and inhabited by up to 5,000 military settlers and their families. British Kaffraria could then be filled up with a large European population which would 'control the blacks, impose peace and exact obedience, afford employment, and thus lift the natives up in the scale of civilization'.

Yet Grey knew that there was already insufficient land for the native population and that there was not the scope for large scale colonization in British Kaffraria as things stood. To put his plan into action he was going to have to undermine the power of chiefs, break up large tribes, relocate some of them, move large numbers out of British Kaffraria altogether, and overawe all of them by a show of military strength.

28 Beckett pl09. 15

The 'cattle killing delusion' of 1856-57 in response to the preaching of a local prophet,

effectively thinned out the native population and enabled Grey to put his scheme of military

settlements in place. The remnants of the tribes which survived starvation, disease and

internecine fighting and had not already migrated east or been sent to work in the Cape, were

concentrated into village, not tribal units, with restricted land resources and their remaining

land was confiscated, thus freeing large areas for occupation by the European farmers Grey

intended to introduce. When British 'pensioners' proved unwilling to emigrate to South

Africa, Grey's military 'settlers' came instead from the Anglo-Gennan legion 'left over' from

the Crimean war. About 2,400 officers and men, about 2,000 of them without wives, arrived

at the Cape in January 1857. There was not enough land available to give them 5 acres each

near European settlements as Grey had planned, and for this and military reasons they were

located well forward of the existing settlements, virtually around the frontiers of British

Kaffraria. While this appeared to secure the frontiers, the scheme was just not viable on either

social or economic grounds. The fact that most of the men were unmarried and an unruly lot

militated against their settling down to a life of farming, and their five acre plots, far from

markets, were uneconomic units. Grey incurred the wrath of both the War Office and the

Colonial Office for keeping the legion on pay and rations while he tried to organize the 11 emigration of Gennan civilians to provide a supply of single females. Nothing daunted, he I went ahead with his civilian immigration scheme anyway; it was his only hope of saving his whole military settlement and colonization scheme from collapse. Grey had high hopes for his

British Kaffraria scheme which was designed to defend the frontier and settle the country with

Europeans, and he pressed it on the British government as a plan 'which is not an expensive

one, has already been tried, and has succeeded'.29

When such a scheme was proposed in New Zealand a few years later many were less sanguine

about the prospects for success, saying military settlements had never worked, anywhere.

29 Rutherford pp304-85. 16

Whatever the origin of the scheme the first mention of its use in this country came in a Domett

minute to Grey of 5 May 1863, in which he advised that the land between Ornata and

Tataraimaka, the property of those implicated in the Oakura ambush, should be declared forfeit

and utilized as a site for a military settiement30 As the outbreak of war looked certain Domett

suggested one way of guaranteeing the future peace and security of the country would be to

confiscate as much enemy territory as necessary on which to establish European settlements.

: I He even considered bringing Ngapuhi down 'to act in concert' with the Europeans against

I, Taranaki and Ngatiruanui on the promise that they could keep any land they might conquer. i I The following month ministers 'cordially concurred' in a plan put forward by Grey for the i I I r defence of the southern frontier of Auckland province, which included the confiscation of 'the

lands of the hostile Natives, part of which ... would be given away and settled on military

I I tenure... and the remainder sold to defray the expenses of the War'}1 On 6 July, before the

government had publicly signified their intention to confiscate land, a notice was published in

the Gazette setting out the conditions on which land between Ornata and would be

granted to military settlers. This was followed by another notice dated 3 August 1863 offering

land elsewhere in the North Island, in such localities as the government might select for the i I \ J purpose of establishing military settlements. Some prospective military settlers had already

accepted the terms and signed contracts before the act was passed to confiscate the land. When

the New Zealand Settlements Act was passed it contained a retrospective clause validating these

contracts}2 The act merely legalized the confiscation of land that had already been 'given

away' to military settlers.

,I I I I II

30 AJHR 1863 E 2 p 20.

31 Domett memo 23 May 1863, AJHR 1863 E7a pp7-8; Domett memo 24 June 1863, AJHR 1863 E7 p8.

32 AJHR 1866 AI3 pp7-8. 17

In July the Governor issued a proclamation notifying the c~iefs that those who

remained peaceful would be 'protected in their persons, property, and land', while those who

waged war against the Queen would 'take the consequences of their acts, and ... forfeit the right

to the possession of their lands guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Waitangi',33 Although this

proclamation was dated 11 July, it was not made known to the Maori until two or three days ------after General Cameron and his troops had crossed the Mangatawhiri stream on 12 July, and it

was hardly sufficient warning of things to come. The government itself had not determined

exactly what was to come. From a comparatively modest proposal to introduce five thousand

military settlers put forward in Domett's memo of 31 July, within a few weeks the number of

settlers and the extent of the confiscation had quadrupled.34

The government considered the Waikato tribes the most powerful, influential and warlike in the

country and thought that if they could be taught a lesson, one 'so severely felt and so much

dreaded' as the confiscation of their land, then other tribes would take heed - especially those

who at the time were considered to be wavering in their loyalty. According to this ministerial

reasoning it was the paucity of the European population and the Maori's lack of respect for

settler and government power which had led them to rebel, so the solution would be to

introduce a sufficient European population to overawe the Maori and secure peace. Ministers

thought the confiscation of land would settle the difficulty with the Waikato tribes and a similar

plan could then be applied to the 'rebellious tribes of Taranaki'. But since the 'civilization and

improvement of the native race' was, they claimed, their prime concern, they undertook to

I \ respect the rights of those who had not rebelled and to leave, even to those who had rebelled, I 'amply sufficient' land for all 'useful purposes',35

! I ! I

33 Gazette 15 July 1863. i : I 34 AJHR 1863 A8 pp 1-4; AJHR 1863 A8a pp 1-12; Cardwell despatch 26 April 1864, AJHR 1864 App to E2 p20.

35 Domett memo 31 July 1863, AJHR 1863 A8 pp 2-4. I !

18

Grey summoned the General Assembly for 19 October 1863 so that it might consider the plan

for the introduction of military settlers. So far it would seem that governor and ministers were i I in accord on the proposed confiscation. Even before parliament met Grey had agreed that the I first 2,000 of the proposed 5,000 military settlers, hopefully from the goldfields of Australia

and Otago, should be enrolled for service in the Auckland province, after which they would be

allotted 50 acre farms to be held on military tenure)6 In apprising the superintendent of

Auckland of the scheme, Domett mentioned in passing that the formation of the planned

I i settlements would probably involve the acquisition of land from 'friendly Natives, which must I be bought in the usual way')7 The problem of distinguishing and separating the land of loyal

and rebel natives was passed over very lightly in 1863 but it was a problem that was to bedevil

successive governments for years to come.

When parliament met, Domett laid before the General Assembly a 12 page memo on how the

necessary roads and military settlements were to be created and paid for. Already 8,000 men

were deemed necessary for about 40 settlements to be located on 190,000 - 200,000 acres of

prime Taranaki land from Waitara to Waitotaia, and 20,000 men and 1,000 miles of road were i \ required overall. By a financial sleight of hand Domett felt able to j~tify the raising of a £4 million loan, £ 1 million of which would be required for expenses of war and could be r9Jaid

from revenue raised by the sale of confiscated land. Domett felt it would be 'only just and reasonable'- to take all the Waikato and Taranaki lands best suited to European settlement, leaving the rebellious tribes 'the valleys and plains further up in the interior'. The government, ~------~~----~------~------he declared, would banish the Maori to the interior, but not 'drive them to desperation and the

mountains'; indeed 100,000 acres could be left to the resident tribes of Taranaki.38 ------~------

36 I I Grey despatch 29 Aug 1863. AJHR 1863 A8 P 1. The conditions of service are laid down in Dornett's : J memo of 3 Aug 1863, ibid pp 4-7.

, I 37 ibid P 8. I 38 AJHR 1863 A8a p 7. i I 19

Although Domett resigned soon afterwards, the new Whitaker-Fox ministry adopted in the

main Domett's elaborate scheme for raising money and confiscating land. , a

fornler premier and attorney general, condemned the scheme as a proposal founded on wrong.

He said it startled everybody as it passed far beyond that outlined on 31 July and would inevitably result in a collision and conflict of races. 39 Sir William Martin wrote a long and

thoughtful paper on 'the plans now proposed for terminating the troubles of the Colony' which he sent to Fox with the request that it be submitted both to the colonial government and to the secretary of state for the colonies, the Duke of Newcastle. Martin pointed out that the imperial government exercised with great caution the right to take, for purposes of defence or other national concerns, the land of those who were represented in the legislature, and questioned the right of the colonial government to take in an unlimited and arbitrary fashion the lands of those who were not so represented.

Martin's paper was a cry for justice for a people who 'are not attached to our system, because it has presented so little to be attached to', who 'have not fallen short of their part in the original contract more than we... have of ours', and who 'have not, as a nation, sinned more against us than we, the superior and protecting power, have against them'. He warned that the present policy would leave behind it the seeds of future war and would increase rather than diminish distrust.40

These prophetic words went unheeded. Fox enclosed a memo setting out his views on 'Sir

William's able and elaborate paper' when he forwarded it to Grey. His overall assessment was that Martin's argument boiled down to a question of whether or not the Assembly had the power to confiscate land from those in rebellion. Martin had not talked of rebels or rebellion but of widespread distrust or disaffection and opposition to government; of the small turbulent

39 Henry Sewell, The New Zealand Native Rebellion: Letter to Lord Lyttelton, Auckland 1864, pp 43- 44.

40 AJHR 1864 App to E2 pp 4, 12, 13. 20

TARANAKI CONFISCATION BOUNDARIES

Waitara River .' ------Oaku~ MI TOllgariro Tataraimaka • At. Mt Ngaurufloe j ·Warea Mt Ruapehu At. Mt Taranaki At. I I I, ,, Waimate : Hawera

Waitotara Wanganui River , I !

- - --- Confiscation Boundary 1864

•••••••• Confiscation Boundary 1865

o 15 30 Miles I ,, " o 25 50 Kilometres

Based on: J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p525 21

minority and the large number living at peace. His paper was in the main an exposition of

European injustice to the Maori. Knowing full well that he would be accused of bias, he

admitted that his statement was in some sense one sided: 'it is the setting forth of that side of !I I. I \ the question which is constantly dropped out of sight, while the other is made as prominent as

possible'.41

The act which gave the Assembly power to confiscate land, euphemistically entitled The New

Zealand Settlements Act, came into law on 3 December. Defending government action Fox I ( declared that the government proposed 'to confiscate (that is, to take without compensation) no

lands except those of which the owners have been engaged in open rebellion'. He stressed that

the new law gave the government no power to confiscate other lands, but it did give power, on

payment of full compensation, to take other lands, Maori or European, for such public

purposes as the establishment of military villages.42 There were, of course, no Europeans , I living 'on the frontier' where it was proposed to form military settlements; the whole purpose

of establishing such settlements was to introduce Europeans to the area.

In moving the second reading of the bill, Fox observed that its primary aim was to aid in the

suppression of the existing rebellion by introducing 'so strong a population into the disturbed

districts ... that the Natives might be deterred from all hope of successful resistance to the

establishment of law'. This of course meant that the government must have land on which to I I ) settle this population; and the land was available: it was that of 'those tribes who have been in

rebellion'. About 4 million acres were available on which to establish 15,000-20,000 souls.

J.E.FitzGerald, MHR for Ellesmere, and a former superintendent of Canterbury, labelled the

bill 'a repeal ... of every engagement of every kind ... which has ever been made by the British

Crown with the Natives'. FitzGerald's spirited speech made some impact, for Fox added i I I I

41 ibid pp 15, 17-18. ! : i 42 ibid P 18.

I i j 22

clauses to his bill with the object, among other things, of reassuring 'really loyal natives' that

they would be dealt with 'as Europeans' and that only the lands of those in rebellion would be

confiscated.43

L _ In the Legislative Council the premier and attorney general Frederick Whi~r passed off the ! New Zealand Settlements Act as a sort of public works act under which all land could be taken

(in districts proclaimed to be in rebellion) and compensation paid to owners - except that those

owners who had been in rebellion should not be entitled to compensation. And he quoted

Vattel's Law of Nations to show that 'when one side of a treaty was violated the other party

was discharged from all obligations; and the Natives had most certainly violated the Treaty of

Waitangi'. ~illiam Swainson opposed the bill saying 'the General Assembly had no legal

power to pass the Bill - in the first place, because they had no power to set aside a treaty which

had been entered into by the Crown, and because no power was given to them by the

Constitution Act to dispose of Native lands'. When Dr Pollen declared the confiscation policy to- be immoral and incapable of being made profitable financially,. Whitaker repeated that 'the land was only to be sold to pay the expenses of the rebellion, and not for lighthouses or any

such purpose; and what fairer principle could there be than that those who caused expenses

should pay them? ... Three-fourths of the land in New Zealand was held on conquest by one .I I ) tribe from another, the recognized principle being that when one tribe was conquered by

another the land followed as a matter of course'.44

The effect of the New Zealand Settlements Act was to proclaim confiscated land to be crown

land freed from all other title or claim, by declaring it to be a district within the provisions of

the act Such districts, within which were the lands of any people deemed to have been in

rebellion since 1 January 1863, could be proclaimed from time to time as the governor thought

43 NZPD 1861-63 pp782-85, 825.

44 NZPD 1861-63 pp 869-74. 23

fit, and set apart for the establishment of settlements.45 Compensation would be paid to those

with 'title, interest or claim' to such lands provided they had not themselves been in rebellion

I I or aided, assisted or comforted those who had, and to those who, having been in rebellion, . \ should come in, deliver up their arms, and submit to trial within a specified time.

The New Zealand Settlements Bill was accompanied through the House by the Suppression of

Rebellion Bill and the New Zealand Loan Bill. This latter was to enable the government to raise

£3 million, partly to help defray the cost of suppressing the rebellion and partly to pay for the I i ! introduction of settlers and the creation of settlements. The sum of £100,000 was to be set

aside to compensate 'loyal Natives for land which may be required for settlement'. According

'- to the colonial treasurer, Reader Wood, the 'rebel districts' in Waikato and Taranaki contained

!

! \ about 8.5 million acres, half of it of suitable quality for settlement Deducting from that the

1.25 million acres required for settlement of both Europeans and Maori, there would be a

balance of 3 million acres, about half of it available for sale. By judicious handling Reader ; I Wood thought this land would realize at least £3 million - but he would be sorry iftne House I I supposed that the government 'looked upon this as a commercial undertaking'; it was just that

details of the monetary transactions involved needed clarifying to show that the proposed loan

could be repaid 'without any difficulty whatever by the sale of land'.46 Early in the new year I I ! J Reader Wood set off for England to argue the colony's case for the loan with the imperial

. government.

Meanwhile the ministry received Newcastle's despatch of 26 November stating that he did not

disapprove of the measures outlined to him by Grey on 29 August and that he thought i I I J 45 There was no clause in the act suspending its operations and the secretary of state required that the colonial government enact legislation to limit its duration. The New Zealand Settlements Amendment Act of 1864 provided that the act should lapse on 3 Dec 1865. The New Zealand Settlements II'. I Amendment and Continuance Act of 1865 made the 1863 act perpetual but provided that no districts could be proclaimed, or land taken for settlement, after 3 Dec 1867; NZPD 1864-66 pp 100-01,263; AJHR 1864 App to E2 p 22, AJHR 1865 A6 p18, ibid Al p26.

46 AJHR 1864 Al p5; NZPD 1861-63 pp 847, 848.

I / 24

aggressors such as Waikato might 'properly be punished by a confiscation of a large part of

their common property'. However he warned against wholesale confiscation as a measure

which would excite the cupidity of both old and new settlers eager for the acquisition of land

and make the Maori desperate since they might view the measure 'not as a punishment for

rebellion and murder, but as a new and flagrant proof of the determination of the colonists to

possess themselves of the land at all risks ... and at any cost'. Ministers were at pains to assure

him they felt no apprehension that land confiscatio~ could not be 'confined within wise and just

limits' and said they had taken particular care to inform the tribes that the property of innocent

persons would be respected and that punishment would be proportionate to guilt.47

Grey's letter to Newcastle of 6 January 1864, sent with the copy of the New Zealand , I Settlements Act, appeared to agree with the intentions of the act, but in fact Grey was already beginning to evince alarm at his ministers' real intentions. While he believed that this rebellion

required more severe measures than any previous ones, including confiscation of land, 'acting

upon the principle of the great wisdom of showing a large generosity towards defeated rebel I I subjects', he maintained he would not carry the system too far. That others were suspicious of

! ( ministers' intentions was also made clear by the Aborigines Protection Society when, early in

1864, they sent Grey an address 'very numerously and influentially signed'.48 The society

expressed itself 'alarmed by the pertinacity with which .. .it has been proposed to confiscate the

Lands of all contumacious and rebellious Natives'. They could see clearly what the ministry I I ) was determined to ignore: that confiscation in New Zealand, as elsewhere, would only

I intensify disaffection and perpetuate 'the strife of races ... through successive generations'. I I, Grey assured the society that he would do his best to ensure that the confiscation of a

'considerable portion' of the territories of those in rebellion would be carried out in a 'spirit of

liberal generosity, and of mercy', but he persisted in his view that such punishment would

47 AJHR 1864 E2 pp 30-31; Whitaker memo 29 Feb 1864, ibid P 31.

48 AJHR 1864 App to E2 p 19; AJHR 1864 E2 pp 16-17. : \

25

'deter others from embarking in a similar career' and he added that it was the government's

intention to 'secure to that numerous part of the Native population who have taken no active

share in the present war, the whole of their landed possessions' - although he must have been

aware that under the act of confiscation this would be impossible wherever loyal and rebel

natives held land in common.

Grey was a past master at the art of manipulating the written word, but ministers, especially i I Fox and , who had been attorney general in the Domett ministry, were apt

\ pupils. The Whitaker-Fox ministry, which took over in October 1863, was dominated by , I Auckland capitalists, notably Whitaker and Thomas Russell, his partner in a successful legal , \ practice which concerned itself largely with speculative land dealing. Russell, a founder of the

Bank of New Zealand, was Whitaker's minister of defence and it was impossible to distinguish

where their political involvement ended and their business involvement began.49 Together they ! [ constituted a formidable force in favour of confiscation of rebel land - for profit, not

punishment.

In April 1864 Whitaker submitted to Grey a draft proclamation declaring that 'Chiefs and

Tribes ofWaikato' had 'justly forfeited all their lands', and reiterating the peace terms they

were prepared to offer the Waikato and other rebel Maori should they submit before 1 July.

The proclamation was the subject of considerable discussion between the governor and his

ministers both before and after Grey hesitatingly signed a Maori version of the draft on 30

April, and the paper war Grey generated over the proclamation fmally led to the ministry's

decision not to proceed with its publication.50 Some of the disagreement was over the question

of whether or not rebels who chose to submit should be obliged to surrender their arms, the

ministry believing that they should and Grey that they should not However, a much more

49 R. C. 1. Stone, Makers of Fortune: A Colonial Business Community and its Fall, Auckland, 1973, pp9,174._

50 AJHR 1864 E2 pp 35-46. For an amended version of the original draft see BPP/IUP vol 14 pp 19-20.

I i \ )

I I 26

serious disagreement arose over the question of confiscation itself, with Grey and his ministers

accusing each other of being the originator of the scheme. Grey questioned the legality of the

ministers' opinion that the rebel natives had forfeited all their lands but Whitaker was satisfied !' that in point of law they had, despite the Treaty of Waitangi whose provisions, ministers

believed, could last only so long as the Maori fulfilled their obligations under it. And 'if there

were any doubt on this point. .. the New Zealand Settlements Act... would virtually justify' the

~ I proposed declaration and 'afford ample means of... carrying it into effect'.51

This was too much for Grey who felt that by signing such a proclamation he was being made

to trifle with the 'whole future destiny of the Maori nation' and made the means of reducing

from wealth to poverty generations of loyal and rebel Maori alike. When his ministers denied

that it was on their advice the rebels were to be infonned they had forfeited all their lands, Grey

felt the whole responsibility for confiscation was being thrust upon him - a situation that would

suit the wily Whitaker very well, since his definition of confiscation was 'appropriation of land

I by the Governor'. Grey argued that the New Zealand Settlements Act could hardly be ! I construed as an act intended to deprive present and future generations of the Maori race of all

their lands when their crime was perhaps no greater than 'comforting a parent, a child or

husband, who had borne arms against the Queen'. His request that the proclamation be

revoked brought forth an outburst from Whitaker who felt that the governor in 'his zeal for the , I Maori... appears to forget the European colonists'.52 )

It was becoming very clear that Grey and Whit8.ker had quite different schemes of confiscation

in mind. Grey conceded that his views had never varied on the 'propriety and necessity' of

confiscating territory from Waikato, Ngatimaniapoto and Ngatiruanui, but insisted that , I \ I 51 Whitaker memo 10 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E2 P 40. See also Michael R Litchfield, 'Confiscation of Maori Land', Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 15, 1985, p341.

52 Grey memo 11 May 1864, AJHR 1864 E2 pp40-41; Whitaker memo 17 May 1864, ibid pp41-43; Whitaker memo 3 June 1864, ibid p46. 27

confiscation should vary in extent in proportion to the degree of guilt of those tribes. Whitaker

on the other hand, admitted the justice of confiscation as punishment for rebellion but qualified

his view by saying it would not necessarily be 'proper and expedient' to confiscate, even

though such a penalty might have been justly incurred.53 Like Domett before him he was

obviously planning a scheme of confiscation based on government expedience rather than

Maori guilt - one that confiscated productive land rather than rebelland54

The ministry now tried repeatedly to pin Grey down and have him proclaim districts under the

New Zealand Settlements Act and he as often managed to procrastinate. He was stalling for time while awaiting instructions from Newcastle; they were anxious for 'political and financial reasons' to get their hands on confiscated land - desirable Waikato and Tauranga land. The act

reql}.ired them first to establish military settlers on the land; having done that they could at last

start replenishing their coffers through the long awaited land sales. Before Grey would put the

act into effect he wanted a clear statement to be issued as to the extent to which confiscation

would be carried, for he believed it was essential that rebel natives who 'came in' should

understand clearly what land they would forfeit and what land they could retain. 55

This request foreshadowed the instructions received about this time from the secretary of state.

Cardwell, who had succeeded to this office, was not as compliant as Newcastle. He recognized

the need to inflict 'a salutary penalty upon the authors of a war' but objected to the powers of the act being permanently embodied in the laws of New Zealand and forming------'a standing qualification... to the treaty ofWaitangi'. He urged that the guilty be carefully distinguished from the innocent, and that punishment be commensurate with crime. He felt that it was justifiable to

recoup some of the war expenditure from the sale of confiscated land, but since most of that

53 Grey memo 25 May 1864, ibid P 44; Whitaker memo 3 June 1864, ibid p 46.

54 i See notes 37 and 38 above. i I I 55 Whitaker memo 30 May 1864, ibid p 55; Grey memo 17 June 1864, ibid. 28·

expenditure had been outlayed by Britain he insisted that confiscation or cession of land be

limited to ensuring peace and maintaining British honour. The imperial government desired that

cession of land be a condition of peace but if this was found to be impractical Grey was to

allow implementation of the act subject to certain restrictions: that its duration be limited to two

years; that the land to be confiscated be promptly defined in area and location by a specially

constituted independent commission; and that it be clearly understood Grey's 'concurrence' in

any forfeiture would be withheld unless he was personally satisfied that the confiscation was

'just and moderate'.56

II The arrival of Cardwell's despatch may have decided the ministry to provide Grey with some sort of an answer to his queries. They finally did so on 25 June when they outlined the extent

of the confiscation they proposed in Waikato and provided for possible subsequent

confiscation of Maniapoto land. In Taranaki they proposed to confiscate sufficient rebel land

'on both sides of the Town of New Plymouth, including land of the Ngatiawa, Taranaki, and

, ( Ngatiruanui tribes' to allow for the establishment of military settlements 'at such points as will

provide for the security of the Town and the settled districts around it..and to afford a

substantial contribution to the expenses of suppressing the rebellion'.57 This was a

conveniently vague description. Whitaker went on to say that it was also proposed to confiscate

rebel land 'from the Waitotara River to a convenient distance, 10 or 20 miles to the North of the

Patea River, including Waimate'. In effect all rebel land from the Waitara to the Waitotara was

to be confiscated, yet ministers did not consider it would be 'necessary to interfere with the

properties of the Loyal Natives, except in some special cases where they hold lands in common

with Rebels'. In such cases loyal natives would be allotted their share of land, which they

would then hold on crown grant. Lest these proposals not be vague enough, Whitaker

provided that should circumstances 'modify' ministers' views, or the conduct of the natives I ! I

56 Cardwell despatch 26 April 1864, NHR 1864 App to E2 pp 20-22.

57 NHR 1864 E2 pp 58-59. 29

'render it just and expedient to go further than is now contemplated', ministers would reserve

the right 'to alter or modify' their proposals.

In attempting to abide by Cardwell's instruction that the governor was expected to act on his

own judgement if ministers' opinions as to peace terms should differ from his, Grey

continually came into conflict with Whitaker. When his ministers naively declared that as yet

practically 'no difference of opinion' existed between the governor and his advisers,58 Grey

suggested to Cardwell that the secretary of state could judge for himself that 'considerable

differences of opinion' had arisen from time to time on subjects 'of great Imperial concern'. I This despatch of Grey's was a very calm and rational statement of the difficulties he faced with i I an Assembly that infrequently met and then only for brief periods, ministers who were mostly

absent from the capital, manipulation by Whitaker and Russell, and a European popUlation

engaged in 'what may with justice be regarded as a civil war' with the country's main land

holders, the Maori, who were unrepresented in the legislature.59

\ I l In the weeks that followed the paper war continued, with Grey resisting actual confiscation of

land and ministers pressing upon him the urgent need for it. Each claimed their course was

designed to give effect to the instructions issued by CardwelL The main issue was complicated

by side issues such as the surrender of arms and the escape of prisoners, and finally resolved

itself into a question of cession as against confiscation of land. On 7 September Grey submitted

to his ministers a draft proclamation which offered a free pardon to any rebel (but not \ ! murderer) who would, before 22 October, take the oath of allegiance and cede such territory as )

i i

58 Whitaker memo 2 Aug 1864, AJHR 1864 E2c p 22.

59 Grey despatch 26 Aug 1864, AJHR 1864 E5 pp 8-9. For Whitaker's view of this despatch see ibid E2 pp 97-100. 30

would be notified him by the governor and the military commander.60 Whitaker replied that if

the ministers were to agree to such a proclamation they wished to dictate its terms, especially in

regard to the amount of land to be ceded or alternatively confiscated. Grey refused to meet the

ministers' wishes, and they declined to 'acquiesce' in the proclamation as it stood. Above all

they would not agree that mere cession of territory should be deemed a 'sufficient submission'.

They required nothing less than that every last rebel should surrender his arms. Grey would

have none of it and declared that with or without his ministers' acquiescence he would issue the

proclamation as it stood. He was still fencing for time. He hoped, but did not expect, that many

Maori would accept the terms of the proclamation, but by promulgating it he could at least

delay the start of the 'summer campaign'.

The governor's responsible advisers, feeling they had lost their 'legitimate influence' in the

affairs of government, now asked to be relieved of office. Grey ignored their request and

continued to press them to specify the amount of land they meant to confiscate. By the end of

the month they finally named a figure: 1.6 million acres, 600,000 of them in Taranaki and near

Wanganui. This was less than they had earlier proposed, but they had modified their demands

lest they be accused of 'prolonging the war for the acquisition of territory'. They had not

suffered a change of heart but had been stirred to action by the return of the colonial treasurer

from London with the news that he had failed to negotiate the loan which was to help solve so

many of the colony's problems. Reader Wood had found there was considerable disquiet at the

Colonial Office over the government's intentions with regard to the confiscation policy and

, ! attributed this partly to interference by Grey. Now, with their honour in question and their .1 financial policy in tatters, they formally tendered their resignations on 30 September.61 Grey , I still contrived not to accept them and the pin pricking correspondence continued for almost

another two months until November when a new ministry was formed with as

60 For the proclamation and the sparring match between Grey and Whitaker which ensued see AJHR 1864 E2 pp 89-97.

61 ibid pp 95, 111. 31

premier and as defence minister. On 6 October the ministers tried to induce

Grey to invoke the New Zealand Settlements Act over the Waikato land in their possession so

that they could settle emigrants - and tap 'an important source of revenue': they hoped to sell

£100,000 worth of land by the following January. Grey reminded them that according to

Cardwell's instructions he should not bring the act into operation until and unless he had failed to obtain cessions of land from 'defeated rebels'. It was therefore necessary to issue his proclamation; ministers need not acquiesce in it nor be responsible for it, but they should publish it.62

When the proclamation finally appeared in the Gazett of 26 October 1864 it gave rebels till 10

December to submit, take the oath of allegiance and cede so much of their land as Grey and

General Cameron should decide. When Grey tried to involve the ministers in decisions relating to required cessions of land, Whitaker replied coldly that they had not countersigned the proclamation so the responsibility was not theirs. 'Where there is the power, there must rest the

Responsibility. The Governor has assumed the power, and thereby released the Ministers, the

General Assembly, and the Colony from Responsibility.'63

The wrangle filled pages of print and months of time, but it had achieved one thing. No Maori land had yet been confiscated. Grey had procrastinated to good effect. Yet within a month, and just one week after the day of grace named in his previous proclamation, he was ready to sign a new one for Weld.64 The reasons for Grey's change of heart were manifold and complex and were dictated to some extent by Cameron's actions and by questions of responsible government. There are also suggestions that it may have been an effort on Grey's part to boost his diminishing mana, or even that it was simply 'the acquiescence of an opportunist'; but it

62 AJHR 1864 E2a p 9; Grey memo 10 Oct 1864, ibid P 10.

63 ibid P 25.

64 Gazette, 17 Dec 1864. 32

had been a long struggle and Grey was not in good health. Although he had foiled Fox and

Whitaker, his attempt to obtain cessions of land had failed. He had agreed to Weld's conditions

on taking office and knew he would face further ministerial resignations should he and his new

responsible advisers fail to agree, but he did believe Weld's confiscation policy would be more

moderate than that of his late ministers.65

The proclamation Grey signed on 17 December 1864 designated as confiscated land all the land in military occupation in the Waikato and as much rebel land in Taranak~ ? 1<;;<1//7 It also provided that the lands of those who had not been in rebellion would be secured to them

and those who chose to surrender would have some part of their land returned to them; and it

was not required that every Maori surrender his arms. This proclamation is, broadly, a

statement of Grey's position as it was from the start: land would be confiscated for

punishment, not profit; punishment would be commensurate with guilt; the land of loyal

natives would not be touched; and the Maori were not to be totally humbled as Fox and

Whitaker would humble them, for their word would be accepted as proof of their intention to

surrender. But while the order in council of 30 January 1865 designated a relatively restricted

area, 'Middle Taranaki', as a district under the New Zealand Settlements Act, in the Waikato

Grey's conscience had been 'stretched' by the Weld ministry 'from Ngaruawahia to Orakau',

in the 'worst injustice ever perpetrated by a '.66

Cardwell expressed his concern that the 17 December proclamation announced a more

extensive confiscation than he had anticipated, but he was satisfied that the promises it made to

65 Alan D. Ward, 'The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars: A Reconsideration', New Zealand Journal of History 1,2, 1967, P 156; Jeanine Williams, 'Frederick Weld: A Political Biography', PhD thesis, University of Auckland, 1973, pp 157-58, 167-69; Grey memo 30 Sept 1864, AJHR 1864 E2 P 95; A. J. Harrop, England and the Maori Wars, London, 1937, p 406; Rutherford pp 573-75; Weld memo 22 Nov 1864, AJHR 1864 A2; NZPD 1863-64 pp 13-15; C. M. Sealy, 'A Study of the Policy of Land Confiscation as Applied in the District of Taranaki', MA thesis, University of New Zealand, 1949, p 31.

1- 66 G. W. Rusden, , vol II, London, 1883, p 273; Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand [1959], Harmondsworth, 1969, p 143. See also Williams thesis pp 176-79. I I

33

loyal natives and rebels prepared to submit would be faithfully observed.67 However, he had

reservations about the 1864 amendment to the New Zealand Settlements Act, passed to satisfy r I the conditions he had laid down regarding the duration of the 1863 act. It provided that the

1863 act should continue in operation until 3 December 1865, 'but by some oversight', he

! I presumed, the usual words 'and no longer' were omitted. Since this might 'lead to questions as to the technical sufficiency of the limitation', he had for the time being refrained from

submitting the acts to Her Majesty 'either for approval or disallowance'.68 The possibility that

the imperial government might later disallow the acts was a serious blow to the Weld ministry

and they expressed 'in the strongest terms, their opinion that such disallowance would be

fraught with consequences disastrous to the Colony'. Whatever might have been the

objections to the 1863 act, it had been 'largely brought into practical operation', and to disallow i I the acts 'would be to paralyze the Government and involve the Colony in inextricable difficulty'.69 It was already obvious that Cardwell's faith in contemporary and future

ministries was sadly misplaced Indeed memories were so defective or selective that 20 years

later another native minister and future Liberal premier , informed the chiefs and

people of the Wanganui district that 'even the Government of the colony had nothing to do'

with the confiscations; that the land was confiscated 'at a time when the administration of the

affairs of the Native people were in the hands of a Governor under the British Government, so

that the Government and the Parliament of New Zealand are not even responsible for that'.70

i I In August, while planning the 'real instrument' of confiscation, Weld was still proclaiming that I the intention of his ministry was 'to confine the confiscation of land taken from the rebel Natives within such limits as may inflict no undue hardship on the rebels, nor on those who

67 Cardwell despatch 27 March 1865, AJHR 1865 A6 p16.

I 68 ! J Caldwell despatch 24 April 1865. ibid ppI8-I9.

69 Weld memo 11 Aug 1865. AJHR 1865 Al p26.

70 AJHR 1885 GI p5. 34

have remained loyaI'.71 But the government's intentions as explained by the new native

minister, J. E. FitzGerald, when appointing Robert Parris civil commissioner for Taranaki, f \ were not simply to secure an area around the settlement of New Plymouth, but rather 'to

confiscate the whole of the lands, to a distance of twenty miles or thereabouts from the coast,

lying between the Waitotara River and the White Cliffs'. The Weld ministry could apparently

believe this would inflict no undue hardship on the Maori since it was not their intention either

to hold or occupy all the land or to expel any of those tribes who were occupying it. Believing

that 'the greatest mischief arose from delays in settling natives on the land, their stated aim

was 'at once' to settle on 'sufficient' land all the local Maori who were willing 'to come in,

\ accept crown grants, and promise to live peaceably under the law', and to return to the loyal ! I natives 'as nearly as possible the exact land they are entitled to now'. Weld naively explained

that this massive confiscation, which belied both the government's and Grey's professed

intentions, would not be a source of further irritation to the Maori since it would be clearly

stated to them and immediately implemented.72

The actual confiscation was promulgated by an order in council of 2 September 1865 which

declared a much larger area, designated Ngatiawa and Ngatiruanui, to be districts under the

New Zealand Settlements Act and which promised that no land of any loyal inhabitant would

be taken except as necessary for the security of the country, and then only against payment of

compensation. It further provided that all rebel inhabitants who came in within a reasonable I ) time and submitted to the Queen's authority would receive a sufficient quantity of land within

the named district, under crown grant.73 The announcement of the confiscation was \ accompanied by a proclamation of peace which declared prematurely that the war which

71 I I, Weld memo 11 Aug 1865, AJHR 1865 Al P 26. I J 72 FitzGerald memo 30 Aug 1865, AJHR 1879 A8 P 3; Weld memo 2 Sept 1865, AJHR 1865 Al pp 26- 27.

I )

73 Gazette, 5 Sept 1865.

I \ 35

commenced at Oakura was at an end. It went on to describe confiscation as a punishment and a

deterrent and to promise that no further punishment would be inflicted on the rebels excepting

those few involved in certain acts which the government considered particularly treacherous. It

reiterated the promise to 'at once' restore land to well disposed natives and most importantly

promised that commissioners would be sent 'forthwith' to settle the people on the land and to

'mark out the boundaries of the blocks which they are to occupy'.74

The Weld ministry may have had the best of intentions with regard to their promises, but they

were unable to withstand settler pressure to implement the confiscation policy in settler rather

than Maori interests and in any case by October 1865 they were out of office. Those who

succeeded them were even more assiduous in their efforts to settle Europeans on 'conquered'

land and the non fulfilment, by ministry after ministry, of the promises contained in the

confiscation and peace proclamations was at the heart of the troubles which plagued the west

coast and the whole colony for years to come. Confiscation left in its wake a bitterness which

to this day has never been effaced.

, I

74 ibid.

I I , I , I 36

CHAPTER TWO CONFISCATION ON THE GROUND: 1866-1876

The acts and proclamations of confiscation were very clear in the promises they made to loyal

natives and returned rebels. It was the non fulfilment of these promises that led to

complications as the confiscation was enforced on the ground. The West Coast Commission

which enquired into the whole question in 1880 was adamant that had the promises of

successive governments been redeemed, full justice would have been done to the Maori and

ample provision made for their needs. But 'the inherent difficulty in any attempt to defme

exactly what the confiscation took and what it did not take'! appeared to paralyse the

government. Apart from the abandonment of the confiscation south of the Waitotara river in

18672 and the 'informal restitution' of the Opunake and Stoney River blocks in 18663 little was

done towards redeeming promises until after the 1880 commission of enquiry.

The 1863 act required that military settlers have first call on the land. Once their requirements

were met the government could survey towns and suburban and rural allotments for sale, and

pay compensation, where necessary, from the proceedings. ~e 1863 act and the 1864 f amendment provided that compensation should be paid to indiv-id-U-al-s-,-n-o-t-to-tn-·be-;:;apu. .)

I ) The 1865 amendment provided that the confiscation of land for which compensation was

claimed could be abandoned, or that compensation could be paid in land instead of money. But

the requirement that claimants be individuals was not then repealed, and since native title was

communal, not individual, it required a further act, the Confiscated Lands Act 1867, to correct

the anomaly.

I I I AJHR 1880 G2 pxlvi.

2 Gazette 15 March 1967 pIl2.

3 AJHR 1880 G2 pxxxix. 37

Under the 1867 act reserves could be made, by proclamation in the Gazette, for tribes or hapu,

for friendly natives or surrendered rebels, and such grants of land could be made subject to

such conditions, restrictions and limitations as the governor might think fit The act also

provided that parts of the confiscated lands could, by proclamation, be deemed to be waste

lands of the Crown, subject to the waste land laws of the province in which they were situated.

The 1864 amendment provided that the 1863 act should lapse on 3 December 1865; the 1865 amendment- made the 1863 act perpetual, but provided that no districts could be proclaimed, or land taken for settlement, after 3 December 1867. But in 1865 a new act, the ..Outlying Districts Police Act, was passed, giving new grounds for confiscation of Maori land. Under this act .... tribal land could be confis-fated in any district in which certain crimes had been committed, or

in any district which harboured the perpetrator or suspected perpetrator of such crimes if, after

the issue of the proclamation, the chiefs and other inhabitants of the district did not help bring

the fugitive to justice; and any lands so taken would become demesne lands of the Crown,

available for sale, with the proceeds expended on policing the district and preserving the peace.

Where confiscation acts had previously been made to appear as public works acts, they were

now to appear as criminal justice acts. But lest the government be accused of simply extending

the New Zealand Settlements Act, this act was to be 'as different as possible' from an act to put

down rebellion - it was 'only an Act for the suppression of crime'.4 At least under the New

Zealand Settlements Act land would be confiscated only where a 'considerable number of

persons' had been engaged in rebellion; under the new act the presence in a district of a single

person suspected of a crime would be enough to set the confiscation process in motion. There

were no longer even loyal and rebel natives. All would now be equally guilty, and since so

much of the land had already been confiscated this would give the government the means of

extending the confiscation boundaries. The government had in mind to take 200,000 acres in

4 NZPD 1864-66 pp324, 345.

I I 38

Taranaki under the provisions of this bill 'in such positions as they may be let at once to settlers

on easy terms, so as to produce an immediate rental'. This land was to be 'laid out, and

surveyed and mapped with the utmost expedition'.5

! : The act met with strong misgiving in the Assembly, but like previous repressive legislation it

was passed by a parliament unwilling to oppose ministerial measures and risk the resignation

of yet another ministry. Sir William Martin also expressed his disapproval of the act in the '-- --- strongest terms and recommended that it not be brought into operation.

The new enactment affords a striking instance of the mode in which measures, which are at fIrst defended as only exceptional come to be extended to entirely different cases. i The seizing of land of innocent men for the offences of others whom they could not , \ restrain, and did not aid, was recently justified in the discussions on the New Zealand Settlements Act, only as being a consequence of war. It is now attempted to make it a part of the ordinary and permanent law, and this too at the very time when the principle is abandoned in the practical working of the original enactment. , I Such acts as this and the Public Works Lands Act 1864, by which the government could take ) land in native districts for roads and other public purposes and, if the taking was resisted, take

more land and apply the provisions of the New Zealand Settlements Act, would, according to

Martin, 1eave to scarcely any Maori in the country any security for the retention of an acre of

his land'.6

Such acts were an illustration of the government's cynicism in continually proclaiming their

intention to treat the Maori fairly and their unWillingness to take an acre more of land than was

really necessary for the peace and security of the country. As Sir William Martin said it must

have appeared tyrannical to the Maori that they were to police districts, in a manner which the

European found impossible, on pain of civil war with those whom they tried to restrain, or

! I confiscation of land for their failure to restrain them. The Colonial Office contented itself with

condemning the act but not disallowing it They had already surrendered responsibility for

5 Native Minister to Parris 30 Aug 1865, AJHR 1879 Sess I A8 p3.

6 AJHR 1866 Al pp72-74. 39

native affairs to the Weld government,? but they could still distinguish an act desig~ed ~ -' confiscate land from one designed to deal with a few criminals. , 0 /~~( ~' The Outlying Districts Police Act was not repealed until 1891, but it was used little, if at all.

~ Perhaps such influential condemnation had some effect. The excuse for its introduction was

ostensibly the spread of Pai Marire and its degeneration into 'that horrible fanaticism,

engendered by desperation and despair - the Hauhau superstition'.8 The peace proclamation of

2 September 1865 was about to be issued and all past deeds except murder were to be subject

to amnesty. New controls were needed; the government decided they were not now dealing

with rebels but with criminals. They had not yet announced their massive confiscation of land

in Taranaki but they believed confiscation to be more necessary there in that 'focus of sedition

and fanaticism', than in any other part of the country. The Ngatiruanui, among whom were

some of the most fanatical Hauhau, were to be the most severely punished; if they were not

rebels they were criminals, and either way their land could be taken.9

:j No sooner were the actual confiscations promUlgated by proclamation than scrapping began in I i parliament as to whether the general or provincial governments should have control of the ( ) confiscated lands - and foot the bills, and reap the rewards. One remark in the House which

met no objection, came from the notorious Thomas Russell. He wanted all natives, loyal or

rebel, moved off confiscated land and concentrated on reserves 'to prevent their rambling over

the entire extent of the Waikato and picking out the best portions, thus interfering with the

I I )

I J

? Alan Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, Auckland, 1973, p189.

I I 8 NZPD 1864-66 p322.

9 AJHR 1865 Al p9; NZPD 1864-66 p323. 40 future settlement in blocks by Europeans'.1 0 By as early as December 1865 had drawn up a detailed scheme for disposing, through the provincial governments, of 'the magnificent lands acquired from the Natives'. He recommended that a million acres of the choicest lands be disposed of by lottery in lots ranging from 50 to 100,000 acres at a price of

£2 per acre, with the proceeds devoted to immigration and public works. He made light of any possible problems over settling confiscated land, but assigned to provincial governments the task of providing the settlers with proper protection from any ill-disposed Maori. 11

Vogel's plan got a mixed reception from the provinces, but in the event Auckland, under the superintendency of Frederick Whitaker, quickly gained control of the rich Waikato lands they had so long coveted. But Whitaker was soon expressing other concerns. It was daily becoming clearer that the hoped for profits would not be made from confiscated land. The operation of the Native Land Court was reducing the price of land in the province and he feared that titles to 200,000 acres had already been obtained, most of it for 'a few shillings per acre'.12

In Taranaki there was no question but that the lands had been confiscated for profit. The politicians saw Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, as so much raw material, to be converted 'into a manufactured article, by surveying it, and opening it up with roads, and providing for its occupation'. And if the land should thus be 'increased in value by something more than the actual expenditure upon it, the Provincial Government should '" be considered to be fairly entitled to such profit'. The superintendent of the province looked forward eagerly to the

10 NZPD 1864-66 p715. See also AJHR 1866 A2a, A2b.

11 Vogel to Stafford 14 Dec 1865, AJHR 1866 A2b ppl-3.

12 Whitaker to Stafford 22 Sept 1866, ibid pp7-8. 41

construction of a breakwater at the Sugar Loaves and an increase in immigration. Taranaki was

to become prosperous through confiscation.1 3

But before the provincial authorities could start deriving funds from the sale of confiscated

I I lands they had to discharge their principal liability - that of 'satisfying the claims of friendly natives', and that this might be done the provincial superintendent, H. R. Richmond, asked I I I that the sitting of the Compensation Court in Taranaki be no longer delayed.14 He feared that

further delay 'in an equitable settlement of all claims could only result in evil'. The settlers

distrusted the powers Robert Parris, the civil commissioner, had been given to adjust claims

I t prior to their final adjudication by the court, and Richmond believed the claimants were 'perplexed and exceedingly discontented with the irregular and unsatisfactory measures'

adopted by the government for adjusting claims. A party of friendly natives had begun felling

timber on surveyed land intended for Europeans, 'declaring that the land was theirs, nothing

having been given to them in return for it'.15 According to E. W. Stafford, the premier, the

government was just as anxious to settle the claims in the interests of peace and the progress of

Taranaki, but he believed some of the disquiet in Taranaki had arisen from the conduct of

certain Europeans, especially military settlers who had harrassed friendly natives and plundered

their goods.16 The military themselves were worse offenders. The treatment handed out by

Major-General Chute and his officers and men to Wi Kingi Matakatea (and his people) who

'was never implicated in this last war and was always proverbial for his kindness to European

13 H. R. Richmond to J. C. Richmond 25 Sept 1865, AJHR 1866 A2a, ppl-2.

14 H. R. Richmond to Stafford 29 Jan 1866, ibid p4.

15 H. R. Richmond to Stafford 8 Feb 1866, ibid pp7-8.

16 Stafford to H. R. Richmond 6 March 1866, ibid p9. See also Parris to Grey 22 March 1866, AJHR 1879 Sess I A8 pp 3-4. 42

travellers' was scandalous and simply 'drove as loyal a Native chief as any in New Zealand

from his allegiance to the Government'.!7

By March 1866 Richmond was less anxious about Maori claims since the country between

I i Stoney River and was, he said, in such an unsettled state that the province could not begin creating agricultural settlements anyway. The solution to the problem was either 'to

reduce the Natives of that District to submission and to acquiescence in the confiscation of the

land or to inflict so severe a chastisement on them that they practically abandon the contest'. 18

Richmond's belligerent suggestion closely followed Chute's devastating foray into Taranaki in

I I January-February. Stafford's only objection to the idea of recommencing hostilities in I Taranaki in order to enforce the confiscation seemed to be that at the moment the government I ) J lacked the necessary funds19 - but from June to November of the same year funds were found

for Major Thomas McDonnell to fight the same enemy over the same ground.20

In July, in an effort to negotiate peace on the coast, the governor sent the Pai Marire leader Te

Ua to the Ngatiruanui district to tell the people that it was the governor's wish that 'Man should

\ ' live'. Te Ua reported that he was 'satisfied that the people between Taiporohenui and i l Waitotara longed for peace' but McDonnell, the commander of the colonial forces in Taranaki,

was anxious that he should be the one to bring about peace, and he set out to effect the

surrender of the Tanghoe hapu. In late July he negotiated with them through Manaia, a

N garuahine chief from north of the Waingongoro, and accepted that they were willing to make

peace. They, however, intended to make peace in their good time, not in his; and in their way,

which meant going to the governor with the blessing of Parris, the civil commissioner, not

17 Correspondence relative to Wi Kingi Matakatea Feb-July 1866, AJHR 1866 A8, pp1-11.

18 H. R. Richmond to Stafford 28 March 1866, AJHR 1866 A2a pplO-l1.

19 Stafford to H. R. Richmond 24 April 1866, ibid p12. I I I 20 Belich Wars pp207-08 43

McDonnell, the military commander. Natanahira Ngahina, a Tangahoe chief, had started off

for New Plymouth with Te Ua on 27 July when he was intercepted by McDonnell who was

determined he should go to Wellington via Patea and Wanganui. He even promised Tangahoe

'that a certain portion of the confiscated lands' - all that between Taiporohenui and -

would be restored to them, and their horses and cattle spared, should they make peace through

him. Natanahira went on to New Plymouth, as Tangahoe and Pakakohe, as well as Taranaki

and Ngatiawa commanded, instead of to the camp at Waingongoro as McDonnell commanded.

This was interpreted as deceipt and treachery and McDonnell, 'thoroughly disappointed at not I I I having succeeded in making peace' determined to attack Natanahira's 'rebel' village of

Pokaikai. The people of the village 'lulled into a feeling of security', sleeping 'the sleep of I I I fools', had been busy preparing kits of potatoes as a peace offering to McDonnell when their

village was attacked about 1 am. on 2 August. An elderly chief Aperahama Te Runganui and

his wife Hera Hine Hawe, and another man Haira Nga Karaka, were killed, Mereana Matau

wounded, and 13 women and children taken prisoner. The Maori put up no resistance, beyond

flight, nor did they attempt to avenge the attack, as it had been made 'in a time of peace. The

weapon of war had been put down after General Chute's campaign' and they thought it was

.j not right 'to take it up again on account of that attack'.

Although questions were asked in the House at various times, the. Pokaikai affair was not

investigated officially until two years later. The report of two of the three commissioners, J. ,( Cracroft Wilson and J. Cargill, whitewashed the whole affair and concluded that no 'wanton

outrage was committed' and that 'the results of the attack upon Pokaikai, were the almost

immediate surrender of the Tangahoe and Pakakohi hapus of the Ngatiruanui tribe'. The third

I i commissioner, George Graham (who had raised the question in the House a year earlier), protested against the majority report of the commission and wrote his own report, highlighting

McDonnell's culpability for the affair and noting the sincerity of the Tangahoe 'in their

intention to make peace ... through Mr Parris'. It was indeed Parris' peacemaking afterwards,

which involved telling Tangahoe McDonnell had no authority to offer them land, but promising 44

that 'some of their favourite places' would be included in the land the government would set

apart for them, that induced them to offer their unconditional surrender. Pakakohe also surrendered to Parris when he told them 'sufficient land would be given to them' including

'some land on both sides of the ' and promised 'to recommend the different

detachments in the district not to molest them',21

Over the years Parris was issued with a succession of instructions with regard to the settlement

of the confiscated lands, In August 1865 the native minister, J. E. FitzGerald, instructed him

to negotiate with all the Maori of the Taranaki district and persuade them 'to come in at once

and accept defined blocks of land within the confiscated territory'. This was followed in ~ September 1866 by instructions from J. C. Richmond, head of the native d~ent in the ~ --::: . /~ .. dN' ~ Stafford government, that Parris was to induce absentee owners of Ngat:i.rUaIlUl an ganawa 9'. ,;(~ to abandon their claims in return for reserves and monetary payment, and to settle the claims of

loyal Maori and make reserves for surrendered rebels to the north of the Patea river. He was to

settle the claims in 'the rest of the Ngatiawa Coast Block' by leaving all the land of the Taranaki

chiefs Wi Kingi Matakatea and Arama Karaka, 'almost the onIy loyal men • in their area, and by making reserves of up to 50 acres per head, including 'kaingas~ fishing sta.tions and any other

favourite spots', for surrendering rebels.22 ~. ,4r~~~ .~ ~ ~ r--z;;-- /~ From June 1865 land between Stoney River and Pukearuhe had been allot1:ed to ITIllitary settlerf\- ~ ~ about 1,500 acres of it belonging to the 'thoroughly loyal' Ngatirahiri hap-U· They had fought

as kupapa in the Urenui district, but their land 'lay on the war-path of the oorthern natives

coming south' and Parris was ordered to induce them to move from their osual settlement .. i inland of Tikorangi 'and form a new settlement on the coast-line between --Titirangi and Rau-o­ te-Huia They left their settlement, their peach gardens and everything th~:Y had to meet the - 21 Report of the Pokaikai Commission 14 Aug 1868, AJHR 1868 A3 ppi-ii, 1_::::2-7; NZPD 1867 i pp379- 82. . I (

22 AJHR 1879 A8 pp3-5.

I 45 wishes of the Government, and moved down to the coast'.23 Five years later the government took the land

they had thus temporarily abandoned and planted upon it two regiments of European military settlers, to whom it proceeded, under the powers of the New Zealand Settlements Act, to issue Crown grants. This was not done without the most resolute remonstrance of the Ngatirahiri tribe, who declared that they would have their lives taken before they would be thus deprived of their ancestral homes. They, however, abstained from attempting to recover them by force, but have never ceased to ask for the return of their property.24

Parris' only reply for them was that the Europeans had 'become as a large rock very deeply embedded, and that it was not in his power to remove them'. When their claim carne before the court in 1866, all their land except that taken for military settlement was returned to them as loyal natives who had never 'abandoned their allegiance to the Crown'. They continued to press their claim for restoration of their settlement at Tikorangi, and in 1873 at a big hui at

Waitara Sir Donald McLean agreed that they had been very unfairly treated and that he would pay them a considerable sum in compensation, 'a proposition which they refused to accept'.

The government later took part of their land for a road and offered them 'several hundred pounds as compensation', but they refused to accept that too and in 1884 the money still stood

'to their credit in the hands of the Government'. In 1878 when the civil commissioner suggested the government fence the road, authority was granted to him to draw the necessary funds, 'no limit being imposed' - but nothing further was done.25 In 1880 the west coast commissioners asked Parris whether 'the placing of military settlers upon this block, which belonged to our own friends', was not done in such a way that they had taken possession of the land of their friends without even giving them compensation. Parris agreed that indeed it was and, at that, 'after they had abandoned the land to please the Government'. The commissioners were not even able to persuade themselves 'that the location of the Military

23 AJHR 1880 G2 pplv, 31-32.

24 AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a p3.

25 ibid. 46

Settlement was made in accordance with the law'.26 In 1884 Fox recommended that £4,000

compensation be awarded to Ngatirahiri, but it should not be paid in cash lest it be 'swallowed

up in the vortex of the drink-shop, and be the cause of a general amount of dissipation and utter

ruin to the helpless victims whom it was intended to benefit'. The licensing benches of the

country had spread, in a most 'reckless manner ... a perfect network of drink-shops allover

the recently-occupied confiscated lands, up to the very margin of the newly-granted reserves'

and Fox advised that most of the compensation money 'should be expended by the

Government in erecting substantial fences of the most durable class along the principal roads

on the reserves', while a small amount of it 'might probably be well expended on agricultural

implements' .27

( I The proclamations of 2 September 1865 promised that no land of any loyal inhabitant would be

taken except as necessary for the security of the country, and then only against payment of

compensation. They also provided that land would 'at once' be restored to those who wished

to settle under crown grants, and that commissioners would be sent 'forthwith' to mark out the

boundaries of their blocks - but the Compensation Court, provided for in the 1863 act, did not ,I begin its work in Taranaki until June 1866 when it sat in New Plymouth to hear claims in the Waitara South and Oakura blocks,28 and then in September for claims in the Ngatiawa Coast

block and the Ngatiruanui Coast block between the Hangatahua (Stoney) and Kaupokonui

rivers.29 The last sitting of the court took place from 18 to 20 March 1874, in Wanganui.30

The court established three principles to guide its work: native title was accepted as dating from

26 AJHR 1880 G2 ply.

27 AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a pp3-4.

28 Gazette 11 April 1866p142. For proceedings of the court see AJHR 1866 A13 pp3-16.

29 Gazette 19 July 1866 pp293, 294. (The Ngatiruanui Coast block claims were heard 15-18 Oct 1866.) See also AJHR 1873 C4b pp3-4.

30 AJHR 1880 G2 p80 .

. I I I 47

the establishment of British government in 1840; each man, loyal or rebel, was deemed to be of

the same value and to have an equal estate; all claimants who had not resided on their land since

1840 were to be absolutely excluded unless their title had been allowed by the government.31

When the court sat at Wanganui in December 1866 to hear claims in the Ngatiruanui Coast

block between the Kaupokonui and rivers,32 the rule of exclusion was reversed,

but, through some devious reasoning, it was decided that 'the interest of a loyal absentee was to bear the same proportion to the interest of a loyal resident as the number of loyal residents

bore to the number of resident rebels',33 The effect of 'this queer equation was that as there

were only 40 loyal residents to 957 rebels, the loyal resident got 400 acres, while the absentee got 16'. This Wanganui judgement was later extended to absentee claimants excluded at the

New Plymouth sittings,34 Considering that in 1848 the governor, Sir George Grey, had persuaded absentees not to return to Taranaki, on the promise that 'they should in any future settlement have their claims adjusted upon at least as favourable a footing as those who, by going to Taranaki, had greatly increased the embarrassments and difficulties of the

Government', this settlement was somewhat less than equitable; the more so since in 1880 nothing had yet been done to allocate the awards of 12,200 acres to 755 absentees of five

Taranaki tribes.35 The 'Chatham Islanders' too were excluded by the Compensation Court36 and in January and November 1868 about 270 of them returned to their former homes in

Taranaki. The government resolved to settle them 'on the land set apart for them in common with other absentees'. But in fact 'no land had really been set apart for anybody' and Parris

31 AJHR 1866 A13 pp3-6.

32 Gazette 19 July 1866 pp293-94. See also AJHR 1873 C4b pp2-3.

33 For the judgement of the court see Gazette 20 April 1867 pp 189-91.

34 AJHR 1880 G2 pxxxv, and App C ppl-3.

35 ibid ppxxxviii, 56.

36 AJHR 1866 A13 pp3-4. 48

settled them on land at Mimi and Urenui, where they remained, despite the fact that there was

'a prior claim of nearly 10,000 acres of Court awards to be satisfied between the White Cliffs

and Urenui')7

The Compensation Court made 518 awards covering nearly 80,000 acres.38 The task of

reconciling the various acts and proclamations of confiscation was not an easy one. Decisions

had to be made on the order of priority of claims; on just how much land was 'absolutely

necessary for the security of the country'; on whether or not parliament had meant that loyal

natives should be ousted to make way for military settlers; on what share of the tribal estate

constituted 'the land of any loyal inhabitant'; on whether loyal natives who were dispossessed

should be compensated in land, and if so, in what land The proclamation of 17 December

1864 had promised to those who had remained and should continue in peace and friendship

'the full benefit and enjoyment of their lands, not lands of equal value somewhere else, but

their own ancestral territory' - which in some cases had already been given away to military

settlers. The court was required to find 7,400 acres of good land for loyal owners in the

Oakura block, yet only 2,500 acres remained when the grants to military settlers had been ) ! made. The answer to their dilemma was provided by the crown agent W. S. Atkinson settling the matter out of court on terms into which 'the Court did not think it their duty to inquire'.39

Fourteen years later the crown grants for these lands had still not been issued.

