Discussion Questions and Answers Related to Studies in Cyberwarfare 1
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Mounting Targeted Attacks for Cyber Espionage with Trojans and Social Engineering
Lecture 30: Mounting Targeted Attacks for Cyber Espionage with Trojans and Social Engineering Lecture Notes on “Computer and Network Security” by Avi Kak ([email protected]) June 23, 2021 1:05pm ©2021 Avinash Kak, Purdue University Goals: Phishing and spear phishing attacks Can a well-engineered network be broken into? Socially engineered email lures Trojans and surveillance software tools (R.A.T, R.C.S, etc.) Cyber espionage Exploiting browser vulnerabilities CONTENTS Section Title Page 30.1 Spear Phishing Attacks Through Email 3 30.1.1 An April/May 2020 Account of a Large-Scale 10 Email-Based Phishing Campaign 30.2 Is It Possible to Break into a 12 Well-Engineered Network? 30.3 Trojans – Some General Comments 17 30.4 Surveillance Software for Espionage 24 — R.A.T, R.C.S, etc. 30.5 Cyber Espionage 35 30.6 Cyber Espionage Through Browser 41 Vulnerabilities 30.7 Other Forms of Social Engineering 43 Based Attacks: Fake News and Ransomware 2 Computer and Network Security by Avi Kak Lecture 30 Back to TOC 30.1 SPEAR PHISHING ATTACKS THROUGH EMAIL As was mentioned previously in Section 17.10 of Lecture 17, the goal of a general phishing attack is to steal sensitive personal information (such as credit-card and banking information) from computers. Such attacks are also aimed at getting people to reveal their usernames and passwords. Spam email is a commonly used medium for launching general phishing attacks. Examples of such spam include messages that appear to be from your bank, from an e-commerce site, from your email service provider, etc. -
Inside Cyber Warfare
Inside Cyber Warfare Inside Cyber Warfare Jeffrey Carr foreword by Lewis Shepherd Beijing • Cambridge • Farnham • Köln • Sebastopol • Taipei • Tokyo Inside Cyber Warfare by Jeffrey Carr Copyright © 2010 Jeffrey Carr. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Published by O’Reilly Media, Inc., 1005 Gravenstein Highway North, Sebastopol, CA 95472. O’Reilly books may be purchased for educational, business, or sales promotional use. Online editions are also available for most titles (http://my.safaribooksonline.com). For more information, contact our corporate/institutional sales department: (800) 998-9938 or [email protected]. Editor: Mike Loukides Indexer: John Bickelhaupt Production Editor: Loranah Dimant Cover Designer: Karen Montgomery Copyeditor: Genevieve d’Entremont Interior Designer: David Futato Proofreader: Loranah Dimant Illustrator: Robert Romano Printing History: December 2009: First Edition. Nutshell Handbook, the Nutshell Handbook logo, and the O’Reilly logo are registered trademarks of O’Reilly Media, Inc. Inside Cyber Warfare, the image of light cavalry, and related trade dress are trade- marks of O’Reilly Media, Inc. Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear in this book, and O’Reilly Media, Inc. was aware of a trademark claim, the designations have been printed in caps or initial caps. While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the publisher and author assume no responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from the use of the information con- tained herein. TM This book uses RepKover™, a durable and flexible lay-flat binding. ISBN: 978-0-596-80215-8 [M] 1259961702 Table of Contents Foreword . -
Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network Information Warfare Monitor March 29, 2009 http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ghostnet http://www.tracking-ghost.nett JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD March 29, 2009 Foreword Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan institutions. The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more. The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began, were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to potentially sensitive information. But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers. From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value. Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. -
Threat Group Cards: a Threat Actor Encyclopedia
THREAT GROUP CARDS: A THREAT ACTOR ENCYCLOPEDIA Compiled by ThaiCERT a member of the Electronic Transactions Development Agency TLP:WHITE Version 1.01 (19 June 2019) Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Approach ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Legal Notice ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................................... 9 Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups .................................................................................................................... 10 Anchor Panda, APT 14 .................................................................................................................................................. 11 Allanite ............................................................................................................................................................................. 12 APT 3, Gothic Panda, Buckeye ...................................................................................................................................