) , At the Wanganui sitting of the court 17,264 acres were awarded to 119 claimants of Ngarauru, Ii and the Ngaruahine, Tangahoe and Pakakohe hapu of Ngatiruanui.40 Another 68 claims \ pertaining to 630 applicants were refused. There were other claimants who did not apply to the

37 AJHR 1880 G2 pp xxxvii, 55-56. ( I ( I 38 AJHR 1880 G2 pp51-56, 80 and App B ppI7-24; AJHR 1883 G3 ppI2-17.

39 AJHR 1866 A13 pp5-6, 11-12, 16, 17, 19. See also AJHR 1883 A4 pp 16, 18.

40 See Gazette, 29 Jan 1867 pp55-56 for details of awards to Tangahoe and Pakakohe. 49

court and whose claims were not heard. Parris allotted 8,352 acres to 42 claimants on the

northwest bank of the Waitotara; 912 acres to 9 claimants on the northwest bank of the

Whenuakura; and 600 acres to five claimants near Kakaramea. None of the other claims were

allotted for another six years and by that time only 6,304 of the 17,264 acres awarded by the

court were still in the hands of the Maori owners. By 1880, despite the inalienation clause

supposedly required in all crown grants, practically the whole of the awards had 'passed into

the hands of Europeans, either by sale or lease' and the crown grants were 'only required in

order to perfect the titles' of the European purchasers who had acquired the interests.41 No

allocations were made north of the Waingongoro and no reserves were gazetted for

N garuahine.42

In the view of the court, the act of 1863 and the regulations of 186543 prescribed that land

should be allotted first to the crown for public purposes; next to military settlers; then to /" t/ ordinary purchasers of superfluous lands; and last to loyal owners who might take land in lieu ::1:i:- of money. But the order in council of 2 September 186544 specifically protected the rights of ~ _~- loyal natives, and the act of 1865 made clear the view of the legislature that the priority of ~ I I i rights should now be: loyal owners; militaIy settlers and works of defence; other purchasers Of} -:- _ superfluous lands.45 ~

Under the 1865 act the court was supposed to 'determine the extent ofland' to be given as

compensation, but as Judge Fenton pointed out 'extent' is not synonymous with 'content' or

41 AJHR 1872 C4 pp 19-23; AJHR 1880 G2 pp79-80 and App B ppI7-23.

42 AJHR 1880 G2 App C p3 n3.

43 Gazette 7 June 1865 pp170-71.

44 Gazette 5 Sept 1865 p266.

45 AJHR 1866 A13 pp9,11. 50

'area' but means 'the actual size, shape and boundaries'. The act went on to provide that

awards of the court were to be accompanied by such plans and particulars as would be decided

from time to time by regulation.46 The problem was that the regulations of June 186647

repeated in September 186748 were 'mutually exclusive' in that not until an award was made

could the claimant select his piece of land, yet the land awarded was to have been already

selected and surveyed. As the 1880 West Coast Commissioners said:

The Court was called upon to do an impossibility, and naturally did not do it. Awards for more than 60,000 acres were not signed for 3 years after the judgements, and when they were signed, the words which ... were inserted in the printed form to describe the land, were struck out. In point of formal validity ... there is no doubt that the awards of the Court were not made in accordance with the law, and that they are thereby reduced from the rank of a statutory 'determination' to that of mere promises or engagements binding in good faith upon the Crown.49

There was a difference in the way compensation court awards were handled north and south of

the Waingongoro. South of the river awards were allocated to 'specific sections of land, after

which the allottees were considered by the government to have a valid and transferable title

even before the Crown grants were issued'. North of the river compensation was awarded and I I

I. scrip issued for a specified quantity of land, but only a small portion was actually allocated

'under arrangements made by Major Parris as Civil Commissioner'. In 1882 Fox found there

were 15,358 acres of awards still to be allocated north ofWaitara, and 12,000 acres between

. Stoney River and Kaupokonui, mainly in the blocks 'given back' to Ngamahanga and

Ngatihaumiti hapu in 1866 - a situation the west coast commissioners described as 'a long­

standing scandal and reproach'.50 When Fox came to allocate the awards north ofWaitara in

1884 he found that there was not nearly enough open land available, and some of the awardees

46 ibid piO. I j

I. 47 Gazette 20 June 1866 p250.

48 Gazette 16 Sept 1867 pp346-47.

49 AJHR 1880 G2 ppxxxvi, 59.

50 ibid ppxxxvi-xxxvii; AJHR 1882 G5c pI. 51

had to be satisfied with one-quarter of their award in open land and three-quarters in the bush,

parts of which were 'very rough, and were surveyed with great difficulty'. Having been

obliged to make this allocation in the Titoki to Urenui division of the coast Fox thought it fair to

repeat it in the Urenui to Rau-o-te-Huia division, so here too awardees got only one-quarter

open land. Those in the Waipingao to Titoki division did even worse. Here the land available

was almost entirely bush, the open country between it and the sea having been entirely appropriated to Pukearuhe military setders, and having by them been subsequently sold to Europeans. The Commissioner cannot help thinking that it was not fair towards the Loyal Natives, who were entitled by law to have their lands returned to them, that they should have been thrust back into the bush and away from the sea frontage in favour of military settlers who never settled, but who received their land merely as so much pay for services, and sold it as soon afterwards as they could to some Europeans, all of whom disposed of their interest to a single European, who now occupies it to the entire exclusion of the original loyal Native owners. But the wrong is past repair .... 51

I ' Land had also to be found for Ngatitama who had, with the concurrence ofWaikato, their former conquerors, returned to their ancestral land and were living as far north as Tongaporutu

until a decision of the Native Land Court 'completely upset the understanding which had been

arrived at'. Ngatitama apparently

failed to establish their case in consequence of a mistake in the manner in which it was brought before the Court, and if they had been allowed a rehearing, for which they applied, they would most probably have succeeded in establishing their right to the land between Tongaporutu and the Confiscated Block; but the Chief Judge of the Land Court positively refused a rehearing. The Ngatitama, being thus stripped of all the land they had, were thrown on the world, and appealed to the Government .... Mr Bryce suggested to the Commissioner to locate them inside the confiscated boundary; and, there being a small block of about 576 acres near Pukearuhe available for this purpose, which they were willing to accept, it was surveyed for them, and they have been put in possession of it.

Fox though it desirable to add to their award 71 acres of 'the town-belt on the south side of the

Town of Pukearuhe, which is never likely to be more than a town on paper'.52 II l

51 AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a pp5-6.

I. , 52 ibid pp6-7. 52

Judge Fenton had ordered that all crown grants of confiscated land were to contain an

inalienation clause. The commissioner of crown lands in Taranaki thought this all very well for

those portions of land that had been 'individualised', but he 'hoped it was not going to apply to'

large blocks of confiscated land to be returned, otherwise it would have a bad effect on

settlement'. He said that when he took over his position he found in his office 'Native grant

forms' containing the inalienation clause, but the clause in most cases had been struck out. All

the grants for the large Waitara east and west blocks had been executed without the clause, with

the result that almost the whole area had 'fallen into the hands of settlers'. 53 .h~ ~ ._/~V"L.::: ~~~~ .. - II In March aLe~te~ber 1866 the government announced that the confiscation was to be I I abandoned over land in the Stoney River and Opunake blocks. About 18,000 acres between I I I I Stoney River and Waiweranui were thus returned to Ngamahanga hapu, and about 44,000 acres between Moutoti and Taungatara to Ngatihaumiti hapu.54 Despite this the Compensation I ' Court dealt with these blocks in October 1866, and, as provided for by the 1865 act, out-of-

court agreements to take 'certain land' in full settlement of their claim were made between loyal I [ natives and W. S. Atkinson representing the Crown.55 The matter was then further

complicated in March 1869 by the issue of compensation awards to those who had signed these

agreements and requested the court not to issue awards. I i I The result was that a large number of loyal Natives received awards ... in blocks of land ... over which the confiscation had been practically abandoned. What ought to have been done ... was not to have given compensation either in the shape of agreements or awards, but to have issued a proclamation under the Act of 1867, which was passed for the very purpose of giving legal validity to the abandonment, but repealed in 1878 without it being done.56 I i

( I 53 AJHR 1880 G2 p59.

54 I t ibid ppxxxix, 51-52; AJHR 1883 G3 p12.

55 AJHR 1880 G2 App E pp3-4.

56 AJHR 1883 G3 p12. 53

The abandonment remained an 'infonnal restitution' and, among others, Wi Kingi Matakatea,

who had remained loyal to the Queen and had been 'proverbial for his kindness to Europeans',

and his people had never had their title confmned.57 It was not until early 1883 that Fox

recommended crown grants be issued for the Stoney River and Opunake blocks. Thus

Ngamahanga were finally to get titles 'to the whole of their original territory, less only about

3,000 acres included in the six miles' radius reserved from the summit of Mount Egmont

downwards' (a provision which applied equally to all blocks abutting on the mountain).

Matakatea's people were to get titles to the whole of the Opunake block 'except the 1,400 acres

of Opunake Township' (and, presumably, the summit of the mountain). In all cases

Compensation Court awards were 'to be held to have merged in the reserves ... made'. 58

In September 1866 military settlers would be entitled to take up their land grants, and as the

government was anxious to place them on land to the north of the Patea river they wanted to

know, even before the court sat at Wanganui, what land was required in the district for friendly

natives and what 'kaingas and favourite places' should be reserved for surrendered rebels.59

Surveying had been delayed by 'the very unsettled state of the country' and the need to provide (I protection for the surveyors. Finally in May 1866 the work was put under the surveillance of the Defence Department and by the end of the month a skeleton survey of half the 20,000 acres

of open land between Patea and Manawapou had been completed. When the local Maori,

displaced by Chute's campaign, returned to the area about June stoppages of surveys became ( more frequent. When Grey requested that imperial troops be stationed at redoubts in the Patea

( , district so that colonial troops could be freed to act as covering parties for the survey, the War

Office handed the request to the Colonial Office, and secretary of state Camarvon wrote a sharp II

I ' 57 AJHR 1880 G2 pxxxix. I ! 58 AJHR 1883 G3 ppI2-17, 21-23; AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a p5; West Coast Settlement Reserves Act 1881 Amendment Act., 1883.

59 AJHR 1879 A8 p4. 54

reply expressing his 'decided disapproval'. He pointed out that the extensive confiscations had

been viewed with 'the greatest apprehension by Her Majesty's Government, and if it is found

that any portion of the confiscated lands can only be surveyed or be held with the aid of a

military force, that duty cannot be allowed to devolve on Her Majesty's Troops, but must be

left entirely to the charge of the Colonial Forces'.60

The inadequate covering parties supplied from colonial forces were unable to prevent the

expression of Maori dissatisfaction at the government's failure to settle their claims before

proceeding to survey for European settlement. Surveying went on for almost 18 months, but

as fast as the surveyors worked, the Maori removed the survey pegs, and the surveyors

refused to venture too far afield or to work in the bush.61 Soon after Grey asked for the help ! ! I of imperial troops to hold the confiscated land, the government announced that they were

abandoning 'the right to take all or any of the land in the Ngatiruanui Coast Block lying

eastward of the Western Boundary of the Waitotara Block'.62 The government had more on its

hands than it could manage.

I I j In June 1867 Parris admitted that many reserves still had to be made in every district for

returning rebels, and that from White Cliffs to Hangatahua and from Patea to Waingongoro 'so

much of the available land by the seaboard has been taken up for the Military Settlement

Scheme, that there is not sufficient to satisfy the awards to loyal Natives within the same lines'.

The military settlements already established were the only part of the confiscated territory that

60 Carnarvon to Grey 28 Feb 1867, AJHR 1867 Al pp31-32.

61 lone Margaret Bremer, 'The Early Development of the Patea-Waverley District A Study of the Problems of Settling Confiscated Land', MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1962, pp22- 25.

62 Gazette 15 March 1867 pIl2. The notice was dated 25 Jan 1867. The 'western boundary' of the land I I I I to be abandoned was not clearly defined; see AJHR 1882 G5 pp23-25. The question was still being I ' debated before the Sim commission in 1927; evidence regarding petition No 41, Sim commission evidence tis pp188-91, MA 85/1. 55

had ever been surveyed. There were still military settlers to be located between Waitotara and

Whenuakura, but none were to be settled between Waingongoro and Hangatah ua. Parris

planned to concentrate both loyal natives and returned rebels as much as possible between 5hIJey (, lit! Hangatahua and Waiweranui, and between Moutoti and Taungatara, thus leaving other parts of

the district 'nearly free, to be disposed of by the Government'. The choisest land in the whole

district, the 30,000 or so acres between Kaupokonui and Waingongoro were, apart from a

reserve to be made for Ngaruahine, also 'free' for the government. This was the desirable and

coveted Waimate plain.63

\ I The land between Patea and Whenuakura was to be surveyed the following month and Colonel McDonnell, in charge of colonial forces, expected the survey party to be challenged. He

strengthened his numbers with 55 men of the native contingent, but warned that if the survey

was opposed he would need more men 'to proinptly and successfully chastise the Pakakohi'.

The survey party went out without cover but retired when a group of about 100 men and

women who seemed 'determined to stop the survey' insisted on the party returning to Patea.

McDonnell mustered his forces and the same night gathered up the survey party then moved

into the Pakakohe village of Oika to demand their reason for stopping the survey. The

Pakakohe were polite but determined; they would allow no surveys 'from the south bank of the

: ; Patea river to the Waitotara'. McDonnell, determined the survey would start the next day, re­

crossed the Whenuakura river 'to see Tito Kowaru and his people', encamped there on their

peacemaking hikoi around Taranaki, and woke them up and told them how vexed he was at the

I I I Pakakohe sending the surveyors back. replied: 'I have advised them (as you and ! Mr Booth know) to allow the survey to proceed, without hindrance, but they would not listen II to me; however, as you return, do not forget they sent the surveyors back in the daylight, and did not hurt anyone or seize anything'. The following day, faced with an overwhelming [ military presence, the Pakakohe said 'Do not ask us to give our consent to the surveys, as we

! i

63 Parris to J. C. Richmond 11 June 1867, AJHR 1867 A18, pI7. 56

are protesting against them; on that point we are silent, but we promise not to interfere or

further molest the work'.64 In 1866 and again in 1867 the Pakakohe had been promised

reserves between Patea and Whenuakura, but the promises were not kept.65 At the time they

protested against the survey, 9,000 acres had supposedly been set apart for them between the

Patea and Tangahoe rivers, but no titles had been confmned. Meanwhile land at Waingongoro

had been allotted to 200 of the native contingent 'on certain conditions of military service', and

about 50 of them had actually occupied their land.66

When the confiscated lands were discussed in parliament J. C. Richmond maintained that

almost all of the native claims had been satisfactorily adjusted, and considerable grants of land,

including 'some of the most lovely spots in New Zealand', had been given to returned rebels.

A. S. Atkinson thought the government painted rather too favourable a picture; that they ought

either to 'fight it out with the Natives' or make terms with them. If they 'had not money, or

men, or courage enough to fight, then they should give the Natives such terms as they would

accept which meant so much of their land back as was necessary to induce them to be

peaceable'.67 The government's answer was to introduce the Confiscated Lands Bill 'by I , I which the Government could give the Tauranga lands to the Arawa tribe, and the Governor, I ,I after proceedings in court, could take more land'. Cracroft Wilson 'was not inclined to think , , I ' ! any Bill dreadful that proposed to reward the Arawas', and Richmond assured the House that

the bill was one for giving, not taking land. George Graham, an Auckland member, asked

what had been gained by confiscation and said peace would never be obtained by keeping up a

64 AJHR 1867 A22 pp3-5. See also James Belich, 'I Shall Not Die': Titokowaru's War New Zealand, .lllli8.::.2., Wellington, 1989, pp16-21.

65 AJHR 1880 G2 pp lv-lvi, 36-37 and App C p3.

66 AJHR 1867 A16.

67 NZPD 1867 i pp381-82. 57

large standing anny to oppress the Maori. He believed that once the obligations to military

settlers had been fulfilled the remainder of the land should be returned to the Maori.68

In November 1867 a proclamation was issued under the terms of the Confiscated Lands Act

declaring that 'five per cent in the value of every rural and suburban block within the districts

of Ngatiawa, Middle Taranaki, and Ngatiruanui before the same is offered for sale shall be

reserved for the benefit of such persons of the said tribes of Ngatiawa, Taranaki and

Ngatiruanui, and Ngarauru, as were residing in the said districts on the thirtieth of June last,

and as the Governor may from time to time appoint'.69 These provisions were confIrmed in

April 1870 and May 1871, but now 'an amount of land equivalent to 5 per cent of the value of

every rural and suburban block', was to be reserved for the benefit of those residing in the area I I I I on 30 June 1867 and who had 'since remained loyal'.70 This promise had, according to the

west coast commissioners in 1880, 'always been a dead letter'. They could find only one case

'where the letter of the Order was obeyed')1

Restitution on paper was not the same as restitution on the ground. While the Maori protested

the lack of reserves, the government was defending itself in response to questions asked in

England. The Ngatiruanui were, they said, 'the most aggressive tribe in the country', whose

name had become 'a proverb of hostility to the Crown and Colony'; and while the

I : Compensation Court patiently examined their claims it was subjected to 'not a little pressure from the menaces of the tribe'. Yet despite this, under the 1867 act, 'very large reserves' had

[ J 68 ibid 1102-03.

II 69 Gazette 29 Nov 1867 p456.

70 Gazette 20 April 1870 p185, 1 June 1871 p259.

71 AJHR 1880 G2 pliv. See also AJHR 1883 G3 p24. 58

been made for the tribes, 'including the majority of their old kaingas and favourite places ...

really princely estates which could be let or farmed by the tribes at considerable profit'.72

The Ngaruahine hapu were, at the time, endeavouring to heal the divisions among and between

tribes throughout Taranaki. Titokowaru, who had established 'friendly relations' with the

Europeans, had for some months 'shown the most untiring energy in his efforts to bring other

tribes to make peace'. He had visited all the hapu throughout the confiscated territory and was

even in contact with the Waikato people.73 In November 1867 he called a meeting at his

'headquarters' Te Ngutu 0 te Manu at which the various Ngatiruanui hapu as well as a number

of the native contingent arid James Booth, resident magistrate at Patea, were present Booth

reported that apart from th~ food presented to Ngaruahine by the native contingent, the hosts

'had not been able to provide anything beyond a few kits of potatoes and some eels'; they

apparently possessed neither cattle nor pigs. The scorched earth policies of Chute and

McDonnell had reduced the Ngatiruanui to a state of poverty and near starvatiop. At this

meeting Titokowaru threw to the ground his 'double-barrelled fowling piece ... that evil

weapon which had caused so much mischief and ill-will', trod it underfoot, then gave it to r I Booth declaring that neither his people nor all those over whom he had any influence would

ever again take up their guns.74 At a later meeting at Te Ngutu 0 te Manu attended by over 600

people representing all the Taranaki tribes, Titokowaru directed the attention of the guests to the

house they had recently built and the purpose for which it was intended: 'This house is built i i i for the King of Peace; there is no longer a Maori King in this district'.75

72 J. C. Richmond memo 20 Feb 1868, AJHR 1868 Al p42.

I I 73 \ i Belich Titokowaru ppI6-21.

74 Booth to J. C. Richmond 30 Nov 1867, AJHR 1868 A8 pp41-42:

75 Parris report 1 April 1868, AJHR 1868 A4 p21. 59

The Ngatiruanui were tired of war and wished only to be left to grow their crops in peace so

that they could fulfil their obligations as hosts in a fitting manner. They could not afford to

lose more land and the sight of European settlers beginning to cultivate land bought from

military 'settlers' caused renewed protest from the Pakakohe hapu. They had protested against

the survey; now they would prevent the settlers from occupying the land. Booth moved in

again with the militia and the Maori gave way when once more threatened with the use of

force)6 Booth was soon complaining that horses stolen from Europeans were known to be at

Te Ngutu 0 Te Manu. He went there to demand their return and was told by 'a sullen young

chief Toi that they would not give the horses up, that the Europeans were doing them a great I ' . ! wrong, so great they did not see it. When Booth repeated what they had earlier been told, that they would get land between Waingongoro and Kapuni, that they knew those were the tenns I ! i I before they made peace, he was told the people wanted all the lands that had been taken 'on this

side the Waitotara' and that when the Europeans went back across the Waitotara river the Maori I , I I I would talk about giving up the stolen property)7

As opposition to the survey continued Booth determined on more forceful action than was

being offered at the time by McDonnell and the armed constabulary, the new colonial regular

army, in the guise of a police force. He began by sending messages to Te Ngutu 0 te Manu i I ! demanding the restoration of the horses and other stolen property as well as the surrender of

the thieves, then marched into the village himself, took three prisoners, two of whom he was

obliged to liberate as soon as he questioned them and one of whom later escaped, recovered

\ ! two horses, and threatened further action against the local people)8 McDonnell, concerned 'to

preserve tranquillity and order in the district without bloodshed' appealed to the government to

place the management of the district in his hands, saying he did not 'at all care to be under the

76 Booth to J. C. Richmond 11, 14 and 25 April 1868, AJHR 1868 A8 pp 3,6.

77 Booth to J. C. Riehmond 5 May 1868, ibid p7. See also AJHR 1880 G2 App C pp3-4.

78 Booth to J. C. Richmond 15 May 1868, AJHR 1868 A8 pp7-8. 60

control or at the disposal of any Resident Magistrate' where any native affairs were concerned,

nor was he inclined to lead officers and men into situations where their lives were not safe for a

moment when there was actually no necessity for the risk.79

Booth's heavy-handed diplomacy soon provoked action.80 On 9 June 'the Natives of

Ketemarae, or the neighbourhood', killed two military settlers and a surveyor. Their preferred

target may have been Booth himself. Other settlers were threatened. One old man, left in

charge of settler property, protested that he was just a poor man and had no land, and was told

he was the same as the Maori; they were poor men and had no land. Booth hurriedly sent for

( , ! Pakakohe chiefs and asked whether they intended to give their allegiance to the Queen or join 'the murderer Titokowaru and his tribe'. They opted for the Queen. Booth wanted friend and

foe distinguished by cap badges of 'stout block tin'; those wearing badges 'would become

marked as Government men, and any men seen without them would be liable to be shot'. He

wanted a 'sharp and decisive blow' struck immediately at Te Ngutu 0 te Manu; he was certain

the killers were 10 of Titokowaru's men, one of them Booth's erstwhile prisoner, and that the

killings had been done with Titokowaru's knowledge and consent.81

The government seemed to be facing rebels again, not criminals; the question of falling back on ) , I i the Outlying Districts Police Act did not arise. The opposition in parliament wanted to know

I what the government intended to do on the coast where 'the present system of military settlers I I I I ' or armed constabulary, so far from putting an end to the difficulties entailed upon the country,

only tended to prolong them'. The colony had adopted 'a disastrous scheme - the scheme of

confiscation'; they could at least do better now than to send 'armed bodies of men into the

Native districts'. Even J. C. Richmond, head of the Native Department, expressed his , I I ) 79 McDonnell to Under Sec of Defence 16 May 1868, ibid pp22-24.

80 Parris to J. C. Richmond 4 July 1868, ibid p45.

81 Booth to J. C. Richmond 11 June 1868, ibid pp9-10. 61

diminishing admiration for the policy of the Domett and WhitakerlFox ministries, but he

maintained that for the past 18 months the Stafford government had worked unceasingly

towards conciliation; that he had sent 'Mr Booth as Magistrate, who had laboured at convincing

the native population of the good-will and the merciful intentions of the Government'.

Moreover, 'large and rich tracts of land had been freely given back to those men, every one of

their old kainga, etc, and ... nothing had been done of an aggressive character'.82

( Titokowaru's war which began in June 1868 with the killing of outsettlers and 'controlled I I I provocation', then an attack on Turuturumokai redoubt, soon became a major milit!!.IY

c~mpaign. After his great victory at Te Ngutu 0 te Manu in September, settlers south of the

Waingongoro river abandoned their homes and farms and took refuge in Wanganui while

\ ( Tangahoe, Pakakohe and some Ngarauru joined Ngaruahine who up till then had virtually

fought alone. Other Ngatiruanui hapu withdrew from the district to maintain their neutrality.

Titokowaru moved his base south, first to Otaia, near Patea, reconquering the land lost to them

by confiscation, then further south to Moturoa, in the bush near Wairoa (Waverley) where he

inflicted another heavy defeat on the colonial forces in early November. At this time Te Kooti,

who had escaped from the Chathams, was causing havoc on the east coast. In mid November

Titokowaru built a new pa at Tauranga-ika, only 15 miles north ofWanganui, and settler I I ( pressure on the government 'to do something' intensified still further.

After Te Ngutu 0 te Manu the Stafford government survived a no-confidence motion by one

vote; after Moturoa the situation looked so desperate that political rivalries were temporarily

forgotten. Never had danger to the colony seemed greater. With most imperial troops

withdrawn and those who remained limited to protecting European towns, the colonists were

feeling the full force of their self-reliant policy and doubting their ability to control even the

west coast between Wanganui and Wellington. The Europeans faced two circumstances

82 NZPD 1868 ii pp131-32. 62

previously unthinkable: defeat at the hands of the Maori, and the return of the confiscated

lands.83 The government was desperate to retain the 18th Regiment in the country but Britain

was not interested in helping New Zealand maintain the confiscation by force. Secretary of

State Granville knew well that the colony's problems arose from the confiscations and pointed

out that it was in the confiscated areas of the east coast that Te Kooti maintained himself; that in

Taranaki the hope of recovering land and status was the 'larger and more generally operative

incitement to rebellion'; and that in the Waikato the condition of pacification was 'the

restoration of the large extent of land confiscated'.84

When the colonial forces finally rallied and set out to attack Titokowaru at Tauranga-ika at the

beginning of February 1869, they were amazed and bewildered to find that the great pa had

been evacuated overnight. For their own good reasons the Maori were no longer prepared to

continue the fight under Titokowaru. In the next few weeks his forces dispersed, Titokowaru

and a picked band covering their retreat in a series of fierce rearguard actions. Government i : fears that Waikato would combine with Taranaki in opposition to European settlement seemed ! i about to be confrrmed in mid-February when a Ngatimaniapoto party attacked Pukearuhe

redoubt and killed eight Europeans, among them the missionary John Whitely and three

military settlers. The settlers saw this as a declaration of war on the part of the King

movement New Plymouth was put on a war footing, the militia and volunteers were called

out and rumours abounded of an imminent Kingite attack. Titokowaru was said to be in touch i I with Tawhiao and Te Kooti, but in fact it was too late for him to seek allies from outside the

province when his support within it had so dramatically dissipated. Gradually it became clear

that a Kingite attack would not eventuate, and the Europeans did not provoke one by trying to ) I

83 Belich Wars pp240-56.

84 Granville despatch 7 Oct 1869, AlHR 1870 Ala pll. 63

avenge Pukearuhe.85 The war was over. Titokowaru retired to Ngatimaru country on the

upper Waitara and the land he had conquered was slowly reoccupied by the settlers.

Titokowaru did not fight again and the Europeans chose not to challenge him.86 But neither

did they ever cease to fear him, and his presence on the west coast practically dictated

government actions for years to come.

While Titokowaru was active in south Taranaki government officials made strenuous efforts,

mostly through the good services of friendly Maori, to keep the peace in the north - but only by

words, not by the settling of grievances over land confiscation. There was great dissatisfaction

everywhere with regard to the confiscations and hui were held in various places to discuss the

question, but there was little evidence of any desire to join Titokowaru. Some Ngatiawa ( I I I reportedly urged Wi Kingi te Rangitake to do so, but Wi Kingi in answer took up the taiaha

laid before him 'and addressed his people, refusing to have anything to do with it, and threw I I, 1 the taiaha over a cliff into the '. A few months later when Titokowaru wanted to

( , I ' cross Ngatiawa territory he was told he would be fired on if he attempted it. However, a I majority of the settlers favoured putting the district on a war footing by calling out the militia I I ,I ," and occupying all the blockhouses, but Parris and H. R. Richmond kept their heads, consulted with local chiefs and calmed the settlers. The main instigator of the unrest was Tamati Teito, I I I I I who threatened to kill settlers if they did not abandon the confiscated land. But Teito had little

support in the district and Parris, knowing he had 'never interfered with the settlers in any way

beyond this demonstration', thought Teito merely hoped to coerce the government into granting

him land and thus 'make himself popular with other Natives'. The military settlers too played

their part in creating unrest. One William Old who had drawn a back bush section which he

!, I

85 AJHR 1869 AlO pp47-49. 54-56; Belich Wars pp268-70.

86 See e.g. Belich Titokowaru pp27 1-74. 64

wanted to exchange for a better one closer in, apparently thought a little stirring might persuade

some settlers to abandon their allotments.87

Parris was kept busy attending hui from one end of his district to the other and then meeting

with settlers to reassure them of the Maori's peaceful intentions. He also found himself in

awkward situations vis-a-vis Maori falsely charged by Europeans with complicity in war.

Right after the attack on Turuturumokai Hone Pihama, recently appointed a government

assessor, complained bitterly that Europeans had turned on his people and accused them of

being involved in the affair. Luckily for them they could prove that they were not involved and

indeed they identified the Maori who died there as being from Te Ngutu 0 te Manu. Pihama

was afraid that those of his tribe who had 'surrendered to the Government' would be liable to ( I I 'another Pokaikai attack'. He warned the government that if such a thing ever occurred he would leave them 'and go to the bush', and that every friendly native in the district would

follow him. 'I would rather die fighting with my race than subject any more of my people to

such treatment as that was.' The government assured Parris that they would have notices

'printed and circulated calling on our men to abstain from any acts or words tending to drive

well-disposed men into the arms of the enemy'.88

In December 1868 Parris took a party of about 200 of his 'friendly Natives' to visit

where the 'disaffected Kingites, under the young chief Te Whiti' lived. They were received

cheerfully and courteously by about 300 people and entertained hospitably for five days. At

their welcome tangi Te Whiti asked who they were crying for and Parris told him they were

crying for those who had been lost to them for many years: 'you, Te Whiti, are one of them;

) I where have you been hiding your face?' Te Whiti replied 'we have been lost to you and you

have been lost to us; let those great matters of difference which have separated us be settled by

87 Parris to J. C. Richmond 21 Oct 1868, AJHR 1869 AlO pp41-42; Parris to Cooper 4 Dec 1868 and 2 Jan 1869, ibid pp 45-47; Parris to J. C. Richmond 4 March 1869, ibid pSI.

88 AJHR 1868 A8 p46. 65

kings, governors, prophets and leading men; let bad works be put a stop to'. Confiscation was

not mentioned at the hui but Te Whiti obviously saw this as but a first encounter; business

could be discussed later. Wi Kingi te Rangitake was at the hui, the first time since the war that

he had left his district; the Waitara party were 'very friendly and sociable'. The chief More

from Tokangamutu, the King's headquarters was there, with a party of a dozen Waikato, and

was 'very sociable'. He had come 'to enquire into the cause of Titokowaru's proceedings ...

and was of opinion that he was wrong and must be left to his fate'. The assessors and 'leading

men' who were with Parris were 'exceedingly pleased' at the result of the meeting and 'very

sanguine as to the peaceful intentions of the Taranaki tribes'. Parris reported the Parihaka

people had 'food in great abundance', were industrious and healthy and that there was a large

proportion of children under the age of 10.89 Isolation from the outside world and__ the

continuing inter-racial unrest had obviously told in favour of the Parihaka people.

The government knew that Te Whiti's influence in favour of peace was strong within Taranaki

90 I I and even with Tawhiao at Tokangamutu yet they looked askance on groups, largely of women and children, who had been with Titokowaru and 'more or less implicated in his late

offences', defecting from his following and taking refuge at Parihaka. This was, they said,

'one of the embarrassments of the question in the breaking up of Titokowaru's force', as it

complicated matters in neutral districts and implicated in their crimes those who sheltered the

refugees.91 Parris even tried to deal with his embarrassment by attempting unsuccessfully to

force the defectors to return to Titokowaru, telling them the gaols were full, that they would be

'sent away by sea to some other island ... that their hands were stained with the blood of the

89 Parris to Cooper 2 Jan 1869, AJHR 1869 AlO pp4S-47.

90 Parris to Cooper 20 March 1869, ibid ppS1-S2, and 19 July 1869, ibid pp83-84.

91 Parris to Defence Minister 28 April 1869, ibid pS7. 66

slain, and their teeth black with eating human flesh'.92 J. C. Richmond more pragmatically

decided that they should be sent to live in selected areas under selected chiefs of the

government's choosing. He told Parris that Tukino's party 'of about 100 men, women, and

children of the Tangahoe, lately with Titokowaru', and whom he believed had meant to

surrender, although they were now said to be at Parihaka with Te Whiti, were to be sent to the

Oeo district under Hone Pihama and Natanahira Ngahina, to work on the roads in exchange for

rations. Those who accepted these terms were to understand that their 'renewed rebellion' had

'forfeited all claims to the lands formerly reserved for them, and that the reacquisition of any

part must be the result of some considerable term of steady continuance in orderly and peaceful

behaviour'.93 The Tangahoe reminded the government of the situation they found themselves

in after Ngaruahine's attack on Turuturumokai 'when the Pakehas became very uncivil to them,

and were always accusing them of being implicated in that affair, and other attrocities of

Titokowaru'. Titokowaru's men had also given them a hard time until they finally surrounded

their kainga at Taiporohenui, 'and coerced them by force to join them'. When Parris saw them

at Oeo he told them that they had forfeited the '10,000 acres of the best land in the district'

which the government had, with great liberality, bestowed upon them, but he reminded the ! I ( i native minister that this reserve, which included Wareroa (Taiporohenui) and Ohangae', was

the 'papatipu of the Tangahoe tribe' and he hoped the government would still retain it 'for their

future location, for the sake of Hone Pihama and Ngahina'.94

In June Major Noake reported that he had been up the Patea river and 'brought in 123

Hauhaus, of the Pakakohe Tribe, including Taurua and the principal chiefs'. Again the

majority of the party were women and children. Taurua had sent out an envoy 'to sue for

! ( peace'; NOake told him he would be magnanimous and spare his life and even his tribe and his

92 Parris to Cooper 7 May 1869, ibid p60.

93 J. C. Richmond to Parris 25 May 1869, ibid pp60-61.

94 Parris to Native Minister 17 June 1869, ibid pp82-83. 67

village and all his possessions except arms, ammunition and canoes. Taurua did not 'plead

anything in extenuation of his fault' but did say that 'in the first instance they were taken

prisoners by Titokowaru but that afterwards they fought willingly on his side'.95 The

Pakakohe, alone of all those who fought with Titokowaru, were later tried for high treason,

and were given prison terms of three to seven years to be served in . Thirty or more of

these people perished in their southern exile.96

The government had included in the native contingent not only west coast kupapa but also 'the

loyal Ngati Porou clan from East Coast'. When the Pakakohe surrendered they were given

into the charge of the Ngatiporou, and it was previously reported that the 'Ngati Porou

Constabulary' had pursued the Tangahoe to the Waingongoro river.97 The presence of the ( I I I Ngatiporou on the west coast was a further cause of unrest among the local tribes, who were

getting ready to defend themselves against this new invasion. They had heard that Ngatiporou

'should not respect kupapas in the Taranaki District but should treat them all as rebels'. Then

they heard the Ngatiporou force from the Patea district was 'coming on to Taranaki to attack

Pariaka ... where there are some of Titokowaru's followers ... taking shelter under Te Witi,

I i who professes to be a peace man'.98 As a reward for their services Ngatiporou were given 'fertile lands ... a rich exchange for their rugged mountains on the East Coast'. They were

'placed (in pursuance of a policy which was successfully carried out at the Cape by General

Cathcart) at Waihi, about 25 miles north west of Patea, as an advance guard for the English

II 95 Noake to Defence Minister and Booth to Native Minister 14 June 1869, AJHR 1869 A3a pp3-4. See ( I also AJHR 1882 G5 ppI6-17.

96 AJHR 1870 A4 p7; Edward Ellison, 'Sacred Stone Links Taranaki and Otago', Historic Places 19, 1987, pp7-11.

97 AJHR 1869 A3a p3; AJHR 1869 A10 p60.

98 AJHR 1869 AlO p84. 68

settlements against Titokowaru's bands, which still infest the country beyond'.99 The

Ngatiporou were the only Maori in the district, all the rest having been detained or forced into

exile. They were thoroughly satisfied with their new location, but three months later they had

done 'very little towards growing food for themselves, and nothing towards a permanent

residence there', and they expected to be relieved within two months by 'another party of the

tribe'. The premier , was hopeful some would volunteer to remainlOO but it did

not appear that a Maori military settlement would be any more successful than a European one.

When Fox toured the district in October 1869 he was told the settlers 'would rely on the rifle

for redress' if the government allowed 'the return of rebel Natives on submission'. In the

circumstances he decided 'for the sake of the Natives themselves they ought not to be allowed

to return to the country which they have justly forfeited by repeated acts of rebellion'. In the

view of most parliamentarians the trouble in the district had really stemmed from the confusion

caused by a division of authority, and the solution was simply to dispense with the services of

the civil commissioner and the resident magistrate and put the district south of the

Waingongoro under the undivided authority of the military - the solution McDonnell had

suggested 18 months earlier.101

The Ngatiporou contingent at Waihi soon found 'small parties of Titokowaru's men ...

creeping back' to within four miles of their redoubt, and establishing 'numerous plantations'

just to the north of the Waingongoro - but obviously, according to Fox, 'for purposes of

( I I mischief. Ngatiporou destroyed the potato plantations, and killed two men and took one woman prisoner. There was a similar brush between volunteers and the Maori up the

! 99 I . Bowen despatch 14 Oct 1869, BPP/IUP vol 16 p161. ( !

100 AJHR 1870 A4 p6; AJHR 1868 A8 p24.

101 Fox memo 1 Nov 1869, AJHR 1870 A4 pp3-5. See also T. McDonnell to Under Sec for Defence 16 May 1868, AJHR 1868 A8 p24. 69

Waitotara river which resulted in the wounding of one rebel and the capture of a woman. Fox

was satisfied that these incidents would have a beneficial effect locally and would 'deter any

more of Titokowaru's people from repeating the experiment they had commenced of crawling

back to their old haunts, under the very fences of Ngutu-o-te-Manu, and almost within long

range of our redoubts'. His main concern centred on the fact that most of the military settlers

between the Waitotara and the Waingongoro who had been given land 'as a return for past

services' and not subject to further military service or conditions of residence, had sold their

allotments and these had become the property of absentee owners. Thus the government had

deprived itself of 'the usual means of establishing a population' and the 'gratuitous gift of land'

had simply provided a means of speculation.102

It became increasingly difficult for the government to maintain its promise to the settlers that no

rebel natives would be allowed to 'return to the Patea district As the settlers were not minded

to distinguish rebel from loyal native the government began to fear the two might make

common cause. The New Plymouth settlers were vocal about their uneasiness over

Titokowaru's presence in their hinterland; the Patea settlers were adamant that Titokowaru's

people should never be permitted to return to their area. Te Whiti wanted to know what the

government meant to do about the situation, and Parris' 'own natives' knew that until

something was done to settle Ngatiruanui who were 'wandering about from one place to

another' nothing would be satisfactorily concluded in the district. The government's main

concern was to get roads made north of Waingongoro. Pihama's, Manaia's and Matakatea's

I I people were all cooperating with the roadmaking between Waingongoro and Opunake, but I I north of there roadmaking was opposed by Te Whiti who 'controlled' the district from Umuroa

I j to Warea.103 The Taranaki members of parliament also wanted a road cut 'through the forest

in the rear of Mt Egmont' as it would 'cut off from the interior the disaffected tribes under Te I I I I

102 Fox memo 1 Feb 1870, AJHR 1870 A4 pp5-7.

103 AJHR 1870 A 16 P19; AJHR 1870 A 17 pp6-8. 70

Witi'.l04 It was obvious that Taranaki would never be peaceful until the dispossessed tribes

and hapu were settled on land of their own, but the government, pressured by the settlers, was

not prepared to take this step. Forcing roads through territory occupied by 'disaffected tribes'

could only result in further unrest, and the government was prepared for the moment not to

press matters between Opunake and the Stoney river.

In August 1870 the government heard of the plans afoot to hold a large hui at Parihaka in

September. A contingent from Waikato was expected to attend, as well as a group from

Wairarapa, and the government decided they should not 'discountenance the meeting, or use

I any influence to deter Natives from attending it, feeling that, whatever may be its results, it is

right that Maoris should have the opportunity of expressing their minds, and that the

Government should know what they think')05 However, they were alarmed when they heard

I that Titokowaru with a party of 80 armed men intended to leave his refuge in the upper Waitara I i I district for the first time to attend the Parihaka meeting.106 They decided Parris should accept

I I an invitation to attend as he might be able to ascertain what Titokowaru's intentions really were I I 'without committing the Government to any course in reference to him'. They agreed that there Ii should be no movement of the forces in the Patea district while the hui was in progress - but they sent HMS Blanche with a strong body of armed constabulary to patrol off the Taranaki I I I. coast, to reassure the inhabitants of New Plymouth and the neighbourhood and to reinforce the

local detachment if needed. Parris collected about 700 'friendlies' to accompany him to the

hui. Ngamahanga hapu and Matakatea's, Pihama's and Manaia's people all joined him, and

they entered Parihaka in 'one body', intent on making a 'wholesome effect' on the assembled

tribes. Parris was particularly concerned that Titokowaru and his party were all armed, but II Titokowaru who wished only to return to his own district, declared that he would remain quiet

[ I 104 T. Kelly to McLean 4 Sept 1869, AJHR 1870 A17 p3.

105 AJHR 1871 F6b pS.

106 AJHR 1871 Al p41. 71

if not interfered with, and hostilities were 'emphatically condemned' by all present, 'unless

forced upon them'. Titokowaru asked Te Whiti when he was going to 'liberate' all those

Ngatiruanui who had been living at Parihaka for the past two years but Te Whiti evidently

wanted something more from Titokowaru as a guarantee for his future good conduct. He

reminded him frequently of his going about armed, and of his previous opposition to ... Te

Whiti's peace policy'. Matenga, a Ngatiruanui man living at Parihaka, complained that they

were 'like an egg without a nest to get hatched in'. Titokowaru's party returned to the

Ngatimaru district without any indication from Parris as to the government's intentions towards

them, but Parris heard that Titokowaru intended to go back and settle on the Waimate plains the

following autumn.107 [ I

( I The state of the surveys south of the Waingongoro was cause for concern, but nothing at all had been done north of the river. It was felt that to attempt to settle the area would be to invite I I \ i war. However the government voted money in 1870 for the 'management of the confiscated

lands'. Robert Pharazyn was appointed commissioner of confiscated lands and an office was

opened in Wanganui, but the government was still constrained by the fact that nothing could be

done until the land was surveyed - and it was not advisable to survey until native claims were

settled. lOS

By the end of 1870 the government had new priorities in Taranaki. Vogel's long-delayed

scheme for immigration and public works was to be put in place through the passing of the ( I Immigration and Public Works Act and the Immigration and Public Works Loans Act; Vogel went to London to negotiate the necessary 10ans.109 The armed constabulary, military settlers

[ ) and various hapu were working on roads north and south of the Parihaka block and it was

[ ) 107 AJHR 1871 F6b pp6-13.

108 AJHR 1872 C4a pp3-5.

109 AJHR 1871 A6 ppI4-15. 72

essential that the road be extended from Stoney river to Umuroa 'to enable, if possible (and if

no Native interruption exists), Cobb's coach to run through to New Plymouth'.1l0 At the

Parihaka hui in December Te Whiti and his followers suddenly made up their minds that the

road work should be carried on, and agreed to join in it themselves'.lll Peace was breaking

out all over. Just before the March 1871 hui at Parihaka, Titokowaru and about 40 followers

attended a meeting of about 200 north Taranaki Maori at Mataitawa, at which many of the

'leading men spoke, and all of them in favour of peace and quietness'. The settlers of the

district were also at the meeting and 'mixed up' with Titokowaru and his people 'and the

I I meeting passed off quietly'. However during the meeting Titokowaru was warned by letter II from some of his people who had left north Taranaki and returned to settle at Omuturangi, that the armed constabulary was out scouring the bush for him and that he had better not return

there yet, as things were 'very unsatisfactory'. When McLean heard this he gave instructions

to the armed constabulary to desist as he did not wish 'to unnecessarily provoke a hostile

feeling in the minds of the Natives' - but he gave no instructions as to whether Titokowaru's

return to the Waimate plains 'should be encouraged or forbidden'.1 12 The north Taranaki

settlers pressed for his return; those of the Patea district continued to resist it. The Honourable II William Gisborne felt that the situation called for the government to take a definite course and so prevent complications and consolidate the present tranquility. I I I " I I The anomalous position of the Natives in respect of land, of ourselves, and of each other; the uncomfortable attitude of Titokowaru; the paralysis of settlement on account of the unsettled land questions; the exceptional state of the district south of Waingongoro, complicated by the future claims of Taurua's tribe now imprisoned in Otago; all these are elements of discord which cannot with safety any longer be ignored and must be peaceably settled without delay. II II

II 110 AJHR 1871 Dl p53.

111 AJHR 1880 G2 pxv.

112 ibid. 73

Sewell, also in Fox's cabinet, agreed and felt that tranquility could only be re-established by

over-looking past acts ofrebellion. The superintendent of Taranaki too wanted 'the claims of

the aborigines ... extinguished, and the outlawed and unsettled Maoris ... provided for' so that

the province could take advantage of the proposed influx of new immigrants. But Fox was not

swayed by the arguments. He was not yet ready to sanction the free passage of Maori from

north to south of the Waingongoro and thus excite a feeling of alarm among the settlers of the

Patea district who had returned on the 'distinct understanding that Natives would be excluded

till it was sufficiently populous to make their return safe'.l13

I I

I ! Titokowaru's people filtered back to the Waimate plains from north Taranaki anyway and the government left them to their 'peaceful avocations', cultivating the land and felling the bush.

By the end of 1871 few Ngatiruanui remained in north Taranaki with Titokowaru. G. S.

Cooper, the under secretary of native affairs, noted that 'it would be politically undesirable and

practically impossible' to prevent Ngaruahine 'occupying the country north of Waingongoro,

I I the confiscation of that country having been abandoned by the Government, so long as they I I I behave themselves and keep the compact about not crossing Waingongoro'. McLean did not

dissent from this minute; but while he would not enforce the confiscation, neither would he

abandon it.1l4

By the beginning of 1872 it was clear to the government that the success on the west coast of

the new immigration and public works policy depended on 'the earliest possible attention'

I t being given to the settlement of the confiscated lands question, so McLean issued instructions I i to Parris as to how this was to be done. South of the Waingongoro the awards of the

Compensation Court had not yet been defined on the ground and there were still outstanding

claims of military settlers. McLean wanted Parris to buyout, at £1 per acre, both the lands

113 AJHR 1880 G2 App A pp8-9; AJHR 1871 D3 p9.

114 AJHR 1880 G2 pxvii. 74

allotted to the native contingent, mainly 'Whanganui Natives, who do not require the land for

their own use', and the Compensation Court awards of those who were willing to sell. The

lands north of the Waingongoro were another matter. They were, 'although nominally

confiscated ... with the exception of 1,400 acres at Opunake, quite unavailable for settlement

until arrangements are made with the Natives for lands sufficient for their own requirements'.

Parris was to concentrate the Maori as much as possible near Kaupokonui and Oeo and

compensate the owners at the rate of 5/- per acre for any lands they would relinquish north and

south of the Oeo 'in order to free them from all difficulties and obstructions'.l15 This policy

was later described as one of not giving up confiscation but rather treating it rather as a

'restoration of the pre-emptive right of the Crown' .116

A great deal of land was 'acquired' by the government within the confiscation boundaries,

either by the purchase of Compensation Court awards or by the payment of takoha. 117 Both

operations came in for severe criticism because of inept handling or downright dishonesty.

The activities of George Worgan, native interpreter, and land purchase officer in Taranaki from

early 1872 to early 1873, were among the most reprehensible. Instead of confining himself to i . buying for the government the interests of willing sellers, he also negotiated purchases for ! I private individuals and in so doing allocated choice blocks to awardees who were willing to

) i sell. Instead of paying £1 per acre, as authorized by the government, he would offer lesser

chiefs 10/- per acre, and split the other 10/- between himself and the principle chief. He even

115 AJHR 1872 C4 pp26-27.

116 AJHR 1882 G5b pI.

117 AJHR 1880 G2 pp56-58. About 363,000 acres were acquired south of the Waingongoro under McLean's instructions of 1872 and 1876; ibid pxxiv. 75

set up a partnership with another European and bought land on their private account in blocks

which he was employed to purchase or lease for the government. I 18

A commission was set up in September 1872 to enquire into Worgan's activities. The seven

charges against him were basically ones of fraud, and the commission concluded that 'with one

exception, all the charges were proved, either completely or in part'.1 19 The excuse offered for

Worgan's conduct was that it was believed the government's aim was not 'so much to acquire

the land for sale as to take it out of the hands of the Natives' and thus get rid of a 'very

troublesome Native question'. As the government 'had practically given a guarantee that the

Natives should not be allowed to return to the confiscated lands ... the only practical solution

of the difficulty was to buy up as many of the Native claims as possible'. Worgan had

supposedly served the public interest and saved the country thousands of pounds by

undertaking the difficult task of inducing awardees to leave the allocation of their claims in his

I i I : hands. He could then group them together in one block and prevent them 'spotting' the country, so that European settlement could proceed unhindered.120 ------Ngarauru owners particularly were severely disadvantaged by Worgan's handling of the compensation claims.

By threats, cajolery and trickery they were persuaded to relinquish their claims, in some cases

without ever receiving full payment for them.1 21

The case of Paramena Tumahuki and Hariata te Rapu of Ngarauru was investigated by Parris

under a commission issued in November 1878. Parris found that in 1872 the two

i complainants had agreed to sell their 'two 400-acre awards of unselected land, Okutuku Block, ! !

118 ibid pp53, 79-80; AJHR 1872 C4 ppI9-26; AJHR 1873 H29 ppl-ll, ibid H29a ppl-3; Ward Show of ~p259.

119 MA 2/64.

120 AJHR 1873 H29 pp8, 11.

121 AJHR 1880 G2 ppIix, 41, 43. 76

at the price of £1 per acre'; that Worgan withdrew the £800 purchase price from the Treasury

and gave 'not more and probably considerably less than £240' to the complainants who then,

'in reliance on the good faith of the Government and its servants', executed conveyances to the

Crown; that the complainants never received the balance of the money due to them; and that the

system of 'jobbery and deception' revealed by the enquiry was 'calculated to bring the greatest

discredit upon the Government by the double-dealing of its agent, between whom and the

government the Natives are unable to draw a clear distinction'.122 The clear distinction may

have been obscured by government double-dealing in Compensation Court awards, such as

I I I that illustrated by the Riddell Grant Act, 1875. This act, 'a miracle of skill in the art of using

words to conceal meaning', obtained for one James Riddell, who had influential friends in

parliament, '600 acres of the best of the public lands in exchange for nothing at all'. 123

Worgan's conduct in the case of Mere Awatea and Erueti te Pewa was even more iniquitous.

He first agreed to buy for the government for 'a price of less than £1 per acre' their two

Compensation Court awards of 400 acres each at Whenuakura. In the midst of the transaction

he persuaded them to accept £1,000 from a Mr Nicholson, a private purchaser, instead.

Worgan obtained the purchase price for the land from the government, as well as the £1,000

from Nicholson, but gave only £400 to the vendors. But in 1872 when they were called before

the commission to give evidence about the transaction, they swore they had been paid in full

for their land. James Booth knew that this was not so, and in 1881 he explained the I ! i discrepancy to Fox. Worgan had threatened 'the old people' that if they told the truth, he and

their nephew who had been associated with him in the transaction would both be sent to prison;

and he promised them that if they lied to the commission he, Worgan, would pay them the

£600 outstanding 'as soon as they came out of Court'. When they asked for their money, he

told them there was none owing - that they had just sworn this on oath in court. Fox

122 Parris report on 'Conduct ofG B Worgan' 11 Feb 1879, AJHR 1879 G3 ppl-3.

123 AJHR 1882 G5 pp25-28. 77

concluded that 'the Natives have, by their own wicked and foolish conduct, relieved the

Government from all responsibility in the matter, and put it out of its power to give them any

compensation' .124

When the charges against Worgan were heard by the commission of enquiry late in 1872, he

was first suspended and then dismissed from the public service. At the end of 1872 the

government also dispensed with the services of Robert Pharazyn, who had approved of at least

some ofWorgan's activities. The Confiscated Lands Department in Wanganui was wound up

and responsibility for confiscated lands between the Waitotara and Waingongoro then passed to I I Charles Wray at Patea. l25 Wray himself held very firm views about the necessity of getting \ I Maori land into European hands. Some large reserves, like the 10,500 acre Whareroa reserve

and an adjoining 10,000 acres north of Ketemarae, had been set aside and Wray felt it

'inexpedient' to issue crown grants for these lands.

Such an extensive area as 20,000 acres, in one block, should not be allowed to remain a bar to settlement in the midst of a district every acre of which is suitable for settlement. I would therefore strongly advocate that these reserves should be administered by the Government on behalf of the Natives, and leased to Europeans for long periods on favourable terms, thus securing the settlement of the district, which i would otherwise be retarded if such lands are unconditionally granted to the I Natives.126 I I

Parris had the job of trying to persuade those Ngatiruanui hapu who had kept aloof from I Titokowaru to settle north of the Waingongoro. They pleaded 'for the restoration of some of ,I J their old residences in Ketemarae' but were told it was useless to hope for the return of land

which had been surveyed and allotted to settlers. The Umutahi hapu finally agreed 'to settle on

a block to be defined at Mawhitiwhiti, north of the Waingongoro, the residence of the old chief

Kewetone', but Parris felt it would be difficult to get the Ahitahi 'whose tribal territory was

124 Fox report 6 April 1881 and enclosures, AJHR 1881 G5 pp8-10.

125 AJHR 1873 H29, H29a, C4, C4a. I I i I 126 AJHR 1880 G2 p79. 78

south of arid bounded by the Waingongoro' to settle north of the river, but they might take 'a

block next to the boundary line of the surveyed and allotted land'. When Ngatitupaea refused

to join Titokowaru in 1868 Parris had moved them from their land 'between the Tangahoe and

Ahitahi Districts' to avoid 'unpleasant complications with neutral Natives'. About two thirds

of them had agreed to go to Oeo with Hone Pihama, but had only stayed there a month 'after

which they removed to Parihaka' where they remained. The rest went with their chief Ahitana

I I I I to Te Ngaere, but when Titokowaru fell back on that district and then on to Ngatimaru country,

they also moved towards the Waitara, but kept aloof from Titokowaru. Finally, early in 1872,

they too moved to Parihaka where Te Whiti advised them not to try and return at that time to

Keteonetea 'as it would only produce trouble', Parris felt this hapu of 100 or so adults should

also be settled back in their former territory, and that the settlement ofUmutahi and Ahitahi

especially would be 'a test of the practicability of settling Titokowaru's people who are now

virtually in occupation of all their tribal territory from Waingongoro to Omuturangi',127 In

June the last of the refugees left Ngatimaru bent on returning to Manutahi. Parris reported they

were going ftrst to Parihaka 'but where they will settle down is at present uncertain, and with

so many of the Natives who belong south of Waingongoro hovering about in the district north

I I of that river, the difftculty of settling the land question on the West Coast is increased',128 ( I

McLean told Parris that he thought sufftcient land had already been set apart to provide for the

'requirements of the Natives' south of the Waingongoro and that Parris was to make 'such

requisite reserves' as he deemed 'expedient' to the north of the river rather than increasing 'the

I i large quantity already available for the settlement of the Natives' to the south. Since Umutahi , 1 had agreed to be located north of the river McLean could see no reason to locate others to the

south. But when Parris complained it was impossible to do as McLean suggested and that it

was absolutely necessary to locate Ahitahi on 'say a thousand acres' on the south side of the \ i I

127 Parris to McLean 25 Apri11872, AJHR 1872 C4 p27.

128 AJHR 1872 F3a p25. 79

river, McLean agreed that it could be done, so long as care was taken 'to fix it as far inland as

possible from European locations'. As to Ngatitupaea, McLean hoped they could be induced

to settle 'north of the Waingongoro and some distance inland, extending towards the Ngaere ...

excluding, of course, the Ngutu-o-te-Manu'. Parris thought that as they were living at

Parihaka their case could be 'deferred for a time, unless they should attempt to settle of their

own accord'. Should 'such an emergency' occur and force the government's hand, then

'immediate action would have to be taken to endeavour to settle them upon a defined block'.129

\ Since Ngatitupaea had shunned Titokowaru they deserved to be settled on their own land; but

) ! since they had chosen to ally themselves with Te Whiti they could be ignored.

Taurua's Pakakohe hapu meanwhile were still imprisoned in Dunedin~and pressure was put on

{ \ I i . I the government by the Wanganui tribes to allow their release and return to the Patea district 130 They were released from Dunedin early in 1872, but were held in Wellington and not allowed

to return to the west coast until 1873 when McLean confirmed the promises about reserves

made to Ngatiruanui in 1867.131 Of their 'very large territory, extending from the Tangahoe to

the Whenuakura River, and far into the interior, up the winding course of the Patea towards

I I Mount Egmont', they were to retain 6,000 acres at Mokoia, 2,800 at Tamahere, 127 at I{ '. Taumaha and 250 at Tangahoe. They were also to get 2,000 acres at Otauto, 10 at Turi's ( , I ! , spring and 5 acres at Matangirei. The rest of their lands between the Waitotara and the

Tangahoe were to be 'at the disposal of the Government',132 Taurua continually requested the

land promised him between Patea and Whenuakura. He requested it from McLean, from

Parris, from Sheehan, from Brown, and as he told the West Coast Commissioners in 1880:

129 McLean to Parris and Parris to McLean May 1872, AJHR 1872 C4 p28.

'I , 130 AJHR 1872 F3a pp25-26. I ,

131 , I Gazette 29 Jan 1867 p56.

132 AJHR 1880 G2 App A p4; AJHR 1882 G5 p16. 80

As fast as one Commissioner succeeded another I repeated the same thing to him, and kept on with it, and will keep on until there are no more Commissioners left .... If I had been told, when I was tried in Wellington that my land was to be taken for my offences against the Queen, then I should have understood it; but I was not told so at the time. My body was punished for my offences,133

The return of Wi Kingi te Rangitake from his seclusion on the upper Waitara to the town of

New Plymouth on 22 February 1872, the twelfth anniversary of the proclamation of martial

law in Taranaki, was taken to be an indication and an assurance of future peace in the district.

He received a warm welcome from government, settler and Maori alike,134 In March he went

to the hui at Parihaka and stayed on and 'appeared likely to continue to live there',135 He was

still there the following year although most of his 'late followers' were still at Manutangihia,

inland on the Waitara river. Parris reported that they never gave any trouble, but about 30 of

) I them visited Parihaka twice a year and generally stopped at the Native Office in New Plymouth

for two or three nights as they came and went,136 i I !

Meanwhile, the belief had grown among the west coast tribes that their land was to be restored

to them. Wi Parata moved a motion to this effect in the House in July, but McLean announced

that the Assembly had already examined the question and had decided 'that the lands which had

been confiscated after due proclamation by the Governor could not be restored'.l37 He i i i I confessed he had never believed in confiscation and thought the confiscated lands 'a very expensive luxury' but he maintained it had been his government's policy to restore the i I i I confiscated lands wherever there were no European interests involved and no 'complications or

I I ,I I 133 AJHR 188002 pp37-38.

I I i I 134 AJHR 1872 Al pp62-63; NZPD 1872 xii p640.

( I 135 Parris report 3 July 1872, AJHR 1872 F3a p24. I ,

136 Parris report 30 April 1873, AJHR 187301 p15.

137 NZPD 1872 xii p167. 81

difficulties' likely to ensue. He assured the House that in Taranaki, between Waingongoro and

New Plymouth, the Maori were to receive titles to 'all the lands required for their own use' and

compensation for the remainder. 138 Then on 5 September in the debate which brought the Fox

government down, Edward Stafford expressed the view that the best thing the government

could do with the as yet unalienated confiscated lands would be to divide them among 'the

Natives who, after fair investigation, may be found to have an interest in them': not, he added,

'in answer to any demand of the Natives, but as an act of grace and as an act of policy'. 139

This was enough for Wi Parata, who informed the west coast tribes that now there was a new

government who would restore part of their confiscated lands to them. 'From Waingongoro

(I I. ... to Taranaki is in reality returned to the Maoris - this is quite decided.'l 40 A month later though, in his brief reign as premier and native minister, the same Stafford declared it was 'not

( I I I the intention of the Government to abandon the confiscated lands at all'. Fox and Thomas Kelly, MHR for New Plymouth, needled Stafford with questions on his intentions withregard ! I. \ to these lands, but Stafford declined to commit the government 'to any specific action'. Kelly

kept up the pressure and moved that the government act on the recommendation of the Native

Affairs Committee to restore the as yet unalienated lands to those owners who had remained

loyal, or who, having rebelled, had returned to their loyalty. Stafford assured him it was

exactly the government's intention to restore to the various hapu some land but not necessarily

that which they had lost. 141 This news was soon known on the coast, but within days another

ministry had fallen and another promise was broken. Once again 'sound principle was

sacrificed to political expediency', and Wi Parata reported the tribes anxious to know 'what )l

!( 138 ibid pp639, 640.

139 NZPD 1872 xiii p154.

140 Wi Parata to McDonnell 12 Sept 1872, AJHR 188002 App A p6.

I I I , 141 NZPD 1872 xiii pp43l, 467, 469-70; -Reports of Select Committee on Native Affairs no. 7, 25 Sept 1872, AJHR 1872 Hll p4; AJI-lR 1880 02 ppxx-xxi. 82

was to become of them; whether they were to be well or badly treated; whether they were to

exist or not'.142

o~ of the problems the various governments faced when it came to returning lands north of

th~Waingongoro was the position of the tribes to the south of the river whose land was for the

most part already occupied by settlers. When the Stafford government heard that Ngarauru [ [ [ i \ were returning to the Waitotara - Waverley area they turned to Keepa Te Rangihiwinui (Major

[ Kemp) who, like Hone Pihama, had rebel natives under his charge, and ordered him to turn the 1 i [ I intruders back. 143 Kemp had heard that the government had 'restored all the lands on the other

side of Waingongoro to the Natives: that is to say to the people who were the cause of all the ) I, troubles in this part of the Island'. He was 'dark' that all the evils had been visited on his part

of the country and asked the government to 'let what is right be right' and not to take 'all the

land of the man whose offence was small, or that of men who have done nothing wrong'.l44

Kemp's letters and telegrams of protest to the Stafford government were ignored. When the

government fell after its brief month in office, Kemp renewed his complaints to McLean, native I ( minister once more in the new government He was, he said, protector of Ngarauru and they I were asking him w4at land they were to have, for they had 'accompanied him to Taupo in the expedition against Te Kooti, and went as far as Tapapa' where one of their number was killed,

and they thought that this would have been accepted in condonement of their offences. But

Worgan was selling the land of Ngarauru, and Kemp asked that Worgan be deposed from his

office lest serious difficulties arise in the district145 Under Secretary Cooper minuted that I )

! 1 142 NZPD 1872 xiii p471.

) I 143 AJHR 1880 G2 App A pp6-7. I, ,'

144 Te Rangihiwinui to Stafford 28 Sept 1872, ibid p7.

145 Te Rangihiwinui to McLean 21 Oct 1872, ibid pp7-8. 83

Kemp's letters required 'mature deliberation and a careful reply', but 'nothing was done

beyond recording that Kemp's letters had been seen by the Minister'.l46

Meanwhile Parris reported that he had attempted to make a 'skeleton survey of the land north of

Waingongoro'. He began by meeting with Ngatiruanui, both those who had returned to

Omuturangi and Manaia's people who were working on the roads. There was 'no violence or

threatening language during the discussion, but a decided opposition to the survey of the land,

and arguments against the confiscation'. Parris thought Manaia as opposed to the survey as

anyone else, despite his protestations to the contrary, and finally Parris called the survey off,

although he found it difficult to decide how far the Maori might carry their opposition should

the survey be proceeded with. He decided there were 'other influences operating upon the

minds of the Natives besides their own objections'. Captain William McDonnell had been

there 'trying to lease the land between Waingongoro and Inaha' although he 'must have been

well aware that the Government had not abandoned the land, and that such interference was

only calculated to embarrass pending arrangements for the acquirement of the said land for

settlemenf.147

The course of events in 1872 'united to justify the Natives who had returned to the country

north of Waingong oro in believing that they would not again be dispossessed'. But faced with

the protests of those to the south of the river McLean 'took steps to make the Natives

throughout the Coast realize their true position'. Early in 1873, accompanied by Wi Parata. he

1\ held big hui at Wanganui, Hawera and New Plymouth. At Wanganui he told the people that

the land north of Waingongoro had not been given up, 'no, none of it has'. Kemp maintained i ( that 'he believed the story about the restoration of the land north of Waingongoro', and Mete

I ' 146 AJHR 1880 G2 pxxi. I

147 Parris to McLean 26 Aug 1872, AJHR 1872 C4 p29. 84

Kingi said he and Taurua had gone to Sir Edward Stafford 'who told him that lands sold to

Europeans could not be interfered with, but that the land not occupied would be restored'. 148

McLean then issued orders as to how the lands north and south of Waingongoro were to be

dealt with. Talirua's people were at last authorized to settle on the lands 'set apart for them'

south of the river, 'but the boundaries, subdivisions and ownership' of them were never

'correctly ascertained' until 1882.149 Ngarauru were to have 'all the lands granted to them by

the Compensation Court, including that part inland of the Waitotara purchase on the southern

bank of the river which was abandoned by the Crown Agent in 1866'. They were also to get I I 200 acres for a fishing station near Ihupuku and 'a few other reserves of a smaller acreage, I I sites of old villages, or burial grounds, etc'; and in case they became short of land they were to

have a block of 2,000 acres 'inland, on the north-west bank of the Waitotara'.l50 The back

boundaries of the confiscation were to be cut without delay, and the boundaries of all the

reserves were to be well defined and pointed out to the owners - but the strictest economy was

to be practised in all matters relating to the survey. Lands already surveyed were to be 'placed

), I in the market without delay'.151

I i I I The lands north of Waingongoro were supposedly to be treated in a manner similar to that used , i i south of the river. For a start a 'clear definition of boundaries' was required so that 'the lands

retained by the Government ... should be clearly distinguished from those which it is proposed

to give up to the Natives for their use and maintenance'. McLean ordered that rivers and

I I natural boundaries be used wherever possible to make the position clear and acceptable to the I, )

148 AJHR 1880 G2 pxxii.

149 AJHR 1882 G5 ppI6-17.

150 On Ngarauru land holding see AJHR 1882 G5 pp20, 25.

151 AJHR 1873 C4a(ii) ppl-5. 85

Maori and to put them, as soon as possible, in possession of their lands. Parris was

'authorized to decide the question of boundaries on behalf of the government'.152

At the New Plymouth meeting on 15 February McLean told Ngatiruanui, Taranaki and

Ngatiawa that all the lands were in the hands of the government and that they should 'cultivate

the arts of peace'; the government wished to see them settled satisfactorily upon the land, for

only then could they consider a permanent peace established. 'My advice to you is to be strong

in cultivating .... Let your future fighting be with the soil .... Return to the land, not as

strangers, but as children of the soil.' This only served to strengthen Ngatiruanui's belief 'that

the Government had really sanctioned and encouraged their peaceable return to the tribal land'.

Parris was soon able to 'acquire' several large blocks from a section of Ngatirnutunga and from I I . I Ngatimaru who were determined to sell all the land they did not require for their own use, and

'ally themselves to the Government'.153 By the time Parris left office in July 1875 about

185,000 acres had been acquired under deeds of cession. This practice of taking formal deeds

of cession created its own problems and led the Maori 'to see in it an acknowledgement of their

tribal ownership'.154 Those Ngatimutunga who had returned from the Chatham Islands I i promising to settle on land to be allotted to them, now repudiated the confiscation and laid claim to all their ancestral land 'regardless of the rights of the resident Natives, who were in

possession during their absence at Chatham Islands, and who obtained awards under the

Compensation Court, which were never allotted to them'. Another section of the coast Parris

found troublesome was that between Stoney River and Te Namu (Opunake), where the Maori

were 'very troublesome and lawless', 'violently opposed to the extension of public works

I ( 152 McLean memo 6 Feb 1873, AJHR 1880 G2 App A p4.

I I 153 Parris report 30 April 1873, AJHR 1873 Gl pIS. On Ngatimaru land selling both within and without I , the confiscation boundaries see also Parris to Native Minister 3 July 1872 and 4 April 1873, and Parris to Minister of Public Works 6 Aug 1872 and 15 May 1873. AJHR 1873 G8 pp24-27; Parris to Native Department 4 May 1875. AJHR 1875 C4 pp5-6.

154 AJHR 1880 G2 ppxxii-xxiii. 86

through the district' and threatening 'to shoot the first man who attempted it', although Te

Whiti was 'still for peace and quietness, and ... non-interference with land selling or public

works'.l55

By 1874 land south of the Waingongoro was vigorously sought after by 'bona fide settlers, the

high prices ruling being a sufficient bar to mere speculation'. Buyers from all over the colony

attended a sale at Patea in March and paid more than £4 per acre for the limited supply of land

available. Every section offered was disposed of, 'the best land at unprecedented prices'. The i \ officer in charge of confiscated lands, C. A. Wray, urged the government to put all available

I i land on the market without delay, particularly the compensation awards in the Okotuku district I I purchased by the government, and the 'waste land between the boundary of the Wellington

I I I I Province and the Waitotara River inland of the military settlements, over which Native difficulties, caused by the improper attitude of the N garauru Tribe' still existed. 156

Parris' report of May 1874 wentsome way towards explaining Ngarauru's 'improper attitude'.

They were disquieted, he said, by the constant agitation of Europeans to lease the reserves and

their 'advancing money to a few, who will agree to lease for the sake of the money' while the

rest of the interested owners were averse to leasing. Parris, although 'fully sensible to the fact i I that to forbid the leasing of those lands to Europeans would be very unpopular' nevertheless

was so daring as to suggest that there were

other considerations involved besides the popular view of the question. The Natives must have land to live on, and it is very desirable they should not be disturbed while the great problem is being solved of acquiring territory and settling it with immigrants; for if the Natives should be led to feel that in the nature of things they cannot retain and enjoy land that has been set apart for them in a settled district, they will naturally oppose the cession of territory to the Crown.157

\ I I 155 Parris report 30 April 1873, AJHR 1873 Gl pIS. i

156 AJHR 1874 C3a pp2-3.

157 Parris report 28 May 1874, AJHR 1874 G2 p13. 87

The Ahitahi hapu under 'the young chief Heke' had recently sold two blocks of land and had

lent their support to the construction of 'the mountain road' (to the east of the mountain).

Heke, a former follower of Titokowaru, was the 'grandson of the late chief Hori te Pakeke,

who with his tribe, the Ahitahi, cut the track for Colonel Wakefield in 1842', against a good

deal of opposition. 158 Heke still had opposition 30 years later, but Parris was satisfied that the

change produced by the government's 'wise handling' of Ahitahi and Ngatirnaru would

influence other hapu to cooperate with the government in land-selling and roadmaking.

Most of the Tangahoe who had been living with Pihama at Oeo had returned to their ancestral

land allotted them at Taiporohenui and Matangarara, south of the Waingongoro. Titokowaru

and his followers who had been at Omuturangi since their return from the Ngatimaru district,

I I I. I were gradually returning to their former residences south of Kaupokonui, and some of them and even offered to sell a block ofland 'next the Waingongoro River'. There had been some

trouble in the district, where all were opposed to the settlers' cattle running on the land to the

north of the Waingongoro. Although the Maori had been prevented from crossing the river

Parris thought it difficult to prevent settlers allowing their cattle to do so because of 'the

scarcity of feed on the settlers' side, and abundance on the other'.

Parris was still concerned about the Maori between Stoney river and Umuroa who were still

'under the baneful influence of the Parihaka Councils' where the monthly hui continued with as

much 'devotion and adoration ofTe Whiti as ever'. In addition to local Maori, there were

many from other districts who regularly attended the meetings and 'believed implicitly' in Te

Whiti; with the effect that they were rendered 'very impracticable in matters relating to public

works and the acquirement of territory for the extension of the settlement of the country'.159

158 AJHR 1873 Gl pIS; AJHR 1873 C4a(ii) p4.

159 Parris report 26 May 1874, AJHR 1874 G2 ppI2-13. 88

In'July 1875 Charles Brown was appointed civil commissioner in Taranaki to replace Parris,

who was about to retire. He went with Parris to the hui at Parihaka in September 1875 and

reported that Te Whiti was still counselling 'peace and goodwill between all people, tribes and

Natives' but that he had nothing to say to his people on the subject of land-selling - 'each one

must use his own judgement on the question'.160 A few months later Brown was moralizing

on the state of the Maori, 'the conquered race', in his district, and commenting on their

'scheming, drinking, and general deterioration' which induced many of the older men 'of

respectability and standing to stand aloof, and say that they leave it to the young men to do as l they like'. In his search for chiefs 'eligible as Assessors' the only men of rank he could see II who behaved respectably and were not too old for the office, were 'Manaia, Titokowaru and Taurua, in the whole of Ngatiruanui'.161 I ) Ngatiruanui south of the Waingongoro had already sold land outside the confiscation i I boundaries and appeared disposed to 'meet the Government as regards the occupation by

settlers of those portions of the confiscated lands that have not hitherto been occupied'. But [I meeting the government meant that further difficulties arose for the Maori. They had leased the

greater portion of the reserves made 'for the benefit' of the tribes who formerly had rights in

the district. But some of the hapu thus compensated had no former rights in that district, while II the land in their own district had been given by the government to settlers. When the lease money was paid out it was appropriated by the original owners of that land and the others,

forced into that area by the government, missed out,

a state of things that will make paupers of a portion of the Natives. It is useless to tell them that the tribal rights have disappeared, and that they hold a reserve by Crown grant for the benefit of the whole tribe. The line of argument with them is, that if it is given to the tribe because it had rights formerly in the land, those in the tribe who held II rights formerly should have them now.

160 Brown to Native Department 23 Sept 1875, AJHR 1876 Gl pI.

161 Brown report 23 May 1876, AJHR 1876 G1 pp30-31. 89

Brown recommended that in future the government make many small reserves rather than a few

large ones, and that they locate them 'as far as practicable where their former rights were'.1 62

The problem with this solution was that these reserves would then be scattered among the lands

occupied by Europeans - and the Maori just might choose to occupy them themselves.

! !

A further difficulty arose through the occupation by Tapa te Waero and a few other Ngarauru II of land near Okotuku granted to military settlers in 1867 and then sold to John Dickie. Tapa 'did not recognize the confiscation' for had not both Parris and Brown paid money to the

II Whenuakura Maori for land on the other side of the Kohi stream, 'and if that were right, what I ) was the confiscation worth'? Brown countered this argument by attempting to convince Tapa that indeed McLean 'did not sanction the purchase of confiscated lands, and what had been

( I given on the west side of the Kohi was a gift from the Government in consideration of the former claims of the ·tribe in the block'.1 63 Tapa was not convinced. Everyone on the coast (I seemed to have learned of the instructions McLean had given to Parris in 1872 about compensating 'Native owners for all the lands they may relinquish ... at rates not exceeding 5s. ( 1 per acre'. These instructions were updated for Brown in April 1876 with reference to lands II north of the Waingongoro because the government had become 'fully aware of the extravagant views held by the Natives as to the value of the land ... as well as to the fact that they have I \ l I failed to recognize the reality of confiscation'. Brown was told not to 'purchase' lands or take deeds of cession for them, but just to give money as gratuities. He was authorized, at his own l1 discretion, 'to offer such annuities to the chiefs or others interested in the sale, as may in the

aggregate amount to 2s.6d. per acre more than the 5s. already mentioned'. Brown was,

II however, to avoid 'everything like extravagant concession' lest it lead to dissatisfaction among

11

162 ibid.

163 ibid p31. A full account of the Tapa te Waero claims is in AJHR 188205 pp19-23 and AJHR 1883 03 pI8. See also AJHR 1884 Scss I A5a p8. I \ i

I \

I 90

the Maori of Waikato and Bay of Plenty, as well as those who had lost lands south of the

Waingongoro. 164

Ten years after the confiscations were proclaimed on paper the government was still finding

difficulty in enforcing confiscation on the ground. The House had had to vote large sums of I I money to be used in acquiring a public estate for the purposes of colonization, because once

they had lost the right of pre-emption in land buying and private capitalists had moved into the

field, they were increasingly unable to compete. Their best land purchase officers had been

enticed away and the government had found itself short of 'officers of experience to carry out

the delicate work of land purchase negotiations'. They had found it 'expedient to make terms

with the most active and successful ... agents, and offer them inducements to enter the

Government service' but even then 'the difficulties which had to be encountered were of no

ordinary kind'. McLean, however, could congratulate himself that the results were 'on the

( 1 whole very favourable to the country', but he reminded the House that 'in acquiring the estate' i \ which had been secured, they had had much to contend with both from their European I I competitors and from 'the trouble and anxiety of dealing with a race so proverbially jealous and (I tenacious of their lands as the Natives'. Despite this, from 1872 when the government commenced its land purchases under the Immigration and Public Works Act 1870, they had

acquired in Taranaki 170,499 acres and had another 84,130 acres under negotiation, and

McLean asked the House to restrain its impatience, for he was sure that several more valuable

blocks would soon be in the hands of the government If they just carried on the work as they

might deem 'safe and advisable a large colonial estate' would be obtained.l65 By pre-emption,

confiscation and public works acts the objects of the colonizers of New Zealand were being

achieved.

164 ~cLean instructions 12 April 1876, NHR 1879 Sess I A8 p6.

165 NHR 187506 pp 1-2, 7-8; NZPD 1875 xvii pp224-29. 91

CHAPTER THREE

CONFISCATION ON TilE GROUND: 1877-1885

In the 1870s, the 'Vogel years', it was obvious to each succeeding government that peace at

any price was preferable to a renewal of the 'native difficulty' if loans were to be raised in the

English market and settlement of the country continued. But the government felt that as they I I I held the confiscated lands by conquest, they were free to occupy them as and when they saw

fit. Donald McLean died at the beginning of 1877 and in October of that year the Grey

ministry, with John Sheehan as native minister, replaced the Atkinson ministry. When the new

government turned its attention to the great fertile Waimate plains, and in July 1878 without

the least effort to define or survey reserves for Ngatiruanui, began instead to survey for sale,

I I \ I there was spirited reaction from the resident tribes north of the Waingongoro.

r ,I I I Resistance to the extension of settlement on the west coast was centred on Parihaka which had long been a haven for the dispossessed. The government, in taking land from loyal and rebel

alike and failing to provide the long promised reserves north of the Waingongoro, had built for

Te Whili the very following they came to mistrust and fear. As Te Whiti's influence on the

coast increased the government were in two minds about him. Fears were expressed that he

was accumulating too much power and influence and this, 'in one Native', was not desirable.

They found Te Whiti hard to cope with. He could not be bought, and as Parris said 'his total

want of sympathy with, and, indeed, his scorn for our action of progress, and the absence of

[ I all desire for money, or anything that we have to offer him, renders it difficult, if not hopeless, : ! to obtain any active aid from him in facilitating the work of colonization') In Sheehan's first .I I statement on native affairs he advised the House that he intended to continue McLean's policy of avoiding conflict with the Maori; that it was better to allow a few outrages here and there

AJHR 1872 F3 p13. 92

than always attempt to enforce the law and thereby imperil the peace of the country - and the

chances of floating a loan on the London market.2

The massive immigration policy of the Vogel years had increased settler demand for land and

from the start the Grey government was under pressure to increase the purchase of Maori land.

Grey and Sheehan set out to woo the chiefs where they could and to overawe them where they

could not. They intended to start in the Waikato and open up the North Island to settlement by

I : breaking down the aukati, the Maori frontier beyond the confiscation line, so 'you could go ,I I. , I into the money market and borrow as much as you liked on reasonable terms'} Having dealt

I \ with the Waikato they could then tum their attention to Taranaki. In January and May 1878 I 1 Grey and Sheehan met Tawhiao and King movement chiefs at Te Kopua and Hikurangi,4 and

: I \1 in June Rewi travelled to Waitara, 'the place where the troubles began', to meet Grey and

Sheehan and to 'finish the work begun at Hikurangi'.5 Grey and Rewi exchanged formalities. i 1 I I Rewi asked for the Waitara; Grey told him Waitara belonged to both of them: that there the struggle had begun and there it should end. Rewi agreed that there at Waitara he and Grey

should plant the tree from which good would spring, a tree from which they could plant

offshoots allover the island. The problem ahead of Rewi was to reconcile Ngatiawa, Taranaki

and Ngatiruanui chiefs with the arrangements he had made with the government After ten I I I J days in Taranaki, with Rewi suitably flattered and appeased, Grey left by the government

steamer Hinemoa for Wellington and despatched Sheehan overland to visit the Waimate plains

and try to reconcile Titokowaru, Te Whiti and Tohu to the impending survey of the plains.

2 NZPD 1877 xxvii pp232-33.

3 NZPD 1877 xxvii p239.

4 AJHR 1878 G3 ppl-3,18-21; Rutherford pp607-09.

5 See accounts from the New Zealander, Taranaki Herald and New Zealand Herald reprinted in AJHR 1878 G3 pp41-70. 93

Although Titokowaru had returned to his land he had not returned to his loyalty, but the

government, claiming their policy of 'wise and salutary neglect' had caused him to 'give in~

had treated him and his people like returned rebels and paid them compensation, although they

failed to settle them on defined reserves.6 This policy had reinforced the view that certaio]:¥ the

confiscation must have been ab~doned if the government was prepared to pay the Maori for

their land. Charles Brown was then ordered simply to offer 'gratuities' to the chiefs in

recognition of their mana whenua. Thisyayment came to be known to the Maori as takoha;

the west coast commissioners later called it secret bribery. When the commissioners

questioned Brown he explained that he 'awarded the takoha in two shaQes. One was to cover

f I the former tribal rights, which was E.ublicly paid to the Natiye~interested; and the other to cover the!!lllil!! of the chiefs, which was privately paig'.? Reporting to McLean in June 1876, c- Brown said he believed 'Titokowaru cannot see his way to taking the initiative in letting the

r i plains go. But he is willing that they should go' and would even assist in the process provided I I I, : his part in the action was not known to his people. 'I would suggest that £50 or £100 be given

to Titokowaru ... not that he is entitled to it.' Brown was quite happy to put the payment

through under the signature of Nuku 'a cousin or brother of Titokowaru' as he did not think

Titokowaru himself would sign.

The other natives who had claims in the Opako block would know nothing of it, as I have refused to pay 'per acre' or to take a conveyance for it, because 'it is I, \ \ 1 confiscated land' - and I have promised something extra to a few, to make them swallow the confiscation, which they do very well when the pill is gilded at the 8 I I expense of the others. l j Whatever the mode of paying, the tribes were not deceived by the change of name; they were

still- being paid for their land. Brown was pleased to tell McLean a few months later that

Titokowaru had 'swallowed the bait'. He had written to Brown asking him to pay his debts ------

6 AJHR 1880 G2 pxvii.

7 ibid ppxli, 72.

8 Brown to McLean 21 June 1876, McLean Mss 178. 94

amounting to £100. It soon became known that Titokowaru was receiving takoha and 'his '-- people jeered at him for sitting on a new stoo1'.9 ._-_ .. _--_ .. _-- ._------

McLean's instructions of 1872 and 1876 laid more stress on compensating the Maori for lands

they would relinquish, rather than on reserves per se. Brown was sure that with ten survey

parties and £900 for takoha, which he intended to disperse at the rate of just 2s 6d per acre, he

could finally 'settle the land between Patea and Waingongoro' and that he would then have no

difficulty north of the river, 'so far nearly as Oeo where the claims of the Ngatiruanui cease'.

The survey of the land between Opaku and the Waingongoro was begun in May 1876. It was

obstructed at Whareroa by the people from Taiporohenui who turned the surveyors back and

took their tools and instruments, but Brown told them that the survey was 'carried on as a I i matter of right which the Government possessed, to do what they pleased within the confiscation boundaries'. By April 1877 Brown had negotiated the acquisition of the Opaku

and Okahutiria blocks by payment of takoha and began 'to treat for the remaining country as far

as Waingongoro'. He achieved this without opposition and thought the Maori were 'gradually

but steadily improving in their feeling of submission' as a result of their defeat in war and that

as he had finished 'carrying out the confiscation' to the south of the river the time was right to

cross the Waingongoro and 'settle the question of the Waimate Plains'.1o

Brown was about to start surveying the plains late in 1877 when he was stopped by a telegram

from Sheehan, the new native minister, who wished to take stock of the situation before

proceeding with the survey. The following May John Ballance, the colonial treasurer,

informed him that if the work was undertaken the government would support him with

r I ). I 'sufficient force'. The government still had visions of Titokowaru, the warrior, but Brown felt himself adequately equipped to settle the west coast difficulty single handed and replied that he (I 9 Brown to McLean 11 Oct 1876, ibid; R.S.Thompson to Brown 6 Aug 1878, LE l/1879!3. See also NZPD 1879 xxxi pp267-68.

10 AJHR 1880 G2 ppxxiii, 68, and App C pp5-6. -WAIMATE PLAINS

E2 ~ § q.~ .~ ~ C:J'~ ~ r$'0 ~ s ~fb ! C:Jf ~fb ~ .if .q.~ ~ ~ ~ () § fa f..t \{»f Proposed Reserve ~ el.1tere ...... § ~ ~ -# ~ ~ Bushline .0 o 2 Miles ~ ~ ~ Iiii I ~ Road o 2 3 4 Kilometres \0 Vl

Based on: AJHR 1880 G2 96

was ready to begin without any force to support him)l The survey and sale of the Waimate

plains had become a pressing issue to the Grey government. James Macandrew, the public

works minister and an ex superintendent of Otago, in a minute to Cabinet of 22 May 1878

urged that there be no further delay in starting the survey - under the protection of a strong

detachment of the armed constabulary. It was his opinion that the government had shown

'great remissness in not having had this land in the market now. It would have placed us in

funds to a very large extent, and enabled public works to be carried on ... irrespective of

loan ... .it will place in the Treasury close on half a million sterling'.12 After thirteen years'

delay the confiscation was finally to be enforced on the Waimate plains - for fmancial reasons.

Brown thought any opposition Titokowaru might have offered to the survey had long been

bought off but he knew Titokowaru wanted information on reserves before the surveyors

crossed the Waingongoro. The government, anxious as they were to improve their finances,

deferred any action on the survey until Sheehan had visited the coast When asked by the west

coast commissioners in 1880 whether he had specific instructions to make reserves on the

Waimate plains, Brown replied that he, had 'general authority' under the instructions of 1876

and had been authorized to do what he 'thought necessary'. When he began to survey the

plains for sale and settlement, he still had not thought making reserves necessary, although he

said that by this time the people of his district understood the government would take all the

land of the plains except for reserves 'which were to be made as soon as the chiefs had seen the

Minister')3 There is no record now of just what Te Whiti was told when Sheehan visited the

area after leaving the Waitara meeting, but Brown, questioned by the commissioners, after

some hesitation decided he had heard Sheehan tell Titokowaru and others that 'ample reserves

would be made for them, comprising their fishing-stations, burial-grounds, cultivations, and

( I 11 AJHR 1880 G2 p50.

J 12 ! I ibid pxxv.

13 ibid pxxiv, xxv, 46. 97

settlements'. Titokowaru told him to go to Parihaka and discuss the question of reserves

there.14 Whatever Te Whiti was told or was given to understand it was apparently enough to

give him hope that the government at last meant to redeem the long unfulfilled promises about

reserves for his people. Talk of takoha would have served little purpose. As Brown told the

commissioners, the nearer he gONo Parihaka the stronger was the influence of Te Whiti and the

less takoha could he disburse. IS

No sooner did Sheehan get back to Wellington than the survey of the plains was ordered. On

29 July 1878 'four strong parties crossed the Waingongoro'. They did not immediately begin

the survey but started by simply cutting traverse lines with 'neither instruments nor chain on

the ground', since Brown wished 'in this manner, to feel his way')6 Two weeks later he

reported 'the successful commencement and prosecution of the survey of the Waimate Plains,

with every prospect of its peaceful c~ntinuance and completion')7 But there was obviously II ( , friction from the start between Brown and the survey office staff. It was a common cry that

divided responsibility hampered the efficient administration of the confiscated lands. During

his brief premiership in 1872, Stafford complained that he had 'the greatest difficulty in

ascertaining the position of the confiscated lands, as ... no one department knew the whole of

the arrangements with respect to them'; the Confiscated Lands Department knew something, { I I I ' { the Crown Lands Department held a few records, the Native Office was full of minutes and

records.18 Until after the abolition of the provinces the Native Office had their own survey I I, I

14 ibid p49.

15 ibid p72.

16 ibid p69.

17 Brown report 10 Aug 1878, AJHR 1878 G5 pI.

18 NZPD 1872 xiii p43I. 98

department, which may have been a happier arrangement than that which existed in 1878 by

which time the Crown Lands Department had responsibility for the surveys.

Brown had spread the word that the surveyors were about to start north of the river and warned

the local Maori not to meddle with survey pegs and trig stations. He sent Katene

Tuwhakaruru, a chief of that area and former lieutenant of Titokowaru, but now a native

policeman, and W.Williams, a licensed interpreter, to distribute and read to unwilling recipients

a panui prepared by Sheehan about the coming survey. Titokowaru's people were unhappy I ' i. with the situation, and with their chief. Te Ika and about thirty of his people protested,

peacefully, but said there would be no armed opposition.19 But trouble over the survey came

soon enough in the form of the murder of John McLean, the cook with a survey party on the

Moumahaki block south of the Waingongoro.20 Sheehan's immediate reaction to the incident

was to ask whether the murder was connected with the survey, though he claimed to attach no

political significance to the offence since the suspected murderer, Hiroki, was said to be a

Waikato with no claim to the land. In fact his mother was Waikato but his father Ngarauru,

and a former Waikato captive; Hiroki was born at Waitotara. When it was believed Hiroki

I I I .\ was heading for Parihaka, Sheehan suggested that Ngarauru could wash the blood of murder from the tribe by going there and demanding Hiroki from Te Whiti - despite the fact that Te

Whiti had sent word he would notify the government if Hiroki sought refuge at Parihaka.

Ngarauru gladly accepted the challenge and a party of ten set off convinced they would find

Hiroki at the Parihaka meeting on 17 October. Te Whiti had stated publicly that he would not

shelter Hiroki, and several messages had arrived from Parihaka that Hiroki was not there, yet

on arrival Ngarauru ignored Te Whiti and proceeded to search the village. Te Whiti and Tohu

\ ! I i were incensed and had the Ngarauru taua muru'd, and ordered them out of the village.

19 AJHR 1878 GS pI. The chief's name is variously written Te lka, Te Iki, Te Ike.

20 See correspondence regarding the incident dated 21 Sept to 10 Nov 1878 in AJHR 1878 Gll and 1879 G4. See also Parris report 23 May 1882, AJHR 1882 Gl ppll-12. 99

Despite the insult paid him Te Whiti maintained his word. When Hiroki did anive at Parihaka

with a severe gunshot wound in the stomach from an encounter with one of the search parties,

Te Whiti sent one of his men to report the fact to Brown and requested an interview with

Sheehan before anything else was done. Sheehan decided he would 'consider' the request, but

meanwhile told Brown he 'had better go up and see Te Whiti'. Titokowaru expressed his

opinion that no one should go to Parihaka until Te Whiti had had an interview with Sheehan,

but Brown went to Parihaka and the people gathered to hear Sheehan's message. They had no

reply for him since the message was abundantly clear: the native minister obviously had no

intention of going to Parihaka himself. These unnecessarily provocative actions of Sheehan's

were typical of the ill-considered tactics that characterized relations between the government

and Te Whiti and served to alienate him from them. By insulting Te Whiti and failing... to consult with him, Sheehan missed the chance to have Hiroki surrendered, and a comparatively

minor incident grew to major proportions and was to materially influence further dealings ( . I ' i between the government and the people of Parihaka.

Brown expected opposition when he crossed the Waingongoro because of the lack of reserves,

) and he later told the commissioners that he was sure there would have been no opposition to \ I the survey of the plains had reserves been made. Yet the survey proceeded with little

,) I interruption for almost seven months before it became obvious that the Ngatiruanui would not

meekly permit the work to be continued if the promised reserves were not flIst delineated. At

the beginning of 1879 none of the west coast people who had received Compensation Court j i awards on paper were yet secure on their land; none of those who, under the 1863 act and

subsequent proclamations had surrendered or 'returned to their loyalty' had titles to reserves;

the confiscated lands which had been 'formally abandoned' by the Crown had not been legally

relinquished by proclamation; and the assurances given to Titokowaru before the survey ( I I , \ ) started appeared totally worthless when the survey lines came within a quarter of a mile of his

I I village. I 100

The survey was confined to Ngatiruanui land between the Waingongoro river and Wahamoko

stream, as it was not 'deemed prudent' at that time to carry it further north into Taranaki tribal

land, where no takoha had been accepted.21 But payment of takoha to Titokowaru in no way

conciliated or restrained his people, and they finally took matters into their own hands. The

first interruption to the survey came from the Ngaruahine hapu in December 1878 when the

surveyors were turned back when they reached the cultivations at Taikatu, Titokowaru's pa

The surveyors profited by the absence at Parihaka of the people of nearby Omuturangi and

carried the survey up to their cultivations before they too were turned back. Brown sent the

interpreter R.S.Thompson ahead to 'discuss' reserves with the villagers, but on no occasion

\ i was a reserve marked out on the ground. There was further opposition to the survey at the ! other end of the plains in January 1879, and again in February when the women and old men

first hindered and then stopped the surveyors who had actually cut lines through their

cultivations. By March the survey pegs were being cut into kindling or pulled from the ground I ! ' over miles and miles of surveyed land.22

) ( It was in March too that trouble flared again over a road being surveyed towards Titokowaru's

village. Titokowaru made a very reasonable request that it avoid his grass seed crop and burial

ground and the Native Department officers agreed this should be done. But again the discord

between Native Department and Survey Department surfaced and Charles Finnerty, an assistant

surveyor, continued with his original plan because although he had been warned several times I I 1,1 to stop he had not actually been obstructed or forcibly prevented from continuing his work.23

The Native Department had spent a lot of time, energy and money in conciliating Titokowaru

and Brown had warned the surveyors to treat him with extra courtesy, but to no avail.

Provoked even to this extent Titokowaru did not react with violence. Leaving his younger men

c I I I 21 Sheehan memo 14 April 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 p4.

22 Evidence of Humphries 15 March 1880, AJHR 188002 pp69-70; ibid App E p7. I ' 23 Evidence of Finnerty, Assistant Surveyor, 23 March 1880, AJHR 188002 p8I. 101

to obstruct the sUIveyors if they wished, he left for Parihaka to lay his take before Te Whiti at

the March hui.

A week after the hui Sheehan visited Parihaka - not to discuss the question of reserves but to

demand the surrender of Hiroki. He then attempted to justify the government's action on the

plains as conforming with the 'intimation' he had given Te Whiti before the survey began, but

his explanation was received with scorn. There was obviously a wide discrepancy between

what the government was doing on the plains and what it had previously 'intimated' it would

do. Sheehan decided that as he had been interrupted by Te Whiti he would not continue the

discussion.24 The end of the meeting signalled the end of Te Whiti's willingness to

accommodate the government It must have seemed clear to him from the way the survey was

being conducted that government promises and those contained in the act of confiscation itself

would not be kept. Te Whiti peremptorily ordered his men to remove all the surveyors from

the plains. At dawn the next day, 24 March, the surveyors were told ofTe Whiti's orders.

None of the surveyors moved of their own accord, but none of them opposed their removal. It

was obvious the Maori meant business; they quietly, thoroughly and good humouredly packed I I up each survey camp, loaded horses and drays and carted everything back across the \ I Waingongoro.25 (

i. I

It was clear to the west coast commissioners who later enquired into the governmen~

'promises and engagements' with regard to the confiscated lands, that the failure to make

reserves was the root cause of the interruption to the survey.26 Failure to make reserves on the ground- was not just careless omission, but a reflection of a deeply rooted view that the I, I Europeans could do what they liked in the country they governed and that in the end their

24 Brown report 22 July 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess II G7.

25 AJHR 1880 G2 pp70-71.

26 AJHR 1880 G2 passim. 102

actions were in the interests of the colony and ipso facto in the interests of the Maori people . ..!!. was a common belief that it was injurious to the Maori to hold large areas of land in common

and that the ideal was for a man to hold on individual title just sufficient land to support himself

and his family. There was a reluctance to survey large reserves which might remain in Maori

hands and impede the progress of civilization and settlement. Such reasoning applied

particularly to this part of the coast where the people were considered to be among the most

troublesome and rebellious Maori in the country. It was illustrated clearly in the case of the

'large reserve' to be made for the 'thoroughly loyal' Ngatiruanui chief, Manaia, and his people.

Brown told the surveyors that a 2,000 acre block was to be reserved for them and that it should

( be excluded from the survey. The surveyor felt his job was to subdivide the whole district into ! ! sections and per:suaded Brown that it was in Manaia's interests to have his land 'sectionized'.

Manaia had not been told what land he was to have. As far as he or his people could tell the

whole area was being subdivided for sale. Nor had he yet been paid takoha. Brown had

offered him fIrst £100 then £1,000 but Manaia 'more straightforward and upright' than other

chiefs had not taken the money then, feeling satisfIed that his mana had been duly recognized \1 and that he could have the money if he wanted it27 II \ I Manaia never was paid his money. Although Brown's promise of £1,000 in takoha 'was as

emphatic and precise as words could make it, and ... nothing but the implicit confIdence

reposed by Manaia in this promise prevented the completion of the transaction then and there',

Fox later felt that 'splendid provision' had been made for him in the way of reserves, and that

the promised takoha, which was supposed to assist in fencing reserves and 'otherwise

promoting... social improvement', could be 'fairly considered to have merged in the noble

estate' of 1,500 acres bestowed upon him.28 According to Brown, Titokowaru at this time had

27 ibid pp69,73,74. I I I

28 Fox memo on The Final Payments of "Takoha'" 7 June 1883, AJHR 1883 G3 p25. 103

accepted £900. In the House on 23 July 1879 Sheehan claimed Titokowaru had received £600

and by his silence had consented fully to the survey.29

Brown blamed a January 1879 telegram from Grey for the fact that no reserves had been made

on the Waimate plains at the time of the interruption to the survey. Grey had ordered him to

submit proposals about reserves for government consideration before he came to any final

conclusion about them or informed the people what land they were to have, and Brown told the

commissioners that this even prevented his telling the people their cultivations and settlements

would be reserved to them,30 something they had been repeatedly promised over the years.

This stoppage of the survey was a new challenge. Brown described it as being 'very different

from ... previous occasions ... when I have always been able to surmount the difficulty by delay,

by temporizing, and by a use of the compensation that was at my disposal')1 The government

thought Te Whiti was still anxious to avoid bloodshed, but claiming to believe that his

pacifism might be overtaken by his followers fanaticism they decided to rush through the sale ) I of some of this choice west coast land before their profit should be endangered by fear of 'another native outbreak'. Two days after the removal of the surveyors a preliminary

advertisement notifying the sale of 16,000 acres of the plains appeared in New Zealand and

Australian newspapers. Even then there was still no move to determine reserves. The most the

government did, a week later, was 'reserve from sale' sections 'affected' by burial grounds, iI ' cultivations·and fishing grounds. This involved an exercise on paper by which certain sections were marked 'withheld from sale'. Then on 24 April a further notice in the papers advised that

the sale was 'postponed until further notice'}2

'I i ,I I 29 Brown evidence 16 March 1880, AJHR 188002 pp73-74; NZPD 1879 xxxi pI87.

30 ibid p47.

31 Brown report 2 April 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 plO.

32 AJHR 188002 ppxxx-xxxii,64-68. 104

At the beginning of April Sheehan had called Brown to Wellington and instructed him to point

out on a map in the survey office some reserves in the surveyed section of the plains, bearing

in mind 'that the Government had decided to return from 20,000 to 25,000 acres to the Natives

on the Plains'. Brown accordingly coloured on the map about 3,000 acres to be set apart for

reserves, comprising 'all the fishing-stations, and all the old pas and burial-grounds' he was

aware of. These were the sections the Taranaki Land Board was then advised to withhold from

sale. No one else was told of the 'existence of this coloured plan' and the fact of the reserves

having been made at all was, according to the commissioners, still unknown to the Maori

fifteen months later.33

In the meantime James Mackay had been sent to the west coast as a special commissioner 'to I ; I report on the whole question of the Waimate Plains'. He sent back a long and illuminating

telegram to Sheehan about his visit to Te Whiti on 2 April.34 Sheehan took care that this vitally

important telegram, which too clearly expressed the 'real views of the natives', was not laid

before parliament, but fobbed them off with a report which he had had Mackay write later, and

which gave no particulars of the interview with Te Whiti. It did however state that the Maori

throughout Taranaki were 'highly discontented and disaffected towards the Government' and

that this was due to the fact that those who had received Compensation Court awards either had

not received their crown grants or had not even been able to select their land; that reserves

made for surrendered rebels had not been subdivided and no guarantee had been given about

the issuing of titles; that lands over which the confiscation had been abandoned had not been

legally relinquished by proclamation as required by the New Zealand Settlements Act, so the

loyal occupants could neither get titles from the Crown nor have their claims heard by the

Native Land Court; that even those on reserves south of the Waingongoro had been told they

( ! could not lease parts of their lands since they were 'the property of the Crown' and the I,I I i i 33 ibid ppxxvii,xxviii,47.

34 ibid App A pp9-12. 105

inhabitants 'were only in occupation on sufferance'; and that Te Whiti and others urged the

long time they had been permitted to occupy the land with no objection from the government,

and indeed on the promise 'that they would not be interfered with in the matter of any lands

which they enclosed and occupied; in consequence of which ... they did fence in considerable

areas', parts of which were included in the survey of the Waimate plains.35

M~kay's telegram was probably the most accurate and revea]jng f@rd ofTe Whiti's views /1 the government ever received, and they ignored it and suppressed it It did not see the light of

day until the west coast commissioners published it in 1880. Te Whiti had said to Mackay

The Governor has no claim on the lands this side of W aingongoro .... Why did not you occupy them at the time of your conquest? According to Maori custom you should have done so. I am now in occupation: and even if the land had been taken, I, according to the same custom, having been allowed to reoccupy the land, have not lost my rights of ownership.

Mackay tried to cite examples of loss of land by conquest but carefully avoided the question of

occupation, and when he said he wanted Te Whiti and the government to come to an amicable

arrangement about the confiscated land Te Whiti replied

I do not admit your right to survey it. My blanket is mine.... you want to cut my blanket in two. It will be too small for me then ... .I do not desire war. All I want is to be allowed to remain at peace on my own land... .I gave up land from Waitotara to Waingongoro under the arrangements with McLean and Parris. That ought to satisfy you ... .I turned the surveyors off quietly, because they had no right on my land.... tell the Governor not to persist in the survey, i I and I will sit down peaceably on my land. Mackay suggested Te Whiti let the government deal with these lands as Parris had dealt with

others, a portion for Te Whiti and a portion for the government But Te Whiti asked if they

had not seen

the line cut through the cultivations at the door of Titokowaru's house? .. Where, then, is the piece to be retained by the Natives? Where are the promises ) I of McLean and Parris that the land in the occupation of the Natives should not be taken from them? But for the surveyors being turned off, we should receive no consideration at the hands of the Government. The works of McLean, Parris, and the old Government were different from the acts of I Sheehan, Brown, and the new Government .... I asked Brown to remove his guns. He said he had, but he carries them up to Titokowaru's house. The

35 Mackay report 14 April 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 pp6-8. 106

surveyors were then taken of ... to prevent evil .... The people might not sit down quietly and submit to their lard being surveyed under their feet.

When Mackay tried to assure him the government did not mean to take all the land but would

give back pieces, as promised by McLean and Parris, Te Whiti asked eagerly if Mackay was

authorized to offer part of the land and agree for the government to take the other part. 'It

seems to me ... by the way the surveys have been conducted, you wish to take the whole of the

blanket and leave me naked.' Mackay could make no such offer, but said he would report to

the government and return and see Te Whiti if there was 'anything of importance to

I ; communicate')6

Suprisingly there was not, although Sheehan tacitly admitted the truth ofTe Whiti's statement

that but for the surveyors being turned off, his people would have received no consideration II from the .government. He told the House on 23 July 1879 that he was not aware, 'nor was the II country aware, nor do I believe the House knows as a fact, what the exact position of those lands on the West Coast was. It has only been made clear to us by the interruption of the II surveys. It turns out that from the White Cliffs down to the ... [Waitotara] the whole country is. strewn with unfulfilled promises')7 Meanwhile Sheehan told Mackay that he recognized Te 1 Whiti's 'desire to discuss the question and come to some settlement' but implied it was really II Te Whiti's own fault that no reserves had been defined. Government instructions regarding Waimate had been, he said, 'of the most liberal character' but they had been unable to give Ii effect to them because the people would not point out the reserves they specially required. This had now been done for them and the sale map was 'speckled over with reserves')8 But on 4

1 April, the day he received Mackay's telegram, Sheehan told the Taranaki Land Board to II

I j 36 Mackay and Blake to Sheehan 4 April 1879, AJHR 1880 G2 App A pp9-12.

37 NZPD 1879 xxxi p185.

38 Sheehan to Mackay 5 April 1879, AJHR 188002 App A p12. 107

withhold until further notice the advertisement regarding the sale of the plains.39 He then

hurriedly returned to Taranaki to confer with Brown, Parris and Mackay and 'ascertain what

foundation there was for the statements made in many quarters, and believed in a great many

others, to the effect that important promises made by the Government in respect of the West

Coast confiscated area had not been fulfilled'; and to determine whether such promises had

anything to do with the interruption of the survey.40

Sheehan had no trouble in discovering justifiable 'feelings of insecurity and distrust' among

loyal natives and those who had returned to their loyalty. Nor had he any trouble in

exculpating both Parris and Brown or in blaming for the present state of affairs past

governments 'who had the control of this question at the time when the confiscation was first

decreed'. He found the Waimate plains to be confiscated land about which 'no promises have

been made to the former owners'. He was sure neither Parris nor Brown had ever disclosed to

the tribes the instructions they had been given by McLean; yet he was in no doubt that the

people were now 'generally aware' the government proposed 'to give both ample reserves and

money payment'. As to the Parihaka block of about 80,000, he could find no evidence that

any 'promise of any character whatever, definite or indefmite, has ever been made to the I I original owners, for the return of the whole or any part' of it - a suggestion the west coast

commissioners could not 'allow ... for a moment'. Nor, he added, had 'any action ever been

taken of an official character to justify even a suspicion that any intention to return the block

had ever existed in the mind of the Government'.41 Certainly Sheehan had taken good care not

to make any promise directly to Te Whiti. But in 1878 when Te Whiti had restrained 'the more

turbulent spirits' from interrupting the survey at its commencement, Sheehan, according to

Brown, said he had considered the question of returning the Parihaka block to Te Whiti but

39 AJHR 1880 G2 p66.

40 Sheehan memo 14 April 1879. AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 pI.

41 ibid pp2-4; AJHR 1880 G2 plio 108

'had come to the conclusion that it would be paying too heavily for Te Whiti's having kept the peace on the coast'. In 1879 though, he admitted that there would have been comparatively little land available for sale once provision had been made for the large number of people of the

Taranaki tribe living on the block. Then in 1880 he told the west coast commissioners that

Te Whiti had done good work for years on the coast in preserving the public peace; and that I was disposed, in the event of his pursuing a similar line of conduct in the future, to recommend to my colleagues the restoration of the Parihaka Block to the original owners; that is to say, the whole ofthe... Block, extending down to the sea. This restoration was to be entirely dependent on good behaviour.42

Sheehan dismissed Te Whiti's discontent as being due to a misunderstanding over the survey lines which had cut through Titokowaru's cultivations, and insisted that the promises alleged to have been made in the past had 'no existence in the official records'. Yet despite this he was prepared to recommend that a quarter or more of the coast be set aside as reserves, that monetary compensation be paid, and that special consideration be shown to the chiefs 'in order of their rank'. 43

Mackay was now despatched through the district between New Plymouth and Wanganui to visit every hapu and every major chief and discuss their grievances - every one, that is, except

Te Whiti. He reported back to Sheehan that it would be 'useless, and ... highly improper... to conceal from the Government that the Ngarauru, Ngatiruanui, Taranaki and Ngatiawa

Tribes ... are very discontented with their present position, and consider that injustice has been done to them in the matter of their lands'; that Ngarauru and Ngatiawa and some of the

Ngatiruanui and Taranaki people would admit European 'right by conquest, but say we have not carried out our engagements about awards and reserves'; while Te Whiti's and

Titokowaru's 'immediate followers ... deny the right of the Crown to any confiscated lands'.

He thought that if the less disaffected could be mollified by the award of reserves or titles to

Compensation Court awards they could be detached from Te Whiti and the strength of the

42 AJHR 1880 G2 p72; AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 p3; AJHR 1880 G2 App A part II p2.

43 Sheehan to Mackay 5 April 1879, AJHR 1880 G2 App A p12. 109

'hostile party' reduced.44 Mackay had advised Sheehan to inform Te Whiti and Titokowaru 'distinctly'. that part of the Parihaka block and Waimate plains would be 'at once set apart fqr them and granted to the proper owners'. But this was not done and when Mackay saw

Titokowaru on 25 April during his journey through Taranaki he found him 'civil, but

seemingly determined to make common cause with and be guided by Te Whiti only'.45 It had been obvious to government officers for years enough that no settlement could be effected- on the west coast unless it was agreed to by Te Whiti himself and yet at this crucial point Sheehan

chose to ignore Te Whiti altogether.

Te Whiti's response to Sheehan's studied neglect drew the attention of the whole colony to the

state of affairs on the west coast. On Sunday 25 May 1879, he sent his ploughmen, unarmed,

to cut his moko into the land at Oakura where the second Taranaki war began in 1863. In the

next few weeks his men, always unarmed, ploughed confiscated lands held by settlers from

Pukearuhe to Hawera.

I I I The settlers were outraged. Courteny,46 on whose farm the ploughing began, telegraphed to

Grey on 26 May 'Five ploughs and 20 hostile natives are ploughing up my best field .... If

Government do not remove them at once I will shoot their horses and the natives also'.

Telegrams flew back and forth between the settlers and the government. Parris reported that he

had been to Parihaka and had 'a long discussion with Te Whiti in the presence of about 200 of

his followers' all of whom were very civil and dignified, and that there was 'no immediate

44 Mackay to Sheehan 6 May 1879, ibid p13.

45 Mackay to Sheehan 14 April 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I C4 p8; Mackay to Sheehan 6 May 1879, AJHR 1880 G2 App A p13.

46 The newspapers gave the settler's name as Courtney; some official papers gave it as Courtenay. 110

danger or cause for alann'; Te Whiti would not resort to violence but had ordered the

ploughing and would persist in it in order to 'assert his right to the land'.47

At last the government took notice of the fact that the unrest on the coast was due to widespread

disillusionment over the lack of reserves or titles. They assured the settlers that the natives had

no hostile intentions but were simply pacificly asserting their claim. One of the ploughmen

was Bob Erangi (Ropata Ngarongomate) of Ngamahanga hapu, a close relation ofTe Whiti

and an original owner of the Stoney River Block which had been granted as compensation to

his hapu after their surrender in 1865 under Grey's peace proclamation. Fox described it as an

'informal restitution' as no title to the land had ever been confinned.48 The settlers were not

appeased. They fonned committees in New Plymouth, Hawera, Patea, Manutahi, and passed

resolutions stating that 'an exhibition of the power of the Government. .. with armed men would

do more to make the natives act as peaceable subjects than any Civil action in a Court of

law ... dealing with quasi rebel natives who by force dispossess peaceable subjects of land held

under Crown grant'.49 They met Grey, who on 31 May had gone up to New Plymouth with

Colonel G.S. Whitmore, the colonial secretary, and the recently arrived governor, Sir Hercules

Robinson, and demanded the government undertake the defence of the province. Grey assured

them the government would protect the settlers, but this reply was considered 'unsatisfactory'.

At a further public meeting in New Plymouth they declared that as long as the government

'allowed the nest at Parihaka to remain' there would be no peace; they were without 'protection

or arms and utterly at the mercy of the Natives' who were not even 'an organized body of

armed natives who had made up their minds to declare war upon the Settlers, but fanatics

47 May correspondence, LE 1/1879/135.

48 AJHR 1880 G2 ppxxxix,52.

49 Crown grants had been issued to Europeans in the district, but not to the Maori.

I i

I I 111

whose mode of action they had no knowledge of.50 It was 'the old fighting chief Titokowaru

who was believed to be the most dangerous of them all'51 that they really had in mind, and

they reacted to the thought of Te Whiti and Parihaka much as they had done to Titokowaru and

Te Ngutu 0 te Manu. They went back to the premier and told him they wanted an answer,

some assurance before he went back to Wellington. Grey told them he would 'not be bullied',

that he had received 'threatening telegrams' and while he was determined to do all he could to

settle the question, he would do nothing wrong: 'I have spoken explicitly and nothing will

move me from doing what is right, with caution and prudence'. 52

The ploughing was suspended while the dignitaries from Wellington were in the area. But they

left without making contact with Te Whiti, and the ploughing resumed with the ploughmen

'very orderly and good-tempered ... but still very earnest and determined to do their work, with

perfect faith in the supreme power of Te Whiti and Tohu to bear them harmless through what is

ordered to be done'.53 The settlers began to enrol as volunteers and demanded the government

issue them with arms and ammunition. Telegrams arrived in Wellington from Manutahi, Patea,

New Plymouth, Hawera, and even Thames, and Timaru offering the services of .

the local volunteers 'in the event of a war with the Natives'. Whitmore was ready to receive all

offers if the government could not 'avert hostilities without sacrificing its duty', but Grey

cautiously instituted some enquiries. He was told that Courteny's land had belonged to both

'rebel and friendly natives' and the latter had signed an agreement accepting other lands as

compensation, but no titles had ever been granted for any of it. Some of the ploughmen were

'friendly natives who owned that particular piece' and who had 'signed the agreement on 2

July 1866'. Grey. concluded that--.. the ploughing should be interpreted not as a determination--.... to

50 Taranaki Herald 2 June 1879.

I 51 \ j Bryce memo 9 Sept 1882, AJHR 1883 Al p5.

52 EJS...tract from Taranaki Herald 5 June 1879, in May correspondence, LE 1/1879/135.

53 Brown report 11 June 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I G1 p20. 112

evict settlers from confiscated land but as a means of drawing the attention of the government

and asserting a legal right.54

War fever continued to grow, fuelled by Major Maillard Noake whose appointment had pleased

the settlers and given them confidence that the 'whole of the settled district' could be held by

volunteers. However they were strongly in favour of having 'the Ngatiporou sent to Parihaka'

to do the fighting for them, since fighting was considered inevitable and it was expected 'the

Maoris will strike the first blow soon'. When ploughing started near Hawera on 21 June the

settlers were 'very excited' and next day Inspector Foster Goring, of the armed constabulary,

advised the government that the settlers had removed the ploughmen and 'carted them across

the Waingongoro Bridge' and the natives were gathering on one side and about a hundred

settlers on the other. Thompson telegraphed that Te Whiti intended to continue ploughing to

force a settlement and that there was a great desire that the governor should visit the district.55

The settlers were sure war would be commenced at any moment, but Captain Arthur Tuke I i reported the ploughmen 'perfectly good humoured' and with no warlike intentions, but an

'implicit belief in Te Whiti'. Grey told him if it appeared their actions would excite the settlers

so much that a breach of the peace might ensue, he should have the ploughmen arrested by the I ' I police or armed constabulary and bring 'a charge of disturbance' against them. Settler pressure

- and the reassurance that extra troops had been despatched to the troubled district - finally overcame Grey's caution. The following day,- 29 June, he wired Goring 'if the Natives plough again arrest them ail'; and Sheehan instructed his officers and the armed constabulary officers

54 June correspondence, LE 1/1879/135.

55 ibid. 113 throughout the district not to worry about the law: 'you take the men and the government will find the law'.56

Immediately the arrests began on 29 June, Te Whiti was said to have ordered that only men of mana should form the ploughing parties: 'Titokowaru, Te Iki and other leading men' were to be taken prisoner. No arms of any kind were to be carried and no resistance offered.57 When

Brown took Major Roberts to arrest Te Iki's party on 3 July they offered no opposition, but Te

Iki asked 'that they might not be bound', and promised to go quietly. 58 The first batch of 11 ploughmen was committed for trial on 5 July in New Plymouth Resident Magistrate's Court charged with malicious injury, forcible entry and riot. The ploughing and the arrests continued throughout the month; on 5July 90 ploughmen were in custody, the next day 105.59 In the

New Plymouth court on 24 July Porana, one of the ploughmen 'indicted for having ... unlawfully and maliciously broken the soil of a certain field the property of W.Jury and done damage thereto to the extent of £5', declared he had ploughed under the orders of his ariki: 'I am one of his spiritual ploughmen, and it is quite right that I should do his work. My weapon was a plough but yours [the arresting sergeant] was frrearms'.60 Two days later ploughmen who had caused damage estimated at five shillings were 'sentenced to two months hard labour in Dunedin gaol, each to enter into his own recognizance in the sum of £600 and to fmd two sureties in the sum of £300 each to keep the peace for 12 months, or to be imprisoned for 12

56 ibid. See also telegrams from Grey to civil and military officers, PM 6/2.

57 Brown to Sheehan 2 July 1879, transmitting Katene's report of the meeting. July correspondence, LE 1/1879/135.

58 Brown to Sheehan 3 July 1879, ibid.

59 As many as 34 ploughed in one day and 180 were arrested in all; 'Epitome of Events' compiled from Taranaki Herald, MA 4/31.

60 Taranaki News 26 July 1879. 114

months in Dunedin gaol; sentences to run concurrently'.61 Others were sent directly to

Wellington to await trial and were held in Mount Cook prison, on which £750 was quickly

spent for alterations and repairs and to build an encircling palisade. It was believed that if any

prisoners escaped or if any were 'set free by due course of law' it would be 'a serious disaster

to the colony ... as Te Whiti and the remainder of his fanatical followers would at once set it

down to his supernatural power'. 62

Mackay reported that the sentencing of Te Iki and Tamati Kuku to seven days' solitary

confinement, and fifteen other Ngatiruanui to 'two days' confmement in cells on bread and

I i water, as punishment for insubordination and general disobedience of the gaol regulations' had I ' had a 'most salutary effect' and all orders were now promptly obeyed. Mackay had enquired

into the fanaticism of these ploughmen and discovered that 'Ngatiawa... joined Te Whiti

because they could get no land satisfactorily reserved for them'; Taranaki had 'stronger faith in I ! I Te Whiti', their grievance being that lands 'formerly verbally surrendered to them by Mr

Parris ... have not been placed on a satisfactory footing as regards title', and they were

II dissatisfied 'as to the uncertain tenure of the Parihaka Block'; Ngatiruanui had 'the most

unbounded and fanatical reliance on Te Whiti and his supreme authority', deemed themselves

'martyrs to his cause' and complained their lands 'were never conquered and held by

Europeans' and that they were offered monetary compensation for their land and promised

reserves 'wheresoever they were occupying and cultivating the land'. Having heard all this,

Mackay concluded that 'no disturbance would have arisen if the Native and Survey I Departments had been acting in accord, and the controlling power been vested in the former'.63

[ ,

61 ibid 2 Aug 1879.

62 Mackay report 29 July 1879, AJHR 1879 Sess I GI0 ppl-2.

63 ibid p2.

I I , I I ) 115

By the time parliament met on 11 July the 'self destroying Grey Government' was under

extreme pressure both internally and externally. Fox, newly newly elected leader of the

opposition, quickly took command of the Address in Reply debate and moved a motion of no

confidence in the government Grey's defence of his government ran to ten pages in

'Hansard'. He said almost nothing about Maori affairs or about granting land to the Maori, but

he would happily accept 'the vast tracts of fertile land still held by the Natives, and which they

are from time to time willing to dispose of' and throw them open to auction instead of allowing

them to fall into the hands of speculators.64 Sheehan, replying to Fox's charges, declared that

although he could not 'admit that the Natives had any right to the land or to reserves', there

was 'abundant evidence in writing that there was every intention to make ample reserves'; that I I he had a plan showing that nearly 4,000 of the 16,000 acres surveyed on the plains were to be

) i set aside as reserves, in addition to 'their burial-places, their pas, and the mouth of every

stream running into their lands'. He did not admit that his plan of proposed reserves was not

even prepared until after the surveyors had been turned off and the land offered for sale, but

maintained airily that it was 'understood' Major Brown should be in a position to make

reserves of 25,000 acres out of a block of about 95,000, and this would make Ngatiruanui 'the

I I wealthiest tribe in that part of the country'.65

The debate in parliament dragged on for two weeks to its inevitable conclusion on 29 July

when the Grey government was shown to have lost the confidence of the House. Grey was

granted a dissolution on the condition that he bring forward no contested legislation, and he

stayed on long enough to pass the Maori Prisoners' Trials Bill on 9 August. There were 170

ploughmen in gaol in Wellington and another 25 in Dunedin, and Sheehan and Atkinson in I ' collusion agreed that they would not be punished, they would simply be detained, for if they 'were brought to trial, and if through a failure to convict, they returned to their district,

64 NZPD 1879 xxxi pp80-83.

65 ibid pp184-85. 116

war would be quite certain there'. The government congratulated itself that 'the greater part of

the best fighting men of the Natives concerned were now in custody',66 but they were not the

only ones who were to be affected by the bill about to be passed into law. Wi Kingi Matakatea

'almost the only loyal Native on the coast' had been solemnly promised his land would never

be taken, but it too was confiscated and later 'returned' to him, although his title to it was never

confmned. After thirteen disillusioning years he had joined the ploughmen and had been I I 'I I imprisoned with the rest The Europeans wanted to think his arrest a mistake; he had not been

ploughing, but only 'looking on'.67 But when offered bail Matakatea refused to leave his men

and when about to be sent to Dunedin in January 1880 he would not accept the native

minister's offer to be 'all but released' and said 'if the Government wished to show him

kindness he hoped they would do so at TaraQaki' by settling the grievances of his people.68

The Maori Prisoners' Trials Act provided that the governor in Council should fix the date and I I, I I place of trial 'of certain Maori Prisoners... committed for trial at the Supreme Court at

Wellington', and also that the place of trial could be 'any other place in the colony' where the I I ) \ Supreme Court sat. The act did not state that the prisoners 'must be brought to trial within

three months of... passing this Bill' as Whitmore argued in the Council.69 The governor could

name whatever date his ministers advised and Sheehan had already agreed with Atkinson that

no date should be named. The act was to remain in force until thirty days after the

commencement of the next session of parliament.

66 ibid pp528-29,530.

67 'Epitome of Events' 14 July 1879, MA 4/31; AJHR 1880 G2 pxxxix.

68 Bryce to Hall 8 Jan 1880, Hall Mss vol 41; see also Bryce to Matakatea 4 October 1880, AJHR 1881 m~ .

69 NZPD 1879 xxxi p541. 117

The bill was debated in the Council before it was debated in the House.7o Standing orders

were suspended and the bill was not translated, despite the protests of Maori members in both

the House and the Council. Since the bill stated that it was 'indispensable for the peace and

safety of the colony that the ordinary course of law should be suspended' members of both

government and opposition were prepared to accept that argument. They could not risk these

men being 'liberated with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court upon them as guiltless' lest

their prophet 'at once have a greater power than the Governor of the colony' and be hurried

along 'to excesses, the end of which cannot be foreseen'. But there was opposition, from both

sides of the House, to people being 'incarcerated for an offence of nothing; to extraordinary

and unjust' proceedings; to 'abominable measures' brought in at the last moment and 'pushed

through unreasonably'. Aucklander William Swanson thought the bill a Taranaki measure

pressed on the government by Atkinson, and this view was reinforced by an emotional

outburst from Thomas Kelly (New Plymouth).?1 Despite their protests, however, members I ! I were not prepared to vote against the bill and make it 'contested legislation' that would have to

be thrown out of the House. The bill was passed on 9 August, and with the 'native question'

safely taken care of for the time being, the government could go to the country and fight an

election that had more to do with personalities, economics and class issues than with racial

ones.

The new session of parliament opened on 24 September 1879 but it was the end of October

before the confusion of the 1879 election and the motions of no confidence were finally dealt

with. John Hall was left as leader of a 'Conservative Government now compelled to be

Liberal' with Whitaker, Atkinson, Rolleston and Bryce in his cabinet.72 In the governor's

speech which opened parliament it was stated that steps were being taken 'for the holding of a

70 ibid pp538ff,55lff.

71 ibid p553.

72 Alfred Saunders, History of New Zealand, vol II, Christchurch, 1899, pp391, 407-18. 118 full inquiry into the existence and extent of all the alleged unfulfilied promises in regard to lands', and the new native minister agreed that 'for the sake of our own reputation abroad and in the colony' an enquiry should be held as he believed there probably were some grievances 'of one kind or another' on the west coast. But he declared that there were

'probably no grievances to speak of on the Waimate plains proper and no mere adjustment of reserves would settle the difficulties that had arisen there. The real trouble, he claimed, was that almost all the Maori on the west coast were 'deeply infatuated with the belief that Te Whiti holds supernatural powers, and that he will recover not only the reserves, but also the Plains, and everything else'. Bryce told the House that he aimed to improve the Native Department

'out of existence' and to give the Land Purchase Department special attention in order to promote the settlement of the country. He thought 'the greatest facilities ... should be given to the Maoris for surveying the boundaries of their land' - not to enable them to settle it themselves, but to facilitate alienation.73

Things on the west coast were quiet. The ploughing had ceased at the end of August and the local tribes were believed 'to be quietly awaiting the action of the Parliament and of the ordinary Courts of law' - a view perhaps based on the actions of a committee of nine prominent chiefs, led by H.K.Taiaroa, MLC, who wished to test in the Supreme Court the validity of the acts under which the land had been confiscated.74 On 19 December the

Confiscated Lands Inquiry and Maori Prisoners' Trials Act was passed into law. This was the first of the curious double-barrelled pieces of legislation passed to deal with the 'Parihaka question'. It provided for 'Inquiry into alleged Grievances of Aboriginal Natives in relation to certain Lands taken by the Crown' (those between the White Cliffs and the Waitotara) and it enabled the governor in Council to 'Postpone the Trials of certain Prisoners who have been committed for Trial for alleged Offences concerning such Lands'. The second part of the act

73 NZPD 1879 xxxii pp4, 358-59.

74 ibid p4; Panui 26 Aug 1879, MA 24(20. 119

repeated the provisions of the earlier Maori Prisoners' Trials Act which had now lapsed, and it

was to remain in force until '60 days after the commencement of the next session of

Parliament'. The act was passed just in time; there was to have been a special sitting of the

Supreme Court in Wellington just before the end of the year. The ploughmen could now be

legally held without trial until about the following August when another bill could be

introduced to further delay trials which the government really had no intention of holding}5

In moving the second reading of the bill on 2 December Bryce explained that he did not attach

much importance to the idea of enquiring into Maori grievances. Indeed he was not really

convinced that there were any unfulfilled promises to enquire into and he had little to say about

the bill because he 'held that it was inexpedient to discuss these matters in detail'; Magna Carta

and habeas corpus were 'mere legal technicalities', 'mere form[s] of English law' for lawyers

not statesmen to fall backon. There were however two points Bryce wished to clarify: there

was no intention in passing the bill to provide for any enquiry into 'the validity of the act of

confiscation'; and no one should imagine that the ploughing had anything to do with the

Maori 'asserting their legal right to the land'}6 Some members however described the bill "as i 'legislation of a very dangerous and unprecedented character' and a means capable of 'grossly ( oppressing the Maoris because we happen to be a little afraid of them'. Several expressed the I , I view that if the Maori had committed a crime they should be brought to trial and if they had not they should be released forthwith. They questioned the double standards whereby the

Maori could be treated in a manner that would cause an outcry if applied to Europeans.

Sheehan admitted that there were many unfulfilled promises and that the west coast people had

grievances enough to justify all they had done, yet he declared he would vote for the bill since r------

75 Bryce had threatened the House with his resignation by saying he would 'not like to take the responsibilty of remaining in office' if they decreed that the trials were to be held as scheduled; NZPD 1879 xxxii p798.

76 NZPD 1879 xxxiv pp621 ,796,797. 120 it was in the best possible interests of the natives to be kept in 'mild confinement' till the government had a chance to 'settle the question'.?7

The bill inspired less discussion, less emotional debate than its predecessor had done. Members were prepared to accept the view of the 'experts' that but for such a bill there would be war on the west coast. They were also consoled by the promise of a commission to enquire into 'alleged promises and grievances'. But Whitmore pre-empted the commission's findings by declaring that the commissioners should be chosen from 'competent and independent gentlemen' whose deliberations would show that although the government may have been for fifteen or sixteen years 'very negligent in issuing Crown grants and so on' it had not actually 'done any substantial injustice whatever'}8 Francis had a more lively sense of justice: he reminded the Council that while the proclamation of 1865 confiscated 'the land of those in rebellion' it not only 'did not' confiscate the land of those who remained loyal, it conserved their rights and made the express promise to them that their land should not be taken'. Clearly, he said, these promises had not been kept and they were 'absolute promises, whose fulfilment some day was a necessity on the part of the Government', no matter what the cost.79

o~;..::.2:.:0::...:J:.:a=n=u=ary:.:L..:l:..:8::..:8:.:::0~th::e.:....!2g::::.ov..:..:e::.rn.::.o;::::r:.!., ..=S::;;:ir:...;:H:,::e=f.:.cu=.:l:.:e:.s :,:R::::o.:bl:· n::so:n::,:..:a~p::po.:i::n::ted:::.....:.W.:..:i:::lli:::· am=.::;.F~o:!.:x1-" F~r~an=cis Dillon Bell and Hone Mohi Tawhai, member for Northern Maori, commissioners under the r act.-- Their commission required them 'to inquire into, examine and report upon' claims brought before them or initiated by themselves relating to promises made or 'alleged to have been made' by the government regarding lands between the White Cliffs and the Waitotara river confiscated under the 1863 act or amending acts. All evidence given before the

77 ibid pp621,793.

78 ibid p863.

79 ibid pp864-65. 121

commissioners was to be 'fully and fairly taken down and transcribed in writing' and if

necessary accompanied by a 'full and accurate translation ... duly verified as correct.80 Any

two of the commissioners could, acting together, exercise the powers of the commission and

their written report was to be presented within four calendar months from that date.81 The

west coast tribes were notified of the commission by a proclamation also dated 20 January

1880, which informed them that those with 'claims and grievances' were to bring them before

the commissioners. Should they neglect the opportunity to do so, the blame would rest with

them and not with the government.82 Despite the promises of the acts and proclamations of

confiscation that loyal natives should retain their land, they were now obliged to come before

the commissioners in order to have these promises fulfilled.83

On 23 December 1879 the governor had issued a proclamation ordering that all those

committed for trial under the Confiscated Lands Inquiry and Maori Prisoners' Trials Act and

held in Mt Cook prison, be tried in the Supreme Court in Wellington on 5 April 1880.84 Early

in the new year, however, these prisoners were quietly transferred from Mt Cook prison and

shipped to gaols in Dunedin and . Bryce reported their removal 'this a.m. by 6.15

[ I while streets were empty'.85 Many people found this dawn raid disturbing, and in the House Tawhai expressed the opinion that they had been sent to the South Island 'in order that they I I I

80 AJHR 1880 G2 App A ppl-2.

81 The reporting date was later extended. The First Report is dated 15 March, the Second Report 14 July and the Third Report 5 August 1880.

82 AJHR 1880 G2 App A pp2-3.

83 In the event so few Maori appeared before the commissioners that decisions about reserves were made for them in their absence.

84 Gazette 24 Dec 1879.

\1 i \ 85 Bryce to Hall 8 Jan 1880, Hall Mss vol 41. Ninety-one prisoners went to Dunedin, 39 to Hokitika; NZPD 1880 xxxv p229. 122

might be got rid of, and that they might perish there'.86 He had not forgotten the fate of those

30 or so Pakakohe who died during their imprisonment in Otago between 1869 and 1872.

The West Coast Commission held its first sitting at Hawera on 11 February 1880, with just

two commissioners, Fox and Bell, the one connected with the confiscation, the other with the

Waitara purchase. Tawhai had asked to be relieved of his position as a commissioner with

B~ll and Fox, feeling he would be like a 'carthorse with blinkers on, driven by a man with a

whip who pulls the reins which way he pleases'. He described past governments, which had

included Fox and Bell as native ministers, as the 'root of all evil'. He claimed he accepted

office as a commissioner since he had fought neither against the Hauhau nor the Queen, but

when he learned his fellow commissioners were not impartial men but were 'the very men

who had created the trouble on the West Coast' he resigned his appointment87 Neither Hall

nor Fox gave Tawhai the credit for deciding his resignation for himself but put it down to 'the

work of Europeans'. Fox told Bell there was no time to be lost in starting their work as

'Mohi's advisers will be doing all they can to impede us and the less time we give them the i I better'.88 Discussions were held between Fox, Bell, Bryce and others with regard to

Tawhai's replacement on the commission. Katene's name was put forward but Bell was

doubtful about his suitability because of his 'insufficient rank'. Fox could not see that as a

valid objection, but in any case was ready to go on 'either with Bell alone or with another

European added'.89 In the event Tawhai was not replaced and Fox and Bell conducted the j I whole enquiry on their own.

I

I j 86 NZPD 1880 xxxvi p354.

87 NZPD 1880 xxxvi pp293-94.

88 Hall to Bryce and Fox to Bell 28 Jan 1880, Hall Mss vol 41.

11 89 Fox to Hall 31 Jan 1880, Hall Mss vol 41.

11 123

Bryce was sorely put out by the appointment of this commission which he felt would poach on

his special preserve, and was determined that 'Justice to the natives was to go hand in hand

with a thorough determination ... to establish the authority of law upon the Coast'.90 Robinson

explained to the Colonial Office that by this Bryce meant roadmaking and surveying on the

plains would proceed while the commissioners held their enquiries, and if any resistance was

offered the armed constabulary would be ready to march on Parihaka 'in order to destroy that

headquarters of fanaticism and disaffection'. The governor was uneasy about this arrangement

but his advisers were 'strongly of opinion that it is desirable to take action before the turbulent

and ill-affected natives now in prison are released'.91 Fox and Bell had even greater

misgivings than the governor and 'positively refused to act' unless ministers were prepared to

maintain the status quo with regard to claims, reserves and titles until the cOrnrrllssion had held

its enquiry and submitted its report. Ministers compromised: the commissioners went to the

coast in January 1880 to begin visiting the various settlements, and on 29 January Bryce was

permitted to move 'several strong detachments' across the Waingongoro to carry out 'repairs'

to the old coast road across the Waimate plains. But the survey of the disputed land was not to i I be resumed 'for the present'.92

Te Whiti offered no obstruction to the roadmaking. Bryce thought this was because the Maori

recognized it as an assertion of European 'right and power to occupy the Confiscated

territory'. It was anything but that and although Bryce was unable or unwilling to read the

'clear indications'Te Whiti had given, the Commissioners were not so obtuse. They notified

90 UPA report 23 March 1881 of Bryce speech in explanation of his resignation, enclosed in Gordon despatch 23 April 1881, BPP/IUP vol 16 p475.

91 Robinson confidential despatch 29 Dec 1879, G 26/1. .

92 Robinson confidential despatch 31 Jan 1880, ibid. 124 the people gathered at Parihaka for the February hui that they would be sitting at Oeo93 and would be glad to hear anything the Parihaka people had to say. In fact they proposed going to

Parihaka, but this prospect disturbed Hall who told them he hoped they would 'consider once, twice, thrice before accepting the invitation'.94 In the end they did not accept it and they lectured the few Maori who 'embarked on the government canoe' and attended the Oeo sitting on 19 February about listening to Te Whiti's foolish words. The commissioners were empowered to enquire into all promises and engagements, but from the start they 'refused to hear counsel who wished to question the validity of the confiscation'. Fox argued that

'harpies' and 'rogues' put the Maori up to questioning the validity of the confiscation and wrote an eighteen page memo dealing with the commissioners' decision not to listen to such arguments. He justified this decision on the grounds that the 1863 act was not ultra vires, and under English law conquest did not have to be validated by occupation as it would under Maori law. He ended by contending that even if an enquiry were legally due to the Maori, there were no moral considerations which would justify the panic this would cause to innocent settlers who had bought land from the colonial government.95

By mid April Bryce had about 600 armed constabulary and public works men pushing on the roadmaking towards Parihaka. He had expected opposition, especially when the roadmakers crossed the Waiweranui 'the Rubicon of the Parihaka country' at the beginning of the month, but again no opposition was offered.

93 The Commission sat at Oeo, Hawera, Waitara, Patea and New Plymouth between 11 February and 30 March, and in Wellington on 12 May and 3 June. The cO!TImissioners also corresponded with ministers and officials past and present in an effort to get to the bottom of the 'alleged promises'. Stafford suggested 'Wi Tako has '" of all the Maoris the most knowledge as to promises alleged to have oren made by Ministers willi respect to the confiscated lands on the West Coast'; AJHR 1880 G2 App A p18. Wi Tako was not called to give evidence before the commissioners.

94 Hall to Bell 16 Feb 1880, Hall Mss vol 3.

95 AJHR 1880 G2 pxlvii; Fox, 'Notes on the Treaty of Waitangi; The New Zealand Settlements Acts; Proclamations of Confiscation etc', undated but enclosed with Hall memo to governor 14 Feb 1881, G 17/8. 125

On 15 March 1880 the west coast commissioners issued an interim report which stated

unequivocally that the question of reserves was basic to the settlement of the west coast

difficulty and that nothing should have been done or must now be done until adequate reserves

were marked out on the ground for both the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki people. They

recommended an immediate start be made to delineate a 'broad continuous belt of reserve' of

about 25,000 acres on the Waimate plains between the Oeo and Waingongoro rivers,

enclosing all the settlements and cultivations of the Ngatiruanui people. This reserve would be

inalienable 'so long as the Natives live there in peace'. The commissioners advised that control

of the whole reserve should remain in the government's hands until such time as the forest

I i was cut back from the various settlements, leaving the inhabitants no escape route into the i bush and giving Europeans the 'strategical command of the whole coast'. The commissioners'

second main recommendation was to set apart for the Parihaka people 20,000-25,000 acres of

I i their own tribal land 'so long as they live there in peace'. The commissioners took pains to ! I i point out that like it or not it was imperative to provide reserves for the Parihaka people: they

'are there, and they must have land to live upon; and, what is more, being there, they certainly

will not go away'. It was obvious to the commissioners that the question of the plains and that

of Parihaka were inseparable; that if an attempt were made to occupy the plains without Te

Whiti being assured that he was safe at Parihaka then it would be found that they could 'get

neither Parihaka nor the Plains except a~ the price of a struggle which no one can doubt would

then be desperate'.96

The report received a mixed reception. Hall 'substantially' agreed to the recommendations of

the commissioners and wanted immediate steps taken to carry them out as far as was possible I under existing legislation. Atkinson agreed that 'the question must be dealt with as a whole' and thought 'ample reserves as ample as you like so long as other Natives are not made I

. I 96 West Coast Commission First Report, AJHR 1880 G2 ppv-x. 126 jealous' should be assigned immediately to Te Whiti and his people.97 Bryce procrastinated and when Hall urged him to make a start on the reserves he decided to begin not with reserves for the disaffected, but with those for Hone Pihama. In addition Bryce wanted more roadmaking, around Norman by . 'This will be enough surveying for present and in my opinion there will be risk of stoppage or worse ... .!t will not do to be hurried into scattering more survey parties over the country than are necessary to shew that we are going steadily on.' Bryce was not happy about the commission and its work and was determined to go his own way for he had persuaded himself that the problem he was up against 'comprised mental conditions', that the question of reserves was but 'a small matter in Te Whiti's eyes' and that the question of the confiscation 'held a very subordinate place in his mind'.98

Soon after the report was issued it was decided Parris should superintend the laying out of reserves as recommended by the commissioners. He was also sent to Parihaka to inform Te

Whiti about the conclusions they had reached. According to Thompson he received a warm welcome there, but as an individual, an old friend returning after a long absence, not as an official of the government or a representative of the commissioners.99 Parris simply said the people were 'civil and cheerful', busy with their crops, with no thought of fighting, and the only hostility he encountered was from Te Whiti who was 'vexed and sullen' so that it was

'impossible to reason with him'. Parris decided Te Whiti was put out because the commissioners had not gone to Parihaka although they had had discussions with

Titokowaru.100

97 Hall to Bryce and Hall to Fox 2 April 1880, Hall to Atkinson 3 April 1880, Hall Mss vol 4; Atkinson to commissioners 18 March 1880, G.H. Scholefield, ed, The Richmond-Atkinson Papers, vol II, Wellington, 1960, p476.

98 John Bryce, 'Fanaticism in the Maori Race', Press 23 March 1903.

99 Hall to Fox 26 March 1880, Hall Mss vol 4; Thompson to Roberts 30 April 1880, LE 1/1879/3.

100 Atkinson to HallS April 1880 quoting Parris telegram, Scholefield R-A Papers p477. 127

The roadmaking and surveying continued without interruption through April, and Parris reported that the seaward boundary of the continuous reserve would be cut by the end of the month. Te Whiti would not cooperate with the government but neither would he offer active opposition. Charles Brown thought he was 'at the pinnacle of his power' and that any day might see the collapse of his influence.101 Bryce was so pleased with the success of his operations that he told the governor matters on the west coast were at last 'in a fair way of being peacefully and satisfactorily settled', and he too predicted that belief in Te Whiti's supernatural powers would be diminished by the government having falsified all his prophecies. Bryce said the government was almost ready to assign reserves on the plains and would do so when the local people were 'prepared to tacitly acquiesce' in the arrangements, and in any case he intended to recommence the sectional survey which had been 'so rudely interrupted 14 months ago, and sell land on the Plain for immediate European occupation'.102

To Bryce the European settlement of the plains, not the granting of reserves to the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki people was 'the only certain way' to settle the problems on the west coast. The commissioners had issued a very strong w'aming that it was 'dangerously absurd to let a question on which may hang the peace of the country be subordinated as it might be by surveyors to the question of the easiest point at which to ford a stream or make a road'.103

Despite this, the constabulary's roadmakers went ahead and cut fences, crossed cultivations and looted Maori property. At the June hui Te Whiti and Tohu again stressed forbearance: their people must restrain their feelings of vexation at the works of the constabulary and not 'by retaliation ... cause a war'. The constabulary officers gave 'stringent' orders to their men but

101 Robinson confidential despatch 24 April 1880, G 26/1; Brown report 18 May 1880, AJHR 1880 G4 p17.

102 Bryce memo 21 May 1880, enclosed in Robinson confidential despatch 22 May 1880, G 26/1.

103 First Report 15 March 1880, AJHR 1880 G2 pvii. 128

this 'failed to restrain the looting propensities of some who... are sufficiently numerous to

bring discredit on their more orderly comrades'.l04

The new session of parliament had opened on 28 May and the question of the Maori prisoners

was soon raised. An order in council dated 31 March had postponed the date of trial yet again

from 5 April to 5 July 1880 and on 29 June the government bought more time by having a

further- order in council issued which postponed the trial till 26 July,lOS the day before the act

under which these orders was issued was due to expire. When questions were raised on 17

June about the west coast situation Whitaker, with Bell's backing, declined to discuss the

question 'piecemeal' saying that 'within a few days' they would have the commissioners'

report before them and they would then fully consider the whole matter.106 But before the

report was ever discussed in parliament and just two days after it was issued on 14 July, a

new bill, the Maori Prisoners' Bill, was introduced as a 'temporary measure' to provide for

I the further detention without trial of the ploughmen protestors.107 Despite- the commissioners' report stating as clearly as it could be stated that the west coast tribes had legitimate grievances,

all pretence of bringing the prisoners to trial was now dropped. It was not deemed necessary rr-- ---.. to try them 'with a view to infliction of punishment', but since their release 'would endanger

the peace of the colony, and might lead to insurrection' they were to be kept safely out of the

way while 'measures' were taken on the west coast. All the untried prisoners and those who

had been tried but were still held in prison in consequence of their failure to find sureties to

keep the peace, and whose sentences were about to expire, were by this act (The Maori

Prisoners Act, 1880) deemed to have been lawfully arrested and to be in lawful custody and

104 Thompson to Roberts 19 June 1880, LE 1/1879/3. ,! I , 105 Gazette 1 April and 1 July 1880.

106 NZPD 1880 xxxv pp308-09. The Second Report of the West Coast Commission reviewed the history of European-Maori relations and events on the west coast which had led to the troubles which existed there; AJHR 1880 G2 ppxi-xliv and appendices.

107 NZPD 1880 xxxvi p282ff. 129

could be lawfully detained but could not be discharged, bailed or liberated except by the

governor in Council 'any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding'. The act was to

remain in force only until the end of October, but it could be extended at the governor's

pleasure for three months at a time.

Bryce was anxious to hurry the bill through the House, but it occasioned fierce debate and was

strongly opposed by those who were averse to the suspension of habeas corpus and who

hoped by stonewalling to prevent the passage of new legislation before the old expired and the

prisoners had to be freed. Bryce claimed that his government had made no mistakes on the

coast and their actions had been an unqualified success. The telegraph line was almost

completed, the road making had been uninterrupted, they were about to erect a lighthouse at r ' '\ Cape Egmont, and before long he hoped to see a good deal· of land sold and hundreds of

Europeans settled on the Waimate plains 'thus disposing of the Native difficulty on that coast

for ever'. There was no mention of reserves and no mention of the recommendations of the

West Coast Commission whose report the House had awaited, but had then not discussed,

before bringing in legislation. Te Whiti's people were described as 'the most turbulent and

courageous of the Natives upon the coast' and it was thought to be in the interests of the

colony and of the natives themselves to keep them in prison. Bryce maintained that Te Whiti

was glad to have them there out of the way, that as he was a man of peace and they were

.i ' troublesome, he had sent them to plough to get rid of them. I

Bryce openly admitted that it was 'a mere farce to talk of trying these prisoners for the

offences- with which they were charged'. All provision for trial had been dropped from this bill

and its purpose was simply to enable the government to hold the men in prison as long as was

thought necessary. This admission drew indignant protests from many members. Even those who--- had not demurred at a farce of a bill which pretended prisoners would be tried in due course, said they would not be party to a bill which transgressed Magna Carta and suspended

habeas corpus. But Hall maintained that a trial would be of no 'advantage whatever to the 130

Natives', and that the government was actually making a concession to them 'in dispensing with a trial, and in asking for power to let them go ... the moment we can safely do so, forgiving all that has been done'.1 08

Fox scorned Grey's description of the act as a penal statute, a bill of attainder. As a commissioner, he admitted these men had legitimate grievances; as a politician, he was prepared to pass legislation which would hold them without trial for protesting their grievances. When Reader Wood advised giving the ploughmen the reserves recommended by the commissioners and letting them 'go back to Taranaki to their own peaceful avocations on the land', Atkinson was indignant He declared that Te Whiti was 'in direct communication with heaven' and might at any time have a revelation that it was time to cut everyone's throat; and like Bryce he threatened to resign if the bill was not passed and the prisoners were let loose.109 These scare tactics had somewhat of a hollow ring in 1880, especially after the presentation of the commissioners' second report which gave not the merest hint that there was any danger of an outbreak. But there were enough members who favoured the bill for their various reasons, to pass it by a large majority after several divisions.

Before the bill had passed the House the activities of the roadmakers in Taranaki had provoked a new challenge that brought about a further series of arrests. Undeterred by past experience and heedless of the commissioners' warnings, the roadmakers had once more carried the road through Maori cultivations. Charles Hursthouse, the surveyor and engineer in charge of road construction in Taranaki had been told to 'layout a fIrst class trunk road' and to make it as straight as possible. He found that requirement diffIcult as it would mean cutting through 'a

108 ibid p326.

109 ibid pp291, 295-99, 305,308-09. 131 dense forest', so he took the road through the cultivations instead.1 10 And in early June the armed constabulary, working on Bryce's orders, opened gaps in fences surrounding 'the

Parihaka clearings'. Colonel Roberts telegraphed to Bryce on 9 June to tell him the Parihaka people had repaired the damage, and a week later informed him that his road makers would be making gaps that day in three fences. Parris testified later that two of these fences enclosed a field in which the previous year's crops were stored. For the next fortnight, each time the

Parihaka men repaired the three gaps, the armed constabulary broke the fences down again, till finally Te Whiti sent Te Whetu to ask Roberts to put a gate across the road. Roberts' reply was that the Maori would have to fence the sides of the road. Bell had warned 'from the first' that the roadmakers ought to fence both sides of the road wherever it went though a cultivation, but more than two weeks later the standoff still continued. Each day the constabulary broke down the fence and each day men from Parihaka repaired it. Roberts reported the Maori were willing to put up a swing gate if Bryce would agree to that, but Bryce would only agree to a gate as a temporary measure and insisted the Maori fence the sides of the road. They refused and said they would re-erect the fences as often as they were taken down and that they were doing it only to protect their crops, not to stop the road.1 11

The arrests of the fencers began on 19 July as Te Whiti sent his men, usually four a day, 'to be taken prisoners, without the slightest violence, or even trace of rancour or vindictive feeling' ..

They seemed to rejoice in arrest. Governor Robinson thought they were 'merely acting under the influence of fanaticism, but what Te Whiti's object was could only be conjectured.112 It should not have been too difficult to discern. Even Bryce noticed that no opposition had been made to the construction of the main road; no obstruction had been made to the erection of the

110 Taranaki Herald 24 Sept 1880, report on the trial of the fencers, reprinted in BPP/IUP vol 16 p369.

111 Gordon report 26 Feb 1881. AJHR 1882 A8 p9.

112 AJHR 1880 G2 plxii; Gordon report 26 Feb 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 plO; Taranaki News 24 July 1880; Robinson to Kimberley 14 Dec 1880. AJHR 1883 AS p3. 132

telegraph line; nor to the cutting of the Stratford-Opunake road; nor to the cutting of the front

line of the continuous reserve; nor to the 'picking up' of the old surveys on the Waimate plains.

Yet he insisted that Te Whiti's infatuated followers were suffering 'a mental epidemic' which /1../)

drove them to protest against European authority by blocking the coast road. Robinson

decided maybe Te Whiti aimed at provoking hostilities, 'the Maoris having a superstitious

aversion to drawing fIrst blood'.1 13 I '

it I I Bryce now asked the House to pass a 'purely, temporary measure', as had become necessary I to arrest certain people whom he feared were 'part of an organization which was hostile to the

authority of the Queen'. The Maori Prisoners Detention Bill provided that 'all Natives' arrested ------~------between the White Cliffs and the Waitotara on or after 19 July should 'be deemed to have been

and to be detained' under the provisions of The Maori Prisoners Act, excepting only that in no

case should they be detained beyond the end of October. No offences were mentioned. It was I i I , enough that such a Maori be arrested and this new act would then have the power of ex post

! facto legislation. ! i

Bryce did not get his bill through the House without both discussion and division. The Maori

members objected, and the Speaker 'regretted exceedingly' that once again there had been an

infraction of standing orders in that the bill had not been translated into Maori. Bryce had to

admit that the 'technical offence' of those affected by the bill 'would scarcely subject them to

arrest at all'. Grey labelled the bill a general warrant for the arrest of any Maori for any offence

or for no offence at all. Reader Wood told Fox he was surprised that he would vote for such a

bill when he had just issued a report showing that all these troubles were the fault of successive

governments and could be laid at the feet of the Europeans who had failed to fulfIl the promises

they had made. He said men were dying in prison while parliament went on passing these bills

113 Bryce to governor 13 Aug 1880, BPP/IUP-voI 16 p361; Robinson to Kimberley 14 Dec 1880, AJHR 1883 AS p3. 133

to detain them, but Bryce assured him that only two had died, and only nine could be called old

and feeble; the rest were really a fine robust lot of men. 114

The Maori Prisoners Detention Act became law on 6 August, one day after the commissioners

presented their final report to the government setting out their recommendations for putting an

end to the troubles on the coast The commissioners had two objectives: 'to do justice to the

Natives' and to continue 'English settlement of the country'. They believed that full justice

would be done to the Maori if the government now redeemed the promises made over the years

by successive ministries, especially that those who lived in peace should not be dispossessed

of their land. They said their recommendations differed from the Grey government's intentions

only in that they would retain for the Crown the section of the Parihaka block between the new

road and the coast - which just happened to be the area of best arable land - but return the rest

of the block to Te Whiti and his people. The commissioners were clearly of the view that no \ I - ~ act ofTe Whiti's between the ploughing in 1879 and the fencing in 1880 could 'fairly be called

hostile' and it it was no less hopeless then than previously to suppose any settlement could be

made except by resort to force, unless it was made with Te WhitL1l5

Bryce's views on how to settle the west coast question were directly opposed to those of the

commissioners. Within two weeks of receipt of their final report he introduced another of his

repressive double-barrelled bills to the House. The aim of the West Coast Settlement (North

Island) Act, 1880 was ostensibly to enable the government to put into effect the ...- recommendations of the West Coast Commissioners.1l6 However, the singular penal clauses ..... enabled the government, at any time during the next three years, to arrest without warrant and ;> ~~ ~ .~ imprison for up to two years, with or without hard labour, anyone committing, or 'reasonably =-

114 NZPD 1880 xxxvii ppI7-26.

115 West Coast Commission Third Report 5 Aug 1880, AJHR 1880 G2 ppxl v-lxiv.

116 NZPD 1880 xxxvii p479ff. 134

suspected' of intending to commit such crimes as interfering with a survey, unlawfully

ploughing or fencing or obstructing a road or assembling for such purpose, or assisting in or

countenancing such acts. The act also provided that those who had been or who might yet be

arrested under the Maori Prisoners Detention Act should be deemed to be arrested and

imprisoned under the Maori Prisoners Act; that is 'prisoners arrested under one Act, shall by

virtue of the provisions of a second, be deemed to be arrested under a third, all passed in one

session of Parliament') 17 The fencers could now be held beyond 31 October 1880 since the

governor had the power to extend the 'temporary' act under which the ploughmen were held.

Bryce's speech introducing the bill made it very clear that justice to the Maori was secondary.

Settlement of the coast was to be the government's flrst priority: they intended to have 'that

Coast settled by European settlers, and it is to that tha.t they look for the healing of the sore

which exists there'. But they would also make some 'concessions' - they would assign

'suitable reserves' and grant them to the Maori as might be found 'expedient and necessary'.

There was no suggestion in his speech of an intention to implement the commissioners'

flndings. Grey insisted that the one thing above all others which would ensure peace on the

I coast was the adoption in total of those flndings, and he suggested they be 'presented to the : I Natives as a charter of rights' and not mixed up with Bryce's penal clauses. Some who had

objected to previous bills made no objection to this one because at least it supposedly provided

for fair trial, but to others the bill was another 'disgrace to the Statute book of New Zealand'

and 'utterly unworthy of Englishmen') 18

By the time the West Coast Settlement (North Island) Act became law on 1 September 1880, i I about 150 fencers had been detained under the Maori Prisoners Detention Act and sent to South Island gaols. On 4 September W.E.Gudgeon of the armed constabulary arrested another 59.

117 Gordon report 26 Feb 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 p8.

118 NZPD 1880 xxxvii pp482-87. 135

They appeared in the District Court in New Plymouth on 23 September before one Judge Shaw

and a jury of twelve settlers, charged with having unlawfully obstructed the free passage of a

thoroughfare. After hearing the evidence and the judge's summing up the jury retired and

deliberated for three-quarters of an hour then announced that they could not agree on their

verdict. The judge then told them that although counsel for the prisoners had stated that

requiring them- 'to obtain sureties to keep the peace might practically mean to imprison them for

life', he could sentence them 'to only one hour's imprisonment' and bind them over to keep the

peace for 'only a nominal time'. He then impressed upon them 'the serious miscarriage of

justice' that would arise if the jury could not reach a verdict and warned them that if they coulq

not agree within an hour he should be compelled to lock them up for the nig,ht. After 'a few - ( minutes' deliberation' they brought down a verdict of guilty. His Honour pronounced

sentence: two years imprisonment with hard labour in the common gaol in Lyttelton and a

requirement for each to find one surety of £50 to keep the peace for six months.1 19

The fencing went on unabated, but with 216 fencers held in South Island gaols and the cost of

maintaining them in 'great comfort' bearing so heavily upon the government, there were no I more arrests. When the fencers appeared as usual on 12 November, instead of making solid I ! fences across the gaps they erected slip rails which would keep stock out of their wheat I, paddocks but which could easily be moved to allow free passage of the road. Bryce allowed

the slip rails to remain. The fencing emergency was over.

j ! In October, while the fencing continued and the Maori were 'carefully avoiding arrest', Bryce

thought it a good opportunity to begin releasing some of the first ploughmen arrested. Wi

Kingi Matakatea was among the prisoners selected for release. On 4 October 1880, his friend

John Bryce wrote him a letter of explanation about the government's motives and actions.

Matakatea, who was arrested on 14 July 1879, had been imprisoned in Dunedin since January i I I 119 Taranaki Herald 23,24 and 25 Sept 1880, enclosed with Prendergast despatch 9 Oct 1880, BPP/IUP vol 16 pp366-75. 136

1880 and was now being released so he would see the truth of the governor's words 'that he

did not wish to ... retain the prisoners longer than was necessary in the interests of both races'.

Bryce went on to tell him the government had, as promised, appointed a commission to enquire

into 'the discontent of the natives' and was now prepared to set aside 'Large and ample pieces

of land ... for those natives who desire that trouble should cease'. They also wished to release

all the prisoners and would do so if, on the return of this first party, 'the natives accept the

proposals now made to them'. Bryce sent Matakatea copies oflaws and proclamations to do

with the West Coast Commission and instructed him to assist the government 'to cause the

confusion to cease, and to promote the real interests' of his people.120

While the government studiously avoided direct contact with Te Whiti they always assumed he

was kept fully informed of all that went on and that he knew what they wanted him to know:

They published notices in the Gazette and kept the English language press supplied With

information; their officers 'frequently met natives' to whom they explained policies or dropped

hints they were sure 'would be reported to Parihaka'; and they met with or wrote to other

chiefs, especially loyal ones like Pihama who was 'in touch with Te Whiti'.l21 So it was

frequently claimed that Te Whiti was 'aware'; aware of proclamations, aware of acts of

parliament (even when they had not been translated for the Maori members), aware of

proceedings in the House, aware of the contents of reports - and especially aware of the

government's 'intentions' to make reserves. But in late September 1880 Te Whiti told a

) ! European visitor that he would be interested to know about the commissioners and their work

and would like to see a copy of their report. This surprised Fox as he had 'heard of at least

three copies being sent through different channels by which it was believed they would reach

I, i Parihaka'; and it annoyed him because the commissioners had several times pressed on the

government the importance of having an abstract of their report 'translated in Maori and

120 Bryce to Matakatea 4 Oct 1880, AJHR 1881 G7 pp4-5.

) I I 121 See e.g. Hall to Gordon 22 Dec 1880, AJHR 1881 Al p21; Parris report 15 May 1882, AJHR 1882 Gl plO.

i I ! 137

circulated not only at Parihaka but everywhere'.122 Hall assured Fox several attempts had

been made 'to communicate to Te Whiti all that has been done and is proposed to be done

towards a settlement of the West Coast question'; but as a consequence of Fox's complaint

they had despatched Parris to Parihaka to explain every thing. 123 But it seemed that Parris had

not done his work thoroughly and would have to be sent again. Despite this, the government

were determined on the immediate sale of 'another slice of the Plains and as much of the Forest

behind them as is ready for sale'. They also proposed to commence surveying 'under Te

Whiti's nose', at once. 'If we were not spending £600 a day on our armed force we could

afford to go more gradually to work. '124 For reasons of financial expediency Hall was

listening to Bryce and ignoring his commissioners' repeated warnings. Fox renewed the

II- warnings: when the Parihaka block was survt?'ed care must be taken to see that reserves were

defined before any land was surveyed for sale and the Maori must be informed exactly what

their reserves were to be.l25

A new governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, arrived in New Zealand from Fiji at the end of

1880, and one of his first duties was to appoint a commission to give effect to the 1880 West

I I Coast Settlement Act. The government had offered the commission to Fox and Bell but then I I decided to send Bell to London as agent general to succeed Julius Vogel, and Fox was left

( : alone to go on with the work on the west coast as sole commissioner. The new commission

issued on 23 December 1880 empowered Fox to allocate the long delayed awards of the

Compensation Court and to define reserves 'in satisfaction of all promises or engagements

made by or on behalf of Her Majesty or the Government... which have formed the subject of

I : ( , 122 Fox to Hall 30 Sept 1880, Hall Mss vol 39. i 123 I i Hall to Fox 18 Oct 1880, ibid vol 5. (

124 Hall to Bell 2 Nov 1880, ibid; Hall to Gordon 22 Dec 1880, AJHR 1881 Al p21.

125 Fox to Hall 6 Nov 1880, Hall Mss vol 39. 138

inquiry' by the west coast commissioners.126 Fox, with Bell's help, had drawn up a

'description ... of the scope and extent of the powers' which should be given to the new

commission. But Hall was still afraid it would not be plain sailing on the coast, and he told Bell

on the eve of his departure that the ministry hoped what had already been done there would

have 'brought matters to a~; that Te Whiti would have either given in or resisted .... But he

is either too cunning or too well advised: he contents himself with a fmancial warfare. He can

afford to wait any length of time while we cannot'.127 Bryce continued to agitate for more

'active measures' to be taken against Te Whiti. There was some short lived opposition to the

survey about that time and Bryce declared he would stand no nonsense; the culprits men,

women or children, would be arrested. He was also prepared 'to go one step further' and

although the Cabinet was not, was prepared for this move, which 'unquestionably

means a march to Parihaka... where we may lay hands on the prophet himself and certainly

will, if we can, apprehend Hiroki for murder'.1 28

In December the ministry received a letter from the Colonial Office enclosing a request to that

office from Charles Bradlaugh, a member of the British parliament, for some action on behalf

of the Maori prisoners 'unjustly detained... without trial'. Secretary of State Kimberley thought

he had not been informed so fully as he would have wished of the circumstances which had led

to the passing of the Maori Prisoners Act, and asked that he be furnished with 'a full report

respecting the Native disturbances of 1879 and 1880, and the measures taken by the

Government of New Zealand in consequence of them'. Gordon promised Kimberley he would

126 AlHR 1881 05 p7.

127 Hall to Bell 12 Dec 1880, Hall Mss vol 5. I ' 128 Bryce to Hall 11 and 24 Nov 1880, Hall Mss vol 41; New Zealand Herald 24 Nov 1880. 139 write a full report as soon as he could procure the requisite data which was not in some cases

'altogether easy to obtain'.l29

The government reacted swiftly and very self-righteously to the question of their handling of west coast affairs being raised in the British parliament Most of the papers they supplied for

Kimberley's edification were simply duplicates of ones previously sent, but Rolleston and

Bryce wrote accompanying memos. Bryce admitted Te Whiti had never 'taken any personal part in active warfare' but had always preached peace and that his influence over the Maori was largely due to this, yet he attempted to justify his stance and his repressive legislation by portraying Te Whirl as a madman who convinced his followers to have faith in him as a great prophet or god. Te Whirl's followers, he said, not only had faith in him, they feared him and his 'associate' Tohu, with a fear 'far exceeding in its intensity the ordinary fear of death'. This

'horrible dread of being makutued' was an ever present fear and caused them to 'adhere to Te

Whiti and obey him'; they dared not do otherwise because of 'what we should call the "evil eye" of their chief. Instances had occurred, he said, where the disapproval of Te Whirl and

Tohu had apparently, and Bryce thought really, 'caused the death of individuals, probably by force of imagination, possibly by more tangible means'.l30 Gordon knew what he was doing when he decided to prepare his own report for the Colonial Office. If he needed alerting to the local situation, Bryce's extravagant phraseology would have been sufficient warning. In a confidential despatch to Kimberley he said he could not 'wholly concur' in Bryce's conclusions and thought 'some of the facts ... not altogether accurately stated'.131

129 Kimberley to administrator 22 Oct 1880, AJHR 1881 G7 ppl-2; Gordon to Kimberley 29 Dec 1880, ibid p2.

130 Rolleston memo 24 Dec 1880, ibid pp2-4; Bryce memo 20 Dec 1880, ibid, ppS-8.

131 Gordon confidential despatch 31 Dec 1880, G 26/1. 140

The Cabinet, wary of Bryce's fanaticism, and with an eye to Kimberley's expressed interest in their doings, told the governor they were willing to try any 'reasonable means for arriving at a satisfactory settlement' of the west coast difficulties (except actually making the promised reserves). They sent Gordon a draft of a letter they wished him to write to Te Whiti inviting him to meet the governor in Wellington or New Plymouth - or any place other than Parihaka.

They also suggested that Te Whiti write out his complaints and send them to the governor in advance.132 The governor entrusted his letter to his aide de camp, Captain L.F.Knollys, but unfortunately he agreed to his being accompanied by Hone Pihama and by Charles

Hursthouse, the 'engineer in charge of road construction on the confiscated land' - he who had taken the road through the Parihaka cultivations and sparked the fencing dispute. On Christmas

Day 1880 they went to Parihaka where Pihama proffered the governor's letter and Hursthouse attempted to explain it. Te Whiti was not interested. It was simply one more piece of Pakeha paper delivered by government functionaries. The governor had not come to Parihaka but had just sent a subordinate 'in stripes, like a soldier'.133 When asked if there was any message for the governor, the reply was that there was nothing. The government party withdrew,. but

KnoUys sent his companions back to Parihaka next day and then determined to return himself.

On this second visit Te Whiti was civil and hospitable. 'He spoke again about Mr Hursthouse being concerned in the wrong, and so being a man he could not talk to about it'; if the governor wished to know more he must go to Parihaka himself. In the end this governor was like other governors: 'a Governor for the white man'.

Although Knollys' mission was a failure, his report was valuable. It highlighted the positive things about the Parihaka situation - the extensive acreage of well tended crops, the comfortably housed and well nourished people, the total lack of fortifications - and suggested that it would be better to spend time coming to an agreement with Te Whiti rather than money

132 Gordon despatch 31 Dec 1880, enclosing Hall memo 22 Dec 1880 and draft letter, AJHR 1881 Al pp20-22.

133 Rolleston diary 2 Oct 1881. 141

on fighting him.l34 This information put the govemor~ in a stronger position than before

Knollys' visit to Parihaka, but he was not 'without apprehension' that an idea was entertained

of arresting Te Whiti.135

The idea was entertained very strongly by Bryce, who had first urged it in September 1880 in

the interregnum between Robinson's departure and Gordon's arrival while the pliant chief

justice, James Prendergast, was administrator. Knollys' mission to Te Whiti was the last straw

for Bryce who believed 'the idea of negotiating with Te Whiti to be perfectly preposterous',136

and he now urged a 'vigorous course' on the Cabinet again, before Knollys' mission was even

complete. He was told there was still some hope for negotiations and it would be unwise to

interfere, but a week later the stresses and strains in Cabinet became public when Bryce once

more tendered his resignation. He had in fact written his letter a month before, but at

Atkinson's request held it back until Cabinet could discuss his proposal 'in reference to the

capture of Hiroki and possibly of Te Whiti and Tohu'.137 The government was more anxious

for the moment about defending its good name in the British parliament than it was about

marching on Parihaka. It would actually strengthen Cabinet's hand now to let Bryce resign and ir ,' they carefully drafted a press release saying Bryce had resigned because of the 'refusal of I ! Cabinet to agree to the immediate adoption of active measures with regard to Parihaka'.

Gordon thought that although Bryce had not succeeded in his 'attempt to engage the

Government in hostilities' he had in fact come close to succeeding, that his views had

134 Knollys to Gordon 31 Dec 1880, AJHR 1881 Al pp23-26.

135 Gordon confidential despatch 31 Dec 1880, G 26/1.

136 BPP/IUP vol 16 p477.

137 Hall to Bryce 29 Dec 1880, Hall Mss volS; Bryce to Hall 8 Jan 1881 enclosing letter of S Dec 1880, ibid vol 41. 142

'narrowly escaped acceptance' and that 'a renewal of similar proposals at a future day' was not improbable. 138

Gordon sent Kimberley a despatch containing a cutting from the New Zealand Herald of 12

January which was said to be Bryce's own explanation of his resignation. It was very close to the official explanation but also surmised that 'in the influence of Sir William Fox in native affairs Mr Bryce has seen a shadow behind the throne'.139 Bryce meanwhile delivered his own explanation for his retirement from the ministry in a speech given at Wanganui on 23 March

1881 in which he prophesied that the plan he had devised for dealing with Te Whiti would still have to be carried out. He could justify all he had done on the coast and claimed success for all his plans: 'I moved the armed constabulary across the Waingongoro.... I made roads... I completed the telegraph line .. .! caused the lighthouse to be begun .. .! falsified all his predictions and put the camp within two miles of Parihaka, and the law was vindicated'. But then he was frustrated by Cabinet.

I ought to have been permitted... to have paid a visit to Te Whiti. I ought to have gone and seen him with such a force at my back as would have commanded respect. .. and I ought to have said then to Te Whiti .... "Either the Queen or you must prevail, and I must see the authority of law shall from this time forth prevail at Parihaka" ... .I would have told him that he could no longer be permitted to harbour criminals.... that there was one murderer there who must be arrested, and that I had come to arrest him.... There would have been no necessity for the arrest of Te Whiti himself, except. .. that it would have been the one thing necessary to destroy his prestige among the Maoris ... .If he had resisted.. .I should have arrested him, and that, I believe, would have been the best thing which could have happened for the solution of the West Coast difficulty.140

But as he could not get his own way with a Cabinet backed by public opinion and committed to its commissioners and to an attempt at negotiation, he resigned.

138 Undated press cutting attached to Bryce's letter of resignation, Hall Mss vol 41.

139 Gordon to Kimberley 12 Jan 1881, AJHR 1881 Al pp26-27.

140 UPA report 23 March 1881, BPP/IUP vol 16 pp475-76. 143

Gordon meanwhile was continuing his search for information which would enable him to write

the report he had promised the Colonial Office. The new native minister, the reasonable and

much more moderate , was helpful to the governor and placed all the Native

Office papers at his disposal. Gordon wrote his own report and sent it to England, then, when

further papers were presented to him he altered parts of the report and sent an amended version

to Kimberley.141 It was that amended version (still dated 26 February) which was finally

presented to the New Zealand and British parliaments. The Cabinet thought they had

satisfactorily answered the Colonial Office's request for information to supply to Bradlaugh

and did not suppose that Gordon himself would write so detailed and sensitive a report. When

they learned of its existence a storm of controversy erupted and they managed to delay its

presentation in England as well as New Zealand for more than a year.

The government had continued to make a token release of prisoners. By the end of February 56

ploughmen and 23 fencers were free)42 They had all been due for release at the end of

January, but on 7 January Gordon had issued a proclamation to extend for a further three ------months- the Maori Prisoners Act under which the plougbmen were held and the fencers were I ' 'deemed to be held'. He told Kimberley he was prepared to extend the act once more so that it remained in effect until parliament met, but that he would 'experience considerable reluctance in

prolonging its operation after that time')43 The government may have sensed this reluctance;

in April when they formally advised him to extend the act yet again, they also informed him

that 86 prisoners had already been released - five or six of them on account of sickness, and

that they hoped soon to be able to release 'a considerable number' of those still imprisoned.

Gordon extended the act for another three months, but this time told Hall of his reluctance to

141 Gordon report 26 Feb 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 pI; Gordon despatch 21 May 1881, G 25/13.

142 MA 4/31.

143 Gazette 20 Jan 1881; Gordon report 26 Feb 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 P 11. · 144

extend it once parliament was in session 'without previously learning in some manner the

opinion and wishes of the Legislature on this subject'.144

Before Fox had even begun work on his new commission, the survey for sale of the seaward

Parihaka block had been commenced under Te Whiti's nose, and a block of about 5,000 acres

on the coast between Cape Egmont and the Warea river was to go on the market 5efOf(iHheend

of January 1881.145 It was only two months since Fox had reminded Hall that this was a

situation which must be avoided at all costs, and one month since Bell had sailed for England,

yet when Fox began work early in the new year he started not with the Parihaka reserves, but

with those at the opposite end of the confiscated block. Fox had made an abrupt change of

course, and had ceased to press the case for the immediate carrying into effect of his and Bell's

recommendations. It was in the government's interests to ignore Te Whiti, who was a

nuisance financially, but not Titokowaru, who was still deemed to be dangerous. The report

Fox submitted about his work on the coast stressed that 'the cardinal point of the case', the

marking out of the continuous reserve and other smaller reserves on the Waimate plains, had

been accomplished to the satisfaction of 'the chief Titokowaru' with whom Fox had maintained

I i close contact Reserves had been made 'for Hone Pihama, for his hapu Ngatitamaahuroa', and

for Manaia and Patukopa, but there was no mention of the Parihaka block which he had earlier

considered inseparable from the question of the plains.

With Titokowaru appeased, Fox turned his attention southwards, and undertook subdivisional

surveys south of the Waingongoro, where the people were 'more desirous of having their

reserves defined')46 In March he circulated a panui among all the people from Waitotara to

144 Hall to Gordon 6 April 1881 and Gordon despatch 14 April 1881, BPP/IUP vol 16 p474.

145 Lyttelton Times 14 Jan 1881.

146 Fox report 17 June 1881, AJHR 1881 G5 ppl-2; AJHR 1880 G2 pix; Fox report 2 June 1882, AJHR 1882 G5 pI. 145

Paraninihi, explaining the work in which he was engaged. The reserves were to be divided

among the constituent hapu, and each hapu was to name its members so that a crown grant

could be issued in those names. The people were told that when the Waimate plains had been

dealt with the work could continue south of the Waingongoro - but the Taranaki lands were to

be left until last. When the Patukai, Upokomutu and Puketoretore hapu chose to give the names of their people, their crown grants would be issued to them.l47 Fox considered it his 'duty to recommend that ... the name of every Native interested should be inserted in the grant', since

under the Native Land Act grants 'had been made in favour of trustees for the benefit of the rest

of the hapu or tribe, the number of such trustees generally not exceeding ten. These ten had

been in the habit of dealing with these lands - granting leases and otherwise disposing of them - and appropriating the whole of the proceeds, to the infinite disgust and injury of the other parties' .1 48

Fox's panui was one more ultimatum to Te Whiti, delivered second hand Fox and Bell had said 'definite intimation can and should be given to Te Whiti of the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the disputed districts: and he should be invited to concur in that "sharing" of them' with the governor in which he had seemed ready to acquiesce when Mackay visited him. But no one was prepared simply to go to Te Whiti with plans, maps and clear words - as had even been done with Titokowaru, with positive results. Sheehan had at first decided that returning the Parihaka block to Te Whiti would be paying too heavily for his having kept the peace; then he decided that the whole block down to the sea should be returned if Te Whiti continued to keep the peace. Then the commissioners decided to cut the Parihaka people off from their mountain and from the sea, but to return about 25,000 acres to them at once, for they would never get the plains in peace without Te Whiti having an assurance that he was safe at Parihaka. Twelve months later the government had got the plains in peace but Te Whiti had

147 Fox panui March 1881, AJHR 1881 G5 p4.

148 NZPD 1881 xl p729. 146

still not got his assurance. The government had overlooked that recommendation of the

commissioners while accepting the one that said 15,000 acres between Parihaka and the sea, Te

Whiti's best arable land, should at once be made available for settlement; 'at the very doors of

Parihaka, the establishment of English homesteads, and the fencing and cultivation of the land,

will be the surest guarantee of peace'.149

Early in April 1881 Hall reported to Rolleston that he was 'favourable to the release of a further

batch of prisoners', but he had received an unfortunate report from Lyttelton that some of them

had 'lately become very insubordinate'. However, if Parris could be spared from his work

with Fox he should go south 'and make a selection'.150 A month later 161 prisoners, 47 of

them ploughmen and 114 fencers, were landed from the Hinemoa at Opunake, after being

I

[ discharged from prisons in Dunedin, Hokitika and Lyttelton. This left a mere 156 still in

custody.151 On 3 June, Gordon was required to telegraph to the Colonial Office that all the

remaining prisoners were released, but when he opened parliament on 9 June he was obliged to

admit that all the prisoners were not yet free.152 The Taranaki News of 11 June 1881 reported

that 'Another batch of Natives, released political prisoners, were brought up from the South by I I the Government steamer "Hinemoa" on Saturday and landed at Opunake'; and a week later the same paper reported 'The remnant of the Maori prisoners - 37 - were brought up from Hokitika

goal by "Stella" on Wednesday' (15 June). It had taken almost two weeks for theoretical

release to become practical freedom, but the government did release all the prisoners before the

last extension to the Maori Prisoners Act expired.

149 AJHR 1880 G2 plviii.

150 Hall to Rolleston 8 April 1881, Hall Mss vol 6.

·151 Taranaki News 7 May 1881; Gordon despatch 23 May 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 p18.

152 Gordon to secretary of state 3 June 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 pI8; NZPD 1881 xxxviii pI. 147

When Gordon sent the amended version of his 26 February report to Kimberley in May, he

also released it to the premier. The ministers were not pleased, feeling it would 'convey a

wrong impression', and Hall sent Kimberley an 'explanatory' memo which was misleading

and quite at variance in many vital details with written reports presented over the years, printed

and published and long since sent to the Colonial Office, and indeed at variance with many

facts presented in the reports of the west coast commissioners.153 Gordon assured Hall that he

did not intend to enter into controversy with his ministers. He felt his report was 'judiciously

impartial' and could see no reason to alter or modify his conclusions. But Gordon's ministers

were afraid the publication of his view of events would 'injuriously interfere' with the

settlement of the west coast difficulties. They did not intend to lay the despatch before the New

Zealand parliament and they had Gordon telegraph the Colonial Office to ask that its publication

in England be delayed as long as possible.154

Fox meanwhile had allowed the survey of the seaward side of the Parihaka block to be

continued. In a later memo he explained that the government had, 'in a spirit of wise [ ) forbearance', given Te Whiti 'full time to consider his position and... avail himself of the

( opening afforded by the governor's invitation'. But once more Te Whiti was required to accept words, not reserves, and lest he reject their words yet again, the government had prepared the [, way for a full scale invasion of Parihaka by completing 'several miles of road'.155 But still Te

Whiti and his allegedly warlike followers had remained peaceful, and the survey for sale had

gone ahead unopposed. Then in July he sent his men once more to assert their mana whenua.

They began enclosing various old cultivations on their ancestral land seaward of the road and

prepared the ground for planting. Parris was sent to tell them this land was 'not set aside for

153 Hall to Bell 18 May 1881, Hall Mss vol 28; Hall memo 19 May and 15 June 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 pp12-1S.

154 Gordon to Hall 12 July 1881, AJHR 1882 A8 pplS-16; Gordon despatch 16 July 1881, ibid ppI6-17; Hall memo 13 July 1881, ibid p16.

155 Fox report 3 June 1884, AJHR 1884 ASb p4. 148

Native occupation', that they were acting illegally and must desist. 156 As the spring advanced

more cultivators appeared. They were warned they were 'trespassing in an illegal manner' and

when they failed to take down their fences a massive force was brought in to deal with the

situation. The armed constabulary men on leave were called back to assist their 150 comrades

at Pungarehu and 50 at Cape Egmont to pull down the fences, and Hursthouse was moved to

Pungarehu to assist Colonel Roberts in preventing the traditional owners of the soil from

'taking possession of Government land'. 157 When the cultivators prevented the constabulary

from collecting firewood on the disputed land Roberts was satisfied that they were determined

on more 'active and serious obstruction' and that there would be a serious disturbance next

time a fence was removed. l58

I \ i In the nine months to 31 December 1880 the armed constabulary in the Patea-Taranaki district

had cost the country £69,000. It had diminished from £9,000 in the month of May 1880 to

£5,000 in November 1880, but could 'be said to be at the rate of £75,000 p.a.'. Te Wheoro

I i (Western Maori) remarked in the House that he thought Europeans in Taranaki with an eye to \ I trade caused rumours of Maori scares to circulate 'for the purpose of getting additional II numbers of constabulary up there'.159 Hall reported to Bell that west coast affairs were 'rather mixed'. They had explained, remonstrated and pulled down fences to no avail but as yet had l stopped short of taking prisoners. Te Whiti was supposed to have said that if they did so he would retaliate; then the order must be 'to Parihaka, quick march', but Hall hoped this might

156 Rolleston memo 24 Oct 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 p4.

157 Parris report 15 May 1882, AJHR 1882 Gl plO.

158 Rolleston memo 24 Oct 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 pp4-5; NZ Constabulary annual reports 31 May 1881, AJHR 1881 H18 p2, and 31 May 1882, AJHR 1882 H14 p2.

159 Hall memo 25 Jan 1881, Hall Mss vol 6; NZPD 1881 xl p793. 149 not come before the session was over.1 60 Despite the promises of the act of confiscation; despite McLean's injunction to the west coast tribes to be strong in cultivating the land and to let their future fighting be with the soil; and despite the solemn promises over the years that old cultivations would be reserved, the Hall government had surveyed and sold the seaward

Parihaka block under Te Whiti's nose, as Hall put it, and no reserves were yet marked out on the ground.

In mid September Gordon left for Fiji for an important land court hearing161 and the chief justice, James Prendergast, assumed the administrator of the government. Gordon was expected to be absent for six or eight weeks and soon after he left Wellington the government introduced a new bill to the House 'to provide for the Administration of Reserves made for

Natives within the Confiscated Territory' on the west coast. Under the West Coast Settlement

Reserves Act, 1881 the reserves 'for the natives' were to be vested in the public trustee who would sell the alienable reserves and lease the inalienable ones, but retain complete control of , their administration, including the right to alter the rules governing their management and leasing and the application and expenditure of the lease money due to the beneficial owners.162

From the rent money that remained when the public trustee had made the appropriate deductions, the beneficiaries would be required to pay a sum towards the support and maintenance of native schools in the neighbourhood of their reserves. The trustee was empowered to lease these Just and ample' reserves in lots of forty suburban or six hundred and forty urban acres to anyone European, on forty two or twenty one year leases. The

160 Hall to Bell 10 Sept 1881, Hall Mss vol 28.

161 Paul Knaplund, 'Sir Arthur Gordon and New Zealand, 1880-1882', Pacific Historical Review 28, 1959, ppI63-64; J. K. Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon. First Lord Stanmore. 1829-1912, Toronto, 1964, pp224, 228.

162 The first amendment to the act came in 1883 and there were another six amendments in the next 10 years. 150

vaunted continuous reserve which was to make the Waimate plains people the richest natives

on the coast, was part of this scheme.

When the bill came before the House there was once more a chorus of complaints that

important bills regarding native affairs were being rushed through the House in the last days of

the session. Asked if the bill had been translated, Rolleston 'presumed' it had since it had

already passed through the Council and he was certain the natives were 'aware' that such a bill

was under consideration. He explained that since the introduction of the West Coast Settlement

Act both inalienable and alienable reserves had been set aside 'for the benefit of the Natives'

and this act would provide for the survey and division of the alienable reserves 'so as to

promote the interest of settlement'.163 The Maori members objected to the fact that control of

the reserves would be in the hands of Europeans and the Maori would have no say in the

matter, and a European member suggested leases be made 'with the consent of the Natives

entitled', as recommended by the commissioners,l64 but neither objection resulted in any

I,r alteration to the bill.

The governor was hardly out of New Zealand's territorial waters before the government

increased the strength of the armed constabulary on the coast. Opunake was reinforced by the

addition of fifty men and on 14 September the House agreed to a vote of £84,000 for

contingent defence.165 On 17 September the half yearly meeting was held at Parihaka. There

are several accounts of it; practically every newspaper in New Zealand reported it, and no two

reports are the same. There were Europeans present and they were as welcome as usual, and

163 NZPD 1881 xl pp695,696,728.

164 ibid pp730,732,735,792; AJHR 1880 G2 plxiii.

165 New Zealand Herald 19 Sept 1881; NZPD 1881 xl p639. 151

the released prisoners came in for special notice. Te Whiti's speech166 might not have attracted

great attention had there not been those who were looking for trouble. Te Whiti had been

provoked by the increase in the armed constabulary and was expected to react. The speeches

were more ambiguous than usual and were interpreted to fit existing preconceptions. The New

Zealand Herald's special correspondent reported that official telegrams transmitting the

speeches placed a 'less formidable construction' on them than the newspapers did, while the

context of the speeches tended 'in a large degree to lessen their apparently menacing nature'.

The speeches were in fact 'thoroughly ambiguous and might mean anything' but the main fear

seemed to be that Te Whiti's influence over his people was waning and he might give them

more freedom to act than before.1 67 A day or two later it was reported that while persistent

efforts were being made in certain quarters 'to work up a Maori scare' there was nothing in it.

In the meeting house at night Te Whiti had 'explained the real meaning' of his speech: he did

not mean to fight and his people must be careful not to bring the anger of the government on

them. He warned them not to give his speeches a literal meaning but to wait until they were

explained to them.168

I ! The House was still in session when reports of the 17 September speeches reached Wellington,

and the Maori members were obviously disturbed at this new Maori scare the press was getting I i i up. Hall sought information of the Maori members and asked if they had heard anything which

gave them grounds for telling the government there was no cause for alarm. Te Wheoro

assured him that if war was a possibility news of it would long since have been passed through

the Maori kin network, and anyway there were Europeans living there and how was it they had

not 'run away and left the district'? Hall thanked the Maori members for their good intentions

and assured them the government was not alarmed, and that they knew perfectly well what was

166 AJHR 1883 A4 pp6-7.

167 New Zealand Herald 19 Sept 1881; Taranaki News 24 Sept 1881.

168 New Zealand Herald 20 Sept 1881. 152 being said and done at Parihaka. Yet the very next day, with only a handful of members left in the House, the government asked for and got a further contingent defence vote of £100,000 'in order that they should be in a position to deal with any difficulty that might arise'.169

Fencing and cultivating on 'European' land in the Parihaka block continued unabated. Te

Whiti's pakanga, the spring planting, was in full swing on land the Maori had had in cultivation the previous year but which had now been sold under their feet, and immediately the

House rose on 22 September the native minister, Rolleston, hastened to the west coast to assess the state of affairs for himself. He soon summed up the situation and decided there would be no cause for alann until the government took 'active measures', as all was quiet around Parihaka - although New Plymouth was in a ferment expecting Te Whiti to invade and burn the town. According to his official report he had, on arrival on the coast, 'at once placed himself in communication with many of the leading Natives in the district' and told them of the government's intentions to meet their wishes 'in respect of particular lands for which they might have any predilection'; and, in typical fashion, he explained 'the general proposals of the

Government and the Commission, to such Natives as would be sure to convey a statement of them to Parihaka'.170 Although Rolleston assured Hall the natives did not wish to fight, the government recruited 200 men for the constabulary and any more they required they intended to get from the various volunteer corps.I71

The Press Association continued to send back alarming reports from 'the front' but Rolleston sent long telegrams commenting pointedly on the 'total absence of any warlike preparations on the part of the Natives'. Neither at Parihaka nor elsewhere was there 'the slightest indication of

169 NZPD 1881 xl pp793,838.

170 Rolleston to Atkinson 23 and 25 Sept 1881, Scholefield R-A Papers pp489,490; Rolleston memo 24 Oct 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 p5.

171 Hall to Bell 1 Oct 1881, Hall Mss vol 28. 153

any intention to fight'. The attitude of the Maori was 'thoroughly pacific and good tempered';

they were unusually busy 'sowing and planting extensively and engrossed in agriculture'. The

Reverend Mr Luxford visited Parihaka and reported that even Te Whiti was away planting

crops, but he saw Tohu who said that native grievances had not been addressed and the people

were complaining bitterly of their good arable land being sold. In Rolleston talked to a couple

working on a surveyed section and asked if they did not realize their illegal fence had been

removed and that section sold. They only knew 'it was a melon clearing for March on their

land' and the woman asked why they could not work together 'instead of playing round the

fences' .1 73

Hall thought it was time some 'misunderstandings were cleared up' so he and Atkinson went to

the coast to talk to Rolleston and Roberts 'to obtain information as to the exact position of

affairs'. There was nothing new, he told Whitaker; statements as to 'the warlike intentions of

the natives' were incorrect. They did not want to fight, but persevered in a course which would

'I make it 'difficult to avoid'. Rolleston was anxious to go into Parihaka and see Te Whiti and

Ii \ although Hall thought nothing would come of the visit except 'proof of our desire for pacific

settlement' he was prepared to agree to the visit 'on the understanding it would be done very

quietly'.174 As a preliminary to his visit Rolleston sent his interpreter, William I I I Riemenschneider, a son of the early missionary at Warea. Te Whiti had known this young man

since he was a child and talked to him very freely. His first concern was about the garbled

versions of his 17 September speech that had appeared in the newspapers and he thought it was

) I in everyone's interests that newspaper correspondents be kept away from his meetings since

they caused mischief by misrepresenting what he said. His pakanga was not a fight, but a

dispute with his only weapon, the tongue, over the cultivations of the ancestors to the seaward

172 New Zealand Herald 27, 28 and 29 Sept 1881.

173 Rolleston diary 30 Sept 1881.

174 Hall to Whitaker 1 Oct 1881, Hall Mss folio 296; Hall to Bell 3 Nov 1881, ibid vol 7. 154

of the Pungarehu road. He again indicated his willingness to share his blanket, saying that on

the Waimate plains and north of Pungarehu 'the land was occupied by the Pakeha who had

built houses and erected fences and there they would remain'. He asked where Fox was and

wanted to know when the government intended giving effect to the commissioners'

recommendations. He had Tohu take Riemenschneider around the cultivations near Parihaka

and when he returned asked him 'if the work of the hoe and the spade' looked as though they

meant mischief. 175

Te Whiti had always preached peace, he had always said there was room for Maori and

European to live side by side, although the government interpreted his claim to land north of

the Waingongoro as a claim to all the confiscated land on the coast. But Te Whiti had been.

prepared to 'share his blanket' to the extent of giving up land from Waitotara to Waingongoro,

and, once reserves had been made for the Ngatiruanui on the Waimate plains, his concern had

been for the seaward Parihaka block. He would not stand by now and see his ancestral lands

invaded, when he had only ever been offered vague promises and had never been offered

definite reserves. Rolleston's report of his visit to Parihaka stated that Te Whiti's concern over

) ! his ancestral cultivations was intransigence and proof of his refusal to share his blanket; he did ,; ,I not mention that Te Whiti was willing to see Europeans settled on those parts of the coast to the

north and south of the Parihaka block which he 'did not care so much for' .176 Rolleston's

interview with Te Whiti was considered to have been 'unsatisfactory' and the native minister l\ ' dutifully followed it up with a threatening letter, warning Te Whiti this was his last chance, that

the illegal fencing which he had sanctioned was wrong, could not be permitted and must be

. stopped, and that his fencers were breaking the law and were liable to punishment)77

175 Rolleston diary 2 Oct 188l.

176 Rolleston report 24 Oct 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 p6.

177 Rolleston to Te Whiti 10 Oct 1881, ibid. 155

As the time of the October hui approached, the military build up intensified. Atkinson was

'strongly inclined' to have Te Whiti arrested at once but Hall, unsure what charge they could

bring against him, preferred to wait till the Maori gave them a good casus belli in the resistance

which he was sure would be offered to their pulling down fences. Meanwhile Hall had called

Bryce to Wellington and proposed he rejoin the Cabinet as native minister. Whitaker advised

Hall that the government's object should now be to satisfy public opinion in both New Zealand

and England that they had no 'reasonable alternative' to the use of force. The only question in

his mind was that of 'the best way of bringing about the inevitable collision'.l78

I ' For all Rolleston's public show of belligerence, privately he was still not convinced of the I justice of the government's stance. He knew there was no warlike intention on the coast and .. - absolutely no preparation for fighting: no defences, no build up of arms, no sign of hostility.

Hall, too, knew the Maori had no warlike intentions, but it was not a message that he or

Whitaker or Atkinson wanted to hear. As long as the settlers continued to talk about the danger,

and the colony to believe it existed, then ministers could justify their actions. Bryce was

disturbed by Rolleston's views which, he said, were totally at variance with those expressed i )

,I publicly by Atkinson and which would have 'a disastrous effect on his election'.l79

The government hoped the October hui would give them an excuse for action in Taranaki, so

they sent Hursthouse, Wellington Carrington and Riemenschneider to Parihaka and had them

make out declarations 'as to the correct translation of Te Whiti's speech as far as they could

note it'. The government could note nothing belligerent in the speech, but neither could they

find any reason for believing that Te Whiti was taking 'a more reasonable view'.l80 They had

178 Han to Whitaker 1 and 14 Oct 1881, Hall Mss folio 296; Whitaker to Hall 15 Oct 1881, ibid vol 41.

179 Bryce to Rolleston 12 Oct 1881, Scholefield R-A Papers pp494-95.

180 Hall memo 19 Oct 1881, AJHR 1882 A8b pI; Rolleslon diary 19 Oct 1881. 156

not found their excuse for action but they suddenly found an urgent need for it two days later

when ministers heard, unofficially, of Gordon's unexpected return from Fiji and of his

imminent arrival in New Zealand. They decided to draw up a proclamation pointing out that I, !' while the offer of reserves had been 'conditional on acceptance by the natives and their peaceful

conduct' the Parihaka people had not accepted the government's offer, but instead Te Whiti had

made a threatening and rebellious speech and his people had fenced European land and resisted

the armed constabulary. If they agreed to accept 'reserves on the conditions attached to them'

the commission would 'sit at or near Parihaka to enquire into their claims and grievances', but

if they did not accept them the government would withdraw its offers and take what land they

thought proper.l81 Te Whiti was now to be given fourteen days in which to agree to the

government's ultimatum or face further confiscation.

Hall did not expect Te Whiti to accept the government's ultimatum and told Fox the

government would, as soon as it had assembled a sufficient force, proceed to pull down the

fences and arrest the fencers, as well as Te Whiti and Tohu if they could 'see a good excuse',

and then 'make, roads straight through the inland Parihaka block and probably sell portions of

it'. Fox thought that since Te Whiti had 'affected not to know what reserves had been intended

to be made for him', they should attach a map to the proclamation showing the reserves 'so that

he may not pretend ignorance'.l82 This was the first and only time it was ever suggested the

reserves 'intended' for Te Whiti be marked on a map and shown to him. The following day the

draft proclamation was drawn up and agreed to by Whitaker - who hoped the Maori could be

brought within English law 'instead of using our venial acts to try them'. At least the

government would then 'stand better in public opinion in England'.l83

181 Hall to Whitaker 17 Oct 1881, Hall Mss folio 296.

182 Hall to Fox 18 Oct 1881, Hall Mss vol 7; Fox to Hall 19 Oct 1881, ibid vol 41.

183 Whitaker to Hall 18 Oct 1881, Hall Mss folio 296.

\ } 157

A meeting of the Executive Council was held at 8 p.m. the next day, 19 October, the

proclamation was signed by Rolleston as his last act as native minister, Bryce was sworn in,

and at 4 a.m. he was on the road. He went only as far as Wanganui; the proclamation did not

reach Parihaka for another three days. But the ministers had won their race against time. At

10.30 p.m., just an hour or so after the Executive Council meeting ended, the Emerald

bringing Gordon home 'post haste' from Fiji, dropped anchor in Wellington harbour. When he

appeared in their midst next morning ministers expressed great surprise to Gordon, but not to

each other. l84 Gordon was furious at the ministry's moves and demanded to know what

changed circumstances had impelled the government to issue 'under the temporary government

of an Administrator' so important a proclamation, and to appoint a new native minister 'when

his own return within twenty-four hours was known to be at least probable, if not well nigh

certain'.185 Gordon had been presented with a fait accompli. He could get neither Bryce nor

the proclamation recalled as it 'had fortunately been brought out in a Gazette Extraordinary on I ! ! the night of the 19th',186 and since it was obvious to him that his ministers had the confidence

of parliament and would be 'supported in their "vigorous" action by nine-tenths of the white

population of the colony' he felt he must comply with such advice as they gave him, or r I ! I resign.187

The proclamation which Bryce carried out of Wellington at 4 a.m. on 20 October berated the

people for the crimes of 'making themselves poor by contributing to useless expenditure upon

feasts'; for neglecting the cultivation of their own lands; for listening to the sound of Te Whiti's

voice which unsettled their minds; for assuming 'a threatening attitude' which caused

184 Hall to Whitaker 20 Oct 1881, ibid; Hall to Bryce 20 Oct 1881, ibid vol 7; Hall to Bell 22 Oct 1881, PM 5/1.

185 Gordon memo 20 Oct 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 pI.

I 186 Hall to Bell 3 Nov 1881, Hall Mss vol 7.

I J 187 Gordon to Colonial Office 31 March 1883, AJHR 1884 Sess II A5 p3.

I

I I. I 158

apprehension among the settlers; and for compelling the government to incur great expense on

the armed constabulary. It exhorted them to leave Te Whiti, and ordered the visitors to go to

their homes. The people were threatened that if they did not, within fourteen days, accept the

'large and ample reserves' it was intended to set aside for them and willingly submit to the law

of the Queen, which must be supreme at Parihaka, the lands 'proffered' them would pass away

from them for ever and they alone would be responsible for this and for 'the great evil which

must fall on them'.1 88

The proclamation appeared to Gordon to give expression to a policy which he deemed

'injudicious'; to contain statements which were 'at least disputable'; and to intimate an intention

which was 'inequitable'. He told Hall that had he been in the colony he would have

'experienced great difficulty' in complying with a recommendation to sign it. Since what was

done could not be undone, and since he could see no prospect of calling 'other Advisers to his

counsels' he felt 'constitutionally bound to give effect to the recommendations of those already I in office, whatever his own opinion as to the morality or justice of the measures suggested by

I 1 them'. So, as volunteers enrolled all over the country, he reluctantly signed a warrant to bring

under military law corps from New Plymouth, Patea, Wanganui, Rangitikei, Nelson, Thames,

Wellington and Wairarapa.189 The government obviously did not expect Te Whiti quietly to

submit to their final ultimatum and they began moving the volunteers to the west coast As

offers came 'pouring in from all parts ... in little more than a week, at very little expense' they

were able to place 1,000 trained and well armed volunteers on the Parihaka block.190

At the same time Hall was seeking legal opinions in Wellington, and of Whitaker in Auckland,

( , as to what charges could be brought against Te Whiti and Tohu when they were finally

188 AJHR 1882 A8b ppl-2.

189 Gordon to Hall 3 Nov 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 pp7-8; Gazette Extraordinary 28 Oct 1881.

190 Hall to Bell 3 Nov 1881, Hall to Fox 1 Nov 1881, Hall Mss vol 7. 159

arrested. He was advised that the Press Association report of their 17 September speeches

contained 'sufficient to justify charges against both of them, of uttering seditious words and

that on information charging use of those words ... warrants would issue' for their arrest.

Whitaker told Hall that one difficulty about a charge of sedition was that 'the language being

Maori the case may break down in translating'.191

Gordon had asked what instructions Bryce had received to regulate his actions on the coast and

was told it had 'not been considered necessary to furnish written instructions' to him, that he

must be given 'a large amount of discretion' and would in special circumstances act 'on his

own responsibility'.l92 Hall later 'jotted down' a few ideas for Bryce, 'for what they are

worth': he should not leave Parihaka once he got there; he should establish a camp, a redoubt if

necessary; he should take possession of all arms and ammunition; he should order all strangers

to their homes and warn them 'that all Natives found out of certain defined localities after a

certain date' would be considered as in anns against the government and treated accordingly; he

should 'clear the whole forest and crop to the Railway and destroy the cultivations at Parihaka'.

And if actual hostilities commenced Bryce would know better than Hall 'how to carry them I ' on'.193

On 3 November, with a military escort and Butler as his interpreter, Bryce reconnoitred the

district towards Parihaka to plan the route for their invasion. They saw that the Parihaka

people had taken down a fence to facilitate the anned constabulary's approach and they

observed all the inhabitants of the village peacefully assembled on the . When the

Europeans were seen nearby, the 'policeman' of Parihaka was sent to invite them into the

191 Hall to Whitaker 27 Oct 1881, Hall Mss folio 296; Whitaker to Hall 28 Oct 1881, ibid.

192 AJHR 1883 A4 p2.

193 Hall to Bryce n.d., Hall Mss vol 7. 160

village. Bryce thanked him and declined the invitation 'but promised to pay them an infonnal

visit on Saturday'.194

The government had assembled an impressive military force to subdue the people at Parihaka.

There were 945 volunteers and 644 anned constabulary, of whom the 109 in A Company were

men specially selected 'on account of their size and strength'. In addition, sufficient anned

constabulary men were left behind to garrison the posts at Rahotu and Pungarehu. The two

columns which marched on Parihaka, the volunteers under Major Pitt, and the anned

constabulary under Major Tuke, carried two days' rations and forty rounds of extra

ammunition and were accompanied by pack horses carrying a further supply of ammunition.

Guards were posted at points where 'the enemy' might threaten communications-and-a-chain-of----~-­

sentries was posted. Major Pitt's 'skinnishers' hastened to occupy the hill tops on the northern

side of Parihaka while the constabulary moved onto the high ground to the west. But before

these formidable military manoeuvres were completed it had became 'apparent that no anned

I ' resistance was intended'.195 1 I

The official reports of the events of 5 November 1881 were exceedingly brief, and not

published for another two years: 'Parihaka occupied by colonial forces this morning. They met

with no resistance, nor was any offered to the arrest ofTe Whiti and others'. This cable was

followed a month later by a brief despatch stating that about fifteen hundred men, women and

children had been arrested, Parihaka 'completely broken up', the Maori population over the

whole district deprived of fireanns, Te Whiti and Tohu 'committed for trial on a charge of

sedition', the 'common criminal' Hiroki arrested, and the old warrior Titokowaru, unable to I ( I find sureties to keep the peace 'imprisoned in default of procuring them'. It was also noted that

'the action taken by the Government undoubtedly meets with the entire approval of the great

194 Reports from corresporidents of the Lyttelton Times, reprinted in BPP/IUP vol 16 pp551, 546.

195 New Zealand Constabulary annual report 31 May 1882, AJHR 1882 H14 p3. 161

majority of the people of the colony'.l96 However the press was ambivalent about the

government's actions. For one thing their reporters had been threatened, and some had even

been arrested, and Bryce had banned them all from the field of operations. Voices were raised

too about the treatment of the prisoners, who six days after their arrest were still confined in the

blockhouse at Pungarehu while no effort had been made to arraign them on any charge.

The arrests and the destruction of the village went on over a period of two or three weeks. By

21 November 1,507 people had been removed from Parihaka under escort, 43 had left

voluntarily, and only six remained in custody: Te Whiti, Tohu, Hiroki, Titokowaru who was

to be charged with uttering threats, Rangi Puahoahoa who was to be charged with obstruction

under the West Coast Settlement Act, and 'Pioto, the thief. The others had all been released

when they reached their home villages.l97 Titokowaru had been arrested on 10 November and

was kept in custody in a whare on 'Fort Rolleston', the hill overlooking the village where the

armed constabulary had installed their six-pounder Armstrong gun. He was still there a week

later, handcuffed and in solitary confinement 'owing to his threatening manner'. Bryce had

made up his mind that Titokowaru and 'many of his paticular hapu wished to fight but

I ! I circumstances were against them'; that 'if bloodshed occurred it would be at Titokowaru's place, near Manaia'.198 He could see good political capital in Titokowaru's arrest and kept him ( I i I, confined, as he was sure the west coast settlers would be 'very glad to hear of his being under

arrest'. Rolleston hoped they might be able to bring a charge of murder 'which would involve

endless remands' rather than a mere 'charge of threatening', and suggested Bryce contact

196 Gordon to secretary of state 5 Nov 1881, AJHR 1883 A4 plO; Gordon despatch 3 Dec 1881, ibid pI!.

197 BPP/IUP vol 16 pp608-10.

198 ibid p603; Bryce to Rolleston 19 Nov 1881, ibid p609; Bryce speech on 25th anniversary of 'Parihaka Day', Chronicle 6 Nov 1906. 162

Whitaker about it since the lawyers in Wellington gave 'very dry law, untempered with any other considerations' .199

As the people were removed from the village their houses were destroyed to discourage their return. Bryce also had the surrounding cultivations destroyed to ensure there would be no attraction for alien tribes at Parihaka, although it was clear to the government that those returning to half abandoned kainga would be short of food. Bryce said he would deal with this problem by offering the dispersed men 'road work at low wages' but he would 'carefully avoid all pampering'. He also intended to institute pass laws by which people whose bullock drays or horses were still at Parihaka would be issued a pass to enable them to return and collect their property and cart back some potatoes 'under strict supervision'.200 In the event many of those whose crops were at Parihaka suffered 'great privation'. According to Parris they gathered fungus and sold it to buy food, and during the autumn fell back on 'indigenous food'; but their prospects through the winter and until the next harvest might have been desperate had they not been allowed to return for their crops at Parihaka.201

On 12 November, Te Whiti, Tohu and Hiroki were removed from Pungarehu at 4 a.m. and driven to New Plymouth gaol, escorted by the Taranaki Mounted Rifles. Later in the morning they appeared at the Resident Magistrate's Court before a magistrate and several justices of the peace. There were two counsel for the Crown, but none for the prisoners. Hiroki was charged with murder and remanded until witnesses were available. Te Whiti, on the information of the government interpreter Hursthouse, was charged with being 'a wicked, malicious, seditious and evil-disposed person' and with

199 Rolleston to Bryce 19 Nov 1881, Rolleston Mss 50.

200 Bryce to RoIIeston 20,21 and 22 Nov 1881, BPP/IUP vol 16 pp609-1O.

201 Parris report 15 May 1882, AJHR 1882 Gl pH. 163

wickedly, maliciously and seditiously contriving and intending to disturb the peace of Her Majesty's subjects, and to incite and move to hatred and dislike of the persons of Her Majesty and the Government, and by inciting numbers of Her Majesty's subjects to insurrections, riots, tumults, and breaches of the peace, and to prevent by force and arms the execution of the laws of this realm, and the preservation of the public peace and on 17th September... did wickedly, unlawfully, and maliciously declare ... the false, wicked, seditious, and inflammatory words following .. .'Naku te whenua. Naku nga tangata. Ko te tino pakanga tenei 0 tenei whakatupuranga.... '202

The case continued for four days and Charles Hursthouse, Wellington Carrington and Charles

Messenger were called to testify as to their knowledge of Te Whiti and his actions and words.

Te Whiti had only one question for Hursthouse: had 'the 25,000 acres reserved by the

Government for the use of the Natives ever been shown to them?' Not, replied Hursthouse,

that he knew of. And when Tohu asked him if he knew 'the division that was made of the land

between the Europeans and the Natives' he affirmed that he did, but that he had not told them

of it.203

On the third day of the trial Te Whiti addressed the court and explained that he and his people

thought there was no land for them, that after the confiscation it all belonged to the government I l i and that since that time they had liv~ on government land. (Kua kiia katoa te whenua rna te

Kawanatanga. Ka noho rnatou ko nga Maori i runga i te whenua 0 te Kawanatanga. Ka noho

mai rnatou i runga i te wahi i rahuitia i te mutunga 0 te patu.) But they had cultivated that land,

not in order to cause strife, but for their wellbeing. It was not his wish that evil should come to

the two peoples. He had never wished that anyone be killed; his wish was that they should all

live happily on the land (engari kia ora katoa tatou ki runga ki te whenua), and this was the way

he had always addressed his Maori people.204 The prisoners were asked to sign their

202 AJLC 1882 N09 p4; Lyttelton Times 14,15 and 16 Nov 1881, reprinted in BPP/IUP vol 16 pp589-95; Rawson, R.M. to minister of justice 26 June 1882, enclosing the Budget 19 Nov 1881, J 1/1882/131l.

203 Rawson to minister of justice 26 June 1882, J 1/1882/1311.

204 AJLC 1882 No9 pp8-9. 164

statements and were then 'committed to the common gaol of New Plymouth, there to be safely

kept untiL.delivered by due course of law'.205

On 23 November, Titokowaru and two other prisoners were taken by the regular coach from

Pungarehu to New Plymouth, with an escort of two armed constabulary men. Two days later

Titokowaru appeared before the court charged with using threatening language. He was

undefended, and he admitted he had chaffed a few Europeans who had offended him, but it

was 'all gammon'. Having considered the evidence, the magistrates ordered him to find two

sureties of £500 each to keep the peace for twelve months and to be kept in the common gaol in

New Plymouth in the meantilIle.206

The trial ofTe Whiti and Tohu was set for 1 May 1882 and the crown prosecutor had told the

government that their case for sedition was weak, that the prosecution might fail and that Te

Whiti and Tohu had 'carefully kept themselves out of the reach' of the West Coast Settlement

Act so could not be brought on an alternative charge of obstruction. Hall hoped Bryce might

know of something that would bring them 'within reach of the law'; he was determined they

I must be detained but hoped the government could do it legally.207 He told Bell, in strictest I ' confidence, that they feared they had no case against Te Whirl 'with Gillies as judge', so they

planned to have the trial adjourned and then ask parliament 'for authority to assign the Prophet

a "residence" for a limited term in some part ofthe Colony where he will be harmless'.208

The government was also considering how it should punish the Parihaka people for failing to

heed the warnings in the 19 October proclamation, and concluded that the continuous reserve

205 Lyttelton Times 16 Nov 1881.

206 BPP/IUP vol 16 pp558-59, 611-13.

207 HaIJ to Bryce 30 Jan 1882, Hall Mss vol 27.

208 Hall to Bell 25 March 1882, ibid vol 8. · 165 on the Waimate plains, the Parihaka reserve and hopefully the Opunake reserve, should each be reduced by 5,000 acres. Fox agreed to the reduction of the first two blocks, but not the

Opunake block and said that although the official papers did not exactly authorize its return to

Matakatea's people, they did recognize it 'very distinctly'. Hall was anxious to 'inflict some punishment' on Ngatihaumiti but thought the government would need special legislation to enable them to 're-confiscate' 5,000 acres and was afraid they could not find any facts to put

before the House which would 'induce it to agree to such a course'.209

Early in 1882 there was further dissension in the Cabinet, largely over Bryce's handling of native affairs, and Hall resigned 'on the grounds of ill health' and was replaced by Whitaker.

But whatever had divided the Cabinet prior to Hall's resignation, it did not include the justice to be accorded Te Whiti and Tohu. On 8 April, a few weeks before the Supreme Court was due to sit in New Plymouth, the government applied for a change of venue for the trial to

Christchurch, on the grounds that it was 'expedient that the trial ... take place at some other

Circuit Court'. They could not count on a conviction in New Plymouth with Gillies on the bench, and they thought it 'absolutely necessary' that Te Whiti 'should at all risks continue in the custody of the Government for some time to come and that his release at this present time would be a grave public calamity'.210 So once the quarterly court sitting in Christchurch was safely past Te Whirl and Tohu were sent there, ostensibly to await the next sitting.

When the court did sit in New Plymouth at the beginning of May it was to hear charges against the prisoners arrested under the West Coast Settlement Act. The judge instructed the jury that for obstruction to be considered a crime under the act it was necessary that 'the order to remove

209 Hall to Bell 29 Dec 1881. ibid vol 7; Hall to Gordon 23 Dec 1881, ibid vol 27; Hall to Bryce 30 Jan 1882. ibid. Fox argued that 'neither in law nor in equity' was reconfiscation of any of the Opunake block justified by the fact that Matakatea had been arrested for 'supposed complicity with Te Whiti's ploughmen' and that many of his hapu were 'sympathizers' with Te Whiti; Fox report 2 June 1882. AJHR 1882 G5 p3.

210 LE 1/1882/150. 166 should be given by a person authorized by the Governor; it would not be sufficient for some

Minister verbally to give such authority'. As Bryce had given the order, the provisions of the act had not been strictly complied with. The government ordered the crown prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi and the judge, discharging the prisoners, expressed his surprise at this

'extraordinary proceeding'.211 At the same sitting of the court Hiroki faced a charge of murder. He pleaded not guilty and evidence was given that there was much disaffection in the district at the time over the confiscation, the survey, and the surveyors' killing the Maori's pigs. Hiroki, particularly, had complained about his pigs being killed.212 He was found gUilty and was hanged on 8 June 1882 at New Plymouth gaol, the government 'having seen no reason to advise His Excellency to restrain the law from taking its ordinary course'.213

When the eighth parliament of New Zealand met on 18 May the governor announced the government's intention to introduce a bill which would both render trial for Te Whiti and Tohu

'unnecessary' and prevent the two chiefs from returning to Parihaka - 'until settlement was so far advanced' as to make their continued resistance to it futile. Te Whiti and Tohu would not be punished, they would simply be lawfully imprisoned without trial, at the governor's pleasure, and if once released would be liable for rearrest and imprisonment at any time, also at the governor's pleasure.214 Bryce introduced two bills to the House: the West Coast Peace

Preservation Bill and the Indemnity Bill. The government described the former as an act empowering the governor to release rather than detain 'certain native Chiefs' awaiting trial for sedition. It also contained a clause which made any group of more than fifty Maori assembling together in public on west coast confiscated lands, which did not disperse when commanded to

211 Gordon despatch 20 May 1882 enclosing cuttings from New Zealand Times 10 May 1882, BPP/IUP vol 16 pp630-31. Titokowaru was discharged under that act but was held for want of sureties to keep the peace.

212 J 1/1882/1183.

213 Gazette 15 June 1882; NZPD 1882 xli p253.

214 NZPD 1882 xli pp5,117. 167

do so, liable to arrest and to imprisonment for twelve months. Bryce moved the second

reading of the bill on 26 May with what Hall described as 'a long speech giving a good history

of West Coast Affairs but no very strong reasons for passing such a Bill'.215 Bryce once more

expressed his antagonism to the west coast commissioners by ridiculing their suggestion that

the Maori had any reason to believe the confiscation had been abandoned, that the non­

definition of reserves had anything to do with the troubles on the west coast or that Te Whiti

had ever shown the slightest inclination to share the land with the Europeans. He did

acknowledge there was 'some doubt' as to whether or not Te Whiti had actually borne anns

against the Europeans and admitted he was 'inclined to think he did not' even though his

followers 'almost to a man had been in rebellion'.216

Later in the debate Bryce countered criticism of his bill by retracting his statement as to Te

Whiti's pacifism and claiming he now had ample evidence to show that if Te Whiti 'did not

take an active part in hostilities he was at any rate engaged in the rebellion'. Bryce's 'proof

I 1 consisted of two letters written in November and December 1862, each 'signed' by several I I chiefs, one of which he said was in Tohu's handwriting, the other in Te Whiti's - although

according to Atkinson the letters and signatures were 'as usual in one handwriting', and one of

the signatures may have read 'Tehu'.217 Bryce overlooked the fact that even ifTe Whiti and

Tohu had signed the letters in question their action would not have come within the provisions

of the New Zealand Settlements Act which referred to acts of rebellion committed after 1

January 1863. The ultimate fate of Bryce's bill was never in doubt, even though the

opposition came from members on both sides of the House who strongly attacked the

government for ignoring the commissioners' reports, denying the Maori justice and now

215 BPP/IUP vol 17 p45; Hall to Bell 17 June 1882, Hall Mss vol 8; NZPD 1882 xli pl07ff.

216 NZPD 1882 xli ppl07-16, 126.

217 ibid pp282-83; Atkinson to Parris 27 and 29 May 1882, Scholefield R-A Papers p5Il. 168 proposing to imprison Te Whiti and Tohu without trial because they feared they could not bring a successful case against them.218

The West Coast Peace Preservation Act was signed into law on 1 July 1882 by Prendergast who was again administering the government, and was followed on 7 August by the Indemnity < Act.. which indemnified those who, in preserving the peace on the west coast, may have adopted measures 'in excess of legal powers'. The only discussion of the bill came at the third reading, ,,-- when it was suggested that some provision be made to compensate the Maori whose property had been destroyed. Bryce advised the House that this would be impossible since the lands on which property had been destroyed were 'lands of the Crown'.219 This was the clearest possible statement that at the time of the sacking of Parihaka no land had been returned to the

Parihaka people.

While their fate was being decided by parliament Te Whiti and Tohu were undergoing a form of 'honourable restraint' in Christchurch and a tour of the South Island designed to 'inform the

Prophet of the power and accomplishment of the Pakeha'. They had been transferred to

Addington gaol on 26 April and assigned as 'warder and interpreter' IohnP. Ward, who had served with Chute, McDonnell and Whitmore on the west coast and had lived long enough in the North Island to gain 'an acquaintance' with the Maori language.220 Te Whiti and Tohu expected to be tried in Christchurch on 6 June 1882, but it was not until 14 June, when the

West Coast Peace Preservation Bill had already passed the House, that Butler, Bryce's secretary, who was also with them, told the two chiefs of the governinent's intentions regarding them: they would not be tried, they would be given 'ample reserves', and if they

218 NZPD 1882 xli pp375-76.

219 ibid p383.

220 See John P. Ward, Wanderings wilh the Maori Prophets Te Whiti and Tohu, Nelson, 1883, for an account of their eleven month stay in the South Island 169

agreed not to hold meetings they would be taken back to Parihaka. Possibly 'other benefits'

were also offered to them, but Te Whiti could not be bought and Butler's proposals fell on deaf

ears. The subject was reopened on 26 June when Butler asked for a definite answer to the

government's terms. If they were accepted, the chiefs would be returned to Parihaka; if not

they would be taken to Nelson and held there as prisoners. Neither promises nor threats had

the least effect Butler tried a third time on 17 July, after a voyage by the government steamer

Stella from Bluff to Nelson yia Fiordland and the West Coast, but with no greater success.

Both Te Whiti and Tohu expected the justice of a trial and when told the government did not

wish to treat them as ordinary men but as gentlemen and chiefs Te Whiti said 'My ears hear a

different talk today to what they did in the past'.221

Butler left the two chiefs in Ward's custody in Nelson and returned to Wellington to tell the

government there was nothing Te Whiti would ask of them or accept from them. On 24 July

Prendergast issued an order in council under the West Coast Peace Preservation Act which

directed 'that John Patrick Ward ... shall keep each of the persons named Te Whiti and Tohu

... in custody within the Provincial District of Nelson until further or other order shall be made

... under the said Act'.222 Bryce intended that no other order should be made until they could

safely be returned to Parihaka - sometime after the 'superabundant' food supplies there had I ! \ dwindled and would no longer support large monthly meetings.223 In the event they remained

in Nelson until the following March.

While the West Coast Preservation Bill was before parliament it was noted that there was no

evidence available to the House to justify the legislation that was being brought down; no

information had been laid on the table of the House referring to any government action on the

221 ibid pp72, 80-81, 112-115.

222 Gazette 3 Aug 1882.

223 Bryce to Whitaker 15 July 1882, G 17/8. 170

west coast since the issuing of the proclamation of 19 October.224 The documents that had

been suppressed had been the subject of controversy between Gordon and his ministers for

some weeks. Gordon had urged publication, while his ministers felt that publication of 'the

whole of the despatches would be prejudicial to the public interest'. Gordon did manage to get

his very able report of 26 February 1881 into print, but by the time it went before the House on

9 June at the end of the second reading of the West Coast Peace Preservation Bill, its relevance

was greatly diminished. Hall's memo of 15 June 1881 which was strongly critical of the 26

February report was printed with it, but the ministers were able to withhold Gordon's reply of

28 December 1881, and a crucial despatch of 3 December 1881 which was too objective a

statement about west coast affairs to be acceptable to ministers. Among other things that

despatch summarized the crimes of Te Whiti and his followers which, according to Rolleston,

had necessitated the issuing of the proclamation of 19 October. These were: interference with

the anned constabulary's woodcutting parties, fencing on disputed land, Te Whiti's 17

September speech which 'conveyed an impression' that he would encourage and condone

violence, Titokowaru's drunken threats, and the unsuccessful termination of Rolleston's

interview with Te Whiti.225

In an effort to get further despatches into print the governor turned to Mante1l226 who agreed to I \ I \ ask for the papers in the Council, and on 14 June moved that there be laid on the table copies of

all public despatches between the governor and the Colonial Office not yet presented to the

House. Whitaker declared that it would be 'inconvenient to the public service' to produce any

further despatches and asked the Council not to pass Mantell's motion.227 The motion was

lost, parliament legislated 'in the dark' and all Gordon could do was point out to the secretary

224 NZPD 1882 xli pp119. 378. 563.

225 AJHR 1882 A8 pp12-15; AJHR 1883 A4 pp12-18.

226 Gordon to Mantell 10 and 14 June 1882. Mantell Mss 287.

227 NZPD 1882 xli pp428-29. 171

of state the colonial government's selective policy with regard to the publication of his

despatches, and ask that if any documents be presented to the British parliament they include

those suppressed in New Zealand.228 Kimberley had until then been no more accommodating

than Hall and Whitaker. Despite persistent requests in the House of Commons he had

managed for fifteen months not to present Gordon's 26 February report, although he told the

Hall government that it 'must be published if pressed for'. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the

previous secretary of state, did press for it in July 1882, and in August a mass of papers

including Gordon's despatches of 3 and 28 December 1881, were fmally laid on the table of

the British parliament and published as the 1882 Blue Book (c.3382) at the beginning of

November, almost a year before they appeared in print in New Zealand.229

Before Gordon left New Zealand in June 1882, Fox submitted to him a progress report on the

work of the commission issued to him on 23 December 1880 to give effect to the West Coast

Settlement Act. He justified his decision to start operations south of the Waingongoro by i I saying the Maori there were more amenable than those under Te Whiti's influence to having r their reserves defined. But with 'the failure of Te Whiti's prophecies', and the defining of

reserves and issuing of crown grants to the Maori south of the Waingongoro, it became

'apparent' to Fox that those north of the river were now anxious to have their reserves settled.

This work was practically completed as far north as the southern boundary of the Parihaka

block - yet seven months after the arrest of Te Whiti, Fox had still not managed to commence

the work of defining or subdividing reserves for the Parihaka people. The government had,

however, found the resources to effect the 'reduction by 5000 acres' of both the proposed

i 228 Gordon confidential despatch 14 June 1882, G 26/1. I, ,

229 Knaplund 'Gordon and New Zealand' p169; Rusden History vol III p364. 172

Parihaka reserve and of the continuous reserve on the Waimate plains, and they had long since

effected the survey of the seaward portion of the Parihaka block, and sold most of it.230

Fox had run into unexpected difficulty with the surveys north of the Waingongoro where any

surveying that had previously been done was found to be so inaccurate as to be almost

worthless, while the 'natural boundaries' had been 'represented on the maps by mere

imaginary lines'. It was going to cost another £10,000 and take large teams of surveyors

'upwards of two years' to complete the work required before crown-grants could be issued to

the various hapu. When Fox's report was referred to the Survey Department, the surveyor­

general agreed that the work could be done, but saw no reason for bothering to cut hapu

subdivisions in the bush; he thought they need only be 'arbitrary lines'. Despite all the trouble

that had been caused through reserves not being marked on the ground, his priority was still

I 'the opening up of the country by road-clearings' to facilitate 'the settlement of the Native I ' \ blocks by Europeans'. Fox replied testily that the occupation of the country by Europeans was

not 'the primary object of-the work of the Commission', and that hapu boundaries, far from

being arbitrary lines, were in fact essential to the 'fulfilling of the promises and engagements of

i the Government towards the Natives'.23l \ J

On 29 August 1882 an Amnesty Bill was introduced to the House and it passed its second

reading on 7 September with little discussion. Bryce explained that the bill was not an amnesty

or a pardon in itself, but it would enable the governor in Council to issue a proclamation

declaring an amnesty. Bryce thought there should be a general amnesty, possibly with some

exceptions, but that any amnesty required assurances of submission; Whitaker was in favour of

( I an amnesty with no exceptions whatever. There was a clause in the act that provided for the

amnesty to extend to 'all offences and to all Maoris' or to except 'certain offences and certain

230 Fox report 2 June 1882, AJHR 1882 G5 ppl-3.

231 AJHR 1882 G5 pp9-10,12-13. 173

Maoris', and most of the discussion dwelt on this clause, and more specifically on whether or

not Te Kooti should be excepted from the amnesty.232 The names ofTe Whiti and Tohu were

not mentioned. The last clause provided that nothing in the act should 'repeal or otherwise

affect' any provisions in the West Coast Peace Preservation Act, and that act, which was to

remain in force till the end of the 1883 session of parliament, provided that 'No court, judge,

justice of the peace, gaoler, or other officer or person shall, during the continuance of this Act, f discharge, bail or liberate ... Te Whiti and Tohu ... without an order from the Governor in

Council ... any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding'. Before the bill had even

become law Prendergast, as administrator of the government, sent a copy to the secretary of

state, although it was to be another five months before an amnesty was actually proclaimed.233 .;---

Ministers were still comfortable in the belief that many crucial papers on Parihaka had, at their

. request and insistence, been suppressed in England as well as New Zealand, and Hall had

forecast that a fresh controversy would erupt if any of Gordon's public or private despatches

were to be published first in England.234 To their dismay, early in 1883 ministers received a

copy of the Blue Book containing 'Correspondence respecting Native Affairs in New Zealand,

and the Imprisonment of certain Maoris' which had been presented to the imperial

parliament.235 The publication of Gordon's despatches and the rest of the Parihaka papers had

a dramatic effect in New Zealand. Five months after the Amnesty Act became law, but just

three weeks after ministers had received the 1882 Blue Book, the governor, 'with the advice

and consent of the Executive Council' proclaimed an amnesty which, subject to the provisions

232 NZPD 1882 xliii pp853-55, 911-15.

233 Prendergast despatch 9 Sept 1882, AJHR 1883 Al p4; Bryce memo 9 Sept 1882, ibid pp4-5.

234 Hall to Bell 20 April 1882, Hall Mss vol 8.

235 Whitaker memo 25 Jan 1883, AJHR 1883 A4 p27. The 1882 Blue Book is reprinted in BPP/IUP vol 16 pp349-639. 174

of the act, was to extend to 'all offences and to all Maoris' with no exceptions.236 The

provisions of the act of course excepted Te Whiti and Tohu. Early in February 1883 Bryce had

hurried to the King Country to question Te Kooti face to face to determine whether or not he

should be included in an amnesty. They met in Rewi's presence on 12 February and Te Kooti

repeated what he had told Sheehan on 24 March 1878: 'You did not make peace. I have made

it myself. I ceased the strife, and will never return to it.' Bryce telegraphed this news to the

governor and within hours the proclamation was issued.237

A few days later Bryce decided the time had also come to release Te Whiti and Tohu because it i I 'would come in well with the amnesty and we ought to have time to rearrest if necessary before

Assembly meets'. Cabinet agreed in principle, but wished first to confer with Fox. He

I ' thought the chiefs should not be released until the surveys on the Parihaka block were

complete, while they thought the continuation of the survey under Te Whiti's nose 'would be a

good test whether he has any thought of giving further trouble, or is likely to be induced to do

so'. They finally decided on immediate release on the grounds that it would be 'more than ever

difficult to justify ... detention after the issue of the amnesty'.238 But by then the amnesty was

not their only concern. It was almost two weeks since they had had the governor inform the

Colonial Office that he had 'this day granted permission to Te Whiti and Tohu to return to their

own horne at Parihaka'.239 The two chiefs were not informed of the fact until 7 March when

\ I Ward received a telegram ordering him to advise them they would be freed 'in a few days'.

They were loaded onto the Stella on 8 March with 'nearly £30 worth of clothing etc ... as a

tohu aroha ... a gift in loving forgiveness from the Government to them both'. Colonel

236 Gazelle Extraordinary 13 Feb 1883.

237 Bryce report 13 Feb 1883, AJHR 1883 A8 pS.

238 Bryce to Atkinson 17 Feb 1883, PM 3/2; Atkinson to Fox 20 Feb and 3 March 1883, ibid.

239 Jervois despatch 19 Feb 1883, AJHR 1883 A8 pI. 175

Roberts, sent to Opunake to drive them back to Parihaka, received them 'very courteously, and legally took possession of them' from Ward.24o Such was their freedom.

When parliament opened three months later the governor observed there was no indication that releasing Te Whiti and Tohu from custody and allowing them to return to Parihaka would lead to 'the renewal of dangerous proceedings' on the part of the west coast tribes. However, before the session closed Bryce had passed another of their 'venial acts', the West Coast Peace

Preservation Continuance Act, just a simple one clause act 'to continue for another year the

West Coast Peace Preservation Act of last session'. This he found necessary because 'the infatuation of the natives on that Coast with respect to their prophet Te Whiti continues in a wonderful manner, so much so that when the monthly Sabbath comes round there is a very strong attempt on the part of numerous Natives to hold meetings atParihaka'. Bryce had just prevented the August hui from taking place and he wanted the legal power to go on preventing any such assemblies 'for a short time longer'. Bryce's supporters were still ready to condemn

Te Whiti 'and other insane fanatics like him' and insist that if the House was not given this power blood would again be shed on the west coast. Bryce's opponents asked what danger there could be in such meetings when the west coast tribes, as members had recently been assured, were the recipients 'of wonderful benevolence' and 'countless blessings' and had been 'enriched .. , for ever' by the receipt of valuable reserves. But the main opposition to the bill came from those members who could not accept the injustice of restricting those who had given 'no evidence of any desire to disturb the public peace' when the ministry had just extended a free pardon to Te Kooti, 'the man of blood, the man gUilty of the vilest atrocities'.241 Bryce did not attempt to renew or extend the act in the following parliamentary session, his last as native minister, and when the Atkinson ministry fell in August 1884 the act finally------lapsed.

240 J. P. Ward pp132-34.

241 NZPD 1883 xlvi ppI57-59, 162-63. 176

TARANAKI: LANDS DEALT WITH BY WEST COAST ROYAL COMMISSION

• Waitara

, '

.----.-...... -....

i \ . l I . ... Mt Taranaki I

I '

N GAT I

~~ftt~ Reserve

~ Bushline

o 4 8 Miles I I I o 5 10 15 Kilometres

Based on: AJ H R 1884 vol 1. sess 1. A5b 177

In June 1883, three months after Te Whiti's return to Parihaka, Fox was able to report to

Governor Jervois that the Parihaka reserve had at last been marked out on the ground. Fox

described this reserve and the continuous reserve on the Waimate plains as 'very large and

liberal, amply sufficient for the wants of resident Natives in every case, and capable of

bringing in a large revenue besides'. He cited difficulty in surveying the land 'intended' for

natives on the west coast as one reason for his work being in arrears. Many of the reserves

were in 'extremely rugged country, broken by deep and wide gullies, and covered by

extremely heavy forest' which rendered the surveys 'more arduous, and consequently more

protracted' than he had expected.242 He should not have been surprised. Fox knew, if anyone

knew, that the most open and accessible land had long ago been surveyed and granted or sold

to Eur-opeans. Even Ngatirahiri ofWaitara who were 'always loyal' and who had fought with

the British, had had to be content with a reserve of which one quarter was open land and three

quarters in very rough bush, since their ancestral land had been given to military settlers - who

'had become as a large rock deeply embedded, which there was no power to remove'. Not

surprisingly Ngatirahiri became 'devoted adherents of Te Whiti'.243

I ( l A year later Fox fmally reported the completion of his work as a west coast commissioner. Considerable misgiving had been expressed in parliament about the length of time it had taken

to complete the work and the fact that the whole question was in the hands of one man 'who is

the supreme arbiter - who gives land to whom he likes - who deals with everything as he likes' -

and who settled all things in secret court. It was felt to be 'not desirable that a single gentleman

... should have so large a power' on the west coast. Indeed Fox had made some remarkable

moral judgements about who should or should not get land on the coast. In one case he

thought it right to recommend the issue of a grant of 100 acres to Charles Wallace, 'the sole

grandson by his first wife' of the late Hemi Parae, 'to whom a grant of 100 acres was

I < 242 ) I Fox reports 5 and 7 June 1883, AJHR 1883 G3 ppl, 13; and 2 June 1882, AJHR 1882 G5 p2. i 243 AJHR 1880 G2 pp1v, 31-32; AJHR 1883 G3 p2; AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a pp2-6. 178

promised for services rendered'. Wallace had two uncles, 'sons by the second wife', one of

whom was deaf and dumb, while the other had been sent to Lyttelton 'for obstruction in the

fencing matter'. Both were 'whole blood Maoris, and entirely habituated to Maori life', while

Wallace had been educated, spoke English perfectly, was married to an English woman and

lived in 'European fashion'. Wallace also had a sister 'married to a half-caste', and when she

and her uncles went before the commissioner they 'voluntarily expressed their wish to abandon

their claims in favour of Wallace ... after his fully explaining to them the circumstances of the

case'. Fox felt the three of them would be 'amply provided for' through their share of 'their

tribal property'. Another case concerned Mrs Jane Brown (Heni te Rau) and Mrs Naera, 'the

half-caste daughters of Betty Nicol' to whom, in 1853, Sir George Grey had promised 150

acres at . This was confirmed by the petitions committee of parliament in 1878, but,

through the benevolence of Sheehan and Charles Brown it soon became an offer of 500 acres

of good levelland between Urenui and Mimi where Betty Nicol was born. There Mrs Brown

built a house, but the land was never surveyed or crown granted, and after a short time she was

{ supposedly 'driven off by Te Whiti's ploughmen' because she declined to join him. Fox I I ( I thought that although there was no doubt 'the action of the Government in all this was entirely

beyond its legal powers', the award, made by two ministers of the Crown, was 'binding in

honor and good faith upon the colony'; and he felt bound to recommend that a crown grant be

awarded to Mrs Brown in the Patea-Whenuakura district - to 'save her from having to reside in

a purely Maori district like Urenui'. He made the recommendation 'the more willingly'

because of the characters of Mrs Brown and Mrs Naera, and the fact of both having large

families, one of which, Mrs Brown's had 'received a superior European education during the

residence of the parents in Sydney'. Fox had met, he said, no half-caste family which

appeared 'more worthy of liberal consideration, or on whom a grant of land for their

maintenance could be more beneficially bestowed'.244 Many petitions were sent to the House

'complaining of great injustice inflicted upon individuals' through Fox's awards, but no one

244 AJHR 1882 G5 pp30, 31-34. 179 had any redress for their grievances because the Public Petitions Committee or Native Affairs

Committee which received them invariably referred them back to the commissioner.245

Fox claimed that he had given effect 'to the very letter, as far as possible' to the recommendations which he and Bell had made. He congratulated himself that 'no single promise, great or small, actual or implied' remained unfulfilled, and no complication remained unsolved. This ensured that every Maori with any right to confiscated land on the west coast had his name inscribed on a crown grant and would thus have 'a settled homestead and the means of maintenance, and in many cases a considerable pecuniary income besides'. This income was to come from land rented to Europeans which was 'surplus' to personal requirements, and since over 5,000 grantees would share about 200,000 acres,246 or fractionally over 38 acres each, their requirements for personal use were obviously considered to be minimal - even less, in fact, than the statutory provision of 50 acres per head.

Whitaker enlarged on the more than '250,000 acres' of reserves which when leased would probably return about £10,000 per year, reduced only by 'comparatively small costs of survey and administration', and concluded that the government had 'promoted the material interests of the Natives' in a most handsome manner.247 Bryce thought the Maori were beginning to realize that government action was in their interests - or at least they accepted it as inevitable and had abandoned all thought of obstruction. He wanted the letting of reserves 'pressed to completion, in the interests alike of the Native owners, the occupying settlers and the colony'.

Bryce had grave misgivings about these extensive reserves, whose value now exceeded that of all the confiscated lands at the time of confiscation, being set aside in the interest of the owners.

He doubted such 'ample' provision was altogether wise since it would 'provide means

245 NZPD 1882 xli p146. ibid 1883 xlvi plS8.

246 Fox report 3 June l8~. AJHR 1884 Sess I ASb ppl-3.

247 Whitaker memo 21 March 1883, AJHR 1883 A8 p4. 180

sufficient to keep these Natives in a state of idleness in perpetuity'.248 However, he preferred

this alternative to that of having Maori land lying in a state of idleness in perpetuity. Bryce was

convinced that his solution had been the right one.

Fox had a rather different view. He felt that much of the credit for the present satisfactory state

of affairs was his own, and he expressed his regret that a similar pacific solution to the native

difficulty had not been found in the past He considered that the award of these just and ample

reserves had now removed all traces of dissatisfaction from the Maori mind and all reason for

disaffection, and that amicable relations between the races had, by his efforts, now 'been

restored never again to be disturbed'.249

While the politicians and government officials congratulated themselves on having at last

solved the native problem the Maori were obviously far from satisfied with the solution presented to them. After the breakup of Parihaka and Te Whiti's arrest Fox had gradually gained the grudging cooperation of every hapu on the coast 'except that which occupied the

Parihaka block'. Te Whiti's people declined to accept money derived from the enforced leasing of their land. Any money they received they wished to earn by their werawera, by the sweat of their brow. Rennell reported that owing to their 'peculiar ideas' government officials had found difficulty in apportioning the rent monies, but 'very shortly' those willing to receive rents would get their shares and he had no doubt the others would then 'gradually alter their minds' when they saw the 'advantages' they would incur.250

248 Bryce memo 13 Feb 1883, ibid p3.

249 Fox report 3 June 1884, AJHR 1884 Sess I ASb pS. In 1927 counsel for the Crown told the Sim commission they were entitled to place 'the very greatest reliance' on the word and work of Fox, and it was just unfortunate that he was wrong in believing he had finally seuled all claims; Sim commission tis p21l, MA 85/1.

250 Rennell report 13 April 1885, AJHR 1885 G2 p20. 181

One month after Fox had declared that amicable relations had been restored between the races,

Tawhiao was in England with four other chiefs representing tribes from a wide area of the

North Island, seeking redress of their grievances from the Queen.251 This was the third time

in three years that leading chiefs had turned to their Queen to seek the justice denied them by

the colonial government and it was indicative of a deep malaise within the Maori community, a

malaise which the government would not recognize or address.

\ i I.

I, !'

I' 251 AJHR 1885 A2 pp3-5.

, ) ! 182

CHAPTER FOUR A NEW CONFISCATION: THE WEST COAST SETTLEMENT RESERVES ACT 1881 AND ITS AMENDMENTS

The West Coast Settlement Reserves Act, 1881, went through no less than fifteen major

amendments, one of which remained on the statute books until 1987 when it was repealed by

section 19 of the Finance Act. The 1881 act was brought in originally to regulate the sale or

leasing of the reserves being set apart by the west coast commissioner under the West Coast

Settlement (North Island) Act, 1880, and indeed it was 'framed by Sir William Fox, with the

assistance of the permanent Law Officer') The 1881 act applied to 'all lands within the

confiscated territory given back to Natives or granted to any of them for their benefit, except

lands given to them under awards of the Compensation Courts, or by the Governor in respect

of special services rendered by such Natives previously to the [1880] Act'. It provided that the

land 'would be surveyed and divided, so as to promote the interest of settlement, and at the

same time secure to the Natives a proper return' from the reserves by charging 'the best

improved rent available at the time'; and it provided for the insertion in the crown grants of

'conditions, restrictions or limitations on alienation', whether or not any such conditions were

'in conformity with the specific terms of any award, promise or engagement respectively, in

fulfilment whereof any such reserve has been made or grant issued'. Alienation would be

permitted only with the concurrence of the public trustee, who was to administer the reserves;

the grantee was to have 'no power to dispose of the land except on lease for twenty-one years, or in the way of exchange'. These leases came to be known as the 'public trustee's leases'.

Fox was determined that restrictions on alienation should be included in crown grants as they were issued lest 'the Natives ... be at liberty to deal with the lands the very next day in a reckless manner' and the government have them on its hands 'as paupers for the rest of their

NZPD 1881 xl p588. 183 naturallives'.2 He took the opportunity while the bill was being debated to justify his actions as sole west coast commissioner and to defend himself against accusations that he had too much power, that indeed he constituted a second native minister in charge of a second native department) He made much of the 'just and ample reserves' he allotted on the west coast.

The object of the 1881 act was, after all, 'to provide an independent means of maintenance for the Natives interested', and it dealt with the 'rights' and 'interests' of the owners or beneficiaries - the lessors - rather than those of the lessees. But by 1883 the rights of the lessees had come to override those of the lessors.

Fox warned in 1882 that Europeans attempting to obtain leases from grantees without the concurrence of the public trustee would find the transactions to be null and void.4 But he had known from the start of the existence of many 'irregular' leases of confiscated land and under the 1881 act was in a position to confirm those obtained prior to the passing of the 1879

Confiscated Lands Inquiry and Maori Prisoners' Trials Act, if they were 'fair and equitable to the Natives' and 'made bona fide and granted by the persons since shown to be entitled to the land'.5 Fox now found that he was not in a position to confmn many leases where 'the lessees had acted in a bona fide manner, and had invested large sums of money in improving the leased lands', because it happened that there was 'hardly a single instance' in which the lessors were the same people as those named in the crown grants. Fox asked that 'a short Act be passed'

(and in fact he drew up the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act 1881 Amendment Act, 1883) to enable him 'to confirm such leases (though the lessors and grantees be not identical)', provided he was satisfied that 'the lessors were the leading chiefs of the tribe or hapu interested in the land in question, and in accordance with Maori usage were entitled to represent, or in the

2 ibid p729.

3 ibid p731.

4 Gazette 23 March 1882 p483.

5 Fox memo 12 May 1883, AJHR 1883 G3 p19. See also AJHR 1882 G5c ppl-3. 184 habit of representing, the tribe or hapu in a transaction of this sort'.6 They had come a long way since Waitara, when leading chiefs were denied the right to represent their tribe in transactions of this sort.

Grantees might now find the land they were living on was allotted to someone else and that the only land allotted to them had already been leased by their leading chiefs; Fox received applications for confirmation of 60 leases and was utimately able to recommend 39 of them, comprising about 14,000 acres of land.7 These leases came to be known as 'the confirmed leases'. The grantees were entitled to their share of the rent money, such as it might be, provided 'a majority' of them made a written statement as to the interest of each of them in the land leased, but there was certainly no provision for them to be left 'in undisturbed possession of their land'. Indeed, under the 1883 amendment agricultural leases 'hereafter issued' would no longer be 21-year leases, as provided in the crown grants, but would become 30-year leases. The act also validated the provision in the regulations of 13 February 18838 that compensation for improvements be granted to the lessee. The process of whitling away such rights as had been granted the owners by the 1881 act, was well under way.

Many of the original 'irregular' leases were due to expire in the 10 years from 1890 to 1900, and the European lessees were persistent in requesting the renewal of these leases. In many cases Maori who had found themselves unwilling lessors refused renewal on the grounds that they needed the lands as homes for themselves, and many who had leased willingly expected their lands to revert to them so they could deal with them as they liked.9 Settler pressure then came on parliament to amend the law in the lessees' interests, and in 1884 the West Coast ~

6 NZPD 1883 xlvi plS7; Fox memo 12 May 1883, AJHR 1883 G3 p19.

7 AJHR 1884 Sess I ASa ppl-2, 12-13.

8 Gazette 15 Feb 1883 p203.

9 See e.g. AJHR 1891 Gl p178. 185

Settlement Reserves Act 1881 Amendment Act, 1884, was passed 'to remedy certain technical defects in the existing legislation',lO The 1884 act repealed the 1883 act but repeated the provisions with regard to duration of leases, compensation for improvements, and confIrmation of 'irregular' leases, and it extended the confIrmation to those made subsequent to the passing of the 1879 act - those which, according to Fox, had been 'very properly excluded' under the 1881 act.II It also empowered the public trustee to extend to 30 years those leases made under the 1881 act; and to accept the surrender of any confirmed lease and grant a new lease of up to 30 years for the same land 'at a rental to be computed on the improVed value of such land' on terms agreed to by the public trustee, the native owners and the lessees.

However by the regulations of 1883 the lessee surrendering the lease was not to be eligible to re-lease the same land for a period of seven years.12 The public trustee was to exercise his powers of leasing in such manner as he should think: fit 'with a view to the benefIt of the

Natives to whom such reserves belong and the promotion of settlement', provisions which in many cases proved to be incompatible.

For a start it was found impossible to get owners to sign documents lest the land 'pass away from them altogether', with the result that unclaimed rents were already beginning to accumulate in the Public Trust Office. Then the restrictions in the existing legislation, meant to safeguard the interests of the owners, had made the acts almost 'unworkable', and a great deal more land could be leased 'if the terms of the leases were modified' in the lessees' favour.13

When the 1884 bill came before parliament it did not pass the Council without some determined opposition from those who objected to dealing 'with Native lands in a way in which they would not attempt to deal with the lands of Europeans'. The extension of leases from 21 to 30

10 NZPD 1884 xlix pp218-19.

11 AJHR 1884 Sess I A5a p2.

12 Gazette 15 Feb 1883 p203.

13 NZPD 1884 I p271. 186

years brought about some heated debate, but was defended on the grounds that the lands being

dealt with were, for the most part, in heavy forest, and it was 'extremely inconvenient to have

to lease forest lands for a short period'.l4

Soon after the passing of the act leaseholders in the Patea district met with Thomas Mackay, the

native reserves commissioner, to get information on how they might 'obtain the benefits

accruing' from the 1884 legislation. Mackay advised those whose leases had not yet been

confirmed to press the government 'to take up the question of confirming their leases'. All

holders of confIrmed leases should then surrender them and obtain new 30-year leases with

provision for compensation for improvements and valuation by arbitration, as provided for in

the regulations of 1883. The lessees were ready to surrender their leases and get new ones, but

were concerned that they should have to bear the cost of resurveying. 1S They need not have

worried; the act was further amended in 1885 to allow the public trustee to advance payment

for the survey of 'any reserves made or intended to be leased' under the 1881 act, 'without the

necessity of any authority other than is hereby conferred', and to make the monies so advanced

'a charge upon the lands surveyed ... repayable, together with interest thereon not exceeding

I, : seven pounds per centum per annum, out of the rents received or accruing from the lessees'.

Ballance, native minister in the Stout-Vogel government, told the chiefs and people of the

Wanganui district on 7 January 1885 that these reserves were bringing Te Whiti and his people

£7,000 a year, which would soon become £10,000 a year, and that by leasing their land it

would remain to them forever and enable them to live 'in ease and comfort'.16 However, Dr

O'Carroll, the native surgeon in the Parihaka district, complained that 'the Native lease land­

holders' were driven 'to borrow and anticipate their rents in order to welcome and honourably

entertain their numerous guests'. He also commented on 'the fewness of the children' he saw

14 ibid p426.

15 AJHR 1887 Sess II G7 ppl-3.

16 AJHR 1885 Gl p4. 187

now in the district, on the fact that 'owing to Parihaka being abandoned, the little ones [had]

fared badly; and that the rising generation amongst the Maoris [was] again on the decline')7

This was in sharp contrast to the days in which he could write of the 50 acres in cultivation at

Parihaka 'the cleanest pa' he had ever visited, with 'the finest race of men' he had ever seen in

New Zealand, and where he 'counted fifty-three children ... in one group'.18

After the West Coast Peace Preservation Continuance Act lapsed in 1884 there were no further

restrictions on the assembling of the west coast people at Parihaka or anywhere else, and when

the summer processions through Taranaki ended19, regular meetings were once more held at

Parihaka. A large hui held between 15 June and 2 July 1885 attracted about 1,800 people,

with visitors from northern Taranaki as well as Waikato, Wanganui, Ngatiruanui and Ngatiapa.

They farewelled Ngarongomate who died during the hui, and at times entertained up to 50

European visitors with 'hakas and amusements'. The authorities kept a close eye on the hui,

but Te Whiti and Tohu spoke nothing but 'peace, peace', in fact 'the whole meaning of the

speeches appeared to be peace'.20 i ] I. I But by mid 1886 'the Natives ... near Mt Egmont' had begun to give 'some trouble by

trespassing on the land of settlers',21 They were evidently reacting to the further erosion of

their interests through legislative tinkering, The trouble began near Patea, then moved to

Manaia. On 17 July Te Whiti once more sent his people 'to enter upon European lands and to

build and plough thereon, taking care not to injure the Europeans'. After scenes reminiscent of

17 O'Carroll report 26 April 1885, AJHR 1885 G2a ppll-12.

18 O'Carroll report 20 March 1871, AJHR 1871 F6b p16.

19 See e.g. AJHR 1885 G2 p20.

20 Robert's reports 30 June, 1 and 4 July 1885, AJHR 1885 G8, G8a.

21 Jervois despatch 28 July 1886, AJHR 1887 Sess I Al p17. 188 those of the ploughing in 1879, Titokowaru and eight others were arrested at Hastie's farm, and Te Whiti was arrested at Parihaka a few days later. At their trial the new ploughmen prisoners were said to have 'wished it to be understood that their action was meant to be a protest against the confiscation of 1865'. Ballance, however, admitted that there had been

'some dissatisfaction at the management of the reserves by the Public Trustee'.22 It was significant that Natanahira Ngahina, 'thoroughly loyal' since the Pokaikai affair in 1866, had joined in the 'Battle of Hastie's Fann'.23 Te Whiti and others were found gUilty of forcible entry, and imprisoned in Wellington for three months.

Meanwhile the Native Land Court was busy subdividing tribal reserves, and it was hoped that this- 'would go a long way towards breaking up the communal interest'. But while the number of applications for individualisation of title to lands between Mimi and Waingongoro had increased, around Parihaka tribal lands were being fenced 'in the vain hope that it [would] arrest the movement in favour of individualisation of title'.24 The hope might not have been vain had the legislature not tinkered with the act yet again. In April 1887 a fi rther amendment bill was introduced to the House, supposedly merely to overcome 'the great difficulty' that had been found 'in getting the consent of the Natives, many. of whom, followers of Te Whiti, would take no interest' in leasing their land.25 Under the 1884 act 'all the Natives interested in land, as well as the lessees and the Public Trustee' had to be consenting parties to leasing.

Under the new bill 'a Native Assessor', appointed by the governor, was to be substitut¢ 'for r--- - _..--...... ____ the Native owners generally' and his assent would be ficient for a 3D-year lease to be granted. The bill would also empower the public trustee to delay action to enforce payment of overdue rents for 12 months, since some Taranaki settlers holding 'old leases' were paying

22 ibid ppI8-21.

23 Belich Titokowaru p290.

24 Rennell report 29 April 1887, AJHR 1887 Sess II Gl p16.

25 NZPD 1887 lvii pp29, 398-99. 189

'very high rents' and needed to be granted relief. It was suggested that there was a danger in

this clause in that 'great pressure' might be brought to bear on the public trustee to postpone ill.l

payments for 12 months with the result that 'the Natives would then not be paid their rents'.

But even so, since the Europeans were perceived to be labouring under an injustice, the clause

was allowed to stand.26 The.-- most important provision in the bill, however, concerned the valuations on which rents for confirmed leases were to be computed. The previous year a

clause had been inserted in the Special Powers and Contracts Bill providing for rents on new

leases to be computed on the value of the land minus improvements, but this raised so many

objections that it was altered to read 'the rent on new leases should be computed upon the land

with improvements, less the value 'of any substantial dwelling-house or permanent farm

improvements', and this clause was inserted in the new bill. Ballance had been in favour of

computing rents on unimproved values, but he had been persuaded that this 'would have been

unfair to the Natives'. He now thought the new clause would do 'substantial justice' to all

parties.27 However, the Taranaki members objected to Ballance's bilL They wanted all

lessees, not just those with the original 'irregular' leases which had been confirmed by the i i governor in Council, to be allowed 'to surrender their leases and take new leases on fairer

conditions'. They argued that many of Taranaki's 'very best settlers', most of whom had

come from Canterbury, 'men whom the House would desire to see settled', had taken up the

land 'in good times', were paying high rentals and could see 'nothing before them now but

bankruptcy', unless they got some relief, and that this could not be 'to the benefit of the

Natives, because they [would] lose good tennants, the land [would] be unoccupied, and it

[would] be a warning to other people not to take it up on such terms'. Ballance would not

accept this Taranaki amendment and continued to argue that a bill was really only necessary to

overcome the obstruction of those owners who would have no part of the leasing process at all;

that if they went further and allowed everyone to renegotiate their leases at lower rentals the

26 ibid pp398-99.

27 ibid pp29-30. 190

Maori would protest and would feel there had been 'a sort of second confiscation' and they

would be thrown 'back into the anTIS ofTe Whiti once more'.28 Dispute over the bill reached

such a point that Vogel, the colonial treasurer and head of the Public Trust Office, finally took

it out of the hands of Ballance, the native minister, and told the leader of the opposition,

Atkinson, that he was not 'under the present circumstances ... to lead this House', that the

government was bound to take the course they thought best, and that responsibility for

conducting the business of the country rested with the government, so long as it was in

office.29 The problem was that the government was ~ready all but out of office. The

worsening economic situation caused the Stout-Vogel ministry to lose its majority in the House

and in the country, and it was replaced in October 1887 by another Atkinson ministry.

Before the government fell the West Coast Settlement Reserves Amendment Bill was thrown

out of the Legislative Council - more because they felt it was an important measure that needed

a longer period of reflection and would be better held over to the next session, than because

( ! they were concerned about the rights of the Maori landowners. ~tkinson lost no time in re­ introducing the bill when he had fmally constructed a ministry, but it was 20 December, once , - more the-last days of the session, before it received its second reading, and the Legislative

Council, far from objecting to a lack of time in which to consider it, simply passed it without

debate. Maori opposition -had grown and 'a great number of Native chiefs ... who had ",---- something to say' on the bill, had gathered in Wellington, but 'the Premier was unable to meet

the Natives and discl!§.s it'. Hoani Taipua, the member for Western Maori, who had hoped that

'legislation---- beneficial to the Natives' would be introduced during the session, had to accept that

'no amendment likely to result in benefit to the Natives' was about to come forward. He and

James Carroll told the House that a number of petitions had been received from west coast r i Maori, taking 'the strongest objection to the appointment of Assessors as valuators' and asking

28 ibid pp745-47. \ .1

29 ibid p835.

r I 191

that 'at the expiration of the leases the land ... revert to the Native owners' to deal with as they

liked - to re-lease to Europeans or occupy and utilise as they wished. Taipua and the Native

Affairs Committee had considered the questions carefully and accepted the recommendation of

the public trustee that the lands 'should revert to the Native owners', that it was 'the best thing

to let the Natives have the land back'. But now he found that the bill went in 'an entirely

opposite direction', that it was obviously 'being brought in in the interests of the European

constituents on the West Coast'.30 Atkinson, however, was sure 'a large majority' of the

Maori approved of the bill because they knew that 'a great injustice' would be done to the

Europeans if it was not passed)1 It was passed, without further discussion, and the few

safeguards in the 1884 act which Vogel had wanted to see retained, were swept away. The

public trustee was indemnified for any loss resulting from his failure to take any action to

recover rents up to 12 months in arrears, and no owner could now block or delay the

compulsory leasing of his land since the act provided that the terms of the new lease would be ! , settled by arbitrators, and if 'either party' failed to appoint an arbitrator, the governor was to

appoint one for them. There was nothing in the act to validate the regulations of 25 October

I. i 1887 which provided both for 'the relief from the burden' of a lessee's rent where the failure to II grant relief might 'result in a monetary loss to the beneficiaries by reason of the inability of the I lessee to continue payment of his rent according to the tenor of the lease', and for the reduction

of interest on overdue rent from fifteen to five percent32 - provisions which resulted in almost

all cases in a considerable reduction in the rentals.33

Under sections 5 and 7 of the West Coast Settlement Reserves Acts Amendment Act, 1887, the

'seven-year rule' had gone and a leaseholder could now surrender his confirmed lease and

[ I 30 NZPD 1887 lix pp933-35.

31 ibid p936.

32 Gazette 27 Oct 1887 pp1368-69.

33 AJHR 1890 I12 piii. 192

immediately take up a new 30-year lease for the same land, with the rental 'computed on the

value of the land comprised in the lease, less the value of any improvements thereon'. The

report of the 1891 Native Land Laws Commission called section 7 'arbitrary and strong-

handed', since it 'took away, in one line' the owners' rights to the improvements which they

had taken into consideration when setting low rentals for the original leases.

The Maoris' rights were confiscated by one dash of the pen, and, at greatly-reduced rentals, new leases for thirty years were given to the lessees .... the Maoris were plundered. The evidence given ... in 1890, showed that twenty-six European lessees obtained new leases for terms of thirty years of nearly 18,000 acres of land, and that the value of the improvements taken from the Maori owners by the 7th section of the Act of 1887 in those lands alone amounted to £19,821 .... In one extreme instance the rent was reduced from £358 per annum to £80. It would be difficult to imagine a more flagrant case of legislative robbery.34

In May 1891, the Court of Appeal 'unanimously declared the awards and leases mentioned in

I I [the above] paragraph ultra vires and void')5

\ "

In 1888 Rennell, now reserves trustee, reported on agitation going on among the Maori in the

Patea district 'for the purpose of obtaining more power to deal with their lands themselves', a ,I I ----~~------~--~~------feeling intensified by the passing of the 1887 act. But in the Parihaka district, he said 'very

little interest' was displayed 'beyond a passive resistance to any law emanating from

Parliament, arising principally from the sympathy with Te Whiti, although many individual

Natives would be glad to see restrictions on their management of their own land relaxed'.36 In

the following year all those Maori owners south of the Waingongoro with confrrmed leases

were said to be 'greatly agitated' over the working of the act They would not agree to new

leases, they would not appoint arbitrators, and they objected to the government appointing

34 AJHR 1891 Sess II Gl pxiv. See also AJHR 1890 G7b ppl-3; 112 pp3-5.

35 ibid.

36 Rennell report 26 May 1888, AJHR 1888 G5 p8. 193

them 'on their behalf, but they were 'taking the matter into the law-courts for redress ...

feeling that the time is past for attempting any other course'}7

The fact of Maori taking action in the courts 'with the view of setting aside certain awards'

gave the legislature pause. Despite their best efforts 'to pass Acts which would be effective

and fair to both parties', difficulties had arisen and doubt had been thrown on the legality of

actions taken under the authority of their acts. They had managed to persuade the owners to

cease all litigation until the end of the next parliamentary session on the understanding that in

the meantime the public trustee would grant no further leases. It was obvious to the

government that cases taken to the Supreme Court would almost inevitably be decided against

the lessees - which would involve 'fresh arbitration, and so expenses would be heaped up' -

and to avoid such a situation they brought in a bill right at the end of the 1889 session which

would suspend the operation of the 1887 amendment act. Taipua agreed to the bill in the hope

that it would give time for something to be done 'with the view of removing grievances in the

I i immediate future'. George Hutchison, member for Waitotara, opposed the bill on the grounds that if Taipua supported it then it must be 'at least favourable to those whom he peculiarly

represents'. He pointed out that lessees had acted in compliance with the law, however , i defective, and he warned the House that if they passed the bill they would give leaseholders 'a

reasonable claim to indemnification for the injury that may be done to them'. Atkinson

expressed the view that the lessees were 'far more sinned against than sinning', that they had

'done a great deal to assist in settling the Native difficulty' on the coast and were therefore

entitled to protection. But it was the 'interests of the ... Exchequer' that were uppermost in his

mind; he knew that if the leases were found to be illegal, the lessees would undoubtedly look to

37 Rennell report 10 June 1889, AJHR 1889 G3 plO. 194

the House for compensation, and he wanted all action suspended until they could introduce a

new law, one, obviously, that would protect lessees' interests.38

The West Coast Settlement Reserves Acts Amendment Act 1887 Suspension Act, 1889, which

was to remain in force until three months after the end of the next session of parliament, 'froze'

the existing situation regarding both leases and actions testing the validity of leases, and

provided that no new actions could be commenced, no new leases executed, and no existing

leases suspended. Any confirmed lease due to expire during the currency of the act was to

remain in force on the conditions and at the rental specified in the lease.

Te Whiti demonstrated his disdain for the law-making process which kept once self-sufficient

Maori in a state of dependence by failing to appear, fITSt when summoned by the resident

magistrate on a charge of debt, and again when the creditor 'applied for a judgement

summons'. He was ordered to 'pay within a certain time or go to prison for three months'. As i he took no notice of the order, he was 'imprisoned accordingly', and 'unfortunately whilst I 1 serving his sentence his wife died'. Sympathy for Te Whiti's stand came from unexpected ,I ,I quarters. Motu, a loyal chief, and 'kind of rival prophet' from Puniho, in the Stoney River

block, who 'never went to Parihaka through all the years of large gatherings and excitement I l I i there ... cast in his lot with the Parihaka people, and ... abandoned his own independent ~'.

And Hone Pihama, 'one of the most influential of the few chiefs who held aloof from Te

Whitism', was said to have become 'a convert before he died')9

During the 1890 session of parliament a joint committee of the House and the Council

examined both the public trustee's and the confIrmed leases, and considered a petition from 'Te

Whareaitu and 505 others from Mokoia to Pukearuhe' which contended that the regulations of

38 NZPD 1889 lxvi pp429-36. I, J

39 Rennell report 30 May 1890, AJHR 1890 G2 p9. 195

1883 were invalid and that the securing of improvements to the lessees was illegal. They also

complained generally of the public trustee's administration, that the land remaining to them was

insufficient for their needs, and that rents had ~n reduced without their consent. They asked

for full control over their lands; that no lease be for more than 21 years, or contain a

compensation clause, or be given without their consent; and that the laws of 1881, 1884, 1885

and 1887 be repealed.40

Counsel for the owners had difficulty in calling witnesses 'because, owing to their not getting

the rents, they have no funds to enable them to come down and give evidence before the

Committee'. However, they maintained that the acts and regulations concerning the west coast

leases had been detrimental to the Maori owners in that they had not carried out the 'promises

and pledges' made in the acts and proclamations of confiscation, they were not in accordance

with the crown grants, and in several instances were contradictory or indeed invalid. It was \ I I shown that many of the confmned leases, which Fox had recommended never should be

confinned, were made by 'certain Natives who had no right, title, or interest in the reserves,

and who were not in the grant', men who were principal men of the tribe, but not of that

particular hapu. In one case a lease was granted in the Tirotiromoana reserve by Hone Pihama

'in order to exert his mana over a piece ofland he had no right to'. It was also shown that

while the public trustee was required under the 1881 act to consult and act 'in accordance with

I I the wishes of the Natives' interested in a particular reserve, he either ignored their wishes or

consulted with 'a Native ... hostile to the hapu in question'. In other cases it was the

arbitration umpire who appeared to be the hostile party. When a lease to John Scott Caverhill,

'the gentleman specially provided for by the Act of 1887', went to arbitration Major Kemp

attended the Arbitration Court and described the proceedings as 'He mahi tinihanga, he mahi

kohuru tenei, ki te Maori' - an act of treachery and plunder. When Kemp objected to the

arbitration award, the umpire was called on to make his decision - and the umpire was James

40 AJHR 1890 1I2 ppi, ii. 196

Livingstone, 'a gentleman who was considered a fair man in other matters, but he was

naturally biassed, as the ploughing disturbance had occurred on his land' in 1879. Livingstone

charged 'three guineas a day' for his services, and the Maori owners were required to pay one

quarter of the expenses of arbitration. In most cases the cost of arbitration greatly exceeded the

new, reduced, annual rental fixed by the arbitrators - all of whom were from Taranaki.41

The committee, believing that its duty was to determine what was 'substantially just' to both

lessees and lessors, concluded that 'the Public Trustee's leases were given in good faith and by

public tender, under the regulations of 1883, and that the compensation clause to the lessees

did not involve any injustice to the Natives interested'; that there was 'actually sufficient land

still available for the occupation of the Natives interested when required'; and that, while the

management of the public trustee had been impugned, they were 'unable to discover ... any

foundation for this complaint'.42

In considering the more thorny question of the confirmed leases, the committee 'experienced

great difficulty in reconciling the legal with the equitable view of the questions submitted for its

consideration'.

The passing of the Act of 1887, confiscating as it did the improvements which belonged to the Natives, was an injustice to them, whilst, on the other hand, there was evidence produced to show that, in consequence of and relying on that Act, and also of the representations made by Mr Mackay in 1884, improvements were made by lessees I ' which would not otherwise have been made. Your Committee is satisfied that, to give l effect to the awards absolutely, an injustice would be done to the Natives, as the rents fixed for the whole term of thirty years were arrived at on an inequitable basis, but to

I refuse to give the lessees any redress so as to recoup them for their improvements would be equally inequitable.43 I I In arriving at their recommendations the committee were strongly influenced by the fact that the

arbitration involved in substituting new leases for confirmed ones, which in nearly all cases

41 ibid ppiii, 1,4, 10, 11, 13,69.

42 ibid pii.

43 ibid piii. 197

resulted in 'large reductions' in rentals, 'occupied several months, and cost a large amount'.

They could see no reason either why the lessors should not pay one quarter of the cost of

arbitration or why the management of the reserves should not remain with the public trustee;

and they recommended 'that leases be granted to the lessees of the land held by them' for a 30-

year term, with the rent for the fIrst 15 years to remain at the low levels set by the arbitrators,

and for the second 15 years to be computed on improved value, with 'all the improvements

whatsoever' reverting to the lessor at the end of the 3D-year term 'without compensation or any

right of renewal'.44

The committee's recommendations 'were not accepted .... and nothing was done to give effect

to them', with the result that once the 1889 Suspension Act lapsed cases could again be taken

to court.45

In May 1891 Te Moauroa and others took action against the public trustee and Henry Thomas

:1 \\ Turner over a lease for 700 acres of part of the Otoia reserve, near Patea. The lease was for 16

years from 1 January 1876, at an annual rental of £105 for the fIrst 10 years and £140 for the I I " last six. In July 1882 a crown grant was issued declaring that the land was 'absolutely

inalienable by sale, gift or mortgage, except by way of exchange for land of equal value, and ( I ( was not to be alienable by lease for any term exceeding twenty-one years, and then only by the

( , written consent of the Governor in Council'. In October 1885 the lease was confmned in t accordance with section 10 of the amendment act of 1884, and could then be surrendered under

section 13 of the same act, or (later) under section 7 of the 1887 act In February 1888, when

the lease had four years still to run, the lessee gave notice of his intention to surrender it, and in

March 1889 he obtained a new 3D-year lease at an annual rental of £73, with 'the option of a

( !

44 ibid.

45 NZPD 1892 lxxvii pp481-83. 198

further renewal for thirty years on the same conditions, at a rent to be fixed by arbitration'.46

But the three judges of the Court of Appeal upheld the plaintiffs' case against the enforced re­

leasing of their land and ruled that the terms of any lease 'must be in accordance with the terms

of the Crown grant', and that 'the Public Trustee is in no way less liable to his cestui Que trust

than any other trustee would be, and that he must not accept the surrender of a lease unless it is

certainly to their advantage that he should do so'. Since the regulations of 188847 conveyed

'an intention that the acceptance of the surrender of a lease should be compulsory upon the

Public Trustee', and this was in conflict with the act, the judges found at least some of the

regulations, as well as those of 188348 to be ultra vires and void. They noted that in this case

the lessee had given notice of his intention, not desire, to surrender his lease just 10 days after

the publication of the regulations, and that there were 'a large number of similar cases'. They

saw in this 'a preconceived plan to defeat the plain meaning of the Acts to the great

disadvantage of the Native owners'.49

The legislation affecting the west coast settlement reserves was not the only unsatisfactory

legislation dealing with native lands. In fact the 1891 Native Land Laws Commission

compared the situation on the west coast with that in other parts of the North Island. The

commission strongly condemned individualization of title and the endless stream of legislation

that had emanated from parliament since the passing of the 1873 Native Lands Act In 1888

'there were eight Acts passed, and in 1889 nine, especially dealing with Maori lands and

Courts, besides others partially touching them .... There were in ten years, from 1880 to 1890,

46 AJHR 1891 Sess II Gl App p3.

47 Gazette 9 Feb 1888 pp227-28.

48 Gazette IS Feb 1883 pp202-0S.

49 AJHR 1891 Sess II G 1 App p2. 199

more than a thousand Native petitions presented for consideration to the House of

Representatives'.50 The confused situation had arisen, according to the commissioners,

because those wishing to deal with native lands had found 'certain legal restrictions existing

which effectually barred their progress'. In order to acquire a title they had then 'gone to the

Assembly, and laws [were] passed which met, or partly met their particular case'. But in

passing such a law 'other cases and other circumstances' were involved and 'a network of

incongruous legislation' was evolved piecemeal. Every transaction in Maori land 'was

burdened with unnecessary cost, and offered inducement to many species of fraud; while the

whole proceedings [tended] to demoralize both Natives and Europeans, to frighten away

capital, to paralyse industry, to tum the Courts of justice into theatres of oppression, and to

hinder the settlement and prosperity of the country'. 'J!1e commissioners reported that the

Maori were well on the way to becoming a landless people, and that the laws made it '--

\ impqssible for them to graze or cultivate the land that did remain to them. They called the \ "- , "'"<--- abandonment of the Crown's pre-emptive right 'a grave and serious eIEor' and believed that 'In

! the interest of the Natives, of the Crown, and of the whole people, for the fulfilment of the I, I Treaty and the Constitution, the right of purchase should still be vested in the Crown, and in

the Crown only'.51

To remedy the existing situation the commission proposed the establishment of a Native Land

! I Titles Court with 'both judicial and administrative powers, as well as the powers and allthority of arbitrators in all cases'; the remodelling of the existing Native Land Court; and the creation (

J I of a Native Land Board of six members, three appointed by the governor, and three elected by

50 AJHR 1891 Sess II Gl ppxi, xvi.

51 ibid ppxi, xiii, xx. 200

all the tribal committees of the North Island, 'with full power to act in all things as trustee of

the Native lands for the Native owners'.52

James Carroll, one of the three members of the commission, dissented from the commission's

report on the question of the Crown resuming the right of pre-emption, saying that 'such a

proceeding would be regarded by the present generation of Maoris as simply confiscation'. He

emphasized the need for legislation which would encourage and support the Maori in their

desire to become 'thoroughly useful settlers' who would add to the productive powers of the

colony by farming their own lands. He said that their hope for the future was based on 'the

prospect of the Legislature granting them the power they ask for to control their own affairs';

and that 'without the thorough co-operation of the general body ofthe Natives no scheme that

any Government may propound, no legislation that it may pass, can be expected to succeed'.53

A second member of the commission, Thomas Mackay, drew up his own independent report

(completed for him after his sudden death by Alexander Mackay) since he dissented from so

many portions of the report drawn up by the chairman of the commission, W. L. Rees. The

reason Mackay gave for not signing the main report was simply that in his view it went far

beyond its terms of reference (although according to Rees it was because 'he did not like to put

his name to the condemnation of Governments and Parliaments the servant of both of which he

was' .54 Mackay set himself to provide 'an epitome of the history of dealings in Native lands

and a survey of the course of Native land legislation', together with his recommendations

regarding revision of the current laws. He did not really address the questions in the terms of i i

\ I 52 ibid ppxxiii-xxiv.

53 ibid ppxxvii-xxx.

54 NZPD 1892 lxxv p372. 201

reference which would expose the grievances of the Maori, and which the other commissioners

did address.55

The 1891 decision of the Court of Appeal in the Te Moauroa case meant that the confirmed

leases reverted to their original term and by 1892 most of them were 'on the point of running

out', a situation which 'left the lessees in the most deplorable position possible'.56 New

legislation was needed, so with a view to 'ascertaining whether Native owners and lessees

[were] prepared for mutual concessions', Ballance went to Patea in January 1892 to discuss the

question with both parties - each of whom got one hour and ten minutes of the premier's time.

He met the Maori owners first and invited 'a candid expression' of their opinions. They told

him that the original leases had been made on the understanding that all improvements would

become the property of the owners; that they would not agree to renewed leases and wanted to

resume the land for which leases had expired; that they expected rent monies for all leases to be

paid promptly and not withheld for 'two or three years'; that they had crown grants which

entitled them to their lands and they wanted to deal with those lands themselves and not have

I 1 the public trustee manage their affairs for them; and that all these questions had been before the

Supreme Court and decided in favour of the owners, and that they expected parliament to act

on that judgement Ballance was disappointed with their opinions and his 'friendly words' to

them were that he thought them to be 'in a state of war, with the war-paint on'; that they were

'not prepared for any compromise, or any agreement or to make any concessions'; that they

were 'prepared to show no mercy to those unfortunate people', the lessees; that no doubt they

thought themselves all-powerful by virtue of the Supreme Court judgement, but that they had

not 'secured the victory altogether yet, even in the Supreme Court'; that the settlers had rights

which the Maori owners had not fully considered, and that in order to protect those rights it

was necessary for the land to remain in the hands of the public trustee. The government's aim \ I, ,

55 AJHR 1891 Sess II G1a ppl-23.

56 NZPD 1892 Ixxvii p482. 202

was, he said, 'to deal fairly with both parties - to get the Natives a fair rent for their lands, and

to obtain for the lessees a reasonable tenure'. This was what was meant by legislating with a

view to the benefit of the natives and the promotion of settlement. All Ballance would promise

them was that the rents which the public trustee was holding would be paid to them and that

there would be no delay in the future in the payment of rents; and that he should try to make

time to see them if they sent a delegation to Wellington with 'any fresh proposition' before the

next parliamentary session.57

Ballance told the lessees he was sure they did not mean to try to enforce past legislation in their

favour by going to the courts, but simply meant to reach 'an equitable and fair agreement with

the Natives upon the basis of the existing leases', and in his view this could be done by

bringing in new legislation which would 'satisfy all parties and put the settlers in the proper

way of getting their titles'. According to the spokesman for the settlers, all they wanted was

compensation for the money they had expended on arbitration when they converted to 30-year

leases, and for the extra improvements they had carried out on the assurance of getting ( I I I . extended leases. But there were also those who thought it would be 'rather unfair' to have to

pay on the improved value of the land - even though, when they took their leases, 'settlers

agreed with the Natives that they were to pay on the improved value of the land - that ... they

were to hand back the land at the end of the term'. Ballance assured them that he would 'not

consent to have the settlers turned off their lands', even though the leases had expired. But, as

he was sure the owners would not accept rent on the unimproved value of the land, he advised

the lessees to 'face the position, and have the rent calculated on the improved value ... less,

possibly, the buildings and houses', for he could 'see the great difficulty of getting a Bill

through Parliament unless that Bill does express the agreement of the Natives as well as the

lessees'. Other settlers brought up the old arguments that 'from the start it [had] been the cry

of Te Whiti to have the whole of the lands back'; that as far as the Maori were concerned it was

57 AJHR 1892 G2 ppl-4. 203

'not so much a matter of leasing land to the Europeans as ... of getting the land back into their

own hands, under Te Whiti's direction' - this in the Patea district where the 'Parihaka

influence' was not so strong, and where the Maori, since the re-establishment of the Maori

mission there in 1887, had 'taken to a fonn of European worship'.58 Ballance quickly

promised that no legislation would be 'at all likely to be influenced by Te Whiti-ism' and that

they were 'not likely to allow the lands to pass into the hands of the Natives'. He advised the ( I ) I settlers to arrive at some agreement with the lessors if they could, but if they could not, they

should take their 'own line of action' to advance their own interests, and that it would be 'for

the Government to then meet them'.59

The government did indeed meet them later in the year when the West Coast Settlement

Reserves Act, 1892 was passed, repealing the acts of 1881, 1884, 1885 and 1887. Whereas

the 1881 act had required the public trustee to lease land 'for the benefit of the Natives and the

promotion of settlement', the 1892 act extended his powers to promote settlement through

greatly amplified provisions for leasing. Under this act the restrictions in crown grants with ,.. ..-

re~ard to the duration of leases were deemed not to exist, and all west coast reserves except

Compensation Court awards and special awards were to be vested in the public trustee in fee

si~ple, and could be leased at his discretion for 21 years with the righ of e I I ) This provision was also to apply to the 'vacant reserves', the unimproved and as yet unleased

lands which comprised the greater portion of the reserves. The 3D-year leases at reduced

rentals made by the public trustee were validated and, like confinned leases, could be

surrendered and replaced by new leases on the conditions set out in the act. These limited the

number of leasehold acres to the 640 prescribed in the 1881 act; provided for a meeting of

lessees and owners to fix the rent to be paid for the first 21 years of the new lease; and

provided that the rent be computed on the unimproved value of the land. Any lessee affected

58 Rennell report 26 May 1888, AJHR 1888 G5 p8.

59 AJHR 1892 G2 pp4-IO. 204

by this act could surrender his public trustee or confinned lease within one year and, by paying

to the public trustee all incidental costs and any rent owing, plus the value of improvements (in

I i the case of leases granted by the public trustee only those in excess of £5 per acre), receive in its place a new lease with right of perpetual renewal; he could not, however, purchase the

freehold of any leased land. The Maori owners, on the other hand, lost both the right to bid for

the lease when it expired, and the benefit of the best improved rent available at the time, but the

public trustee could, at his discretion, grant them licences to occupy parts of reserves 'for the

purposes of cultivation or residence or occupation'.

\ This bill was hailed by parliament as one designed to put an end to all injustices and to I , 'establish friendly relations once more between the lessees and the owners'. The owners

however, were obviously far from satisfied. Taipua had received numerous petitions about the

6O { bill and was not convinced that it would be any more successful than previous legislation. I I , I ' Ngatirahiri hapu were still trying to get justice. Their petition with 370 signatures had arrived i ! too late to be considered, but it was read to the House during the debate on the bill. Ngatirahiri I \ begged in vain that their claims be considered and their land exempted from the provisions of i ( the bill and left to them to manage in their own interests.61 Members were quick to condemn

the act of 1887, but while some called it 'nothing short of confiscation', others said it was 'a

disaster to the lessees'; no-one, however, was prepared to take responsibility for it. There was

considerable misgiving too about the power delegated to the public trustee. That officer's

performance had been condemned by the judges of the Court of Appeal, and although a new

man had been appointed to the position he was said to be now 'a political officer ... practically

a tool of the Ministry'.62

60 NZPD 1892lxxv pp365-69.

61 NZPD 1892 lxxvii pp400-01.

62 NZPD 1892lxxv pp371-75. 205

The first amendment to the new act came in the following year. The main provision of the

West Coast Settlement Reserves Act Amendment Act, 1893, was a further concession to the

lessees. 'Improvements' and 'substantial improvements' as defined in the 1892 act were to

have the same meaning as 'substantial improvements of a permanent character' in the Land Act,

1892. These included reclamation, clearing, fencing, planting, cultivating, fertilizing,

buildings, roads, wells, water-races and sheep-dips, among other things. In response to Maori

demands to be allowed to farm their own lands, the act also provided for land to be leased to

them 'in possession and not in reversion' - in other words individuals or groups could lease up

to 640 acres of the 44,000 acres 'specially set apart for the Natives, and not included in the

Public Trustee's leases' without tendering for the lease, but otherwise on much the same

conditions as those applying to European lessees. The government claimed this provision

would give 'every facility' to those 'who wished to emerge from the thraldom of Te Whiti,

under which they had lived for years'.63

In 1895 the act was again amended by sections 6, 7 and 10 of the Native Reserves Act

Amendment Act by which lessees with valid leases of more than 14 years, without right of

renewal or valuation for improvements, could be granted a new 21-year lease with perpetual

right of renewal ; and lessees with public trustee's leases who had not already converted them

(,! j

! I to leases with the right of perpetual renewal, now had a second chance, within the next twelve months, in which to make application to surrender the lease and obtain a new one. They were

given a third chance by section 20 of the Reserves, Endowments, and Crown and Native

Lands Exchange, Sale, Disposal, and Enabling Act, 1898, under which they could convert

their leases between November 1898 and November 1900. Because of the costs involved a

number of lessees failed to take even this opportunity, but twelve years later when their 30-year

leases were due to run out, they exerted strong pressure on the government to give them still

further opportunities to convert to perpetual lease.

63 NZPD 1893 lxxxi p643 and lxxx p339. 206

In the last years of the century tensions among the Maori of the west coast built up again in

response to the situation in which they found themselves with regard to their leased lands. The

'usual monthly meetings' were still held at Parihaka, the largest being the March meeting, and

'for some time past' they had led to 'no difficulty or trouble'. But in August 1893 Te Whiti

was arrested once more for contempt of court, although this time he was simply cautioned and

discharged.64 Then in 1895 increasing tensions led to a split between the Taranaki chiefs Te ( ,! i Whiti and Tohu. In March 1896 'a number of influential Natives from all parts of the colony'

attended the annual hui and made 'great efforts ... to reconcile Te Whiti and Tohu, but without

success'. In October of that year a dispute between their followers flared up over some land

\ , near Oeo. Tohu's followers were in residence there, but Te Whiti's followers, wishing to crop ( I the land, arrived with their ploughs and were treated as trespassers. For a few days 'there was

great uneasiness amongst the peaceable Natives in the locality' but 'the contending parties

seemed pleased' at the arrival of the police, and took their advice not to cause a disturbance or

break the peace; and it was presumed that the public trustee 'arranged' the land in dispute.65 In

the following September the dispute flared again, more fiercely. They began 'by burning

down each others fences, and, had it not been for the timely interference and tact of the

I ' constables in the district they would have burtled down houses and whares, and have caused I i bloodshed'. In October 1897, Ngatirahiri, exasperated beyond endurance, 'commenced ?--r-!CA <~ r...., "jtVI'~' ploughing Europeans' land at ... Waihi .~though a num~em were arrested, they kept up the ploughing in different parts and in isolated places until the middle of November'.

As soon as one lot were arrested, 'another lot started ploughing in a different direction'. As in

1879 grievances were discounted, and the police reported that there was 'no doubt but Te Whiti

was the cause of all this trouble'.66 Ninety-four ploughmen were imprisoned for two months

with hard labour, and questions were asked in parliament over this episode. Henare Kaihau, .-

64 Annual report on police force of the colony, AJHR 1894 H14 pp4-5 and 1895 H28 p5.

65 ibid 1896 H16 p5 and 1897 Sess II H16 p4.

66 ibid 1898 H16 p8. 207

Western Maori, suggested the government enquire into Maori grievances and 'take steps to redress the same'. The Liberal premier, Seddon, assured the House that 'these misguided

Natives' had 'deliberately gone and broken the law, never asking the Government to make any inquiries or stating ...that they had any grievance'. If the reserves made in Donald McLean's time were the root of the trouble, he said, there had surely been 'ample opportunities' during the ensuing years to bring their grievances before the government. Like any other of the

Queen's subjects they had the right to come to parliament with their petitions and ask 'the representatives of the people to deal with their grievances'. However, he believed they had been 'acting on advice' and that 'the real offenders were not in gaol' - but 'the mana of the

Queen must and would reign supreme'. Seddon ended by saying that 'every one of those who had offended, and their offspring, had a black mark against them', a slur against them, for having been in gaol. 67 It was 1879 allover again.

In 1900 the government again amended the 1892 act 'for the benefit of the Native owners'.

The West Coast Settlement Reserves Act Amendment Act, 1900, gave the public trustee the power to let unleased lands for seven years instead of the one year previously stipulated. This would enable him to keep lands the Maori had in no way been encouraged to farm, clear of gorse, brambles, blackbenies and other introduced weeds, in accordance with the requirements of the recently passed Noxious Weeds Act.68

In 1902 the act was amended yet again 'to bring all Native reserves now in the control of the

Public Trustee under one uniform system, by bringing them under the provisions of the West

Coast Settlement Reserves Act, 1892'.69 This meant that any reserves within the confiscated

67 NZPD 1897 c ppll-12.

68 NZPD 1900 cxiv pp475, 569.

69 NZPD 1902 cxxii p526. 208 territory previously subject to the Native Reserves Act, 1882,70 were now vested in the public trustee in fee simple, 'to be managed, dealt with and disposed of under and subject to the provisions' of the 1892 act. Lessees concerned with these reserves could now surrender their lease and obtain a new one by paying to the public trustee costs, outstanding rents, and the value of all improvements on the land. The rent under the new leases was to be 'five per centum per annum on the value of the land without the improvements thereon'. The leases were to be for 21 years, and, because they were subject to the 1892 act, would carry the right of perpetual renewal. Far from allowing or encouraging the west coast Maori to resume their leased lands and manage them for themselves, this act further distanced from their own land even.- those owners whose land was never subject to the 1880 West Coast Settlement (North Island) Act. ...------

Some of the owners who were to have become 'the richest Natives on the coast' through Fox's awards of just and ample reserves, were shown by the 1906 Commission of Inquiry into

Usury on Loans to Maoris, to be in debt, in need, without sufficient income to provide them with 'the necessaries of life', and even 'living on flour and water'. H. G. Seth-Smith, the commissioner who enquired into loans alleged to have been made at exhorbitant rates of interest to those whose reserves were vested in the public trustee under the 1892 act 'in anticipation of the rents payable thereunder', found it 'conclusively proved that moneys [had] been lent to Natives at usurious rates of interest, and that the Natives [were] thereby impoverished'. Since about 1894 one C. R. Bayley had been lending money against 'a promise that the borrower should,------when he next received a payment from the agent of the Public Trustee in respect of rent due to him, hand the cheque for such rent to Mr Bayley'.

Interest was charged at the rate of five shillings in the pound on the amount borrowed and if the rent received was less than the amount owing, the balance was treated as a fresh advance. As rents were distributed at six-monthly intervals, the interest charged by Bayley was 'never less

70 There were about 3,000 acres. 209 than~r annum'. Some of the Maori witnesses explained that they had no option but to borrow from Bayley, as the storekeepers had ceased to give them credit and there was no­ one else to whom they could tum. They needed money for food and clothing and other necessities, they could only get those for cash, and they could only get cash by borrowing.

They could not grow their own food and produce a surplus for sale because, although reserves

'for cultivation by Natives were made to encourage them to support themselves', these reserves had now been leased and they were left with no land to cultivate.

Maori witnesses at the enquiry testified that Bayley was present when Fisher, the reserves trustee, paid their rent. Te Hokio, on oath, cross examined by Bayley, said that when he got a cheque from Fisher he handed it over to Bayley: 'Sometimes you ask me for it. Sometimes I give it to you. If I gave it to anyone else perhaps you would be angry with me'. Maro Kopa testified that he had a farm and stock and was in a fairly good position, but his European tenants would not advance him money so he went to Bayley of his own free will 'to borrow money in accordance with Native custom when we had a big meeting'. He even had to borrow money from Bayley when his tenants owed him money. 'Corrigan was one of the tenants. I wanted to buy some cattle, and wanted Corrigan to lend me the money. He referred me to

Bayley. Eventually Corrigan paid me rent. I do not know why he did not pay me when I was forced to go to Mr Bayley'.

William Williams, a former native interpreter, said he had known cases in which money had been lent to Maori 'to build houses and buy cattle; but as soon as there is a meeting at Parihaka they sell and squander the money, so that what is done for them seems to be of no avail'. As far as he could see it was no use giving the land to the Maori as they would not work it.

Ngarangi Katitia did not agree, saying that they were 'suffering through the Act of 1892', that they were willing to work their land, but it was 'all locked up'. Natanahira Ngahina also objected to it being said they were idle and_that going to Parihaka impoverished them. 'I am a

Parihaka man. It costs me 4s. to stay there for several days .... We do not lose anything that 210 way. We of the Ngatiruanui tribe spend our money going to race-meetings and other pakeha amusements'. But he explained that he and the other 'old people' were now beyond work and the rents paid them by Fisher were 'not enough to supply the necessities of life for six months; that they went to Bayley from the time their crops were affected by blight and that they were now practically without potatoes.

Commissioner Seth-Smith's report recommended that the government 'empower the Public

Trustee ... to guarantee the payment of debts incurred by Natives for necessaries ... and to deduct them from rents as and when they become payable'. This would 'remove the objection which tradesmen now raise to giving credit to Native customers, and ... at the same time destroy the value of the rents as security for money-lending transactions'.?1

In 1912, when the earliest 3D-year leases still under the 1881 act were soon to expire, the government bought a reprieve from the pressure put on them by lessees intent on surrendering their existing leases and obtaining new ones under section 8 of the 1892 act, by inserting a clause in the Reserves and Other Lands Disposal and Public Bodies Empowering Act, which extended leases for one year. This gave time for the setting up of yet another commission of enquiry. Alexander McArthur and William Kerr were appointed to the West Coast Settlement

Reserves (North Island) Commission to enquire into the terms and conditions on which the lessees should be permitted to exchange their leases; which leases should 'remain under the present tenure' so that when they expired the Maori owners might 'compete for the possession of the lands held under them'; and what provisions should be made to enable Maori owners 'to get financial assistance from the Government .,. to work their farms, should any of them become tenants of such leaseholds'.

71 AJHR 1906 Sess II Gl ppl-IO. 211

The commission sat in Hawera, Opunake and New Plymouth, with R. D. Welsh of Hawera

representing most of the lessees, and W. H. D. Bell, a grandson of Francis Dillon Bell,

representing all the Maori owners. Evidence given to the commissioners by the lessees made it

quite clear that they avoided the courts but expected parliament to legislate in their favour. We

did not think that to have introduced a case into the law-courts would have given us any

assistance at all. We thought it would have been a costly operation, because it was difficult to

get over the exact words of the lease, but that a petition to Parliament would really represent

that we have a real grievance.'72 Parliament had legislated in their favour. As Bell told the

commissioners: 'Acts like the Act of 1895 and the section in the Act of 1898 do not pass

themselves; they are due invariably to an agitation amongst the people interested')3

The Maori owners, on the other hand, had turned increasingly to the courts for a just settlement

of their grievances only to find, any time a case was decided in their favour, that settler

pressure had convinced parliament to introduce further legislation which progressively whittled

away the owners rights. In presenting the case for the owners Bell pointed out that the public

trustee

ought to have known the whole position; he ought to have seen ... that the Act of 1892 was wrong, that the Act of 1895 was wrong, that the Act of 1898 was wrong, that the reduction of rent was wrong, that the reduction of interest was wrong, and a departure from the bargain which we had already made, and that the Act of 1910 ... was wrong. He should have resisted each one of those measures .... Now, some evidence has been given that the Public Trustee has always been very good to the lessees, and has never pressed them for their rent.

Bell objected to a person in the position of a trustee 'taking up an attitude ... hostile to the

attitude taken up by the beneficiaries, and working against them'; and he found 'something

rather humorous' in the lessees who sought to escape from a bargain into which they had

entered and who urged their demands on parliament, 'urging their claims once more before this

Commission, and some of them giving evidence contrary to fact, all in the sacred cause of

72 AJHR 1912 Sess II G2 p19.

73 ibid p72.

, i 212

saving the Native from himself.74 He told the commissioners that the owners were eager to

'have the chance of competing for their own lands' - and even asking for the freehold. There

were about 5,000 Maori interested in the 50,000 acres reserved on the west coast, and if the

18,000 acres. still under the 1881 act could be added to that by putting the leases up for public

competition, then each Maori would get about thirteen and a half acres - hardly excessive

'when the white man has anything from 110 to 550 acres' and could have up to 640. The

lessees also had the advantage of being able to lease very cheaply from the public trustee and

then sub-letting at 'enormous profits'. The commissioners found 'one man getting £1.14s an

acre for what he was paying 2s an acre - making a profit of £352 a year'. The public trustee

agreed that this was so, but claimed that the Maori were 'not concerned' so long as they got

their rents; that 3D-year leases were in their interests, lest the land lie idle; and that the lessees , l I had 'a right by contract that no Parliament could for a moment think of breaking')5

The witnesses Bell called gave moving evidence as to 'the marvellous way' they had got ahead

and were making a success of dairying, 'despite the difficulties which [did] not stand in the

way of the pakeha'. Many of them

were without finance when they started; they had to wor~ for the pakeha and earn a little, and then clear the lands themselves. Sometimes they leased their lands free of rent in order to get them cleared .... they had no permanency of tenure, and ... had to take the risk of having lands which they had cultivated taken from them and leased to the·pakeha .... the Act which gave the Public Trustee power and directed him to do that was wrong from the very beginning - absolutely wrong. Your Worships must have been impressed with the evidence of that Maori who said, 'I brought my land into cultivation. I was farming it successfully, when one day it was taken from me and leased to a pakeha'. Asked who it was leased to he said 'Solway'. 'And what are you doing now?' 'I am working for Solway.'76

They also gave evidence about a union, formed at Taiporohenui in May 1909 among 'a great

number of people' from Paraninihi to Waitotara, 'for the purpose of being of one mind to

74 ibid pp74, 120.

75 ibid pp75, 77.

76 ibid p121. 213

prosecute and work our lands, and also to have the lands returned to our own hands from the

Public Trustee'. Among the leaders were men 'who were of authority under Te Whiti and

Tohu'. Both Wi Hipango and Kahu Pukoro held prominent positions, and Maui Porn are was

'one of the prime movers in starting the union'. Pomare explained that 'the people in the

district were unsettled, their old advisers and kaumatuas had died, rough seas were besetting

them ... there was no encouragement held out to them to settle on their own lands ... and a

change was taking place in the Maori mind for more progress'. Wi Hipango told the

commissioners that they decided 'to make themselves a political body in order to elect a

member to represent them ... in Parliament', and that they selected Pomare in an 'endeavour to I . I i get redress for their injuries')7

Soon after the union was formed a delegation of72 'representatives of the Natives from the

White Cliffs to Waitotara' went to Wellington where they met Sir James Carroll, the public

trustee and T. W. Fisher, under secretary for native affairs and one time reserves agent on the

west coast, and asked them to wipe away the tears that had flowed ever since the days of the

Taranaki war. The petition they presented asked the prime minister, Sir

to repeal the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act of 1892 and its amendments, and to . place our lands under the provisions of the Crown grants, because the said Act is a vjQ!.ati.Qn of the Treaty of Waitangi, a violation of the Constitution Act of 1852 a violation of Sir George Grey's solemn Proclamations of the 17th December, 1864, and 2nd September, 1865, and a trampling under foot of the Crown grants of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria. Further that iniquitous and cruel Act .... empowered the Public Trustee to arbitrarily lease our lands for all time, regardless of whether we have sufficient for our maintenance or not .... And now we pray that no further leasing of our lands be continued by the Public Trustee, and that our lands now falling due for all time be returned to us.

Carroll 'dramatically drawing himself up' pointed to a map 'dotted with yellow spots'

representing the 18,000 acres of land still leased under the 1881 act, and said 'Kahu Pukoro,

go home; I will wipe away your tears with the 18,000 acres'. But despite two further meetings

in Taranaki at which Carroll confirmed his promise, and two more visits to Wellington, during

77 ibid pp85, 95, 96, 107, 115. 214

one of which the union leaders drew up a bill which Carroll said he would introduce in the

following session, no legislative measures were forthcoming. The union summed up Carroll's

promises and 'found he was a failure'. The most he could do was to write and tell them that he

was 'sending a Commission to make inquiry into these lands')8

The'<::::;::::: commissioners' report, presented on 24 June 1912, reviewed0_ all the legislation to date regarding the west coast leases and concluded that it was eminently clear that every legislative

-measure had been in favour of the lessees, and that on no occasion had the Maori owners been

consulted regarding any new legislation. Turning to the judgement of the Court of Appeal in

the case of Te Moauroa and others, they found that 'unless the Legislature has distinctly given

authority to the contrary, both parties to the contract contained in the lease should be held to il II their bargain'. While it would be in the lessees' interests to surrender their present leases and secure conversions to perpetual lease, this would prevent the Maori owners from the right of r I i competing at the end of the term of the leases, and the commissioners felt this would be

'contrary both to law and equity'; that as a considerable number of Maori were now turning

their attention to· dairy fanning it was only just that they should not be deprived of the right of

competing for leases by changing the tenure in favour of the lessees.

I , I I I The commissioners recommended that none of the lessees be allowed to surrender their leases.

TJ:ley had already had three opportunities of doing so and it was too late now 'to again offer

them a privilege or concession to which, under their leases, they had no claim as of right', and , in fact to do so would be 'an interference with the inviolability of contract'. They also

recommended that since all the 18,000 odd acres still leased under the 1881 act might 'hereafter

be required by the Native owners for their use and occupation', .those lands should all remain

under their existing tenure. Finally, since private lenders would not advance money to Maori I i owners, as no share or interest could be seized or sold or be 'subject to any law relating to

78 ibid pp108-09, 115-16. 215

bankruptcy', the commissioners recommended that owners look for financial aid to the public

trustee, 'the only legal entity against whom this statutory provision does not operate'. The

public trustee had in fact stated 'that the improvements would be a sufficient security for

advances made by the Government if there were authority given to make such advances')9

Criticism of the public trustee during this commission of enquiry contributed to the ~ - establishment in December 1912 of anotber, charged with enquiring into the working of the

Public Trust Office, and ascertaining, inter alial whether the interests of Maori were 'carefully ~..... and satisfactorily managed' by the public trustee and whether 'Native business ... should be

separated from the Public Trust Office and managed by a Board or a Trustee specially

appointed for the purpose'. At the time, the west coast settlement reserves consisted of

193,966 acres, of which 120,110 acres were held by Europeans under perpetual lease, and

18,400 acres under 30-year leases; and 24,800 acres were held by Maori owners under

occupation licences. This commission's findings rather nullified some of the positive II recommendations of the earlier commission for it concluded that as far as the leased portions of the west coast settlement reserves were concerned, the work was 'largely routine and

[ mechanical' and 'carefully and satisfactorily done', although supervision of the 24,800 acres

under occupation by 368 Maori, was much less satisfactory. The public trustee was not happy

( I that many of the Maori licensees had 'not themselves cultivated, but [had] granted the use of

the land to Europeans', and that where they had used the land themselves they had not done so I 'to the best advantage'. He also questioned whether the more than 25,000 acres of papakainga

I [ land should be allowed to remain 'practically waste'. The public trustee was not in favour of letting the Maori bid for the expiring 30-year leases, and repeated the view he expressed to the

1912 commissioners that 'the Native, as a rule, is not qualified to be a successful occupant of a

highly improved farm'. Thus, in the interests of settlement, he supported the lessees and felt

they should be enabled to convert to 21-year leases with the right of perpetual renewal.

79 ibid pp6-9. 216

Apparently he no longer thought improvements sufficient security for government loans to enable Maori to bid for leases, for at the most he was only prepared to advance funds for working and stocking 'available acres' which the Maori might take up 'in small associations under European management and control'.

The commissioners felt that the whole position of 'the Native and his lands' needed reviewing and even questioned whether 'the large increase of rentals shortly to be expected on revaluation

... should or should not be devoted to measures for the improvement of the Natives interested instead of being paid over to them directly'. They thought the whole burden of 'Native business' should be lifted off the public trustee, that it did not pay him to do it, and that while increased rentals might bring in 'a handsome profit' the money would be better spent 'in the interests of the Natives' by setting up a native reserves trustee with a board consisting of himself and four others, one of them Maori; and if such an arrangement 'cast on the Native owners any greater obligations' than they already bore, then it was to be remembered that the public trustee had administered the reserves at a loss, and it was only just that such a loss should be borne 'by those for whose benefits the trusts [were] created'.80 The establishment of a separate office of native trustee was delayed by the war and was not effected until 1920..

Under section 3 of the Native Trustee Act, 1920, the Native Trust Office was established; in

1921 it came under the control of the native minister, and by an act of 1932 came to form part of the Native Department. 81 Section 13 of the 1920 act provided that all native reserves which on commencement of the act were vested in the public trustee should be transferred to and vest in the native trustee.

The Reform government, enlightened by the findings of many commissions, t.i>ught in new legislation in 1913 to deal with the 18,400 acres still on 30-year leases. Far from legislating to

80 AJHR 1913 B9a ppl, 13-19.

81 Report of Commission of Inquiry into Maori Reserved Land, AJHR 1975 H3 pp20-21. 217

satisfy the Maori owners who were so looking forward to resuming their lands, subject only to

payment for improvements, the government 'ignored and disregarded' the very able report of

the 1912 west coast settlement reserves commissioners.82 The West Coast Settlement

Reserves Amendment Act, 1913 was supposedly an 'equitable arrangement' by which each of

the lessees should be 'entitled to a new lease of the land comprised in his present lease for a

further term of ten years', at which time all rights of the lessees should 'absolutely cease and

determine '" other than the right to be paid compensation for improvements'. And although no

European would be 'satisfied with anything less than 5 percent', the new rental was to be at

4.5 percent on the capital value of the land, less improvements, reducible to 4 percent for

prompt payment; and at the end of ten years full value was to be paid for improvements, even if

they exceeded the existing limit of £5 per acre. The Native Land Court was required to

partition among the owners all leased lands subject to the provisions of this act, but the

partitions were not to take effect until the new leases expired. Meanwhile the public trustee

was to deduct from all rentals received ' five pounds per centum for his pains and trouble' of

administration, plus incidental expenses, including survey fees, and from the remainder was to

pay one-third to the Maori owners and two-thirds 'to the common fund of the Public Trust r I I I Office, there to accumulate with the interest thereon' so that the lessees could be paid full compensation on the expiration of the new leases. If, however, there was not then sufficient

money accumulated from anyone lease, the public trustee was authorized to pay for the

improvements and charge the sum against the land. Such a charge would then 'have the same

force and effect as if it were a valid mortgage' and of course the land could be sold if the owner

could not keep up the payments. Even should a lessee decide not to renew his lease, the land

would not simply revert to the owners, but would be compusorily re-Ieased for another ten

years. In addition, the Crown assumed the right, under section 109 of the Native Land Act

Amendment Act, 1913, to buy up any of the extended leases during the last ten years of their

duration and sell the land to the lessees.

82 NZPD 1913 c1xvii p88S. 218

When the bill came before the House on 25 November there was an uproar, both about the

lateness of the session, and about the 'confidentiality' of the agreement over the bill supposedly

come to between the owners, the lessees and the public trustee. When the native minister

assured the House that there was nothing contentious in the bill, and that all parties had agreed

to it, the Maori members and others asked to see the agreement, but were told first that it was a

confidential agreement which could not be laid on the table, and then that it was 'not an

agreement in the ordinary sense of the word ... but really the minutes of the conference ... held

to decide this important matter' - quite 'the fairest agreement possible for the Native people

concerned'. Pomare's views as expressed to the 1912 west coast settlement reserves

commission differed markedly from those he expressed in the House. The government had, he

said, discarded the commissioners' report 'for something better', and he claimed the agreement

come to was quite satisfactory to his constituents. But both Carroll and Ngata on the opposite r side of the House from Pomare, objected that all the owners were certainly not in favour of the I I I proposal. Those named in the bill as 'representing the Native owners' were supposedly the

current members of the 'Maori union', but Kahu Pukoro, the founding president; was not one

of those-named, and he and his group, 'some of the most important beneficiaries', had been

I I I denied a hearing by the select committee considering the bill. According to Herries, the native \ minister, they were doing the owners a great favour, since their object was 'to get out of the i \ I hands of the Public Trustee' and by this bill they would, in ten years, 'be shot of the Public

I I Trustee' and their land would go back to them 'absolutely'; they would step into their 'own l property in severalty' and would then have no difficulty in borrowing money to improve their

land.83

The bill of course referred to but a small portion of the reserved lands on the west coast, the

bulk of which were tied up under the 1892 act, and when Taare Parata, Southern Maori,

suggested the government amend that act, Herries claimed it could not be done, for they could

83 ibid pp136-38, 879-80, 911-12. 219

not 'break sacred contracts'.84 However they could break crown grants, for, under section

109 of the Native Land Amendment Act, 1913, the Crown could purchase, from the owner or

trustee, any land held as a native reserve or held in trust for any native, whether or not 'such

land be held under a trust with power of alienation or with prohibition against alienation'. One

member described the bill as a leasing bill with a freehold bill at the back of it providing

'machinery by which the whole of these leases can be turned into freeholds during the currency

of the ten-years lease'. This provision, which gave the Maori the right to sell to the Crown,

I , was justified by the native minister as fulfilling article two of the Treaty. 'Word for word you I I could not get this Bill to better conform to the Treaty of Waitangi, and if it is good enough for i 1 ! \ the Treaty of Waitangi it is good enough for this House'.85 The Maori members in oppositio!l, I I Carroll, Ngata, Buck and Parata, did their best to have the bill altered in favour of the Maori I I I : owners, but not one of their nine amendments was accepted, and the bill passed into law on 15 I I .-- December 1913. Under this act there were 'limited Crown purchases' in the west coast

settlement reserves.86

In 1914 and 1915 further amending acts were introduced to 'repair defects' in the 1913 act, and

to facilitate the partitioning of lands among the Maori owners. Partitioning was an important

provision of the 1913 act, an antidote to the occupation licences of the 1892 act, which had, I I I according to Pomare, only 'encouraged communism'.87 In the main, the amendments in the

new acts were suggested by judges of the Native Land Court involved in the partitioning

84 ibid pp879-80.

II 85 ibid pp915. 921.

86 AJHR 1975 H3 p50.

87 NZPD 1913 clxvii p900. 220

exercise. It seemed some attention was to be given to Maori needs; both Ngata and Parata

commended the 1915 act as being in the interests of the west coast Maori.88

About the time the extended leases were due to run out, the remaining lessees presented a

petition to parliament asking to be given the right to acquire a perpetual lease 'and the same

right to acquire the freehold in fee-simple ... from the Native owners' as they believed was

enjoyed by lessees holding perpetual leases under the 1892 act. But the mood of parliament i ' had changed, and when the West Coast Settlement Reserves Amendment Act, 1923 was debated, there was no sympathy 'with the prayer of the petition', and even the Taranaki

members did not speak in favour of the lessees - if only because 'the Act of 1913 was defmite,

and ... there was no possible chance of getting out of it'. Unfortunately Ngata's fear,

expressed in the 1914 debate, that rents had been set too low and there would not be 'enough

money in the hands of the Public Trustee to meet the improvements at the end of the ten

years'89, was shown to be well founded. Only £30,000 of the hoped for £70,000 had

accumulated. Because of this 'slight failure in the Act of 1913' it had become necessary to

pass a bill under which the owners were not 'required' to extend the leases yet again, but they

could 'consent' to an extension of five years to allow further accumulation of funds. If the

owners refused their consent, then the money to pay for improvements was to be advanced by

the government and 'be secured by charges on the lands' - repayable within five years.90

There were by now only 12,000 acres left which came under the provisions of this bill.

The contribution of the Pioneer Battalion in the first world war served to change European

views of the Maori, and raised Maori hopes of a greater European appreciation of their

( ! grievances and needs. But returning Maori servicemen found their war-time footing of equality

88 NZPD 1915 clxxiv pp607-0S.

89 NZPD 1914 clxxi pp529-30.

90 NZPD 1923 ccii pp556-59, 5S0. 221

with the European did not translate to peace-time. Their expectation that justice would be done

to them was not fulfilled. They were even denied the rehabilitation assistance given to

European ex-servicemen. Their old struggle for the land was taken up again and 'petitions

poured in' and deputations waited on ministers in an attempt to get satisfaction for their land

claims. The government's response was to institute further commissions of enquiry into Maori

grievances.

\ ! In November 1920 the Native Land Claims Commission reported on the continuing saga of the ( ) Waipuku-Patea reserve which had already been enquired into by the Fox-Bell commission in

1880 and the Fox commission in 1882. Pepe Heke of Araukuku and his people had

complained in 1876 that the 700-acre reserve made for them in 1873 had been 'turned over' by

Charles Brown on the orders of the premier, Harry Atkinson, to make way for the proposed

town of Stratford. The people had agreed to the move reluctantly and 'under duress', and the

Fox-Bell commission had no doubt that the transaction was unlawfu1.91 In 1882 Fox

recommended that crown grants for 700 acres 'near Stratford' and 300 acres 'lower down the

Mountain Road' be issued to Heke Pakeke (Pepe Heke) and 34 others to 'adjust' their case:

'The compulsory exchange of a reserve of 700 acres was undoubtedly a very high handed

transaction on the part of ... Major Brown ... and one very injurious to the interests of the I ! \ natives .... The difference in value between the two blocks was very great'. Had Heke's

people not already leased the substituted reserve (which they did not care to occupy

themselves), Fox would have 'considered it only just that the title of the natives to the portion

of the site of Stratford included in the original reserve, not yet sold, should have been

maintained'. But under the circumstances he thought compromise the best option, and 'a long ) l ' neg¥ation, ably conducted by Major Parris, ended in the natives agreeing to retain the I substituted section and to have 300 acres more'. They were supposedly 'perfectly satisfied \ ..

91 AJHR 1880 G2 pplv, 8, 11,61. 222

with the conclusion arrived at', which, Fox acknowledged, was one 'extremely favourable to

the Government' .92

However, in 1920 the owners were still complaining that they had been 'injured by the alleged

arbitrary action of the authorities' in altering the location of their reserve, and that the 300 acres

'compensation' offered them was insufficient and not even agreed to by all of them. The 1920

native land claims commissioners questioned 'the fairness and justness' of the adjustment.

They found that the portion of the reserve in the town of Stratford was valued at over £11 per

acre, while the substituted reserve was worth only £2 per acre, but they thought it 'would not

be fair to take the full value of the land laid out as a town as a fair measure of the compensation

to which the Natives were entitled'. After some complicated arithmetic they settled on £4,323

as the appropriate amount of compensation due for the people's 'forced deprivation ... and

expense in endeavouring to have the wrong righted'.93 Ten years later the Native Land Court

had drawn up a list of beneficiaries entitled 'to any relief that might be granted', and section

100 of the Native Purposes Act, 1931 provided that there should be paid from the consolidated

fund to the District Maori Land Board 'such sum as shall be appropriated by Parliament I .' l \ for the purpose, whether in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims and demands for relief or by way of instalment on account of the relief sought to be granted'. But in 1935 '7""---- compensation still had not been aid, and section 21 of the Native Purposes Act of that year

I ' provided for the settin u 0 et another commission to etermine what level of compensation ! ' it would be 'reasonable' to award to the beneficiaries. The new commission was not to be

bound 'by any former finding as to the amount of compensation to be awarded', and the

92 AJHR 1882 G5 pp15-16.

93 AJHR 1921 Sess I G5 pp22-24. 223

amount it recommended was not to become payable unless and until it was approved by the ~ r minister of finance and appropriated by parliament.94 . ~ ~c-::::: ~.~ , -;7'~~ t/'~

In 1905 the claims of 'absentee members of the Ngatimutunga Hapu' had come before a

commission of enquiry under James Mackay. J. C. Richmond had decreed in 1867 that the

absentees of five Taranaki hapu should be awarded 16 acres each, and that 3,000 acres

between Titoki and Rau-o-te Huia should therefore be reserved for Ngatimutunga - 'yet

nothing was done to allocate the awards'. When none of the hapu had claimed their entitlement

by 1890, the government decided the land would not be required for them and proceeded to

dispose of it 'as ordinary Crown lands'. Subsequently Heni te Rau (Mrs Jane Brown, to

whom Fox had awarded land between Patea and Whenuakura in settlement of another claim)

petitioned parliament on behalf of herself and her hapu, praying that 'the whole of the 3,000

I I acres in the Waitara district should be handed over to the Ngatimutunga Hapu without I I restriction and that they should be allowed to partition it as they pleased among themselves'.

Mackay decided that Richmond's intention had been to award Ngatimutunga 16 acres per adult,

and he, with great diligence, drew up a whakapapa to determine those interested in, or entitled

to succeed to the land promised by Richmond. He finally recommended an award of 1,168

I I acres representing 73 'full shares of 16 acres each'. Only one resident ofParihaka wrote I advancing a claim, and he was told that to 'prefer a claim he must appear personally before the

Commission' - a provision not required of those claimants resident in the Chathams. No-one

from Parihaka appeared, but in the end Mackay recommended the award of 16 acres to Tutu te

Hihi, the absent Parihaka claimant. He also recommended that 'the sum of £10 should be

considered an equivalent to an award of 16 acres, and be paid to those persons who desire it in

lieu of land'.95

, I l 94 It has proved difficult to determine whether such a commission was ever set up and if or when the owners received compensation.

95 AJHR 1905 G7 pp2-3. 224

In 1922 N gatimutunga were again petitioning parliament for the fulfilment of the promise to

them of 3,000 acres, or compensation at the rate of £1 per acre. Under the provisions of

section 55 of the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, 1922, the

petitions of Heni te Rau and of Roimata Wi Tamihana and others were referred the following

year to the Native Land Court at New Plymouth. After an 'exhaustive enquiry' the court had

no difficulty in satisfying itself that the claims of the Ngatimutunga absentees had never been

met and that the promises made to them by the government of the day had never been carried

out. There was no question according to the court 'but that Ngatimutunga were a loyal hapu'

and that in 1867, having taken into account the number of claimants, the government had

promised them an award of 3,000 acres. The court believed the Mackay commission 'made a

I fundamental mistake in assuming that the award was restricted to 16 acres for-each adult I i , ' absentee' it could account for; that the under-secretary for lands had been allowed to take 'an \ I unduly prominent part in the proceedings' of the commission; and that it was a pity the l ' claimants had not been allowed to be represented 'by at least one solicitor capable of putting the

Native side of the question intelligently before the Commission'. But since the reports of the

Mackay commission had not been given effect to, the court felt they should be used simply as a

guide to the names of some of those entitled to the £3,000 they recommended be paid as i I compensation. It was pointed out that the promise of 3,000 acres to the 'absentee I I \. I , Ngatimutunga' was quite separate from the promise of 10,000 acres to the 'Chatham

Islanders'; though why the latter, men, women and children, were to get 50 acres each, while

the former were to get only 16 acres each was not at all clear to the court. The final

recommendation was that legislation be passed to set aside £3,000 compensation, and that the

names of those entitled be ascertained by the Native Land Court; and the judge begged

'specially to recommend that definite action be taken one way or the other' lest his report meet

the same fate as that of the Mackay commission.96 The report was acted on: section 28 of the

Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, 1925, empowered the

96 AJHR 1924 G6I pp 1-6. 225

Native Land Court to ascertain the names of those entitled 'to any relief that might be granted -

although it remained to the discretion of the government to consider what, if any, relief should

be granted.

Finally, in October 1926 the confiscation itself became the subject of enquiry when Sir William

Sim was appointed chairman of a 'Commission to Inquire into Confiscations of Native Lands

and Other Grievances Alleged by Natives'. The commission's terms of reference required it to

report on whether the confiscations 'exceeded in quantity what was fair and just'; whether any

confiscated land should have been excluded from the confiscation; whether any descendants of

those entitled to compensation should now receive such compensation; whether reserves made

for rebels were 'in regard to any particular tribe or hapu inadequate'; and whether claims made [ . I I in certain petitions should receive favourable consideration.97 Counsel for the Maori owners,

Smith, concentrated on the petitions which raised the question 'as to whether the act of

confiscation itself was justified', and argued that since the war which resulted in confiscation

was the fault of the Europeans, 'the confiscation from Whitecliffs to Waitotara was in itself

unjustified'.98 Although the commission's terms of reference assumed confiscation was

justified, the Crown did not dispute the petitioners' right to question the justice of confiscation.

However Taylor, counsel for the Crown, contended that Smith's view was based on the work

of historians 'who knew personally nothing of the matters on which they gave their opinions',

but who were all influenced by G.W. Rusden, whose History of New Zealand might be 'more

justly described as an attack on the Colonial Government for its dealings with the Natives'.

Taylor argued that the question of the justice or injustice of the Waitara purchase was irrelevant

to the enquiry since the 'rebellion' which arose out of it had resulted in no confiscations of

land; that the enquiry should properly relate only to those events which occurred after 1

January 1863, and that since the Maori were in rebellion after that date confiscation was

97 AJHR 1928 G7 pp2-3.

98 Sim commission evidence tis p5, MA 85/1. 226

justified; and that the main question to be considered was whether the extent of the confiscation

was justified, as he contended it was, given 'the huge financial burden of the cost of putting

down the rebellion',99 While Smith had told the commissioners they might rely on the

historian William Pember Reeves, Taylor told them they were entitled to place 'the very

greatest reliance indeed, upon the word and work of Sir William Fox', But as Smith pointed

out, Fox was appointed only to fulfil promises, not to 'do complete justice, as this

Commission is appointed'.100 Smith questioned 'the justification for the confiscation of the

{ i Ngatiawa proclaimed district' and concluded that it was 'quite clear that the Government had no ! justification between 1863 and 1865 for taking those Ngatiawa lands', but he admitted that

under the terms of the 1863 act there were grounds for confiscation of 'Ngatiruanui and

Taranaki districts'.101 On the question of compensation raised in the petitions, Smith [: /1 contended that the Ngatirahiri claim had not yet been fully satisfied, while according to the Crown it had been 'amply met', When it came to the 'Chatham Islanders' Taylor had to admit

that the 10,000 acres awarded them had never been allocated.102

The commissioners accepted W, p, Reeves view that the Waitara purchase was 'needless and

disastrous ... the classic example of a blunder worse than a crime', and they saw it as central to

the question of the justice of confiscation as punishment for acts of rebellion. They found the

Waitara purchase 'was the cause of both the Taranaki wars, and was one, at least, of the causes

of the Waikato war', They concluded that the

Natives were treated as rebels and war declared against them before they had engaged in rebellion of any kind, and in the circumstances they had no alternative but to fight in I their own self-defence .... Both the Taranaki wars ought to be treated ... as having I. i arisen out of the Waitara purchase, and judged accordingly .... Although the natives who took part in the second Taranaki war were engaged in rebellion within the meaning

99 ibid pp99, 101, 105.

100 ibid pp72, 186,211.

101 ibid ppI56-58.

102 ibid pp186-88. 227

of the New Zealand Settlements Act, 1863 .,. in the circumstances, they ought not to have been punished by the confiscation of any of their lands.103

The commissioners considered an annual award of £5,000, 'to be applied by a Board for the

benefit of the Natives of the tribes whose land was confiscated', to be adequate compensation

for the 'wrong done by the confiscations'. But they admitted that it was 'difficult, if not

impossible, to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion as to the value of the land at the date of its

confiscation'l04 - and, as usual, the monetary value of land was an overriding consideration. :' I , ( . It was also difficult, as counsel for the Crown admitted, even to arrive at accurate figures

regarding the amount of land confiscated throughout the North Island, as well as the amount

'paid for', and the amount 'returned to the natives', but an overall figure of 1,523,123 acres

Ii was settled on as 'the total area of land of which the Maoris were deprived under the \ I confiscations, without payment of any kind'.105 An 1866 committee had estimated that in

Taranaki a total of 1,443,348 acres worth £418,850 was confiscated,106 but the

commissioners accepted that 1,275,000 acres were originally confiscated in Taranaki, 557,000

acres were 'purchased from the Natives and paid for by the Government', and 256,000 acres

'returned to the Natives, thus leaving 462,000 acres as the total area finally confiscated'.107

[ , Of the thirteen Taranaki petitions examined by the commissioners only one received favourable

consideration. Petition no. 37 related, among other things, to the invasion of Parihaka in 1881

when 'Government soldiers plundered the houses of the people, confiscated all guns found,

103 Sim commission report, AJHR 1928 G7 pp7, 10, 11.

104 ibid pH.

105 Sim commission evidence tis p125, MA 85/1.

106 AJHR 1866 F2 p4.

107 Sim commission report. AJHR 1928 G7 pl1. The Fox commission gave 1,192,000 acres as the total area in the Taranaki confiscated territory; AJHR 1884 Sess I ASb p24. 228

smashed open boxes containing valuable greenstone goods and other things held dear by a

Maori'. The commissioners accepted that destruction and looting had taken place, and they

relied on W. P. Reeves brief description of the 'expedition' to Parihaka, which, they said, was

the view 'now generally accepted, and ... the view on which ... the present claim should be

judged'. As the Maori had not kept any record of their losses, the commissioners found it

'impossible now to ascertain exactly what these losses were and who the individual sufferers

were'. But they thought 'according to good conscience and equity' the sum of £300 'should

( , be paid as an acknowledgement, at least, of the wrong that was done to the Natives of

I. Parihaka'.108 A contemporary newspaper account had reported the Maori as having stated

'that coin and greenstone, etc, to the value of 3001., was taken during the constabulary search'

of Parihaka after the invasion.109

The recommendations of the commission were to be given effect to by section 49 of the Native

Purposes Act, 1931, 'either according to the terms of the Commission's recommendations or

in accordance with any modified, varied or extended terms that may be deemed just or

expedient' - and with the proviso that 'where-the recommendation of the Commission requires I I the payment of any sum of money ... no payment shall be made unless and until the amount to I, l be paid has been appropriated by Parliament for the purpose'. The act provided for the

establishment of boards of management, constituted as bodies corporate, and under the control

of the governor-general in Council, but with the power to determine what might be a 'proper

object' for which a payment might be made out of the funds it held. The Taranaki Maori Trust

Board was deemed to be a board of management. Section 105 of the act provided that the 451

acres known as Parihaka numbers 9, 10, lla and 51 should cease to be subject to the 1892 act

and should revest in the beneficial owners. In determining who were the beneficial owners the

court was not to be bound 'by any Crown grant or former title' to the land, but could 'take into

108 AJHR 1928 G7 pp32-33.

109 Lyttelton Times 11 Nov 1881, reprinted in BPP/IUP vol 16 p587. 229

consideration the necessity of affording protection to those who have been occupying or

residing upon any part of the land'. According to the west coast commissioner in 1884 the

hapu which occupied the Parihaka block 'had refused to give the information as to tribal

interests and other matters' necessary to enable him to recommend their crown grants, and he

had got the 'required information' from Hone Pihama, Ruakere, 'and one or two others'.1 10

~~/ --/1f2/ ), Funds for payment of the compensation to the Taranaki tribes were appropriated annually until

1944 when the Taranaki Maori Claims Settlement Act provided for a statutory annual p~yment

of £5,000, as recommended by the Sim commission. The act stated that 'the Maoris now

concerned' with the claims dealt with by the commission had agreed to accept the provisions in

the act 'in full settlement and discharge' of those claims. The monetary compensation was to

be paid to the Taranaki Maori Trust Board 'on the fIrst day of April in each and every year' and

the sum of £300 was to be paid to the board 'in settlement of all claims which have heretofore

been made or which might hereafter be made ... in respect of the loss and destruction ... of

{ certain goods and chattles owned by the Maori inhabitants of Parihaka'. It was admitted in the I \ I House that this was 'a small sum - a nominal sum', but there was no suggestion that it be

increased or that interest be paid for the 63 years since the debt was incurred or even the 17

years since payment of compensation was recommended by the commission. It was simply I : 'an acknowledgement of the wrong done to the Maoris of that day'. Qf more moment to some members of parliament was the fact that compensation for confIscation was to be paid in

perpetuity, but it was pointed out to them that the confIscation was in perpetuity and that an

annual payment of £5,000 represented an annual rental of only 6d per acre,111 The Maori ~--~~------~------~--~------Trust Boards Act 1955 repealed both the 1944 act and section 49 of the 1931 act, and provided

simply that the Taranaki Trust Board should continue to exist and continue to receive the

£5,000 annual payment.

110 AJHR 1884 Sess I ASb pS.

III NZPD 1944 cclxvii pp750, 7S3, 763. 230

Dissatisfaction with the public trustee's perpetual leases came to a head in 1934 over valuations made by arbitration as provided for in the 1892 act. The 1934 arbitrations were 'very unsatisfactory' to the Maori owners since they resulted in a reduction of all the rentals when almost all of them should have been substantially increased. The reduction was due not to 'a reduction in the gross or capital value of the land', but to a defective system of valuation which

resulted in the improvements being overvalued and the land undervalued. In July 19351 soon after Ngata's resignation, the native trustee took the case of a disputed arbitration to the

Supreme Court in order to get 'the true interpretation' of clause 56 of the schedule to the 1892 act which stated that at the end of the ternl of a lease a valuation was to be made of all substantial improvements made by the lessee during the ternl and then in existence on the land.

The Maori owners were not disputing the ownership of the improvements, but the valuations on which rentals were based. But the presiding judge, Mr Justice Blair, ruled that 'on the true interpretation of clause 56, only those improvements were deductible from the gross or capital value for the purpose of ascertaining the residue on which the rental was to be based, which had been effected during the tem1 of the then existing and expiring lease',l12 The lessees of course reacted sharply to this ruling and would certainly have taken an appeal to the Court of

Appeal and even to the Privy Council, which would have involved delays of two or three years and inevitably ended in amending legislation. In the circumstances it was agreed to proceed with legislation, but the representatives of the lessees made such strong representations to the, coalition government's leaders, O. W. Forbes and J. O. Coates, and to the Taranaki members of parliament, that the matter was treated with urgency, and 'a hastily prepared and ill- * considered enactment ... vitally affecting the interests of a large body of Maoris' was rushed through 'in the last hours of the ... final session of a moribund Parliament' without the Maori

112 AJHR 194801 pp13, 15. 231

owners' knowledge and 'without their having any opportunity of being heard by way of

I:rotest' .113

Subsection 5 of section 19 of the Native Purposes Act, 1935, amended clause 56 of the 1892

act by omitting the words 'made by the lessee during the term' - and backdated the amendment

his amendment, which resulted in 'consistently reduced' rentals, passed

parliament without comment, and on 26 October, the last sitting day, the act passed into law.

The beneficial owners soon heard of this change in the legislation and immediately made their

concerns known to the government and asked that the question be re-considered, but 'nothing

was done'.114 According to the commissioners appointed in 1947 to enquire into the law

relating to the assessment of rentals under leases of the west coast settlement reserves, it was

I i t ) 'doubtful whether any of the persons responsible for the enactment appreciated the implications

of the enactment, and what its real effect was or perhaps what it was not'. The native trustee

thought it would mean rentals would now 'be based on the "unimproved value" as defmed by

the Valuation of Land Act', whereas in fact it meant

that all permanent improvements are to be taken into account whenever effected, and

I: I, not merely those effected during the current and expiring term, and, instead of the 'unimproved value' being ascertained first as it would be if all the definitions of the l ,I Valuation of Land Act had been invoked and the rental fixed at 5 per cent of the value, the capital value is ascertained first, then the improvements, and the rental is based at 5 per cent. on the residue in accordance with the Schedule to the 1892 Act The capital value and the value of the improvements were still to be ascertained by arbitration, and the arbitrators were at complete liberty to fix their own valuations and to disregard the valuations made by the Government valuers as appearing in the valuation roll.llS

Th! result was that som!rents.,J£Ne reilnced-bx more than 50 percent, and the native trustee realised,------the position was worse than ev~. In September 1936 a deputation of Maori owners waited on M. J. Savage, the new prime minister, who assured them that something would have

113 ibid pp6, 19-20.

114 ibid p23.

115 ibid p24.

\.1 232

to be done, 'and done pretty soon'.1 16 They hoped a clause might be inserted in the 'Washing-

up Bill' of that session, as had been done for the lessees in the previous one, but again nothing

was done. And there, but for a series of petitions from the beneficial owners, and

'representations and deputations to Ministers', and reports from the Native Affairs Committee,

the matter rested until 6 October 1946, when a deputation waited on the then prime minister and

minister of native affairs, , and voiced their grievances. At last, after another war

and the undeniable sacrifice of the Maori Battalion, their plea was heard, and a commission,

\ I consisting of Sir Michael Myers, Arnold Reedy and A. M. Samuel, was appointed in August l 1947 to investigate the whole question. 117

In the commissioners' view the Maori owners had 'suffered a grave injustice' and should now

be given 'the fullest measure of justice and future protection and security that it is reasonable

and possible to give them. They are entitled to that'. They considered that a payment from the

'accumulated profits in the Native Trustee's Account' of £30,000 'would be reasonable and

just, but not excessive, compensation' for the loss in rentals the owners had suffered in the

intervening eleven years, (the Maori had claimed losses of up to £5,000 or £6,000 per year); r and that new legislation was required for their future protection and security.118 A later commission of enquiry found it 'somewhat surprising' that the Maori trustee be required to pay

compensation to remedy the injustice suffered by the beneficial owners, especially since the

chairman of the Myers commission had earlier said: 'It is unfortunate perhaps that the people

II . I

116 ibid p26.

117 Report of Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into and Report upon the Operation of the Law Relating to the Assessment of Rentals under Leases of the West Coast Settlement Reserves, ibid p27.

118 ibid pp 6,28,29. 233

who ought to be made to pay it, if it should be paid by anybody, are the Legislators who

passed this legislation in 1935 in the dying hours of a session .. .'119

The West Coast Settlement Reserves Amendment Act, 1948, gave effect to the

recommendations ofthe Myers commission. The act affected 474 leases covering 71,643

acres, the residue of the west coast settlement reserves subject to the 1892 act, of which there

I ' were 4,272 beneficial owners. Most of the leases had been wrongly valued and they were all

to be cancelled as from 1 January 1948, and new 21-year leases substituted at rentals of 5

percent of the unimproved value determined through new valuations made under the direction

of the valuer-general, and with the right of appeal to a valuation committee consisting of three

members nominated by the valuer-general, the Maori trustee, and the West Coast Settlement

Reserves Lessees Association. The act also provided for the payment from the Maori trustee's

reserve fund 'to the Maori owners, or to the Maori Trustee for their benefit', of such a sum I I I I 'not exceeding £30,000 as the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Minister of Finance may

jointly determine'. One member of the opposition representing a west coast electorate

questioned the payment of compensation and thought that the grievances of the Maori were

more imaginary than real, that the grave injustice the Maori land owners were 'supposed to

have suffered over the last twelve or thirteen years was, in fact, no greater than was suffered

II by other classes of land owners'; while a future minister of Maori affairs, E. B. Corbett, said

that the lessees in his Egmont electorate were 'very hopeful' that the Maori would keep this

agreement 'in the spirit in which it was entered into', and that there would be 'no more

cavilling or raising of imaginary grievances as in days gone by'.l20

This was the last major amendment to the West Coast Settlements Reserves Act. In 1955 the

Maori Reserved Land Act provided that all land subject to the provisions of the West Coast

119 AJHR 1975 H3 p258.

120 NZPD 1948 cclxxxiv pp4279-80, 4284. 234

Settlement Reserves Act, 1892 should, on the commencement of the 1955 act, become

settlement reserves subject to the provisions of that act. In other words 'as far as possible the

same general rules' were, by this act, to be applied to all reserved land, although the act

distinguished between 'reserves' and 'settlement reserves'.1 21 The act repealed all the west

coast settlement reserves acts still extant (as well as clauses in other acts relating to those

I ' reserves) - except the West Coast Settlement Reserves Amendment Act, 1923, which, probably I simply through legislative oversight,122 remained on the statute books until it too was repealed

by section 19 of the Finance Act 1987.

Section 3 of the Maori Purposes Act, 1962, provided that on an application for an

amalgamation order being made to it by the Maori trustee, the Maori Land Court should make

such an order. The owners of the west coast settlement reserves had talked of amalgamation

for some years, and attempts had been made to have enabling legislation introduced. The 1961

Hunn Report recommended amalgamation of titles, and the 1962 act fin all y provided for it. On

1 May 1963 the Maori trustee made application to the court for an amalgamation order declaring

that all the west coast settlement reserves 'be held in common ownership under one equitable

title by all the owners of the settlement reserves and their successors in title', the order to take

effect on 1 July 1963 and the land so amalgamated to be known as the Paraninihi-ki-Waitotara

Reserve.l23 The application was heard by Judge D. G. Davis in Hawera on 11 June 1963,

and the court, having satisfied itself that all the necessary requirements had been met, made an

amalgamation order 'in accordance with the Application of the Maori Trustee'.124

121 AJHR 1975 H3 pp21-22.

122 Personal communication, Office of the Clerk of the House, 6 Dec 1989.

123 Office of Maori Trustee, Wanganui.

124 Maori Land Court Taranaki Minute Book No. 73/137-142. 235

Under section 9 of the Maori Reserved Land Act 1955, the Maori trustee had no power to sell

any reserved land. However, this was amended by sections 155 and 156 of the Maori Affairs

Amendment Act, 1967 (which came into effect on 1 April 1968), to enable the Maori trustee to

sell settlement land to any lessee desirous of obtaining the freehold of the land comprised in his

lease, at 10 percent above the unimproved value as determined by government valuation. The

wording of the act made it clear that the Maori trustee should accept an offer made by a lessee

unless he was, 'for any reason, unable to accept his offer'. Owners were not obliged to sell; i . the sale would go ahead only if there were owners 'willing to sell and in sufficient numbers'.

I, I. When a lessee expressed his interest in freeholding, the Maori trustee would canvas the [ I beneficial owners to ascertain how many 'would be interested in considering an offer to buy their interests'. Those who first expressed such an interest were to be given preference if the ( I scheme went ahead. The number of sales which took place between early 1968 and late 1974 showed that 'the Maori Trustee's letter canvassing for shares was not without avail'; in the

II west coast settlement reserves 16,325 acres were sold for $1,192,895.125 II The Maori trustee was not asked for, nor did he offer his views as to whether the freeholding II provisions of the 1967 legislation were in the best interests of the beneficiaries, nor was there evidence of criticism or opposition from 'those persons or societies in the community who l might be expected to raise a voice of protest' against what was, in effect, 'a unilateral alteration by legislation of a long-existing contract between the Maori Trustee and the lessees'. Many of

the beneficial owners, however, 'regarded with alarm' this legislative provision by which

lessees were to be able to freehold the land they held on perpetual lease. They felt the reason

some owners sold was simply that they received so little in the way of rents; and while they

125 AJHR 1975 H3 pp50, 51, 52. 236

recognized the right to sell, they wanted other owners 'to have prior rights of purchase so that

Maori ownership of the corpus could be retained'.l26

In past years the lessors' role had been 'a completely passive one'. They had been treated as

'children or persons under a disability'; they were not 'adequately consulted', and when they

did speak out their views carried no weight. But 'the eqUilibrium established by the tensions

between parliament and the lessees ... finally expressed in the Maori Reserved Land Act 1955

... has in recent years been seriously disturbed by the concerns and demands of the beneficial

owners who are no longer willing to playa passive part in the administration and control of

these lands'. Their concerns were addressed at the end of 1973 when yet another commission

was set up, this time to enquire into the administration of the Maori reserved land administered

I ) by the Maori trustee under the provisions of the Maori Reserved Land Act 1955. The chairman

of the commission was Bartholomew Sheehan, a retired judge of the Maori Land Court, and

I the members were Rolland O'Regan and Georgina Te Heuheu. Their commission required II them, 'having regard to the interests of the beneficial owners of the land, and to the rights of existing lessees', to report on whether or not the administration of the land should remain with I ) the Maori trustee; whether the legislation under which lessees could obtain the freehold was warranted; and whether provisions as to the assessment of rentals and renewals of leases were

I satisfactory. The commission sat over a period of six months in thirteen centres in both

I ' islands, including sittings in Hawera and Wanganui on 30-31 July and 13 August 1974. In Taranaki the commission was concerned with 58,294 acres of farming land comprising 396

leases and with 4,572 beneficial owners.127 \ i

I ' The majority of the owners who appeared before the commission favoured changes in the

system of dealing with the reserved lands to give them complete, or at least greater control of

126 ibid pp53, 183.

127 Report of Commission of Inquiry into Maori Reserved Land, ibid pp6, 9, 12, 16. 237

the administration. Their dissatisfaction arose largely from the fact that they knew little about

their lands and had never been consulted on any matters regarding the leases. Their best

options for change seemed to be either a trust under section 438 of the Maori Affairs Act,

1953, or an incorporation under part IV of the Maori Mfairs Amendment Act, 1967. The

owners of west coast reserves were strongly in favour of incorporation, subject to a feasibility

study; the status quo was the last thing they wanted. The lessees, on the other hand, saw the

current administration as 'entirely satisfactory', and urged that the provisions for freeholding

their leases be retained or even extended. One 'experienced witness' told the commission that

'the Maori by nature is not a farmer' and that it was unlikely he would ever want to live on his

lands and farm them.128

The commissioners pointed out that while the leases under the 1955 act were 'nominally

between the Maori Trustee and the lessees', they were in fact between the Crown (that is,

parliament) and the lessees; and parliament had been 'under continual pressure from the

lessees' over security of tenure, rights of renewal, methods of determining rents, and the right

to freehold. Parliament, they said, had responded to this pressure 'responsibly and on the

whole, fairly, but inevitably it has resulted in law and leases designed more to protect the total

estate than to provide an equitable return to the beneficial owners'. The commissioners were

clear in their views that the method of rent assessment and the periods between rent reviews

were unsatisfactory in that the negative effects of both reflected entirely on the lessor, and the

lessee was totally protected from them. The procedure of assessing rural rentals at five percent

of government valuation, rather than market value, had been written into section 34 of the

Maori Reserved Land Act 1955 as a result of recommendations made by the Myers commission

in March 1948. This had had the effect of raising rentals above their previous 'unjustly low'

levels, but it also had 'the serious defect that it resulted in a very conservative rent at the

beginning of the 21-year period and ... was a factor in producing miniscule rents at the end of

128 ibid pp23, 25-26, 33, 34, 63, 182 .

. I 238

it'. In the absence of a policy of general indexation which would maintain stable rents in real

tenns, the commissioners favoured 5-yearly rent reviews - given the conservatism of a lessee

in trying to detennine a reasonable rental over a long period, the increasing rate of inflation,

and especially the fact that many lessees sub-leased and required 3-yearly rent reviews of their

tenants. 129

The commissioners condemned the system of perpetual renewal and urged that the granting of

such leases be forbidden for the future - but they did not recommend that the legislature

'interfere with valid contracts' to dispense with perpetual lease, as it had done to institute the

practice in the first place. Such a change, they said, would be 'completely indefensible and

would certainly involve the payment of very substantial compensation'.l30 One possible

\, IJ solution in the commissioners' view was for the administrators of the lands to freehold them

and purchase 'similar or even identical lands in replacement of them and so liberate themselves

from the shackles of perpetual renewability'. Yet, because they were firmly of the opinion

'that the principle of retention of Maori land in Maori ownership must be finnly upheld', they

urged that the provisions allowing for the sale of freehold to lessees be repealed 'to ensure that

further erosion of the corpus is prevented'; and that any future body set up to administer the

lands 'be empowered to buy up the shares of anxious sellers'.l31 r i I

The commission's main recommendation with regard to Taranaki was that 'notwithstanding

anything to the contrary in the Maori Reserved Land Act 1955 or in any other Act the beneficial

owners of the following Maori reserved land namely: Parininihi-Ki-Waitotara be constituted

129 ibid pp61, 76, 82, 84-86.

130 In December 1989 there are still 350 Taranaki leases subject to perpetual renewal, many of them almost at the end of their 21-year term. The government has promised to review the legislation in 1990 and may renew the leases for one year while this is done; radio report National Programme 9 Dec 1989.

131 AJHR 1975 H3 pp53-55, 68,87-88. 239

by statute a Maori incorporation under Part IV of the Maon Affairs Amendment Act 1967'.

The purpose of the incorporation would be to take over from the Maori trustee his 'title and

right' to administer the lands, and all his 'rights, powers, duties, liabilities and contracts'

concerning the lands 'whether under the Maori Reserved Land Act 1955 or otherwise

howsoever'. The object of the incorporation would be to exercise those powers and rights; to

arrange sales or leases; to work towards effecting the better utilization of the land; and to

purchase leases with the aim of occupying and managing the land in the interests of the r i incorporation. 132

By order in council of 16 February 1976, pursuant to section 15a of the Maori Reserved Land

Act 1955, the governor-general in Council constituted the proprietors of the Paraninihi Ki

Waitotara block, 'more commonly known as the West Coast Settlement Reserves', a Maori

incorporation under and subject to part IV of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967. The

order was to take effect from 28 February 1976 and the objects of the incorporaton were:

(a) to receive from the Maori trustee all land transferable by him to the

incorporation in accordance with the provisions of section 15A(6) of the Maori

Reserved Land Act 1955: (b) To use, manage, and administer any land or interests in land for the time bein~ ~

vested in or owned by the Incorporation. - r rtf'"3,.. .:; J -'" 0"""""'~ ~/~cr-rl~' / ~_ /' ,.s-0t" / ~ ?~' After 111 years the 50,000 odd acres that remained from about 150,000 acres of just and ample (0& f ~~ r and inalienable reserves that were to be theIrs and their children's for ever, returned to the ~~J control of the Maori owners. Two years later their tapu mountain, Taranaki, was 'symbolically

returned' to the Taranaki Maori Trust Board by the Mount Egmont Vesting Act 1978, in order

I that it might be given back to the Crown 'as a free gift and as a symbol of love to all the people I ' of New Zealand by the Board on behalf of the Atiawa, Ngati Mutunga, Ngati Maru, Ngati

132 ibid pp34, 35, 37-38. 240

Tama, Ngati Ruanui, Ngaruahine, Taranaki, and Ngarauru tribes, and their descendants'. But

the full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands guaranteed them by the Treaty of

Waitangi has never been returned to the people of Taranaki.

I ,I !I

r I I I r I I I 241

APPENDIX A

RESERVES, COMPENSATION COURT AWARDS, AND CROWN GRANTS

SUml.AHY of NATIVE J.JAND ill the CONFISCATED '.rmmITOHY adjlltlicl1tcd upon by the WEST COAST COmlISSIONER, uuder "The \Vest COltSt Settlemeut (North Island) Act, 1880." iBxclllRi~e of 111.n(1 gmntcd by Go\"crHlTl!!nt uuder oMler ActR.j

Numher Number of I of I Area.. TotaL GrnntA. Grnntccs. I ----- A.-LandR gmnted or in course of being granted :- A. n. 1'. A. R. P.· (i.) Hcser\"cs (Appendix 1., Schodule A).- (1.~ Wn.itotaro. to Po.ten...... 41 GS\) 11,069 3 26 (2. Pn.ton. to Wn.ingongoro ...... an 1,328 32,538 3 27 (3.) Wn.ingongoro to Tn.ungo.tarn...... 12 676 2u,004 1 20 (4.} 'fmmgato.rn. to Moutoti ...... 12 2;:;0 45,308 2 24 (5. M.outoti to Waiwero.uui ...... 41 578 21,482 2 0 I , (G. Waiweranui to Omo.to...... 5u I 351 25,035 035 I ' (7.) Bell Block to White OlilTs ...... oH 1,382 26,6::i7 1 19 i (iL) Compensation Awo.rcls (Appendi:;: I., Schedul(l 13),- Dh'isioll I.-Wnipingn.o to Titoki ...... 20 12 3,458 0 0 " II.-Tit<>ki to Urcnui ...... 35 35 6,450 0 0 llT.-Urcnlli to Hau-o-te-Ullin. 38 38 2,700 0 0 " .. .. 3n2 5,280 I 201.395 0 B.-Ln.1Hls 1ll0Rtly surreyec1 hy Oommission Rnd reported UpOll, I but, for reasons gi~cn, lIot TI1COllllllelldec1 to bo granted nt WClsent (Appendix 1., Schedule 0) ...... I .. 12,764 3 14 O.-T.:Lnils to he ('oll\'oyncl to Nn.tiycs by wn.y of exehn.nge (AppclHlix 1., Schedule D.) ...... li16 0 0 Toto.l ...... 214,675 314 . .- ;f.;:;~~:~~~::1\: ~f::~:~.~.. ~~· :.~~~":.~':.: ~:~?,,:,:: ~:~ ~~~::"': .~.: ~: . " .. ::".~~: .:.~ .. AP~ENDIX I. . SCHEDULE A.-RESERVES. 1.-W AITOTARA TO P ATEA. Dlock and Locality. Section. Areo. . IName of Reserve. \ Granteos. Restrictions. . I A. n. P.I XII., W,.iroa 308,344,301, 027 2 o· IhupUh.'1.1 Apernhama Tama.ipa.roa and 17 others Inalienable by sale, gift, or mortgage; alienable by exche.ngo or IC".5o 302 for twenty-one YOl\rs, with oonsent of Governor in Council. VIII. Ilontl L\:., Wairoa Pt. 389 nnd 260 0 0 Te Whiu a.nd 25 others Ditto. 390, and 393 Pt.389 &391 240 0 0 Hona Rongonui a.nd 23 others Pt.389 &300 342 3 16 Ta.whitopoll and 28 others •. . '1388, o.nd pt. 330 0 o· Ro.kei Tawho.rekorito a.nd 24 others 394 XII., WlliroOo "I Pt. 465 5 0 0 Ho.uriri Apero.hama. Tama.ipa.rea. a.nd 17 others IX., W(\iroo. .. "j • 7 305 0 0 To Rotiu )Iahutongo. and 10 others III., WOoiroa. " 42 6 0 0 To Whiu WIthout restriotions. "I 24 35 0 0 TI\mnnui o.nd 6 others .. Inalienable by sale, gift, or morlge.ge; n.licuo.1Jlo 1,.)" CXCllttll~C ,)1" l~flsc III. a~;l VIII., Wairoa .. I 0, 15 113 2 0 Pipi Ruauri and 13 others for twenty-ono years, with consent of Govornor [n Council. III., W!\iroa .. 5,6 243 1 0 M[l.no.waru Puhino aud 8 othors .. Ditto. Okotulm 352 52 3 0 Okoia To.urua I\nd 8 others XI., Wairoa. .. Pt. 465 62 2 0 Okahu To Whlll].;arua and 5 others Okotuku 417 406 3 0 Ho.kopa te Puku and 20 others .• 418 405 1 27 Hare Tipene and 38 others XL, Wo.iroa .. 419 505 3 2!J To.hua and 9 others .. VIIL, Wairoa "I 64 65 2 24 Nga.motu Wirihana Rangitukihono a.nd 3 others Okotuku 48 2!J 2 0 To Ore Ore Ro.hira Kahukaka. a.nd 3 others .. XI., Wairoa. .. 16 37 3 0 Herono.ue Ngo.po.ki and 7 others .• -:J VII., \Vairoo. 39,40 63 020 Oturi Ngairo and 3 others .•• Okotuku 134 51 3 16 To Popoti Poha.rl\ma Takarangi and Ngairo VI., Wairoa .. 177 52 3 29 Te Hllopua Raumati and 8 others •• 145 209 2 0 To Mo.wao and i others V., \V~iroa .. 75 50 o 27 Wlloipipi Ngapnki and 13 others .. I 370 532 0 0 Te Oho Ngairo and 32 others " VI., \Vairoa .. Pt. 218, 361 256 2 0 Oiko. Wiremu Ngo.paki and 31 others .. Pt. 218 122 0 0 Ro.wiri a.nd 18 others •. !., W[l.iroa .. 141 260 0 0 P~tahi Ngairo and 36 others " Okotuku 470 217 0 0 VI., Wairoa" Pt. 98 150 0 0 Heni te R~~ 0 to Rangi and Mere No.ern. Without restriotions (as from 2nd November, 1878). 50 0 0 Haututu Wiremu :::-Tgapa.ki and 44 chhers .. Inalienable by sale, gift, or mortgage i alienable by exchange or l~,\s V., W~iroa. .. 87" 10 0 0 Potakataita Taurua for twenty-ono years, with consent of Governor ill Council. 85 6 2 18 Pllornunui Komene Ditto. When"uakum District, Carlyle 84 14 0 01 Wai 0 Ture Taurua Survey District IV., Carlyle .. 86 505 0 0 Pukorokoro or Komene To.kurangioand 24 others Little Taro.nl.1Jd IV. and VII!., Carlyle 33,1 . 509 0 0 Ditto Wiremu N/iapaki o.nd 23 others IV., Cp.rlyle .. • 35 303 0 0 Miriama Hinekoro.ngi and 17 others III., Secs. 5, 6; IV., Seo. 29, pt. 1,045 0 0 TaUIua Socs. 30, 31, 32, 34, Co.rlyle > III., Secs. 7, 8, 9, 10; IV., pt.! 2,190 0 0 IOt:l.utu Taurua and 16 others Sec. 30" Ca.rlyle '1 VII., C,\rlyle 136 18 2 0 Huko.tero .:;t Paten Distriot 94 70 1 20 ~lienablo by salo or by Icll.so for a longer period th:l.n t'>"ClltY-0110 yenrs, or by mortgage, excopt "ith tho consent of thij GO"crnor tv TotOoI 11,069 3 26 . being previously obto.ined to o,ery such se.lc, loase, or mort­ +:­ gage. tv SOHEDULE A.-RESERVES-continued. > 2.-PATEA TO WAINGONGORO. i mock a.ud Locl1lity. Section. Aroa. ~( I NQ.ll1e ot Rooor':"e., Grantees. TI9strictilJ:ls ..

A. It. n , I IlL, Cn.rlyle .. 2,3' 1,200 0 0 moin. Tutn.ngo o.nd 12 others In[1.licnc.blo by salo, giit, or mortgage; [.lienable h.'i" '1:1:clln.ngro or le:1~c I for twonty.one yeo.rs, with consent of Governor ill CO:ll1cil. 4 15 1 28 Po.ro.ono Tutorc o.lld )lGreri to Oi .. IWithout restrictions. Pate;' District, CD-rlyle Surycy 582 15 o 30 Te Kuru Paniwho.kn. District "I " ((15 from 1st Jo.nuo.ry, 11377). Ditto 642 15 0 0 Whitikan lIIo.ruero. n.nd 12 others .. .. Inn.licnc.blc by sale, gift. or mortg,_gc: o.iieno.ble by oxcb.nge or leai'tl On the Po.te(1 Ri,or ' .. 1 o 32 Ahipekepeko - To lIIo.whiti .'j for twenty-one years. with ~on;cllt of G0\'emor in Conncil. 3 3 20 Ho.urangn. lIlera Tauruo. o.nd 11 others .. Ditto. 7 3 23 Upokoro.u .. " 1 1 2 ObJ.wako Te ~Iawhlti 31 3 12 Kurn.nui Tn.urun. 6 3 24 To Mn.ire 11 2 26 K!1ihihi Ngo:'wai o.nd 2 others Paten. Dis:dct, Carlyle StU,'ey ,. 515 \J 3 \J Ngo.neko iVithout rcstrictions. District Ditto " 5W 30 114 :DIere Tn.uruo. P!1tC!1 Districc, liD-wern. Sur'.'cy I 361 127 0 0 To.maherc Ro.ngiwn.hio. !1nd TIida Rangiwahia by gift, ulortgngc; by District Ino.licnn.bl; snle, or o.li~ll:lb~c excuo.ut{(! O~ ~t:n.':I(! for twenty-ono YC!1rs, ';I'ich consent of Go':"cl110r in C'Juncil. XII., Sec. 33; XV., Sec. 2; IV., 2,800 0 0 Tu.umahe. Haumato.o and 88 others Ditto. Sec. 1, H~.werl1 I XII" Ha,"ero. .. 5 63 2 0: Takirul\hine Who.remn.to.ngi and Po.eto.i T.. p(\tco. Di!;trid, C",!'lyl~ S!ln·cy. 537 31 1221 " I\I!1tiu, Ro.ngiho.cn.to., o.nd Tutn.ki, in trust for the Absolutely ina.liellabl~. District I Wo.iho.roto n.nd Ngarun.hino ho.ptls of tho l'akl1.· 1 koho tribo . 1 :j8G Pn.tcn. Di:;tl'ict: I{(l.''';E:rr.. Sun"cy 246 o 0 OkotLU'i £.Ia.tiu and '7 others .. ; Inn.1icnr.hlc by sale! gift, or UlortgugoJ: nlir..!nc.l.Jiv tJ.\· (:xchc'.!UJi\ or len.;;~' ,District 1 1 for twcnty-one \-cnrs, witil COllSCiIt of GO\'0r!lOr in Co;md. Dl.tO .. 58'; 73 0 0 Tongo.hoe Nl1.to.U(1.hil'9. Ng!1hiuo. .. 1Ditto. . • .. ..I Pt. 331 HI 0 0 ... Without restrictions ins frem 1st July. lS"1. YII .. S~cs. G,/,S; YIII.. Sec. 1 ; i 4,800 0 0 :Mokoin. To.utahi 170 others l1.~d In!1iicn:l.bi·} by sl1.le, gift. or lllicll;).\)lc by cxcimll:;'c l'1' 1,·:'-,o :~II., "I' lllOrtgt1.g~: XL, Sues. tit 7, 8; St.:c. ; fot' twenty-one ,yt:!(I.rs. wi:h COl1~cnt of GO\"i:,n:or in CounciL 32, Hawem ., Pn.tca District . . . . 255A 13J 0 0 iVaokona Hone Pilmmo. to Rei IIo.l1n.tn.uo. Ditto. Part \Vhnreron. Rl!5CrVC (I.nd Sec. I 4,302 0 o ! Whllxeron. N!1to.nn.hira Ngtlhinn. o.nd 183 others (Ho.potiki 588, Pl1.te!1 Discrict, Hawc:rn. I ho.pu) Survey District Part Wharerol1. Reseryc, Hawern. 4,122 0 Tl1mo. Ohungio. o.nd 167 others (H:l.llUo. hapu) Sun'!;\' District 01 " Ditto • 2,017 0 o " .. Rongohurumn.nu 11l1d 80 othcrs (Ngn.tihn.wo hl1.pu) II., Sec. :j; II!., Sec. 3; YI., Sec. 3,611 0 o Tirotiromon.nn. Ngo.to.u o.nd 117 others (Ngl1titl1ll()wa.i hn.pu) 4, Hn.worn. . XIV .. Sec. 12. Ngacre; II., Secs. 3,257 0 0 To Iko.Tcro!lllui l1.nd 131 othcr.~ (NGo.titup(1eo. ho.p11) 3 n.nd ·1; Hn.wcro. XIII .. Sec. 54; XIV., Secs. 8, 9, 3,129 0 0 Tuko.rang!1tai and 132 othors (Ahito.hi hap\1) N 11, Ngo.e1'o; 1., Secs. 55,56; ,J:::. 11., Secs. I, 2, H!1wcrs. W Patcn. District, H~worn. Survey 576 2 0 28 Ra.hid Piho.ma. o.nd 2 others Ino.lienablc by s!1le or by leo.se for A. longer period thn.n trrenty-ollo District years, or by mortgo.ge, except with the consont 'of tho Go\·crnor boing prcyiously obto.illCd to eyery such soja, lease, or mortgo.gc. SCHEDUDE A.-RESERVES-conti7L1~ed. 2.-PA~EA TO WAL'I{GONGORO-continued. to mack Ilnd LOClllit,. Section. I Aroa. I::;ramo 01 Reservo·1 Grantees. Restrictions.

A.. B. P. \ . I' I.". >I l., Sc>c. ;;/;__" II., ~cc. 6. Hawero. \ 10 0 2 .. Hoko Pakoko .• •• .. •• Wlthout restrictIOns. as from 8th M!lr. 1814.~ I.. Hawcm 6. 7 101 0 36 Te Rauno. ., \ Katone Tmvhakaruru and 3 oth~rs . • Inalieno.ble by so.le, gift. or mortgago; alieno.blo by excil:!!l;::" O!' !caso ::'"1 18. HI I 492 0 0 Kanihi .• \ Heke Pakeke am1 39 others . . •• for twenty-ono yeo.rs. with consent ill Governor ill. Councii. '::: H 20 289 0 0 Ok:l.hu ., Kateno Tuwhakaruru and 7 others • • Ditto. Tow!l of !Ir..wcrn. Allot. 23 of I 0 0 39 Pl1toho and 4 others (in trust for Tongo.hoo and Absolutely inalienable. Sec. 19 Ngatitupo.ea ho.pus) Ol!!!,we To=shin Part Town 24 0 0 Ranga.to.pu •. ' Tuko.rangatai an(l 5 others (in trust for Kanihi o.nd • Belt I Ahitahi, ho.pus of the Ngatiruanui tribe) XIY., ::\'g:.crc 10 I 300 0 0 Heke Pa.keke and 34 others ... I Inaliena.ble by Dale, gift. or mortgo.ti!3; o.lieu!l.ble by cJ:cho.uc;>J or ka.sn ~X .. .. ! 38 . 100 0 0 Ko.ro.urio. for twonty-one yeo.rs, with consent of Governor in C':;Ul'.c!l. XIII.. 15 I 100 0 0 Wo.ti Tunupou and 3 othera (Ngatiro.kei ho.pu) Ditto. 11., 13 705 0 0 I Stratford Hoko Po.keke and 34 others Total 132,.538 3 271 !

3.-WAINGONGORO TO TAUNGATARA.

I ::\"!.. S::c. 51. E.t.. npokonui; I 2,103 0 0 I Continl1ous Re-I Wo.irau o.nd 80 others (Umuto.hi h:1.pu) " Ino.licnable by sale, gift. or mor::;ego; alieno.b1e h:; c::c!::!:l:;~ 0: ;~!l.EC X.III" Sac. 55, ~G~iIO; 1..1 servo for twenty.one reo.rs. with COllsent of Go,e::!o! in C~1:::"::i. SeC . .::;'.). Hn."ern, I ::.:> 1';., ~-;·:·c.131, Wai!!!n.te; I., Sec. I , 2,160 0 0 Wiremu Ko.tcno and 78 others (Inun.wo.i ho.pu) Ditto. GO, Hn.wcrn. xc; .. !3~c. n, Kr.upokcnui; III.. 3,582 1 0 Titokowaru a.nd 56 others (part Nga.timanuhio.kn.i Sees. 65, 64, Wa.imo.te; IV., hapu) Sees. 13~, 133 :::~~." :-;::~.~:3t l\.r.. cpoko,nui: ~\T., 5.944 3 0 lIanaia. Hukanui and 75 others (Ng:l.titu h[l,pu) ""·c. ·,0. "'~t~pOkonUl; 11., ~cc. B. \\·;;,juw.to XI}l., S.~c. 3~. r;(1,~lpokonui; 1.. 2,7,2 0 0 Te Ramo. and 49 others (Nge.tihauo. ho.pu) :oees. ,,0. 31, \\almo.te XIII.. S"o. 33, K;:.ujokonui; 2,081 0 0 Kokiri and 22 others (part Ng8.tii:n[l,nuhiD.kai ho.pu) 1.. S2C. 29, Wa.imo.to X1';., Sec. 12, 0pU1lako; II., 1,706 0 0 Hono Piham[l, te Rai Hrmatauo. and 60 others SQC3. ::?4, 11, Oco (Ngo.tite.mo.o.huroo. h[l,pu)

YIII. I \Y :lil!!:' ~a 31 22 0 0 Heke, Wharcrn.to., Patuwairun., and Tauke (in trust Absolutely inalieno.ble. for Ko.nihi, Umut[l,hi, and Inuawn.i ho.pus) . 88 800 Titokowaru o.nd Kokiri (in trust for Ngo.timanu­ hifi.kai ho.pu) YIL, \\'aimo.tc 128 33 0 0 r.Ia.naio. Hukanui, Titokowo.ru, o.nd Rangia.we (in trust for Ngatitu and Ng[l,tihawe hllpus) 30 67 0 0 Po.tukopo. .• •• .. •• Inalienable by so.le, giH, or mortgage; alieuo.ble by e;:chn.!l£C or ieJ.sa 130 720 Karewo. for twenty-one years, with conseut of Goycroor i:J. CJu::eiL 129, l13, 1l1, 1,148 0 0 !lIo.no.ia. Hukanui Ditto. - . 112,25,33,34, >- 27,35,36.28. 37, 29,38, 39, 40,41, 42, 43, l-w:::;+:>. 44 .+:>. SCHEDULE A.-RE SERVE S-continued. 4.-TAUNGATARA TP MOUTOTI. , ' . Block and Locality. Section. Are". INama of R~serve·1 Grantees. .. I! ~:~;.:-i-;; ~:. Restrictions. A. n. P. Orimupiko Block, Opuna.ke Sur­ 6,909' 0 0 Opunrure Block Ihala. NgoJdrikiri. and 49 others (Ngo.timo.iio. ha.pu) ., ~i:~bie by' so.le, gift, 0: '~~rtgage; o.liena.ble b~ e:tchan~e or lease \'CY District '. '. . '...... " .• 10l twenty-one yea.rs. Wlth consent of Governor In Council. . PUkekohn.tll Block, Opuna.ke 7,531 0 0 To.mo.ti Ko.weora.and 50 others {Ng~o.l1ine hapu) Ditto. ..' . Survey District 1>Ia.taikawhai Block, Opuna.ke 2,463 0 0 PirihU:o. Po.rni and 16 others (Walotnnia hnpu) .. :.~ ':-S;~~.";~;;"'-'-"'!''''''.-- Survey District . . .." Ngo.titama.rongo Block, Opu­ 6,186 0 0, Wiremu xing! Mnto.kntea and SO others (Ngo.~it~ !.. ~::. . :;: nake Survey District . ma.rongoha.pu)·. . ... :.. ".' ,; ...... , • ; .... ," Ngatikahumo.te Block, Opuno.ke 7,223 0 0, Wiremu King! Ma.to.ko.~ea and 2~. others .~ga.tika..-: i ~ ." :~ Survey District humate ho.pu). .' '...... ". .:... . . Ngo.tito.ra Block, Opuna.ka Sur­ 15,070 0 0 Robia. Wha.ks.rongomruwnlio and 67 otherS {N go.ti-· ~ .. ~., .. ~. :." ft· vey District ·ta.ro.'ho.pu)'·"·; .>: ':- ',;1 . • ...... :;.' t··,·:·:.'.,.>·: ~" ...... L\:., Opunake 32' 3 0 Orimupiko To.ma.ti Ko.weq·i:n and' 6' others (iii. trust for Ngo.ti-' Absolutely ino.lleno.ble. . '" ha.umia. ho.pu). . . . " .. ;.. ., XII" Town of Opunake 4,5 0 1 27 To.mo.ti Ko.weoro. (in trust for Ngo.tiho.mnia. ho.pu) ... · ;Ino.lleno.ble by so.le,.:or by 1eo.se, or by exchange, or by mortgage I, :I 0 1 37 Ihaia. Ngakirikiri (in trust for Ngo.tima.iJ.u hapu)·. ~' : 'except'with the consent of the Governor being previously obtained. 3 0 1 0 Wiremu Hoha.io. (in trust for Ngo.tiwetenga. ha.pu)· . ))itto::;, '::.' . - . IX., Opun~ke 17 10 0 0'I George To.ylor (ho.lf.oaste) ; .' . • '. '. . • :. :Without restrictions. . 43 0 3 0; Wiremu Klngi te Matako.tea. and Tuwa.hipa. (in 'Absolutely ino.lieno.ble. ! trust for Nga.tito.mo.rongo ho.pu) . '. . , ,...... )-' To tOol 45,39B 2 2.1 ! . . .;';.'

5.-11OUTOTI TO W AIWERANUI. -j- ::<;!.l;:mhekcranJ;i Block, Opu­ 2.~59 0 o i P"l'ihako. Block Rangiteihingo. and 54 others (Ngo.tituhekerangi IIna.lienable by so.le, gift, or mortgo.ge; alienable by e:s:chn.nge or :1['.;;" SUl'YCy District . ! hapu). ., .. leo.se for twenty-one yeo.rs, with consent of Governor in Council, ::C"'~::InUpoto Block. Cape and 5,,45 0 Te Ko.hul and 146 others (Ngo.tiho.upoto ho.pu) •• Ditto. tjlP:in:;l.kc Survev Districts °i ',',';­ ; . : Ina.lieno.ble by so.le, or by leo.se, or by exohange, or by mortga.ge, with- 90 40 0 OIOkahu Ko.hui ... . -:~: ~ '''.'':':,' 'l ~ ...... out the consent of the Governor being previously obto.ined, . Ct 8S 43 0 o IParimoto Ranglteihinga. Absolutely ino.lleno.ble •. t:::l •• tv ~ 0\ SOHEDULE A.-RESERVES-cQntVnuea. :>­ 5-MOUTOTI Tq" W AIWERA...",{UI-~ontinued. '1 Cr Block and Locality. Seotlon. Aroa. IName of nosorve.\ Grantoos. Restrictions. A.. n. P. 1., Opuno.ko •• 78 175 0 0 Tako.ro.ke.u and 4 others in (trust for the Ngo.tihau. Absolutely inn.liono.ble: poto hapu of the Taranaki trihe) 102 132 0 0 IPukerimu ·. I"Ro.mucrs. Rangiuru •• •• .• 81 13 0 0 Ta.whitinui •• Ko.hui Karerehc, Hemi PUll., o.nd Kama •. I Inn.lienn.blo by sale, gift, or mortgagc; alieno.ble by e:rchm::!(e or lease for twenty-one yeo.rs, with consent of GO\'crnor in CounciL 71 25 2 0 Eruini .. ,Without restrictions. 72 25 2 0 Korepa Taho.rangatiro. •. 84 32 0 0 Thais. Ngakirikiri' .• Ab~oluteli ine.lienOoble. 41 50 0 0 Whats.rau to Mn.nu Without restrictions. 73 720 Otuka.rews. •. \ Miru •• Absolutely inn.lienablc. 99 100 Te Toka.ros. 101 25 0 0 •. K~re~~ne " Without r;strictions. XI!., Cape 51 23 0 0 Otua.ko.is. •. I1tIiru •• " • • •. Absolutely inalienable. 57 900 Wa.irus. • . Mares.rea s.nd Tuterakengs. 55 15 0 0 Tipoka. .'. I , 54 300 Wharooka n.nd Whars.wharo.nui 56 10 0 0 Waitara-Iti •• I Tuterakenga •• 39 112 0 0 Wiremu Taka Ngatata :: I Without restrictions. 31 100 0 0 Wi Tako Ngo.tn.ta n.nd Thaks. te Rou (heirs n.ud successors of Mohi Ngo.pongal" 29 35 0 0 To Pokn.iheruiwi Ruaron. and Wharn.wharnnui .. \ Without restrictions. t-o 23 ~60 0 0 Hone Mutu n.nd 27 others .• Inn.liennble by sale, giit, or mortga.ge; aiienabie hy e:tc!Jnn~c 0: lease for twenty-one ymHs, with COllsen;; of Go..-cr::lor in C'J;J~cil. 4 21 0 0 Whn.rehokn. .. I Without xestrictions. VII1., Cape .. 95 220 Ikaroo. • .\ Hona Mutu .• . . Absolutely inalier.[lble. 94 100 Okn.wo. .• Whatn.rau Ariki 93 o 2 0 Ihutn.ngi • • Tutcuroho . . • . 126 620 Wharehcikn. and Whatara.u •• 1 92 100 Wn.ngn.nui •• I Run.kore Mocau and Whato.rau •. 2 31 0 0 Turakihi I;;., Cupe .. ,' 15 420 Tuiro.ho •• I Of ••••• • IX., C'\FO 131 105 0 0 To.puinikau '.. IWhntnra.u Ariki anc1 5 others (in trust for tho }lgo.­ tihinepo.re, Ngatitukirinnu, o.nd Nge.tirunn.ru Total .."I : 21,482 2 0 I hapus)

6.-WAIWERANUI TO OMATA. v .. Soc. 1; VI., Sec. 1; X., Sec. 1,506 0 0 IStonyRivorBlookl Hon.ni Wharoko.wn. fUld 24 others Innlienn.blo by 50.10, gift, or Inortgo.~e; o.lienable by cxchnn!!c or !cn.~c ii, Capo Sun'oy District for twenty-ono yea.rs, with consent or Go,ernor in Council. IV., Sec. 22: IX., Sec. 29, Co.pe 1,205 0 0 " Poriko.pn. te Wo.rowaro !lnd 23 others Ditto. Survey District IV., Sec. 21; V., Seo. (); IX., 1,561 0 0 Ruakere n.nd 24 others .. Sec. 28, COone Survey District IV., Sec. 20; V., Sec. 8; IX., 3,144 0 0 "Pn.ora.,Tutn.hs. n.nd 39 others t-v .j:::.. Sac. 30; X., Sec. 3, Cn.pe -J Su.rvoy Distriot ":.:::. ":~';'}:~;~i;;~~;t~~~~t";~;!l;1~~~~¥(:"~ SCHEDULE A.-:-RESERVES-continued .. 6.-WAIWERANUI TO OMATA-c01Itinued.

Block o.nd Loco.lIty. Section. Areo.. IN~me at Reserve. I Gro.ntees. Rostrictions. A. n. P., IV., Sec. 1!l; V., Secs. 5,7; X., 2,262 0 0 Stony River TaihlLoro o.nd 24 oth~rs Inalienable by 6ale, gift, or mortgage; alienable by exchangc or le!l.se Sec. 6 ; XL, Sec. 3, Co.pe Sur· Block for twenty·ono yoars, with coment of Go,'crnor in Cuuncil. vey Pis trice IV., Sec. 18; V., Sees. 4, 2; 4,473 0 01 Komene Tupoki e.nd 44 others Ditto. X., Sec. ,1; XL, Sec. 1, Cape Survov District V., Sec~ 3; XI., Sec. 2, Co.pe 6!l7 0 Minernpe. Kn.hu !l-lld 12 others Sun:ey District I Okato Township 2 1 0 :1 PoriklLpa. te WlLrewlUo •• 111 1 0 0 49,50 2 0 0 106 1 0 0 Korenene !l6, 100 2 0 0 Ha.rita. Rawiri 112 1 0 0 Tamati Pekn. •• 104,108 2 0 0 RuhirlL Tuhoto 110 1 0 0 Renato. Okato District, Cape Survey lOS 14 2 16 Roronone District Ditto 2 127 0 0 Porikapn. to Waro'IVaro .• 11!l,120 2!l 0 0 James Harriaon (he.lf.caste) 45 50 0 0 Porikn.pa. te Wa.rewlUe .. C;;) 41 51 0 0 Tamati Poko. .• •. . 4 53 0 0 Porikapo. to Wa.rewo.re 99 52 2 0 Ruhira. Tuhoto •• 101,105 104 0 0 Ani Nge.horu .. O;lmro. District, Cape Survey 123 51 0 0 Keremena.to. te Mo.rae •• District Ditto 129 50 0 0 Iho.ko. te Manu 143 50 0 0 Tonis. 148, 119 65 0 0 Kerenene 137,141 71 0 0 Ho.rita. Rs.wiri 151,152 95 0 0 Trunati Peka. ., 168 1,430 0 0 Po.tuho. Re.ngcs Porikapn. o.nd 18 others 169 1,300 0 0 Komonc a.nd 10 others •• O;kurn. District, ClLpe and Eg. 170 5,800 0 0 Ropo.to. NglUongomo.to o.nd 42 others mom Sun'e\' Districts Oakum. District, 'iYaimu Survey 4!l 45 0 0 Kaito.ke Ropata Ngarongomate .• District Ditto Soc. I, Sub· 2 0 0 Pt. Hauro.ngo. •• POriko.pllo to Wo.rewa.re •• Without restrictions. div.1 Sec. I, Sub· 2 3 0 Raukato.uri diy. 2 Oakum. Town 208,216,217 1 2 0 Ropa.ta Nga.rongoms.to •• 195,196,197- 1 2 0 Meroo.na Matua.rei > 214,215,226 1 2 0 Maraeo. Tipuno. I 230,232,246 1 2 27 Peti Ngehe .. ;:., 1!l8,202,204 1 2 0 Matiu Wharemato.ngi •• tv .j:::. DC SCHEDULE A.-RESERVES-continued. > 6.-WAIWERANUI TO OMATA-continued. ::.,i DIock anti Locality. Section. Areo.. INo.~e of Reserve. \ Grantees. Restrictions. A. R. P. Oakum. Town 2HJ, 222,223 1 1 37 To Ngoungou •• •• , Without restrictions. 244,245 101 Ropato. Ngarongomato •• 239,240 100 Neretini .. .. 233,234 100 Wi Ko.mokamo 158,182,183 1 3 34 Raukato.uri •• Oakum. To",n Belt, Wairau 16,17,18 42 1 0 Ropo.to. Ngarongomo.to o.nd 2 others :: I Ino.Iien(lbl; by so.le, gift, or mortgage; alienable by exchange or lease Survcv District for twenty-one yoars, with consent of Governor in Council. Ditto • .. , 12,13,14,15 21 0 0 Rauko.to.uri and 4 others '" Ditto. 1 o 132 I ..•• Wi Ko.moko.mo • • Without restrictions. O:1.kum District, W(lUUU Survey 4 99 0 0 Pa.hitere •• , Ropata Nga.rongomate and 2 others •. Inalien(lble by so.le, gift, or mortg(lge; alieno.ble by el:chn.nge or lease District for twenty-one yeo.rs, with consent of Governor in Council. Ditto Pt. 5 6 132, .. Ropo.to. N ga.rongomo.te •• '" Absolutely ino.lienable. 167 3 1 0 Korn •• Ditto. Kcru Town Belt, W (luau Sun'ey 2,3 49 o 0 •• Wi Ka.mok(lmo and 6 others · . Inalien(lble by so.le, gift, or mortgage; a.lien(lble by e:tcha.nge 0: lease District for twenty-one years, with consent of Governor in Council. Koru To",n Belt (lnd Oakum I} 4 25 3 161} N era.tini and 5 others ., •• ,Ditto. D!scrict, \Vo.iru.u Survey Dis­ 7!1 1S 0 0 trIct Oum,tn. District, We.iro.u Survey 360 0 0 I Pukiekie •• , Ropata Nga.rongomate and 14 others •. , Inalien(lble by s(lle, gift, or mortg(lge; alieno.ble by exchange or ease District for twenty-one ye(lrs, with consent of Governor in Council. Omllto. District 13S 92 0 0 IPoutoko "1 Ropa.ta. Nga.rongomate.. •• .. I Without rostrictions (o.s from 1st Januo.ry, 1869). 139 1 0 0 Poutoko Buria.l- Ropa.ta. Ngarongomate and 2 others · .\ Absolutely inalienable. ground Toto.l 25,035 0 35

7.-BELL BLOOK TO WHITE OLIFFS.

Wn.itn.m West District, Pn.ritutu 134 567 0 01 Puketa.pu Roera. Rangi and 8 others (in trust for the Puke- Absolutely ina.lienable. Survey District tapu tribe) Ditto Pt. 50 127 0 Tamati Teito and 8 others (in trust for the Puke- Ditto. o I"."'t"'~ tapu tribe) Pt. 50 158 0 o " Ngata Mahau and' 3 others (Ngato. Maho.u, 123 In£llienable by a£llo, gift. or mortg£lge; £Ilien£lblo by e:s:ch(lnge or leMQ (lcres; Pcti M(lh(lu, 10 acres i Roni Mah(lu, 10 for twenty-one yen.rs, with consent of Governor in Council. acres i Wa.tere Ko.uo.kino, 15 o.cros) P(l.rt Scc. 1, Wn.it£ltn. Suburb£ln, 21'11 0 INgo.ta Mah(lu a.nd 3 others (in trust for the Puke- Ditto. r.nd part Sec. 50, W£litam West ta~u tribe) W n,it(l.r:1. Suburban, Paritutu Pt. 1 16 0 :1 Ro.W1ri Wo.tmo Without restriotions., Survcy District ';Y:!.itar; West District, Pari tutu 52 33 0 0 I~ga.huingo. Te Wetere Kauakinllo and 11 others Inalien(lble by sale, gift, or mortg(lge; alienable by e:tcho.nge or le£lse for twenty-one years, with consent of Governor in Council. ~ur'iev District N Ditto • 133 578 0 0 Kaipakopllolto .. Roero. Rangi and 42 others •• Ditto. .j:::. 100,101 162 2 30 N ga.puketuruo. Rameko. te Am£li and 22 others •• \C Pt.9S 130 WiremuPutu.. .. ' Without restrictions. W l~itn.m West District, W£litaro. 132 156 ,3 0 Krura.u '. ,.,Apera.hamo..Ngo.to.ullo and 81 others Inalieno.ble by a£lle, gift, or mortgage; alieMble by exchange or leaso Survey District for twenty-one,yea.rs, with consent of Governor in Council. , SCHEDULE A.-RESERVES~ontinued. 7.-BELL BLOCK TO WHITE OLIFFS-continued.

Block o.nd Loco.lity. ! Section .. Areo.. INo.me ot Reserve., Gro.ntees. Restrictions ..

A. R P. W o.ito.ro. West District, W o.ito.ro. 185 597 0 0 Mo.to.rikoriko •• Wi Piti te Ko.pongo. and 46 others Inalienwble by so.lo, gift, or mortgage; o.lieno.ble by oxcho.ngc or leaso' Survey. District for twenty-one years, with consent of GoveJ:nor ill Council. Ruiro.ngi District, Po.ritutu 1,184 46 2 0 Roero. Ro.ngi " Ditto. Survev District Ditto • 186 204 0 0 Manuto.hi Te To.ke Ngahuru a.nd 23 others :lIanuta.hi Town Belt 1,2,3,4 21 3 0 Tamiho.na and Roera. " Without t63trictions. 5 17 3 0 Ko.repo. Kerei Wo.oro .. 7, S 14 o 27 Roera. Ruiro.ngi District, Paritutu o.nd 38, 103,104, 493 0 0 Ko.iroo. To.wo.ke Rio. and 29 others Inaliena.bie· by sole, gift, or mortgage; o.lienable· by exchange or leo.se W,\ito.ro. Survey Districts 105,106,107, for twent:l'"-one yeo.r8, with consent of GovernoD'in Council. 108,109,110, 122 Huiro.nd District, W o.ito.ro. Sur­ 163,168,170, 235 0 0 Peka.tu Apera.ho.rno. :::;rga.to.uo. and 32 others Ditto. vey b"istrict 171,172 Ditto 179 52 0 0 Te Arei . Wo.ita.ro. West District, III., 25 18 1 12 Pukekoh1!.tu To Teiro. Manuko. Without restrictions . Pari tutu Survev District >-'­ ex., Town of Wiitara West ., 0 3 20 Huriro.pa. Paro.no.hi and 4 others .• Inalienable by sale, gift, or mortgo.ge; a.1ieno.ble by excho.nge or lca.se ,-"t: for twenty-one yeo.rs, with consent of G"oyernor in Council. XXXV.• Town of Waitaro. West 5,6,7,8 1 o 19 Ditto. XXXIV., Town of Waita.ro. West 5,6,7,8,9, 2 0 0 Teira. 1Ianuka. and 3 others 10,11,12 XV!., Wo.itaro. East .• 5,6,7, 8, 9'1} 10,11,12 3 0 0 Enoka. Ta.taira.u and 4 others XVII.• Wo.itara. East •• 5, 7, 9, 11 Wn.ico.ro. East District, Wa.ito.ro. 10 25 0 0 Mo.nukorihi Absolutely inalienable. Survey District Waitn.ro. East Suburban, Wai­ 81 22 0 o Rohutu Enoka. To.taira.u and 9 others to.ra Survey District \\'aito.ro. East, Wo.ito.ra. Survoy 71,72 34 3 25 Hotena and 6 others Ina.lienable by 80.le, lease. exchange,. or mortgage, wit.hout" the con­ District sent of the Governor lieing previously obtained. Tikoro.ngi District, Wo.ito.ro. Sur­ 76 340 0 0 Pukepo.pa. Rotene a.nd 23 othors Ditto. ... ey District Ditto 38 51 0 0 Pita. Hongihongi and 7 others (in trust for a.ll the I Absolutel, ina.liena.ble. people of the Nga.tira.hiri tribe) Oto.raoo. Block, Waito.ra. Survey 2,62,1 0 0 Rotene o.nd 70 others •• Inalienable by sa;le, gift, or mortgage; a.l'icns.ble by exchan;e: or. District lease for twenty-one yeo.rs, with consent "f Governor. in <1ouucil. Pa.rt Rimuta.uteko. Block, Wai- 500 0 0 Enoko. Tata.iro.u and 42 others Ditto. tara. Suryey District Ditto 2,000 0 0 Ro.ngikohuru and 86 others > VI.. Huiroo. .• 12 196 0 281 To.riki Awo.kere o.nd 8 others •• " V .• Huiroo. .• 1 200 0 0 Otikiwi III., Huiroo. •• 1 1,000 0 0 Ko.Wo.u Tuihu ana'33 others •• ~~ tv 2:j SCHEDULE A.-RESERVES-contvltued. >- 7.-BELL BLOCK TO WHITE CLIFFS-continued. '1 ::""1: Block and Locality. Section. Area. INo.mo of Reserve., Grantees. Restrictions. 4. B. 1'. III., Ruiroo. .. 4 18 0 0 Pukehou Tukirikau and 3 others Absolutely inalienable. 5 71 0 0 Kerikeringa. Tuihu and 33 others 6 280 0 0 Pukerata. Tuihu and 18 ochers •• Inn.lienabie by sale. gift, or mortgage; alienable by e:;:chllngc or 3 13 o 0 Kirikiri Mangu and 4 others len.se for twenty-one yee.rs, >vith consent of Goyernor in Council. 7 34 o 0 Onepoto Tuihu and 2 others .• , Ditto. Subdivisions I, 10, Ngo.tirahiri 1,713 0 0 Ramoka te Paro. Iwikahu and 34 others (Ngo.timo­ Block eOohu hapu) Subtlivisions 2, 11, ditto 2,337 0 0 Timoti Nikorima a.nd 44 others (Ngatirahiri hapu) 3, 9, 987 0 0 Pitama Pirika. and 18 others (Ngaciikaporo hapu) •. 4,12, 1,921.0 0 Taniro. Pohowo. a.nd 36 others (Ngo.tihine ho.pu) •• 5, 8, 1,454 0 0 Pita Hongihongi !LIld 27 others (Ngatitamo.rongo hapu) 6,14, 1,350 0 0 Tuiti to Kahutopn. and 25 others (NgOotiwhiwhin.o ha.pul . * 7,13,,, 1,091 0 0 Porere Nikorim!l. and 21 others (Ngatiwairo.k:a b o.pu) Wo.ito.m Survey District 4 71 0 0 Wo.ha.paka.pa.ko. To.miha.na to Karu o.nd 30 others . . • • Absolutely ino.lienable. . . 7 71 0 0 Ma.tene Rangipito a.nd 29 others VII.. Scc. 56; XL, Sec. I, WBi- 597 0 0 Ohango. Mo.tene Ro.ngipito and 60 others InOolicnabl~ by so.le, gUt. or mortgage; uiien!l.ble by e:::ci:::l::::;n or tr.ra. Su:yey District lease for twenty.one years, with cor.sent of Goveraor :n Co=cii. \Yo.iw.rfl. Su:yoy District 57 100 0 0 Hemi 1>fo.tenga . Without restrictions. 58 50 o 0 Radrota Hinemurn. III., \Ya.ita.r';. Survey Districc .• 9 1 1 10 Mangu and Matn. Ngo.horo 10 1 1 10 Piupiu •• "Grcnui D:s:;ict, Wa.itnro. Survcy 14,15,19 150 0 0 KaipikOori Reu and 8 others Inaliena.blo by sale. g!i~, or mortpse; o.licnablc by el:c!J.u.r;g~ or Dh:trict leo.se for twenty-one ycnrs, with consent of Governor in Co:;.ncil. VII.. S<:c. :j; VIII., Sec. 5, Wo.i­ 500 0 0 Ro.llglpito o.nd 16 others Ditto. t:un. Suryoy District VII .. W~,i:o.rn Survey District .• 1 200 0 0 Mangapoun. Rn.mo.ri Horomono. and 6 othors IV .• Sec.:2. Wa.ito.ro.; V., Sec. 2, 500 0 0 Rani to Rau 0 te Rangi Oond Mero Naero. Upper \Yll.itn.rn. III.. :jec. 1; IV., Secs. 2.1, 25, 789 0 0 I Chatho.m IslOond.' Ho.mi to rrfOounu and 67 others .. Wr.ito.rn. ers' IV., Wo.ito.ro. 23 195 0 0 Riwo.i Tn.upata and 63 others 1." Sees. 4, ii, Upper Wo.ito.ro.; 394 0 0 IV., Sec. H, Wo.itaro. IV., "Vo.itn.ro. 28 110 0 0 Tupo.ri Patu HopOoi n.nd 7 others •• Absolutely. inalienable. 'Pukea.ruhe District, Wo.ito.ra 61 42 0 0 Mimi RiwOoi Taupo.tn. and 5 others Survcy District Pukcnnihc District, Upper Wo.i­ 54 156 0 0 Wll.i-iti Rangipuo.hoaho and 13 others tnm Surycy District X.,1>Iimi •. 1 100 0 0 23 " N Town Belt, Pukeo.ruhe 6,7 o 38 .. Hurin. :r.ro.teng~ and 3 others Without restrictions. V1 8' 47 8 0 Tupoki o.nd 18 others .. ' VI.,)Iimi 4 576 0 0 Paro.rown. and 49 others (NgOotitn.ma hapu) Ino.lieno.bl~ by eale, gift, or mortgn.ge; Ooliono.blo· by- exchango 0;: lease for twcnty.ono years, with conscnt of Go.ernoroin Council. .. ' 26,657 1 19 ,; ..... ·':~:f:·~~~:~_;:{.~~~·:· ',::. :.... ~ .. "' -.·le-·.·· ..

.. ,.,..;- ...... ,"::.~'\.: - " '." -' ,.. SCHEDULE. B.-COMPENSATION AWARDS.

M DIVISION 1.-WAIPINGAO TO TITORr. r Whero allocatod. >- '{uUlber "utI Name of Awardee Amount of Restrictions. Antevo5ting ~'l \U ... 2.1l>50. Appendix B. pago 17). Award. Block and Locality. ISection. \ Aroa. Datu.

A. n. 1'. A. n. 1'. 1. \Vuimupuno. 250 0 0 I X., Mimi GG 250 0 0 Inalienable by so.lo or hy lease for a longor period tho.n twenty.one yea.rs, or by mort· 1 Juno. lSG.:i. gage, oxcept with tho consent of the Governor being previously obtained to evory auch sale, loo.se, or mortgage 63 250 0 I Ditto .. •• .. 2. :'Io.to. Who.reo.upa.ki 250 0 0 " o 3. Ro.iWo.ko. 250 0 0 I., Uppor Wo.itara 32 250 o 0 4. :'Io.to. Ruo. Ahuroo. 250 0 0 X., Mimi 67 250 o 0 5. Pirihiro. Rokoti .. 251 0 0 1., Upper Wo.itaro. 31 250 o 0 Town of Pukeo.ruhe 9! 1 o 0 Without restriotions G. ~Iirio.mo. To.rewo. .. 251 0 0 XI., :!lIimi 1 250 o 0 Inalienable by sILle or by leo.so for a longor poriod than twenty.one years, or by mort· gage, except wilili the consont of the Governor being previously obto.ined to oyery suoh sILle, lease, or mortgage Town of Pukeo.ruho 31 100 Without restrichlons .• 7. ~hto. Ro.ngiwllko.wo.io. 251 0 0 I I., Upper Wo.itarn. 30 250 0 0 InILlienable by sa.le or by Ie Me for a longor period than twenty.one years, or by mort· gage, exoept with the consent of the Governor being previously obtlLined to every such salo, leMe, or mortglLge ,---. Town of Pukeo.ruhe 40 100 Without restrictions " • • . . -J. 8. Hero. Hinerae 251 0 0 I·X., :Mimi 68 250 0 0 Inalienable by sale or by leaso for 0. longer period than twenty.one yeo.rs, or by morc· gage, oxcept with the consont of tho Governor being pre,iously obtained to e,ery such sILle, lease, or mortgage Town of Pukearuhe 52 100 Without restrictions " g. \Vi Wcko 201 0 0 I X" Mimi 65 200 0 0 InalionlLblo by sale or by lease for 0. longor poriod than twenty·one years, or by mort· gage, exoept with tho oonsent of the Governor being previously obtained to every such sale, lea.se, or mortgage . Town of Pukeo.ruho 32 100 Without restriotions " 10. Wi Kt\tipu 251 0 0 I!., Upper Waitara 29 250 0 0 Ina.licno.ble by sale or by lease for a longer period than t\venty·one yeILrs, or by mort· gage, except with the consent of the Governor being previously obtlLined to c,ery such so.le, lease, or mortglLge . . Town of Pukeo.ruhe 49 100 Without restrictions " 11. ~op~ro. 501 0 0 I X., Mimi 64 500 0 0 Inalienable by sale or by lease for a longer period than twenty·one yeILrs, or by mort· gage, excopt with the oonsont of the Governor being previously obtlLined to evcry such sale, lease, qr mortgage Town of Pukoo.ruhe 47 100 Without rostrictions " 12. Ho.ko.ro.io. 501 0 0 I X., Mimi 2 500 0 0 InILlieno.blo by so.lo or by leo.so for a longer period lilian twenty-one years. or by mort;· gILge, except with the consent of the Governor being previously obta.ined to o\'cry Buch sale, lease, or mortglLge Town of Pukeo.ruhe 16 100 Without rostrictions •• Total 3,458 0 0 > '1 .:.., ::0 tv VI tv SCHEDULE B.-COMPENSATION AWARDS-continu£ld. ">- DIVISION IT.-TITOKI TO URENUL ".... Where al1oco.tod. " A.nte~estiug ~amo Amount of Xumoor "nd ot Awardeo Rostrictious. D~te. (U.--~,18i:lO, Apponuu B, paso 11). Award. Dlock .. nd Locality. ISectIon. I Areo.. A. n. P. A. n. P. 13. Heni Wo.renui 50 0 0 I IV., Waitnm •• 9 12 2 0 Ino.liena.ble by 80.1e or by leo.se for 0. longer period thBn twenty·one yoo.rs. or by mort· 11 June, lSGG. I., Upper Wnitam 8 37 2 0 gage, excopt with the consent of the Governor being obtBined to every such 0010, leo.se, or morbgllogo 14. Kcpr. \Vllr.re 100 0 0 I IV., Waitsra •• 3D 30 0 0 Ino.1ionlloble by so.le or by lease for 0. longer period tho.D twenty.one yeMe, or by mort· L, Upper Wo.itaro. 26 70 0 0 gage, excepll with the con~ent of the Governor being prenously obtained ;0 Q,ery such sllo!e, lease, or mortgage 15. Wi Weko 100 0 0 I IV., Wsitsra •• 113 25 o 0 Ditto •• •• .. •...... • .. .. 33 75 00· 16. Reho.ra. Hr.mi 200 0 0 " 10 50 o 0 6 Au,., 18S3. L, Upper Waitsrllt 22 150 o 0 " ...... • 17. ?lIo.ko.reto. Rctima.nr. 100 0 0 IIV., Wsit&ro. .. 22 100 o 0 Inalienable by sale, gift, or mortgBge: l\liano.ble by excho.nge or lease for t\vcnly-one 1 June. 1 yeo.rs, with conRent of Governor in Council 13, Hr.ro.wim ?lIokeno. 100 0 0 I • 6 25 0 0 Ino.lieno.ble by so.le or by lelloso for llo longer period ihllon twenty.one yeBrs. or by mort· L, UpperWo.i&o.m 12 75 0 0 go.go, oxcept with the consent of tho Governor being previously obtained t:> e,ery Buch sale, leMe. or mortgage 10, ~It>r!1.er. .. 100 0 0 I IV., Wo.ito.ro. .• 7 25 o 0 I Ditto L, Upper Waitaro. 11 75 o 0 "I 20. Kepo. ~gr.po.po. 500 0 0 3 148 o 0 "I 9 352 o 0 :c 21. P:J,mr.riki 500 0 0 IV., WBitaro. ... 17.21 200 o 0 1., Upper Wr.itBra 19 300 o 0 :: ! 22. Rr.hiro. KBa.ro 50 0 0 IV., Waittu:a •• 15 12 2 0 V., Upper WBito.ra 3 37 2 0 23. ?lIere(l.ina. 50 0 0 IV., Waito.ra .. 32 12 2 0 L. Upper Waito.ro. 24 37 2 0 24. ?lIcrcr.na. TBupo •• 50 0 0 IV., Waitaro. •• 14 12 2 0 44 37 2 0 25. Hn.ratn. .. 100 0 0 • 35 25 o 0 In~lienable by soJa, gift, or mo~tgo.ge; o.lieno.ble by oxchBnge or leo.se for twenty-one I., Uppor We.ito.ro. 33 75 o 0 yeo.rs, with consent of Governor in Council 26. Hu.ri:J.tB Horomonga 300 0 0 IIV., Waittu:r. .• 40 73 o 0 InoJieno.blo by 50.10 or by 100.5e for 0. longer perio:l tha.n twenty·one yoo.r.s. or by mort· L, Upper Waito.rr. 18 227 o 0 go.ga, except with the consent of the Goyornor bzing preyjously obtained :0 c,ery " such so.lo, 100.60, or mortgo.ge I 27. lnb P!1.ihio. 100 0 0 IV., Wo.itaro. •• 5 25 o 0 Ditto ...... " I 1.. Upper Wo.ito.ro. 28 75 o 0 ,,! 23. Eri:J. ~gBmuka 300 0 0 IV., Wo.itBro. •• 10 75 o 0 "i L, Upper Wo.itaro. 20 225 o 0 ... • 20. Hemi PUBnu 200 0 0 IV., Wo.ito.ro. •• 20 50 o 0 .. 1 G Aug., lSS·3. 1.. Upper Wo.ito.ro. D5 100 o 0 " i - 30. To \Yiriha.no. Piro 500 0 0 IV., Wa.ito.ro. •• 26 125 1111 June SSG. 1., Upper Wa.ito.ro. 21 "375 g g :: N 31. ?lIctn.piro 50 0 0 IV., Wo.ito.ro. •• 31 12 20" VI 1., Upper Wo.ito.ro. 27 37 2 0 " VJ 32.. Rr.mn.ri Rur.tr.ko.to 100 0 0 1 25 00" 15 75 I) 0 '" 38. ~r(l.rn.ea. .• 100 0 0 I IV.• Wo.ita.ro. •• 4 25 o 0 .. I .. Upper Waittu:o. 14 75 o 0 " SCHEDULE B.-COMPENSATION AW ARDS-continuea. DIVISION II.-TITOKI TO URENUI-continucd.

-~ Where allocatod. :-;umher aod ~amo of Awardee Amonotot Anto"c5tinf: (G.-2. 1&0, Appon

~.- ....--- .. ~- I

> '\ c.,""t t:: tv VI .J::>. SCHEDULE B.-COMPENSATION AWARDS...... :contimtea. > " DIVISION III.-URENUI TO RAU 0 TE HUlA. r:.:...~

Wboro ~lloc~ted. Xu:ubcr 0.11<1 Name of Awardee !Amount of Restrictions Ant~.eEtin~ (G.-2.1ll-."O, Appendh: B, pag

A. R. P. A. R. P. 48. Kepa Whare .• •. 50 0 0 VII., Waitara.. .. 77 12 2 0 Inalieno.ble by so.le or by leo.sc for 0. longer period th:m twenty·one years, or by mort. 1 Junc. 18GG. XI.,. H •• •• 10 37 2 0 gage, e:ccept with the consent of thc Govornor being previously obtained to e;'ery suoh so.le, lease, or mortgage

50. Hioionn. Tioki .• .. 50 0 0 VII., H" .. 63 12 2 0 Ditto ...... •...... XL, » •• .. 17 37 20M •• .• .. .• •...... , li1. Rn.mari Kapil... •. 100 0 0 VII" N" .. 97 25 0 0" .. .• ...... XL, " .• •• 31 75 0 0 M •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• • 52. Tc Rllkatn.U . . . . 200 0 0 VII., " . . .. 98 50 0 0 Inalienable by 50.10 or by leaso for a longer period thrm twenty.one yeo.rs, or by mort- .. XL, ".. .. 35 150 0 0 I gago, except with the consent of the Goyernor being obto..ined to e .... ery such sale, lease, or mortgage li3. Rt:hia ~fn.tene . . . . 50 0 0 VII., " . . • • 68 12 2 0 Inalienablo by sale or by lease for 0. longor period tho.n twenty-one yen.rs. or by mort- ., XI., H • • • • 21 37 2 0 gago, c:ccept with the consent of the Governor being prenousl)' obtained :0 cyery suoh sale, lease, or mortg·o.ge 54. Wi Tllmihllnn. to ~eke.. 50 0 0 VII., H" .. 75 12 2 0 Ditto ...... XL, " • • • • 11 37 2 O. • • ...... •

55. Ronchiro. Tero.ngihaemato 50 0 0 VIL, " . . . . 92 12 20 M • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

XI., H • • • • 2 37 20 M • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • •• {jG. He!~~.rc ::.rn.tcne ... •. ];00 0 0 VII.,,, • • 86 25 0 O...... , . , . . .. \.:::' XL, " • • • • 32 .75 0 O...... , . . . . , ...... I .. GO, Riwn.i tc ,\hu . . . . 100 0 0 VIL, N •• •• 67 21i 0.0. • ...... 1 XI., " • . . . 30 75 0 0" ...... '1 .. 62. ~ra.~enga Rare . . • _ 50 0 0 VII., " . • •• 69 12 20 M , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. XI., " .... 23 3720" ...... G3. ~rcreInia .. •. 100 0 0 VIL, ".. .. 60 32 0 0" ...... XL, " •• .• 26 68 0 0 M • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • '1 .. Go! ~fllngn.re. . • • . 50 0 0 VII., N • • • • 81 12 2 0" . . . . • ...... •

XI., • • . .. 28 37 20 M • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. G5. Kllrina ...... 50 0 0 VIL, ".. .. 82 12 2 O...... I .. • XI., • •. •• 6 37 2 0" ......

GG. Ruruhim . . . . 50 0 0 VIL, " • • . . 72 12 20 M • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• , .. VII., " • • • • 7 37 2 0" ...... i .. G/. Wb.ngowhungo .. .. 50 0 0 VII., " •• •• 90 12 2 0 Ina.lienll.blo by sale. gift, or mortgage; o.lienablc by exchange or lease for twe:1ty.ollc , .. XI., " •• •. 24 37 2 0 yea.rs, with consent of Go .... ernor in Council 1 68. ~Iir:l1 Pomhu . . . . 50 0 0 VIL, " •• . • 76 12 2 0 Inalienll.ble by sale or by lea.se for II. longer period th!1.11 twenty-one years, or. by mort- II " VII., H • • • • 8 37 2 0 ga.ge, except with the consent or the Goyernor being previously obtllineu to every such sale, loll.so, or mortgago /~. K!1.tcne Rotenc .. •. 50 0 0 VII., • .. .. 96 12 2 0 Ino.lionll.ble by sn.lc or by len.so for 0, longer period ~hall twenty-one yen.rs. or hy mort-Ii XL, • •• •• 7 37 2 0 Ilnge, except with tho consent of the Go .... ernor being obtained to every such sale, lea.se, or mortgll.ge 'i3. Hn.riata Ihaia . • • . 50 0 0 VII., • . . . . 87 12 2 0 Ditto . . . . . • . • ...... I .. XL, " • • • • 29 37 2 O. . • . • ...... '1 .. tv 'j 4. Hani Karipa . . . . 50 0 0 VIL, • •• . . 79 12 2 0 Inalieno.ble by salo or by len.se for II. longer period thn.n twenty-one years., or by mort· VI XI., • •• . • 20 37 2 0 gage, except with tho consent of the Governor being previously obtained to every VI Buoh sale, lease, or mortgage SOHEDULE B.-OOMPENSATION AW ARDS-cont·inued. ~ DIVISION III.-URENUI TO RAU 0 TE HUlA-continued.

Where a.l1oco.ted. Number a.:ld Name ot Awardee Amount of Antovestillg G.-~.lS30 • .\.ppeudis B, pago 17). R!lstrictions. nlltc. Award. Block ILnd LoclLllty. ISection. I Area..

A. n. P. I A. n. P. 73. Pe:i Hnkihaki 50 0 0 VIL, Wo.itara .. 6,1 12 2 0 Inalienable by 50.10, or by leaso for 0. longor period than twcnty-onc yeo.rs, or by mort­ 1 Junc, lS6G. XL, 18 37 2 0 gage, except with the consent of thc Governor being previously obtained to overy such sale, loaso, or mortgage 'i6. Poti Huking-a. 50 0 0 IVII., 65 12 2 01 Ditto XI., 9 37 2 0 ".- ..... 1 I I. n.c-.,in.pa .. 50 0 0 VII., 83 12 2 0 In~lienable by sale, or by lease 'ior 0. longer period tha.n twenty-one ye[l.rs, or by mor~­ XL, 3 37 2 0 gage, except with the consent of the Governor being obto.ined to eveq such 50.\0, lease, or mortgo.go 'is. Ori\\io. :'Io.tial:o. .. 100 YII., 73 25 0 0 Inalienable by so.le, or by lease for 0. longer period than twenty-one yeo.rs. or by mort· 0 0,' VII., o 75 0 0 gage, oxcept with tho consent of the Governor being previously obtainod to every such salo, loaso, or modgo.go 70. :'Iihi Komma. 50 0 0 VII., 80 12 2 0 I Ditto .. .. XI., 12 37 2 0 so. Roihi Hn.kihaki .. 50 0 0 VII., 05 12 2 0 XI., 5 37 2 0 * .. S1. Ihc.;';J, te Kauri VO 0 0 VII., 94 12 2 0 Ino.lienablo by so.le, or by lease for 0. longer period than twenty-one ye:J.rs, or by mort­ I XL, 10 37 2 0 gage, except with the consent of the Governor being obto.ined to every such 50.10, leo.se, or mortgage tv Q2. Po.o~:t. tc Kauri .. I 50 0 0 I VII., 80 12 2 0 Inaliono.ble by sale, or by leo.se for a longer period than twenty-one years, or by mort- XI., 8 37 2 0 go.ge, except with the consent of the Governor being previously obtained to every such sale, lease, or mortgo.ge C3. i:I:::i. ti'! K:1l!:i I 50 0 0 I VII., 88 12 2 0 Inalionable by salo, or by leo.so for a longer period the.n. twenty-one yeo.rs, or by mot:· "I XL, 22 37 2 0 gage, except with tho consent of the Governor bcing obtained to every such s:tle, lease, or mortgage ,,~, ,. Ep:h'" t:! Huhcn£~ .. I 50 0 0 I VII., 62 12 2 0 Inalienablo by sale, or by leo.se for 0. longer period than twenty-one years, or by mort­ I XI., 13 37 2 0 gago, excopt with the consent of the Governor being proviously obtained to cvery such sale, leaso, or mortgage 89. Tipene Kc1:o.jlu .. I 50 0 0 VII., 03 12 2 0 I Ditto .. .. i XL, 4 37 2 0 DQ. Tcrctiu ':amiaka, .. 50 0 0 VII., 78 12 2 0 XI., 27 37 2 0 01. H€:tC:I!lr..ic, :: 1 100 0 0 VIL, 85 25 0 0 I XL, 25 75 0 0 I 92. Ka.ripa te Whem 50 0 0 VII., 84 12 2 0 XL, 15 37 2 0 94. Ho::c Pt:n1ipi 50 0 0 VII., 01 12 2 0 I:~lienable bi:sale, 0) ~y lease :f~r 0. lon~~r POriO~ thnn t\~~nty-on~: yeo.rs, Lby mo)t~ ) VII., 6 37 2 0 gage, except with tho consent of the Governor being obtained to every such so.le, I lease, or mortgage 06. Ro~!'~ 50 0 0 I VII., 61 12 2 0 Inalienable by salo, or by leo.so for 0. longer period tho.n twenty-one yeo.rs, or by mort­ XI., 16 37 2 0 gage, except with the consent of the Governor being previously obto.ined to (lvcry such sale, leaso, or mortgage > (J7. '.Vi tc Arei 200 0 0 I VII., 59 50 0 0 Inalienablo by salc, or by leo.so fat 0. longer period than twenty-one years, or by mort.,. VII., 10 150 0 0 gage, except with the consent of the Governor being obtained to every such so.lc, lease, or mortgago ';''1 tv VI .- C\ SCHEDULE B.-COMPENSATION AWARDS-contimted. ;> " DIVISION III.-URENUI TO RAU 0 TE RUIA-continued. C,., t::: Where allooatod. Numbor and Nama of Awardoe Amounto! Restrictions. Antp.1"osting (0.-2.1830. Appenili:t B. pago 17). Award. . Date. Block and Locality. ISection., Areo.. A. n. P. A.. n. P. 98. Piri Ka.wn.u 100 0 0 I VII., Waito.ro. •• eo 25 o 0 Ino.lieno.ble by so.lo, or by lea.so for a longer periocl tho.n twenty-ono yeo.rs, or by mort-II 1 .June, ISG0. XI., 33 75 o 0 gage, excopt with the consent of the Governor being previously obb.inccl to every, suoh so.le, 10o.se, or mortgo.ge ! 99. Te ?lfatino. 200 0 0 I VII., 70 50 o 0 Ditto .. J XL, 34 150 o 0 ! I Tota.l o.wo.rds of Divislioll m. for whi'ch gro.nts o.re being issued 2,700 0' 0 I

The following awards in Division III. are merged in the Ngatirahiri Tribal Grn.nts, see A.-5A, 1884, Appendix I., No.3 :- i 49. ROTJono.ia. .. .. 50 0 0 57. Amirio. •. .. .. 50 0 0 i 58. ~\Ieri Ri ...... 50 0 0 50 0 0 i 59. Rio. .. .. I 61. Kihirini Ruriwo.ko. .. 50 0 0 t-::: 69. Hero. Ngn.moko. .. .. 50 0 0 t-::: 70. Erina .. .. 50 0 0 71. ?tIerc Ngo.mokn. .. .. 50 0 0 I 84. Ih[lim To.puhi .. .. 100 0 0 85. Pirika Rongoo.ko. •• .. 50 0 0 ! 86. Pita. Hongihongi .. .. 50 0 0 89. Teicti Kotuku .. 50 0 0 93. :1tIatio.ho. Ho.kn.pu .• ", 50 0 0 ~5. Kcreopo. te WIlhn.na .. 50 0 0 .. .. 750 0 0 Totn.l ...... , . .. 3,450 0 0 I --- --_.- -~---

t-..J V1 -....l --~,

SCHEDULE C.-NATIVE RESERVES RECOMMENDED, BUT NOT TO BE GRANTED AT PRESENT. I Block aud Locality. Section. Aroo.. Name of Resorve. Natura of RcsJrvo. RemllrfrB. I A. n. P. II., Wo.iroo. 1.76 379 o 0 In tho Momohlloki -On Waitoto.m Rivor 1,500 o 0 Distriat IX., ,Va.llas. .. Pt. 38. 1 2 18 Ditto •• ,Eel-woir IX.. 1 1 2 lX., . o 3 26 ·VIII., " Pt. 394 o 2 13 VIlli., ,,. Pt. 395 1 o 0 TIlL, • 2 1 10 :: IEel:weir and b~ria.l-gr~~d VIII., .­ Pt."l0 o 234 ., Eel-weir ._ _. IX., Pt. 378 2 3 22 •. Burillol-ground.. " IX.. N Pt. 381 030 r., Opunake .. 97 006 These sections h~vt.l' ceen sUl'Yeyed, but- in many co.ses ho.\'o no roo.d. to r.. . 1 Titore V., • them. They hm'1ll been reco=ended to bo go.zettcu 0.. =S-o.tiv 9 1 0 0 Kohinikuro. reserves. Waito.m ED.st 80 o 1 8 Urenui District 77 o 1 17 Te Ngaio •• VI., Huiroo. ., 7 1 0 0 Apiti II., 2 o 1 0 Ngo.kohete II .• 1 o 1 0 lIango.one IIr., • 2 o 1 0 Hango.ruru XV., Wo.ito.ro. 2 o 2 18 )r~tlloketo.ke XV., .. 1 12 2 0 Tilopuipo. J ~. XI.. ~[jmi :2 1,300 0 0 For Nga.tita.mllo o.bsentees C;;i VIII.. W,\itl\ro. G 3,000 0 0 • Ngllotimutungllo • Rimutn.utcko. Block 2,.00 0 0 ~These sections bo.ve been sot o.po.rt to so.tisfy the. GO\'ernm~m ~bsentcc • Ngllotio.wo. J A\TIlords. See P.eport. A.-OA, 1684, Appendb: IY. \\' o.hvemnui Block 3,100 0 0 • To.rD.nlloki· Kopuo. •• I Burillol-ground •• () 1 o I )[Ilokino " 330 0 01 Aotawllo " :: ISpecilloi reserv~ 'for Occ~po.tion :Mlloko.ha.u " Burillol-grolmd.. " o 2 0 Nllomuul\IIlu () 2 0 l'u.ritutu •• 50 0 o :1>Iangoapo. Specilloi reserve for Occupo.tion 1 0 o Pohohitoo. Burillol-ground.. . . Puhetui . Old po. nnd burial-ground 300 0 o . NgD.korlloko Specio.l roserve for Occupo.tion. To include Mo.ngllohllou Burio.l-ground on opposite Theso o.re reserves in tIle Upper Wo.ito.m o.nel the Opn.ku Block, wllicl I side of Wo.ito.ro. Hiver hllovo not yct boen surveyed. When tho settlement ,;urycy~ rcn.c! Mo.nuto.ngihillo Specio.l resorve for Occupo.tion .• these districts they will be IJlll,rked out :md Crowll-gr:l.Dt~d. ToNa.u " ~Io.ti\o, Torllokihi,lIIllo' Old villiloge site;; no one living there now i klloiko.too., 1>Illongo.­ o.nd in 1lo11 probo.bili\y by the time tho Wo.tllo, )Iango.one, district is. surveyed it will not be neces­ Rcrrehullo, Tangitu, so.ry to reserve them i bu t the fo.ct of Tokanganui, ~roki their being old villo.go sites mnkos it necesso.ry tho.t they be recorded IOpaku Bloak 750 0 I Kilowhiti •• " I Specio.l reserve for Occupo.tion .• >- "I ~ Total 12,764 3 14 C,., 00 ""